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Race as a social construct? No — and
Yes!
Anthony Hilton and Kevin MacDonald
December 9, 2008
Are the PC and
non-PC crowds still arguing over the meaning of race? Of course. But a recent
and quite useful review in The Occidental
Quarterly (Fall, 2008) by Alexander Hamilton (“Taxonomic approaches
to race”) shows that genetic differences imply that race is a valid biological
category, on a par with sub-species in the rest of biology.
However, we
will point out here that, actually, there is at least a modest role for social
constructs.
Hamilton
explains that the criterion for species differences is the absence of successful
reproduction of fertile offspring between such groups. On the other hand,
interbreeding can be successful between sub-species even though the individuals
are somewhat different genetically. Since biologists routinely categorize other
organisms as members of sub-species on the grounds of significant and meaningful
genetic differences, why isn’t it reasonable to consider human races as
sub-species and, hence, equally legitimate, valid, and useful biological
categories? Hamilton then goes on to review the taxonomic problem scientists
have had in deciding on the number of races.
As he notes,
species become species only when the original population of a species divides
and the resultant groups are somehow blocked from further contact and
interbreeding; subsequent independent genetic changes in each group accumulate
to the point that interbreeding is no longer possible. Normally this all happens
because of geographical barriers. And this isolation is the reason why so many
racial (genetic) characteristics cluster together.
Hamilton notes that race deniers complain that Luigi Luca Cavalli-Sforza, whose research is considered standard in the field of human population genetics, sampled people from different geographical areas in a search for genetic differences, as if he were somehow artificially jacking up the amount of genetic difference. The race deniers suggest obtaining random samples aimed at finding genetic relatedness. However, it is that very geographical isolation and the resulting clustering that helps make race meaningful as a category.
Why? Because
the clustering allows one to make predictions about what is likely to accompany
a particular racial classification. If I know that you have aboriginal ancestry,
I would be well advised to avoid encouraging you to drink alcohol. Alcohol is
really a poison for a great many Indians because of their biological ancestry,
and they may need all the help they can get in refraining from it. (There
obviously are non-Indians for whom alcohol is a poison, too. It’s just that
alcoholism seems less of a racial characteristic for some other races.)
Of course this
is racial profiling. But racial profiling improves prediction about what people
are like, so it’s a problem mainly for people who do not want their behavior
predicted.
It’s interesting that some species don’t interbreed because of quite trivial obstacles. Two species of birds may not reproduce together only because they have, say, a slightly different song For example, the red-legged partridge and the rock partridge look similar but remain separate because of their mating calls. In other words, some different species look to us as more similar to each other than do many members of the same human race, not to mention people of different races. Thus, being different species doesn’t imply different appearance.
On the other
hand, if races are biologically different because of clusters of genetic
differences, they can (like species) still vary in precisely how different they
are from each other, especially when the isolating barriers are not totally
impermeable. Biologists use the term cline
when there are gradients in the distributions of the genes responsible for the
racial differences. This variation in degree of genetic difference is the basis
for conceptualizing trees of genetic relatedness. The following illustration is
from Frank Salter's important On
Genetic Interests and is based on Cavalli-Sforza's
work:

Next note that
the genetic differences that make the races different need not be visible to the
human eye. For example, reproductive isolation over many generations could make
one race more susceptible to diabetes than another. Who would know? It’s not
something one can see in another person even though it represents a genetic
difference.
This is
probably why people have trouble agreeing on the number of races.
Anthropologists and people generally differ according to which differences they
experience as salient or dramatic and they do so for psychological and
social reasons as Pierre
van den Berghe recognized.
The number of
races is not set in stone but a more a matter of where one wants to draw lines.
The figure below results in seven different racial groups, but one could easily
combine some groups together and get a lower number.

The second author of
this article has described several ways in which human psychology influences
racial classification. First, using our rational faculties, we can decide how to
carve up the racial landscape to best suit our political and genetic interests.
For a European-American, it makes much more sense to identify with others who
can trace their ancestry back to Europe before 1492, but possibly excluding
Jews given the unusually long history of hostility and mistrust between
Jews and other groups and because most of their genetic background derives
from the Middle East. On the other hand, it would be a poor strategy to identify
only with Scottish Americans or Italian-Americans because these relatively small
groups have much less political potential in multicultural America than the
category of European Americans.
Secondly, psychological
research on race shows that people's perceptions of others are typically
tinged by racial stereotypes. At the unconscious level, the social
construction of blacks in America is tinged by our images of black criminality
and poor academic performance. But at the conscious, explicit level, we tend to
construct race according to what the mainstream media like the New York
Times tells us we should believe. Needless to say, there are very large
penalties in store for people who publicly dissent from the official
view.
The score?
Both sides are right. Race exists as a biological reality and, as
Frank
Salter reminds us, it is an important storehouse of genetic interests
for all humans. But how we behave on the basis of this information is not at all
determined by the genetic data. We Europeans must define ourselves in a way that
makes strategic sense. And we have to make explicit assertions of racial
identity and explicit assertions of our racial interests. No other strategy will
succeed in staving off the dispossession of European
America.
Anthony Hilton is Assoc. Prof. (retired) in the Psychology Department, Concordia University, Montreal.
Kevin MacDonald is a professor of psychology at California State University–Long Beach.
Permanent UR: http://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/articles/CollectiveEditorial-Race.html
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