As of now, the agreement has not yet been signed, and the details are only partly known. But as of Sunday night, it seemed that there would be a significant curbing of Iran’s nuclear program in the best-case scenario. No attention to other problems most likely on the agenda, like ballistic missiles, aid to terror organizations in the Middle East and, more ambitiously, regime change in Tehran. This outcome would be a far cry from the promises of victory touted by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu when he embarked on this war.

Tehran, Iran, Sunday. Credit: Vahid Salemi/AP

Certainly, many Israelis welcomed Sunday’s (tentative) news with joy. Israel’s public is exhausted after more than two and a half years of intermittent war, with over 2,000 fatalities. The idea of Iran renewing its fire at the country’s center and south – in the north it is almost incessant – made no one happy. But the question of what happens to the uranium stash and what is decided regarding Iran’s right to enrich uranium is critical to Israel’s future security. If Trump manages to impose a reasonable deal, this issue will be of great importance

It appears that other objectives have not been attained. The U.S. president treats ballistic missiles as an Israeli problem. The proxies, such as Hezbollah, interest him less in any case. Regarding the regime’s stability, Iran will see a gradual unfreezing of tens of billions of dollars and a lifting of sanctions against its oil industry. This relief will fill Iran’s coffers with huge amounts of money and probably help Hamas and Hezbollah.

If in January, at the height of the nationwide demonstrations, it appeared the regime was wobbling, it now seems, in the wake of the brutal oppressive measures that were taken, that there are no signs of a renewed awakening of the protests.

What is decided in the Gulf will also impact what transpires in Lebanon. Israel, in total contrast to public declarations by its leaders, is helpless against Hezbollah. The daily threat of explosives-laden drones is causing injuries to soldiers, with fatalities every few days. Israel’s strategy, if there was one in Lebanon, has collapsed. The group continues to attack and is not even considering surrendering, in contrast to the previous campaign in 2024.

The bottom line is that Netanyahu is very far from achieving all he promised the public regarding the war. As for Iran, he cannot publicly oppose Trump, having to make do with milquetoast briefings given under the guise of diplomatic sources. He dares not cast blame on the U.S. administration.

In Lebanon and Gaza, the military’s tactical achievements, some of them impressive, have not been translated into a permanent and improved strategic reality, due to Netanyahu’s fear of being portrayed as a conciliatory figure or as someone who capitulates. The distress of his media mouthpieces is evident. It seems that Netanyahu’s office has not yet come up with new talking points. Broadcasters are forced into contortions to try and resolve the dissonance that is obvious to every viewer or listener.

The horrible failure of October 7 looms above all. The massacre took place as a result of Hamas exploiting IDF and Shin Bet security service shortcomings. However, Netanyahu cannot shake off his responsibility and is incapable of explaining to the public why nearly all the top echelons of the defense establishment have resigned or been fired while he is resolved to cling to his seat forever.

The upcoming election will be, first and foremost, a battle over memory. The Likud and other coalition parties will try to convince voters not to grapple with the reasons for the massacre and the persons responsible for it. They will apparently need a security-related diversion to deflect the conversation away from those topics. Netanyahu’s difficulty lies in his needing Trump’s assent, as Trump is trying to put out fires in Iran and Lebanon. It is unclear whether Trump will agree to a new conflagration initiated by Israel in the Gaza Strip.