The Future of the European peoples (Part 1)

The following is a translation of my speech delivered in the German language ( Die Zukunft der Völker Europa) at the NPD Summer Academy in Saarbrucken, Germany (August 2326, 2012).  The meeting and the lectures were also attended by several representatives of the Front National from the nearby Alsace, France. My original speech in the German language can be downloaded here

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First off, thanks to the NPD for the invitation. I would also like to extend my greetings from my colleagues from our American Third Position Party. The ethnic and demographic situation in Europe today looks completely different from 40 years ago. Therefore, it is appropriate to reevaluate differently terms such as ‘nation’, ‘state’ and ‘national consciousness’.  My main thesis is that the future of the European peoples, or rather their chances of survival, lie in the rejection of petty nationalism, in the rejection of all forms of interethnic resentments, as well as in the revival of the idea of the Reich.

I must point out that some unpredictable historical deviations occurred during the period of the last decade of the previous century. In the early nineties of the last century communism collapsed in Eastern Europe because its ideas had already been better put into practice in the West — albeit under a different name. Many paleo-communist ideas, such as egalitarianism, the intellectual Gleichschaltung, as well as the belief in permanent economic progress in a putative multicultural system — all those ideas the early Bolsheviks and latter-day Marxist intellectuals had dreamed about — were better realized in the capitalist West. For that reason alone, it was to be expected that former Marxist intellectuals and politicians in Germany or the EU could easily convert to liberalism and the ideology of the free market.

A second historical deviation allows us now in hindsight to welcome some parts of the communist legacy. In Eastern Europe there are almost no non-European immigrants. Thanks to modest living conditions under communism, Eastern Europe had never exerted attraction on Third World immigrants, although the communist system had always longed for and also worked toward a multi-cultural system, and in addition, rejected any form of nationalism. However, Third Worldimmigrants were not naïve, as they knew that they could have a better life in former colonial countries and former so-called fascist countries of the West. Life in Frankfurt on the Main was more enjoyable than life in Frankfurt on the Oder.

A third historical paradox needs to be mentioned here. Those of you, those of us who lived for a period of time in Third World countries know well what racial discrimination and social and cultural exclusions against the Other means. A mestizo inMexico, or a Turk from eastern Turkey residing in Istanbul, knows very well which racial and cultural circle he belongs to in his homeland. A destitute Turk with Asian features has no place in the higher echelons of White upper-class Turkey, whose denizens are, as a rule, very proud of their European, i.e. White Albanian and Bosnian origins. A Mexican illegal immigrant, in his now newly discovered America, knows his rights by heart — rights he can only dream about in his native Mexico. Otherwise he would not have come to the so-called racist Americain the first place. Now, residing in America, he can bet on legal support from left-wing intellectual circles. Germany and America offer immigrants from all parts of the Third World social opportunities that are usually foreclosed to them in their native countries.

Let’s make a first quick summary: The course of history is always open. We should be careful with predictions about apocalyptic endtimes awaiting the European peoples. History is not pre-programmed and there are no last stops on the horizon. The lapse of historical time knows no boundaries and can easily destroy all walls of time — if I can use the title of a book by the German writer Ernst Jünger. Our present liberal wall of time may collapse any minute. Therefore, it is wrong to invoke horror scenarios and complain about the imminent extinction of the European peoples.

East and West Europe: What moves their peoples?

We have to make a clear distinction between the self-perceptions among Eastern European and Western European peoples respectively. What moves Western European and Eastern European peoples today? Which are their dominant myths? Thirty or forty years ago, the main topic among West European nationalists was not non-European immigration, but rather the subject of communism and how to defend themselves against the communist threat. The national question of various European nations, apart from low key riots in South Tyrol, Northern Ireland, or the Basque country, was not on the agenda. The perceived enemy of all West European nationalists, including their political establishments, was not the issue of non-European immigrants, but the issue of the communist commissar. Today the communist commissar is no longer an issue for Western European nationalists because the overriding issues is that all West European peoples, without exception, are exposed to a massive inflow of non-European immigrants. In retrospect, and in light of today’s endless waves of non-European immigration, the question arises as to whether communism, after all, was really such a life threatening danger for the European peoples? Maybe under communism all Western European peoples would have secured their identity far better than under capitalism?

After all this was the case inEastern Europe. National consciousness in Eastern Europe is today much more pronounced than in West European countries. This may be partly due to the erstwhile violent repression of their nationalist sentiments by the communist system which, as a rule, the ruling communist party always dubbed “the fascist danger.”

Fear of the endless influx of non-European immigrants and the real or alleged subversion of their core nationhood now prompts many European nationalists to redefine notions such as “people,” “national consciousness,” or “national spirit.”  Back then it was common for all West European nationalists to define their national identity by vilifying nationalists from their neighboring European countries. Fortunately, this is no longer the case. Much more important today for all Western European nationalists and their representatives is the survival of their common bio-cultural uniqueness. Again we must point to another historical paradox here; namely, the larger the number of non-Europeans flocking to Europe, the less the chance of conflicts between once warring neighboring West European peoples. It is hardly possible to imagine the Flemings starting a war with the neighboring Walloons, or the Austrian government inciting the South Tyroleans into the secession from Italy.

By contrast, feelings of historical guilt or self-hatred, which can be daily observed in Western Europe and particularly in Germany, are unknown among East European peoples. National pride is still relatively strong and it determines to a large extent the national consciousness of all its citizens and all its politicians. The common folk in Croatia and Hungary, for instance, need not read academic papers on the dangers of multiculturalism, nor do they need to discuss the meaning of their nation’s soul. Most of them know that they are White, European, and good Christians.

Despite many advantages in terms of their ethnic homogeneity, the situation between Eastern European peoples is not good. All Eastern European peoples show a high degree of “negative” or “reactive national consciousness,” which always excludes the neighboring European Other. One should not underestimate interethnic and inter-European hatred among East European peoples as a source of new conflicts in the region. Although they have been spared so far the massive immigration of non-Europeans, internal interethnic resentments among East Europeans still run high.

Here are some examples of such “reactive” or “negative national consciousness” among the peoples of Eastern Europe, which are often difficult to grasp by nationalists inFranceor in distantAmerica. Thus, the national consciousness of a Polish nationalist, who may otherwise agree on all issues with his colleague from Germany, such as their common criticism of globalism, anticommunism and anti-capitalism, is often rooted in his strong anti-German feelings. Furthermore, one third of ethnic Hungarians — more than 2 million people — live under the foreign jurisdiction of Slovakia, Serbia and Romania, and their national consciousness is often based on a close relationship with their kinsmen in Hungary. Despite an apparent peace treaty between Serbia and Croatia, their perceptions of each other, as well as their self-perceptions, are mutually irreconcilable. These two peoples share two completely different views of contemporary history, and display two mutually hostile victimhoods. In short, Serbs and Croats, despite their astonishing racial similarity, display two radically and mutually exclusive national consciousnesses. Often, for a Croat nationalist it is hard to define himself as “a good Croat” unless he first describes himself as a “good anti-Serb.”

Who is to be blamed for such fatal and mutually hostile self-perceptions that are still alive among and between peoples of Eastern Europe? Modern historiography and modern court historians, as well as modern mediacricy share a large dose of responsibility for these negative perceptions of each other. Although East European peoples rid themselves of communism, the overall interpretation of their respective contemporary histories has not changed much since 1945. National myths and mutually negative and exclusive perceptions of each other are largely based on flawed historical memories dating back to the Second World War. Here is a glaring example:

The root causes of the break-up of the former communist Yugoslavia and the ensuing war in 1991 are to be traced to Yugoslav communist historiography, which had held out for decades the figure of 600,000 Serbs, Jews and Communists allegedly killed during World War II by the so called Nazi Croats. At the time of communist Yugoslavia, the verbiage of anti-fascism and the so-called Nazi-Croats were the two main symbols of paramount evil, but also symbols that constituted the two negative founding myths of communist Yugoslavia, i.e. the two “civil religions” that kept the communist state of Yugoslaviaalive. In 1991, a historian and the future head of state, Franjo Tudjman came into revisionist limelight. In his earlier works of the late eighties, Tudjman had significantly reduced the number of Serbs, Jews and Communists killed in the Croatian Nazi-Ustashi camps — from 600,000 down to 60,000. The consequences of this new historical narrative in a new-born Croatia were soon to be known worldwide. The ethnic Serb minority in a crumbling Yugoslavia and a new-born Croatia went literally into panic attacks in the face of what they believed was as a resurgence of fascist Croatia. And then all hell broke loose.

One might draw a parallel with Germany. Supposedly the impact of the so-called Beneš decrees and the expulsion of 3.5 million Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia in 1945 were to be critically addressed by the European Commission in Brussels. One can guess that this would likely lead to serious tensions not just between Germany and the Czech Republic, but would also cause serious troubles all over Europe. In short, flawed, exaggerated, surreal, deceitful, or romantic historical narratives, especially those tinkering with WWII body counts, are the main culprits of the lingering mutual fear and interethnic hatred among East and Central European peoples.

End of Part 1 of 2. Go to Part 2.

Dr. Tom Sunic ( is a writer and the Board member of the American Third Position Party)  


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