Ukraine, Part II

Having in my previous article outlined the political and ethnic shenanigans leading up to the Ukraine conflict, this article examines in some granular detail the current progress of the war in light of what appears to be previously recognized limitations in the Russian logistics chain and the development of their war doctrine, including the use of nuclear weapons.

Observers of the Ukraine war have been surprised at the initial Russian movement towards Kiev, then its apparent retreat, until we see a current Russian force disposition amounting to a belt running interior to the southern, eastern, and northern border of Ukraine, not much more at its furthest than 100 miles in all positions from the Russian or Belarus borders.

In addition, it seems obvious that either due to a distaste for causing civilian casualties or a simple lack of capability, the Russians have been able to take few Ukrainian cities outside of the near Donbass and, most recently, Mariupol.

However, clues to what is going on and what may happen next may appear in a group of not-well-publicized articles written by U.S. military defense specialists.

In a little noticed article in War on the Rocks, Alex Vershinin, a recently retired Lt. Col. In the U.S. Army, “pointed out in 2021 that the Russians, in contrast to the Americans and NATO, have very limited logistics capabilities. He estimated that the logistical chain of a Russian invasion, say of the Baltics, would be limited for a significant period of time to a range of an incredibly short 45 miles from the Russian border. This, he says, is due to the fact Russia has an extreme shortage of road transport as compared to Western armies. In Russia, the main transport is by rail. Unfortunately for Russia, Russia uses the wide 1.520 mm gauge railway, while the rest of Western Europe, including the Baltics, uses the narrow 1.470 gauge railway. Accordingly, anything shipped by rail must undergo significant border delays while bogies are exchanged, not only creating delay but offering an ample targeting opportunity for enemy forces. In that “delay time,” Vershinin postulated, NATO could bring its rapid-deployment reinforcements into play, creating a much more difficult struggle for the Russians.

How does this impact the Ukrainian war? Although Ukraine uses the same gauge railway as Belarus and Russia, like most European countries, all the rail hubs are in the major cities. The principal rail hubs of intersecting rail lines appear to be Kiev and Kharkov, neither of which the Russians have yet been able to take, apparently afraid of being bogged down in another Stalingrad. However, without access to the cities through which the rail lines run, can the Russians actually supply their troops adequately with rail? According to a recent Bloomberg article by Mark Champion, “How Ukraine’s Rail Network Threw Russia’s Military Off Track,” not likely:

Ukraine — unlike Western Europe — uses the same gauge of railroad as Russia. That infrastructure, though, can’t be used to bring supplies until troops control the towns that sit on them, in particular key junctions such as Kharkiv, Sumy and Chernihiv in the north, or Kherson, Mykolaiv and Zaporizhzhia in the south. …

The problem for Russia is that its military needs to take major cities to access the rail network, Vershinin [cited above] said by telephone from Virginia. “The other problem is that the Russians have not brought enough manpower,” he said. “This is a huge country, and every time they need to take a city they also have to leave force behind to hold it.” That means the military also can’t yet run out temporary pipelines to deliver fuel, because they don’t control the territory and can’t rely on locals not to destroy them. Instead, oil tankers have to be sent by road, putting further stress on a limited resource.”

In Ukraine, Russian units have had to travel long distances from supply depots. That isn’t necessarily a failure, but it means there have to be pauses in an advance to allow supplies to catch up. That creates a special problem for Russia because its military carries three times as many artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket systems as the U.S. military does. Reloading just the rocket launchers of a Russian army — units of which there are several in Ukraine — takes as many as 90 trucks per volley, based on Vershinin’s math.

“Once Russian forces control the railroads, they’ll be able to move fuel, ammunition, and equipment to the front much more efficiently [emphasis added], according to Roger McDermott, a Russian military specialist at the Jamestown Foundation, a U.S. think tank. That suggests even darker times ahead for the Ukrainian armed forces and civilians on the receiving end. Despite the “mystifying lack of planning,” the Russian military historically has tended to make early errors and then learn quickly from them, according to McDermott, who also works at the Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.[2] “If you get hold of one of the old Soviet maps of the rail structure, you can start to make sense of why they are putting so much importance on a place like Kharkiv,” McDermott said. “Once they have the rail hubs and can control the rail roads, they can start to fix a lot of the problems they’ve had.”

If not, the only alternative is supply by trucks, which puts the Russians almost in the same place as they would be had they invaded the much smaller Baltics with their nasty, narrow-gauge track. Unfortunately, in addition, most of the big highways go through cities, even if the Russians had enough trucks. Going “off road” in the muddy springtime is unlikely.

A look at the present Russian-conquered territory would appear to provide indirect evidence for this logistical thesis. The Russian-acquired territory resembles a fringe, or ring, lining the border of the Ukraine — almost from Odessa on the West, along the Black Sea coast to the Russian border (Mariupol is the last Ukrainian city to fall on that border), and up from the Black Sea along the Western border of Russia through part — though not yet all — of the Donbass, with an additional northern strip extending somewhat north of Kiev. Crucially, as noted, except for Mariupol, no cities, and thus no railroad hubs, have yet been taken. This belt varies in width, but appears to approximate 50 to 100 miles at the maximum. This disposition of Russian success would appear to accord with the logistical issues noted in the above-cited article.

Of course, over time, as supplies are moved forward, the Russians can move deeper into Ukraine, railroad or no railroad, if they can neutralize the remaining Ukrainian armed forces.

On top of these problems, the Russian Army at the time of its entry into Ukraine and now is on a peacetime, rather than a wartime, footing. Not only is the army thus smaller in gross numbers that it would be if put at full-strength wartime footing, but the reduction in strength, as is common in many armies, is expressed in a way that makes offensive operations even more difficult than a mere uniform shortfall of troops would suggest. Specifically, in contrast to, say, 50 years ago, the bulk of troops are brought to the front in armored vehicles. It typically takes a crew of two to man these vehicles (apparently these buggies are more complex to drive than a Honda). The carriers can hold eight soldiers, which leaves 6 combat infantryman that dismount and commence fighting. Many armies, of which to its regret the Russian Army appears to be one, maintains its reduced peacetime force not by reducing the number of armored personnel carriers, but by keeping the personnel carriers constant and removing infantry. So if there are so few troops that there are only 3 or 4 men per APC, given that a minimum of two will have to be non-combat-infantry drivers, that leaves only two, instead of eight, infantrymen per-APC.

Thus, a 50 percent reduction in troop levels to achieve a peacetime force level can reduce actual combat infantry by an astounding 2/3rds— instead of 6 infantrymen per APC, you now have only two. Plus the ubiquitous two drivers, of course. If you toss in a repairman or two — these vehicles seem constantly to be breaking down — plus men to drive the oil tankers to refuel the vehicles, you have a significant reduction in combat capability. This supposition has been confirmed by the many captures or kills of such vehicles containing only 3 to 4 persons — essentially “ghost” APC’s as it were.

Did Putin, a former FSB (not Army) man realize this? Were his senior military leaders too afraid to inform him? Putin appears to be oblivious, showing more concern for his domestic poll ratings than for the military requirements of the invasion. In late April, Putin had the opportunity to extend the contracts of existing soldiers for a year, while adding a new cohort of 130,000 soldiers. Despite the reported rage of his generals at the decision, he refused. So the veterans will soon be returning home to be replaced by green conscripts. Shades of Vietnam’s one-year rotations?

Moreover, Putin seems to have rejected out of hand a declaration of full mobilization, which could raise north of a million potential soldiers in addition to those already conscripted. Fighting a significant war with less than significant means has never been a good idea, and may not work out well for the Russians either.

Nevertheless, the Russians appear to be grinding on, though at the edges, within their apparently limited logistical leash.

But if the Ukrainian army is resupplied (adding insult to injury, by railway, of course) from the West, its firepower and combat effectiveness will presumably increase substantially just as the Russians finally mover their supply sources up far enough to allow them to move farther in.

A foretaste of this is exemplified in a Wall Street Journal report by Thomas Grove, March 5, 2022, in which he reports that Ukraine is starting to strike the logistics hubs just inside the Russian border to disrupt Russian supply even through their already too-short logistical supply line. Ominously, these strikes may become much more effective if US supplies get through:

The Institute for the Study of War said in a report that Ukrainian forces will likely continue to conduct cross-border strikes to disrupt Russian logistics, possibly with drone or missile strikes. But new weapons that the Ukrainians will receive from the West are much more powerful than anything they or the Russians currently have, raising the possibility of more strikes deeper inside Russian territory. (Emphasis added.)

See also: Kateryna Stepanenko, Karolina Hird, and Mason Clark, “Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 4, 2022,” May 4, 2022, Institute for the Study of War.

Thus, to defeat the Ukrainian armed forces, or perhaps, as the Wall Street Journal indicates, to avoid defeat itself, the Russians will need, among other things, to interdict the massive supplies of high-quality armament coming in from the West, primarily by rail, or risk a completely new and more dangerous kind of war against an enemy with a bunch of nasty weapons presumably not anticipated in the Russian war plans.

Romania, Slovakia, and Poland (the three countries other than Hungary that, apart from Belarus and Russia, border Ukraine) are permitting re-supply through their countries, which presents a significant logistical challenge for the Russians. How are the Russians likely to interdict these shipments?
Plan A would be for the Russians, from long distance, via conventionally armed missiles or air power, to bomb each of the rail lines near but inside the Ukraine border to keep all the rail lines permanently disabled. I have seen no analysis of how much materiel this would take and how likely it is to be accomplishable.

Plan B would be to take advantage of the fact that the West uses 1.435 mm narrow-gauge track, whereas Ukraine (like Belarus and Russia) uses 1.520 mm wide gauge track. This means that each train incoming from the West to Ukraine needs to stop for quite a while, while the whole train is crane lifted up and the underlying wheeled bogies are changed to the proper gauge. (See the video at “Ukraine wants to connect to Europe in 1.435mm” — — Rail Europe News). Russia could thus wait until trains were halted, changing their bogies at or near the border. This would afford Russians the time for a leisurely and, presumably, more accurate and devastating strike on actual supply trains. This could in theory simply wipe out any and all incoming freight trains without the nuisance of the intensive bombing required to permanently disable track.

The countermove of course would be for Poland, Slovakia, and Romania to construct 1.520 gauge railways a few miles into their national borders and change bogies there. The temptation for the Russians would be to bomb inside those NATO countries, giving rise to a potential NATO Article 5 response, leading to a significant escalation. Oh-oh. The brilliant Poles already thought of this. As we sit today, a 1.520 gauge track goes from Lviv in Western Ukraine to the Eastern Polish rail terminal at the city of Przemyisi. (For pictures of the beautiful, restored [so far, until Russian bombing] rail station, see the previous link.) So, perhaps the sneaky Poles would change bogies in Przemysi, not at the Ukraine border. Whoa! Do the Russians bomb that straight off and trigger NATO Article 5? Or do the Ruskies wait until Putin gets angry and then trigger Article 5, not to mention destroying a lot of historic architecture to boot?

In evaluating the likelihood of such sustained pinpoint conventional attacks, one must note that the accuracy of modern missiles and other armament depends heavily on microchips. It is not clear if the Russians have their own foundries from which they can re-supply these super accurate missiles. If not, then the sanctions regime — interdicting microchip supply from Japan, Taiwan, the United States, and Western Europe (think ASML) might result in the Russians being completely out of weaponry once their existing inventory was depleted. This would impede their ability to conduct the precise strikes required for Plans A or B.

Note this excerpt from a recent RAND report setting forth RAND’s analysis of current Russian military thinking regarding escalation to nuclear weapons:

One report [citing certain Russian-language sources], for example, noted that the maintenance of a stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons is, in part, a means to respond to a large-scale (i.e., not localized to a single region) NATO conventional aerospace attack involving thousands of cruise and ballistic missiles, and that Russian tactical nuclear weapons could be used in the early phases of such a war. The lack of ability to respond in kind to a conventional aerospace attack with precision munitions has been described as NATO’s “escalation dominance,” because Russia, given the assumption of inferiority in precision munitions, platforms, and enabling infrastructure, could be faced with the choice between capitulating on unfavorable terms or escalating to nuclear use with the accompanying risks of mutual assured destruction that would bring. As a result, since 2011, Russia has been attempting to reduce the quantitative imbalance by rebuilding its own conventional long-range strike capability and capacity as a form of nonnuclear deterrence. Clint Reach, Vikram Kalambi, and Mark Cozad, Russian Assessments and Applications of the Correlations of Forces and Means, RAND (2020), at p. xiii, RAND_RR4235.pdf

This implies that Russia may not be able to effectuate Plans A or B, since it appears — according to its own analyses — not to have sufficient precision conventional capability.

Indirect evidence suggests this situation may be playing out now. There is no evidence more than two months into the war that the Ukrainian railway passage to the West has suffered serious interdiction. In fact, the ISW report cited above notes as of May 4:

Russian forces intensified airstrikes against transportation infrastructure in Western Ukraine on May 4 but remain unable to interdict Western aid shipments to Ukraine. Six Russian cruise missiles hit electrical substations near railway stations in Lviv and Transcarpathia (the southwestern Oblast of Ukraine) on May 4.[1] A senior US defense official reported that Russian aircraft conducted 200 to 300 airstrikes largely targeting transportation infrastructure in the last 24 hours.[2] The US official added that these Russian strikes are likely intended disrupt Ukrainian transportation capabilities and slow down weapon re-supply efforts but have been unable to do so. (Emphasis added.)

Thus, it might be concluded that, for one reason or another, the Russians are incapable of executing Plans A or B. Now it is worth mentioning that the reports from ISW may be less than fully accurate as regards Russian victory or defeat, given that it is a think tank founded and operated by the notorious Kagan family (of which Victoria Nuland is an in-law). However, it certainly gives a bird’s eye view into how the Neocons see the future of this war proceeding — direct attacks on Russia never contemplated during 8 years of US aid to Afghanistan. This all could be very bad news. For everybody, including the West. Even for those at ISW’s and RAND’s Washington DC office.

Plan C. If Plans A and B fail or are impracticable, another tactic the Russians would be tempted to use, which would be consistent with publicly announced Soviet military doctrine pre-1982 (see V.D. Sokolovskii, Soviet Military Strategy; translated by RAND Corporation for the U.S. Air Force, 1963, at 411), would be the much easier task of dropping tactical nuclear weapons on railways near to border, as well as highways.[1] This would accomplish two objectives: First, due to the greater power of the nukes, a handful of not very accurate bombing runs or missile hits would take out the entire surrounding railroad. Second, the bombing would create a radioactive radius around all border rail facilities which would impede border crossings by rail (or road). This tactic was discussed in Soviet Military Strategy, at 414, where it was noted that a likely strategy in a war involving tactical nuclear weapons would be the laying down of an entire radioactive belt, which would prevent troop passage until the radioactivity died down. This (plus a no-fly zone) would effectively cut off supply to the Ukraine from the west.

If, in response, NATO ground troops massed to attack Ukraine, Russia would then presumably lay down a nuclear “field of fire” to create a radioactive band stretching from the Baltic to the Belarus border consistent with old Soviet nuclear war doctrine (Ibid.). This might prompt NATO to invade through pleasantly radiation-free Belarus, thus bringing Belarus (and undoubtedly Russia) directly into the war. At that point, even Putin’s restrained 2020 doctrine of nuclear weapon use would permit any and all use of nuclear weapons, as a defense of the homeland. The result probably would be strategic-level nuclear strikes on any concentrated NATO ground formations, plus supply depots.

Since much of the supply to the NATO troops would presumably also go by rail, the best way to disrupt NATO troop movements and re-supply would be the nuclear destruction of European cities such as Warsaw and Berlin, since such cities are the principal railroad hubs, the destruction of which would cripple movement of supply by rail.

Needless to say, the nuclear bombing of Warsaw, Berlin, Munich, Prague, etc. with 500 kiloton warheads, wiping out, in addition to the railways, a good part of the civilian population of those historic cities, including, let it be said, a lot of newspaper editors and “talking heads,” would further escalate the war, perhaps uncontrollably.

In addition, to the extent any supplies were coming directly from the US to mainland Europe, the use of missiles and submarines to interdict and sink sea freighters and air-to-air missiles to destroy air transport in flight would further escalate matters. The consternation inside Western capitals might trigger unpredictable responses.

Thus, the very weakness of Russian conventional forces — either in accuracy or in inventory of weapons, if that proves to be the case — could lead it to the use of tactical nukes, with unpredictable consequences. And even if current Russian armament is enough to effectuate Plans A or B, what if, once the inventory is run down, Russia is unable to replenish the inventory due to, as noted above, sanctions on various hi-tech components such as microchips.

What a contrast to Joseph Stalin! What comparative humiliation! Stalin methodically prepared for a massive war in which he assumed the Soviet army supplies would have to be replenished solely from Soviet sources. He spent 8 years building up — with assistance from such Western companies as Ford (which was of course also helping Hitler!) — a massive vertically-integrated production system, from mines and oil, to factories for all components, all replacement parts, to finishing factories for all types of armament; in addition, during the war, substantial R&D continued, further enhancing Russian-made weaponry.

It is said that Russia still has significant inventories of relevant weapons, and that the Ukrainian war has reduced Russian stockpiles by only 20%. But after 10 more months, 20% goes to 100%. In contrast to Stalin, therefore, it appears that Putin’s infrastructure preparation may have been amateur hour. A display case of fine looking weaponry good for 8 or 9 months, with nothing in the back room for spares. He may have been misled into believing the war would be so short that existing supplies were more than ample. If so, he made the same disastrous mistake, ironically, of which Hitler, in the reverse position, has been accused.

The tragedy will be if, instead of inducing negotiation or retreat, this situation impels Putin to up the ante to the nuclear level.

A wise statesman such as Kennedy or Nixon would give Putin a path of face-saving retreat, through some negotiated settlement that met some, if not all, of Putin’s relatively modest pre-war demands. However, our leaders are neither wise nor statesmen. Not only are they effectively refusing to negotiate — still demanding the Crimea! — they now accuse Putin of war crimes and assert that they will prosecute him if they win. Astounding. They appear to be leaving Putin the choice between (1) national and personal humiliation and possible harassment and jail time (remember Saddam Hussein anyone?) and (2) nuclear war. We may have met our man. He may well just choose Monty Hall’s door number (2) and “let ‘er rip.” Personally, at least, what does he have to lose?

Hey, wanna buy a condo in New York City?

Or, on reflection, would a shack in Tierra del Fuego with a real deep basement and about 4,000 cans of Spam and bottled water be more to your taste?

1/ Sokolovski states “In a future World War the basic weapons in ground theatres will be nuclear weapons, used primarily with operational and tactical missiles and front line air forces (bombers, fighter bombers, and fighters). In addition, Strategic Missile Forces and the Long Range Air Force will deal nuclear blows to targets in the zone of the advancing fronts.” pp. 410-411.
2/ Roger N. McDermott specializes in Russian and Central Asian defense and security issues and is a Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, Senior International Research Fellow for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. McDermott is on the editorial board of Central Asia and the Caucasus and the scientific board of the Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies. He recently wrote The Reform of Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges and Policy Implications (October 2011).


22 replies
  1. JoaoAlfaiate
    JoaoAlfaiate says:

    “The Institute for the Study of War said in a report…”

    Stopped reading right there.

    An article which quotes the Kagans is immediately suspect.

    • JRM
      JRM says:

      Oh come on, @JoaoAlfaiate, the author himself pointed out the problems with that source, and why it still might be worth noting. There is an abundance of good information in this article.

  2. Robert Henderson
    Robert Henderson says:

    Putin is gradually breaking the resistance of the Ukrainians, reducing important cities to rubble and gaining more and more influence in the Black Sea coastal regions. . You would not know from the Western media most of which has been and is little better than a cheer leader for Ukraine.

    The reality is that all the West have done through their supply of military equipment to Ukraine is to prolong the agony of the struggle.

  3. Poupon Marx
    Poupon Marx says:

    Highly speculative. “Might be….”. Third hand information. No checking or backup sourcing. Rambling and wordy.


  4. Derek Shaw
    Derek Shaw says:

    “Baltics uses the narrow 1.470 gauge railway”

    From Wikipedia:
    “Estonia mainly uses a track gauge of 1,520 mm, inherited from the Russian Empire times.”
    Lithuania – “the majority is broad gauge (a legacy of the Russian standard)”
    “Rail transport in Latvia is done on 1,520 mm Russian gauge.”

  5. John Alder
    John Alder says:

    It would be wise for those of us living in America to set aside supplies to get us through a number of shortages caysed by mobs of panic stricken people. What do you think will happen when people get a breaking news bulletin about a nuke being used ? How quickly will they hit the supermarkets and gas stations? Thank the neocons while you panic shop.

  6. Captainchaos
    Captainchaos says:

    The Jewish neocons don’t give a damn about who controls Donbas or Crimea. Nor do they invest much hope in affecting regime change in Russia. They have the limited goal of smashing as much of Russia’s military as they can get away with. So far their plan is working perfectingly with Putin’s (unwitting?) cooperation. At the present rate of attrition I wouldn’t be surprised to find that it will take Russia ten years to rebuild its military capacity to its pre-war state.

    • Poupon Marx
      Poupon Marx says:

      The Jewish neocons don’t give a damn about who controls Donbas or Crimea. Nor do they invest much hope in affecting regime change in Russia. They have the limited goal of smashing as much of Russia’s military as they can get away with. So far their plan is working perfectingly with Putin’s (unwitting?) cooperation. At the present rate of attrition I wouldn’t be surprised to find that it will take Russia ten years to rebuild its military capacity to its pre-war state.

      I am curious. How old are you? Do you have any sources or references to reinforce or buttress your glib assertions?

      • Captainchaos
        Captainchaos says:

        I became racially conscious in my 20s. That was about 15 years ago.

        As for my “glib assertions,” it is as simple as inferring peoples’ motivations based upon their words and actions in combination with an accurate understanding of human nature.

        Those with power tend to view those beneath them as expendable. Who are the real power players and what is the seat of their power? Men like Soros are the true power players and control of the West is the seat of their power. People like Nuland and Blinken are just hired help, competent but utterly replaceable technocrats. Even lower on the food chain of Jewish power are clowns like Kolomoisky and Zelensky. I’m sure Ukraine is important to Kolomoisky but it is nothing but a rustic backwater to Soros and his minions. Kolomoisky is expendable and so is Ukraine. Putin beholds the lives of his soldiers with equal contempt, utterly expendable.

        However, if nuclear war is initiated then both sides, Putin as well as Soros, lose everything. Both sides regard the Ukrainian war as a relatively low takes game of poker in which neither is willing to bet the farm.

  7. Forever Guilty
    Forever Guilty says:

    The article is the best short military analysis of Russia-Ukraine conflict that I hav read so far.

  8. ValhallaX
    ValhallaX says:

    The Jews support heartily two White Countries to kill each other, in quantity and, of course, as much as possible hate between them. This is a Jewish win-win. Both countries are economically destroyed, and even better, the West is crippled with Energy and Food Crisis, What is not to like?

    This is another classical slaughter of White People and their countries. Further analysis is useless as we may find some nuances only regarding the damage to these White Nations and we can try to find “stupid” Russians and “stupid” Ukrainians. But it is of no use. They are pointing, both parties, their guns on wrong people. That is it, the rest is bickering, and as we know, the bickering people have no soul.

    It is simply, once again, The Jews. That is it.

    • Poupon Marx
      Poupon Marx says:

      VX- I believe most Whites would agree that racial realism is the best orientation. How is that so when every setback, loss, or humiliation is always “The Jews. That’s it.” Of course they are set on seek and destroy. But are we just stationary targets, bound, blind, deaf? We see it incoming but take no action. How does that work for a sports team, just passively watch the scoreboard gain points on one side? Ground troops just maintain stationary position while being shelled, shot at, or bombarded?

      So, we put up with it. Our own people are actively assisting them, choosing them over us-their own kind. Jews don’t do that. Nobody does except the Western European White. For two thousand years.

      I have notice very little wrtiten about this passive attitude of Whites. Most of the commentators here repeat the same facts and conclusions. Any remedies, alterations that might be helpful, as in saving the race? Exhortations?

      No exultant jubilate. Keep bending over, Rover.

  9. Bobby
    Bobby says:

    Thank you Albermarle Man. Very good writing from you as usual.

    To expand on Valhalla X’s point, the commentator preceding me, with all that’s going on in the US, out of control inflation, financial markets falling everyday, food shortages, an open border that helped facilitate 107,000 drug overdoses last year, and now – a baby formula shortage so bad, that even Tucker Carlson is talking about it (when have you ever heard of a baby formula shortage in the US?) the Jewish run Biden administration; Mayorkas, Klain, Garland, Yellen, Klein, Psaki on her mother’s side, and the list goes on, a $40 Billlion “care package”, has been approved by them and our Reps in D.C., for Ukraine. And course, Ukraine is run by Jewish gangsters as has been written about here at TOO. Where is that $40 Billion going to wind up? I’m guessing that most of it will wind up in Israel.

    • John Alder
      John Alder says:

      I have read that there is so much corruption in Ukraine that if you go there and shake hands be sure and count your fingers. Remember Zelensky has a 35 million dollar mansion in Florida.

  10. bruno
    bruno says:

    First of all, thank you for the article. The problem of changing tracks I found interesting. Having gone from west to east and vice a versa, that has been experienced. I can’t recall the time involved, as it’s been decades. However, if recollection is somewhere near adequate, it took about an hour to 90 minutes. I can still recall geiger counters being used to check female vaginas and toys. Westerners would go there and try to bring gold to the West.

    The fact about Ruski roads was excellent. Having ridden motorcycles in that country, one must say that mud during certain seasons was/is, indeed, something that can be prohibitive. Most don’t comprehend that the road system there, along with the train system, cannot compare with that of the west.

    Some of the comments were quite fascinating. Nothing was mentioned about the Z factor. That’s understandable. However, they nearly completely run the Uke hierarchy.

    One has to comprehend that prior to Eurocide II, there were at least 3 million in Ukraine and another 3 million in Poland. The Soviet Union, of course, obtained all of Ukraine. The numbers were/are really higher in eastern Ukraine because many were no longer religious and didn’t affiliate with brethren Zs. Despite holycause propaganda most were not eradicated. That does not imply the some were not executed.

    As for actual conflict, Washington has bases all around the topic under discussion. Moreover, in a short term limited war, Washington based networks would overwhelm and gain much. In a nuclear confrontation, of course, both sides would face horrendous consequences.

    The Z government and her political satellites in Washington and Western Europe unofficially favor Ukraine. This is due to the immense Z population there. Also, at least a million Ukrainian Zs have migrated to their psychological intrinsic homeland. As always, they play both sides against the middle. Thus, they can easily switch sides or stay neutral if things get really hot.

    It’s understandable why Putin didn’t commit to wholesale destruction. This is because he believes that Ukrainians are part of the family. Most people in the West find this incomprehensible. After all, they have had their massive religious wars and have continued, until recently, killing their brothers.

    Warsaw is facing an immense burden with the nearly 2,000,000 migrants refugees entering. They have to be supplied with nutrients and living quarters. The Polish political apparatus has been more than an arse-kissing regime. They have allowed a statue to be constructed of Bandera. He was the leader who believed in an ethnically pure Ukraine. He slaughtered Armenians, Polonians and others. In fact, the Wehrmacht had to stop them. For those not in the know, recently a leftist Ukrainian female threw paint in the face of the Russian ambassador. A big debate was in the Polish parliament. Some members believed that she should have been incarcerated. Others believed it would cause an uproar in western media and be very detrimental.

    Where I reside some of the stores have been asking for donations to the Ukrainian cause. War misinformation is a given. Zielinskyy has became nearly a god. Monopoly media glorification is understandable. Also, the military industrial complex can gain. Where this will end is anybody’s guess.

  11. Poupon Marx
    Poupon Marx says:

    Bobby-Do you have any suggestions or thoughts on what actions Whites could, should, ought to take for tactical and strategic purposes? Defensively, counter-offensively?

  12. Peter
    Peter says:

    From the US Department of Defense government website:

    “On May 13, Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III spoke with Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Shoygu for the first time since February 18. Secretary Austin urged an immediate ceasefire in Ukraine and emphasized the importance of maintaining lines of communication.”

    That suggests Ukraine is losing and on the verge of defeat.

Comments are closed.