Nations and Ethnicity
When discussing the meaning of nationhood, Wolfe rejects “the so-called creedal nation concept” according to which a nation is “united around a set of propositions that creedalists consider universally true or at least practically advantageous for all and so readily acceptable by all.” His target is the “egalitarian themes and rights-talk” characteristic of mainstream American political discourse.” He concedes, however, that his argument “does not preclude political or social creeds that serve to unite a people.” He gives as an example of a “universally true statement” the proposition that “Jesus is Lord,” claiming that it “certainly serves to unite the people of a Christian nation.” Wolfe claims that “Christianity is the true religion” as another example of a universally valid spiritual proposition. One wonders whether and how that spiritual truth was recognized during the religious wars of the seventeenth century in Europe or the American Civil War during the nineteenth century.
Wolfe acknowledges that such Christian propositions cannot and do not serve as the “foundation for nations.” The question then, of course, becomes: What is the foundation or basis for nationhood, Christian or otherwise? Unfortunately, Wolfe never provides a clear answer to that question. The cover of Wolfe’s book with the image of a cross radiating beams of light superimposed upon a map of the lower forty-eight United States suggests that his project will be focused upon an American version of Christian nationalism. But, as one of his critics observes, “the interior of his 478-page tome tells a very different story. Indeed, America hardly comes up in the first nine [of ten] chapters, and much of what he writes could be applied to any Christian (by which he means Protestant) nation.”
For Wolfe, it is axiomatic that every “Christian nation acknowledges God as the author of nations in general and as the providential author of their particular nation.” But the “universal truths of Christianity do not nullify national particularity. Each Christian nation has a distinct way of life.” It is true, he says, “that fellow Christians, regardless of nationality, are united spiritually, as fellow members of the kingdom of God.” But this “is chiefly a heavenly or eschatological relation, made possible by grace, not nature.” The spiritual brotherhood making man “fit for a heavenly kingdom” is not well suited to provide the practical tools (such as a common language) enabling the everyday cooperation between individuals and families necessary “to procure the full range of goods required for living well in this world.”
While Wolfe recognizes the particularity of every nation, he locates the sources of that particularity in a “lived experience” shared by everyone, a “sense of familiarity with a particular place and the people in it.” This “sense of we,” is not “rooted…in abstractions or judicial norms (e.g., equal protection) or truth-statements.” He appears not to notice that he grounds his own argument in a general “truth,” applicable to all nations, tribes, and peoples, before and after the fall. All of us, Christians and non-Christians alike, share “a pre-reflective, pre-propositional love for one’s own, generated from intergenerational affections, daily life, and productive activity that link a society of the dead, living, and unborn.” Particularity, for Wolfe, is a property attached “to a people in place.” He describes his concern for the “lived experience” of particular peoples in particular places as a “a sort of phenomenological topography.”
He admits that the “idea of a nation is notoriously difficult to define, and identifying true nations is equally challenging.” But he is careful to deny that nationhood can or should be identified “on the basis of a modern racialist principle.” He disavows any suggestion that his position is “a ‘white nationalist’ argument.” On his view, “the designation ‘white,’ as it is used today, hinders and distracts people from recognizing and acting for their people-groups.” Having rejected the concept of race, Wolfe then uses “the terms ethnicity and nation almost synonymously,” if not necessarily very consistently. His use of the terms as synonyms is especially confusing when he announces that he will use “nation…to emphasize the unity of the whole” since “every people-group has internal differences” (e.g. those based on class) “though no nation (properly speaking) is composed of two or more ethnicities.” Most readers, I suspect, would take the latter observation to imply that there can be no American nation. After all, is not the United States today composed of a patchwork of different ethnicities (not to mention “races”)?
But Wolfe almost immediately begins to fudge the issue of ethnic and national identity. “Ethnicity, as something experienced,” he declares, “is familiarity with others based in common language, manners, customs, stories, taboos, rituals, calendars, social expectations, duties, loves, and religion.” All of these permit communication and completion of common projects. What about blood ties? According to Wolfe, while a “community of blood” may be “crucial to ethnicity. But this should not lead us to conclude that blood ties are the sole determinant of ethnicity.” He prefers to think of ethnicity or nations as a function of “soul” or “spiritual principle.”
Accordingly, “the ties of blood do not directly establish the boundaries of one’s ethnicity. Rather, one has ethnic ties of affection because one’s kin conducted life with other kin in the same place.” In other words, if a Southern White man’s kin lived in a particular place alongside the extended families of Black slaves or sharecroppers, together they would leave “behind a trace of themselves and their cooperation and their great works and sacrifices.” Both groups, White and Black, could then be said to share a common Southern or even American ethnicity because their collective kinfolk “belonged to this people on this land,” and were bound together by a common Volksgeist.
Wolfe never specifies his own ethnicity. Instead, he waves the issue away with the commonplace observation that “white Americans” often assign their ethnicity “to some distant European ancestry.” The closest he comes to coming out of the closet is when he writes that “I might say that I’m Italian, German, and English” without making it clear whether that is an autobiographical fact or, instead, just a hypothetical example of a typical White American response to the question of personal “ethnic identity.” Perhaps Wolfe actually is just some random Euromutt castaway. On the other hand, he could be related somehow to the prominent Anglo-Irish family of the eighteenth-century English Major General James Wolfe.
Once upon a time (not so very long ago), every English-Canadian schoolchild literally sang the praises of General Wolfe as “the dauntless hero” who “planted firm Britannia’s flag on Canada’s fair domain.” Wolfe died on the Plains of Abraham near Quebec City, having defeated the French General Montcalm. British North America was thereby rid (for a time) of a dangerous imperial rival. Ironically, Wolfe’s victory smoothed the path of rebellious American colonists ready to break with the British Crown to create a continental empire of their own.
Many English-Canadians, including myself, would be proud to claim General Wolfe as an ancestor. (Indeed, though I can boast no such connection, I have a large print of Benjamin West’s famous painting of Wolfe’s death hanging on the wall of my library). Wolfe of West Point, however, prefers to believe that one’s genetic origins, while “not entirely irrelevant…say little about who you are, at least with regard to your everyday life.” At most, they provide little more than “some mildly interesting fact you use in small-talk.”
Relating ethnicity primarily to the topography of lived experience has the effect of obscuring the intertwined significance of history, biology, and culture. Wolfe has no apparent interest in either in the historical origins or the “ethnic genetic interests” of his own people, whoever they might be. Indeed, he writes that “Given my friendships and associations with people of different ancestry, I can say that being ‘white [much less of British ancestry] is unnecessary both to recognize themselves in what I describe and to cooperate with someone like me in a common national project.”
Remarkably, in Wolfe’s mind, ethnicity can cross racial lines. According to Neil Shenvi, Wolfe has affirmed in a personal conversation that “People of different ancestral origins can be part of the same ethnicity.” How else can Wolfe entertain the hope that an American Christian nationalism will emerge? Kevin DeYoung remarks that “the all-important concept of ‘nation’ sometimes operates in Wolfe’s thinking more organically like an ethnicity, sometimes more loosely like a culture, sometimes more locally like a love of people and place, and sometimes more traditionally like a nation-state with a recognizable set of laws, a governing magistrate, and the power of the sword.”
Wolfe argues that all nations can be Christian nations seeking “their temporal and eternal good through their own civil arrangements.” He devotes a chapter to defend the proposition that a Christian nation has “a natural law right to revolution against tyrants to that end.” Of course, so long as “a legitimate ruler uses civil power to command what is just and the people disobey this command, they are disobeying God himself…because the law itself, though human, is an ordinance of God.” But God does not bestow civil authority “to command what is unjust…for God’s ordinances to man are always just.” It follows that no unjust command can bind the conscience. A tyrant, “though he may have the appearance of civil authority, is but a man ordering fellow men to great evil.” If necessary, forcible resistance to such commands may be justified. Even a Christian minority may “revolt against a tyranny directed against them and, after successfully revolting, establish over all the population a Christian commonwealth.” 
In Wolfe’s Christian political theory, it is axiomatic that “although civil administration is fundamentally natural, human, and universal” it “was created to serve Adam’s race in a state of integrity, as an outward ordering to God.” In our redeemed state of grace, “those who are restored in Christ are the people of God. Thus, civil order and administration is for them.” This raises the question of the political status of non-Christians in a Christian commonwealth. Any answer to that question is a matter of prudence, recognizing, of course, that the civil administration “must guarantee equal protection and due process with regard to human things for all people…But this does not entail equal participation, status, and standing in political, social, and cultural institutions.” Non-Christians cannot “be expected to take an interest in conserving the explicit Christian character and ends of these institutions and of society.”
Wolfe invokes the Anglo-Protestantism practiced in Puritan New England as a source of inspiration in shaping any future Christian commonwealth. There and in the new nation during the founding era, liberty of conscience was to be respected. No one could be compelled to believe or profess the Christian faith. The civil power dealt with heresy or dissent with a view to “practical considerations” relating to the “public harm caused by public error and on the limitation of civic action for spiritual reformation.” Accordingly, the civil power acted not to wreak vengeance on the enemies of God but “as a means to safeguard the souls of those under the magistrate’s care.” Punishment was meted out only to those who publicly sought to promote heresy and unbelief, to subvert the established church, to denounce its ministers, or to instigate rebellion against Christian magistrates. The fundamental Anglo-Protestant view was “that the Gospel and religious belief cannot be coerced; it is a matter of persuasion, and one must decide for oneself.”
What went wrong? Why did the American republic not remain as a Christian nation, on the Anglo-Protestant model? Wolfe’s answer in a nutshell is: modern R2K theory. That is to say, the mainstream Anglo-Protestant view still rests upon a two kingdoms theology distinguishing church and state but the radical two kingdoms view is that only pastoral vocations in the church are part of God’s kingdom while the state rests on a natural law that applies in a neutral fashion to all men everywhere, Christians and non-Christians alike. This, of course, begs the question: how did the R2K position come to dominance in the church? To answer that question requires a realistic political ethnotheology of Christian nationhood, one willing to confront a number of highly-charged issues that Wolfe is at pains to avoid and obfuscate. What was it about the Anglo-Protestant tradition that led to the erosion of its earlier determination to create and preserve a Christian nation in America?
The Elephant in the Room
One scholar suggests that WASPs were their own worst enemy. According to Eric Kaufmann, the decline of Anglo-America was not due to external factors; in particular, it did not follow an organized campaign by rival ethnic groups seeking to challenge WASP hegemony. He contends that the decisive “forces of dominant-ethnic decline” emerged instead “from within Anglo-Protestant America.” There is a large element of truth to the Kaufmann thesis. The modern American corporate capitalist society that emerged in the late nineteenth century was the unique product of the interaction between a kind of person, a kind of economy, and a kind of religion.
Brian Gatton suggests that the most significant psychological and spiritual force driving WASPs to commit hari-kari was the other-directed nature of the “social self” fabricated by the corporate system. In the early modern period a God of Will was worshipped by the bourgeois individual of the Protestant ethic, whose enterprising ways helped the modern capitalist economy to take off. But while the driven personality of the inner-directed Protestant supplied power on the runway, once in flight the economy relied on technique, not on character, to keep itself aloft. As Donald Meyer put it in his study of the American gospel of positive thinking, “if at the center of nineteenth century social imagination stood a man, in the twentieth he was replaced by a system.”
The dominant ethos of the Anglo-American corporate system depends upon a novel blend of psychology, economics and theology. The economy became an object of religious devotion for the managerial and professional classes. Today, in all sectors of society and culture, economic development has become an occasion for dependency rather than belonging. Our abject subjection to the mysterious movements of the global economy parallels the relationship of Protestant believers to their “hidden God, the God of Will” who can be known “only in His works, not in His nature. In an awful recurrence, we are returning to the situation of the early Protestants as an abyss opens up between us and an economy invested with all the attributes of divinity. Its inner workings surpass ordinary human understanding. Among our elites and opinion leaders, insight, knowledge, and intelligence can do no more than serve the disembodied forces animating the society of perpetual growth. It is not the courage or the strength of our political and corporate leaders, nor our respect for tradition that sanctifies the system. It is faith alone. Awesome and inscrutable, spectacular and self-propelling, the system invites adoration.
No doubt the emergent other-directed character of the WASP middle-class was a uniquely Anglo-American adaptation to the organizational imperatives of corporate capitalism. But if the home-grown “corporate self” provided the seed-bed for the cosmopolitan spirit of the Progressive Era, the WASP clerisy had plenty of help from other ethnic groups, especially Jews, in nurturing a full-blown cult of the Other. Indeed, Kaufmann credits Felix Adler, a leading Jewish intellectual, with a leading role in awakening Progressive reformers to the possibilities inherent in this new pluralist vision of American national identity. In his own recent book, Whiteshift, Kaufmann, too, is remarkably sanguine about the demographic, cultural, and political impact of mass third world immigration on the future of the White majority in Anglo-American society.
An interesting comparison can be made between Eric Kaufmann and Stephen Wolfe on the issue of immigration-induced cultural change. In principle, Wolfe advocates limits on immigration from culturally alien sources, even though they might be Christian. Kaufmann, on the other hand, treats “white opposition to mass immigration as a problem to be solved, not as an expression of legitimate ethnic interests or democratic will.” Both are confident, however, that, so long as the rate of change is less than alarming, assimilation of cultural outsiders will be possible. Kaufmann merely cautions that whites must be allowed “some social space to express their identity.”
Both are what Frank Salter describes as “ethnic traditionalists” in the sense that “they support immigration so long as the immigrants assimilate, regardless of the impact on [White] ethnic identity, even if [the White majority] eventually disappears.” It may be that the differences between them with respect to the scale of immigration reflect differences in their respective racial and ethnic identities. Whatever the precise weight any given European ethnicity may have contributed to Wolfe’s identity, he is unquestionably White. Kaufmann’s ancestry is noticeably more exotic: part-Jewish, part-Chinese, and part-Hispanic. Perhaps that explains why Kaufmann promulgates the ideal of a “whiteshift” over the next century or two when he expects (and hopes) most Westerners will become “what we now term ‘mixed-race.’”
For his part, Wolfe certainly does not actively promote race-mixing as an end in itself; nor, however, does he accept that a “community in blood” is “the sole determinant of ethnicity.” Sensitive to accusations of “racism,” he is not opposed to intermarriage in principle. Nor does he approve inter-ethnic or inter-racial marriages merely as particular exceptions to a general rule requiring respect for ethnic and racial boundaries. Hannah Arendt, by contrast, frankly accepts that “every mixed marriage constitutes a challenge to society.” While opposing the legal prohibition (but not social disapproval) of interracial marriage, Arendt preferred to treat mixed marriage as a private matter between individuals “who have so far preferred personal happiness to social adjustment that they are willing to bear the burden of discrimination.” On Arendt’s realist view, such discrimination is a necessary evil. If people (and, presumably, churches) are not free to shun those whose private lives, social mores, or ethnic identity they disapprove, “society would simply cease to exist and very important possibilities of free association and group formation would disappear.” By contrast, Wolfe treats race-mixing as a positive good which, over time, will create the “bonds of affection” that will enable the formation of “various brotherhoods and tribes and shared or public pastimes.” Nationhood, for Wolfe, is a spiritual phenomenon, not a matter of hematology.
Despite their differences, however, neither Wolfe nor Kaufmann examine the role of ethnic rivalry (much less antagonism) between Jews and WASPs as a major contributing factor to the decline of Anglo-Protestant “cultural Christianity.” Such reluctance to tackle the Jewish question directly is noteworthy given their joint preoccupation with the immigration issue. After all, Jews led the long campaign to overturn the national origins regime (adopted in 1924), designed to radically restrict the numbers of immigrants to the USA from areas outside northwestern Europe. Elsewhere in the Anglosphere, too, Jews have been active in promoting non-White immigration, especially after the passage of the 1965 Hart-Celler Act in the USA.
A secular, part-Jewish, cosmopolitan such as Kaufmann cannot be expected, perhaps, to highlight the prominent role played by Jews in undermining the institutional supports for Christian nationhood. But, given the prominence that Wolfe gives to his discussion of “the good of cultural Christianity,” it seems strange that he completely ignores the issue. Wolfe understands cultural Christianity as “the force that normalizes Christian culture,” even for many who neither attend churches readily nor publicly profess Christian beliefs. It is a “social power” which “directs people to activities wherein they can procure the things of eternal life, both inside and outside the instituted church.”
Much to the amusement of cosmopolitan urban sophisticates (“cloud people”), Wolfe holds up the fictional North Carolina town of Mayberry (home to the “dirt people” of the 1960s’ Andy Griffith Show) as the avatar of cultural Christianity. This folksy, small town was “a community of few and small concerns, high social trust, and an ease of life.” Wolfe remarks that “any American” watching that show today “cannot but feel nostalgia for an America lost by negligence and malevolence.”
Note that Wolfe attributes the destruction of the world of Mayberry, a place where everybody went to church and probably “all the kids were above average,” to both negligence and malevolence. But, surprisingly, even West Point graduate Wolfe declines to identify the foremost enemy of American cultural Christianity. This reflects the fatal flaw in Anglo-Protestant political theology: the absence of an explicit ethnoreligion anchored in the history and destiny of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. Jews are far more ethnocentric than even the ethnic traditionalist minority among WASPs. The most important difference between Jews and Anglo-Protestants is the propensity of the former community towards a high level of what Salter labels “ethnic nepotism.” In other words, Jews are much more likely to exhibit a strong belief “in the unity of family and racial kinship.” Jewish parents are much more likely than WASPs to see their children as an essential “contribution to the immortality of their race.”
Arguably, Jewish elites believe that it is in their ethnic genetic interest to dismantle the institutional supports for Christian nationhood and have pursued legal, political, and cultural strategies to achieve that end. This campaign included a battery of legal challenges which successfully ended school prayers and bible reading. A famous book entitled The Authoritarian Personality, sponsored by the American Jewish Committee, appeared in 1950 and inspired a multi-pronged attack on the Christian family which continues down to the present day. Mass third-world immigration, feminism, pornography, contraception and abortion, and, more recently, transgender rights have all been weaponized by Jewish activists waging a concerted war on cultural Christianity.
The reconstitution of Christian nations in the USA and the rest of the Anglosphere will require the emergence of a counter-elite ready, willing, and able to contest the Jewish Ascendancy, not just within the state, but also on the terrain of civil society, in the corporate sector, the media, academia, and the legal profession. Any such counter-elite must be driven by an ethnoreligious spirit if it is to have any chance of success. The greatest weakness of Wolfe’s vision of Christian nationhood is that he treats the particularity of each people and place as adiaphorous, a thing indifferent, not affecting the universal spiritual unity of the kingdom of God.
For Wolfe, Christ redeemed humanity as a whole; the constituent elements of mankind’s transient life in this world were to be perfected by ordering the various Christian nations/ethnicities to Christ. Wolfe takes it for granted that humanity has a telos in common, already known to Christian theology. But what if race is not just a social construct but also possesses an intractably biological dimension? What if the phenomenology of place is ultimately grounded in the evolutionary history of distinctive biocultures? Race is a trinitarian phenomenon: race-as-biology, race-as-culture, and race-as-theology, all develop together within a complex differentiated historical process. Every “people-group” (the tender-minded synonym for tribes, nations, and races) possesses its own language, culture, patterns of experience, and goals; they cannot all be squeezed together into the simplistic schematic structure of a neo-Augustinian metanarrative.
Anglo-Protestants desperately need to situate themselves within a theologically informed ethnohistory. Such an ethnotheology must come to grips with biocultural science, with genetic similarity theory, and with a consciousness of the importance of ethnic genetic interests to the physical and spiritual well-being of their people. Only in that way can Anglo-Protestants hope to understand the rise, decline, fall, and possible restoration of Anglo-Saxon Christendoms throughout the Anglosphere.
As things stand now, Anglo-Protestant theology bears a large share of responsibility for the deformation of Christian nationhood. Perhaps the most telling symptom of the present crisis is Wolfe’s claim that there can never again be a chosen nation or people. No Christian nation today, he writes, can be “a holy nation in the sense that Israel was holy when under the Mosaic Covenant. No nation today is God’s nation by some special divine command or by exclusive divine favor.” Wolfe acknowledges that a people can only become or maintain themselves as a Christian nation “in an explicit sense, [by] an act of national will.” But here he is intellectually crippled by the idealist, other-worldly character of his historical and political theology. A more realistic account of the origins of the Mosaic Covenant might understand it as a product of a historical process in which both divine command and national will were involved.
As one writer, who goes by the name of Jung-Freud, contends, “if Jews believed in many gods for different peoples as pagan folks did, then there would have been no need for the Covenant.” Instead, Jews took a different path “out of boldness, imagination, arrogance, megalomania, or whatever,” they “came to believe in only one God for themselves.” But they also taught their children that no other gods were real and that it was a grave sin to worship them. But why would that one God favor the insignificant small-time people of Israel over all other tribes? That seemingly insoluble puzzle made it necessary for the Israelites to come up with the Covenant. Without it, “there was no guarantee that God would stick with the Jews.”
In light of the heroic role of Anglo-Protestants in the foundation of the nations of the Anglosphere, why should they, too, not feel in their bones that they can and should enter into a special covenant with God? After all, the process by which a people enter into covenant with the divine must be akin to what has long been known to the Orthodox Christian tradition as the experience of “theosis” or “deification.” Perhaps, a “stateless” people, such as the ancient Israelites on their exodus journey to the Promised Land, is more receptive to communion with the divine.
But the Jews are not the only people to experience “statelessness.” In our own time, the “nation-states” of the Anglosphere have been subordinated to the hidden hand of globalist plutocracy. As a consequence, the Anglo-Saxon peoples, both “at home” and in the diaspora, are now de facto, if not yet de jure, “stateless.” Perhaps providentially, certainly ironically, such political and cultural dispossession may have created the conditions for a spiritual renaissance. WASPs may yet rediscover the ethnoreligious spirit that once moved Alfred the Great to look to Covenant as the essential medium for the collective deification of his embryonic Angelcynn nation.
Given that possibility, it is no wonder that organized Jewry does everything in its power to demonize the ethnoreligious spirit of Christian nationalism throughout the Anglosphere. But let us not forget that such cultural subversion also successfully targeted once-great Christian nations such as Germany as well—with the active cooperation of the Anglo-Saxon nations. Anglo-Protestant theology happily sanctified the thirty-year war waged on Germany. Now re-educated, guilt-tripped, and thoroughly demoralized by a systematic process of Überfremdung, Germany remains securely under the thumb of the globalist American regime overseeing its proxy war on Orthodox Christian Russia. “Our” phony victories in those wars should be sources of shame rather than pride. Compare the negative, dysgenic, maladaptive impact of Anglo-Protestant Woke political theology with the positive, eugenic, and adaptive success of the Jewish political theology grounded in the Holocaust Mythos. In the one case, blasphemy laws are conceived as a violation of human rights; in the other, “condoning, denying, or downplaying” Jewish suffering is a shocking offence against the laws of God and man, alike.
It is long past time for Anglo-Protestant political theology to identify and clearly distinguish friend from foe in the holy war we are compelled to wage for the earthly survival and spiritual salvation of the Anglo-Saxon race worldwide. God save the King.
Andrew Fraser taught constitutional law and history at Macquarie University in Sydney, Australia for many years. He is the author of The WASP Question (London: Arktos, 2011) and Dissident Dispatches: An Alt-Right Guide to Christian Theology (London: Arktos, 2017).
 Ibid., 119-120, 186.
 Ibid., 120.
 Mark David Hall, “The 500-Year-Old Case for Christian Nationalism” https://providencemag.com/2022/11/the-500-year-old-case-for-christian-nationalism/
 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 176, 199.
 Ibid., 120, 134.
 Ibid., 119, 135.
 Ibid., 136, 140.
 Ibid., 139.
 Ibid., 136.
 Ibid., 136
 Ibid., 119.
 Neil Shenvi, “Of Gods and Men: A Long Review of Wolfe’s Case for Christian Nationalism, Part III-Objections” https://shenviapologetics.com/of-gods-and-men-a-long-review-of-wolfes-case-for-christian-nationalism-part-iii-objections/
 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 431, 475.
 Kevin DeYoung, “The Rise of Right-Wing Wokeism” https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/reviews/christian-nationalism-wolfe/
 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 329-330, 334, 345.
 Ibid., 346, 392.
 Ibid., 390-392, 414-415.
 Kaufmann, Rise and Fall of Anglo-America, 4.
 Donald Meyer, The Positive Thinkers: A Study of the American Quest for Health, Wealth, and Personal Power from Mary Baker Eddy to Norman Vincent Peale (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1966), 177.
 Brian Gatton, “Hari-Kari of the Anglo Elite,” (2006) 25(4) Journal of American Ethnic History 181. For more on the distinction between inner-directed and other-directed character types, see David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd: A Study of the Emerging American Character (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001 [original ed. 1961]).
 Meyer, Positive Thinkers, 177.
 Ibid., 177-178.
 Kaufmann, Rise and Fall of Anglo-America, 91-95.
 Eric P. Kaufmann, Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities (London: Penguin, 2018).
 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 199-204.
 Frank Salter, “The Ethnic Predicaments of the Shrinking White Majority,” (September 2019) 63(9) Quadrant 31, at 34-35.
 Ibid., 33.
 Kaufmann, quoted in Salter, “Ethnic Predicaments,” 33.
 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 139.
 Hannah Arendt, “Reflections on Little Rock,”[originally published in 1959] in Peter Baehr, ed. The Portable Hannah Arendt (New York: Penguin, 2000), 238-239.
 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 139-140.
 Ibid., 213..
 Ibid., 226.
 Salter, “Ethnic Predicaments,” 32-33.
 Simple internet searches for material on “the Jewish role” in each of those movements will yield ample evidence to support this proposition. A more systematic academic introduction to these issues can be found in Kevin Macdonald, The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Long Beach, CA: 1st Books, 2002 [originally published by Praeger in 1998]).
 Andrew Fraser, Reinventing Aristocracy in the Age of Woke Capital: How Honourable WASP Elites Could Rescue Our Civilisation from Bad Governance by Irresponsible Corporate Plutocrats (London: Arktos, 2022).
 Good introductions to these fields can be found in Frank Salter, On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethnicity, and Humanity in an Age of Mass Migration (London: Routledge, 2006); J. Phillipe Rushton, Race, Evolution, and Behavior: A Life History Perspective Third Edition (Port Huron, MI: Charles Darwin Research Institute, 2000); and Andrew Fraser, The WASP Question: An Essay on the Biocultural Evolution, Present Predicament, and Future Prospects of the Invisible Race (London: Arktos, 2011).
 Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 176.
 Jung-Freud, “Why the Euraces (Or European Races) Need Their Own COVENANT(s) in a One-Truth and One-Power World” https://www.unz.com/jfreud/why-the-euracesor-european-races-need-their-own-covenants-in-a-one-truth-and-one-power-world/
 I deal with this question in Andrew Fraser, “Anglo-Republicanism and the Rebirth of British History: Why Virtuous WASPs Must Challenge the Corrupt Globalist Plutocracy Misgoverning the Anglosphere,” (Fall 2021) 21(3) The Occidental Quarterly 3-58. Available online at: https://mq.academia.edu/AndrewFraser
 See, e.g., Rabbi Deborah Waxman, PhD, “Ethnonationalism is a Grave Threat to Democracy” https://www.reconstructingjudaism.org/news/ethnonationalism-is-a-grave-threat-to-democracy/