JFK’s Forgotten Confrontation With Israel
Today’s foreign policy establishment treats unconditional backing for Israel as a sacred commandment, but over 60 years ago, the Oval Office operated under a very different set of rules.
Under President John F. Kennedy, bilateral relations featured sharp friction and a push and pull-dynamic that appears almost unthinkable today. Kennedy sought to balance ties with Arab nationalism alongside Israeli security, which naturally provoked fierce resistance from Israeli leaders like Golda Meir and domestic Zionist organizations.
For a start, Kennedy entered the White House with a record of recognizing Palestinian displacement. In an address to the National Conference of Christians and Jews, he urged that refugees willing to live at peace with their neighbors “be repatriated to Israel at the earliest practical date”, while urging that those who preferred to remain under Arab jurisdiction be resettled in Arab countries. In a February 9, 1958 speech to a B’nai Zion dinner, he called the Arab refugee problem a matter on which “the books cannot be closed” and said it had to be resolved through negotiation and resettlement.
During his 1960 campaign, Kennedy shifted toward resettlement. In an August 10 letter to Rabbi Israel Goldstein, he endorsed the Democratic platform pledge to “encourage direct Arab-Israel peace negotiations, the resettlement of Arab refugees, in lands where there is room and opportunity for them.” At the Zionists of America convention on August 26, he listed “a reconsideration of the Arab refugee problem” among the examples of cooperation the next President should stimulate. After taking office, he wrote on May 11, 1961 to six Arab leaders, pledging help in resolving the refugee problem “on the basis of the principle of repatriation or compensation for properties.”
To carry out paragraph 11 of UN General Assembly Resolution 194, the administration backed the plan of Joseph E. Johnson, Special Representative of the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission. In an August 7, 1962 memo to Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk described a process in which refugees would state their preferences confidentially between repatriation to Israel and resettlement in the Arab states or elsewhere. Rusk wrote that a UN obligation to pay compensation would arise only for refugees resettled outside Israel, and that Israel “would still have to make the ultimate decision” on admissions.
Rusk estimated roughly “one refugee repatriated for every nine resettled” and said he believed Israel would consider taking back between 100,000 and 150,000 Arab refugees. Washington saw the plan as a way to defuse a regional threat. Rusk warned that “extremist elements” might use the refugees to “Algerianize” the dispute between Arabs and Israel. In April 1961, officials had warned that Congress would be unlikely to keep appropriating funds for the UN refugee agency, UNRWA, unless some move was made.
The initiative began to unravel amid tactical missteps and Israeli opposition. White House aide Myer Feldman urged Kennedy to link the refugee proposal with the sale of Hawk antiaircraft missiles, which made Kennedy the first president to sell arms to Israel. At an August 14 meeting, Feldman said that if the Hawk could be tied in, the plan might work.
On August 19, 1962, Feldman informed Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion of Washington’s willingness to provide a Hawk missile. In his own report, he wrote that he then turned to the Johnson Plan, and the initial reaction of Ben-Gurion and his Foreign Minister was negative. Washington had offered its main inducement before getting Israel’s consent. National Security Council staffer Robert Komer lamented in a December 5, 1962 memo to Kennedy that Washington should not have launched the plan in August, nor have given “the Hawk assurances beforehand,” nor have let Johnson publish a detailed plan before the basic principles were settled.
Israeli officials ended up rejecting the plan. On September 20, Foreign Minister Golda Meir told Feldman and others of Israel’s “unalterable opposition,” calling it non-negotiable, per a FRUS editorial note. On September 26, a telegram from Rusk summarizing his talk with Meir recorded her objection that UN follow-up on returning refugees was “another gross derogation of Israeli sovereignty.” On December 27, 1962, a memorandum of conversation recorded Meir telling Kennedy that Israel knew of Arab plans for refugees “to make an Algeria out of Israel.”
Meanwhile, American Jewish leaders and Israeli officials also worked the domestic front. On June 23, 1961, Max Nussbaum, chairman of the Zionist Organization of America’s National Executive Council, cautioned the government that a reported refugee plan might mean “100,000 or 200,000 Arabs” entering Israel. On September 20, 1962, Feldman attended a dinner at the New York apartment of Abraham Feinberg, chairman of the Bonds for Israel Committee, with Foreign Minister Meir, Ambassador Avraham Harman and Philip Klutznick of the US delegation to the UN. A State Department memo from that month records that the President “does not want to have trouble with American Jewry at this time.”
In the aforementioned December 5, 1962 memo, Komer told Kennedy that “the Israelis have mounted a pressure campaign with which it is almost impossible for State to cope.” He added that because the issue touched US domestic politics, and “they take full advantage of this fact.” Komer listed 4 US concessions, among them Hawk missiles and security assurances, and said the United States had “gotten nothing from our efforts.”
On December 27, 1962, in Palm Beach, Kennedy met Meir. The memorandum of the meeting has him describing “a special relationship with Israel in the Middle East.” He also said that “If we pulled out of the Arab Middle East and maintained our ties only with Israel this would not be in Israel’s interest.” On refugees, he said “We had not made any progress on the Johnson Plan and that is gone,” though he did not think the United States should give up on refugees.
Although Kennedy capitulated on the question of Palestinian repatriation, he waged a relentless campaign against Israel’s clandestine nuclear weapons program at Dimona. On January 19, 1961, the day before Kennedy’s inauguration, outgoing Secretary of State Christian Herter warned him that the Dimona reactor could produce 90 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium by 1963, which historians Avner Cohen and William Burr put at enough for 10 to 15 nuclear weapons. Nuclear proliferation was Kennedy’s “private nightmare,” as Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Glenn Seaborg once noted.
Cohen and Burr wrote that Kennedy saw proliferation as the path to a global nuclear war, and a 1961 intelligence estimate predicted “consternation” in the Arab world, with blame falling on the United States and France. A March 1963 CIA memo warned of “substantial damage to the US and Western position in the Arab world,” and said Arab states would look to the Soviet bloc for help.
Kennedy pressed Israel to honor Ben-Gurion’s pledge to the Eisenhower administration and allow a U.S. visit to Dimona before the two leaders met. AEC scientists Ulysses Staebler and Jesse Croach toured Dimona on May 20, 1961, then reported the reactor was “of the scope and peaceful character” Israeli officials had claimed. At the May 30 Waldorf Astoria meeting, the memorandum of conversation records Kennedy suggesting, “on the theory that a woman should not only be virtuous but also have the appearance of virtue,” that the problem was how to disseminate information that would remove any doubts about the reactor’s peaceful purposes.
On September 26, 1962, two US Atomic Energy Commission scientists, Thomas Haycock and Ulysses Staebler, were in Israel to inspect the small Soreq reactor when Israeli officials took them to Dimona without prior warning. They received a tour of about 40 minutes. Ambassador Walworth Barbour called the visit “unduly restricted to no more than forty five minutes.” Cohen and Burr say stage managed tours in 1961 and 1962 raised suspicions in the US intelligence community. The CIA’s director of intelligence, probably Ray Cline, said “the immediate objectives of the visit may have been satisfied, [but] certain basic intelligence requirements were not.”
Kennedy escalated in spring 1963. He met CIA Director John McCone on March 25. On April 2, Barbour presented Ben-Gurion with the US request for semiannual visits, and Kennedy’s June 15 letter was the peak of the confrontation. Cohen and Burr describe it as a near ultimatum.
NSAM 231, issued after Kennedy met CIA Director John McCone, directed State, the AEC and the CIA to “undertake every feasible measure to improve our intelligence on the Israeli nuclear program.” To meet it, State asked Israel on April 2, 1963 to allow semiannual visits to Dimona. State’s proposal sought access to all areas of the site and to related facilities such as a plutonium separation plant. That same day, Shimon Peres told Kennedy at the White House, “we will not introduce nuclear weapons to the region, and certainly we will not be the first.” Myer Feldman later understood this as a conditional assurance that Israel would not act unless other regional states did.
Ben-Gurion promised periodic visits in a May 27 letter, but Kennedy wanted a fixed schedule. His June 15 letter proposed a visit in early summer, another in June 1964, and visits every six months after that. It warned that American “commitment to and support of Israel could be seriously jeopardized” if Washington could not obtain reliable information.
Cohen and Burr wrote that no American president had been so blunt with an Israeli prime minister since Dwight Eisenhower’s message to Ben-Gurion during the November 1956 Suez crisis. Ben-Gurion resigned on June 16, 1963, and State held the letter undelivered. Kennedy then sent Levi Eshkol, the new Prime Minister, a nearly identical letter dated July 4, which Ambassador Barbour delivered on July 5.
After about seven weeks of internal consultations, Eshkol’s August 19 reply agreed to a visit in late 1963 and suggested discussing a follow-up in mid 1964. He did not commit to the twice-yearly schedule. Acting Secretary of State George Ball told Kennedy that a precise reading of the written reply limited the United States to examining the reactor alone.
Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963 ended the most direct phase of American pressure on Dimona. Under Lyndon Johnson, Komer called the approach a “soft sell.” Johnson stressed the importance of the semiannual visits, then agreed to waive the next one until after the November 1965 Israeli elections. Cohen and Burr wrote that none of the nine AEC teams that visited Dimona between 1961 and 1969 ever learned of the underground plant, and that Israel’s deception fully succeeded. After the July 1969 visit, the team inferred that “the US government is not prepared to support a real ‘inspection’ effort.”
The Johnson administration also became Israel’s direct arms supplier. Komer wrote in 1966 that the drying up of Israel’s European sources forced Washington to become a direct supplier, first of Hawks and then of tanks. In 1965 the United States offered 110 M48A2c tanks to make up for the German shortfall and 100 M48A1 tanks. The Skyhawk aircraft arrived later. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke told Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin in November 1968 that selling 50 Phantoms would make the United States one of the principal suppliers of arms to Israel. The Phantom conditions under discussion included semiannual inspections and an Israeli signature on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Warnke tried unsuccessfully to link the sale to Israel’s NPT signature. Israel instead agreed not to use the F-4s to carry nuclear weapons and “not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the area,” per a 1968 memo.
After the 1967 war, the United States helped craft UN Resolution 242. It called for “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” (i.e., the 1967 Arab-Israeli war), without specifying the extent of the withdrawal. The Americans were determined to prevent a resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from all captured territories. The resolution also stressed that conquest of territory by war is inadmissible.
Kennedy’s readiness to clash with the Israelis would look almost alien in today’s Washington, where lawmakers compete to prove how devoted they are to the Jewish state. Kennedy was never an anti-Zionist in any doctrinal sense, but his repeated pushback against Israeli demands surely earned him a growing roster of enemies among the Zionist power elite.
That friction between his administration and Tel Aviv lends real credence to the theories surrounding Israeli involvement in his November 1963 assassination. From that point on, the Israelis had a much safer pair of hands in LBJ, who would do their bidding without any pushback. Succeeding presidential administrations have followed in these pro-Zionist footsteps.
What cannot be disputed is this: a political figure with Kennedy’s independence would be shut out of the highest echelons of power today. Bowing before the Supreme Sanhedrin is now a prerequisite for political advancement in the Zionist-occupied territory that is present-day America.
José Niño is a freelance writer based in Charlotte, North Carolina. You can contact him via Facebook and Twitter. Subscribe to his “Substack” newsletter by visiting “José Niño Unfiltered” on Substack.com.





>JFK’s Forgotten Confrontation With Israel
Anyone interested can find a good number of articles about JFK and Israel on the Unz Review — Unz himself has also written about it — that the Jews killed JFK was the conspiracy theory du jour a while ago — personally, I never found the evidence, what little was presented, convincing — it was more innuendo, based on a plausible-sounding motive: the Jews wanted the bomb, JFK was staunchly opposed.
Do you have any specifics about the sudden death of the Russian Ambassador to the US?
He passed on USSR documents regarding the JFK assassination – so was he himself assassinated?
https://reseauinternational.net/mystere-sur-la-mort-de-lambassadeur-de-russie-aux-etats-unis-alexander-darchiev/