European Nationalism

The Ukrainian Conflict: A Ukrainian Nationalist View, Part 5: The Conflict in Eastern Ukraine


Masked pro-Russian demonstrators prepare to storm the military Prosecutor’s Office in Donetsk, eastern Ukraine, Sunday, May 4, 2014.

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Part 4

Returning to the events in a few (out of over a dozen) regions of eastern Ukraine, then there is a saying amongst many Ukrainians that, regarding Ukraine, the Kremlin is a slave to its own propaganda. It essentially creates its own myths and acts those myths out in real life as if they were somehow close to reality. One of the biggest myths the Kremlin created is that speaking Russian in Ukraine means having more loyalty to the Russian Federation than Ukraine.

This is why the Russian mercenaries have received so little support from the local population in eastern Ukraine. Even the commander of the Russian-funded mercenaries in eastern Ukraine (himself a citizen of the Russian Federation) stated quite clearly during a speech posted to You Tube that essentially, no locals are joining his ranks to “fight Ukrainian nationalists”  (why not Ukrainian liberals?) — despite being provided with money and modern weapons. In fact, he stated that “those who join our ranks usually just get weapons, take some money and go home to rob shops. We provide people the opportunity to fight Ukrainian nationalists, but they would rather stay at home and drink beer.”

Eastern Ukraine in general is the more liberal region of Ukraine, and the Donbas region — the only eastern region of Ukraine where Russian-funded mercenaries have not yet been driven out — is by far the most liberal region of the country. Before these events, the leader of Donbas, who is now supporting the Russian mercenaries, even stated that “a gay parade would take place peacefully in our region.” (Incidentally, I hate constantly using homosexuals as an example, but the organized modern homosexual movement is simply a symbol of the dominance of liberal elites in Western societies that are hostile to the traditional peoples, cultures and ethnic identities of all European peoples.) In fact, as usual, only nationalists (and also members of Churches) went to protest the possibility of a parade in Donetsk. None of the current “anti-Western” movements were seen, nor were activists of the “Donetsk Peoples Republic.”

The local governments of the region, most of which now support the Russian mercenaries, have been actively bringing “diversity” to the region as well. Yet, who protests illegal (and not only illegal) immigration to the region? Perhaps the Kremlin might finance some movements to keep the region Slavic? Of course not.  As usual, it is only nationalists who do such things. Mass protests have been led by nationalists (typically the Svoboda party) throughout the region against illegal (and not only illegal) immigration — despite intense opposition from the local governments. Read more

How Dieudo Met Jean-Marie: Or, the Power of Goy-Hatred

Not long ago, French pundit and Zionist activist Alain Finkielkraut argued that the only thing that might keep multicultural France united was anti-Semitism: “This great multicultural France that we wanted to see as an alternative to the old France, well, if it exists and when it exists, beyond communitarianism, it is cemented precisely by anti-Semitism.” This was not, one presumes, a call to stoke Jew-hatred as the only thing which might prevent an ethnic civil war in France.

The statement perhaps makes more sense as a Freudian slip, if one bears in mind the late Joe Sobran’s corrected definition of anti-Semitism: “An anti-Semite used to mean a man who hated Jews. Now it means a man who is hated by Jews.”

There is perhaps no better illustration of this than the relationship between the métis Franco-Cameroonian comedian Dieudonné M’bala M’bala and the venerable French nationalist leader Jean-Marie Le Pen. Read more

The Ukrainian Conflict: A Ukrainian Nationalist View, Part 4: Russia as a Globalist, Liberal, Anti-Ethnic Nationalist Power

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Why does the Russian Federation push and defend Western liberalism so much in Ukraine? The answer can be found by looking at modern Russia as a country.

The Russian Federation is, in essence, itself a liberal state. It is a typical liberal democracy that, in many ways, differs little from Western European countries. It is a country that attacks the culture of its founding people; a country where the youth could not care less about the traditions of their ancestors;  a country where MTV rules the airwaves and McDonalds is the most popular destination for those looking to dine out (indeed, the biggest McDonalds in Europe is in Moscow); a country that defines itself as a proposition nation with a political — not ethnic — understanding of the nation (“everyone who is a citizen is Russian”); a country that, on the state level, closely deals with the IMF and the UN; a country that even  is helping American and NATO forces in Afghanistan; a country where the most popular musicians, in addition to Western artists like Madonna or Lady Gaga, are non-ethnically Russian degenerates like Filipp Kirkorov and rapper Timati — exactly the types that the globalist media uses to brainwash the youth around the world to forget their ethnic heritage and traditions; a country where Chechnyan president Ramzan Kadyrov — whose father actively fought against Russian forces and was responsible for essentially ridding Chechnya of Russians — is officially a state hero.

In fact, the one and only way that the Russian Federation differs from Western Europe — and one of the only things that gives Western dissidents illusions — is the way it banned LGBT propaganda. Yet this has been grossly misinterpreted. It is a great law, of course, but it was passed with huge resistance even within the ruling party and pro-government media. Essentially, all it does is ban gay parades (in itself, of course, a good initiative). Yet pro-LGBT propaganda is increasingly present in all the media, and gay clubs flourish.

When looking at such cases, people forget that the destructive ideology of liberalism as it is now defined in the West appeared in the Russian Federation far later than in the West. In this sense Russia today is the same, in terms of the LGBT movement, as the West 30 or 40 years ago. Banning homosexual propaganda is merely a compromise — a tactic by the ruling elite that will satisfy the millions of Muslims in Russia and the millions of people from the older generation who grew up in the Soviet Union where it was a criminal violation. If the elite of the Russian Federation were truly sincere about this, they could do far more than essentially only ban gay parades for a while, without touching the immense presence of LGBT propaganda in the media. But it doesn’t.

Hardly better than Konchita or Lady Gaga: modern Russian show business

Hardly better than Konchita or Lady Gaga: modern Russian show business

In fact, the regime now in power in the Russian Federation has virtually completely uprooted any authentic pro-Russian opposition: far from being neo-Nazi clowns, truly nationalist and Orthodox, anti-Zionist Russian opposition leaders like General  Vladimir Kvachkov — a former SPETSNAZ (Special Forces) colonel and high-ranking official of the Russian army  who was implicated in an assassination attempt on Jewish oligarch and privitization czar Anatoly Chubays — have been completely humiliated, destroyed and thrown in prison. Read more

The Ukrainian Conflict: A Ukrainian Nationalist View, Part 3: The Conflict with Russia


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The Conflict with Russia

From the point of view of global oligarchy and all forces spreading cultural decay throughout the world, the Russian Federation could not have picked a better moment to start a conflict with Ukraine. To be quite honest, it is hard to think of something that would more effectively transfer the target of most people’s hate away from them and completely save their image in Ukraine.

The aggression commenced at the moment when the previous government fell, before the new government had appeared. It was essentially a moment of anarchy, a moment when well-trained nationalist street mobs ran things in the capital, a moment when key police stations and army bases were captured, when a complete nationalist coup d’état was within reach.

Everything started in Crimea. It is here where Russian troops first entered the country and overthrew a government — in this case, installing the only truly pro-Russian movement of Crimea in power, a movement that during previous elections in Crimea obtained only 4% of the vote and had never led any large protest. The “president” and member of this movement, Sergei Askonov, turned out to be a known figure in organized crime in Ukraine, known as “goblin” in the “salem” gang in Ukraine. Read more

The Ukrainian Conflict: A Ukrainian Nationalist View, Part 2: The Maidan and Yanukovych


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The Maidan and Yanukovych

In February 2010, Viktor Yanukovych became the president of Ukraine after defeating Yulia Tymoshenko in the second round of elections. (In Ukraine, if no candidate gains over 50% of the vote in the first round, the two leaders go into a one-on-one second round). Yanukovych obtained 48% of the vote, versus 45% for Tymoshenko.

The close relations of Tymoshenko and Vladimir Putin are well known in Ukraine. In fact, Tymoshenko’s imprisonment — which was one of the few deeds of the Yanukovych regime that the vast majority of Ukrainians, and especially Ukrainian nationalists supported — was vehemently opposed by not only the West, but Russia as well. It was Tymoshenko that essentially sold out Ukraine to Russia with highly corrupt gas-deals while she was prime-minister — actually one of the reasons she was sent to prison. It was because of these deals that nationalists urged voting against both candidates leading up to the elections in 2010.

Overall, the most influential oligarchs in Ukraine supported Yanukovych — often the deciding factor in Ukrainian elections. It’s worth also noting that, indeed, Eastern Ukraine gave Yanukovych an absolute majority, whereas Tymoshenko gained the support of the vast majority of western Ukraine (despite being herself a Russian-speaker from Eastern Ukraine). This is largely due not to separate views on Ukraine but internal battles between oligarchs, who largely control media and business in their respective regions. In both regions, the oligarchs are usually not ethnic Ukrainian, nor ethnic Russian, and quite often switch sides, but that is another topic for another day.

Indeed, on the most important internal questions that the Western and Russian media claim “divide” Ukraine, we see strong national unity. Read more

The Ukrainian Conflict: A Ukrainian Nationalist View, Part 1


Editor’s note: This series of articles on the current upheavals in Ukraine is written from the perspective of a Ukrainian nationalist. It also provides a nationalist perspective on Ukrainian history leading up to the present. It is of interest to TOO readers for many reasons. In particular, there are detailed comments on the conflict with Russia — a textbook case of competing nationalisms as described by Tom Sunic in several places (e.g., “Which way White Man?”). 

Comments are open for this article.

Over the past few months, there has been an enormous amount of analysis done in Western nationalist circles on the conflict in Ukraine. This analysis was, quite naturally, originally focused on the protests against the now overthrown Yanukovych government — and has since transferred towards the conflict between Ukraine and anti-state protesters inside the country. The events have been analyzed from an array of different perspectives: everyone from Eurasianists (or perhaps, I should call them “Duginists”) to Third Positionists and everything in between.

Although each respective analysis has come from a different angle, virtually every single piece of information on Ukraine on Western nationalist websites shares one key trait:  a complete lack of anything even remotely close to the Ukrainian nationalist view. This complete lack of presence of the Ukrainian nationalist view has given rise to numerous myths and quite strange theories. It can be compared to a modern, informational  Iron Curtain. Western nationalists and Ukrainian nationalists currently live in separate universes in terms of their information, and this has lead to numerous, unfortunate misunderstandings. In this article, I hope to finally give the Ukrainian nationalist view. Read more

Update on Imperium Europa and the European Parliament Elections

Several months ago, I wrote about the campaign by the Maltese pan-European racial nationalist group Imperium Europa, who were running candidates for the European Parliament elections.  The election is over, so I’d like to summarize what happened, what I have learned, and what lessons can be derived.

The results from Malta are here.  Imperium Europa did not win any seats and got less than 2% of the vote. But they did substantially increase their votes from the last election.

Despite the low numbers voting for Imperium Europa, some find its performance “worrisome,” such as Arnold Cassola, chairman of the Alternattiva Demokratika (AD), an environmentalist party that also did poorly in the election:

Initial estimates suggest that Imperium Europa could have garnered an equal number or more votes than AD — a “worrying” scenario for Cassola, who dubbed the far-rightists’ electoral performance as “preoccupying” and “bad” for all the country.

… Cassola nevertheless argued that most of the voters did not intend on voting for the far-right over their affinity with extremist policies, but conversely because of their “concerns” on migration and work.

“Most voters who voted for the far right mostly did so because they feel threatened by migrants in Malta and believed their jobs are in jeopardy. This further proves the need for the government to implement a holistic approach on job creation and a national immigration policy.” (“Far-right’s electoral performance ‘worrying and preoccupying’ — Cassola”).

Read more