To remember Emanuel Celler only as the congressman behind landmark immigration reform is to miss the wider program he pursued for much of his career. The Jewish congressman was a forceful proponent of foreign intervention, international institutions, refugee admissions, and a more deeply entrenched American commitment to the State of Israel. Those commitments stood behind the scene on October 3, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Immigration and Nationality Act in a ceremony staged deliberately at the foot of the Statue of Liberty. The setting was a piece of political theater: Johnson’s administration believed the location announced the law’s symbolic meaning before a word was read aloud.

That achievement placed Celler among the most consequential lawmakers of the 20th century. The law abolished the national origins quota system that had governed American immigration since the Johnson-Reed Act of 1924—a regime that allocated visas based on the ethnic composition of the U.S. population as counted in the 1890 census, effectively reserving roughly 70 percent of all slots for immigrants from Britain, Ireland, and Germany and sharply restricting entry from Southern and Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. In its place, Hart-Celler erected a preference hierarchy that dedicated 75 percent of visas to family reunification, 20 percent to employment skills, and 5 percent to refugees. Celler and other supporters presented it primarily as a civil rights measure—an answer to discrimination encoded in the quota regime rather than a fundamental reordering of who would come to America. Johnson himself was so dismissive of the law’s demographic implications that he called it “not a revolutionary bill” at the signing—a common platitude among those favoring the bill.

He was wrong. The family reunification provisions created precisely the chain migration dynamic that immigration researcher Mae Ngai identified as the law’s defining and least predicted consequence: each admitted immigrant could sponsor relatives, who could sponsor their own, compounding across decades into a transformation of American demographic life that no supporter of the bill had publicly forecast.

The law did not stand apart from Celler’s foreign policy beliefs. It reflected a conviction he had articulated at the start of his career, when he ran for Congress in 1922 on a platform stressing “the evils of Prohibition and the virtues of the League of Nations.” He ended up winning the 10th Congressional District of Brooklyn by 3,000 votes in a seat his party had never previously held. At a time when many Americans wanted to distance themselves from European conflicts after World War I, Celler advocated for the United States to take a more internalist posture on the world stage.

That instinct led him to oppose isolationism as the National Socialists consolidated power in Germany. During the 1930s, Celler pushed for an American boycott of the Berlin Olympics and called for economic measures to make German goods harder to sell in the United States. His objections centered on the Nazi government’s campaign to eliminate Jewish influence from German public life—a campaign defined by the exclusion of Jewish athletes from Germany’s Olympic team and Joseph Goebbels’s unabashed direction of the anti-Jewish propaganda effort. In a cable to International Olympic Committee member General Charles Sherrill, Celler stated: “Any government that abets Jewish persecutions and which threatens daily through Dr. Goebbels to intensify anti-Jewish atrocities cannot be trusted to keep its promise not to discriminate against Jewish athletes.” His argument did not rest on sports alone. He wanted economic and diplomatic isolation of a government conducting what he regarded as a systematic assault on one of the world’s most influential Jewish communities.

Celler carried that anti-isolationist conviction into World War II, repeatedly condemning Washington’s restrictive immigration policies that made it nearly impossible for Jewish refugees to leave war-torn Europe. His most direct target was the State Department, specifically Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, who blocked resettlement measures. Speaking at the New York County Council of the Jewish War Veterans on April 5, 1943, Celler charged: “The State Department must revise its modus operandi with reference to passing upon admission of refugees. The present method is both cold and cruel. It lacks color and humanity. Even though reputable agencies endorse an applicant, it still carries no weight. I intend to fight this until I break it wide open.” When Long testified before Congress in December 1943, Celler leaked certain sections of the testimony to reporters and denounced Long’s professed sympathy as “crocodile tears,” warning: “If men of the temperament and philosophy of Long continue in control of immigration admission, we might as well take down that plaque from the Statue of Liberty.”

He rejected the argument that Allied victory should take precedence over immediate rescue. “Victory, the spokesmen say, is the only solution. … After victory, the disembodied spirits will not present so difficult a problem; the dead no longer need food, drink and asylum,” Celler said in a speech. Celler’s sustained pressure, in addition to Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau’s internal exposure of State Department obstruction, contributed to President Roosevelt’s creation of the War Refugee Board in January 1944.

His Zionism reflected the same outlook. Celler became a Zionist after reading Theodor Herzl during World War I and spent the following decades pressing that conviction into policy. He lobbied President Truman persistently to recognize the new Jewish state, including a 1946 letter complaining about U.S. absence from London conferences on Palestine’s future. He argued that “Palestine is not ‘an extraneous issue'” but an urgent international humanitarian question, and wore down Truman’s resistance despite warnings from military advisers that recognition would antagonize Arab oil-exporting nations.

When Truman recognized Israel on May 14, 1948, Celler did not pause to celebrate. He immediately demanded the U.S. go further, calling for the arms embargo to be lifted: “President Truman is entitled to fulsome praise for his example of statesmanship in recognizing the State of Israel. It is now essential for the United States to go the full way. … The ridiculous arms embargo should now be lifted for the benefit of the State of Israel.” In 1958 he went further still, urging the United States to conclude a defense pact with Israel and admit Israel to NATO: “The omission of Israel from NATO is a serious gap in the free world’s peace insurance,” he declared, arguing that such an alliance “would release much of the understandable tension in Israel, would build the Middle East’s balance of power and would deter any act of aggression by the Arabs.”

Celler also viewed immigration as a foreign policy instrument. He argued that the quota system damaged America’s global standing by implying that people from Eastern Europe and Asia were less desirable than those from Northern and Western Europe. That concern became central to the Hart-Celler Act. Repealing nationality-based preferences was not merely a domestic civil rights measure. It was a statement about what the United States wished to represent during the Cold War. Namely, a capitalist beacon that would pull ambitious migrants from the Global South away from communist influence and integrate them into America’s liberal capitalist order.

Celler was also associated with Franz Boas. For example:

Boas was greatly motivated by the immigration issue as it developed early in the century. Carl Degler (1991, 74) notes that Boas’s professional correspondence “reveals that an important motive behind his famous head-measuring project in 1910 was his strong personal interest in keeping the United States diverse in population.” The study, whose conclusions were placed into the Congressional Record by Representative Emanuel Celler during the debate on immigration restriction (Cong. Rec., April 8, 1924, 5915–5916), concluded that the environmental differences consequent to immigration caused differences in head shape. (At the time, head shape as determined by the cephalic index was the main measurement used by scientists involved in racial differences research.) See notes on Celler’s correspondence with Boas in Hungary data. The two men thus cooperated on immigration policy. Here Boas tells Celler “I wish very much that an amendment to allow Hindues to come here could go through,” arguing that higher caste Indians are basically European. “The difficulty at present lies with the definition of what is a white person and Caucasian race.” (Letter from Celler to Boas, May 26, 2927).

More on Celler, from Chapter 8 of The Culture of Critique:

In 1945 Representative Emanuel Celler introduced a bill ending Chinese exclusion by establishing token quotas for Chinese, and in 1948 the AJCommittee condemned racial quotas on Asians (Divine 1957, 155). In contrast, Jewish groups showed indifference or even hostility toward immigration of non-Jews from Europe (including Southern Europe) in the post-World War II era (Neuringer 1971, 356, 367–369, 383). Thus Jewish spokespersons did not testify at all during the first set of hearings on emergency legislation to allow immigration of a limited number of German, Italian, Greek, and Dutch immigrants, escapees from communism, and a small number of Poles, Asians, and Arabs. When Jewish spokespersons eventually testified (partly because a few of the escapees from communism were Jews), they took the opportunity to once again focus on their condemnation of the national origins provisions of the 1924 law. …

As noted above, Rep. Emanuel Celler was involved in the publication of the report Whom We Shall Welcome that viewed changing the ethnic balance of the U.S. as a desirable goal. Cofnas (2021) argues against this by noting that “Even the authors of the legislation were surprised by some of its immediate consequences. According to Graham: ‘Emanuel Celler himself, disturbed by the steep decline of European immigration, introduced a bill to allow higher immigration from Ireland, Britain, and the Scandinavian countries, which he said had suffered from ‘unintentional discrimination’ as a result of his own law.’” [1]

However, given the substance of the PCIN report and Celler’s involvement in its publication, it’s difficult to believe that Celler did not advocate changing the ethnic balance of the U.S. The fact that Celler wanted to increase immigration from parts of Europe is certainly not incompatible with this. It would be far more convincing if Celler had advocated a law explicitly reaffirming the ethnic status quo, as the 1924 and 1952 laws had done, but he vigorously opposed the ethnic status quo. Getting rid of the national origins formulas was a necessary condition for changing the ethnic status quo, as Celler was well aware. All that remained was increasing the absolute numbers of immigrants, as the PCIN advocated, and that is what ultimately happened.

[1] Graham, Collision Course, 94–95.

Viewed as a whole, Celler’s record offers an early version of the Invade the World, Invite the World, Support Israel Unconditionally consensus that Washington still vigorously promotes. He pressed the United States toward deeper involvement in foreign crises while helping construct the legal framework for mass migration, two commitments that remain embedded in the governing assumptions of both major parties.

José Niño is a freelance writer based in Charlotte, North Carolina. You can contact him via Facebook and Twitter. Subscribe to his “Substack” newsletter by visiting “José Niño Unfiltered” on Substack.com.

Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War
Pat Buchanan

2832 Words

There are various tacks revisionists can take when looking back at the Second World War. There are those who express net sympathy with the German cause; there are those who express sympathy with the Allied cause while exposing Allied misdeeds and skullduggery, and there are those who maintain that the war was a tremendous blunder and that it should never have been fought to begin with. With his 2008 book Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War: How Britain Lost Its Empire and the West Lost the World, Patrick Buchanan takes this third approach while offering his readers a characteristic black pill. So devastating was this war, and the world war which preceded it, that Western civilization was effectively destroyed as a result. Often Buchanan speaks of it in the past tense, as if there is no possibility of recovery. After all, he writes, “Western man suffered a catastrophic loss of faith—in himself, in his civilization, and in the faith that gave it birth.”

The purpose of this work is in part to guide the reader through the history of the first four decades of the twentieth century so we can better understand why these wars were fought and how they could have been easily avoided. Also, Buchanan is keen to bust the cult of Churchill, which places “the indispensable man” upon a pedestal and proclaims him the man of the twentieth century. Buchanan is a revisionist not simply because he rejects the “good war” myth of the Second World War, but also because by disclosing the sheer viciousness of Allied actions during both wars, he tips the scales of morality in favor of the Germans without ever having to say so. Buchanan relies on mainstream historians for his source material, such as William Shirer, John Toland, Richard Evans, Paul Johnson, Niall Ferguson, and many others. However, he also relies heavily upon revisionist or revision-adjacent works such as William Henry Chamberlin’s America’s Second Crusade (1950), Charles Tansill’s Back Door to War (1952), and AJP Taylor’s The Origins of the Second World War (1961). Sadly, Harry Elmer Barnes, David Hoggan, and David Irving were all overlooked in his bibliography.

Buchanan makes two assumptions off the bat which will challenge the prevailing narrative of the World Wars. One is that both were in fact European civil wars rather than wars of nation versus nation. This re-frames the conflicts intra-racially, and, many decades after the fact, kindles a sense of pan-European solidarity in readers who wish to regain the greatness that was once the West. Second, two profound sea changes in Western thought were responsible for these rifts to occur. One was Thomas Jefferson’s idea that “All men are created equal,” and the other was Woodrow Wilson’s doctrine of self-determination. In so many words, the West fell because Westerners abandoned race for liberalism. In Buchanan’s view, many of the blunders which led to both wars can be attributed to this, as well as to all-too-common human foibles such as vanity, power lust, and egotism.

One example was the secret 1904 “entente cordiale” between England and France, which stipulated that in the event of another Franco-German war, Britain would join sides with France right away. Buchanan stresses that the Liberal government in England concocted this scheme. Another was Kaiser Wilhelm’s efforts to build a great navy which would threaten Britain’s. At least, that’s how the British saw it, neglecting to appreciate how the Germans needed to be supreme in the Baltic Sea to protect themselves from Russia, which also had a navy. Buchanan also skewers the outdated doctrine of “balance of power” which compelled the British to oppose whoever proves to be the master of the continent, whether it be France, Spain, or Germany. As events grew more and more tense due to the Balkan crisis in 1914, Buchanan chronicles how one individual was perversely giddy at the prospect of war: the young First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill.

As would be expected, Buchanan makes much of the punitive Treaty of Versailles and how it not only violated Wilson’s doctrine of self-determination but also “reinforced a spirit of nationhood” among the Germans. After the war, millions of Germans were displaced against their will under the authority of Frenchmen, Italians, Czechs, Poles, and other European ethnicities. This says nothing of the financial ruin the treaty imposed on a defeated Germany. Thus, with frustrated German minorities practically everywhere, Europe was turned into a powder keg. But Buchanan distinguishes himself with his pages on the starvation blockade, which perhaps more than anything else inspired resentment in the German mind. It was bad enough that by 1918, 762,000 Germans had been deliberately starved to death. It was not until July 12, 1919 that the blockade was lifted—eight months after the Germans laid down their arms that previous November. This killed approximately another 100,000.

The Germans felt utterly betrayed—and blamed America.

“President Wilson is a hypocrite and the Versailles Treaty is the vilest crime in history,” said the social democrat Scheidemann, who had brought down his government rather than sign. “If these are the peace terms, then America can go to hell,” said General Ludendorff.

Men who believe in the rule of law believe in the sanctity of contract. But a contract in which one party is not allowed to be heard and is forced to sign at the point of a gun is invalid. Germany signed the Treaty of Versailles only when threatened that, should she refuse, the country would be invaded and her people further starved.

And who was the “architect and chief advocate” of this inhumane blockade? Again, none other than the First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill.

Buchanan adeptly summarizes the events which led to the Second World War, and he collates lesser known tidbits of history in with the greatest hits, so to speak. One interesting example includes how in the early 1920s, Churchill and others had urged the Lloyd George government to abandon its alliance with Japan in favor of the United States. During the First World War the two island nations made natural allies, but this was thrown over for a romantic “pan-Anglo-Saxonism,” and an alliance with the United States. This had the twin negative effects of greatly diminishing the Royal Navy’s reach in the Pacific as well as alienating the Japanese, which freed them up for their eventual alliance with Nazi Germany.

Of course, Buchanan guides us through more famous events in the 1930s which led to the Second World War. These include:

• The 1934 murder of Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss at the hands of Nazi assassins
• The collapse of the 1935 Stresa Front, which confirmed British, French, and Italian opposition to German rearmament. A double-dealing Britain had signed a separate pact with Germany which allowed Germany to violate the Versailles limits on warships in return for its recognition of the Royal Navy’s supremacy. This ultimately isolated Italy from the Allies.
• The re-militarization of the Rhineland and the Anschluss, both of which Buchanan characterizes not as German aggression or a sign of things to come but as Germany reasonably reuniting its diaspora back into the Reich. Both were extremely popular moves among the Germans.
• The Munich Accord of 1938, which Buchanan also portrays as reasonable. He dismisses concerns that Neville Chamberlain appeased Hitler. He also describes how Wilsonian principles repeatedly conflicted with British self-interest. In the end, Chamberlain acted wisely when not interfering with Hitler’s actions in Czechoslovakia.

The brutal truth: The Sudeten Germans wanted to be reunited with their kinsmen and could not forever be denied. And as Britain now believed the decision to deliver them to Prague had been a blunder, why fight a war to perpetuate a blunder? …

Chamberlain had another motive in going to Munich. He believed the key to peace lay in addressing the grievances of Germany and rectifying the wrongs of Versailles, and he wanted to be the British statesman who restored Germany to its rightful position as a Great Power and converted her into a partner in peace. If this required the return of all German lands and peoples, should they wish to return, Chamberlain would facilitate it, if done peacefully.

So if by September of 1938 Britain and Germany were simpatico over the reincorporation of the Reich—including, as it turned out, the German city of Danzig which was within the borders of Poland—then what went wrong?

According to Buchanan, it was not any single person’s nefarious design. Rather, it was a tragic combination of ego, vanity, and other human foibles often experienced by men in power. But if there was one individual most keen on another European civil war, it was MP Winston Churchill, who flip-flopped on his previous hatred of the Bolsheviks and proposed an alliance with Stalin to oppose Hitler. Buchanan duly explains that by 1939, Stalin and the Soviets had already killed millionsof their own people, while the Nazis had done nothing of the sort.

As for Hitler, he gave in to arrogance as well as anger towards the Czechs—especially towards Czech foreign minister Eduard Beneš, whom he loathed. He behaved belligerently towards Chamberlain during their Bad Godesberg meeting, also in September 1938, and frequently lost his temper. It was clear he really wanted to, in his words, “smash the Czechs.” While not letting Hitler off the hook for his reckless behavior, Buchanan depicts this episode as Hitler’s spiteful vendetta against Beneš rather than his first step toward world domination. In fact, Buchanan demonstrates that when dealing with Poland, Hitler had been far more reasonable and patient; his attempts at bringing Poland into his Anti-Comintern Pact and his very generous overtures to the Poles regarding Danzig attest to this.

And as for Chamberlain, Buchanan agrees that he was correct to avoid war after Munich, yet he takes the much-maligned prime minister to task not just for his naivete in trusting Hitler not to want to incorporate Danzig into the Reich, but also for taking the aftermath of Munich so personally. When Hitler marched on Prague in March 1939, Chamberlain was humiliated and sought to save face. This, as much as anything else, in Buchanan’s view, is why Britain went to war. Yes, Hitler’s aggressiveness and his indulgent attitude towards Joseph Goebbels after Kristallnacht didn’t help. And yes, Polish intransigence and delusions of grandeur also didn’t help. But the “fatal blunder” was committed by Chamberlain when, under pressure from Lord Halifax, he issued a guarantee to Poland that Britain would intervene in case a German attack. This was the infamous “blank check,” and Buchanan goes on for many pages decrying it quite convincingly as the greatest blunder in history.

This is where a comparison with Hoggan seems warranted. In Hoggan’s 1961 work The Forced War, Lord Halifax is painted unambiguously as the main villain behind the Second World War. Using a multitude of primary sources—including many German language ones not appearing in Buchanan’s bibliography—Hoggan shows that Halifax was ready to guarantee Poland by August 1938, one month before Munich. In his footnotes, Hoggan points out how he contradicts AJP Taylor on this point. Hoggan also states that Halifax had concocted the Tilea Hoax—which purported that Hitler had designs on Romania—and believed that war with Germany became inevitable as soon as the Germans occupied the Rhineland in 1936. Hoggan also includes how in 1938 Halifax and Chamberlain had pushed for the production of thousands of long-range heavy bombers with the purpose of bombing German civilians. None of this appears in Buchanan.

Hoggan also delves into how American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt had egged the British on with their warmongering throughout the late 1930s, while Buchanan does not. Despite admitting that the FDR administration was “honeycombed with Soviet spies,” Buchanan gives the opposite impression.

Could Britain have relied on America had she defied Hitler?

In September 1938, the month of Munich, FDR disabused Europe of any such notion: “Those who count on the assured aid of the United States in case of a war in Europe are totally mistaken. … To include the United States in a Franco-British front against Hitler is an interpretation that is 100 percent false.” That month, America informed France that, in the event of war, America could not, under the Neutrality Act, transfer to her the warplanes she had already purchased. FDR’s message: This is your war, not ours.

Compare this to Hoggan, chapter 5:

Perhaps frustration and knowledge of the domestic obstacles confronting his own policy increased President Roosevelt’s fury. Jules Henry, the French Chargé d’Affaires, reported to Paris on November 7, 1937, that President Roosevelt was interested in overthrowing Hitler, but that the majority of the American people did not share his views. French Ambassador Saint-Quentin reported on June 11, 1938, that President Roosevelt suddenly blurted out during an interview that the Germans understand only force,” and then clenched his fist like a boxer spoiling for a fight.

And chapter 7:

Lipski and the other Polish diplomats were influenced in their judgment of this question at the moment by a report which had been telegraphed by Count Jerzy Potocki from Washington, D.C., on November 21, 1938. The Polish Ambassador was informed by William C. Bullitt, the American Ambassador to France who was visiting in the United States, that President Roosevelt was determined to bring America into the next European war. Bullitt explained to Potocki at great length that he enjoyed the special confidence of President Roosevelt. Bullitt predicted that a long war would soon break out in Europe, and “of Germany and her Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, he spoke with extreme vehemence and with bitter hatred.” He suggested that the war might last six years, and he advocated that it should be fought to a point where Germany could never recover.

Clearly, FDR had his hands dirty when it came to taking sides before the war had even started. That Buchanan doesn’t sufficiently explore this possibility comes as a bit of a surprise since historians Charles Tansill and William Henry Chamberlin, whom he draws from often, certainly do. The difference between The Forced War and Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War is that of scholarly history versus popular history.

And there is the question of why Winston Churchill suddenly became so virulently opposed to Hitler that he sought an alliance with the Soviet Union, the most murderous regime in history, in order to stop him. Since Buchanan ignores David Irving, the possibility that Churchill had been involved in a quid pro quo with Jewish financiers such as Henry Strakosch of the shadowy anti-Nazi group the Focus, never gets mentioned, even if only to be debunked.

None of this impugns the overall worth of Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War as a work of popular revisionist history. It would simply be impossible for such a work to cite Hoggan and Irving and still qualify as “popular” according to today’s censors. Further, perhaps the work would have been more accurately titled if Chamberlain’s name had been included in the title since it was Chamberlain’s blunder, according to Buchanan, that had sealed the fate of Western civilization. Still, Buchanan does excellent work dismantling the myth of greatness surrounding Winston Churchill, not merely by exposing his unwarranted truculence during both World Wars, but also by putting his amoral nature on display when he dealt with Josef Stalin. It seemed there was nothing he wouldn’t do for the communist dictator. Churchill appeased Stalin far more extensively than Chamberlain had ever appeased Hitler when Churchill “consigned one hundred million people to the mercy of Stalin’s butchers” both during and after the war—all because he didn’t want 350,000 Danziger to be reunited with Germany.

The aim of Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War, it seems, is to nudge the reader in the direction of Second World War revisionism. It was not a good or just war. It was not a necessary war. According to Buchanan, it was a tragic and devastating civil war which came as a result of human frailty and bad ideas mixed with the psychopathy found in men like Churchill, Hitler, and Stalin. While this is debatable, just the fact that Buchanan puts Churchill on a moral par with Hitler and both men far above Stalin is an excellent starting point for budding revisionists. Yes, Buchanan condemns Hitler when he can and dutifully brings up the Jewish Holocaust. But he places it within the context of the vast bloodbath that was the Second World War and demonstrates that in balance, communism was a far greater threat to civilization than Nazism ever was. Had Neville Chamberlain simply not issued that suicidal guarantee to Poland, the overall carnage would have been greatly reduced—for everyone, Jews and gentiles alike. That this would have led to Nazi Germany being the dominant power on the continent and the prime bulwark against the Soviet Union does not seem to bother Buchanan at all. Viewed within this lens, a nudge, thankfully, is as good as a shove.

Here’s how the IRA lost the last war

All wars are different. But perhaps there are lessons to be learned from the previous civil war? The most important thing to learn is how we can avoid another civil war.

No offence to any of the tens of thousands who at great personal risk and inconvenience did their Geneva-Convention-allowed duty to blow enemy soldiers to Kingdom Come.

To cut a long story short: The IRA was riddled with informers from top to bottom, from the early days in the 60s to the final ceasefire in the 90s. There were so many informers that it’s fair to say the average IRA volunteer was known to the police within weeks of joining and from then on almost his every move was known to them. If he managed to kill some enemy soldiers, it was only because the Brit deep state allowed it. (There are many well-documented cases where the Deep State sacrificed its own men. The Chinook helicopter crash into the Mull of Kintyre killed dozens of counter terrorism Ulster policemen.)

The IRA men were just lab rats in a big civil war experiment run by the deep state.

IRA enthusiasts boast about an undefeated army and a pathway to a united Ireland. Technically true, but meaningless. Unfortunately, the killing of Protestant civilians in the name of a united Ireland has made the Prods much less enthusiastic about the whole idea.

The start:

The first IRA explosion was actually in Dublin in 1966. They damaged the famous Nelson’s Pillar. It was grossly irresponsible: people were wallking in the street as lumps of rock flew around. They could have killed a dozen people. (One of the men was called Sutcliffe. Sutcliffe’s relative has achieved great wealth and hatred for his role in importing vast numbers of foreigners. He has a company called Quanta Capital and is currently spending lavishly ón ads to “Stop Suicide” amongst Irish men.)

Also in 1966, the first Protestant civilian was killed. Martha Gould was a widow and had the misfortune to live beside a Catholic property. Local Protestants had been incited to damage Catholic property. Unfortunately, they chose to use fire to damage the property. The fire spread and that is how the first Protestant civilian to be killed in the civil war was accidentally killed by her own people. (During the recent, mostly peaceful Remigration Rallies it was terrifying to see fire sometimes used as a way to encourage people to leave. Window smashing is a much less dangerous way to achieve the same aim).

The Ulster Volunteer Force also shot some random Catholics the same year. But the UVF had the names and addresses of actual IRA people. For the same effort to kill a random Catholic they could have killed an actual IRA man. Smells of deep state.

The deep state spent several years planting bombs and beating innocent people to death before major shooting started in 1969.

The war was triggered by discriminatory housing and harsh treatment of peaceful protests. 3,500 dead for an issue that could have been sorted in a week.

Oddly, both the United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland now have a very similar situation: Our leaders discriminate in favour of foreigners in housing and are – sometimes, by no means always – very harsh in treating peaceful protests and cheeky online comments.

The housing marches were inpsired by the wonderful Marxists of People’s Democracy. The beatings of the protestors were unnecessary and counterproductive. Either they were the actions of undisciplned police or they were done by order. The cops who did the beatings rarely got punished, so we can assume they were ordered by HQ.

The conflict was scripted and staged from Day One. It ended in a flood of Ecstasy pills and other feel good drugs that the deep state shipped into Ulster at just the right moment.

The website Belfast child (https://belfastchildis.com) provides a detailed timeline:

On 5 October 1968, a civil rights march in Derry was banned by the Northern Ireland government. When marchers defied the ban, RUC [Royal Ulster Constabulary] officers surrounded the marchers and beat them indiscriminately and without provocation. More than 100 people were injured, including a number of nationalist politicians. The incident was filmed by television news crews and shown around the world.It caused outrage among Catholics and nationalists, sparking two days of rioting in Derry between nationalists and the RUC.

How convenient that the British state allowed TV cameras to record this and broadcast it to the whole world.

On 1 January 1969, People’s Democracy began a four-day march from Belfast to Derry, which was repeatedly harassed and attacked by loyalists. At Burntollet Bridge the marchers were attacked by about 200 loyalists, including some off-duty police officers, armed with iron bars, bricks and bottles in a pre-planned ambush. When the march reached Derry City it was again attacked. The marchers claimed that police did nothing to protect them and that some officers helped the attackers. That night, RUC officers went on a rampage in the Bogside area of Derry, attacking Catholic homes, attacking and threatening residents, and hurling sectarian abuse.

Foolish to organise a march that you cannot defend. Burntollet has been full of Prods for four hundred years. They should have known to expect trouble at Burntollet. If they had the numbers and everybody armed with steel dustbin lids there would have been no trouble. Or if they had negotiated with the locals before marching through the area?

Residents then sealed off the Bogside with barricades to keep the police out, creating “Free Derry“, which was briefly a no-go area for the security forces. In March and April 1969, loyalists [i.e., those who wanted Ulster to remain under British control] bombed water and electricity installations in Northern Ireland, blaming them on the dormant IRA and elements of the civil rights movement. Some attacks left much of Belfast without power and water. Loyalists hoped the bombings would force O’Neill to resign and bring an end to any concessions to nationalists. There were six bombings between 30 March and 26 April. All were widely blamed on the IRA, and British soldiers were sent to guard installations. Unionist support for O’Neill waned, and on 28 April he resigned as Prime Minister.

On 19 April there were clashes between NICRA (a pro-Catholic civil rights organizaiton) marchers, the RUC and loyalists in the Bogside. RUC officers entered the house of Samuel Devenny (42), an uninvolved Catholic civilian, and ferociously beat him along with two of his teenage daughters and a family friend. One of the daughters was beaten unconscious as she lay recovering from surgery. Devenny suffered a heart attack and died on 17 July from his injuries. On 13 July, RUC officers beat a Catholic civilian, Francis McCloskey (67), during clashes in Dungiven. He died of his injuries the next day.[72]

On 12 August, the loyalist Apprentice Boys of Derry were allowed to march along the edge of the Bogside, a Catholic neighborhood near Derry. Taunts and missiles were exchanged between the loyalists and nationalist residents. After being bombarded with stones and petrol bombs from nationalists, the RUC, backed by loyalists, tried to storm the Bogside. The RUC used tear gas, armoured vehicles and water cannons, but were kept at bay by hundreds of nationalists. The continuous fighting, which became known as the Battle of the Bogside, lasted for two days.

What idiot decided it would be a good idea to throw stones and petrol bombs at the loyalists?

In response to events in Derry, nationalists held protests at RUC bases in Belfast and elsewhere. Some of these led to clashes with the RUC and attacks on RUC bases. In Belfast, loyalists responded by invading nationalist districts, burning houses and businesses. There were gun battles between nationalists and the RUC, and between nationalists and loyalists. A group of about 30 IRA members was involved in the fighting in Belfast. The RUC deployed Shorland armoured cars mounted with heavy Browning machine guns. The Shorlands twice opened fire on a block of flats in a nationalist district, inadvertently killing a nine-year-old boy, Patrick Rooney. RUC officers opened fire on rioters in Armagh, Dungannon and Coalisland.

Now comes a very unhelpful intervention from the southern Government. Instead of calming things down, they inflame things.

During the riots, on 13 August, Taoiseach Jack Lynch made a television address. He condemned the RUC and said that the Irish Government “can no longer stand by and see innocent people injured and perhaps worse”. He called for a United Nations peacekeeping force to be deployed and said that Irish Army field hospitals were being set up at the border in County Donegal near Derry. Lynch added that Irish re-unification would be the only permanent solution.[…]

On 14–15 August, British troops were deployed in Derry and Belfast to restore order, but did not try to enter the Bogside, bringing a temporary end to the riots. Eight people had been shot dead, more than 750 had been injured (including 133 who suffered gunshot wounds) and more than 400 homes and businesses had been destroyed (83% Catholic-owned). 1,505 Catholic and 315 Protestant families were forced to flee their homes. The Irish Army set up refugee camps in the Republic near the border. Many, but not all, nationalists initially welcomed the British Army, as at first they provided a bulwark against the RUC. However, relations soured due to the British Army’s heavy-handedness and discrimination.

Read that líne again: “nationalists initially welcomed the British Army”. They were hailed as heros and offered cups of tea. How did it go from cups of tea in Belfast in 1969 to being blown apart in London parks a few years later?

If the British government wanted to stop the war, all they had to do was to instruct the soldiers to continue behaving in a friendly and cheerful way with the nationalist population. But it seems orders were given for the soldiers to be as harsh, insulting and provocative as possible.

After the riots, the ‘Hunt Committee‘ was set up to examine the RUC. It published its report on 12 October, recommending that the RUC become an unarmed force and the B Specials (a quasi-military unit) be disbanded. That night, loyalists took to the streets of Belfast in protest at the report. During violence in the Shankill, UVF members (a loyalist paramilitary group) shot dead RUC officer Victor Arbuckle. He was the first RUC officer to be killed during the Troubles. In October and December 1969, the UVF carried out a number of small bombings in the Republic of Ireland.

Poor Victor Arbuckle! There is no logical reason for a Protestant pro-United Kingdom Ulsterman to shoot a fellow Protestant pro UK member of the Royal Ulster Constabulary at a peaceful demo about reforms to that Constabulary.

We can suspect the famous hidden hand. Who pulled the trigger and who was winding him up to it?

The provocations continued, the IRA started killing more people. Internment angered people – many non-IRA people were snatched and treated harshly. Various massacres of unarmed civilians by British Army people helped inflame things.

Even at the start of the conflict, the British had many agents in the IRA and lots of surveillance. At any stage, they could have arrested the vast majority of IRA men. But they didn’t.

Except for once: in Derry in the 1980s. They had many informers, but they used just one 0f them to arrest a hundred IRA men and give evidence against them. They were in jail for a year, and sure enough, there was much less IRA activity in Derry that year. The judge – bizarrely – said that the informer was clearly a liar, and the IRA men were found not guilty. There was plenty of other evidence against them, apart from the informer, so it is suspicious that the judge would release them all.

Most of them were released and most of them continued as IRA men.

Tactical mistakes the IRA made.

These are also proof that the IRA was mostly acting as golem for the Brits.

Total lack of moral code. Obeying obviously insane orders. Allowing massive infiltration of informers. Killing informers. Crippling people. Rampant drunkenness and womanising. Rampant chitchat about past and upcoming operations. Lack of basic care of the lives and brains of their volunteers. Disdain for the lives of civilians, even fellow ethno-Gaels. Lack of training in weapons. Mismatched weaponry. Lack of training in operating together as a group. Deliberately sectarian attacks, while piously proclaiming they were non-sectarian. Very poor targetting. Avoidance of high-rank targets

Lies. Lies, lies – Lack of spiritual code: It’s true that some Catholic monks would smuggle guys here or there, but officially the Church was against the war. RUC recount how they used Pope John Paul’s sermons in Ireland to flip IRA men into confessing. The lack of a code makes other tactical mistakes easier – killing civilians, etc.

Unfortunately, various IRA people told quite a few shocking, outrageous lies over the years. This meant they developed a bad reputation. They lied a lot about killing civilians and nationalist civilians in particular. “It wasn’t us, it was someone else.” “We killed him because he was an informer.” “It was an accident.” “British Army interfered with the bomb and made it explode prematurely.”

Sometimes these statements were true. But often they were not.

It seems that the IRA killed more Catholics than any other target group. A nationalist living in the six counties was as likely to be killed or injured by IRA activity as by British Army activity. Hobson’s choice.

Because of all the lies the IRA told, they steadily lost support, and so they lost the war.

Spies:

The IRA was riddled with spies. Almost every unit had at least one spy. Many had two or more spies. HQ was even worse. The guys in charge of interrogating suspected informers were themselves informers. Martin McGuiness and Gerry Adams were known as IRA leaders in the early 1970s. They were part of a six-man delegation that was flown to London to negotiate a peace deal with British.

The Brits knew they were IRA men back then. Three thousand people were killed in the decades since, yet nobody laid a finger on Adams or McGuiness. There was one supposed attempt to kill Adams and it must rank as the most pathetic British Army operation since the battle of Hastings in 1066. The two boys spent very little time in jail. They were either very lucky, very skillful, guided and protected by God above or … they were protected by the Brits.

Some estimate that as many as one quarter of arrested IRA men gave information to the cops while being questioned. Many IRA activities were gruesome, counterproductive, and harmed the nationalist population. Deliberate killing of women and children is a coward’s game, but the IRA killed many. A lot of IRA men were disgusted at what the IRA had done (and their own part in it) and gave information to the Brits without torture.

As well as spies and repentant members, the IRA was very heavily surveilled, even back then. Tiny microphones in your house, garden, car, pub, etc. Cameras on all roads.

The IRA had some spectacular successes in recruiting well- placed spies. There were plenty of patriotic English, Welsh and Scots, with legitimate personal grudges against an Army officer, a judge or an MP and would have been delighted to provide information on the target so the IRA could kill him.

But their reputation as an untrustworthy and very, very, very heavily infiltrated group reduced recruitment.

Bloodthirst was more urgent than military victory. The IRA did numerous deliberate, planned civilian massacres while loudly proclaiming they never did such a thing. The young recruits ordered to do the killings were told to say they were freelancers if they were caught. There was no shortage of legitimate military targets in Ulster but they chose to kill the unarmed, the uninvolved, and the innocent. While they did plenty of civilian massacres, the IRA avoided attacking top people in the British State. They only killed three MPs.

Killing civilians can work as way to defeat your enemy. The Allies did it to the Germans. But killing a few only makes the rest of them angry. If you want victory through killing civilians, you will need a mountain of corpses. For example, the Israelis must have killed at least a million Palestinians since 1921 and they still haven’t won.

Killing for the fun of it or killing people, even for the noblest of reasons, is a serious business. Unfortunately, it can also become a enjoyable hobby. Someone who started out as an ethno-nationalist keen to save his tribe transforms into a killing enthusiast. The cause of the war became less important than the fun of killing. The means became the end. This is obviously disastrous from the point of view of actually wining a civil war.

When sadism rules, silly ol’satan can’t be far behind. There are accounts of IRA members hanging out in sex-and-drug covens which included their supposed enemies in the loyalist groups and the deep state. One of the rarest books about the Troubles is Jim Cairns book – Disappeared. It is impossible to find. More recently, the famous lesbian martyr Lyra McKee wrote a book with a similar theme. Also impossible to find. (Lyra was killed, long after the ceasefire, when a splinter IRA group fired a couple of long distance shots at a bunch of police observing a demo. They missed the cops completely, but one shot hit Lyra and she died. Some US feminist bigwigs were in Ulster at the precise time she was shot. Whatever one might say about conspiracies, her book is impossible to obtain.

Contempt for the lives of their own volunteers

Given the high level of British agents in the IRA, this is perhaps not surprising. There are numerous accounts of raw, untrained youngsters being sent into highly dangerous situations. In the space of a year or so 25 IRA men were killed by their own bombs. At best this was gross negligence.

The proverb says: Treason never prospers. For if it prosper, none dare call it treason. This was true of the Royal Court in London and of the IRA cell in Derry/Londonderry.

John Crawley’s excellent book The Yank tells of an IRA patrol of untrained men, who had never operated together as a unit, being sent across the border on the off-chance they could kill some Brits. The Brits would be highly trained and very experienced working together as a group. Plus the Brits had all the advantages of air cover, radio, surveillance and huge numbers. To send untrained men out to try and attack such overwhelming force was at best farcical foolishness.

The torture and killing of supposed informers was another sign of contempt for the lives of their men. The informer is the most dangerous enemy and death is often the penalty. But that does not mean that the most useful thing is to kill them.

The British used the threat of IRA vengeance to keep their informers in líne.But if the informers knew for certain that the IRA would not kill them if they confessed to informing, that would give informers an incentive to stop informing. The deal would be that the informer gives full details of the information he gave, any details on his handlers and does a full press conference, apologising for betraying his comrades and blaming the Brits for having blackmailed or beaten him into. The IRA did exactly that a couple of times, but mostly they were tortured and killed.

Once an informer was identified, it would make sense not to alert them that they are suspect. Simply avoid giving the informer access to information. Watch the informer so as to lead to his handlers.

In any war, there will be a few deaths and injuries. The IRA sacrificed their men far too cheaply.

Poor target selection

The Deep State wanted a mini civil war. There are numerous advantages to having a small war bubbling away. They could train their soldiers and experiment with various weaponry and bring in new laws to deal with the threat. They could play mind games to scare the people in Britain. If they wanted people killed, they could use the IRA to do it.

This might explain why the IRA killed remarkably few VIPs.

The IRA killed about 2,000. Only three MPs. Only one Royal. Very few officers or high-ranking judges or police.

The story of two of the MPs killed is suspicious. An opposition MP was expertly killed with a car bomb as he came out of the Westminster car park. If they had the capacity to kill an MP, why kill an opposition MP? Seems insane. It no doubt helped Thatcher win the subsequent election. Even more bizarre is that the Irish National Liberation Army unit that did it was riddled with informers and drunks. But somehow, they managed to keep the job a secret? Doesn’t make sense.

Another MP was from Ulster. The story goes that he had been given information about Deep State VIPs using a state childcare home as a source of teenage male sex partners, the infamous Kincora. He was about to blow the whistle. They say that the IRA men who killed him did not bother to conceal their identities and seemingly had an aura that they would not be punished. Although he was the only Northern Ireland MP to be killed, his story is very rarely mentioned.

The other MP was killed in the Brighton bombing which failed to kill Thatcher. He was Catholic and well disposed towards the Irish in general. He could have been a useful person to approach about torture of IRA men in UK prisons or other humanitarian issues. A potential peacemaker.

Imagine if the IRA had concentrated solely on killing MPs. That might average two dead MPs every week. Two by-elections every week for thirty years! Solving the Ulster war would have been every MP’s priority.

The IRA did have some minor tactical wins that are worth noting.

The zero-fatality bomb. Careful target selection and clear warning sometimes allowed the IRA to do economic damage without the bad publicity of shredded civilians. Many bombs killed civilians. There was a series of a dozen or more bombings in Birmingham that did huge damage to industry and killed nobody. But then there was that awful, insane and counterproductive Birmingham bomb that killed all those civilians.

Helicopters are a weakness. The Deep State loves to use helicopters to scare us. Helicopters are suprisingly vulnerable. They are relatively slow and not armoured, so at close range they can be disabled with all sorts of simple weapons.
God forbid there will be yet another UK civil war, but if there is, a clever opposition would ensure that every government plane and drone is neutralised in a safe manner.

So that’s how the IRA lost the last civil war in the UK. Rampant with informers, surveillance everywhere, treacherous and cruel and bloodthirsty and wasteful with the lives of its own men. The deep state wanted the war, so it created the conflict, kept the cannibal pot simmering for decades and then quenched the fire when they got bored of it.

Sinn Fein is the remnant of the IRA campaign. It is also very heavily infiltrated with British agents. It’s leaders openly grovel to the globalists and actively usher in the migrant swarms and sneer at anyone who objects.

But out of much tragedy, perhaps some good will come?

Any future UK civil war will be fought over the immigration issue.

Ulster is showing how the UK can avoid a civil war or even any injuries and resolve the immigration problem in a friendly, mostly polite way.

Various so-called riots have successfully encouraged some surplus foreigners to leave Ulster. Although some houses were burned or had windows smashed, it is worth noting that NOT ONE foreigner was killed – or even injured. Not so much as one hair on one foreigner was harmed.

Nobody. The foreigners suffered property damage and they were told in plain and mostly polite language that they were not welcome. A peaceful pogrom?

Civil War in the UK? Nein, danke! I’ll have an Ulster-style legally rude but mostly polite peace.

Sources:

John Crawley’s https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Crawley_(Irish_republican) book The Yank has much information to show the extent of high-level infiltration of the IRA. There is strong evidence against Martin McGuinness.

Www.sarsfieldsvirtualpub has a thread called Sinn Fein traitors with detailed evidence against named Sinn Fein politicians. There are also many amusing stories of Sinn Feiners being insulted in public. One Sinn Fein lady had a mental breakdown after insults and coins were thrown at her ón the election campaign.