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A Theory of Khazars and Ashkenazi Jews

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If there were Jews living in a region called Khazaria largely occupied by present-day Eastern Ukraine and part of Southern Russia, including Crimea without Sevastopol, these Jews were not Gentiles who converted to Judaism, i.e., converts. Attracted by the strategic proximity of the Khazarian capital Itil to a number of important caravan routes, these Jews — who were merchants and slave dealers, mostly rhadanites or rabbinic Jews from Persia and the Middle East, active in the slave trade between Christendom and the Muslim world — settled there in large numbers between the eighth and tenth centuries. “By the 8th century” writes French historian Laurent Guyénot, in an excellent article on the life and work of famed Russian historian and ethnologist Lev Goumilev,

they formed a foreign elite and gained increasing political influence. The situation came to a head at the beginning of the 9th century when a Jewish prince took power and made rabbinic Judaism [talmudism] the official religion of the state. A bloody civil war ensued, which the Jewish caste won by using mercenaries. Although the mass of ethnic Khazars was eventually forced to submit to the authority of the Jewish elite, they never converted to Judaism, which remained exclusively the faith of the political authorities, according to Goumilev. With this, he concludes, Khazaria was transformed into a ‘social-political chimera ruled by a Jewish trading elite, with the original ethnic Khazars becoming subjects of ‘a state that was alien to them in terms of ethnicity and religion.’ (1)

This Jewish hostile elite was eventually subdued at the end of the tenth century by the Kievan Rus’ led by Prince Sviatoslav. Their empire collapsed and the surviving Jewish Khazars dispersed throughout Eurasia and Europe. Some retreated to the Crimea, others fled to the West. “Many,” according to Goumilev, “remained active in the Russian lands, encouraging hostilities between the Russian princes and inciting the steppe peoples to attack the Russians.” (2)

To recap, Jewish Khazars did indeed rule over Khazaria between the eighth and tenth centuries but they were not converts, i.e., gentiles who converted to Judaism. According to Wikipedia, this purely speculative theory on the Khazarian origin of Ashkanezi Jews was first developed by a French philosopher named Ernest Renan. It was then popularized by Arthur Koestler in his book, The Thirteenth Tribe: The Khazar Empire and Its Heritage. (3) More recently, extremely left-wing Israeli historian Shlomo Sand, the author of The Invention of the Jewish People (4) argued that because Jews are mostly descended from Khazar converts, they do not constitute a nation or need a state of their own. Likewise, Arabs have long cited the Khazar myth in attempts to deny a Jewish historical claim to the land of Israel.

Several historians who are aware of the apologetic nature of its hypothesis rejected this theory. (5) A crucial difficulty right from the start is in the word “Ashkenaz” which means “the West,” (6) i.e., Jews of England and France who after their expulsion from these countries moved to Germany and Eastern Europe into an area designated by the Russian government as the “Pale of Settlement,” the great medieval haven of Jewry. This area included Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Bessarabia. These regions which were also inhabited by the Jewish remnant of the Jewish Khazaria empire were part of the Russian Empire, but not of Russia as such. (7)

The fact that Ashkenazi Jews speak a language based on German (Yiddish) rather than a language based on Turkish is an additional difficulty. Moreover, it is unlikely that the highly literate Ashkenazim would retain no trace of their Turkish origins. (8) Finally, genetic evidence also weighs heavily against such a hypothesis. According to Jewish journalist Tina Hesman Saey:

Large-scale genetic studies have shown that today’s diverse Jewish communities have remarkable genetic cohesion. The Jews of Iran, Iraq, Yemen, North Africa, European Ashkenazi and other Semitic groups all originated in the Middle East. A common geographic origin can be observed for all major Jewish groups studied. This genetic research clearly disproved the story of the Khazars: a pre-10th century Turkish-Asian empire that converted en masse to Judaism. The researchers compared the DNA signatures of Ashkenazi Jews with those of people of Turkish descent and found no match. The DNA results support the hypothesis that the paternal gene pools of the European, North African, and Middle Eastern Jewish communities originated from a common ancestral Middle Eastern population, and suggest that most Jewish communities remained relatively isolated from neighboring non-Jewish communities during and after the diaspora. (9)

The Khazars have nevertheless become a kind of all-purpose device, a sort of strawman or red herring used by Jews and non-Jews alike. The idea that the Ashkenazim are not Semites but converted Khazars is a trick that is widespread on social media, allows non-Jews to safely vent their hate of Jews and of Israel. Some sincerely believe this legend is true since it is so widespread, others are just trying to escape a life-threatening accusation of antisemitism, the only anathema still punishable by social death, even assassination. And if you are Jewish, blame the Khazars for whatever bad deed you are accused of. If Ashkenazim are in fact converts, this implicitly means that the real Semitic Jews from the Holy Land, the real “chosen people” are not responsible for their actions. Arthur Koestler, for example, uses the Khazar conjecture to defuse racial antisemitism, which, from his point of view, would be misdirected, since he supposes that Ashkenazi Jews are not Semites. Thus, if for some reason Ashkenazim behave badly, evangelical Christians, for example, and all Christians for that matter, who are convinced that the Jews are God’s chosen people, will be able to continue fooling themselves since the bad Jews in question are not real Jews, but impostors. (10)

Professor Revilo P. Oliver, one of the greatest American White conservative thinkers of the last century, had the following interesting insights on the subject of the Khazars:

During the past century, many Christians who resented the depredations of the Jews, chiefly Ashkenazim, but wanted to retain faith in their favorite story book, elaborated the theory that their parasites were not really God’s People but only the descendants of Khazars who had been converted to Judaism. The theoretical evasion was so attractive to them that it became an article of Faith, and it was finally adopted by a prominent Jew, Arthur Koestler, who expounded it in The Thirteenth Tribe: The Khazar Empire and Its Heritage (New York, Random House, 1976).

Despite his odd claim that his book did not invalidate his race’s claim to the territory now called Israel, Koestler’s demolition of the ‘Chosen People’ myth was savagely denounced by many of his fellow Ashkenazim. Some speculate that the hostility of his fellow tribesmen may have influenced the joint suicide of Koestler and his wife not long thereafter.

The Jews’ interest in making Khazarian conversion to Judaism authentic is explained by their pretense that they are a religion, not a race. If they are a religion, like Christianity and Islam, they must seek converts and what better proof than that they once converted a whole kingdom? (11)

This will by Christians to retain faith in the Bible at all cost—the first point made by R. P. Oliver in the above citation—is still very much the norm today. The Biblicism Institute has an eloquent easy-to-find Internet article on the subject called “The Ashkenazim.” Prominent catholic intellectual E. Michael Jones is a staunch believer of the Khazar theory.

The last point on the race/religion gambit is particularly interesting. For example:

John Murray Cuddihy’s (1978) book, No Offense: Civil Religion and Protestant Taste, Cuddihy focuses on the elevation of Judaism to the status of one of the “big three” U.S. religions, to the point that a rabbi officiates at the presidential inauguration even though Jews constitute approximately 2–3 percent of the population. Cuddihy argues that this religious surface served as a protective coloring and led to a sort of crypto-Judaism in which Jewish ethnic identities were submerged in order to make them appear civilized to non-Jews. As part of this contract, the prominent Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr acknowledged “the stubborn will of the Jews to live as a peculiar people”—an acknowledgment by an important Protestant leader that the Jews could remain a people with a surface veneer of religion.

Both sides gave up something in this bargain. The Jews’ posturing as a religion left them open to large-scale defection via intermarriage to the extent that they took seriously the idea that Judaism was akin to Protestantism, and to some extent this did occur.

What the Protestants gave up was far more important because I think it has been a contributing factor in the more or less irreversible ethnic changes in the United States and elsewhere in the Western world. Judaism became unconditionally accepted as a modern religion even while retaining a commitment to its ethnic core. It conformed outwardly to the religious norms of the United States, but it also continued to energetically pursue its ethnic interests, especially with regard to issues where there is a substantial consensus among Jews: support for Israel and the welfare of other foreign Jewries, immigration and refugee policy, church-state separation, and abortion rights (Goldberg, Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish  Establishment: Addison-Wesley, 1996, 5). What is remarkable is that a wealthy, powerful, and highly talented ethnic group was able to pursue its interests without those interests ever being the subject of open political discussion by mainstream political figures, for over 60 years—since Lindbergh’s ill-fated Des Moines speech of 1941.

I suppose that Niebuhr thought that he was only giving up the prospect of converting Jews to Christianity, but the implicit downgrading of the ethnic character of Judaism provided an invaluable tool in furthering Jewish ethnic aims in the United States. The downgrading of the ethnic aspect of Judaism essentially allowed Jews to win the ethnic war without anyone even being able to acknowledge that it was an ethnic war. For example, during the immigration debates of the 1940s–1960s Jews were described by themselves and others as “people of the Jewish faith.” They were simply another religion in an officially pluralistic religious society, and part of Jewish posturing was a claim to a unique universalistic moral-religious vision that could only be achieved by enacting legislation that in fact furthered their particularistic ethnic aims. The universalistic moral-religious vision promoted by Jewish activists really amounted to taking the Protestants at their own word—by insisting that every last shred of ethnic identity among Protestants be given up while Jews were implicitly allowed to keep theirs if they only promised to behave civilly.

The evidence provided by Cuddihy suggests that Niebuhr was socialized by the Jewish milieu of New York into taking the positions that he did—that his position as a major Protestant spokesperson was facilitated by alliances he formed with Jews and because his writings fit well with the Jewish milieu of New York intellectual circles. Niebuhr’s behavior is therefore as much an indication of Jewish power and the ability of Jews to recruit gentiles sympathetic to their causes as it is an indication of Protestant self-destruction. One cannot underestimate the importance of Jewish power in intellectual circles in New York at the time of Niebuhr’s pronouncements (see CofC, passim). For example, Leslie Fiedler (1948, 873) noted that “the writer drawn to New York from the provinces feels . . . the Rube, attempts to conform; and the almost parody of Jewishness achieved by the gentile writer in New York is a strange and crucial testimony of our time.”(Fiedler, L. A. (1948). “The state of American writing.” Partisan Review 15: 870–875. (12)

Judaism is in fact a group evolutionary strategy which allows the Jewish ethnicity to pass off the ideology that it is a religion when it is really a political project which allows them not only to survive, but to prevail. Hitler in Mein Kampf had penetrated the secret of this form of cryptic Darwinism:

One of the most ingenious tricks ever devised has been that of sailing the Jewish ship-of-state under the flag of Religion and thus securing that tolerance which Aryans are always ready to grant to different religious faiths. But the Mosaic Law is really nothing else than the doctrine of the preservation of the Jewish race. (13)

According to evolutionary psychologist Kevin MacDonald, Jews are constantly inventing all sorts of such legends and ideologies to protect themselves, achieve their goals, and maintain their hegemony. (14) Several Jewish historians try, for example, to falsify the history of their country of adoption to serve nationalist Jewish causes. Polish Historian Yitzhak Schipper, for one, attempted to show, notes K. MacDonald, that Ashkenazi Jews originating from the Khazar empire who had converted to Judaism,

had lived in Poland as long as the Poles, and further that they had had a civilizing influence on Poland. His theory of a powerful, independent Jewish state was also meant to be a model for a future Zionist state. His emphasis on the agricultural prowess of the Khazars implied that Jews engaged in farming unless prevented by others—a claim that was meant to counter the antisemitic charge that Jews avoided farming and were disloyal, alien economic parasites. (15)

However, this theory has outraged many Polish historians, including A. Marylski, who see in this lie an attempt, “to place pre-historic Poland under the boot of the Jews.” (16) This is an impossibility since Sephardim, i.e., Spanish Jews and Ashkenazi, i.e., Western Jews, arrived in Poland after their expulsions from Spain and Western Europe starting in the 15th century, much later then, than the supposed influx from the Khazar Empire which came to an end in the early 10th century.

Likewise, V. Zelensky, the president of Ukraine, uses the historic presence of Jews in Khazaria a 1000 years ago to claim that Ukraine is a Jewish land, just like Zionists in Palestine use their historic presence in Palestine 2000 years ago to claim that Palestine is a Jewish land. (17) (18)

References

  1. Laurent Guyénot, “Lev Goumilev et « la chimère khazar,” E&R, December 1st, 2022. This article is a review of the book by Mark Bassin, The Gumilev Mystique: Biopolitics, Eurasianism, and the Construction of Community in Modern Russia, Cornell University Press, 2016.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Arthur Koestler, The Thirteenth Tribe: The Khazar Empire and Its Heritage, Popular Library, 1976.
  4. Shlomo Sand and Yael Lotan (Translator), The Invention of the Jewish People, Verso, 2020.
  5. Kevin Macdonald, Ted Sallis: More Jewish Genetics: The “Weak Khazar Hypothesis,” The Occidental Observer, December 11, 2009.
  6. Norman F. Cantor, The Sacred Chain. A History of the Jews, Har-perPerennial, 1994.
  7. For a map of this region and an example of what most authors say about the Khazars see Benton Bradberry, The Myth of German Villainy, Authorhouse, 2012, pp. 62-65.
  8. Kevin Macdonald, work cited.
  9. Tina Hesman Saey, “Tracing Jewish Roots: Genome Study Helps Map Diaspora, Highlights How Heritages Blended,” Science News, June 3, 2010.
  10. Kevin Macdonald, work cited.
  11. Revilo P. Oliver, The Khazars, Internet Archive
  12. Kevin MacDonald, Preface to the First Paperback Edition of The Culture of Critique, AuthorHouse, 2002, p. xvii.
  13. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Hurst and Blackett LTD, Unexpur-ged edition, 1939, p. 127.
  14. Kevin Macdonald, Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism, 1stBooks, 2004, p. 267; see also: “Refuting the Khazar Theory & Occidental Observations,” Red Ice TV, September 29, 2014.
  15. Ibid, p. 267.
  16. Ibid.
  17. Jim W. Dean and Gordon Duff, “What Role Does Judaism Play in the Ukraine Conflict?”, VT, February 22, 2022.
  18. Henri Makow, “Ukraine War – Chabad’s Strategy for Slavic Genocide,” www.henrimakow.com, August 18, 2022.

Alkali-Throwing for Allah: How the Right’s Rhetoric and the Left’s Lies Work Together to Deny Racial Reality

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Kimberley Frank and Samantha Sykes. Those names were missing from the outraged commentary on the latest outbreak of vibrancy to enliven the formerly pale and stale United Kingdom. An Afghan Muslim called Abdul Ezedi is accused of throwing a flesh-eating alkali over a woman and her two young daughters, then trying to run them down with a car. “Human depravity doesn’t go much lower than this,” said the Trotskyist libertarian Brendan O’Neill. “If Ezedi is indeed the perpetrator, then this looks like the most horrendous and preventable of attacks,” said Brendan’s comrade Tom Slater. “How on earth was [Ezedi] given asylum once he had committed a sex offence that resulted in him being placed on the Sex Offenders Register?” said the Jewish comedian Konstantin Kisin.

Importing Afghanistan

Amid all the outrage, there was absolutely no honesty. None of them admitted the obvious truth: that importing Third-World people inevitably means importing Third-World pathologies. O’Neill and company believe in striking poses, not in solving problems. That’s why none of them mentioned the names of Kimberley Frank and Samantha Sykes. Nor did any other commentator in the mainstream media. O’Neill and company have either never heard of those two White girls or forgot about them long ago. This isn’t surprising, but it is reprehensible, because everything that is now being said about the depraved Afghan criminal Abdul Ezedi applies double to the depraved Afghan criminal Ahmad Otak:

Sadistic Afghan asylum seeker made ex-girlfriend watch him stab her sister and friend to death because she wouldn’t take him back

A “sadistic” asylum seeker who forced his former girlfriend to witness him stabbing her sister and her friend to death after she refused to take him back has been jailed for life. Afghan national Ahmad Otak laughed and spat on 17-year-old Kimberley Frank’s body after stabbing her 15 times at her home in Yorkshire while her sister Elisa watched helplessly. He then tied his ex-partner up with electrical flex and lured her friend Samantha Sykes, 18, to Kimberley’s flat in Wakefield, where he stabbed the teenager repeatedly before slitting her throat. … Leeds Crown Court was told that Elisa had met Otak in a children’s home after he arrived in the UK from Afghanistan in 2007, claiming he was 16 years old. The pair had an on-off relationship and had planned to marry in 2011, but when Otak became more controlling Miss Frank called off the wedding, the court heard. Prosecutor Richard Mansell QC said: “He said that even if she didn’t marry him she could not leave him. He told her that he would go crazy and would kill people.” He later claimed he was joking but later threatened to kill Elisa, her friends and members of family — including his eventual victims Samantha Sykes and Miss Frank’s sister Kimberley.

Mr. Mansell said Elisa was too frightened to report what had happened to the police but Samantha Sykes, 18, was not and reported Otak to the UK Border Agency as an illegal immigrant and contacted police, but no action was taken because Elisa declined to make a statement. In September last year she finally decided to leave him for good but relented when he threatened to throw acid in her face and petrol bomb her mother’s house. [Et cetera ad nauseam.] (Sadistic Afghan asylum seeker made ex-girlfriend watch him stab her sister and friend to death because she wouldn’t take him back, The Daily Mail, 9th November 2012)

Brutally murdered, long forgotten: White nobodies Samantha Sykes and Kimberley Frank with their Afghan enricher Ahmad Otak

The parallels between Abdul Ezedi and Ahmad Otak are glaringly obvious. Both were bogus asylum-seekers, both were refused asylum, both were nevertheless allowed to remain in the UK, and both made their depravity plain to the authorities long before they committed their horrendous crimes. But no-one in the mainstream media has drawn those parallels and pointed out the truth: that allowing any migration at all from Afghanistan is both evil and insane. Note how Ahmad Otak “threatened to throw acid” in a woman’s face. Abdul Ezedi went beyond threats and threw alkali in a woman’s face. That’s Afghan culture for you. But not just Afghan culture, of course, because acid-throwing flourishes all over the Third World. So do rape, misogyny, corruption, exotic diseases, and the genetic horrors that result from marriage between close relatives. When Third-World people come to the First World, those Third-World pathologies start flourishing in the First World too. Who could have seen that one coming?

Posturing and evading the truth

Not Brendan O’Neill and company. They continue to pretend that it’s possible to import Third-World people without importing Third-World pathologies. The trans-British Bangladeshi Rakib Ehsan responded to Ezedi’s Afghan culture by thundering: “The UK’s asylum system is utterly dysfunctional. Time and again, we see criminals, traffickers and terrorists slipping through the net. But even by Britain’s woefully lax security standards, the case of Abdul Ezedi has plumbed new depths.” As usual, Ehsan was posturing and evading the truth. He refuses to admit that the problem with the “UK’s asylum system” is not that it is “dysfunctional,” but that it exists at all. Western nations should not be granting any kind of permanent residence, asylum or otherwise, to non-Whites from the Third World. Please tell me, Rakib: Was the British “asylum system” functioning well when it admitted the Libyan parents of the suicide-bomber Salman Abedi? After all, those parents never hit the headlines. It was their son, born and raised in Britain, who blew children to bits at a pop-concert. And was the American “asylum system” working well when it admitted the Afghan parents of the mass-murderer Omar Mateen? Again, the parents never hit the headlines. It was their son, born and raised in America, who machine-gunned gay revellers in a Florida night-club.

Disconnecting the dots

As I described in “Sunshine Hate,” the left reacted to Mateen’s massacre by lying long and hard. They didn’t merely refuse to connect the dots: they denied that there were any dots there in the first place. Commentators like Gary Younge, the chief Black intellectual at the Guardian, claimed that the massacre was “home-grown” and had nothing to do with immigration, Islam or Afghanistan.   The mainstream right aren’t always as dishonest as that. They’ll admit that the dots exist, but they refuse to connect them. The left denies the dots; the right disconnects them. That’s why there was no mention of Kimberley Frank and Samantha Sykes in the outraged commentary on Abdul Ezedi’s alleged crime.

It’s also why the right are drawing the wrong conclusion in their outraged commentary on the departure from politics of a British MP called Mike Freer. The Jewish comedian Konstantin Kisin said more than he realized when he responded to Freer’s departure like this: “I don’t think it’s possible to sum up the state of Britain better than the fact that Mike Freer, a gay MP, has decided to leave politics because of death threats from Islamist extremists.” Mr Freer is a staunch supporter of Israel, you see, and so he’s under threat from Islamists. Indeed, Mr Freer has said that his “husband” is so worried that he “always wants to make sure he picks me up from the tube after work, he doesn’t like me walking home alone.”

Pedo-punim vs Islamist extremism: the Jewish comedian Konstantin Kisin (photo by John Anderson)

Konstantin Kisin thinks that a gay MP being menaced by Islamists is a perfect summary of “the state of Britain.” He’s right. But not in the way he means. He wants to suggest that the married homosexuals being menaced by murderous Islamists is anomalous and disturbing. He’s wrong. Married homosexuals and murderous Islamists go together perfectly, because both groups arise from the decadence and depravity of modern Britain. A culture that allows men to marry each other is suicidal and rotten to the core. That’s also why it allows mass migration by Muslims and other non-Whites who bring with them all the pathologies of the Third World. Kisin and company can’t connect the dots of gay marriage and “Islamism” because they approve of the former and disapprove of the latter. Nor can they connect the dots of “Islamism” and Freer’s support for Israel. It’s precisely because British politics is controlled by Jews that so many non-Whites have colonized Britain against the clearly expressed opposition of the White majority.

Not-so-random stabbing spree

But non-White migration is only the first stage of the Jewish war on White Britain. The second stage is minority worship, the lying cult that insists that non-Whites enrich and strengthen the country when in fact they do the exact opposite. A few days before that Afghan called Abdul Ezedi began throwing flesh-eating alkali in London, a psychotic Black called Valdo Calocane was sent to mental hospital for stabbing three people to death in Nottingham last year. Two of the victims were White and one was half-White, half-Indian. The Guardian didn’t reveal that Calocane came to Britain from Guinea-Bissau in West Africa at the age of 16, but it did say that his vibrancy “has disturbing similarities to that of Zephaniah McLeod, who killed 23-year-old Jacob Billington and injured seven others in a violent and random stabbing spree in Birmingham in September 2020.”

McLeod was also psychotic and also well-known to the authorities before the murder, you see. But in fact his “stabbing spree” wasn’t so random after all, because McLeod is also Black and his victim was also White. The Guardian didn’t mention those highly relevant facts or the “disturbing similarities” with the psychotic Black Phillip Simelane, who murdered a White schoolgirl called Christina Edkins in 2013, and the psychotic Black Timchang Nandap, who murdered a White scientist called Jeroen Ensink in 2015, and the psychotic Black Darren Pencill, who murdered a White father called Lee Pomeroy in 2019. The newspaper is dedicated to the cult of minority worship, so it never admits either that Blacks commit murder, rape, and other violent crimes at much higher rates than Whites do or that, just as in America, Blacks are far more likely to harm Whites than Whites are to harm Blacks.

Another psychotic Black enriches Britain: the Nottingham murderer Valdo Calocane and his victims (image from the London Evening Standard)

And although the Guardian does admit that Blacks are much more likely to suffer from psychosis, it does so only in order to portray Blacks as victims and to blame their higher rates of psychosis on (can you guess?) White racism. However, it can’t blame White racism for the lowered intelligence and horrible genetic diseases caused by inbreeding among British-based Muslims, so it doesn’t discuss that delicate topic.

In other words, it denies the existence of the dot. The mainstream right rarely discusses Muslim inbreeding either. And when it does, it never connects the dot of Muslim inbreeding to the dot of Muslim terrorism to the dot of Muslim alkali-throwing to the dot of Muslim rape-gangs to the dot of Muslim political corruption to the dot of Muslim honor-killing. After all, if the mainstream right connected those dots, it would have to admit that migration by Muslims and other non-Whites has been utterly disastrous for Britain. And if it admitted that non-White migration has been a disaster, it would have to ask why said migration has continued for so long at such high volume in the face of such clearly expressed opposition by the White majority.

Third-World people = Third-World pathologies

That question can’t be asked by the mainstream right, because the answer exposes the Jews who control politics here and oversee the cult of minority worship just as they do in America, Germany, and France. All across the West, three things have happened. First, non-White migration has taken place against the clearly expressed opposition of the White majority. Second, non-Whites have reproduced the pathologies of their Third-World homelands. Third, the mainstream right have disconnected the dots and refused to admit that non-Whites don’t belong in the West and never will.

“Third-World killers and rapists are good for you, goyim!” says the Jewish globalist Gideon Rachman

We’ve seen that disconnection often in the past. Now we’re seeing it in the commentary on the alkali-throwing Afghan Abdul Ezedi. We’ll soon see it again when another non-White commits another horrendous crime. The mainstream right are in thrall to the Jewish cult of minority worship. That’s why they can’t admit the obvious truth: Third-World people = Third-World pathologies. That obvious truth has an equally obvious corollary. If you want to end Third-World pathologies, you have to expel Third-World people.

The Trials and Tribulations of a White Advocate

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“Mr. Williams is an unpopular figure, and had I more experience at the time I would have certainly declined this representation.”
Laura Finch, Mr. Williams’ defense lawyer

Pocahontas Show Trial: The Wrongful Conviction of an Unpopular Figure in West Virginia
(See also the webpage for the book.)
William White Williams
Cosmotheist Books, 2021.

Pocahontas Show Trial is the story of the legal and personal challenges experienced by Will Williams from 2014 to 2021 as chairman of the National Alliance (NA). His rather complicated account is intensely personal, yet also deals with broader issues — organizational, sexual, ideological, and judicial — relevant to White activism.

To put the story into context: In July 2002 William Pierce, founder and chairman of the National Alliance died. One anonymous online poster described Pierce as a complex and driven man who gave up a comfortable academic life to become a dissident teacher and prophet. At the time of his death the Alliance was the foremost radical White advocacy group in the country, radical in its original meaning of root, of dealing with root or foundational issues.

After Pierce’s death the organization went into a steady decline. By 2013 the NA had only a handful of members and was essentially bankrupt. The then chairman, Erich Gliebe, was selling off the group’s assets. At this point Williams, the former membership coordinator under Pierce, along with another former member, Kevin Strom, decided to resurrect the organization. After buying Pierce’s 13,000 volume personal library from Gliebe, Williams struck a second deal.   Gliebe was being sued by another group of former members for control of the moribund organization. Williams worked with Gliebe to extract him from this suit by assuming chairmanship of the NA. The above account may appear to be just “movement drama,” but it does have wider ramifications.

One of the broader issues involved in this story is the organizational structure of White advocacy. The Alliance is a membership organization with considerable real assets attractive to grifters, opportunists, and lawfare warriors. Although Gliebe had driven the Alliance into the ditch, the organization still possessed a 350-acre headquarters in West Virginia, a million-dollar property with several buildings, saleable timber, media inventory, and customer lists that could produce cash. Pierce was convinced that only such a real-world organization could achieve long-term success. But such an organization is also vulnerable to damage from both defective supporters and malicious opponents.

The subtitle of this book could have been: “Good Help Is Hard to Find.” Attracting dysfunctional persons has been the bane of White advocacy groups for decades. Williams describes Pierce’s method of recruitment as kissing a lot of frogs to find a prince. Referring to the Grimm Brothers fairy tale, Pierce had to go through a number of prospects before he found a keeper. He was able to do this because of his unquestioned leadership and because he was on-site. When Williams took over control of the NA he was living in Tennessee 200 miles from the Mill Point headquarters. Thus he needed to hire someone to hold down the fort in his absence. The pool of candidates was limited — almost all were what Williams calls toads — no princes.

The first so-called toad encountered was former Chairman Gliebe’s business manager Patrick Martin. After Williams gained access to the Alliance’s financial statements, he found evidence that Martin may have embezzled tens of thousands of dollars from the organization, funds the NA badly needed.

Williams’ first hire, Randolph Dilloway wasn’t any better. Dilloway had worked as a volunteer for the Alliance, and Williams hired him to look after the NA headquarters. “I hired Dilloway tentatively in mid-December 2014, when I was desperate to get someone on the property just to have a presence there.” By the following May, Dilloway had been fired for insubordination and theft. Not too unusual, personalities conflict at work, people quit or get fired, hard feelings result. But that was just the beginning of the story.

Some of the items Dilloway stole were Alliance records that the contemptable thief sold to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) for a reported $5,000. The SPLC is a malevolent, multifaceted organization: a propaganda mill, a private spy agency, a fund-raising racket, and a lawfare firm. Much of the materials stolen were invoices from old book sales, but there was at least one item of actionable intelligence for the SPLC’s chief female bloodhound, Heidi Beirich. Beirich is a familiar figure to the Dissident Right. We learn in Show Trial that contrary to popular belief, she is not Jewish, but a self-hating, obese, lesbian of German descent.

Beirich’s one gold nugget was a thirty-year-old letter from Pierce to his attorney that was CC’d to a law student Glen Allen. Decades later Allen was now an attorney working for the city of Baltimore until the SPLC lobbied to get him fired. Not one to take things lying down, Allen, who is the head of the Free Expression Foundation and a contributor to The Occidental Observer, sued the SPLC to defend First Amendment rights.[1]

But with Dilloway gone, things were actually going to get worse with the hiring of Garland DeCourcy, AKA Garland Corse, Elizabeth Corse, Gail Dempsey. It is not clear when DeCourcy began working with the SPLC. Williams writes that she “became another SPLC asset by September 2015.” Williams knew DeCourcy had been an Alliance member many years ago when the author hired her in April 2015. In a coup attempt several months later, DeCourcy staged a “battery incident” in which she claimed Williams assaulted her. Though not apparent at first glance, there was mounting evidence that DeCourcy was mentally unstable, perhaps psychotic. Again, good people are hard to find.

The assault allegation led to Williams’ arrest and most of the book describes his travail dealing with the West Virginia court system. The author had several factors working against him. The NA headquarters is located in Mill Point, Pocahontas County, a backwoods area of West Virginia. The Alliance has had a presence in the county since the 1980s. The relationship with local law enforcement might be described as a bit tense, but not confrontational. The long-time sheriff, Jerry Dale, had bought into the SPLC propaganda depicting the NA as armed and dangerous. Thus once Williams entered the criminal justice system it was unlikely he would get off scot-free regardless of the evidence. The county’s establishment saw this as an opportunity to possibly rid themselves of NA’s presence.

So another of the wider issues involved in the Williams case is the unequal application of the law due to ideological considerations, sometimes called selective enforcement and prosecution. Perhaps the best example of this was the differential treatment afforded the Floyd rioters of the summer of 2020 and the demonstrators who besieged the capitol on January 6th.  Pocahontas County is overwhelmingly White, but conventionally conservative, so many of the locals looked askance at the NA for being non-Christian (Cosmotheist) and unpatriotic (opposing American globalism).

Another issue is the feminization of the judicial system. The author’s case occurred during the height of the #Me Too movement. His accuser was female, he had two female judges and an ineffective female counsel. An example of the anti-male bias: Defense attorney Laura Finch told Williams that they should keep quiet regarding his two combat tours in Vietnam as a Green Beret officer because that might indicate a violent personality. One would think having served honorably in the armed forces would be an asset. To add to the all-female cast, Williams claimed biased coverage from Jaynell Graham, a reporter for The Pocahontas Times.

Williams later learned that one of his judges, Magistrate Carrie Wilfong, had a complaint filed against her for “being drunk at a magistrate meeting, and even while on the bench — including the period when she heard my case.” Ms. Wilfong died in January 2020 at the age of 43 after a “documented history of long-term alcoholism and serious drug addiction.” The courthouse was a nuthouse.

In addition to holding the wrong political/social beliefs and being of the wrong sex, Williams was a victim of courthouse cronyism highlighting the difficulty that an outsider might have finding competent legal representation in a highly rural area. When the author hired Laura Finch to defend him things appeared hopeful. Ms. Finch thought the evidence against him was very weak and they should win the case. But her attitude changed, and she put forth a slipshod defense to say the least. Why? There are several possible reasons, none mutually exclusive. One, the powers that be in Pocahontas County wanted Williams convicted and Finch wanted to remain in good standing with the courthouse crowd. Two, Finch had political ambitions, and a successful defense of a “Nazi” would not add luster to her resume. In 2018 she ran unsuccessfully for state senate, and in 2020 ran again unsuccessfully for county prosecutor. Three, there may have been an element of laziness involved. Lawyers owe their clients the best defense they can provide, but some just go through the motions, putting forth a minimum of effort.

To make a long story short, Williams was convicted of assault. He appealed his conviction all the way to the West Virginia Supreme Court The conviction was upheld. He was sentenced to 20 days in jail, credited with two days served, and got eight days off for good behavior. He probably could have avoided jail time with a plea deal, but refused to plead guilty to an act he says he did not commit.

Williams went on to file two complaints with the West Virginia Judicial Investigative Commission, one for the criminal case and one for a civil case brought against him by DeCourcy. He also filed complaints with the West Virginia Office of Disciplinary Counsel which led to a hearing before the Investigative Panel of the Lawyers Disciplinary Board.  All to no avail. Finally, Williams even filed a complaint against the West Virginia judicial authorities with the U.S. Department of Justice in Washington. He had yet to receive a response as of the book’s publication.

Show Trial is Williams’ personal account — his story, his history. But he gives a convincing account that is extensively documented. There are some suspenseful moments as well. After his December 2015 arrest, he is released from Tygart Valley Regional Jail without transportation, money, or even a hat and coat to hitchhike 75 miles in a winter rain back to his truck parked at Mill Point. Throughout Williams exhibited a tenacity and resilience that overcame criminal charges, civil suits, and a torrent of online attacks to retain leadership of the National Alliance. He was fortunate to have the unwavering support of his wife and helpmate Lana.

Show Trial recounts a complex story involving many more persons and events than mentioned in this short review. The text reflects its self-published origins. The volume would have benefited from some professional structural editing, perhaps a stronger chronological framework. That said the book should be read by attorneys, law students, and anyone interested in the history of the National Alliance. I wonder if a copy is available at the Pocahontas County Public Library.

[1] The Free Expression Foundation, P.O. Box 65242, Baltimore MD 21209.  freeexpressionfoundation.org

 

Weimerica? — Carl Schmitt on the Rule of Law

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Carl Schmitt, 1888–1985

The Liberal System likes to adorn itself with the label “the rule of law,” implicitly suggesting that other systems of belief,  other non-liberal states or statelets throughout history solely function as lawless entities violating the freedom of their citizens. This is not true. Since time immemorial states worldwide, even the worst tyrannies, have used legislative policies when passing a verdict against political opponents or common criminals. The problem is not whether those illiberal states or statelets are/were just or unjust; the problem is rather the right or wrong choice of words and the subsequent interpretation of those words by the detractors or proponents of those states.

For instance, legislation in communist Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union contained detailed constitutional structures covering all aspects of citizens’ lives. The same goes for Fascism in Italy and National Socialism in Germany (1922–1945), whose leaders considered their country’s laws far more freedom-loving than the laws of the Liberal System.  In contemporary America, under the cover of the grandiloquent expression “the rule of law,” the judiciary tends more and more to slide toward excessive legalism—lawfare by any other name, which sooner or later leads to administrative disruption with a possibility of triggering civil unrest. Currently, this process of lawfare can be observed in the US judiciary, as illustrated by numerous indictments against former president Donald Trump, by Letitia James’s crusade against VDARE, the Charlottesville lawsuit, and much else.  Moreover, the quasi-Soviet-style trials of thousands of January 6 Capitol protestors are in full swing with defendants becoming subjects of poorly defined and often abstract misnomers (rioters?, trespassers?, insurrectionists?, terrorists? …or freedom fighters!?). It must be pointed out that the salvo of mutual accusations, felony charges, and countercharges from Trump’s legal team versus US government-sponsored local DAs and activist, Trump-hating lawyers like Roberta Kaplan are not an inherent feature of the American system. Not at all. In fact, overt hyper-legalism in the US, bordering increasingly on administrative anarchy, represents the very essence of the historical dynamics of the Liberal System.[i]

Quis judicabit? — who makes the final legal decision?

The striking similarity between the current US judicial system and the semi-anarchic judiciary in Weimar Germany that had resulted in incessant civil unrest and serial political killings was observed by Carl Schmitt in his numerous critical articles published from 1933 to 1944 in legal journals of National-Socialist Germany. One must, however, keep in mind several points of concern when studying Schmitt’s legal work. The English language does not have the equivalent for the compound German noun “Rechtsstaat” (state ruled by law), a noun which has its exact verbal and conceptual replica in all continental European languages (état de droit, pravna država, stato di diritto, právní stat, etc.).  Instead, US/British legal scholars resort to a more general expression such as “the rule of law” or the “constitutional state” — terms which do not convey the same specific meaning as the German “Rechtsstaat”. The expression I use in my translations of Schmitt’s citations, i.e., state ruled by law may by closest to the original German noun “Rechtsstaat”.

Secondly, one must keep in mind that Schmitt, who is often quoted today by scores of contemporary US and European traditionalist scholars, Alt-Right, or New Right intellectuals and activists, was not only a legal expert and a renowned political scientist, but also a multilingual scholar constantly prodding into the meaning of political concepts and their semantic distortions by diverse ruling political classes in Europe and the US. The expression “fake news” did not exist during his lifetime, although Schmitt was well aware of the faked legalese embedded in liberal judicial jargon. Despite his open sympathy for National Socialism and Fascism it is worth examining the relevance of his articles, especially when assessing the current US and EU legal systems within international law. In his article under the laudatory subtitle “The National Socialist state is a righteous State” he writes:

Whether a “Rechtsstaat” [i.e. state ruled by law] exists depends on a specific property that one attributes to this ambiguous word and also to what extent a Rechtsstaat  comes close to a righteous state. Liberalism of the 19th century attributed to this term a specific meaning, thus turning the Rechtsstaat into a political weapon in its struggle against the state. Whoever uses the expression, must exactly spell out what he understands by it and how his Rechtsstaat differs from the liberal Rechsstaat, as well as how his Rechtsstaat should be national socialist, or for that matter any other kind of Rechtsstaat.[ii]

Given the widespread overuse of the term “the rule of law”, it must not come as a surprise that this term hardly sounds credible any longer. “In this sense,” writes Schmitt, “liberalism has indiscriminately endeavored over the last century to portray every non-liberal state, be it an absolute monarchy, be it a Fascist state, be it a National-Socialist or a Bolshevist state, as a state not ruled by law (Nicht-Rechtsstaat), or as an unjust or lawless state (Unrechtsstaat).”[iii] Furthermore, the Liberal System, as its supporters tirelessly point out, is established  as a two-tier social construct with a sharp division between the state apparatus and a private person. The underlying assumption is that such a division can best prevent the rise of a powerful state and a dictatorial leader. The liberal state, according to liberal theoreticians, must solely function as an occasional “nightwatchman,” never interfering in the private sphere of the individual:

This two-tier nature explains the typical two-tier constitutional framework of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat. Fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the liberal-democratic state and its constitutional system are essentially the rights of the private person. For this reason alone [those rights]  can be considered “apolitical”. The liberal state and the constitutional framework are based on a simple and direct contrast between the state and the private person. Only on the basis of this contrast is it natural and worthwhile to endeavor to create the entire building of legal protections and facilities in order to protect a helpless, defenseless, poor, isolated private person from the powerful Leviathan “state”. Only for the protection of a poor individual do most of these legal protection measures, in the so-called Recthsstaat, make sense. They can be justified on the grounds that the protection from the state must be increasingly modeled on judicial proceedings, and even more so in line with the decision of judicial authority independent from the state.[iv]

The above-mentioned quote on the romantic self-perception of the Liberal System is flawed. One might raise the question: is it true, as liberal theoreticians claim, that division between the civil society and the state can best guarantee individual liberties, and best protect private citizens from arbitrary state decisions? Hardly. Is it true that the much-lauded liberal checks and balances, including a sharp separation between the executive, the legislative and judicial branches can best prevent totalitarian temptations? Hardly. The overly praised cleavage between the private sphere and the public sphere is deceptive; it does not enable citizens to escape from the modern liberal surveillance state. It must be emphasized over and over again that in the Liberal System it is no longer the state that exerts control; instead, a myriad of elite, well-funded pressure groups, NGOs, media companies, and lobbies influence citizens on the daily basis while wisely using the state only as a legal cover. Schmitt analyzed long ago the negative impact of nongovernmental counterpower pressure groups.

However, all of this gets completely absurd as soon as strong collective associations or organizations conquer nongovernmental, non-political spheres of freedom, and as soon as nongovernmental (but by no means apolitical) organizations get hold of private persons, on the one hand, while confronting the state under the guise of various legal titles (people, society, free bourgeoisie, producing proletariat, public opinion, etc.), on the other. Such nongovernmental, but, as mentioned, thoroughly political associations, come to dominate both (via the legislature) the will of the state as well as (through social and “purely private law” coercion) the single individual whom they turn into a media subject. They are actual and real political decision makers and manipulators of the levers of state power.”[v]

Does this sound familiar? What is now derisively named as deep state was well anticipated by Schmitt, although this term did not exist during his lifetime. In their criticism of the liberal Weimar Constitution German nationalists introduced and popularized all over Europe the term (das) System, a term that can easily be substituted today for the modern liberal deep state. Surely, in a Liberal System where power is decentralized, known in academia as the “power-sharing” process, a dissident citizen can only fantasize about toppling the government by force in  his resident state. At first sight this may sound like a noble freedom-protecting trait of the Liberal System. However, the atomized nature of dispersed power in Liberalism, resulting from its famed checks and balances policies, inevitably leads to a dispersed mutual distrust and hatred among citizens, in which the line between the victim and the perpetrator gradually disappears. The late Claude Polin, who was one of the best observers of liberal contradictions, raises a haunting question: “How is it possible that one fears a king exercising his power, and why is it that one has less fear when the same power is conferred on millions of little kings?”[vi]

Hundreds of nongovernmental kingly figures and hundreds of private agencies in the US and EU, including scores of ethnically based pressure groups, each displaying often a bizarre victimhood, and each controlling its own turf, have their own methods of repression against dissident voices. Surely most NGOs in the US and EU, do not hide their deep aversion of the strong state and are quick to denounce any sign of populism in the government bureaucracy.  Yet they do not shy away from exercising their own repressive policies against other out-groups, while begging at the same time  the state for generous subsidies.  ADL, SPLC outlets in the USA, dozens of antifa and transgender foundations, including government-funded Chistian and Jewish institutions in the EU, such as Crif, LICRA or Amadeu Antonio Stiftung  operate very similar to former Soviet local people’s commissariats. They all take for granted, however, that they are entitled to a slice of government, i.e., the taxpayers’ cake. In the name of abstract “tolerance” and “the rule of law” they consider their democratic and legal duty to spy and denounce their fellow citizens who are critical of liberal judicial dogma. The postmodern liberal democracy, although bragging about being the best of all the worlds, is increasingly reminiscent of the early medieval states-in-the-making.

The Liberal System, i.e., the deep state in contemporary US and EU, being basically an oligarchic system, did not drop from the moon, nor is it made up of conspiratorial monolithic gangs of self-declared thieves bent on subverting the state. The Liberal System in the West is just a logical outcome of different, often mutually feuding groups that willingly—and sometimes unwittingly—as in the case of Christian religious groups promoting liberal refugee policies—work on the social, racial and national decomposition of the state and its people — a trait inherent in the very dynamics of the liberal (mis)rule of law.

[i] T. Sunic, “Historical Dynamics of Liberalism: From Total Market to Total State? “, The Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies 13, no. 4, (Winter 1988), p. 455.

[ii] C.  Schmitt, „Fünf Leitsätze für die Rechtspraxis“ in Deutsches Recht, 3, Nr. 7 (1933), S. 201–202, reprinted in Gesammelte Schriften 1933–1936 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2021), p.56. (also: https://archive.org/details/carl-schmitt-gesammelte-schriften-1933-1936)

[iii] C. Schmitt, Der Rechtsstaat, first published in  Nationalsozialistisches Handbuch für Recht und Gesetzgebung (München: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1935, S. 24–32) reprinted in Gesammelte Schriften 1933–1936, p.286-287.

[iv] C. Schmitt, „Die Verfassungslage Deutschlands“ in Preußische Justiz – Rechtspflege und Rechtspolitik, Nr. 42, 5. Oktober 1933, pp. 479–482, reprinted in Gesammelte Schriften 1933–1936, p.74.

[v] Ibid, p. 75-76.

[vi] Claude Polin, “Pluralisme ou Guerre civile ?” Catholica (winter, 2005–06), p. 16.

Britain’s “Hate Speech” Trap

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In one of the more famous Zen Buddhist riddles, or koans, an army officer meets with a monk and attempts to frustrate the contemplative monastic. “A man has been raising a goose in a bottle since it was a tiny gosling,” the officer explains. “Now it is fully grown and has no space left in the bottle. Without hurting the goose, and without breaking the bottle, how can the man get it out?” The monk doesn’t answer the question and instead moves the conversation to the weather. A little while later, the meeting coming to an end, the officer stands up to leave and approaches the door. As he reaches for the handle, the monk cries out “Oh officer!” As the officer turns, the monk smiles and continues, “There. It’s out!”

This particular koan is a good example of koans in general, in that the reader or student is presented with an impossible riddle, an intellectual trap that is totally unsolvable by logic. The goal is to sublimate the thinking mind to the instinctual mind that takes precedent in living “in the moment,” or “being present.” The koan came to mind recently while I read the horrifying news from Britain that a man has been found guilty of incitement to hatred merely for producing stickers bearing such non-aggressive slogans as “Reject White Guilt”, “Nationalism is Nurture”, and “We will be a minority in our homeland by 2066.”

How has British speech legislation been used to secure this criminal conviction and, to return to the idea of the koan, how can pro-White advocates advocate for anything when even the more passive elements of their argument have been criminalized? The riddle is straightforward: What can be said when saying anything runs the risk of imprisonment?

The Public Order Act 1986: A Jewish Contrivance

Samuel Melia, a long-serving activist and a figure apparently well-known and liked in British nationalist circles, has been convicted under section 19 of the Public Order Act 1986, which makes it a criminal offence to publish or distribute “written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting.” In the wording of the legislation, someone is guilty of an offence if “(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or (b) having regard to all the circumstances, racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.” Melia was also convicted of “encouraging or assisting the commission of the offence of racially aggravated criminal damage,” presumably because, in an act of race terrorism, the stickers may have left tiny residues of glue upon removal.

As far as legal texts go, there is much left to interpretation in the Public Order Act 1986. It’s a highly subjective piece of work. Consider, for example, the necessary but inevitably tendentious speculation on a defendant’s intentions. This is to say nothing about “regard to all the circumstances” or how exactly the likelihood of “stirring up hatred” is to be measured. The document has always been vague, and because it has remained unaltered for almost 40 years, we might assume that this was by design.

Britain’s speech law is demonstrably Jewish in origin and design. The impetus behind the Public Order Act 1986 can be traced back to the 1910s with early murmurings among Britain’s Jewish elite about the potential criminalization of anti-Semitism. Following the Jewish bombing of the King David Hotel, then British administrative headquarters for Mandatory Palestine, in 1946, Jewish delegates attempted to pass a resolution “outlawing anti-Semitism” at that year’s annual Labour Party Conference.[1] However, the bombing cost the Zionists a great many non-Jewish friends within the Labour movement, and the proposal was crushed. Following the notorious Sergeant’s Affair, in which Jewish terrorists murdered British soldiers in barbaric fashion, another explicit proposal to outlaw anti-Semitism was introduced in the House of Commons, but was rejected at its first reading in 1948. Direct and explicit efforts such as these continued to fail. In Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policy Making Since the 1960s, Erik Bleich notes that “during the late 1950s and early 1960s Jewish groups sought laws against anti-Semitic public speeches made during this era, but there is little evidence that this pressure achieved substantial results.”[2]

Further attempts to achieve speech laws were attempted through stealth, in that they concerned race more generally rather than Jews explicitly. These measures were also introduced, though unsuccessfully, with the assistance of willing White M.P.s with a track record of assisting Jews. Bleich notes that “a small number of individual Labour Party Members of Parliament repeatedly proposed anti-discrimination laws. In the early 1950s, Reginald Sorensen and Fenner Brockway each introduced ‘color bar bills’ designed to prevent discrimination against blacks on British soil.”[3] Brockway attempted no less than nine times over nine years to achieve laws against ‘discrimination’ and free speech. Although the full extent of the involvement of these politicians with Jews is unknown, a record of Parliamentary debates shows that Sorensen had been involved in assisting Jews since at least the 1930s, even participating in a 1945 symposium titled “The Future of the Jews,” where he gave a lecture to his mostly Jewish audience on “Our Common Humanity.” We have evidence that around the same time, Brockway was breaking the law by assisting Jews with forged passports and documents enabling them to enter Palestine.[4]

Since 1945, the Board of Deputies of British Jews had also been working on drafting a “group libel law” that it eventually hoped to get passed in Parliament.[5] Efforts to further tighten libel laws were made in 1952, when Jewish M.P. Harold Lever introduced a Private Members’ Bill modifying Britain’s libel laws for the first time in over fifty years. However, Lever’s efforts were later mauled by a hostile Parliament to such an extent that by the time his Bill became an Act of Parliament, his provisions were not extended, as he and his co-ethnics had hoped, to cover groups.[6] Britain’s first legislation containing any such provision as prohibiting ‘group libel’ was introduced in Parliament by Frank Soskice, the son of David Soskice — a Russian-Jewish revolutionary exile. Scholars Mark Donnelly and Ray Honeyford state that it was Soskice who “drew up the legislation” and “piloted the first Race Relations Act, 1965, through Parliament.”[7] The Act “aimed to outlaw racial discrimination in public places,” though it was soon felt, in Jewish circles, that it hadn’t gone far enough. Crucially, the 1965 Act created the Jewish-led ‘Race Relations Board’ and equipped it with the power to sponsor research for the purposes of monitoring race relations in Britain and, if necessary, extending legislation on the basis of the ‘findings’ of such research.

In 1985, another Jew moved to criminalize expressions of White racial solidarity when M.P. Harry Cohen introduced a “Racial Harassment Bill” to Parliament. Sociologist Rob Witte reports that Cohen’s attempt only failed because of “lack of parliamentary time.”[8] The following year, Cohen made a second attempt, which failed, only for Jews to return to more stealthy methods when racial elements were included with the much broader Public Order Act (1986).

The Public Order Act had been introduced to Parliament by Leon Brittanisky (renamed Leon Brittan) and supported primarily by Malcolm Rifkind, a descendant of Lithuanian Jewish immigrants. It was another clever piece of work. Brittan’s team had been tasked with drafting a White Paper on Public Order to deal with a series of miners’ strikes and demonstrations. Although issues of race were not remotely related to the events provoking the White Paper, Brittan saw that the government was eager to pass legislation restricting the miners as soon as possible and, sensing that the wide-ranging bill would endure little opposition, he ensured that additional elements were included, such as the criminalization of “incitement to racial hatred.”[9] It is Brittan’s clever little addition which has posed problems for more vocal racial nationalists in Britain today, and has led to the criminal conviction of Samuel Melia for “stickering.”

Legislative Evolution

In the early years of the Act, sentencing on conviction was a maximum of two years in prison and this was normally reserved for blunt expressions of animosity towards non-White groups. John Tyndall for example, founder of the British National Party, was one of the earliest victims of the Public Order Act and was sentenced in 1986 to 12 months in prison, serving four. In 1998, Tyndall’s successor Nick Griffin was given a nine-month suspended sentence for publishing his Who Are The Mindbenders? pamphlet in the course of which he pointed out Jewish influence in the British mass media and how this had flooded the nation with “anti-British trash.”

The Act was problematic, and had a gagging effect on British nationalism, but its reach was sufficiently blunt, and sentences relatively short, for Jonathan Bowden to remark during one of his speeches in the late 2000s that one could still discuss many controversial topics in public so long as this was done in an abstract or slightly indirect way. This seemed partially proven in 2004 when Nick Griffin was arrested and charged again, this time for remarks he made in a pub about Muslims and Islam. Although subjected to a trial, both Griffin and his co-accused Tyndall were found not guilty. Today, however, we can have no doubt that Bowden’s analysis no longer applies.

The vague wording of the Act has allowed the transformations in British culture to carry it to greater extremes without the need for an entirely new law. And there can be little doubt that culture has shifted radically further to the Left in the last 20 years. An amendment led to the extension of the maximum sentence from 2 to 7 years, with the result that sentences are now averaging 3–4 years rather than 10–12 months.

More important, the law has been gradually reinterpreted in light of new cultural ‘understandings’ of hate. ‘Hate’ used to mean that you had extreme and quasi-violent feelings of animosity towards a particular individual or group, but we now live in an age where hatred can be something as simple as insisting on the biological basis of gender, or conducting a survey of intelligence or crime alongside racial taxonomies. Hate has moved from being understood as an active and aggressive position against a given entity, to being something as banal as adopting a neutral or non-radical position on a sensitive cultural question treasured by the Left. Crucially for Mr. Melia, ‘hate’ now also encompasses the position that Whites as an ethnic group have interests and should defend them. Stickers with slogans like “No White Guilt” are seen as hateful, and part of an extreme and dangerous ideology. In such a context, we can assert that Britain has criminalized White self-defense.

Hate Crime Entrepeneurs

The increasingly extreme reach of British hate speech law has led Civitas: Institute for the Study of Civil Society, to call for the government to “hold an inquiry to determine, review and potentially repeal all elements of the law that conflict with freedom of speech, for example: Section 127 of the Communications Act, offences of stirring up hatred under the Public Order Act 1986, and the offence of ‘indecent or racialist chanting’ under the Football (Offences) Act 1991.” Of particular concern to Civitas are what it calls “hate crime entrepreneurs,” or “groups with a vested interest in presenting their members as victims of hate crime” and are thus able to “influence hate crime legislation.”

Civitas point out that the very concept of hate speech has led to a loss of freedom orchestrated by an unelected elite of lawyers and intellectuals.

Each new Act of Parliament and clarification of police guidance introduces a more subjective element into the law. The state, either through the Crown Prosecution Service or the police, comes to define what is offensive, threatening or abusive. Such understandings are grounded in a perception of the ‘lived experiences’ of ‘victims’ as members of historically oppressed groups and a belief that words can have an impact as harmful as an act of physical violence. … Every aspect of people’s lives will come under legal scrutiny in order to promote a set of state sanctioned values that have been determined by lawyers rather than voted on by the electorate.

Civitas explain that “identity groups are represented by ‘hate crime entrepreneurs’ who are incentivized to report ever increasing harms experienced by members of their community. The law comes to play a role in affirming the identity of victim groups, recognising suffering, re-educating offenders about the ‘correct’ way to think and sending a message to the rest of society about the values deemed ‘appropriate’.” In other words, society is undergoing an incentivised brainwashing and the reduction of freedom across the board. All minority identity groups have a vested interest in expanding definitions of hate crime to encompass the groups they represent, and obviously they have a vested interest in seeing increased reporting of hate crimes committed as a basis for their own future fundraising.

The groups insinuate themselves, in undemocratic fashion, into the police and legal structure, with one group noted by Civitas as boasting “we have also established joint training between the police and Crown Prosecution staff to improve the way the police identify and investigate hate crime.” So the very manner in which the police see crime and speech is being determined by non-elected minority agents. Civitas also make some comments which match up well with the historical and contemporary record of Jews ensuring their place as a privileged and protected elite within Western societies.

Such organizations lobby for better protections for their members. In order to secure these protections, they are incentivized to increase the reporting of hate crimes committed against members of their particular identity group. This lends itself to ever looser definitions of hate crime and ever more expansive cohorts of victims. Furthermore, many groups that lobby on behalf of particular communities receive government funding for their work. For example, Challenge It, Report It, Stop It reports on plans to support a range of groups such as the Jewish Museum, Show Racism the Red Card, Searchlight Educational Trust [founded by a Jewish communist] and Faith Matters’ Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks (MAMA) project.

Jewish, Muslim, and other groups hold almost constant “meetings with legal and academic experts, police and the Crown Prosecution Service (‘CPS’), charities and civil society groups, and numerous individuals with an interest in hate crime laws.” The hate crime entrepreneurs thus “play a significant role in determining the assumptions and theoretical underpinnings for the Law Commission’s analysis.”

In other words, it is the activities of these groups, as well as the problematic Jewish-led Public Order Act 1986 itself, that have led to the current predicament of Samuel Melia for mere stickering. Mr Melia is the victim of a vast and corrupt “hate crime” industry that is fuelled both by material greed and by a seething and entirely genuine hatred of the native peoples of the British Isles. To that extent we can say that the nation is in fact host to a hate crime of gargantuan nature and scope, but that it is totally forbidden, and now illegal, to speak its name.

[1] P. Medding, Studies in Contemporary Jewry: XI: Values, Interests and Identity, 108.

[2] E. Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policy Making Since the 1960s, 42.

[3] Ibid, 41.

[4] C. Knowles, Race, Discourse and Labourism, 172.

[5] D.S. Wyman, The World Reacts to the Holocaust, 617.

[6] C. Adler (ed), The American Jewish Year Book, 1953, 234.

[7] M. Donnelly, Sixties Britain: Culture, Society and Politics, p. 115, & R. Honeyford, The Commission for Racial Equality: British Bureaucracy Confronts the Multicultural Society p.95.

[8] R. Witte, Racist Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, France, and the Netherlands, p.71.

[9] T. Brain, A History of Policing in England and Wales Since 1974, p.104.

Christianity Is White Nationalism

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Most of my thoughts these days don’t pertain to the political realm, rather I tend to focus on the level of spiritual depravity that has led to our fallen state—our fallen state as individual people, due to our fallen state collectively as a people. To paraphrase Dostoevsky, there is a spiritual war going on between good and evil, and the battlefield is the heart of man. Nietzsche predicted the outcome for this battle with his statement, “God is dead.” He envisioned a post-theological society, the likes that would produce a nihilistic existence where every year 106,000 people die of drug overdose and 50,000 people commit suicide (70% of those are White men). That’s a million White men every 8 years that would rather kill themselves than exist within the status quo, and those numbers are rising. What a tragedy! It’s not a coincidence that God and White people are simultaneously dying off. Our existence has to have meaning for our children to have a future. Thus, the importance of faith.

What is faith? According to scripture, it is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen (Hebrews 11:1). Faith transcends reason, insofar as reason begets faith. Everything requires some degree of faith, we just take most of it for granted. Every aspect of religion is faith-based, and everyone is religious.

Religiosity is a fundamental essence of the human condition. Our individual belief-system is hierarchical, with our primary belief being not only our religion, but our central identity. You are mostly what you believe most.

To compare and contrast different religions is futile, and typically paved in self-righteousness. More precisely, it’s a discussion often rooted in pride (e.g., “My God is the real God, because that’s what I believe.”; “I’m too smart to believe in God.”). For Christians, pride is the root of all sin. It was Eve’s pride to “be like God” (Genesis 3:5) that introduced sin into the world. God’s letter to his people (the Bible) explains the origin of our sinful nature. Whether you choose to believe it or not is irrelevant to its validity. But if you want to analyze it philosophically, why has nobody (excluding Jesus) been able to lead a sinless life? Seems like it would be a simple thing to do.

Aside from the existential crisis and predispositions that lead to religion, why would a person in the Western world be a devout Christian? It’s certainly not cool or trendy. Why would one have the desire to pray, go to church, repent and attempt to live a life that rejects our fundamental human nature, which is sinful? What provokes that desire? Is it just a coincidence that you feel drawn to God? Jesus said, “You did not choose me, but I chose you and appointed you so that you might go and bear fruit—fruit that will last…” (John 15:16).

Christianity preaches rejection of the world. To be connected to the world is to be disconnected from God. The Bible says, For everything in the world—the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life—comes not from the Father but from the world (1 John 2:16). Christianity dislikes the world just as much as you do. And the world hates Christianity just as much as it hates you. Jesus said as much 2000 years ago, “If the world hates you, keep in mind that it hated me first. If you belonged to the world, it would love you as its own. As it is, you do not belong to the world, but I have chosen you out of the world. That is why the world hates you.” (John 15: 18–19). You can belong to the world, or you can belong to God, but you can’t belong to both.

As I mentioned in the opening sentence, I don’t ponder politics much these days. As a result, I don’t read from the political sphere as much as I used to (honestly, it’s depressing). But I recently came across an article titled, “Christian Nationalism Has Made Me Agnostic” by Jason Kessler, which prompted me write this piece. The purpose not being a prideful critique rooted in “My God is the true God,” but rather an antithesis which attempts to make the assertion that fundamentalist Christianity is essentially White Nationalism, as well as the direct link between God and the achievements of White people, which have undeniably brought humanity out of darkness.

Christianity brings forth a message known as “the good news.” It’s a miraculous message that inspires hope through God’s promise of salvation. God packaged that salvation unconditionally as a covenant (contract) which developed into a contract with a race of people—White people, who since have changed (blessed) the world inconceivably. Just for a second, try to imagine a world without White people.

Most White Nationalist-types are pessimists. So they will instinctively find reasons to discredit Christianity. Usually it’s something related to the “Jews.” And while from a theological perspective, that’s somewhat understandable, it’s not very pragmatic. The “Jews” referenced in the Bible aren’t the same people we call “Jews” today. While I assume that most people reading this will agree with that statement, it is also clearly stated in the prophesy of Christ, “I know thy works, and tribulation, and poverty, (but thou art rich) and I know the blasphemy of them which say they are Jews, and are not, but are the synagogue of Satan.” (Revelations 2:9).

The intent here wasn’t to go down a rabbit hole, but rather to focus on the compatibility of Christianity and White Nationalism. If you were to walk into a fundamentalist Christian church on Sunday morning, what would you see?  Predominately, you would see White families who reject modernity (i.e., the world). If you were to ask them about their values, what would they say? They would typically say that they are family-orientated, against abortion, against homosexuality, adhere to gender roles, despise pornography, don’t watch much TV, vote Republican, work hard and want to lay a good foundation for the future of their children. How is that not White Nationalism? Sure, the majority probably aren’t explicitly racial or have negative opinions about Jews. And they probably don’t read White Nationalist websites, but so what? If these aren’t the people that you ideologically go to bat for, then who are? Why are you a White Nationalist?

I would posit that fundamentalist Christians are better representatives of White Nationalism than the vast majority of self-proclaimed White Nationalists. White Nationalism in the realm of practical politics should be based on actions and behaviors, not words and ideas. All the words, ideas, mantras and essays are redundant at this point. White Nationalists have been saying the same things over and over for 70 years.

For pro-Whites who have no interest in Christianity, the question is this: How serious are you about the future of White people? Do you think you’re just going to vote your way into an ethnostate? Are you waiting for minority status to reclaim your glory by way of a victim card? Do you just want to read essays that always focus on problems, yet never propose solutions? This isn’t intended to be a personal attack, the point being that there’s just not a lot of viable options. Here’s the fact of the matter: the modern world is unapologetically anti-White, and that’s not going to change anytime soon.

Speaking of essays, 10 years ago I wrote one titled, Is White Nationalism Real?. I concluded that paper with the following observation:

In conclusion, the term “real” is defined as having actual physical existence. With a very few minor exceptions, the White Nationalist movement would be better defined as a hobby of like-minded idealists. The reality of an all-White homeland in the foreseeable future (in America) is comparable to finding the end of a rainbow….

“Nothing ever becomes real until it is experienced” ~ John Keats

Back then I had this idea that White Nationalism could only be “real” on an explicit, macro level. That’s where I was wrong. White Nationalism only exists (with rare exceptions) on an implicit, micro level. It starts with community. It’s building communities within communities. Like Christianity, it takes effort. White Nationalism isn’t lingo or essays; It’s faith and family. It’s not hating Jews and blacks; It’s loving God and your people. In fact, these are the first two commandments of Jesus as stated in the gospel of Mark:

And Jesus answered him, The first of all the commandments is, Hear, O Israel; The Lord our God is one Lord: And thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength: this is the first commandment. And the second is like, namely this, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. There is none other commandment greater than these. (Mark 12:29-31)

You have millions and millions of “neighbors” in the US who think just like you do, they just might not say it the way you say it. There are lots of churches in the US who don’t approve of the world, they just might not do sermons in opposition to interracial marriage. Christianity is centered around the premise that God loved his people so much that he sent his Son to die by torture for your sins. How much do you love your people?

When Eve brought sin into the hearts of mankind, a perfect world ceased to exist. So, if you’re a White Nationalist waiting for the perfect storm to take us back to the glory days, then good luck. But if you’re looking for a savior and a pro-White plan, one exists that’s simple and effective: repent, join a fundamentalist church, reject the world, make babies and put your faith in God.

Love your God and love your people.

God bless!

The Problematic History of the European Union: Review of ‘Eurowhiteness’

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Eurowhiteness: Culture, Empire and Race in the European Project
Hans Kundnani
Hurst Publishers, 2023

Eurowhiteness is one of those books that immediately catches the attention of a “racist”. With a bright orange cover and a title like Eurowhiteness displayed in large block letters, how could it not? Curiosity compelled me to take it down from the bookshop shelf and browse the introductory remarks. After a brief Google search to confirm my suspicions of the mixed-race origins of the author, I was ready to groan and roll my eyes at what I presumed to be a vapid book that deconstructed European identity by arguing that “blackness” or “brownness” somehow has just as much place within Europe as “whiteness.” What emerged from its pages instead was a novel left-wing polemic against the European Union (EU) *because* of its perceived Whiteness.

Author Hans Kundnani was born to an Indian father and a Dutch mother and grew up in the United Kingdom. As with most mixed-race people who struggle to place their identity, he believes this background gives him a unique perspective on European history and identity. His first post-university job was for the Commission for Racial Equality, the enforcement body established by the UK Race Relations Act 1976, and by 2009 he was working for the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank dedicated to Pan-European ideas. As Kundnani describes it, Eurowhiteness is the culmination of his shift in thinking from a pro-European convinced of the moral good of the EU, to a critic who has abandoned the myths that once informed his worldview.[1]

Kundnani does not present a bibliography, but his ideological debt to leading thinkers in critical race and post-colonial theory is apparent. His endnotes draw from well-known figures in this sphere such as Charles W. Mills, Gurminder K. Bhambra, Paul Gilroy, and historical forebears Frantz Fanon and W.E.B Du Bois. The acknowledgements section reveals Kundnani’s “particular debt” to Swedish post-colonial scholar Peo Hansen. Hansens’ book Eurafrica, which explores the African strategic fantasies of early Pan-European thinkers — notably Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi — are what seemingly began Kundnani’s path towards euroscepticism.

Eurowhiteness is well-paced and I can offer no criticism of Kundnani’s cogent writing style. Other reviewers have affixed the word “challenging” to the book, but to those of us not inflicted with colour-blind thinking and who already see the intrinsic link between Western civilisation and the White race, the themes parsed out in Kundnani’s book are hardly cause for discomfort. His claim that the EU has recently taken a “civilisational turn” towards the protection of European identity and that as a result the institution could just as easily be used as a vehicle for racist purposes is also familiar. Way back in 2017 Richard Spencer was pouring cold water on the euphoria over the Brexit vote, arguing that the European Union could instead become a potential racial empire, a counter to NATO and Atlanticism.

The value of this book for readers of The Occidental Observer lies principally in understanding the intellectual journey of the author and discerning the potential for the emergence of a popular left-wing critique of the EU in the Anglosphere and beyond. Kundnani’s transition from EU booster to EU sceptic is instructive, as well as revealing the anti-White perspectives and motivations that can lie behind soft-spoken academics. Despite the myriad of anti-racist measures, tolerance initiatives, and hate speech laws that encompass the modern EU, Kundnani has turned on the European Union because it is just still too White, too Western. After all, the EU’s history is rooted in Europe and much of its historical and present-day motivations are the defence of European people and Western values. That alone is enough to condemn it in Kundnani’s eyes.

Regionalist Racism

Kundnani’s critique of the European Union begins with the dismantling of what he sees is the common misunderstanding of its structural nature. Rather than conceptualising it as an inclusive cosmopolitan project that has renounced nationalism — a position held by both supporters on the left and critics on the right — Kundnani attacks the EU as a project analogous to nationalism. According to Kundnani, it is better understood as a form of “regionalism.” That is, nationalism on a more continental scale, and imbued with all the same chauvinistic impulses, power dynamics and histories of colonial dispossession that nation-states are saddled with.[2] The same impulse towards nation-building is found in the ‘region-building’ of the EU.

Building on this concept of regionalism as nationalism on a larger scale, Kundnani draws upon Jewish academic Hans Kohn’s theory of nationalism. Kohn invented the concept of civic nationalism as distinct from ethnic nationalism ideally suited for facilitating non-White migration. Just as a nation can have strands of civic and ethnic nationalism, so too does the regionalist EU. It possesses both a civic and an ethnic component that waxes and wanes in strength across time; secularism, civil institutions and liberal rights weighed against Christian, illiberal, civilisational and racial ideas. For Kundnani, it is “disturbing” that the EU continues to draw upon such ethnic/cultural elements from Europe’s history.[3]

Chapter 2 briefly traces the history of European identity from its ethnic and cultural origins at the time of the Battle of Tours, where the word was first used by the victorious Franks in order to “other” the external enemy, the Muslims. From the seventeenth century onwards, ideas of Europe began to shift from being strictly synonymous with Christianity. At this point, a rationalist, enlightenment notion of Europe with a civilising mission to the rest of the world emerged, and finally the notion of whiteness or the racial identification of the European peoples as Whites.

Kundnani’s critique of the Enlightenment values that form the basis of the EU follows the now standard deconstruction of its universalism, positing that it is instead of being based in Whiteness and in the particular systems of White supremacy:

… while Enlightenment ideas like the “rights of man” — the antecedent of what we would today call “human rights” — were potentially universal, they emerged from a particular European context, and moreover, were put into practice in a racialized way. … [C]olonialism and slavery were carried out in the name of enlightenment ideas.[4]

The Enlightenment is presented (or problematised, to use the lingo) in the most debased terms possible, as the output of White supremacists. Immanuel Kant, whom Kundnani points out wrote an early appeal for European unity that is now celebrated by the EU, is lambasted for his racial theories. Rousseau is condemned because his writings did not speak directly to the plight of Black slaves in French colonies.

Next, the alleged colonial origins of the EU are fleshed out — the “original sin” of the EU as Kundnani likes to call it. Rather than being anti-colonial, the early movements towards Pan-European unity developed the concept of Eurafrica, which envisioned the African continent as a yet undeveloped source of raw material for a future European power-bloc. Many of the founding states of the EU also held onto their colonial possessions after the formation of the European Economic Community (EEC), the formal precursor to the EU. France and Belgium in particular factored these colonies into their economic considerations for a post-war redevelopment enmeshed into wider Europe. Predatory relations further continued after the formal independence of these colonies, in the form of exploitative labour schemes and guest worker programs.

Kundnani argues that from 1945 onwards, civic regionalism came to dominate as a reaction to the ethnic conflicts of World War II. This was not the clean break from Europe’s past that many claimed it to be, with the older ethnic/cultural regionalist tendencies still pushing through into Pan-European rhetoric. The civilising mission remained, as did the belief in the superiority of European values and the claim of their universality. Even the holocaust is not spared from critique. The EU, Kundnani contends, has used holocaust remembrance as a cover for forgetting colonial injustices, patting themselves on the back for upholding “Never Again” whilst continuing to refuse to engage in decolonisation or recognise Europe’s true original sin. The foundational memory of the holocaust has obscured Europe’s foundational history of colonialism, and thus the EU is a project of political amnesia that has forgotten, or choses to ignore, its origins as a quasi-colonial institution.[5]

The end of the Cold War reignited the civilising mission towards incorporating the EU’s more “backward” eastern Europeans neighbours, those who were European but not quite yet *in* Europe in cultural or political terms. More than halfway through the book, we finally encounter the meaning behind its title, derived from Hungarian sociologist József Böröcz, who proposed a spectrum of Whiteness within Europe. “Eurowhitness” is associated with the centre of Europe in the West and “dirty whiteness”, the less immaculate and somewhat less West European version to the East. Kundnani repurposes the term to refer to the ethnic/cultural version of European regionalist identity. Eurowhiteness, used as a pejorative or a negative by Kundnani, simply means to identify as European in a non-civic (that is, “racist”) way.

With the arrival of the Eurozone crisis in 2010 and the chaos of the refugee influx of 2015, Kundnani argues that the European Union has swung towards a defensive position, focused on countering the external threats to the stability of Europe:

By the beginning of the 2020s, the civic element of European regionalism seemed to have become less influential and the ethnic/cultural element more influential in “pro-European” thinking. In other words, whiteness seemed to be becoming more central to the European project.[6]

Kundnani sees little distinction between pro-European politicians who posit a defence of the “European Way of Life” or who worry about the future of Western civilisation and far right “extremists” who invoke the supposed trope of the great replacement. In the face of these threats to EU stability, those who fear the decline of EU power and sovereignty are the international political equivalents of the those who fear White replacement.[7] After all, both positions are “pro-European.” For Kundnani, the EU’s dramatic response to the war in Ukraine, opening its arms wide for Ukrainian refugees compared to what he sees is the closed-door policy to non-White refugees at its southern borders, is just further proof of the return to Eurowhiteness.

By far the weakest point of the argument is the evidence (or general lack thereof) provided to attribute Eurowhiteness motivations to current EU leaders or bureaucrats. As an outsider, the civic European component still seems predominant and the appeals to European civilisation are mere scraps thrown to a public increasingly disillusioned by the failure of the EU to respond to issues of mass immigration. It feels like a stretch to widely attribute chauvinistic views to the EU leadership, but the impulse to defend Europe as Europe, as some kind of distinct entity of a distinct group of people, does certainly exist enough for the label of Eurowhiteness to stick.

Kundnani believes that a different Europe is needed than the one we currently have.[8] Nearing the conclusion, he briefly hints at the EU itself being a barrier to overcoming Eurowhiteness. He claims that engaging with its colonial past could in fact be a danger to the EU because Eastern European member states with no colonial history or collective guilt over colonialism would resist such initiatives, which could in turn have a disintegrative effect on European identify and the structure of the EU. However, the narrative abruptly ends there and is not further expounded upon, and we are left wondering what his true feelings about the future of the EU are. Kundnani at least admits in the introduction that he is only offering critiques, not solutions — at least not for the EU.

Reconsidering Brexit

The final chapter, Brexit and Imperial Amnesia, changes gears and presents us with a revisionist account of the Brexit Referendum, aimed at the British left still reeling from the 2016 vote. Kundnani challenges the dominant narrative of the Leave vote as a racist vote yearning for a White fortress that shuts the door to migrants. The true nature of the Brexit vote is presented as more complex and less binary, highlighting that one in three members of Britian’s ethnic minority population also voted to leave. Kundnani expands upon the angst of many non-White Britons regarding the EU and their perception that continental Europe is still more racist than the UK. Given the persistence of Eurowhiteness, it remained hard for Britain’s Black and Asian populations to truly feel part of the European project and they have struggled to identify with its history. Kundnani is also captive of these feeling towards the EU, mentioning in the introduction that he could never bring himself to feel “100% European” due to his mixed-race background.[9]

Another area of hostility outlined towards the EU is the discrimination many felt from the changes that entrance into the project brought to immigration. Following the admission of the UK into the EEC, Commonwealth citizens from Britain’s former colonies suddenly found it was harder to enter the UK than continental Europeans. The story is familiar to Australians, who too felt abandoned by the mother country when the border control lines at the airport no longer privileged the peoples of New Brittania.

With the Brexit vote reconceptualised, the Leave decision is transformed into an opportunity, offering the chance for Britain to rebalance its identity. Eurowhiteness and ties to the EU have allowed the UK to escape from its colonial history by focusing on the national identity narratives of Europe and World War II. Through engagement with former colonies, Britain can shift its national story away from Europe. Here, in the final two paragraphs of the book, we finally come to the vehicle of this reimagining of Britain and what perhaps Kundnani sees as the best way to combat Eurowhiteness: immigration policy.

The corrective is a policy which amends the turn away from Commonwealth-based immigration — a form of reparations issued on the path to becoming a less Eurocentric country:

It would be possible to go further in the rebalancing of British immigration policy that has taken place since Brexit — in particular, by making it easier for citizens of Britain’s former colonies to come to the UK. … such a policy — what might be called “post-imperial preference” — could even be thought of as a form of reparations.[10]

Once again, the great replacement trope is an evil conspiracy theory when observed by a critic and an obvious political good when advocated for by a supporter.

Yes. And?

Kundnani’s thesis can be pulled apart on a number of technical levels. The appropriateness of the notion of regionalism as applied to the EU and its analogy to nationalism can be questioned, and in turn there is often a conflation of concepts, with “Europe”, “the European Union” and “EU Member states” used interchangeably as suits his argument. A rather weak critique of neoliberalism also flows underneath the main critique of Eurowhiteness and the linkage between the EU and colonialism feels forced. By the time the EEC came along in the 1950s, European colonialism was in its death throes, far from the height of its power. However, lacking a detailed understanding of the history and functioning of the EU and of the political conceptions of its leadership class, my review of the narrative of Eurowhiteness turns elsewhere.

Much of the book is perplexing if you don’t have a pathological sense of White guilt or an inferiority complex about the success of European civilization. This is without a doubt a book produced from decades spent ensconced in an academic world brimming with anti-White narratives, plundering the rancid depths of post-colonial theory for a vector to attack an institution that even most die-hard progressives support — until they read Kundnani’s book perhaps. The extent of White guilt that a reader must have to agree with his conclusions is altogether frightening when considering that the book has received a generally positive response in the British left-wing press.

To me, the arguments presented in the book elicited a kind of “Yes. And?” reaction, a sense of confusion or bemusement as to why a historical fact or a political reality has been presented as a negative. Kundnani considers it damning evidence of Eurowhiteness that the EU draws upon figures such as Charlemagne and continues to award the Charlemagne Prize in his name. Why is this damning? Because he is European? At its heart, Kundnani’s critique is that the European Union only brings together European nations and peoples, European ideas and values, and strives for European interests and goals. Yes. And? Is this a bad thing? Are Europeans not allowed to do this? The EU was certainly never constituted in any way other than as a continental union, no different than similar unions that now exist in the other regions of the world. The fact that some of the original member states still possessed leftover colonial territories is beside the point.

It is hard to shake the feeling that Kundnani feels there is something inherently dangerous with the European Union setting its geographic limits as Europe and bringing Europeans together. The flat refusal issued to Morocco’s request to join the EEC in 1987 is transformed by Kundnani from an obvious rejection issued to a country trying to simply cash in on proximity to Europe into proof of a malign identity embedded within the EU. Does Kundnani think it was wrong to reject Morrocco’s application? As a country with a long historical link to the African continent, would Spain being rejected from joining the African Union also be couched in such negative framing?

A Union, if you can keep it

Eurowhiteness raises questions regarding the long-term durability of the EU project. If the demographic trends away from a White majority in European nations continue, will we start to see more Euroscepticism from the left, more anti-White reactions against the EU like that which has captivated Kundnani? Whilst it would be comforting to believe that Eurowhiteness is an isolated product of the distinctly British detachment from the EU that has no currency elsewhere, Kundnani draws upon a global range of anti-EU perspectives, both historical and current-day. It’s not hard to see conclusions such as his, presented in an accessible form, from developing in popularity.

Non-whites living in the West have stepped up their rhetoric in recent years, rallying against the presence of White faces and White ideas within their living spaces. Statues have been removed, the Western canon expunged, and names of places and institutions changed for the sake of diversity and anti-racism. Their actions have shown that they believe that all Eurocentric ideas must be challenged, and above all that diverse faces must be predominant in public life. To a degree it is surprising that critiques of the EU along these lines have not emerged before to a significant degree. Perhaps that is simply due to the political left adopting a reflexive pro-EU stance in the face of the right-wing anti-EU stance —a reflexive response that Kundnani is now seeking to correct.

Ultimately, the impulse behind Eurowhiteness is a sense of exclusion by Europe and a feeling of discomfort in Western civilisation, one certainly shared by others of non-European background. Kundnani admits as much himself when he states that: “European identity is externally exclusive — that is, it excludes those who are not European or who cannot think of themselves as being European.[11]” To those of us comfortable with European identity, Charles Martel or Charlemagne are inspirational warriors of our history, men who shaped and fought for the Europe we have and cherish today and without whom we may not even exist.

The Battle of Tours in October 732 — by Charles de Steuben (1788–1856)

All that people like Kundnani seem to see are exclusionary figures who upheld Christendom or who waged wars to defend Europe from dark-skinned Muslims — detestable characters they cannot feel an affinity with and whom they believe only a racist would celebrate. They survey the history of Europe and all the cultural touchpoints behind the EU and find that it just doesn’t represent them. From a racialist perspective, they cannot really be faulted for this. It is a natural impulse to seek out the familiar and to desire to live in an environment that accords with your being and your own racial identity. The problem was always in letting them into the West in the first place.

In all, Kundnani’s polemic against the EU reads as a fear of White unity writ large. Whiteness (or Eurowhiteness) is the threat to overcome. That much is clear when he advocates for non-White immigration as the solution to Britain extracting itself from Eurocentrism and frets about the possibility of the far-right moderating its Euroscepticism and accepting the EU[12].

 The center right, it turns out, doesn’t have a problem with the far right. It just has a problem with those who defy E.U. institutions and positions. …

The blurring of boundaries between the center right and the far right is not always as easy to spot as it is in the United States. …

[T]oday’s far right speaks not only on behalf of the nation but also on behalf of Europe. It has a civilizational vision of a white, Christian Europe that is menaced by outsiders, especially Muslims. …

But as the union unites around defending a threatened European civilization and rejecting nonwhite immigration, we need to think again about whether it truly is a force for good.

Any form of White identity, and any association of Whites together as Whites, even if only implicit, must necessarily be a dangerous thing. As Eurowhiteness proves, even Western institutions that we may have once considered safe by virtue of being perceived as progressive are now suspect.

[1] By his own admission this did not however cause him to vote Leave in the Brexit referendum of 2016, presumably because it still felt racist to do so
[2] At this point, Kundnani posits the Marxist theory of nationalism (Hobsbawm, etc.), which claims that national identities only emerged during the Enlightenment era, but it doesn’t impact the argument much.
[3] Kundnani, H 2023, Eurowhiteness: Culture, Empire and Race in the European Project, Hurst & Company, London, 42.
[4] Ibid., p.53—55
[5] For all the complaints about European universality or that “Europe is not the world”, Kundnani conveniently fails to mention the empires and colonial histories of the non-European world, which were every bit as exploitative and arguably more barbaric.
[6] Kundnani, Op. Cit., p.126
[7] Ibid., p.146
[8] Ibid., p.3
[9] Ibid., p.1
[10] Ibid., p.178
[11] Ibid., p.20
[12] Kundnani, H 2023, ‘Europe may be headed for something unthinkable’, New York Times, December 13, retrieved from: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/13/opinion/european-union-far-right.html