European Nationalism

Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi: Ideological Father of the EU

This article describes a mixed-race political figure, basically a professional activist, who projected a benevolent exterior, yet brought destruction in his wake.  Count Richard Nikolaus Eijiro von Coudenhove-Kalergi is today an obscure political figure, though in his time he was kind of a minor celebrity, and began the concept leading to the European Union.

His father descended from Byzantine nobility, and also with ancestry from lineages all over Europe.  This citizen of the world was a diplomat and married a Japanese woman whose parents were quite displeased, throwing her out of the family.  Richard was born in 1894, the second of seven children.  In his infancy, they moved from Tokyo to a small town near the present-day Czech-German border.

When Richard was twenty years old, his father died, leaving him wealth of which the vast majority can only dream and freeing him to pursue his hobby full-time.  Much like Karl Marx, Richard wrote a lot but never had a real job in his life.  The major difference was that he was a scion of landed gentry, while Marx was basically a bum plotting worldwide revolution while swilling beer at London pubs. Read more

The Fate of Populism in Europe: The Dutch Election and a Preview of France, Germany, and Italy

On Wednesday the Dutch voted in huge numbers (82% turnout) in the first of three crucial Eurozone elections this year. Rarely has a Dutch election drawn this much global interest and financial-market attention. Preliminary, unofficial results indicate that incumbent Prime Minister Rutte’s party won 33 seats in the 150-member legislature while Wilders’ party won 20 seats.

Rutte is now poised for a third term as prime minister. He seems to have profited from co-opting much of Wilder’s thunder in the hard line he drew in a diplomatic standoff with Turkey over the past week. The fight erupted over the Netherlands’ refusal to let two Turkish government ministers address rallies in Rotterdam about a referendum that could give Turkey’s President Erdogan more powers. It gave Rutte an opportunity to show his new-found nationalism by refusing to bow to foreign pressure, a stance with widespread backing in the nation.

Wilders, who campaigned on radical pledges to close borders to migrants from Muslim nations, close mosques, ban the Quran and take the Netherlands out of the EU, had insisted that whatever the result of the election, the kind of populist politics he and others in Europe represent aren’t going away. After the results were reported, Wilders commented,

We were the third biggest party, but now we are the second biggest party in the Dutch Parliament and a major political force. I promise you: Next time we will be first! The genie cannot be put back in the bottle.

I assure you: We will not stop trying to save our beautiful country, the Netherlands, our European civilization and our Western freedoms.

Still, it’s hard to be cheerful given that Wilders polled only around 13% of the vote — after all the horror stories related to African and Islamic migration  to Europe that have appeared since the last election. Read more

European or Ethnic Identity?

Ethnic Nations of Europe. Click here for an enlarged version.

In light of the mass migrations of non-Europeans to Europe we must redefine the notion of the political. The notion of the political is eternal, although its wording, alongside its political conceptualization, takes on different names in different time periods. We must also clarify the meaning of political concepts, such as the concept of “multicuturalism”, “identity”, “nationality”, as well as the meaning of the more atavistic communal concepts of “race” Or “ethnicity”. My main point is that various European national identities should from now on play a secondary role. I argue that our first priority should be to what is sometimes conveniently referred to as our common biocultural identity, or to put it in different words, the salvaging of our common and collective heredity as represented by the broader family of interrelated European peoples.

A Few Starting Points…

In our so-called “multicultural system”, where millions of people from hundreds of different nationalities live side by side, we should clearly draw the line between individual or particular national identity and this broader “familial” identity as described above, or better yet, between our national awareness and our European awareness. These two concepts are not always synonymous, although they often overlap. For example a Flemish national cannot be a Walloon national – just as a South Tyrolean nationalist must not be denied freedom to show his German roots to his Italian nationalist colleague.

In America, during the period of the state building process, the role of a generalized ethno-religious identity (often referred to by the abbreviated term: WASP) played a much stronger role than in Europe. By way of contrast, still very popular among the American fringe right is the expression “White Nationalist”, although the term “nationalist” has a different meaning in America than in Europe. The genesis of White American nationalism has had little in common with traditional ethnic and culture-bound nationalism of diverse European peoples living in Europe. In the English language there is also no corresponding word for the German word “Volk” or “völkisch” or the word “narod” in Slavic languages — words which are awkwardly translated with the noun “nation” or by the adjective “national” or “ethnic” into the standard modern English language. This national consciousness, or better yet national awareness in the traditional European sense, has played a minor role in America. Until recently national consciousness in Europe was built primarily on the basis of a common language, a common sense of history and a common destiny, i.e. preconditions that had taken a different turn among early European descended Americans of the early eighteenth century. Read more

Björn Höcke and the Potential Return of Sanity in German Politics

On January 17th 2017, one of the leading members of Germany’s new alternative conservative party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), Björn Höcke, gave a speech before his party’s youth organization (Junge Alternative) in the city of Dresden. In his 20-minute speech, Höcke addressed the future of his party, its rebellious function and patriotic orientation, the architectural disfigurement of landscapes and cities, the failures of the political establishment in the refugee crisis, German cultural identity and — yes, he did — the World War II guilt cult and the Holocaust memorial. The speech had the potential of ringing in a new era of self-liberation from the shackles of the post-war historical narrative that denies the German people their sense of self-worth.

However, Höcke clearly poked a hornet’s nest, given the hysterical reactions across the political establishment, including the media and representatives of the Jewish lobby in Germany. Although the speech was well-received by young patriots, some remarks did not go over well with the ruling class. Höcke had been bold enough to suggest that

  1. Instead of focusing primarily on those twelve dark years of the country’s history, German youth should be allowed to develop a positive identity by remembering and honoring the achievements of Germany’s numerous composers, poets and philosophers, of which the country had produced perhaps more than any other.
  2. Germany was the only country in the world that had decided to plant a ‘monument of shame’ in the heart of its capital, and had made the most horrible event in its history the foundation of its national identity.
  3. The Allied fire-bombing of Dresden was a war crime comparable to the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The guilt cult, however, allowed for a portrayal of Germans as perpetrators only, preventing them from mourning their own victims.

The press reacted “with disgust and horror” — as if Höcke had denied the Holocaust (which he didn’t). Although Höcke had remained rather factual in his description of the status quo without attacking anyone in particular, vocabulary from the familiar arsenal of curses was hurled at him: “Nazi”, “right-wing extremist”, “Goebbels”, “hard right”, “populist”, “nationalist”, “national Romantic”, and so on and so forth. In an article by Amanda Taub and Max Fischer in the New York Times, his brownish-grey hair suddenly turned blonde, more or less subtly conjuring up images of the blonde Germanic beast, familiar from countless anti-German Hollywood productions and books. Read more

Europa Terra Nostra Conference: European identity and the populist revolt in the USA and Europe

sunic-kevin-bill

Left to Right: Kevin MacDonald, William Johnson, Tom Sunic

Europa Terra Nostra recently held a conference in Wismar, Germany titled “Freedom Conference, with a message of hope.” The conference was sponsored by the EU (!) because the EU sponsors groups associated with parties that are represented in the European Parliament. This includes Germany’s NPD (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands; National Democratic Party

Das Logo der Nationaldemokratischen Partei Deutschlands - NPD, 2005

of Germany) which has several representatives in the European Parliament, including Udo Voigt, former party leader of the NPD, who gave a photo presentation on the disaster in Syria, Israeli complicity, etc. The program featured speakers who will be familiar to TOO readers, Nick Griffin (whose talk focused on the dire consequences of massive non-White immigration combined with a disastrously low White birthrate) and Tom Sunic (whose talk focused on differing European identities and the limits of petty European nationalisms). Daniel Friberg, founder of Arktos Media, gave a very upbeat talk on the prospects for the European nationalist right.

logo_-_ludova_strana_nase_slovensko_-_peoples_party_our_slovakia-svgThe contingent from Kotleba (People’s Party — Our Slovakia) were also very optimistic about the future.   Dr. Milan Uhrik, MEP and vice-chairman of the party talked about the success of the party in obtaining 14 of the 150 seats in the National Council, the Slovak Parliament, noting that the ongoing disaster in Western Europe is making nationalist ideas more attractive. William Johnson, Chair of the American Freedom Party, gave a brief presentation on the AFP’s activities in the current election.

Frank Rennicke, a well-known nationalist folk singer and composer, provided entertainment. Nothing like a crowd of around 100 singing enthusiastically and in unison to get the blood flowing — even if you can’t understand the words. This video, featuring Rennicke in a duet with a backdrop of Hamburg, 1945, gives a flavor of his singing and world view.

My talk was a pastiche of some of my previous ideas, with some additions for the predominantly German audience. I present it here in its entirety.

Some attendees at an outing to the beach at Ostee.

Some attendees at an outing to the beach at Ostee.

Read more

Croatia: the State of Affairs, the State of Emergency

What follows is the English translation of my piece originally written in French for a French publication.

*   *   *

Since the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, Croats have faced an ill-defined identity. Their recent war of secession, awkwardly called the “Patriotic War” and “War of Defense,” lends itself to serious legal misconceptions. The more accurate phrase, namely “War of Croatia’s Liberation from Communism and against Yugoslavia” has never been used.

There is a considerable difference, however, between these labels. The political class and the media class, all being converted now to the US-style Westernism, consist mostly of former Yugoslav officials—former Communists, including their progeny. If the recent Croatian war of secession is named the “War of Defense,” one is entitled to raise the question whether Croatia between 1991 and 1995 was in the process of protecting and safeguarding the heritage of Communism and Yugoslavia, or whether it was expressing a desire to get rid of it.

Moreover, the role of Croatian nationalists must not be overplayed, as the foreign media often does. Many Croatian nationalists can be described as “Croats by default,” or “reactive Croats,” given that their nationalist sentiments are often framed in terms of their hatred of the Other, namely in terms of the alleged Serbian threat.

In Croatia, the political class deliberately sidetracks the root causes of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia. By focusing solely on the real or alleged Serbian threat, Croatia’s political parties, including many followers and supporters of the former Communist leader Marshal Tito, thus allocate themselves a convenient niche in order to hide their bloody legacy.

The accession of Croatia to NATO in 2009 and then to the European Union in 2013 further complicates Croatian identity. Despite the fact that NATO has no more reason to be in Europe, given that its opponent, the Warsaw Pact, was dissolved long ago, NATO, in the Croatian popular consciousness, remains a symbol of Croatia’s adherence to the West, as well as the best defense against the alleged Russian and greater-Serbian appetites. Read more

“It takes a Village on July 27”: Srb, Yugoslav Antifa, and Croatia’s Bare Bones

The common antifascist narrative in the media and academia consists in a frequent reversal of World War II victimhood—a procedure once tested by communist commissars in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The label of communism, once proudly sported by a large number of intellectuals and journalists, has come out of fashion today. A more generic trademark, such as a neutral sounding word ‘antifascism’, had to be called to the rescue. For the recycled former Yugoslav historians and journalists residing in Serbia and Croatia, the term ‘antifascism’ offers the safest way to cover up their own murky and often hagiographic past. In addition, the word’antifascism’ serves today as a decent camouflage for shrugging off crimes committed during and after World War II by Yugoslav communists. In regard to the reversal of the antifascist victimhood narrative, a Soviet killing field, the Katyn Forest, comes first to mind. For a long time, communist-friendly historians managed to switch the role of the victim with that of the perpetrator, thereby successfully imprinting onto public consciousness the Katyn location as the locution for a  “Nazi-perpetrated crime.”

Similar scenarios of the narrative reversal are being observed in regard to the Croatia’s village of “Srb” (i.e., Serb), a small community situated in the southeastern part of Croatia and largely populated by ethnic Serbs. In communist Yugoslavia this high profile three-consonant eponymous village, in addition to being a crucial part of ex-Yugoslavia’s communist founding myth and a mandatory part of the school curriculum, also served as a place of pilgrimage for the Party. Every July 27 high-ranking Yugoslav communists commemorated the anniversary of their “Armed Uprising against Fascism” there. Read more