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The Optimism of Adolf Hitler

The common thread linking most if not all of Adolf Hitler’s actions and statements throughout The Forced War is ethnocentrism. He harbored a deep identification with the German people, and, to a lesser extent, an appreciation of distinct, non-German (or non-Aryan) European peoples. From the beginning, Hitler sought to undo the injustices to the German people committed by the framers of the Treaty of Versailles. This meant that in 1933 over ten million ethnic Germans in the political nation-states of Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, and Lithuania had been robbed of self-determination and were made to suffer foreign rule. Aside from shepherding Germany’s economic recovery during the Great Depression and reestablishing Germany’s status as a great power, bringing these people back into the Reich where they belonged (and in most cases wanted to be) was of paramount importance to Hitler.

But Hitler sought to do this peacefully and by stepping on as few toes as possible. In The Forced War, Hoggan allows for the historical record to speak for itself in order to exonerate Hitler from the charge that he wished to conquer the world. The Sudeten Germans, the Germans in Austria and Poland, and in Memel, which was seized by Lithuania in 1920 in violation of the League of Nations, did suffer oppression and indignities as second-class citizens under hostile rule. Hitler was addressing a pressing problem for his people, and had no interest in incorporating outgroup members such as Poles, Czech, and Slovaks under his rule. He said this numerous times. Is this what a power-mad conqueror would say?

Further, in January 1937, Hitler had instructed Marshal Hermann Göring to insist to Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Beck that Germany had no designs on the Polish Corridor or any other part of Poland for that matter, and would not form an alliance with the Soviet Union as Germany had done in 1922 in Rapallo, Italy. In return he had hoped for similar concessions from the Poles (such as Danzig, which was not even officially part of Poland). Now, either this was a wise move or it wasn’t, given how the Poles were not being honest and were abusing their German minority. Either way, it makes the reader ask if Hitler’s behavior was consistent with that of a modern-day Genghis Khan.

Nearly every time Hitler’s name appears on the page (which is often), Hoggan forces us to ask such questions. And every time, it gets harder and harder to answer in a manner harmonious with the accepted narrative, which paints Hitler as evil and insane.

If there are any criticisms of Hitler lurking in The Forced War, they are exceedingly mild—praise by faint damnation, if you will. Yes, Hitler underestimated the military capabilities of the Soviet Union. Then again, so did almost everybody in Western and Central Europe. After all the bloody purges and terror famines of the 1930s, who could have envisioned the Red Army as the colossus it turned out to be? Hoggan has a few choice things to say about some of Hitler’s diplomats as well, especially Hans Moltke, German ambassador to Poland.

Hoggan’s most consistent criticism, however, deals with Hitler’s character. Der Führer was optimistic almost to the point of naïveté. He didn’t realize until it was too late that Lord Halifax was a snake in the grass intent upon encircling Germany. He also didn’t realize that Józef Beck had been an enemy all along and never once negotiated in good faith over Danzig. Hitler, in Hoggan’s view, simply assumed that everyone wanted peace as much as he did. This is why he instructed Göring not to haggle with the Poles over Teschen. This is why he renounced German claims to territory in France, Denmark, Italy, and Poland. This is why he continually suppressed stories of Polish anti-German atrocities in the German press. This is why he made the Poles a very generous offer in return for Danzig. This is why he instructed Danzig Senate President Artur Greiser to capitulate to the August 4 Polish ultimatum, which threatened to starve the city. This is why mere days before the invasion of Poland, he halted all military operations when there appeared a glimmer of hope that the Poles might negotiate after all. This is why he never stopped trying until the moment Poland made her belligerent intentions clear by fully mobilizing.

Here are the terms Hitler offered the Poles:

Germany would request Poland to permit her to annex Danzig. She would ask permission to construct a superhighway and a railroad to East Prussia. Lipski was assured that these carefully circumscribed suggestions represented the total of German requests from Poland.

It was clear that there had to be a quid pro quo basis for negotiation and Germany was prepared to offer many concessions. Poland would be granted a permanent free port in Danzig and the right to build her own highway and railroad to the port. The entire Danzig area would be a permanent free market for Polish goods on which no German customs duties would be levied. Germany would take the unprecedented step of recognizing and guaranteeing the existing German-Polish frontier, including the 1922 boundary in Upper Silesia.

Sadly, Beck preferred subterfuge, inflated national prestige, and a disastrous war over solving the Danzig crisis and acquiring a steadfast ally against the Soviet Union, of whom the Poles were rightfully wary. He also unwittingly preferred being a pawn in Lord Halifax’s grand scheme for crushing Germany, and being ruthlessly sacrificed in the process. Not realizing this caused Hitler and his government to waste time and resources being more conciliatory towards Poland than they should have been. With 20/20 hindsight, Hoggan avers that Hitler’s diplomatic efforts in the days leading up to the invasion, earnest as they were, “left very little to be desired.”

Hoggan assesses this melancholy situation quite well:

Hitler had stressed with unerring aim the importance of the British attitude toward Germany. His optimism about avoiding an Anglo-German war would have been justified to a greater extent had German-Polish relations been as solid and friendly as Hitler had indicated. Hitler was not aware of the extent to which Great Britain had fostered an anti-German policy in Poland, and he had been misled by the friendly attitude of Beck at Berchtesgaden. Hitler was disappointed by the failure of the Ribbentrop mission to Warsaw, but he remained confident that the Poles could be induced to cooperate, if they were handled with tact and patience. Hitler had made a formidable attempt to convince the foreign groups hostile toward Germany that another World War would be a disaster. It is surprising that it was necessary, after the experience of World War I, to expend so much eloquence to make such an obvious point, and it is depressing to note that the war enthusiasts of Great Britain were impervious to every such eloquent argument.

Still, Hitler never wanted war, and in an April 1939 Reichstag speech declared that despite his deep admiration for Britain, “love cannot be provided from one side if it is not received from the other.” On the eve of the invasion, he wrote to the Duke of Windsor, who was living in France at the time, “you may rest assured that my attitude toward Britain and my desire to avoid another war between our peoples remain unchanged.”

Astonishing things for a German patriot like Hitler to say a mere 20 years after Britain had helped starve to death 800,000 German children and old people during the Allied Hunger Blockade of the First World War. Even after the invasion, Hitler stated he would stop all military action if only the Poles would finally negotiate.

If only.

The Absence of Jews

There are many fascinating aspects of this crucial history not discussed at length in this review—most notably, Hoggan’s evaluation of the historical and ideological backdrop to the events of the late 1930s, his thorough coverage of the Czech crisis, his biting appraisal of Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s ignorance and cynicism, his tart dismissals of rival mainstream historians such as Martin Gilbert, Richard Gott, and William Shirer, and his moving depiction of French Foreign Minister Bonnet and his government’s slow, tragic, and entirely unnecessary capitulation to Lord Halifax.

But one curious aspect of The Forced War must be discussed to make this review complete for today’s dissidents and revisionists: Hoggan pretty much kept the Jews of out of it. On balance, there is barely a whiff of counter-Semitism in the entire book. Yes, he characterizes William Bullitt as a warmonger, but he ignores his Jewish roots and at best construes him as a junior partner to Lord Halifax. Nor does he mention that Gilbert and Gott were Jewish, while he does mention the Jewish roots of historians Lewis B. Namier and T.L. Jarman whom he finds more able and honest. There are also a small number of Jews or half-Jews who turn up from time to time to enflame the war hysteria in Britain and the United States, such as “tory warmonger” Leopold Amery. But one must go to Wikipedia and not David Hoggan to discover this.

The closest Hoggan gets to taking a stand regarding the Jews is his evenhanded (some would say approving) estimation of Hitler’s Jewish policy, as exemplified by the following two passages:

Hitler believed that the policy of granting full legal and political equality to the Jews, which had been adopted in Germany and Great Britain during the previous century, had been a great mistake for Germany. He believed that inter-marriage between Germans and Jews harmed the German people and should be discontinued. He shared the conviction of Roman Dmowski in Poland that the Jews were harmful in the economic and cultural spheres. He also believed that the Jewish influence on German politics had weakened Germany. Hitler worked for the day when there would be no more Jewish subjects in Germany, just as Abraham Lincoln in his last years had worked for an exodus of Negroes from America.

. . . and . . .

He charged that the Jews had monopolized the leading positions in German life, but he wanted his own people in those positions. He desired German civilization to remain German and not to become Jewish. Foreign spokesmen often claimed that Germany was driving away her most valuable cultural asset, and Hitler hoped that they were sufficiently grateful that Germany was making this asset available to them. He knew that there was ample room in the world for Jewish settlement, but he believed that it was time to discard the idea that the Jews had the right to exploit every other nation in the world. He urged the Jewish people to form a balanced community of their own, or to face an unpredictable crisis.

Of course, I am not in a position to challenge Hoggan’s neutrality on this issue. According to two Jewish sources I have read, Benjamin Ginsburg’s How the Jews Defeated Hitler and Edwin Black’s The Transfer Agreement, influential anti-German Jews did warmonger throughout the 1930s and did have a tremendous impact upon the events leading up to the war. Yet this makes almost no appearance in The Forced War. For one thing, Hoggan outclasses both Ginsburg and Black as a historian. For breadth and depth of information as well as scholarly objectivity there really is no comparison. So that must be taken into consideration.

Secondly, I spotted some glaring inconsistencies between The Forced War and these two other sources. In The Transfer Agreement Black strongly implies that the outrage of Polish Jews over Hitler’s ascension to power is what drove Polish intransigence when dealing with Germany. Hoggan, on the other hand, stresses Polish “cruel and audacious” anti-Semitism—which was stronger than Hitler’s—and lays this intransigence squarely at the feet of Beck and his subordinates. The Jews, according to Hoggan, had nothing to do with it. Ginsburg, on the other hand, paints Roosevelt as a great ally and benefactor of the Jews who was greatly influenced by Jews in his administration such as Felix Frankfurter, Henry Morgenthau, and Samuel Cohen. Yet Hoggan insists that Jews had little to no influence on Roosevelt’s anti-German belligerence, and that FDR had “no strong pro-Jewish feelings.” Germany’s Jewish policies never amounted to more than a pretext for FDR; as evidence, Hoggan demonstrates how Jews were treated worse in Poland than in Germany.

Considerable attention was given to the problem of encouraging Jewish emigration from Germany in the years from 1933 to 1938, but far more Jews departed from Poland than from Germany during these years. An average 100,000 Jews were emigrating from Poland each year compared to 25–28,000 Jews leaving Germany annually. From September 1933 to November 1938 a special economic agreement (Havarah agreement) enabled German Jews to transfer their assets to Palestine, and the German authorities were far more liberal in this respect than Poland. There were also special arrangements for wealthy Jews in Germany to contribute to the emigration of others by capital transfers to various places. 170,000 Jews had left Germany by November 9, 1938, compared to approximately 575,000 who had departed from Poland during the same years. It was noted that thousands of Jews who left Germany in 1933 returned to the country after 1934, and that scarcely any of the Polish Jews returned to Poland during the same period.

If it was all about the Jews for FDR, then why not support war against Poland, or stay out of the fight altogether?

I don’t know who is correct about this, but I suspect there are elements of truth on both sides. History, as we all as know, can be quite messy, and historians have been known to grind axes. While Ginsburg and Black can be criticized for their anti-German biases, the same can be said for Hoggan’s apparent pro-German bias. In any case, Hoggan’s work is valuable in that he discusses the devastating harm that White gentiles can undoubtedly do to themselves. Such analysis can help prevent or limit future blunders as well as understanding the Jewish Question can.

There is, however, one personage in The Forced War who does challenge Hoggan, and Hoggan, to his credit, gives him ample airtime—even as he dismisses him outright. It seems that nearly every time Polish Ambassador Jerzy Potocki’s name appears on the page, he’s blaming the Jews for something:

Potocki overestimated the Jewish question because of his own intense prejudices against the Jews, which were shared by the entire Polish leadership. He was highly critical of the American Jews. He believed that Jewish influence on American culture and public opinion, which he regarded as unquestionably preponderant, was producing a rapid decline of intellectual standards in the United States. He reported to Warsaw again and again that American public opinion was merely the product of Jewish machinations.

Hoggan states further that . . .

Potocki continued to exaggerate the importance of the Jews in American policy, and he ridiculed prominent American Jews, who claimed that they were “desirous of being representative of ‘true Americanism’,” but were, “in point of fact, linked with international Jewry by ties incapable of being torn asunder.” He complained that the Jews hid their Jewish internationalism in a false nationalism, and “succeeded in dividing the world into two warlike camps.”

Far be it for this reviewer to give greater weight to Potocki’s position on the Jews than Hoggan’s. But considering all the scholarship and revelations of the post-Soviet period, which include the crucial works of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Kevin MacDonald, Andrew Joyce, Ron Unz, Brenton Sanderson, and Igor Shafarevich (among others), as well as the fact that Potocki’s analysis accords very closely with those of Jewish writers like Ginsburg and Black, one cannot help but suspect that David Hoggan may have had a bit of a blind spot when it came to the Jews.

Conclusion

David Hoggan’s The Forced War is an invaluable work of history and a crucial touchstone for modern dissidents. Appreciating the justice and truth behind the German perspective during the Second World War is the first step we all must take to have a balanced and accurate understanding, not only of history, but of the crippling ideological conformity of our own times—which springs directly from the smoldering ruins of 1945 Berlin and the Nuremburg Trials which followed.

But the book’s own story is fascinating as well.

First published in West Germany in 1961 under the title Der erzwungene Krieg, the book engendered much hostility in the press and from establishment scholars, who dubbed it a work of “right-wing extremism.” According to historian Kurt Glaser, this was due less to the few errors Hoggan had committed and more to his “heresy against the creed of historical orthodoxy.” Naturally, patriotic German citizens, especially those who had lived through the war, praised Hoggan. His popularity was such that the German edition of The Forced War went through over a dozen printings of more than 50,000 copies.

Efforts to publish an English-language edition stalled due to disputes between Hoggan and publisher Devin-Adair. Eventually, the Institute for Historical Review obtained the rights to the book. But disaster struck in 1984. As IHR director Mark Weber explains in his Foreword to the 2023 edition:

But a devastating arson attack on the IHR’s offices in July 1984, which destroyed the book’s layout and proof sheets, art work and other key files, delayed publication several more years. (No one was ever arrested for the crime. Only years later did law enforcement authorities reveal that the perpetrators had been activists of the “Jewish Defense League,” an organization identified by the FBI as a major terrorist group.)

Fortunately, IHR persevered with The Forced War. This book should be read carefully and with great urgency by as wide an audience as possible. As pure history, it is as entertaining as it is enlightening. The sheer breadth of Hoggan’s scholarship makes us ask important questions and inspires high confidence in his thesis. Any atrocities, actual or purported, committed by the Germans during the Second World War must be counterbalanced by the wealth of exonerating evidence found in The Forced War. And none of this diminishes the irony that a work which scrupulously shielded Jews from blame had nearly been done in by them forty years later.

A re-formatted and expanded new edition is now available, in both hardcover and softcover, from the Institute for Historical Review.

The Forced War (hardcover and softcover)
David Hoggan
Institute for Historical Review, 1989/2023

The conflict between Warsaw and Berlin became the pretext in 1939 for the implementation of the antiquated English balance of power policy. This produced a senseless war of destruction against Germany. As it turned out, each Allied soldier of the West was fighting unwittingly for the expansion of Bolshevism, and he was simultaneously undermining the security of every Western nation. Never were so many sacrifices made for a cause so ignoble.
— David Hoggan, The Forced War

INTRODUCTION

The best litmus tests for today’s Dissident Right should include only one question: did the right side win the Second World War in Europe?

If you answer yes, most likely you’re not a dissident. If you answer no, most likely you are. In this case, degrees don’t matter—neither does intent. One can profess the saint-like innocence of the Nazis in the face of their genocidal enemies, or one can cop to all the atrocities ascribed to the Nazis and support them anyway. Dissident. On the other hand, one can carefully weigh the actions of both sides and conclude that the Nazis were slightly more in the right than the Allies. Doesn’t matter. Dissident.

To be sure, similar questions about similar wars can become similar litmus tests. Soviet citizens who believed the Whites should have beaten the Reds in the Russian Civil War were one example. Present-day Southern Nationalists who believed the wrong side won the American Civil War are another. But the most meaningful question involves the Second World War because that conflict was the most destructive, affected the most people, and has had the profoundest impact on Western Civilization.

Thus, to be a dissident one most likely needs a level of historical understanding that goes far deeper (although not necessarily broader) than that of the average educated person. David Hoggan’s 1961 work The Forced War: When Peaceful Revision Failed provides this historical understanding so comprehensively that it should be nearly impossible for anyone to subscribe to his thesis and not wind up a dissident.

The Forced War effectively offers the German point of view during the lead up to the Second World War. More specifically, it demonstrates the paucity of good reasons (and indeed the plethora of bad reasons) why England and Poland in particular resisted Adolf Hitler’s dogged attempts to peacefully revise the map of central Europe. Hitler’s purpose was to right the wrongs of the Treaty of Versailles, and in so doing serve the legitimate interests of the German people. The Forced War concerns itself only with the events culminating in Germany’s invasion of Poland, which can be seen as a conflict separate from the worldwide conflagration which followed.

The story amounts to a series of decisions and actions made by men in Berlin, London, and Warsaw, with Rome, Washington, Moscow, Prague, and Paris acting more or less from the sidelines. One action impacts another and another, and so on. In a sense, The Forced War is a broader and deeper version of A.J.P. Taylor’s landmark 1961 volume The Origins of the Second World War, which Hoggan references often. Both these works refuse to demonize Adolf Hitler and the Nazis (or psychoanalyze them into insanity). Instead they show them as rational, ethnonationalist fascists who, to be sure, made mistakes, but more often than not got things right and had justice on their side. Much is made in both works of Hitler’s peaceful revision of central Europe during the 1930s.

While Taylor reserves some space for moral criticisms of Hitler, Hoggan offers nearly none. Instead, he focuses on the one person whom he believes was most to blame in unnecessarily bringing about the most destructive war in history: British Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax. Described by Hoggan as “one of the most self-assured, ruthless, clever, and sanctimoniously self-righteous diplomats the world has ever seen,” Halifax emerges from the pages of The Forced War as the villain par excellence of the twentieth century and beyond. As the dominant personality in Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s government, he seemed to have harbored a malignant hatred for Germans and for Germany. He was also dead set upon war as soon as Hitler began expanding his nation’s borders and influence on the continent, starting with the Anschluss of Austria in March 1938. War, Halifax felt, was inevitable, which justified every underhanded tactic he employed to goad Germany and Poland into it. Indeed, if Hoggan’s analysis is even partially correct, it is nothing less than a travesty that Halifax is not being vilified the way Hitler continues to be 80 years after the war.

Of course, one man’s hatred would not have amounted to much had the European map not been muddled by the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The treaty violated everything we know about nationalism and rearranged borders to make them both ethnically inorganic and ultimately unworkable. The sorest point, of course, turned out to be the majority-German Free City of Danzig, which was now surrounded by Polish territory and under the tenuous control of the League of Nations. Hitler dearly wanted to reincorporate it into the Reich:

The ultimate treaty terms gave Poland much more than she deserved, and much more than she should have requested. Most of West Prussia, which had a German majority at the last census, was surrendered to Poland without plebiscite, and later the richest industrial section of Upper Silesia was given to Poland despite the fact that the Poles lost the plebiscite there. The creation of a League protectorate for the national German community of Danzig was a disastrous move; a free harbor for Poland in a Danzig under German rule would have been far more equitable. The chief errors of the treaty included the creation of the Corridor, the creation of the so-called Free City of Danzig, and the cession of part of Upper Silesia to Poland. These errors were made for the benefit of Poland and to the disadvantage of Germany, but they were detrimental to both Germany and Poland. An enduring peace in the German-Polish borderlands was impossible to achieve within the context of these terms.

Sadly, Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck seemed to take these gifts a little too much to heart. According to Hoggan, Beck was swayed by the false notion that the regions the Versailles Treaty had grafted onto Poland had always belonged to Poland—despite their German majorities and centuries-long German presence. This led him to defend these acquisitions at all costs, despite Hitler’s generous offers and attempts at peaceful revision. Of course, it would have been suicidal for Beck to do this alone, since by the time Germany had re-armed in 1935, Poland had approximately half of Germany’s population, was less industrialized, and would have stood no chance against her in a war. It was only due to promises of military support from Halifax in the event of a German invasion that Beck felt brazen enough to defy Hitler.

Polish defiance of Hitler on the Danzig question did not occur until the British leaders had launched a vigorous encirclement policy designed to throttle the German Reich. It is very unlikely that the Polish leaders would have defied Hitler had they not expected British support. The Polish leaders had received assurances ever since September 1938 that the British leaders would support them against Hitler at Danzig.

Another, albeit secondary, element of the story is how US president Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his warmongering half-Jewish ambassador William Bullitt lurked in the background, constantly making the political atmosphere favorable for war against Germany—but as discreetly as possible since the American public had no appetite for a second forceful intervention in Europe. As early as November 7, 1937 FDR had declared to the French Chargé d’Affaires Jules Henry that he was interested in overthrowing Hitler.

A year later, the Polish diplomat in Washington Jerzy Potocki reported that Bullitt had informed him that

. . . President Roosevelt was determined to bring America into the next European war. Bullitt explained to Potocki at great length that he enjoyed the special confidence of President Roosevelt. Bullitt predicted that a long war would soon break out in Europe, and “of Germany and her Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, he spoke with extreme vehemence and with bitter hatred.” He suggested that the war might last six years, and he advocated that it should be fought to a point where Germany could never recover.

Potocki did not share the enthusiasm of Bullitt and Roosevelt for war and destruction. He asked how such a war might arise, since it seemed exceedingly unlikely that Germany would attack Great Britain or France. Bullitt suggested that a war might break out between Germany and some other Power, and that the Western Powers would intervene in such a war. Bullitt considered an eventual Soviet-German war inevitable, and he predicted that Germany, after an enervating war in Russia, would capitulate to the Western Powers. He assured Potocki that the United States would participate in this war, if Great Britain and France made the first move.

As would be expected, The Forced War dives into a great many diplomatic and political details of the late 1930s. Not every tit in the book leads to a tat, but most do, demonstrating the veritable gym floor of diplomatic dominoes which was in place at the time. Hoggan thankfully keeps historical encounters and correspondence as brief, punchy, and to-the-point as possible, and with very few tangents. This allows him to pack his book with enough day-by-day and down-to-the-minute detail to make it a real page turner. Two-thirds of the way through this 320,000 word history (that’s nearly Don Quixote length, by the way), Hoggan is still discussing the events from mid-August, 1939. This means he dedicated about one-third of his magnum opus to the final two weeks before the German invasion of Poland.

This is an eventful book, to say the least. And it’s good stuff too—the scheming, the backstabbing, the heroics, the cold feet, and the histrionics are all there. So are all the lies and blunders. Some of this amounts to fallible human beings practicing politics as usual (such as Italy’s dithering support for Germany in August 1939), but much amounts to what Hoggan ascribes to foul play. And the prime perpetrator was the Halifax-Beck-Roosevelt tripartite, which forced the war upon an comparatively innocent Nazi Germany.

What follows in parts 2 and 3 of this review is less an evaluation of the entirety of The Forced War than a presentation of the evidence which supports Hoggan’s thesis—evidence which will prove invaluable to the dissident case today. This evidence falls into three categories:

1. Lord Halifax deviously manipulated both Poland and Germany into war.
2. Poland deserved to be invaded by refusing to negotiate over Danzig and by abusing her German minority.
3. Hitler wanted peace and sincerely cared about the German people.

Go to Part 2.

Go to Part 1.

Ch. 18: Rasputin as a representative of Jewish interests

In his attempts to help his new friends Rasputin was faced everywhere with the resistance of influential personalities as well as the anti-Jewish attitude of the ministers. He therefore turned to Simanovich with the request to name people who could inform him in detail on the situation of the Jews in Russia. These people Simanovich could naturally place at his disposal immediately from his own chancellery and Rasputin was informed and instructed in a very one-sided manner in favor of the Jews.

Now the time had also come to enlist Rasputin into the great support action that Simanovich had raised for his racial comrades. For numerous matters could not be accomplished without the cooperation of Rasputin.

The special concern of Simanovich was at first for the Jewish youth.

That is, the Russian government allowed Jews into high schools and universities only in a very limited number in order to reserve these educational places primarily for the sons and daughters of the Russian people. To obtain exceptions was for Jews, up to then, very difficult and cost a lot of money.

Here Simanovich considered it urgent to bring about relief for the Jews:

I was daily stormed by telegraph, letters, as well as orally, to work for the Jewish youth who were hindered in their educational aspirations by the current determinations.

These petitions for acceptance in the state educational institutions came from all of Russia to Simanovich, who up to then had fulfilled them as far as he was able to do. But Simanovich had not been able to accomplish very much. Perhaps he had succeeded in effecting an exception now and then in individual cases, but it was impossible for him to implement the entry of Jews to institutions of higher education in large numbers.

Here only Rasputin could help. But it is characteristic of the Jewish presumption and arrogance that Simanovich, after forcing of the starets into the Jewish front, took charge of him independently.

He produced in large quantities blank recommendation letters of Rasputin to influential personalities of the court, to Petersburg professors, and senior priests which he then handed out to his protégés in cases of need.

But Simanovich took care to see that these possibilities of academic study for Jews were used in the greatest numbers. Suddenly Jews started appearing in hordes who wished to be permitted to study at the university or at the high schools of Petersburg. Simanovich provided them all with Rasputin’s recommendation letters and took them personally to the relevant ministers to whom he lied that the Tsarina herself had advocated the visits of these Jews. Then Simanovich reports boastfully:

My wards were then accepted regardless of the firmly established quota.

The baseness of this manner of acting lies especially in the fact that the Tsarina did not have any idea in general of this misuse of her name and that, on the other hand, however, the apparent intervention of the Tsarina on behalf of these Jews provoked justified rage among the genuine Russians, and their hatred of the German-origin Tsarina only rose.

For, large sections of the Russian people saw in the Jews only traitors, spies and shirkers.

But Simanovich achieved three things through this underhand manner of acting:

• first, that his racial comrades were allowed to the eagerly desired studies;
• secondly, that the respectability of the Tsarina and, therewith, of the Tsar was considerably reduced among patriotic Russians;
• thirdly, that Rasputin was, on account of his intervention for the Jews, hated in Petersburg but as a result he was so much more tightly chained to him.

How obedient Rasputin had already become is proved by the following significant statement of Simanovich:

The letters of Rasputin which he wrote according to my dictation ran roughly the following way: ‘Dear Minister, Mama (that is, the Tsarina) wishes that these Jewish scholars study in their homeland so that they do not need to go abroad where they become revolutionaries; they should remain at home. Grigori.’

Did any minister still have the possibility of doubting the genuineness of the wording of the letter of the favoite of the imperial couple? The result was that innumerable Jews received entry into the universities in all of Russia.

But Simanovich did not stop at these successes, he went all out.

His next efforts were directed at removing the restrictions of the right of residence of the Jews in Russia. For, it was in general forbidden to the Jews in Russia to dwell in Petersburg or Moscow or to undertake commercial travels outside the district allotted to them.

These restrictions naturally prevented the Jews from being able to extend their businesses as they pleased or to engage in free professions. For precisely the big cities were the goal of innumerable Jews. Thus Simanovich was besieged with petitions to bring about a right of settlement in these cities. But even here the cunning Jew knew what to do.

For the realisation of these innumerable petitions, he set up a big special organization with its own office. Thanks to the support of Rasputin and thanks to his own relations with commercial entities he pushed through everything so that he could write:

I provided the residence permit to all Jews without exception who approached me.

But how did he go about it?

Indeed there was one possibility for the Jews to settle everywhere: the right of settlement had been granted to Jewish handicraftsmen to settle everywhere where they wished to practice their handicraft. However, they had to fulfil one condition: every Jew who wished to make use of this right had to undergo a test which however, according to the assertions of Simanovich, offered no special difficulties.

Here therefore was a possibility of disguising Jews as handicraftsmen and smuggling them in even when they were not handicraftsmen. This possibility therefore Simanovich exploited fully. Simanovich writes in his book:

I took pains to gain a firm entrance into the relevant Petersburg chamber of commerce and exerted a decisive influence in the election of the board. My candidates were always elected and were then my faithful collaborators.

The residence permit I provided not only to people who really engaged in a handicraft but also to those who had no idea of the handicraft on which they were tested. They were entered into the register as journeymen. I myself, as a jeweller, could have journeymen and made full use of this right even though I had no workshop in Petersburg. In my flat there was an empty room with many workbenches but nobody ever worked here. My so-called journeymen engaged in all sorts of businesses, only not in jewellery handicraft. There were actors, teachers, singers and writers among them.

In especially difficult cases, however, Simanovich turned to the following method:

Sometimes however it occurred that the petitioner had no formal justification for a move to Petersburg. Then I had two petitions for a residence permit in Petersburg sent to him telegraphically, one to me, the other to the city captain of Petersburg and then telegraphed the petitioner: “You are informed that until further notice you are assigned to the chancellery of the city captain.” This procedure was resorted to by the city captain especially when, in difficult cases, it was a question of circumventing the restriction of a residence permit. The Jews supposedly assigned to the chancellery of the city captain could live in Petersburg with their families without hindrance.

In this way hundreds of Jews obtained the possibility of settling in Petersburg, conducting their businesses and setting up their all-subverting activity. The forerunners of the future Jewish racial rule could in this manner gather together gradually and prepare their subversive activity.

But difficult cases of Jewish petitioners were at first handed over to Rasputin himself. Jews sought his support especially when they had come into conflict with police or military authorities. He helped here too whenever it was possible.

The changed attitude towards Jewry emerged also clearly from the treatment of the petitioners in his chancellery. The Jewish poison began to work increasingly on him. On this Simanovich reports triumphantly:

If there were generals, he (Rasputin) declared contemptuously to them: ‘My dear generals, you are used to being received first everywhere. But here there are Jews without rights, I shall first do what is necessary for them. Jews, come! I wish to do everything for you!’

Then the Jews were entrusted to me. I had to undertake the required steps for them in Rasputin’s name.

After the Jews Rasputin turned to the other petitioners and only at the end of the reception did he inquire what the generals’ request was.

One sees from this how the Jews had already succeeded in separating Rasputin from his racial comrades and in slowly killing his racial consciousness.

Even these facts naturally contributed to further heightening the aversion of large circles of the Russian population to the starets.

On the other hand, Simanovich took care to see now that Rasputin could indulge his passions fully; for it was important to him to keep the starets in a good mood. He raised easily with the help of his Jewish friends the enormous amounts of money that his drunken revelries and his friendships with prostitutes consumed

He promoted wherever he could the craving for status and the aversion of the starets to the Russian aristocracy as well as to the other ruling strata of Russia. With scornful delight therefore the Jew describes Rasputin’s behavior with regard to the above-mentioned circles:

He conducted himself in the aristocratic salons with incredible insolence and nonchalance. It was a strange spectacle when Russian princesses, countesses, famous actresses, powerful ministers and worthies swarmed around the drunken peasant. He treated them like lackeys and servant maids. On the least provocation he scolded the aristocratic ladies in the most obscene manner such as would hardly have found approval in the stables. … Towards the society ladies and girls he conducted himself with the utmost shamelessness and the presence of the husbands or mothers did not disturb him in the least. His gestures themselves would have offended even a prostitute. Nevertheless it happened rarely that people showed that they were hurt by him. They feared and therefore flattered him.

If, on the other hand, it was a question of the desires of a Jewess, then Simanovich himself took care, as a racial comrade, to see that the starets could not approach her too closely but that, on the other hand, her desires were fulfilled. Especially significant here is the case of the Jewess Lippert.

The Jewish doctor Lippert had, like hundreds of thousands of other Russian citizens, become a German prisoner of war. But, whereas the wives of all the other prisoners of war who had no protection had to wait patiently for the return home of their husbands, the Jewess Lippert — a relative of the Jewish wife of the former Russian Prime Minister Count Witte — turned to the Jew Simanovich with a request to effect the exchange of her husband for the release of a German prisoner of war.

Simanovich directed her to Rasputin, who immediately received the Jewess in the presence of his private secretary. In spite of his initial resistance, Rasputin allowed himself then to be persuaded to deliver to the Jewess the following letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sasonov, the well-known opponent of the starets: “Dear friend, help the man languishing in German war captivity! Approve two Germans and demand one Russian! God will help in the rescue of our countrymen. Nowych[1] Rasputin.”

Mrs. Lippert handed over this letter personally to the Minister but received only an evasive reply. But when, after a week, no final decision had been taken by the minister, Mrs. Lippert turned once again to Rasputin, who gave her the following new letter: “Listen, minister. I sent you a hussy, you have said god knows what to her. Let that pass, do it, then everything will be alright. If not, I will give you a punch in the ribs, I will relate it to the dear man and you will flee. Rasputin.”

The words, “I will relate it to the dear man” mean, according to Simanovich, that Rasputin intended to inform the Tsar directly of the case.

Mrs. Lippert handed over this letter also personally to the Minister Sasonov. Enraged by Rasputin’s shameless letter, Sasonov shouted out: “Should I be pleased with such letters from an adventurer like Rasputin? If you were not a lady, I would simply throw you out.”

Thereupon the Jewess demanded the letters back. But the minister at first refused this request. Trusting in the aid of Rasputin, who had made her affair his own, the Jewess threatened the minister that she would go directly to Rasputin and relate to him the course of the conversation.

Regarding the continuation of the conversation Simanovich reports in full awareness of the Jewish triumph:

Sasonov became embarrassed. “Well, let’s leave it,” he said after some hesitation, “I was beside myself. Please do not make a fuss of it. Tell Father Grigori that it was only a joke of mine.

“In my opinion,” remarked Mrs. Lippert, “it would be better if you would call Rasputin now.” The quick change in Sasonov’s voice did not escape her. “You know that he changes ministers like gloves.”

She picked up the telephone, called Rasputin’s house, and requested him to come to the phone. Then she gave the receiver to the minister.

“You send me such a remarkable letter, Grigori Yefimovich,” said Sasonov, “Are you angry with me?” “Why?,” replied Rasputin. “I don’t care. You have hurt me. Don’t contradict me, we wish to be friends.” The discussion concluded after some clarifying information with the conciliatory remark of Rasputin’s: “I shall be friends with you; I have not yet written such letters to anybody.”

After a fortnight, the Jew Lippert was already in Petersburg whereas innumerable Russian prisoners of war who had been listed in advance had to wait in vain for the handling of their exchange request. Once again Jewry had won and produced the proof of what a powerful position it had already obtained thanks to the support of the Jew-enslaved Rasputin.

Rasputin had indeed once again asserted his will but, on the other hand, created new ruthless enemies for himself.

The influence on his Jewish secretary became greater every day so that adventurous rumors formed themselves around him. It was soon thought that Simanovich had become the Minister for Jewish Affairs, and soon it was maintained that he was active as an agent of the American Jews.

But these rumours had a factual background. For, international Jewry considered that the appropriate moment had arrived to exploit the present distress of Russia — which was conditioned by the enormous blood sacrifice and the indescribable misery of the Russian people — and to extract from the unfortunate country far-reaching concessions to Jewry.

If the Jew Simanovich hides himself on this matter in strict silence, other sources however give sufficient information on these Jewish attempts at interference.

Ch. 32: Rasputin Plans a Revolution

When Rasputin finally came to the conviction that Tsar Nicholas II would remain true under all circumstances to his obligations towards the allied powers and would furthermore refuse to arrange a special peace with Germany, he took a desperate decision.

He spoke with his private secretary Simanovich, and declared that there was only one possibility left to initiate peace negotiations with Germany and this sole possibility was the unleashing of a revolution. “Only that would place Russia in a position to free itself of its obligations towards its allies.”

Rasputin considered the military and political situation of Russia to be so dark that he wished to force the Tsar under all circumstances to end the war. Indeed, Simanovich maintains that the Tsar knew of these preparations of a revolution and indeed promoted them.

But numerous other sources — for example, the Frenchmen Gilbert Maire[2] and Gabriel Gobron[3] — relate convincingly that Tsar Nicholas II had not been informed of this plan at all, but that Rasputin had planned to force the Tsar, after the success of the revolution, to the conclusion of a special peace.

Even the French and English ambassadors report in accord of the unconditional faithfulness of Tsar Nicholas II towards his allies. The English ambassador Buchanan even considered that “We never had a truer friend and ally than Tsar Nicholas.”

Sir Samuel Hoare wrote, “If he sacrificed his Russian friends, he never left his allied brothers-in-arms in the lurch.”

On the other hand, Simanovich is silent on the main reason that was for him decisive in promoting the revolution from above: the immediate resolution of the Jewish question in favor of Jewry. But we are informed of this fact by the Frenchman Gilbert Maire, who was excellently informed of the planned revolution.

According to his report, Rasputin had developed a political programme that had been decisively influenced, even elaborated, by Simanovich.

The programme had the following contents: 1. Conclusion of a separate peace; 2. A large-scale agrarian reform that aimed at the distribution of state- and church-landed property to the peasants and, indeed, first to those who had taken part in the war; and 3. The emancipation of the Russian Jews.

At the same time Gilbert Maire also mentions that Rasputin had, of all things, informed his deadly enemy Prince Yusupov[4] precisely of this plan. But this blind trust and imprudence accelerated his downfall to a great degree. For he had revealed to his enemy his most secret plans.

But Rasputin was of the opinion that the present situation was especially suited for the planned overthrow of the government. He held a detailed conference to which he had invited the Minister of the Interior Protopopov and the generals Khabalov, Globachev and Nikitin. It was decided to gather together reliable young soldiers and officers in Petersburg and, furthermore, on the streets of Petersburg food riots should be initiated through suitable selected people.

The soldiers will then scatter the people without difficulty. But we could inform our allies: We are faced with a revolution.

If this happened, nothing more would, in Rasputin’s opinion, stand in the way of a peace agreement. The old trade treaty with Germany would then be renewed and Poland recognized as an independent state. Russia would receive parts of East Galicia while the Baltic Sea provinces would be ceded to Germany.

But this plan was soon known in Petersburg. Simanovich thinks that the female agent of the member of parliament Guchkov, Laptinskaya, had eavesdropped on this discussion and written it down.

But while the preparations for this revolution were still being made Rasputin was murdered and the entire plan was thereby brought to an end.

Ch. 34: The End of Rasputin

Rasputin’s Jewish private secretary observed the further development of matters with the greatest concern, even though he had gradually reached the goal of his Jewish wishes. For, shortly before his death, Rasputin informed him that the Tsar had decided to take measures for the improvement of the situation of the Jews. The ministers had already received instructions to remove the restrictions on the residency rights of the Jews. Similarly, measures were introduced for the expansion of Jewish rights.

Even the Jewish delegates of Russia were informed of all these measures. Jewry could therefore be satisfied with their advocate Rasputin.

But the hatred against Rasputin in the leading strata of Russia was so great that Simanovich rightly had to worry about the life of the starets. His spies also soon brought him information regarding an assassination attempt that was being planned against Rasputin.

Simanovich indeed had always had excellent relations with the gaming clubs in Petersburg that were frequented by leading personalities. Through one of his spies who worked in the ‘Russian National Club’ he soon learned of the secret meetings in this club:

He reported that the well-known anti-Semitic member of parliament Purishkevich[5] acted as chairman there. Further, there took part in the proceedings the Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovich, Count Tatischev, young Prince Felix Yusopov, the former Minister of the Interior Khvostov, the reactionary member of parliament Shulgin, and many young officers. My source did not know the names of the officers. All the time much was spoken about Rasputin in these proceedings. Now and then the names of the English ambassador Buchanan, the Tsar and the Tsarina were mentioned. Something secret was being planned, they spoke of somebody having to be thrown out.

Simanovich deduced from this report that a conspiracy against the Tsar and Rasputin was in process, in which Purishkevich was the leading man. He informed Rasputin immediately. Thereafter these meetings were continuously watched.

Simanovich received valuable information on the planned conspiracy through his colleague Evsey Buchstab and a doctor whose name he does not reveal. For, Purishkevich was being treated by this doctor. The latter skilfully turned the conversation during a treatment to Rasputin. Carelessly Purishkevich stated “that Rasputin would soon no longer dwell among the living. I wish to free the Russian people from Rasputin.” “You will see,” Purishkevich concluded, “what will happen in three days.”

Simanovich informed the starets immediately of this, asked him to inform the Tsarina and added: “The conspirators wish to first kill you, but then the imperial couple too would be next in line.”

But Simanovich worried rightly for his life since Purishkevich was also his deadly enemy. Filled with anxiety, therefore, he made the following proposal to Rasputin to save his life:

The Tsar must now separate himself from you. Only through this sacrifice can one forestall the revolution. If you are out of the way, all will calm down. You have raised the aristocracy and the entire nation against you. Tell Papa and Mama (that is, the Tsar and Tsarina) that they could give you a million English pounds; then both of us could leave Russia and settle down in Palestine. There we can live in peace. I am also seriously worried about my life. On account of you I now have very many enemies. But I want to live.

This proposal, which is taken verbatim from Simanovich’s book, reveals fully the true character of this Jew. In the moment of danger, he demands of Rasputin that he turn his back on his Russian homeland and have the Tsar gift him 20 million marks so that he and Simanovich can lead a peaceful life in Palestine.

And what a distortion of the facts does Simanovich indulge in! Who then had alienated Rasputin from the Russian people? None other than his Jewish secretary Simanovich, his secret advisor, in whom Rasputin confided on everything and whose advice he unfortunately followed only too often!

Rasputin was of course strongly affected by these warnings and proposals but rejected them trusting in his influence and his power.

In fact, an officer tried, immediately after this conversation, during a carousal, to shoot Rasputin. But fearlessly Rasputin looked the officer — who had already placed his revolver on him — in the eye, so that the latter lowered the revolver again and shot himself in the chest. This assassination attempt had failed and Rasputin considered himself fully secure in spite of all the warnings from around him.

But his death was already determined. The conspirators were in no way satisfied with this unsuccessful assassination attempt.

On the same day, Simanovich learned that Rasputin had been invited to a tea at a Grand Duke’s. Once again he warned Rasputin and made him aware of the danger. For, he feared that Rasputin would fall into the trap of Prince Yusupov and the Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovich. But Rasputin threw all these warnings to the wind and said to his secretary: “Nobody can forbid me to go there. I shall wait here for the ‘little one.’ He will pick me up and we shall go together.”

Simanovich asked him who the “little one” was, but remarkably Rasputin did not betray his secret to him. Further attempts to hold him back he shrugged off brusquely.

Even the Tsarina and Vyrubova, who had been informed by Simanovich, warned him about invitations and requested him urgently to remain at home. All these warnings remained unsuccessful.

For the sake of security, the house was surrounded by agents of the political police, who had the order not to let Rasputin out of the house. But Rasputin cancelled even these security measures, gave them money, and asked them to go away because he wished to sleep. They went away and left Rasputin alone.

Around midnight, Rasputin called his secretary and informed him that, in spite of everything, he was going to the “little one.” At the same time, he promised that he would call him at 2 o’clock. Simanovich waited in vain for this call. At dawn he drove, full of ominous presentiments, to Rasputin’s house. The starets had not yet returned. In spite of all the warnings, he had run into death.

Simanovich’s investigations were soon successful. A police constable who had been on duty at the palace of Prince Yusupov gave him the following report:

An unknown man had given him fifty roubles and declared that he was Purishkevich, the member of the Duma, and had murdered Rasputin. “I have freed Russia from this monster,” Purishkevich stated. “He was a friend of the Germans and wanted peace. Now we can carry on the war. You should likewise be faithful to your fatherland and be silent.”

Further investigations revealed that Grand Duke Pavlovich and Prince Yusupov had taken part alongside Purishkevich, as well as some other personalities of the Russian high aristocracy.

Although Rasputin had been badly hit by many bullets, he did not die immediately. The conspirators then dragged the unconscious man into a car, drove to a place on the Neva chosen in advance because it was not frozen and threw him here into the water. After a long search the corpse was finally found there.

Rasputin was murdered in the night of 29–30 December 1916.

The Tsar, who was in his main office, was informed by telegram and returned immediately. Rasputin’s corpse was secretly buried in a chapel in Tsarskoye Selo in the presence of the Imperial family and Vyrubova. Rasputin’s death threw the entire Imperial family into the greatest grief and distress. The Tsar himself was convinced that Rasputin’s death would inevitably be followed by his downfall also. An important role was here played by Rasputin’s will, in which he had set down the following gloomy prophecy:

If I am killed by hired murderers and even by my brothers, Russian peasants, you the Russian Tsar do not need to fear anything. Stay on your throne and rule. And you, Russian Tsar, do not need have any worries regarding your children. They will rule Russia for centuries.

But if I am killed by boyars,[6] aristocrats, and they shed my blood, your hands are soiled with my blood and you will not wash your hands clean of the blood for 25 years. You will leave Russia. Brothers will rise against brothers and kill and chase one another, and in the course of 25 years there will no longer be any aristocracy in the country.

Tsar of the Russian lands, if you hear the church bells that announce to you that Grigori was murdered, you should know: If it was your relatives who accomplished the murder, then none of your family, that is, your children and relatives, will remain alive for more than two years, they will be killed by the Russian people.

But the Jew Simanovich had taken possession of the entire literary remains of Rasputin. He was therefore able to influence the Tsar and the Tsarina in an important way up to the outbreak of the Russian Revolution based on the supposed written instructions of Rasputin that were supposed to relate to personal matters. In this way even the dead Rasputin was exploited for Jewish goals until international Jewry threw the Tsar down from his throne.

But Simanovich succeeded, after varying fortunes, in leaving Russia, taking with him a large treasure of jewellery and copious amounts of money, for his mission in the service of international Jewry had been completely fulfilled.

[1] This seems to provide credibility to the claim made by some scholars that Rasputin’s surname was Nowych.

[2] Gilbert Maire, Raspoutine, Paris, 1934.

[3] Gabriel Gobron, Raspoutine et l’orgie Russe, Paris, 1930.

[4] Prince Felix Yusupov (1887-1967) was one of the principal conspirators in the murder of Rasputin. After the murder, the Tsarina wanted him and Grand Duke Dmitri Pavlovich to be shot but the Tsar sent Yusupov to his estate in Belgorod instead and the Grand Duke Pavlovich to the front in Persia. Yusupov wrote an account of the murder in La fin de Raspoutine (1927).

[5] Vladimir Purishkevich (1870-1920) was a monarchist, anti-Communist and anti-Semitic politician who helped to form the Black Hundreds and was one of the founders of the Union of the Russian People. He agreed to join Prince Yusupov’s conspiracy because he believed that Rasputin and the German Tsarina were hindering Russia’s chances of victory in the First World War.

[6] From Wikipedia: A boyar or bolyar was a member of the highest rank of the feudal nobility in many Eastern European states, including Kievan Rus, Bulgaria, Russia, Wallachia and Moldavia, and among Baltic Germans.