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The Cult of Ugly: Leftist Lies, Jewish Junk, and the Malign Martyrdom of George Floyd

It’s a perfect image for our insane and ugly age: an overweight gender-fluid Black woman in a Wu-Flu mask pressing her head in worship against a giant mural of George Floyd at the site of his martyrdom in Minneapolis. The martyr is ugly, the mural is ugly and the mourner is ugly:

Gender-fluid Damarra Atkins worships at a mural of George Floyd in George Floyd Square, Minneapolis

In its ugliness, the image confirms once again the words of the great Catholic writer Hilaire Belloc (1870-1953):

[T]here is (as the greatest of the ancient Greeks discovered) a certain indissoluble Trinity of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. You cannot deny or attack one of these three without at the same time denying or attacking both the others. Therefore with the advance of this new and terrible enemy against the Faith and all that civilization which the Faith produces, there is coming not only a contempt for beauty but a hatred of it; and immediately upon the heels of this there appears a contempt and hatred for virtue. (Belloc, The Great Heresies (1938), ch. 6, “The Modern Phase”)

Leftists do indeed hate beauty, which is why ugliness is the most obvious feature of leftism and its art, culture and acolytes. But, as Belloc explained, leftists can’t hate beauty without also hating truth and goodness, which is why they flocked so eagerly into the martyr-cult of George Floyd. He was an ugly Black criminal who killed himself with lies: he first tried to pass fake money to an Asian shopkeeper, then to conceal his possession of drugs when the police were called.

George Floyd as icon of anti-Whiteness

In life, Floyd was at war with Truth, Beauty and Goodness; in death, he became a leftist icon not despite his ugliness and criminality, but because of them. Leftism is powered by its contradictions, not weakened. It insists that “Black is White” in all senses, portraying violent Black criminals as saintly victims and civilized law-abiding Whites as murderous oppressors. This inversion of reality has sent the murder-rate soaring among young Black men in America, as leftists perform their usual trick of most harming those they claim to be most helping. But in reality leftists don’t want to help Blacks: they want to harm Whites. George Floyd is best seen not as an icon of Blackness, but as an icon of anti-Whiteness. From his dark skin and thick lips to his low intelligence and immorality, the destructive and criminal Floyd is the antithesis of a creative and law-abiding White. He represents Black savagery against White civilization.

And that is why he is now an icon of leftism. But even for leftists Floyd isn’t entirely perfect. If only he’d been Muslim too! Then he would have represented an even stronger antithesis to White Western Christian civilization. That’s why Black Muslims like Somalis are probably the leftist ideal as immigrants into Western nations. Steve Sailer has pointed out that White Scandinavian Minneapolis was once “the most boringly sensible big city in America.” Then leftists enriched it with Somalis and home-grown Black thugs like George Floyd. In Britain, the Jewish immigration minister Barbara Roche was very happy to enrich us with 200,000 Somalis and counting: “Since most were untrained and would be dependent on welfare, the Home Office could have refused them entry. But they were granted ‘exceptional leave to remain [by Roche]’.”

“Jews are, on average, ugly people”

And in Sweden the Jewish sociologist Jerzy Sarnecki (pronounced Sarnetski) does his best to deny that Somalis and other immigrants form the “vast majority” of gang-rapists. Sarnecki is very well-suited to serve as a high-priest in the lying leftist Cult of Ugly, because he has an ugly and unappealing punim (Yiddish for “face”). As Chateau Heartiste so often pointed out: “Physiognomy is real.”

The ugly Jewish sociologist Jerzy Sarnecki, who prominently features in the [Swedish] media as an expert on all things crime-related.”

And it isn’t coincidental that Sarnecki is both Jewish and ugly. He’s Jugly, as you might say: that is, he’s ugly in a characteristically Jewish way. I agree with a fascinating article at National Vanguard arguing that “Jews themselves are an unattractive and, on average, ugly people” and that “Jews, as a group, oppose beauty.” Indeed, as Kevin MacDonald has noted, the Talmud advises Jews not to regard physical beauty as important in marriage: “For ‘false is grace and beauty is vain.’ Pay regard to good breeding, for the object of marriage is to have children” (Taanith 26b and 31a).

Jewish junk for Juglification

Jews oppose beauty in all parts of life – art, music and architecture, for example. At the Occidental Observer Brenton Sanderson has examined the anti-art of Mark Rothko (1903-70) and Jewish attempts to uglify the operas of Wagner. The acclaimed Jewish painter Lucian Freud (1922-2011), grandson of the ideological uglifier Sigmund Freud and brother of the sex-criminal Clement Freud, spent a long career putting ugly bodies onto canvas. And I’ve been struck by the ugliness of the menorahs with which Jews have increasingly laid claim to public space in Western cities.

Some memorable menorahs

The ugly art of Jewish painter Lucian Freud

An article at Chabad.org, “How the Chanukah Menorah Made Its Way to the Public Sphere,” claims that “Through the years and the courts, a small spark in Philadelphia now lights up the world.” I disagree: I think the world has been uglified by menorahs, not enlightened. They’re Jewish junk expressing Jewish self-worship and the pursuit of Jewish interests. The article says that the “small spark” in Philadelphia was the lighting of the first public menorah “in front of Independence Hall,” which is home to the Liberty Bell, “the icon of American freedom.” But Jewish activism in America has always aimed to reduce the freedom of Whites and to destroy the nation they founded.

Ugly faces, ugly brains

In other words, that first menorah was a lie. Those who promote ugliness also promote lies and immorality, exactly as Belloc predicted. This anti-trinity is particularly obvious on the extreme left – Steve Sailer has noted that Antifa “tend to be ugly people with bad teeth and even worse taste in grooming.” The Cult of Ugly has ugly acolytes, just as one would expect. But two interesting questions arise here. What is the exact relationship between ugly faces and ugly ideology? And why are Jews and leftists “on average, ugly people”? If you consider that ugliness is a matter of asymmetry and ill-proportion, it would follow that there is some correlation between an ugly face and an “ugly” brain. The same biological factors – disease, inbreeding and harmful mutations – that distort the geometry of faces will also distort the geometry of the brain.

Portland antifa mugshots

That’s why “physiognomy is real”: faces do say something about the brains that lie behind them and, therefore, about personality and behaviour. The correlation isn’t perfect, of course, but it’s strong enough to be useful and it’s clearly relevant to the ugly acolytes of ugly leftism. As for Jews and the ugliness of both their punims and their brains, note the studies that have identified marked inbreeding and higher rates of mental illness among Jews. For example, “Rabbis Eric Weiss and Nathaniel Ezray have said that ‘mental illness is a Jewish issue’ and point to the findings of geneticists at John Hopkins University who have identified a high incidence of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder among Ashkenazi Jews. Many suffer from an autosomal recessive trait that goes back thousands of years and which manifests as congenital lying, delusional behaviour and paranoia.”

Prime ingredient in a poisonous stew

This would certainly explain why Jews have, down the centuries, so often come into conflict with their gentile neighbours and been expelled from gentile lands. And ugly Jewish brains have consistently created ugly ideologies that war on the “indissoluble Trinity of Truth, Beauty and Goodness.” Jewish communism promised prosperity, peace and equality, but delivered slavery, slaughter and ecological devastation. Jewish psychoanalysis did sterling work on behalf of lies, ugliness and immorality, and is now a prime ingredient in the poisonous stew of Critical Race Theory (CRT) and the Transgender-Industrial Complex, where Jugly and immoral Jews are once again massively over-represented.

Young Woman with a Water-Jug by Jan Vermeer (c. 1665)

And Jugliness has been prominent in a recent assault on the “beautiful game,” as soccer is often called. It’s rightly called that, in my opinion: I would place soccer among the great artistic achievements of White Western civilization. But some White nations have contributed disproportionately to the beauty of that civilization and its art. The small nation of Holland, for example. The paintings of the great Dutch artist Jan Vermeer (1632-75) are sublime and so, in a lesser but comparable way, were the skills of the great Dutch soccer-player Johan Cruyff (1947-2016). The beautiful game is a White creation whose best and most intelligent players and coaches are still disproportionately White.

Dutch soccer super-star Johan Cruyff

Jews are over-represented in the beautiful game not as creators or players, but as owners and exploiters. And when a group of big clubs recently attempted to form a money-grubbing “European Super League,” the “plan triggered” what the Jewish Chronicle called a “wave of antisemitic abuse” and “outpouring of hate … in which Jews are blamed for ‘ruining football’.” Jews are dominant at three of the six English clubs that wanted to join the Super League, including Manchester United, perhaps the world’s most famous club. As the proud holder of a season-ticket at White Hart Lane, I’m obviously not a fan of Manchester United myself, but I recognize that its teams and players have created some of the most beautiful soccer in history. I also recognize that the club’s current owners, the Jewish Glazer family, are not good for Manchester United or for soccer as a whole.

Jewish machers in the beautiful game: (clockwise from top left) The Glazer family at Man Utd; Roman Abramovich at Chelsea; Daniel Levy at Spurs; the late Malcolm Glazer at Man Utd

I’m not the only one recognizing things. A cartoon of the Glazers in the Financial Times captured their Jugliness in a way that makes me worried for the career of the cartoonist. Perhaps the cartoonist is one of those who “Love United, Hate Glazer,” as a popular slogan at United goes. If so, he’s right in both his depiction of the Glazers and his attitude to their behaviour. The Glazers are indeed Jugly and have indeed harmed one of the world’s greatest clubs with their greed.

The War on the West

Jews like the Glazers could never have created either Manchester United or the beautiful game in which the club has excelled. But Jews can and do use their financial skills to exploit soccer-clubs and the game as a whole. Manchester United fans haven’t succeeded in removing the Glazers as owners of their club, but they helped defeat the European Super League in which the Glazers intended to play a central role. As many White nationalists have observed of the affair: it’s a pity that White men don’t care as much about the future of their nations and race as about the future of their anti-White sports-clubs.

But for those with eyes to see, the money-grubbing Super League was yet another example of the central Jewish role in the war on the “indissoluble Trinity of Truth, Beauty and Goodness.” And day by day more people are acquiring eyes to see that lies, ugliness and evil are central to the war on the West. Members of any group are capable of joining that war, but some groups, like Blacks and Muslims, serve much more readily than others. However, Blacks and Muslims are merely footsoldiers. The generals and grand strategists are drawn disproportionately from that single small group known as Jews.

Ugly Jewess becomes beautiful shiksa: Ruth Bader Ginsburg was played by Felicity Jones

But even as they wage war on Whiteness, Jews accept White beauty as the ideal. The Jewish writer David Cole has pointed out that the very gentile actress Felicity Jones was chosen to play the very Jewish lawyer Ruth Bader Ginsburg in a recent biopic. RBG’s ugly punim reflected her ugly politics and Jewish-leftist Hollywood didn’t want that reality to appear on screen. Like the monstrous Caliban in Shakespeare’s Tempest (1610), the Cult of Ugly cannot bear to look upon its own image. And like Caliban, the Cult of Ugly will fall.

A Review of “Revolutionary Yiddishland: A History of Jewish Radicalism,” Part 1 of 3

Editor’s note: I am reposting this extensive review by Brenton Sanderson of Alain Brossat and Sylvie Klingberg’s Revolutionary Yiddishland, originally posted in January of 2018. This is an important contribution to understanding the importance of Jews and the left. The book, written by Jews mainly for a Jewish audience, reveals the importance of Jews for the success of communism in the USSR and Eastern Europe, and it does so in an refreshingly unapologetic manner—quite a change from the many apologetic accounts of Jews and communism that are standard academic wisdom these days.


Introduction

Alain Brossat and Sylvie Klingberg’s Revolutionary Yiddishland: A History of Jewish Radicalism was first published in France in 1983. A revised edition appeared in 2009 and an English translation in 2016. Intended for a mainly Jewish readership, the book is essentially an apologia for Jewish communist militants in Eastern Europe in the early to mid-twentieth century. Brossat, a Jewish lecturer in philosophy at the University of Paris, and Klingberg, an Israeli sociologist, interviewed dozens of former revolutionaries living in Israel in the early 1980s. In their testimony they recalled “the great scenes” of their lives such as “the Russian Civil War, the building of the USSR, resistance in the camps, the war in Spain, the armed struggle against Nazism, and the formation of socialist states in Eastern Europe.”[i] While each followed different paths, “the constancy of these militants’ commitment was remarkable, as was the firmness of the ideas and aspirations that underlay it.” Between the two world wars, communist militancy was “the center of gravity of their lives.”[ii]

While communism in Europe in the early- to mid-twentieth century was characterized by economic dysfunction, systematic oppression, summary executions, and the elimination of entire ethnic groups, Brossat and Klingberg wistfully recall it as a time when European Jewry “failed to achieve its hopes, its utopias, its political programs and strategies.” Instead, the messianic dreams of radical Jews were “broken on the rocks of twentieth-century European history.” A product of their ethnocentric infatuation with the “romance” of Jewish involvement in radical political movements, Revolutionary Yiddishland is Brossat and Klingberg’s hagiographic attempt to resurrect a history that is today “more than lost, being actually denied, even unpronounceable.” Read more

“King of Kings” (1927) and the Origins of Jewish Cultural Censorship

“My own suggestion would be … both in your interest and in the interest of the cause of the Jews of the world to strike out the words ‘Crucify Him’ entirely.”
Rabbi Edgar Magnin to Cecil B. DeMille, 1927. [1]

Initially established in 1913 to manage fallout from the conviction of Jewish murderer Leo Frank, the ADL’s first major effort to engage in cultural censorship began in the early 1920s in the form of a campaign against Henry Ford’s Dearborn Independent essay series “The International Jew.” The campaign began with a cross-denominational conference in September 1920, during which Orthodox and Reform rabbis gathered in Chicago to develop a strategy that would suffocate Ford’s momentum and stifle growing American anti-Semitism.[2] The chosen approach was based on crypsis. The rabbis agreed that rather than condemn Ford themselves, they would draw up a statement condemning his writings as un-American and un-Christian and have it signed by prominent non-Jewish American luminaries. This crypto-Jewish manifesto was then signed by, among others, President Wilson and former President Taft, before being published to a gullible public.

The manifesto, however, was later deemed to have had only a minor effect in diminishing Ford’s momentum, so further, more direct, action was undertaken. Detroit’s Rabbi Leo Franklin was dispatched with instructions to personally influence Ford against further publishing against Jews. When Franklin failed to weaken Ford’s resolve, the ADL drafted “anti-discrimination bills” they hoped would preserve the image and status of American Jews, and mailed them to Jewish bodies across the country for lobbying purposes. Concurrently, the ADL initiated a boycotting campaign targeting the Dearborn Independent’s advertising revenue. Ford finally ceased discussing the topic when he was personally targeted in an individual libel lawsuit by Jewish lawyer Aaron Sapiro.

The episode demonstrated that, even in its nascent stages, Jewish censorship strategies were flexible and multifaceted, with efforts being undertaken in the social, political, economic, and legal arenas. In the following essay, I consider a less well-known, but equally important, instance of early Jewish cultural censorship — the ADL’s battle against Cecil B. DeMille’s 1927 biblical epic King of Kings. The King of Kings case, it will be seen, provides considerable insight into Jewish approaches to (and fear of) Christianity, as well as pathological levels of Jewish anxiety about security, and the remarkable variety of Jewish tactical approaches to perceived anti-Semitism. Perhaps most crucial of all is the insight provided into the nature and direction of Jewish social and cultural control, especially the overwhelming need for control over what the majority population believes and perceives, or is allowed to believe and perceive. The story of the ADL and King of Kings is ultimately about the contest over ‘ways of seeing,’ a contest that prefigured very similar reactions to Mel Gibson’s The Passion of the Christ (2004), and that remains at the heart of American life almost a century later.

The Uneasy Identity of Cecil B. DeMille

Cecil B. DeMille (1881–1959), regarded by many as one of the greatest filmmakers of his era, was in some ways an unlikely candidate for an ADL-designated public enemy. He was halachically Jewish via his mother Matilda Beatrice Samuel. He worked closely with Jewish producers Jesse Lasky and Schmuel Gelbfisz (later Samuel Goldwyn), and he enjoyed his greatest success in an industry dominated by Jews. His relationship to Jewishness, however, was complex. His mother disowned her family and Jewish roots when her parents objected to her intentions to marry a Christian, the Episcopalian businessman Henry Churchill de Mille. She later engaged in an apparently sincere conversion to de Mille’s religion. There were no trappings of Jewishness in DeMille’s childhood home, and both Cecil and his brother William were reported by friends and relatives to have held anti-Semitic views as adults. They are also said to possess a subtle resentment of their partial Jewish ancestry. Biographer Scott Eyman has argued that DeMille consistently emphasized only his Episcopalian background to the press during his early ascent in the movie industry, prompting “people who knew his mother in New York” to “assume a covert anti-Semitism, a stance that would only be strengthened by his future status as a pillar of California’s right wing.”[3] William DeMille’s daughter Agnes, a dancer, recalled her father at times railing against her “Broadway Jew manager,” and that her uncle Cecil once confided to her “I don’t like the Jewish people out here.” Cecil DeMille’s longtime screenwriter, Jesse Lasky Jr, commented after DeMille’s death: “He did not heavily identify himself with Jews.”[4]

Despite discomfort with his origins, DeMille was intelligent enough to use his Jewish ancestry, in the right company, to help him navigate a heavily Jewish industry. The Jewish Tribune pointed out in the late 1920s that DeMille “considers it of great commercial and strategic importance to boast of the Jewish blood in his veins.” And, as will be discussed below, in certain contexts, DeMille would often praise Jews and their characteristics. DeMille thus comes across as an opportunist, who identified with his own success more than any ethnic cause or group, and who could simultaneously hold deep ambivalence about his Jewish background while understanding that this uncomfortable fact would be useful for his career in an industry that operated like a Jewish cousinhood. Jesse Lasky Jr probably summed it up best when he argued that DeMille ultimately didn’t identify with anyone: “He had a suspicion that most people might not be worth identifying with anyway. He served his own Gods.”

King of Kings

By 1926, DeMille had made a personal fortune directing movies for Jewish producers. It seemed a logical next step that he should strike out on his own, and DeMille Pictures Corporation was born. His first two pictures, however, The Road to Yesterday and The Volga Boatman, were a flop and a hit respectively, thus cancelling each other out and placing the new production company, now bleeding capital, in significant peril. He needed a significant hit. In May 1926, Denison Clift, a DeMille studio contract writer, wrote a memo to DeMille:

Why skirt around the one great single subject of all time and all ages — the commanding, majestic, and most sublime thing that any man can ever put upon the screen: the Life, Trial, Crucifixion, Resurrection, and Ascension of Christ: in other words: the LIFE OF CHRIST, with its awe-inspiring power, its simplicity and its unutterable tragedy. … The title of the picture would be: THE KING OF KINGS.

DeMille threw himself into the project with intensity, working with screenwriter Jeanie MacPherson on a script that closely followed the Gospels with one exception. Reflecting his penchant for more seedy material, and the perennial notion that “sex sells,” DeMille personally held the belief that Judas had not betrayed Christ for money, but because Judas lusted for Mary Magdalene and had been frustrated by Christ’s conversion of her. DeMille expected that this change, even introduced subtly, would result in some minor complaints from Church authorities, but he was extremely pleased with a final script that ran to a mammoth 366 pages. In the end, DeMille had little to fear from the Church.

The Synagogue was a different matter. DeMille was aware, from the earliest stages of the project, of a need to manage Jewish sensibilities. On August 23, 1926, the day before production began, DeMille assembled all senior cast and crew for a six and a half hour meeting at his home. At one point, DeMille told those present:

We have to protect all classes of people, especially the Jew. The purpose is to treat all classes fairly and particularly the Jew, because the Jew is put in the most unfortunate place of any race in the Bible because it was not really a matter of the Jew having persecuted Jesus, it was Rome — Rome with her politics and graft. … The Jews are a very great race, a very sensitive race and we have no desire to hurt them, nor do we desire to hurt anyone.

DeMille also expressed the opinion during the early stages of filming that the movie would bear great responsibility not only in fixing in the public mind an image of Christ, but also an image of those responsible for his crucifixion. In addition to his own anxieties, at least one major film executive wrote to DeMille expressing the hope that DeMille would do all he could to “get around the Bible’s anti-Semitism,” mainly by opening the picture with a caption stressing Roman dominance in Judea and other rhetorical conceits intended to portray the Romans as the primary antagonists. Eyman argues that, throughout filming, DeMille “strove to ameliorate any charges of anti-Semitism.” DeMille completely removed Matthew 27:25 (“His blood be on us, and on our children”) and instead inserted a line for Caiaphas the High Priest during the earthquake the follows the Crucifixion: “Lord God Jehovah! Visit not Thy wrath on Thy people Israel — I alone am guilty.” The move was designed to completely side-step the issue of Jewish communal and generational guilt for the death of Christ.

Caiaphas (Rudolf Schildkraut) pays Judas (Joseph Schildkraut)

While showing tremendous sensitivity to Jewish interests in the text of the film, DeMille was stunningly unaware of the implications of his casting choices. Jesus and the Disciples were portrayed by young actors of northern European heritage, while DeMille insisted that the Jewish mob was played by extras culled from nearby Jewish quarters, along with Caiaphas and Judas, who were played by the Jewish father and son Rudolph and Joseph Schildkraut.[5] This practice of ethnic casting alone was to prove infuriating to Jewish authorities across America, who insisted that, despite DeMille’s alterations to the Gospel, the film remained an anti-Semitic Blood Libel.

The Jewish Reaction

DeMille’s King of Kings was released to huge public acclaim on May 18, 1927, and was every bit the commercial and critical success that DeMille hoped it would be. In fact, the only negative reaction to the film came from the organized Jewish community, which reacted to King of Kings with what can only be described as extreme vitriol. In the words of Jenna Weissman, “Where Christian America showered the film with hosannas, Jewish America pummelled it with brickbats.”[6] The Jewish Tribune led the initial campaign against DeMille with some deeply personal comments concerning racial betrayal:

[DeMille] brooks no argument, no contradictions, no independence, no apologies reflecting upon him. … Cecil is the real son of his mother … an English Jewess who embraced the Christian faith early in her life. … Mrs. DeMille does not consider herself a Jewess, but Cecil even now likes to repeat to every handy listener how proud he is of having a Jewish mother. … It is as if he were naively, yet sincerely, saying to the Jewish press and pulpit which accuse him of the betrayal of the Jewish race, “Can a man who is proud of his Jewish origins betray the Jewish race?”

The article went on to state that DeMille was a new Henry Ford, with King of Kings likely to become the motion picture equivalent of The International Jew. The remarkable assertion was also made, despite all glaring evidence to the contrary, that the film was a flop, and had only been rescued by publicity surrounding its anti-Semitism. As DeMille biographer Scott Eyman points out, the Jewish Tribune, consumed with hysteria, had abandoned all logic:

The Jewish Tribune tried to have it both ways: castigating DeMille for freely acknowledging his Jewish heritage, when they would have undoubtedly castigated him even more had he avoided the matter, then bewailing the way the Jewish media had risen to take the director’s bait even as the article itself was part of the protests.

Prominent Zionist and Jewish activist Rabbi Stephen Wise entered the fray, saying the film would not have been made if a single Jew in Hollywood had acted “with the stature of a man.” Wise was the first major Jewish figure to call for the complete censorship of the film, telling one reporter, “I do not believe that the picture is curable. The only way to mend it is to end it. … The blood of Jews will be on the heads of the owners of this picture.”

Eyman writes that DeMille was “bewildered by this criticism,” having gone to great lengths to absolve Jews of any communal responsibility for Christ’s execution. Eyman suggests that DeMille probably reflected back on the September 1926 letter from an unnamed executive demanding that the movie place all blame for the crucifixion on the Romans. In DeMille’s opinion at the time, this would have represented too great a departure from the Bible, so he opted instead to attempt to place blame solely on Caiaphas. And DeMille had invested much in this attempt at pacification. Caiaphas is introduced in the film not as a Jewish High Priest, but as a “Roman appointee.” When Pilate asks the crowd, “Shall I crucify your king?,” it is not the entire collective of chief priests—as in John 19:15—but Caiaphas alone who responds “We have no king but caesar.” Throughout the film, Eyman stresses, DeMille reconfigures the blame solely upon this Romanized High Priest. It was now clear to DeMille, however, from the Jewish reaction to King of Kings, that any suggestion that Jesus was executed at the instigation of even a single Jew was more than the Jews of America would tolerate. They wanted nothing less than a rewrite of the Gospels.

DeMille was furious. During the latter stages of filming, he was often seen quietly staring at a portrait of Christ that he had placed on his desk, prompting at least one close associate to speculate that DeMille was beginning to become “deeply religious.” Jewish reactions to King of Kings certainly hit a strong nerve with DeMille, something indicated in a letter to a non-Jewish colleague:

I felt [the Jewish leaders] would greatly harm the Jewish race by bringing the matter to an open fight. … Someone in the Jewish race is trying to start trouble. This trouble should be stopped immediately for the good of all, as it could very easily lead to a situation that might be very destructive. Those Jews who are raising these rather violent objections would crucify Christ a second time if they had the opportunity, as they are so ready to crucify what, for want of a better term, I shall call His second coming upon the screen.[7]

Demands for changes to the film were formalized and broadened via the intervention of the ADL, with demands for substantial cuts and rewrites in return for a cessation of Jewish protests. The ADL contacted Los Angeles-based Rabbi Edgar Magnin, an associate of DeMille’s, and asked Magnin to persuade DeMille to acquiesce. The ADL projected power but was clearly only too aware of the popularity of the film and of DeMille, with the result that the ADL was as keen to see an end to the furor (though with its interests achieved) as DeMille. This tightrope situation was expressed succinctly by Magnin in a letter to DeMille dated September 28 1927:

An open rupture between [the Anti-Defamation League] and you could do absolutely no good to either and would likely result in harm to both. … Strike out the words ‘Crucify Him’ entirely. It would appear to me the action in itself is descriptive enough without the title. … Please give this your most careful and thoughtful consideration in the next few days, and if you can possibly do so, accede to the request of the League.

DeMille attempted to buy time by hastily preparing a memo describing actions he had taken to protect Jews during the making of the film, but the Jewish pressure continued. Resolutions condemning the film were passed by the United Synagogue of America, the Board of Rabbis of Northern California, and numerous similar groups across the country. Private detectives were hired to follow H. B. Warner, who played Jesus, in the hope that any discovered revelations about his private life (he did have a drinking problem) would help diminish ‘Jesus’ in the minds of the viewing public. The Schildkrauts, who played Caiaphas and Judas, were attacked as race traitors in Jewish editorials for allowing themselves to be cast in their villainous roles. DeMille later recalled, “Joseph was frightened. Joseph thought his career was through.” Felicia Herman writes that “the controversy over the film raged through November and December, receiving almost constant attention in Jewish newspapers through the nation.”[8] The ADL began making calls for the wholesale banning of the film, and then, in December, a three-page ADL ‘shopping list’ of proposed cuts and alterations arrived in DeMille’s office. Among the demands were:

  • Eliminate all scenes of the lashing of Jesus barring the first.
  • In the scene where a Jew, in answer to the question, ‘What evil has he done?’ shrugs his shoulders and jingles a coin, eliminate the jingling of the coin.
  • In the scene where Pilate washes his hands and puts the responsibility for the crucifixion on Caiaphas, let Caiaphas say “I assume the responsibility …”
  • Tone down the crucifixion.

The ADL also demanded that the film open with a foreword explaining that “the Jews were no longer an independent people,” and that all legal decisions at the time of Christ were ultimately the responsibility of the Romans. Coinciding with the arrival of the ADL “shopping list,” MGM announced that it would not release the film in eastern European countries “where it might inflame existing prejudices against the Jewish community.”[9]

DeMille’s will collapsed. In January 1928 a new version of the film was announced and released, incorporating the changes demanded by the ADL and others. By March 1929, DeMille was telling the Jewish Daily Bulletin that he regretted ever making the film. Even with the large number of changes, remarks Steven Carr, subsequent showings of the film

were subject to everything from accompanying benevolent ministerial statements to outright censorship. For example, in 1937 when the film was shown to churches in California, two entire reels were censored. The deleted scenes involved Judas accepting the bribe, the betrayal of Jesus, mob scenes, the activities of the high priest, and the Crucifixion itself. Before the film, a minister was to make a statement “completely exonerating the Jews” from any responsibility for the Crucifixion.[10]

The ADL used the battle over King of Kings to establish a permanent relationship with the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors Association (MPPDA). Thereafter, the MPPDA (1915–1936) would facilitate an “official Jewish representative” appointed by the ADL who would liaise with the MPPDA and enable the ADL to screen any film for anti-Semitism before release to the public.

Legacy

One of the most remarkable features of the battle over King of Kings is the extent to which the entire affair was subject to the grossest of exaggerations. Even for its time, the film was remarkably tame, and of course it had been thoroughly sanitized by DeMille prior to release. The severity of Jewish reactions therefore suggests one of two possibilities, or perhaps a combination of both. In the first instance, it’s clear that Jews have a strong fear of the portrayal of Jews in the Gospel stories in their unadulterated form, a fear that resurfaced on the release of Mel Gibson’s Passion of the Christ. In my own personal interactions with Jews over the years, I’ve constantly observed a strong and deep-seated unease when Christianity is discussed. In the realm of scholarship, it’s commonplace in Jewish historiography to see anti-Semitism portrayed as fundamentally theological in origin, despite a wealth of evidence suggesting far greater socio-economic influence in the development of anti-Jewish attitudes. Many Jews, engaged in self-deception, probably do believe that the New Testament is the sole reason why they have experienced hostility. In the context of such anxieties, no matter how misplaced, it should come as little surprise that Jews would react with extreme horror towards any representation of the New Testament, and especially any representation of the trial and execution of Jesus.

On the other hand, much of the Jewish behavior surrounding this episode appears extremely calculated and well-organized. Relations between the MPPDA and the ADL were already embryonic prior to the filming of King of Kings, and there is some reason to suspect that the entire episode was exaggerated in order to manufacture a crisis that demanded a response (greater formal Jewish involvement in the censorship of mass media). There is of course a possibility that Jewish fear and Jewish ambition have merged in this instance.

Reading much of the material relating to the King of Kings controversy, I found myself quite disturbed on realizing that much of contemporary Christianity resembles DeMille’s butchered film. Almost everything that gave it some teeth in past centuries has been excised, leaving for the most part a rather toothless brute that is a tame lapdog scared of its own shadow. Yes, Christianity, excepting a few corners of resistance, has been censored. It’s been rendered safe. It’s been declared “Jew-friendly.” Most importantly, it looks nothing like its original form, its ‘Director’s Cut’ so to speak. The fact that Jews even feel secure enough to now demand that the New Testament should come printed with “anti-Semitism warnings” really says it all.

The King of Kings censorship campaign also highlights the unique relationship that Jews have with censorship. Cultural censorship, of course, is not limited to Jews, and calls to limit speech or expression have also been common among Jews and Christians. The difference is that Christians in the twentieth century were often most heavily involved in attempts to limit or remove obscenity in culture, whereas Jews were most often leading the battle to advance the same obscenity in the name of “free expression.” American Christians, and Catholics in particular via organizations like the National League of Decency, often campaigned for censorship on behalf of abstract moral values like decency and modesty rather than for themselves as a church or a people. Jewish involvement in censorship, on the other hand, is without exception always self-interested. As mentioned above, Jews are extremely liberal in their advocacy for the freedom to view or consume material regarded as morally destructive, but have been nothing less than relentless in their pursuit of legal methodologies and other forms of pressure designed to limit any speech or activity that would bring them into criticism or otherwise harm their interests as a group.

The episode has clear parallels with our contemporary situation. Many of the tactics pioneered in the Ford-DeMille years remain in place a century later. Blackmail, spying, boycotts, and behind the scenes pressure remain the mainstays of the ADL’s tactical bag of tricks. The old MPPDA-ADL partnership sees its postmodern equivalent in the form of Big Tech companies that allow the ethnically solipsistic fanatics of the ADL to declare what is or is not hateful content that should be censored from public view.

If I have a lasting frustration with the King of Kings story, it is that millions of Americans stood and watched as a tiny hostile minority—a minority that had not attained anywhere near the power they would achieve in later decades and had only recently lost their campaign against the 1924 immigration restriction law—dictated what they could and could not see on a subject no less than what is supposed to be, for most of them, their most sacred scriptures. This was at a time when the ADL’s power in relation to DeMille’s involved considerable bluffing, as they themselves conceded in some of the Jewish correspondence of the period. The sheer gutlessness of that generation which collapsed in the face of Jewish pressure left a heavier burden for the subsequent generation, and that burden has been getting heavier ever since. Censorship brings a multitude of victories for the censor. What is truth if it can’t be spoken?


[1] Cited in S. Eyman, Empire of Dreams: The Epic Life of Cecil B. DeMille (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010).

[2] D. D. Moore, B’nai B’rith and the Challenge of Ethnic Leadership (New York: State University of New York Press, 1981), 115.

[3] Eyman, Empire of Dreams.

[4] Ibid.

[5] For an interesting perspective on the casting of the Schildkraut’s see A.K. Koslovic, “The Deep Focus Casting of Joseph Schildkraut as Judas Figure in Four DeMille Films,” Journal of Religion and Popular Culture, 6 (2004).

[6] J. Weissman, Set in Stone: America’s Embrace of the Ten Commandments (Oxford University Press, 2017), 40.

[7] M. Bernstein (ed), Controlling Hollywood: Censorship and Regulation in the Radio Era (Athlone, 2000), 80.

[8] F. Herman, Views of Jews: Antisemitism, Hollywood, and American Jews, 1913-1947 (Brandeis University Press, 2002).

[9] K.R. Phillips, Controversial Cinema: The Films That Outraged America (Praeger, 2008),139.

[10] S. A. Carr, Hollywood and Anti-Semitism: A Cultural History up to World War II (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 81.

The Psychology of Moral Communities, Part 5 of 5: Psychological Mechanisms for a White Renaissance

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Go to Part 2
Go to Part 3
Go to Part 4

Psychological Mechanisms for a White Renaissance

In general, individualists are less ethnocentric than others, but this does not imply that they are incapable of ethnocentrism. It makes sense a priori to suppose that natural selection would act to make humans—even individualistic Whites—at least somewhat ethnocentric. Frank Salter presents a powerful case for the adaptiveness of ethnocentrism.[1] Different human ethnic groups and races have been separated for thousands of years, and during this period they have evolved some genetic distinctiveness. This genetic distinctiveness constitutes a storehouse of genetic interest. In other words, people have an interest in their ethnic group in exactly the same way that parents have a genetic interest in their children.

In raising their children, parents ensure that their unique genes are passed on to the next generation. In defending their ethnic interests, people are doing the same thing—ensuring that the genetic uniqueness of their ethnic group is passed on to the next generation. When parents of a particular ethnicity succeed in rearing their children, their ethnic group also benefits because the genetic uniqueness of their ethnic group is perpetuated as part of their children’s genetic inheritance. Moreover, when an ethnic group succeeds in defending its interests, individual members of the ethnic group also benefit because the genetic uniqueness that they share with other members of the ethnic group is passed on. This is the case even for people who don’t have children: A person succeeds genetically when his ethnic group as a whole prospers.

Even a cursory look at the historical record shows that conflict between biologically related tribal groups has been common throughout history. Cooperative defense by tribal peoples is universal and ancient and it is bound to have boosted the genetic fitness of those who acted to further the interests of their group. Under such circumstances it would be odd indeed if natural selection did not mold the human mind to be predisposed to ethnocentrism. Of course, this fact does not tell us what psychological mechanisms actually evolved to promote ethnocentrism or how these mechanisms can be controlled by inhibitory mechanisms located in the prefrontal cortex. For that, we will have to turn to the empirical research.

My review of the literature concluded that there are universal mechanisms underlying ethnocentrism.[2]

  • Mechanisms of genetic similarity: People preferentially assort with genetically similar others. Friends, spouses, and the other people we make alliances with are more like us than people selected at random; other things being equal, this enhances the benefits of such relationships and lessens the risks.[3] This is the most likely explanation for implicit Whiteness.
  • As noted above, there is good evidence that social identity processes are a biological adaptation important for group defense. But since they don’t necessarily respond to genetic differences between groups, they are not really of use in ethnic defenseunless the groups are already constituted on an ethnic basis, as in traditional tribal societies.
  • Groups composed of sports fans and the like can trigger social identity processes, but they do not result in the deep emotions that are aroused in ethnic, religious, and patriotic groups. It is not at all uncommon for people to make the ultimate sacrifice on behalf of these groups. The best explanation for this is that humans have a natural tendency to classify themselves into ingroups and outgroups on the basis of these categories so that they tend to have stronger allegiance to these groups than, say, their stamp collecting club. Race and ethnicity have all the features of an evolved module. For example, processing of racialand ethnic differences is rapid, unconscious, and automatic[4]—all characteristics of implicit processing and hallmarks of evolved modules.

In any case, whatever the strength of the mechanisms underlying ethnocentrism, given the tendencies of Whites toward individualism in the context of the present cultural environment of the West that vilifies White ethnocentrism, these mechanisms have thus far proved insufficient to provide for ethnic defense of Whites. However, the current culture also contains facets that will in fact increase White ethnocentrism.

Being Aware of Impending Minority Status Triggers White Ethnocentrism

The foregoing has discussed why achieving widespread acceptance by Whites of an explicit culture of White identity and interests is an uphill struggle. However, there are also mechanisms that are likely to create an increased sense of White identity and White interests in the years ahead. The fundamental reason for this is the demographic transformation resulting from massive immigration of non-Whites into countries that were either homogeneously White or, like the United States (ninety percent White in 1960), had a politically dominant White majority. This transformation, in which it is obvious that White political power is declining as Whites head toward minority status, would by itself trigger defensive mechanisms of implicit Whiteness and behavior such as White flight discussed above.

Individualists are less naturally ethnocentric, and the left has created a culture that encourages Whites to inhibit expressions of ethnocentrism while encouraging non-Whites to be ethnocentric. Because the media is dominated by the left and because even the conservative media is terrified of appearing to advocate White interests, explicit messages that would encourage Whites to become angry and fearful about their future as a minority are rare. Indeed, the media rarely, if ever, mentions that Whites are well on their way to becoming a minority. And this for good reason: Whites in the United States and in Canada who are given explicit demographic projections of a time when Whites are no longer a majority tend to feel angry and fearful. They are also more likely to identify as Whites and have sympathy for other Whites.[5]

In other words, while I have emphasized the ability of the higher brain centers to inhibit ethnocentrism, explicit messages indicating that one’s racial group is threatened are able to trigger ethnocentrism. This is especially important because many Whites live far from the areas undergoing the demographic shifts. Their day-to-day life of living in an essentially White environment hasn’t changed while population centers such as Los Angeles, Sydney, Toronto, and London have changed beyond all recognition from what they were 50 years ago. An obvious inference is that pro-White activists should appeal to Whites’ higher brain centers with explicit messages emphasizing these transformations. 

Expressions of Anti-White Hatred Promote White Ethnocentrism

Another force that will make Whites more willing to coalesce into cohesive groups is the strident anti-White rhetoric that is now common in the elite media and academic culture throughout the West. There are many examples of this. It’s common now for the left to conceptualize American history as nothing more than dispossessing the Indians and enslaving Africans, Jim Crow laws in the South, etc., with the result that American history is being deconstructed from an anti-White perspective—Howard Zinn’s A People’s History of the United States, 1492–Present is the classic text.[6] American historical figures are being delegitimized, their statues removed, etc.

Recently the New York Times hired Sarah Jeong, an Asian woman with a history of anti-White tweets, the New York Times’ Michelle Goldberg rejoiced that Whites are being replaced in Georgia, a Princeton classics professor advocated shutting off White men from publishing in the field, and CNN’s Don Lemon stated that White males are America’s biggest terror threat.[7]

It’s obvious that in a post-Obama America the anti-white zeitgeist is out of pandora’s box. … Due to unprecedented immigration and fatalist progressive experiments, there is no country where anti-white cultural currents are not rising. It wasn’t supposed to be this way, weakness, wealth transfers, preferential treatment, open borders and accommodation were supposed to invite warm feelings, equal outcomes and racial blindness. …

By the 1990s the entire constellation of Christian morality and civic responsibility in the public space had been secularized and compressed into a singular mandate. Millennials were taught from childhood that the highest moral good was serving the self-esteem of non-whites. In prior ages virtues such as courage, modesty, chivalry, valor and faith were ways young adults were encouraged to distinguish themselves but for Millennials it was an adeptness and willingness to navigate the mercurial minefield of knowing when and how to serve the self-esteem of non-whites that mattered.

Over the past thirty years conservatives were busy building an entire culture around anti-socialism while the Left was busy pushing its cultural trojan horse to unleash a whole different kind of plague. Maybe deep down many conservatives knew the anti-white dam would burst but they were too cowardly to confront it.[8]

Too cowardly indeed—quite like the professors unwilling to discuss Jewish influence on Mideast policy.

The following discusses several evolved mechanisms acting at the implicit, unconscious level that could act as a countervailing force to this culture of the left.

 

Social Identity Processes

At the outset of this chapter I reviewed research on social identity processes indicating that identification with an ingroup is increased in the presence of group competition—part of the argument for why social identity processes are an evolved universal. Because the left has adopted a program of encouraging identity politics among its racial, religious, and gender non-conformist constituencies, the result is that boundaries between groups have become clearer, thus triggering social identity mechanisms of positive bias toward the ingroup and negative bias toward outgroups.

As noted above, an awareness of impending minority status and the ubiquity of anti-White rhetoric are processed by the higher brain centers. However, the result is that Whites feel increasingly threatened in the multicultural West. This feeling of being under threat feeds into our evolved psychology of social identity. It is thus predicted that Whites in America and throughout the West will coalesce into a cohesive group based on these processes.

White people in the U.S. are coalescing in the Republican Party, and implicit White identities and associations continue to be common. However, explicit White identities remain uncommon, a testament to White individualism and relative lack of ethnocentrism, likely dovetailing with the effects of the media, the educational system, threats of ostracism, etc. According to a 2019 Pew Research survey, Whites remain by far the least likely racial group to state that race is extremely important (5 percent) or very important (10 percent) to their identity, with Whites under age 30 least likely to say so.[9] However, between 2017 and 2019 there was an increase among Republicans (the vast majority of whom are White) who agree that “if America is too open to the other people of the world, we risk losing our identity as a nation (from 48 percent to 57 percent),” with men, older people, and the less educated more likely to express this attitude.

Even more surprising is the sudden upsurge in such sentiments: “since September [2018], the share of Republicans who say America risks losing its identity if it is too open has increased 13 percentage points, while the share who view the nation’s openness to others as essential has declined 10 points.”[10] At least some of this phenomenon is likely explained by President Trump’s rhetoric on immigration which has placed the issue front and center in American politics and resulted in a torrent of abuse from the left.

Of course, these results are likely conservative estimates due to Whites not wanting to provide such opinions to a pollster given that such attitudes are proscribed by elites in the media, political culture, and educational system.

It’s therefore of interest that data from the same poll indicated that a substantial percentage of White Americans (61 percent) have a sense of shared fate with other White people, and such attitudes are actually more common among younger adults (age 30 or less) compared to older Whites (age > 50), and they are more common among highly educated Whites.[11] Attitudes of shared fate are an indirect measure of White identity and are likely more accurate than asking direct questions about explicit White identity or wanting more diversity because such attitudes have not been explicitly condemned by the mass media and educational system. A sense of shared fate is a strong marker of ingroup identity; at the extreme, a sense of shared fate has been linked to martyrdom and other forms of self-sacrificing behavior on behalf of the group.[12] As Ben Franklin reportedly stated at the signing of the Declaration of Independence, “we must indeed all hang together, or most assuredly we will all hang separately.”

Chapters 3–5 of my book Separation and Its Discontents developed the argument that group competition has been central to the main historical examples of anti-Semitism: the development of institutionalized anti-Semitism in the Roman Empire in the fourth century, the Iberian inquisitions, and the phenomenon of National Socialist anti-Semitism in the period 1933–1945 in Germany.[13] The common denominator of these movements is that they involved a powerful sense of group cohesion in opposition to Judaism, and I argue that each of these movements may be profitably analyzed as a reaction to the presence of Judaism as a highly successful group evolutionary strategy. Based on the social identity research discussed above, powerful group strategies are expected to beget opposing group strategies that in many ways have provided a mirror image of Jewish groups which they combat—socialization for ingroup identity, punishment for defectors, feelings of ingroup superiority and outgroup inferiority, and a sense of shared fate.

What this means in the present context is that as Whites see their power diminishing and notice that hatred toward them and their history is increasingly expressed in mainstream media outlets and in the actions of activists, they will increasingly identify as Whites and develop into a much more cohesive group opposed to the forces arrayed against them. Historically, this has often ended in violent conflict between groups. 

The Extremism of Scandinavian Culture: Egalitarianism, Trust, Conformity and Consensus Decision Making

It seems appropriate to conclude a chapter on the psychology of moral communities by discussing the extremism of Scandinavian political culture. In Chapter 1 it was argued that the Scandinavian countries are on the extreme end of the northwest-southeast genetic cline, with higher levels of northern hunter-gatherer-derived genes than other parts of Western Europe. Chapter 3 described these hunter-gatherer cultures as reflecting egalitarian individualism, and Chapter 4 described the Scandinavian family patterns as extreme within Western Europe.

Although all Western European-derived societies are undergoing replacement-level, non-White migration, there can be little doubt that Scandinavia and especially Sweden, are extreme in welcoming replacement of their peoples and cultures. As elsewhere in the West, a major role in these transformations has been played by Jewish activists and Jewish media ownership,[14] but Scandinavians seem particularly favorable to these transformations. Indeed, Noah Carl, analyzing 2015 survey data from the European Union, found that Swedes were the least ethnocentric group as measured by items such as approval of children having a love relationship with various ethnic groups, sexual minorities, and disabled people.[15] Respondents from the U.K. and the Netherlands were also highly tolerant, with Eastern European countries on the low end, data consistent with northwestern Europeans being the most tolerant.

The reputation-based moral communities of Scandinavia have been strongly egalitarian. The “Jante Laws” of Scandinavia are paradigmatic: 1. Don’t think you are anything; 2. Don’t think you are as good as us. 3. Don’t think you are smarter than us. 4. Don’t fancy yourself better than us. 5. Don’t think you know more than us. 6. Don’t think you are greater than us. 7. Don’t think you are good for anything. 8. Don’t laugh at us. 9. Don’t think that anyone cares about you. 10. Don’t think you can teach us anything.[16] In short, no one must rise above the rest. Such egalitarianism is typical of hunter-gatherer groups around the world[17] and is antithetical to the aristocratic ideal of the Indo-Europeans.

Extreme egalitarianism results in high levels of conformism and social anxiety. Individuals fear social ostracism for violating egalitarian norms and standing out from the crowd—a phenomenon that has played a major role in creating a public consensus in favor of mass migration and multiculturalism. Decisions are by consensus, implying that individuals are loathe to stand out from the group. In Sweden especially there is no public debate on the costs and benefits of immigration; sceptics typically remain silent for fear of shunning and disapproval.

Reflecting this pattern, contemporary Scandinavian society in general has a history of relatively small income and social class differences, including the absence of serfdom during the Middle Ages (see Chapter 4). A recent anthropological study of hunter-gatherers found that economic inequality approximated that of modern Denmark.[18] Chapter 4 discusses the individualism of Scandinavian family patterns, including relatively egalitarian relationships between spouses—extreme even within the Western European context.

Reputation-based moral communities thus lead to groupthink as individuals trust one another to have honest opinions, and individuals who deviate from group norms are shunned. A Swedish attorney commenting on a legal case where an innocent person was convicted of a crime, noted that many people were involved in the decision and all agreed with what turned out to be an unjust verdict:

When the same people participated in all or most of [the decision], a groupthink developed. … Strong trust between people is often described as one of Sweden’s great assets [but] it cannot replace a critical approach to serious allegations, even when they are self-accusations [i.e., a false confession by the accused].[19]

Strong social trust is indeed a great asset of Sweden and other countries with a significant Nordic population, leading to societies based on individual merit (a facet of reputation) and low levels of corruption. However, as in the above example, it can lead to groupthink as individuals who stand out or dissent from group norms in any way are ostracized—a facet of the Jante Laws (and the Tall Poppy syndrome of New Zealand; see Chapter 8): it’s not only excellence that is punished, but any deviation from group norms, including opinions shared by group members.

Egalitarian groups thus make decisions by consensus, not in a top-down, authoritarian manner. Once there is a decision-by-consensus, dissenters are seen as willfully ignorant or obstinate, and they lose status within the group.

Strong tendencies toward egalitarianism can thus easily lead to powerful social controls, either formal or informal, on behavior which are designed to ensure that individuals do not deviate from consensus attitudes, as noted in Puritan-derived cultures which became dominant in England and had a strong influence on the United States (Chapter 6). Thus, even though Scandinavian cultures have been described as the most individualistic in terms of family functioning (Chapter 4), it is  not surprising that these cultures may exert strong controls on individual behavior to ensure conformity to the norms of a moral community.

Both egalitarianism and socially enforced norms (conceptualized in moral terms) thus typify these cultures. Sweden appears to be extreme in these tendencies. Whereas Chapter 3 discussed Sweden’s egalitarianism, here I describe the intense social controls that have virtually banned discussion of the negative aspects of immigration and multiculturalism, support for which has become a consensus among the Swedish elite.

Sweden has declared itself a “humanitarian superpower”— a superpower whose ideology is that no sacrifice by the Swedes on behalf of Third World migrants is considered too great.   Official policy is that Swedes should make sacrifices to ensure sufficient housing for the continuous flow of immigrants, including repurposing churches (while mosques are being built). The government buys virtually any standing structure to be turned into immigrant housing, and there are proposals to confiscate vacation homes “for the greater good.” Meanwhile, Swedes have a lower priority for housing than immigrants, and thousands can’t find an apartment, a situation that is particularly difficult for young people, especially those wishing to start a family. Leading politicians openly say that Sweden does not belong to the Swedes, and that Swedes and Swedish culture are bland or that Sweden does not have a culture. [20]

This phenomenon is a violation of the general finding that people are less willing to contribute to public goods (e.g., public housing, health care) to people who don’t look like themselves[21] and again indicates very low ethnocentrism. Thus, the European societies that inaugurated national health care programs did so when they were racially homogeneous.  Besides a long history of self-reliance as fundamental to Americans’ self-concept, a likely reason universal health care has been so slow in coming in the U.S. is its historically large Black population, and in recent decades the post-1965 multicultural tsunami.[22]

A critical aspect of the success of Swedish multiculturalism is that Swedes are terrified to violate the moral consensus surrounding migration for fear of ostracism and loss of job. They are engaging in groupthink that demands allegiance to a moral community as defined by the media and the political culture. In effect, considering the genetic distances involved, this is an extreme form of what evolutionists term “altruistic punishment”—willingness to punish one’s own people and sacrifice them on the altar  of a moral ideal for fear of violating violate the norms of a moral community (Chapter 3, with further examples in Chapter 6).

Journalist Ingrid Carlqvist comments on the enforced silence on any criticism of multiculturalism, particularly in the above-ground media. Violating the silence is met with moral outrage intended to produce shunning and ostracism—in other words, there is a socially mandated groupthink where people are terrified at the thought of having dissenting opinions:

The situation in Sweden is far worse than in Denmark [which, as noted in Chapter 1 is quite different from Sweden genetically]. In Sweden nobody talks about immigration problems, the death of the multiculti project or the Islamisation/Arabisation of Europe. If you do, you will immediately be called a racist, an Islamophobe or a Nazi. That is what I have been called since I founded the Free Press Society in Sweden. My name has been dragged through the dirt in big newspapers like Sydsvenskan, Svenska Dagbladet and even my own union paper, The Journalist.[23]

This phenomenon has nothing to do with Christianity. Sweden is the most secular country in the world. Its elites are hostile to Christianity and more than happy to donate Christian churches to the non-Christian newcomers or to destroy churches to make housing for them. Rather, it is a new secular religion of moral consensus. They are behaving like the Puritans and Quakers, as discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, but without the religious veneer. Of course, we see the same thing throughout the West, albeit to a lesser extent. Western societies have uniquely been high-trust, reputation-based societies, a basic corollary of the psychology of Western individualism.

Ironically perhaps, one of the major findings on multiculturalism noted above is that it erodes trust not only of ethnic outsiders, but also of people of one’s own race or ethnicity. We can thus look forward to Swedes and other Westerners being less trusting, but by the time this happens, Sweden will already have been transformed into a non-homogeneous society prone to intra-societal conflicts and lack of willingness to contribute to public goods. When trust evaporates, Swedes may become more willing to stand up to the suicidal consensus.

Groupthink implies failure to look at the facts of the situation rather than idealized versions that reinforce the consensus. Groupthink thus makes it difficult to question multicultural mantras like “diversity is our strength” by considering the research on the effects of importing ethnic and religious diversity. In the case of Sweden, research indicates that, as in the United States noted above, Swedes, especially highly educated, relatively affluent Swedes, are the first to flee diversity, typically while failing to question its value.

We’ve found a so-called “tipping point” at around 3-4%, says Emma Neuman, research economist at Linneuniversitet. When the non-European immigrants are that many in a residential area then the native Swedes start moving out. …

The effect doesn’t revolve around immigrants generally. Immigrants from European countries do not result in a moving effect, only non-European immigrants. It is reminiscent of the phenomenon of white flight in the USA where whites move away from neighbourhoods where many blacks move in.[24]

Despite such implicitly nativist behavior, these Swedes are unlikely to publicly dissent from the consensus opinion that forbids any discussion of the effects of importing non-European diversity. The question of whether Swedes benefit from an increasingly segregated, culturally and racially divided, conflict-ridden society is never raised in public.[25]

 

The Special Case of Finland

I noted in Chapter 1 that Finns, particularly in eastern Finland, are genetic outliers compared to Western Europe. It’s interesting that Finnish society exhibits a similar phenomenon to the Jante Laws discussed above. Edward Dutton notes that a factor contributing to the lack of condemnation of a recent epidemic of rapes by migrants was the desire not to stand out from the crowd. Like their Scandinavian neighbors, Finns are high on conformism and social anxiety, concerned to maintain a good reputation in their moral community.[26] They do not want to dissent from the moral consensus that defines the community. Being ostracized from the small face-to-face communities that Finns evolved in was certain evolutionary death.

At the same time, traditional Finnish society, especially in eastern Finland where there is relatively little Swedish genetic or cultural influence, clearly has not exhibited the northwestern European family system discussed in Chapter 4.[27] Family structure was patriarchal, with fathers controlling sons and determining marriages. ‘‘The head of the household took the decision as to when to partition his farm, when to make appointment to the son and when to retire.” Although they could leave the family farm with an equal inheritance as their brothers, sons tended to remain in the household, the oldest son becoming patriarch, while daughters married outside the family. In eastern Finland in the second half of the eighteenth century, fully 70 percent of families were extended or multiple, rising to 84–90 percent among the peasants. This pattern is remarkably similar to that found in southern France and southeastern Europe, and contrasts with the patterns of northwest Europe, as discussed in Chapter 4. In Finland, it wasn’t until well into the eighteenth century that this pattern began to change as a result of influence from Sweden via the Lutheran church’s opposition to clans and marrying kin. (Sweden dominated Finland until 1809.)—characterized by socially enforced egalitarianism as typified by the Jante Laws.

This suggests that egalitarianism, social anxiety, and conformism evolved in Finland independent of other parts of Scandinavia where they are linked to extreme individualism in family structure.

 Conclusion: The Importance of Changing the Explicit Culture

Evolutionists have not been properly sensitive to the enormous gulf between humans and animals resulting from human general intelligence and the Conscientiousness system. At a very broad level, the Conscientiousness system allows our behavior to come under the control of the surrounding culture. We make complex appraisals of how our behavior and attitudes mesh with the rewards and punishments present in the current cultural milieu, and we are inundated with ideas and ideologies emanating from the academic world and the media. Importantly for the present political context, potential political dissidents must assess the risks to their reputation and livelihood in their face-to-face world.

But it gets more complicated than that. The people creating messages emanating from the mainstream media and academic culture need not—and often do not—have the same interests as the recipients of the messages. For example, it is a commonplace that media images have important effects on behavior even though people are often unaware that their behavior is so influenced.85 These images are often engineered by advertisers who are consciously attempting to influence the recipients of the messages in ways that conform to advertisers’ interests, not those of the audience.

More important, media messages and academic culture—both dominated by the anti-White left—have been able to shape the discussion of issues related to White identity and interests. The culture of critique has become the explicit culture of the West, endlessly repeated in media messages but packaged differently for people of different levels of intelligence and education, and for people with different interests and from different subcultures.86 White people are constantly exposed to suffering non-Whites as proper candidates for immigration and refugee status. They are exposed to messages intended to induce guilt for the history of slavery and dispossession of the Native Americans. A theme of this chapter is that by programming the higher areas of the brain, this explicit culture is able to control the implicit ethnocentric tendencies of White people.

To find a way out of this morass, therefore, changing the explicit culture is critical, in particular legitimizing a strong sense of identity and group interests among Whites. This won’t be easy, but I suggest that the first step is a psychological one: making proud and confident explicit assertions of White identity and interests, and creating communities where such assertions are considered normal and natural rather than grounds for ostracism. The fact that such assertions appeal to our implicit psychology is certainly an asset. It’s always easier to go with a natural tendency than to oppose it. And in this case, opposing our natural ethnocentric tendencies by using our quintessentially human prefrontal inhibitory control against our own ethnic interests is nothing less than suicidal.

Moreover, the massive demographic changes that have occurred throughout the West along with increasingly common anti-White themes in the mainstream media appear to be making Whites more aware that their interests are not being met by the erection of minority-White, multicultural, multiracial societies throughout the West. As discussed above, this anti-White rhetoric has the effect not only of making Whites more conscious of being White, but of making them more willing to coalesce into a White political force.

The result has been increasingly strident efforts to ramp up propaganda in support of the status quo on issues related to race and immigration and to shut down free speech on these issues. Particularly since the election of President Trump, the dominant cultural apparatus of the left has moved into high gear, with major newspapers (The New York Times, Washington Post) and television networks (CNN, MSNBC) becoming obsessively anti-Trump. Since the charge of Russian collusion has collapsed, the media has shifted to greater emphasis on Trump’s alleged racism.

However, when propaganda fails to have its desired effects of manipulating our evolved psychology—as appears to be increasingly the case—the establishment has been resorting to force. Stifling speech by people who disagree with the establishment line on race has become common. Speakers are barred from college campuses or shouted down, often amid rioting.[28] Social media companies have shut down the accounts of outspoken White advocates, such as Jared Taylor, and have engaged in shadow banning, and limiting numbers of followers. Media sites associated with the Dissident Right have been denied financial services by PayPal and credit card processing companies.

As noted in Chapter 7, there is also a robust academic literature by leftist law professors that justifies essentially abrogating the First Amendment on issues related to race.[29] If Hillary Clinton had been elected president and appointed even one or two Supreme Court justices, the First Amendment would have been gutted. Justice Elena Kagan has already shown a willingness to rein in the First Amendment regarding speech on diversity issues.

And recently the American Civil Liberties Union—long a stalwart defender of free speech and often regarded as a de facto Jewish organization[30]—has changed its policies to combat ideas associated with the Dissident Right:

A recent internal ACLU memo on “case-selection guidelines” explicitly says that the cases the organization takes up may be influenced by “the extent to which the speech may assist in advancing the goals of white supremacists or others whose views are contrary to our values. … Factors like the potential effect of the speech on ‘marginalized communities’ and even on ‘the ACLU’s credibility’ could militate against taking a case.”[31]

Historically, leftists have favored free speech when they did not have the power they do today. For example, during the 1950s’ McCarthy era, the left—already well entrenched in the media and elite universities—was mainly concerned to protect communist professors and other leftist dissidents—many of them Jewish—who were targeted by Congressional committees. Their political views stifled by restrictions on communism, their response was to create a culture in which free speech was viewed as sacrosanct. Inherit the Wind (by Jerome Lawrence Schwartz and Robert Edwin Lee) was written to oppose McCarthyism.[32] Another famous example of anti-McCarthyism from the 1950s is Arthur Miller’s The Crucible which implicitly condemned the House Un-American Activities Committee by comparing their hearings on communist infiltration to the Salem witch trials in Puritan Massachusetts.

However, the rise of the left to cultural dominance has coincided with the power of organizations like the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC—another de facto Jewish organization[33]) and the Anti-Defamation League that care nothing for free speech and specialize in getting people fired and ostracized for thought crimes. There is clearly a Jewish ethnic aspect to this transformation.[34] While there are endless tears for Hollywood screenwriters blacklisted during the anti-communist fervor of the 1950s and since promoted to cultural sainthood,[35] don’t expect our new elite to condemn witch hunts against the Dissident Right. And don’t expect any time soon to see a hit Broadway play based on an allegory in which the SPLC is implicitly condemned for its persecution of race realists and White advocates.

The lesson is that the left will not give up its cultural dominance without a battle and they will be utterly unprincipled in how they attempt to remain in power. The left’s power resides in its ability to engage in psychological manipulation by occupying the moral and intellectual high ground in the media and universities; it resides in its ability to shape incentives and disincentives in the workplace; it resides in its ability to import a new left-leaning electorate. If all these fail, force can and will be used.


[1] Salter, On Genetic Interests.

[2] MacDonald, “An Integrative Evolutionary Perspective on Ethnicity.”

[3] J. Philippe Rushton, “Genetic Similarity Theory and the Nature of Ethnocentrism,” in Kristiaan Thienpont and Robert Cliquet (eds.) In-group/Out-group Behavior in Modern Societies: An Evolutionary Perspective (The Hague, Netherlands: Vlaamse Gemeenschap/CBGS, 1999): 75–107.

[4] Susan T. Fiske, “Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination,” in Daniel Todd Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey (eds.), The Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th ed., Vol. 2 (Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1998): 357–411.

[5] H. Robert Outten, Michael T. Schmitt, and Daniel A. Miller, “Feeling Threatened about the Future: Whites’ Emotional Reactions to Anticipated Ethnic Demographic Changes,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 38 (2011): 14–25.

[6] Howard Zinn, A People’s History of the United States, 1492–Present (New York: Harper, 1980); see also: Kevin MacDonald, “The Academic Left’s Involvement in Politics, The Occidental Observer (February 1, 2010).

[7] Fox News, “New York Times Stands by New Tech Writer” (August 2, 2018).

https://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/new-york-times-stands-by-new-tech-writer-sarah-jeong-after-racist-tweets-surface

Michelle Goldberg, “We Can Replace Them,” The New York Times (October 29, 2018).

Rod Dreher, “Classics Studies: No Country for White Men,” The American Conservative (January 30, 2019).

Lindsey Bever, “CNN’s Don Lemon Doubles Down after Saying White Men Are ‘the Biggest Terror Threat in This Country,’” Washington Post (October 31, 2018).

https://www.washingtonpost.com/arts-entertainment/2018/10/31/cnn-host-don-lemon-said-White-men-are-biggest-terror-threat-this-country/?utm_term=.7512d32960f4

[8] Mark Point, “Racism on the Rise,” American Thinker (November 6, 2018).

https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2018/11/racism_on_the_rise.html

[9] Pew Research Center, “Race in America, 2019” (April 9, 2019),

https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2019/04/09/race-in-america-2019/

[10] Claire Brockway and Carroll Doherty, “Growing Share of Republicans Say U.S. Risks Losing Its Identity If It Is Too Open to Foreigners,” Pew Research Center (July 17, 2019).

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/17/growing-share-of-republicans-say-u-s-risks-losing-its-identity-if-it-is-too-open-to-foreigners/

[11] Kiana Cox, “Most U.S. Adults Feel What Happens to Their Own Racial or Ethnic Group Affects Them Personally,” Pew Research Center (July 11, 2019).

Paraphrased, the poll asked “Does what happens to your racial or ethnic group in the U.S. affect overall what happens in your own life?”

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/11/linked-fate-connectedness-americans/

[12] MacDonald, “An Integrative Evolutionary Perspective on Ethnicity.”

[13] MacDonald, Separation and Its Discontents.

[14] M. Eckehart, How Sweden Became Multicultural (Helsingborg, Sweden: Logik Förlag, 2017);

  1. Roger Devlin, “The Origins of Swedish Multiculturalism: A Review of M. Eckehart’s How SwedenBecame Multicultural,” The Occidental Observer (September 9, 2017).

Kevin MacDonald, “The Jewish Origins of Multiculturalism in Sweden,” The Occidental Observer (January 14, 2013).

[15] Noah Carl, “Tolerance of Inter-Ethnic Relationships in Europe,” @NoahCarl (July 227, 2019).

https://medium.com/@NoahCarl/tolerance-of-inter-ethnic-relationships-in-europe-c27bda8a25e1

[16] Aksel Sandemose (1899–1965) in his novel En Flyktning Krysser Sitt Spor (A Fugitive Crosses His Tracks, 1933). Although originating in a work of fiction, the Jante Laws have been widely recognized by Scandinavians as accurately reflecting a mindset typical of their society.

[17] Christopher H. Boehm, Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

[18] Eric A. Smith, Kim Hill, Frank Marlowe, D. Nolin, Polly Wiessner, P, M. Gurven, S. Bowles, Monique Borgerhoff-Mulder, T. Hertz, and A. Bell, “Wealth Transmission and Inequality Among H-gs,” Current Anthropology 51, no. 10 (2010):19–34.

[19] “Lawyers Blame Groupthink in Sweden’s Worst​​ Miscarriage of Justice,” The Guardian (June 5, 2015).

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/05/groupthink-sweden-miscarriage-of-justice-sture-bergwall

[20] See Kevin MacDonald, “Pathological Altruism on Steroids in Sweden,” The Occidental Observer (April 4, 2015).

[21] Frank K. Salter, Welfare, Ethnicity, and Altruism: New Data and Evolutionary Theory (London: Routledge, 2005).

[22] Kevin MacDonald, “Racial Conflict and the Health Care Bill, “The Occidental Observer (March 3, 2010).

[23] Ingrid Carlqvist, “I Want My Country Back,” speech given at the International Civil Liberties Alliance in the European Parliament, Brussels (July 9, 2012); emphasis in original.

https://www.trykkefrihed.dk/i-want-my-country-back.htm

[24] Henrik Höjer, “Segregation Is Increasing in Sweden,” Forsting & Framsted (May, 29, 2015) (edited Google translation).

https://fof.se/artikel/segregationen-okar

[25] One might think that because of the importance of conformity, Scandinavian cultures would not be not prone to producing geniuses—phenotypic outliers who create novel ideas and inventions. However, a rough per capita ranking (based on 2018 populations) of Nobel Prizes in the sciences (chemistry, physics, and physiology or medicine) indicates that Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark) have a ranking comparable to other northwestern European countries, and higher than France or Germany. These results are not substantially altered by excluding Jewish laureates (only two of whom resided in a Scandinavian country). The results for Finland are comparable to France, and slightly higher if one excludes Jewish laureates living in France.

The reason perhaps is that scientific communities in the hard sciences (but not in many of the social sciences) are not moral communities. Dissenters may be treated as eccentric or none-too-smart, but they are not vilified as moral reprobates.

“List of Countries by Nobel Laureates Per Capita,” Wikipedia.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_Nobel_laureates_per_capita

[26] Edward Dutton, The Silent Rape Epidemic: How the Finns Were Groomed to Love Their Abusers (Oulu, Finland: Thomas Edward Press, 2019), 25.

[27] Kirsi Warpula, “Eastern Finnish Families on the Borderland of Historical Family Forms,” History of the Family 7, no. 3 (2002): 315–326.

[28] For an exhaustive account, see Richard Houck, “Words Like Violence: The Left’s Total War on Freedom of Speech,” Ch. I of Part 2 of Liberalism Unmasked (London: Arktos, 2018), 55–85.

[29] See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012).

[30] J. J. Goldberg notes that “within the world of liberal organizations like the ACLU and People for the American Way, Jewish influence is so profound that non-Jews sometimes blur the distinction between them and the formal Jewish community.”

  1. J. Goldberg, Jewish Power: Inside the American Jewish Establishment (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1996), 46.

[31] Mark Hemingway, “Want to Defend Civil Liberties? Don’t Look to the ACLU,” The Weekly Standard (June 29, 2018).

https://www.weeklystandard.com/mark-hemingway/the-aclu-gives-up-on-free-speech-and-the-first-amendment

[32]Inherit the Wind (play),” Wikipedia.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inherit_the_Wind_(play)#Background

[33] Kevin MacDonald, “Jerry Kammer: The SPLC Depends on Jewish Donors,” The Occidental Observer (March 18, 2010).

[34] Kevin MacDonald, “The Hate Crimes Prevention Bill: Why Do Jewish Organizations Support It?,” VDare.com (May 11, 2009).

https://vdare.com/articles/the-hate-crimes-prevention-bill-why-do-jewish-organizations-support-it

[35] Kevin MacDonald, “Joe McCarthy and the Jews,” review of Jewish Organizations’ Response to Communism and Senator McCarthy, by Aviva Weingarten (2008), The Occidental Quarterly 19, no. 1 (Spring, 2019): 97–105.

The Psychology of Moral Communities, Part 4 of 5: Psychological Challenges to Developing an Explicit Culture of White Identity and Interests

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Psychological Challenges to Developing an Explicit Culture of White Identity and Interests

The foregoing has discussed psychological mechanisms underlying the power of human cultures to influence behavior and attitudes. Clearly, the wider culture of the West, now dominated by the anti-White left, poses a major obstacle to developing an explicit culture favorable to White identity and interests. In the absence of changes in the explicit culture on issues related to the legitimacy of White racial identity and interests, Whites will simply continue to retreat into implicit White communities.

There are obviously a great many obstacles to developing such a mainstream culture, the main one being opposition by elites in the media, academia, business, and political cultures. However, there are other mechanisms that have come into play which make it difficult to create such a culture. 

Self-interest and the Anti-White Infrastructure

A large part of the problem is that these elites have created a very elaborate infrastructure so that, for the vast majority of individuals, economic and professional self-interest coincides with support for anti-White policies. Particularly egregious examples are individuals and companies that directly benefit from immigration via cheap labor, or companies, such as First Data Corporation, that benefit from remittances sent by immigrants to relatives in other countries.

Noteworthy examples are university presidents, many of whom earn seven-figure salaries. For example, Mary Sue Coleman earned over $1,000,000/year before resigning as president of the University of Michigan in 2014. She had been a leader in attempting to preserve racial preferences for non-Whites and in promoting the (non-existent) educational benefits of diversity.[1]

Similarly, when three White lacrosse players at Duke University were accused of raping a Black woman, faculty and administrators issued statements assuming their guilt.[2] Because the leftist political cultural of the university has become conventionalized, statements deploring the racism and sexism of the players could be counted on as good career moves, even when they turned out to be groundless. Adopting conventional views on race and ethnicity is a sine qua non for a career as a mainstream academic (particularly an administrator), a public intellectual, or in the political arena.

Consistent with the importance of self-interest in supporting explicitly White policies and politicians, a 2017 study found that high-income Whites were less likely to support politicians who strongly identify as White if they think the racial hierarchy is unstable. In other words, Whites who have the most to lose are most likely to be unwilling to “rock the boat” by provoking minorities if they think that the racial hierarchy could change because of demographic shifts.[3]

As Frank Salter has pointed out, Whites who fail to attend to the interests of their wider kinship group benefit themselves and their families at the expense of their own wider ethnic interests.[4] This is especially true for elite Whites—people whose intelligence, power, and wealth could make a very large difference in culture and politics. They are in effect sacrificing millions of ethnic kin—for example, by turning their backs on the White working class who are well known to suffer most from non-White immigration and the multicultural regime—for the benefit of themselves and their immediate family.

This is a disastrously wrongheaded choice by the standard measures of evolutionary success. However, because our evolved psychology is much more attuned to individual and family interests than to the interests of the ethnic group or race, Whites who benefit economically or professionally from adopting conventional views on race and ethnicity are unlikely to feel unease at the psychological level. Indeed, given that conventional views on race and ethnicity have been buttressed by the ideology that departures from these views indicate moral turpitude or psychopathology, such individuals are likely to feel morally righteous by signalling their support—virtue signalling within the moral community created by elite culture. 

Social Learning Theory: The Consequences of Not Dominating the Cultural High Ground

Although changing the structure of material benefits is doubtless critical for advancing White ethnic interests, we should also pay attention to social learning, i.e., learning by imitating models. People are prone to adopting the ideas and behavior of others who have prestige and high status, and this tendency fits well with an evolutionary perspective in which seeking high social status is a universal feature of the human mind. A critical component of the success of the culture of White dispossession is that it achieved control of the most prestigious and influential institutions of the West, particularly the media and academia. Once this culture became a consensus among the elites, it became widely accepted among Whites of very different levels of education and among people of different social classes.[5]

For example, Leslie Fiedler, a Jewish literary scholar associated with the New York Intellectuals,[6] described a whole generation of American Jewish writers (including Delmore Schwartz, Alfred Kazin, Karl Shapiro, Isaac Rosenfeld, Paul Goodman, Saul Bellow, and H. J. Kaplan) as “typically urban, second-generation Jews.” The works of these writers appeared regularly in Partisan Review, the flagship journal of the New York Intellectuals. Fiedler goes on to say that

the writer drawn to New York from the provinces feels … the Rube, attempts to conform; and the almost parody of Jewishness achieved by the gentile writer in New York is a strange and crucial testimony of our time.[7]

Once Jews had achieved prestige and status in the literary world, it was only natural that non-Jews would admire and emulate them by adopting their views on race and ethnicity—views that were mainstream in the Jewish community and well to the left of most Americans.

Like other modeling influences, therefore, maladaptive memes are best promulgated by individuals and institutions with high social status. Because they have been elevated to the pantheon of elite culture, individuals such as Sigmund Freud or Stephen Jay Gould have become cultural icons—true cultural heroes. The cultural memes emanating from their thought, therefore, have a much greater opportunity to take root in the culture as a whole.

Moreover, adopting the views on race and ethnicity held by elites also confers psychological benefits because it enhances one’s reputation in the contemporary moral community created by these elites. On the other hand, publicly dissenting from these views carries huge costs for most people. White elites who turn their back on their own ethnic group are likely to be massively reinforced within the contemporary explicit culture, while those who attempt to advance White interests can expect to suffer psychologically painful costs.

There are many examples of White people who have been fired from their positions in the media or other positions of influence for expressing attitudes on race and ethnicity that depart from the conventional wisdom. On the other hand, the massive social approval University of Michigan president Mary Sue Coleman received within the culture of the university for her positions on diversity issues is doubtless a positive component of her job. If she suddenly reversed position on the benefits of diversity, her career as a university president and her $1,000,000+/year salary would have been in dire jeopardy. 

Benefits and Risks of Conscientiousness

A psychological system that bears on moral reputation is Conscientiousness, discussed previously in connection with inhibiting our natural tendencies in the service of long-term payoffs. However, people who are high on Conscientiousness also tend to be deeply concerned about their reputation.

This is no accident. In fact, developing a good reputation is an important way for conscientious people to get long-term payoffs. Think of it this way. If someone cheats another person, he gets a short-term gain at the expense of developing a bad reputation when his cheating becomes known. The only way he can continue to survive is to prey on others who don’t know his reputation, and that means moving on and interacting with strangers—who will be less trusting—rather than with friends and allies. On the other hand, if he cooperates, both persons benefit, and he develops a reputation as a cooperator that may last a lifetime. In the long run, therefore, he will be better off.

Conscientious people, unlike sociopaths, are cooperators, and as a result they are vitally concerned about their reputation. This is particularly critical for individualists because they tend to interact more often with strangers—their reputation is first and foremost established among non-relatives who would be relatively quick (compared to relatives) to cease interacting with them if there are signs of untrustworthiness.

Theoretical work has shown that having access to people’s reputation is likely to be a necessary condition for the evolution of cooperation.[8] Information on the reputation of individuals constitutes a collective memory of the past history of individuals and is made possible by language—that is, explicit representations of the past history of individuals in cooperative situations.[9] Without such explicit information on reputation, cooperators would be at an evolutionary disadvantage and vulnerable to a strategy of short-term exploitation rather than long-term cooperation with like-minded others. This explicit information on reputation is therefore processed by the higher brain centers located in the prefrontal cortex linked to Conscientiousness.

I suggest, therefore, that evolutionary pressure for cooperation is a critical adaptive function accounting for the evolution of Conscientiousness. Psychological research shows that people high in Conscientiousness are responsible, dependable, dutiful, and reliable. Indeed, responsibility emerges as a facet (i.e., subcategory) of Conscientiousness defined as cooperative, dependable, being of service to others, and contributing to community and group projects.[10] These traits are also highly correlated with honesty and morally exemplary behavior.

Thus Conscientiousness not only makes us better able to inhibit natural impulses like ethnocentrism, it also makes us more concerned about our reputation in a moral community. We want to fit into the community and we want to be known as cooperators, not cheaters. At the low end of Conscientiousness are sociopaths (also low on Love/Nurturance). They are more likely to take advantage of people for short-term gains and care nothing about developing a reputation as honest and trustworthy. After they prey on one victim, they must move on to an area where their reputation is not known.

Obviously, Conscientiousness as defined above is a pillar of human civilization and cultural life. This is especially so in the individualistic cultures of the West given its importance in achieving a good reputation in groups of strangers.

To this set of traits, Francis Fukuyama also adds trust as a critical virtue of individualist societies.[11] It is linked to Conscientiousness because we are more likely trust people who have a good reputation—people who have the trust of others. Trust is really a way of emphasizing the importance of moral universalism as a trait of individualist societies. In collectivist, family-oriented societies, trust ends at the border of the family and the wider kinship group. Social organization, whether in political culture or in economic enterprise, tends to be a family affair. Morality is defined as what is good for the group—typically the kinship group (e.g., “Is it good for the Jews?”).

This lack of trust beyond the kinship group is the fundamental problem that prevents the development of civil societies in much of Asia and Africa, where divisions into opposing religious and ultimately kinship groups define the political landscape. People who have good jobs are expected to help their relatives, leading to high levels of corruption.[12] The movement of the West toward multiculturalism and opposing identity groups based on race and ethnicity means the end of individualist Western culture, replaced by a culture characterized by conflict between self-interested groups rather than individuals.

In individualist cultures, organizations include nonfamily members in positions of trust, and nepotism is looked on as immoral and is subject to legal sanctions. Morality is defined in terms of universal moral principles that are independent of kinship connections or group membership. Trust therefore is of critical importance to individualist society.

And fundamentally trust is about building a trustworthy reputation—for example, a reputation for honest dealing, not only with fellow kinsmen, but with others as well. It follows that European-derived people are particularly prone to being concerned with reputation. In the individualistic societies in which Westerners evolved, cooperation (and therefore success) resulted from having a good reputation, not from being able to rely on extensive kinship relations.

There are obviously great benefits to trust and the wider psychological system of Conscientiousness. The suite of traits associated with individualism is the basis of Western modernism. Relying on the good reputation of others is a key ingredient to building cooperative civil societies capable of rising above amoral familism.

The downside, however, is that conscientious people become so concerned about their reputation that they become conformists. Once the cultural and political left had won the day, a large part of its success was that it dominated the moral and intellectual high ground on issues of race and ethnicity. The culture of critique had become conventionalized and a pillar of the intellectual establishment. People who dissented from this leftist consensus were faced with a disastrous loss of reputation—nothing less than psychological agony.

There are many examples showing the power of this mechanism. Over 75 years ago Anne Morrow Lindbergh became one of the first victims of the modern version of political correctness when her husband, Charles Lindbergh, stated that Jews were one of the forces attempting to get the United States to enter World War II. Shortly after his speech, she wrote:

The storm is beginning to blow up hard. … I sense that this is the beginning of a fight and consequent loneliness and isolation that we have not known before. … For I am really much more attached to the worldly things than he is, mind more giving up friends, popularity, etc., mind much more criticism and coldness and loneliness. … Will I be able to shop in New York at all now? I am always stared at—but now to be stared at with hate, to walk through aisles of hate![13]

What is striking and perhaps counterintuitive, is that the guilt and shame remain even when she is completely satisfied at an intellectual (explicit) level that what her husband said was based on good evidence, that it was morally justifiable, and that he is a man of integrity.

I cannot explain my revulsion of feeling by logic. Is it my lack of courage to face the problem? Is it my lack of vision and seeing the thing through? Or is my intuition founded on something profound and valid? I do not know and am only very disturbed, which is upsetting for him. I have the greatest faith in him as a person—in his integrity, his courage, and his essential goodness, fairness, and kindness—his nobility really. … How then explain my profound feeling of grief about what he is doing? If what he said is the truth (and I am inclined to think it is), why was it wrong to state it?

Her reaction is involuntary and irrational—beyond the reach of logical analysis. Charles Lindbergh was exactly right in what he said, but a rational understanding of the correctness of his analysis cannot lessen the psychological trauma to his wife, who must face the hostile stares of others. The trauma is the result of the power of the Conscientiousness system in leading to loss of reputation resulting from breaching the cultural taboo against discussing Jewish influence.

I’ve had similar experiences, on a much smaller scale, resulting from attacks on me at the university where I worked.[14] As with Anne Morrow Lindbergh’s concern about going shopping in New York, the most difficult thing is dealing with loss of reputation in my face-to-face world at the university. The biggest problem is that being an academic nonconformist on race and ethnicity has huge moral overtones. If one dissents from the reigning theory of macroeconomics or the main influences on nineteenth-century French Romanticism, one may be viewed as a bit eccentric or perhaps none too smart. But one is not likely to be subjected to torrents of moral outrage.

Given that academics tend to be Conscientious types, it’s not surprising that academics are generally loath to do or say things that might endanger their reputation. This is at least ironic, because it conflicts with the image of academics as fearless seekers of truth. Unlike politicians, who must continue to curry favor with the public in order to be re-elected, and unlike media figures who have no job protection, academics with tenure have no excuse for not being willing to endure labels such as “anti-Semite” or “racist” in order to pursue their perception of the truth. Part of the job—and a large part of the rationale for tenure in the first place—is that they are supposed to be willing to take unpopular positions: to forge ahead using all that brain power and expertise to chart new territories that challenge the popular wisdom.

But that image of academia is simply not based in reality. Consider, for example, an article that appeared almost two months after the publication of John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt’s famous essay on the Israel lobby,[15] appropriately titled “A Hot Paper Muzzles Academia.”[16]

Instead of a roiling debate, most professors not only agreed to disagree but agreed to pretend publicly that there was no disagreement at all. At Harvard and other schools, the Mearsheimer-Walt paper proved simply too hot to handle—and it revealed an academia deeply split yet lamentably afraid to engage itself on one of the hottest political issues of our time. Call it the academic Cold War: distrustful factions rendered timid by the prospect of mutually assured career destruction.

Professors refused to take a stand on the paper, either in favor or against. As one Ivy League professor noted, “A lot of [my colleagues] were more concerned about the academic politics of it, and where they should come down, in that sense.” As in 1941, discussing Jewish influence—even in a fact-based, dispassionate manner—carries huge costs.

Sadly, there is now a great deal of evidence that academics in general are careful to avoid controversy or do much of anything that will create hostility. In fact, some researchers are pointing to this fact to question whether tenure is justified. A recent survey of the attitudes of 1,004 professors at elite universities illustrates this quite clearly. Regardless of their rank, professors rated their colleagues as

reluctant to engage in activities that ran counter to the wishes of colleagues. Even tenured full professors believed [other full professors] would invoke academic freedom only “sometimes” rather than “usually” or “always”; they chose confrontational options “rarely,” albeit more often than did lower ranked colleagues. … Their willingness to self-limit may be due to a desire for harmony and/or respect for the criticisms of colleagues whose opinions they value. Thus, the data did not support the depiction of Professorus Americanus as unleashed renegade.[17]

Seen in this context, the reaction to the Mearsheimer and Walt paper makes a lot of sense. As one professor noted, “People might debate it if you gave everyone a get-out-of-jail-free card and promised that afterward everyone would be friends.”[18] This intense desire to be accepted and liked by one’s colleagues is certainly understandable. Striving for a good reputation is part of our nature, especially for the conscientious among us.

Ostracism and moral condemnation from others in one’s face-to-face world trigger guilt feelings. These are automatic responses resulting ultimately from the importance of fitting into a group—i.e., they were developed over evolutionary time. This is especially so in the individualistic cultures of the West, where having a good reputation beyond the borders of the kinship group forms the basis of trust and civil society, and where having a poor reputation would have resulted in ostracism and evolutionary death.

Moreover, it’s interesting that in my experience, decisions by academic departments and committees are by consensus as is typical of egalitarian groups, as in Scandinavian culture as discussed below. Going against a consensus is thus likely to risk ostracism.

As shown by these examples, being able to rationally defend the ideas and attitudes that bring moral condemnation is not sufficient to defuse the complex negative emotions brought on by this form of ostracism. One might think that just as the prefrontal control areas can inhibit ethnocentric impulses originating in the sub-cortex, we should be able to inhibit these primitive guilt feelings. After all, the guilt feelings ultimately result from absolutely normal attitudes of ethnic identity and interests that have been delegitimized as a result of the ultimate failure of the period of ethnic defense discussed in Chapter 6—failure that eventuated in the erection of the culture of critique in America and throughout the West. It should be therapeutic to understand that many of the people who created this culture retained a strong sense of their own ethnic identity and interests. And it should help assuage guilt feelings if we understand that this culture is now propped up by people seeking material advantages and psychological approval at the expense of their own legitimate long-term ethnic interests. Given the strong Jewish influence in erecting this culture,[19] the guilt feelings are nothing more than the end result of ethnic warfare, pursued at the level of ideology and culture instead of on the battlefield.

Getting rid of guilt and shame, however, is certainly not an easy process. Psychotherapy for White people begins with an explicit understanding of the issues that allows us to act in our interests, even if we can’t entirely control the negative feelings engendered by those actions.

Evolutionary theorist Robert Trivers has proposed that the emotion of guilt is a sign to the group that a person will mend his ways and behave according to group norms in the future. Shame, on the other hand, functions as a display of submission to people higher in the dominance hierarchy.[20] From that perspective, a person who is incapable of shame or guilt even for obvious transgressions is literally a sociopath—someone who has no desire to fit into group norms. As noted above, sociopaths are at the low end of Conscientiousness, and there were doubtless strong selection pressures against sociopathy in the small groups that we evolved in, especially among the individualistic peoples of the West; as noted above, White subjects in fact do score higher on Conscientiousness than other groups with the exception of East Asians. The trustworthy cooperators with excellent reputations won the day. 

Cognitive Dissonance as a Force of Psychological Inertia

Once the left had established cultural hegemony throughout the West, people were essentially socialized to see the world through the lens of a leftist worldview—i.e., a worldview in which Whites, especially White males, see themselves as past oppressors of the entire gamut of identity groups that make up coalition of the aggrieved: Blacks, Native Americans, Latinos, Jews, women, sexual non-conformists, etc. Once established, such a mindset of liberal-left beliefs is difficult to change.

Cognitive dissonance research has shown that people with strong beliefs, especially beliefs tied up with their personal identity, often do not change them when confronted by conflicting evidence.[21] Fundamentally, the brain wants to avoid conflicting ideas and often uses illogical reasoning and other mechanisms to retain a sense of psychological comfort. For example, when presented with contradictory evidence (such as data showing genetically based race differences in intelligence), people may ignore the data in order to retain a self-image as a morally righteous person. Moreover, people tend to forget evidence that conflicts with their beliefs, and they tend to accept weak arguments that fit with their world view while rejecting strong arguments and data that conflict with it. They may focus their attention not on the evidence itself but on the person presenting the evidence, impugning their motives and accepting guilt-by-association arguments. Clearly, the mind is designed to go to great lengths to avoid psychological discomfort.[22]

This poses a challenge in trying to convert White liberals and most White conservatives to accepting ideas such as that Whites have legitimate interests as a group, that race is real, and that immigration of non-Whites is a long-term disaster for Whites, etc.[23]

This is especially the case given the previously discussed mechanisms that promote inertia within the culture erected by the left. Nonconformity carries costs that can be avoided by dismissing contradictory information. And, given the control that mainstream media has over information presented to the public on race, etc., people can easily avoid information that conflicts with their world view. This explains why the leftist media corporations like YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter are removing such information from the internet or at least limiting its reach. And it shows how important it is to erect an explicit culture in which White identity and interests are legitimate.

Go to Part 5.


[1] Mary S. Coleman, “Diversity Matters at Michigan,” University of Michigan News Service (November 8, 2006).


www.ns.umich.edu/htdocs/releases/story.php?id=1050

[2] Michael Skube, “Duke’s Recovery from a Rush to Judgment,” Los Angeles Times (December 31, 2006).

[3] Sora Jun, Brian S. Lowery, and Lucia Guillory, “Keeping Minorities Happy: Hierarchy Maintenance and Whites’ Decreased Support for Highly Identified White Politicians,” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 43, no. 12 (2017): 1615–1629.

[4] Frank K. Salter, On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethny, and Humanity in an Age of Mass Migration (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 2007; orig. published in 2003 by Peter Lang, Bern, Switzerland).

[5] MacDonald, The Culture of Critique, Ch. 6.

[6] The New York Intellectuals are analyzed as a Jewish intellectual movement in The Culture of Critique; Ibid.

[7] Leslie A. Fiedler, “The State of American Writing,” Partisan Review 15 (1948): 870–875, 872, 873.

[8] Lan Liu and Tong Chen, “Sustainable Cooperation Based on Reputation and Habituation in the Public Goods Game,” Biosystems 160 (2017): 33–38; Manfred Milinski, Dirk Semmann, and H-J. Krambeck, “Reputation Helps Solve the ‘Tragedy of the Commons,’” Nature 415 (2002): 424–426; Dirk Semmann, H-J. Krambeck and Manfred Milinski, “Reputation is Valuable within and outside One’s Own Social Group,” Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 57(2005): 611–616.

[9] Mojdeh Mohtashemi and Lik Mui, “Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity by Social Information: The Role of Trust and Reputation in Evolution of Altruism,” Journal of Theoretical Biology 223 (2003): 523–531.

[10] Brent W. Roberts, Oleksandr S. Chernyshenko, Stephen Stark, and Lewis S. Goldberg, “The Structure of Conscientiousness: An Empirical Investigation Based on Seven Major Personality Questionnaires,” Personnel Psychology 58 (2005): 103–139.

[11] Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (New York: Free Press, 1995).

[12] Kajuju Murori, “Just Like Corruption, Nepotism Also Strains Africa’s Growth,” African Exponent (June 27, 2016).

https://www.africanexponent.com/post/7434-just-like-corruption-nepotism-also-strains-africas-growth

[13] Anne Morrow Lindbergh, War Within and Without: Diaries and Letters of Anne Morrow Lindbergh (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), 220–239.

[14] Kevin MacDonald, “Campaign Against Me by the Southern Poverty Law Center,” kevinmacdonald.net.

http://www.kevinmacdonald.net/Beirich.htm

[15] John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby,” London Review of Books 28, no. 6 (March 23, 2006): 3–12.

https://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n06/john-mearsheimer/the-israel-lobby

[16] Eve Fairbanks, “A Hot Paper Muzzles Academia,” Los Angeles Times (May14, 2006).

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2006-may-14-op-fairbanks14-story.html

[17] Stephen J. Ceci, Wendy M. Williams, and Katrin Mueller-Johnson, “Is Tenure Justified? An Experimental Study of Faculty Beliefs about Tenure, Promotion, and Academic Freedom,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29, no. 6 (2006): 553–594, 565,

[18] Fairbanks, “A Hot Paper Muzzles Academia.”

[19] MacDonald, The Culture of Critique.

[20] Robert Trivers, Social Evolution (Benjamin-Cummings, 1985).

[21] Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1957).

[22] Margaret Hefferman, Willful Blindness (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012).

[23]

The Psychology of Moral Communities, Part 3 of 5: Race Differences in Personality

Go to Part 1
Go to Part 2

Race Differences in Personality

Race differences in personality explain the unique tendency of Whites to create moral communities where reputation is paramount. The critical role for reputation implies that we evaluate the personalities of group members and potential group members. A reputation as heartless, calculating, untrustworthy or selfish is not going to help one’s status in a moral community, whereas the opposite of these traits will be welcomed. Because of the long history of moral communities in the West, it is expected that research findings will show race differences in traits conducive to membership in a moral community.

As an introduction to discussing race differences in personality, I will briefly discuss an evolutionary theory of personality systems and how they relate to the psychiatric classification of psychopathic personality, the subject of Richard Lynn’s Race Differences in Psychopathic Personality which is discussed below.[1] Bear in mind that individual differences in all personality traits are heritable—approximately half of the variation between individuals in personality traits is attributable to genetic influences.[2] 

Some Basic Personality Systems

The Behavioral Approach System (BAS). One set of traits that contributes to reputation within a group as well as to psychopathic personality relates to seeking reward; collectively they are here labeled the Behavioral Approach System (BAS). Among even the most primitive mammals, there must be mechanisms designed to approach the environment to obtain resources, prototypically foraging and mate attraction systems. The BAS evolved from systems designed to motivate approach toward sources of reward (e.g., sexual gratification, dominance, control of territory) that occurred as enduring and recurrent features of the environments in which animals or humans evolved.[3] In the contemporary world, these reward mechanisms can be triggered not only by aspects of the environment humans evolved in, such as social dominance and mating situations, but also by things like synthetic drugs designed to trigger evolved reward centers. These reward systems overlap anatomically and neurophysiologically with aggression, perhaps because aggression is a prepotent way of dealing with the frustration of expecting a reward but not getting it.[4]

The mechanisms underlying the BAS show sex differences in accord with the evolutionary theory of sex, which predicts that on average males will be higher than females on the BAS system because they have more to gain by social dominance, aggression and control of resources than females.[5] This is because successful, socially dominant males are much better able than females to translate their success into reproductive success by attracting high-quality females, extra-pair copulations, and, in the vast majority of human societies, multiple mates. Fundamentally, males benefit by being able to control females much more than the reverse, since female reproduction is constrained by the demands of pregnancy and lactation. For example, by leading successful armies, Genghis Khan and his direct descendants were able to set up harems in areas they conquered, with the result that he now has around 32 million direct descendants spread throughout Asia. No female could do that in a similar time period given the limitations of pregnancy and lactation.

As a result, it’s no surprise that among human adults, behavioral approach is also associated with aggressiveness and higher levels of sexual experiences and positive emotions (e.g., emotions one feels when achieving social dominance or attaining goals).[6],[7]

Relevant to psychopathic personality, there are evolutionarily expected sex differences in aggression, pleasure-seeking (including sensation-seeking), and externalizing psychiatric disorders (e.g., conduct disorder, oppositional/defiant disorder, and aggression). Moreover, the social interactions of boys are more characterized by dominance interactions and forceful, demanding interpersonal styles.[8] On the other hand, females are more prone to depression which is associated with low levels of behavioral approach.[9] In fact, anhedonia (lack of ability to experience pleasure) and negative mood are primary symptoms of depression within the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V) classification.[10]

The Love/Nurturance Pair Bonding System. In Chapter 3 it was argued that Western populations are more inclined to value the traits of love/nurturance in prospective mates as an aspect of individualist mating patterns and, ultimately, because of the need to cement close family relationships and paternal investment in the harsh environments that northern hunter-gatherers evolved in. Unlike kinship-based societies, marriage is exogamous and based at least partly on personal attraction, including personality characteristics like Love/Nurturance. This trait is also important for status within moral communities. Most people would not find cold-heartedness attractive in a potential marriage partner, nor would they desire cold-hearted people to be part of their moral community because such persons would tend to be untrustworthy and selfish. The following presents a fuller account of the Love/Nurturance system.

Mammalian females give birth and suckle their young. This has led to a host of adaptations for mothering, an outgrowth of which are pair-bonding mechanisms present also in males, although to a lesser extent on average.[11] For species that develop pair bonds and other types of close relationships involving nurturance and empathy, one expects the evolution of a system designed to make such relationships psychologically rewarding. The adaptive space of Love/Nurturance therefore becomes elaborated into a mechanism for cementing adult relationships of love and empathy that facilitate the transfer of resources to others, prototypically within the family.

The personality trait of Love/Nurturance is associated with relationships of intimacy and other long-term relationships, especially family relationships involving investment in children.[12] Individual differences in warmth and affection observable in early parent-child relationships, including secure attachments, are conceptually linked with Love/Nurturance later in life.[13] Secure attachments and warm, affectionate parent-child relationships have been found to be associated with a high-investment style of parenting characterized by later sexual maturation, stable pair bonding, and warm, reciprocally rewarding, non-exploitative interpersonal relationships.[14] The physiological basis of pair bonding involves specific brain regions underlying the ability to take pleasure in close, intimate relationships.[15] People who are high on this system are able to find intimate relationships psychologically rewarding and pleasurable and therefore seek them out, while psychopaths are prone to cold and callous personal relationships.

If indeed the main evolutionary impetus for the development of the human Love/Nurturance system is the need for high-investment parenting, females are expected to have a greater elaboration of mechanisms related to parental investment than males. The evolutionary theory of sex implies that females are expected to be highly discriminating maters compared to males and more committed to long-term relationships of nurturance and affection; cues of nurturance and love in males are expected to be highly valued by females seeking paternal investment. In agreement with this theory, there are robust sex differences (higher in females) on the Love/Nurturance dimension.[16]

And because empathy is strongly linked to Love/Nurturance, this also implies that women will be more prone to being motivated by empathy for the suffering of others and pathological forms of altruism. In turn, this has important ramifications in the contemporary world saturated with images of suffering refugees, immigrants, and other non-Whites. Love/Nurturance involves the tendency to provide aid for those needing help, including children and people who are ill.[17] This trait is strongly associated with measures of femininity as well as with warm, empathic personal relationships and psychological dependence on others.

People who are low on Love/Nurturance are prone to psychopathic personality—exploitative interpersonal relationships, lack of warmth, love, and empathy, an inability to form long term pair bonds and close, confiding relationships, and lack of guilt or remorse for violating others’ rights. The finding that males in the general population are three times as likely as females to be categorized with Antisocial Personality Disorder[18] fits with the robust sex differences in this system. Psychopathic personality, which is characterized by lack of empathy and social bonds, is associated with having many sexual partners, an uncommitted approach to mating, sexual coercion,[19] many short-term sexual relationships, sexual promiscuity,[20] and lack of nurturance of children.[21]

In terms of race differences, the Love/Nurturance system is a central aspect of a slow life history strategy,[22] with the result that it is expected that African and African-derived populations will be less prone to affectionate pair bonding and paternal investment in children, and more prone to short-term sexual relationships. Indeed, while African mothers are sensitive and responsive to babies’ needs, mother-child interactions in prototypical African cultures are devoid of the warmth and affection that are typical in European cultures.[23] Thus Mary Ainsworth, a pioneer in mother-infant attachment research, found that Ugandan babies were quite securely attached despite the fact that their mothers rarely showed any affection toward them—a phenomenon also noted by other researchers for a different African group.[24]

Prefrontal Executive Control (PEC). Having a reputation as conscientious and dependable is important for being accepted in a moral community. A relatively recent trend in evolution, especially in the Primate line, has been the evolution of a centralized control system able to integrate and coordinate lower-level adaptations. This top-down Prefrontal Executive Control (PEC) system enables coordination of specialized adaptations, including all of the mechanisms associated with the BAS.[25] PEC involves explicit processing of linguistic and symbolic information and the top-down control of behavior. Unlike the automatic processing typical of the BAS, it is able to evaluate complex contexts in order to generate behavior that is adaptive in contemporary human societies with their constantly changing, highly complex environments and reward-punishment contingencies.

For example, emotional states resulting from adaptations designed to react to evolutionary regularities may place people in a prepotently aggressive state energized by anger—an emotional state that is one of the subsystems of the BAS. However, whether or not aggression actually occurs may also be influenced, at least for people with sufficient levels of PEC, by explicit evaluation of the wider context, including evaluation of the possible costs and benefits of an aggressive act (e.g., penalties at law, possible retaliation). These explicitly calculated costs and benefits are not recurrent over evolutionary time but are products of explicit processing evaluating current environments and producing mental models of possible consequences of behavior.

Individual differences in PEC are most closely associated with the personality trait of Conscientiousness.[26] Conscientiousness involves variation in the ability to defer gratification and pleasure (both related to the BAS) in the service of attaining long-term goals, persevering in unpleasant tasks, paying close attention to detail, and behaving in a responsible, dependable, cooperative manner. Not surprisingly, Conscientiousness is also associated with academic success;[27] indeed, higher Conscientiousness is likely the reason for the finding of sex differences favoring females throughout the school years, including college.

Conscientiousness refers to “socially prescribed impulse control that facilitates task and goal-directed behavior”[28] and is thus central to understanding under-controlled behaviors associated with psychopathic personality.[29] Specifically, variation in PEC is central to understanding the difference between controlled and uncontrolled aggression—i.e., the difference between an impulsive act of aggression carried out in anger because of an insult versus a well-planned attack of revenge carried out in cold blood. Variation in PEC is also central to controlling reward-oriented behavior (pleasure-seeking), another central component of the BAS.[30] Individuals with low levels of prefrontal control are prone to impulsivity, substance abuse, and have low levels of emotional control, including relative inability to control anger, a prime motivator of some types of aggression.

Richard Lynn’s Race Differences in PersonalityWhites as More Generous and Empathic than Other Races

Richard Lynn’s Race Differences in Personality provides a welcome review of the personality literature related to race differences that fits well with the material on personality discussed above.[31] Studies from the United States have consistently found a rank ordering of races on behaviors related to psychopathic personality—highest in Blacks and Native Americans, followed by Hispanics, lower among Whites, and lowest among Asians, especially northeast Asians. The variables studied included conduct disorder, direct measures of psychopathic personality, measures of sexual promiscuity (indicating less proneness to pair bonding and being high on the BAS), Conscientiousness (Blacks vs. Whites only), criminality, school suspensions, emotional intelligence (Blacks vs. Whites only), drug and substance abuse, child abuse, and self-esteem (linked to the BAS: individuals high on the BAS are prone to high self-esteem and self-confidence.) In general, as with IQ, race differences are greatest between Whites and Blacks and much attenuated between Whites and northeast Asians.

Given the data on European individualism and its effects on mating patterns (highlighting the importance of love and pair bonding in choice of marriage partner compared to more kinship-oriented societies), I suggest that the differences between northeast Asians and Whites are best explained mainly by differences in Prefrontal Executive Control. The results for Blacks clearly indicate higher levels of the BAS, lower on Love/Nurturance, and lower on PEC.

Indeed, since the uniqueness of Western individualism is central to the present analysis, it’s important to note that Whites are more generous than Asians in terms of charitable donations, thus departing from the usual rank ordering of races on IQ and PEC. This is important because, as indicated above, the Love/Nurturance system is linked to altruism and empathic concern; moreover, Love/Nurturance has been of special importance for the West because of two particular aspects of individualism:

  • Individual choice of marriage Love Nurturance is an important criterion for both sexes but especially for men seeking a monogamous marriage with a woman high on a trait linked to nurturance of children and sexual fidelity. On the other hand, marriage in collectivist cultures is more determined by customs of marrying relatives as well by family strategizing, with parents playing a determining role.
  • Reputation in a moral community. Reputation in a group of non-relatives depends partly on being seen as generous, cooperative, and unselfish. Being high on the Love/Nurturancesystem is linked with empathy for the suffering of others. Moreover, among individualists, because of the lack of strong group boundaries and because reputation within a moral community is so critical, empathy would be expected to be directed to others outside one’s own kinship group but within one’s moral community.

Congruent with this scenario, Lynn presents data showing that Whites are more willing to contribute charitable donations than all other groups, including Asians.[32]And again, I emphasize that this is especially noteworthy given that it departs from the usual rank ordering of racial groups based on life history differences. Empathy for suffering others was a striking aspect of the movements to abolish slavery in England and the United States (Chapters 6 and 7) and in the eighteenth-century “affective revolution” that fed into the sensibility on display in the Second British Empire (Chapter 7). Ultimately, this was an ethnic shift that brought to the fore the hunter-gatherer sensibility with its greater emphasis on egalitarianism and moral communities.

Finally, it was noted above that women are higher on Love/Nurturance and its emotion of empathy. As a result, it is not surprising that Lynn finds women are more generous than men; indeed, White women are the most generous group of all, a finding that makes sense in light of the above comments on White women being more susceptible to appeals from suffering non-Whites, refugees, immigrants, etc. 

Life History Theory

Nicholas Baumard has proposed a life history theory-based account of the fact that Britain was the first to develop the industrial revolution.[33] He points out that pre-industrial Britain was relatively wealthy compared to any other area of the world, including other parts of Europe. Although he does not attempt to explain why Britain was wealthy prior to the Industrial Revolution—usually dated as beginning around 1760, he recruits life history theory to propose that this increased wealth had a cascading effect on a number of psychological traits, including a tendency to have a longer time horizon (less time discounting), higher optimism, and higher levels of trust in others, all of which are proposed as paving the way for innovation.

The basic idea is that in a stable resource-rich environment, people are optimistic and plan for the future rather than behave impulsively; since the struggle for subsistence is less salient, they are nicer to others and are less concerned with material goods. For example, he cites a study comparing Native American children with non-Native American children before and after a casino opened on tribal land. After the Native Americans received casino payments, there were reductions in criminal behavior, drug use, and behavioral disorders associated with poverty such as depression, anxiety, and oppositional disorders, as well as increases in the personality traits of Love/Nurturance and Conscientiousness described above.[34] In a similar manner, Baumard proposes that increased wealth in Britain led to an increase in these traits and that these in turn led to a flowering of innovation and technological progress.

Baumard’s theory contrasts with Gregory Clark’s theory in A Farewell to Alms which proposes natural selection for bourgeois virtues like Conscientiousness beginning in the early modern period.[35] While Baumard explicitly adopts a blank slate perspective, Clark’s theory is compatible with pre-existing genetically based variation in traits like Conscientiousness and IQ. More intelligent, conscientious people were able to rise in the new environment of the early modern period—an environment that unleashed the economic potential of individualism—and had more children, constituting natural selection for these traits.

Another theory based on selection has been proposed by Peter Frost and Henry Harpending based on the finding that penalties against violence increased dramatically beginning in the eleventh century, with up to two percent of males in each generation being subjected to capital punishment or dying in other ways related to their crimes.[36] This culling of violent males would have reduced the numbers of males at the high end of aggression and at the low ends of Conscientiousness and Love/Nurturance.

I regard all three of these proposals as contributing factors in European modernization; however, by itself or in combination they are inadequate. Baumard’s blank slate proposal ignores the massive data on genetic variation in personality traits and intelligence. Frost and Harpending’s thesis would not explain why strong states in areas like China and Eastern and Southern Europe would not have had similar selective effects on these traits, so they cannot explain the uniqueness of northwestern Europe—its individualism, the vastly disproportionate number of discoveries and inventions, and its exploring and colonizing the planet. China’s penalties for serious crimes were particularly draconian, punishing entire families of the alleged perpetrator beginning at least by the fourth century B.C. and extending to the early twentieth century.[37]

Moreover, none of these theories discuss individualism as a necessary condition for European modernization, including the Industrial Revolution. As presented in Chapter 4, northwest Europe had a long history of individualist family structure long before the Industrial Revolution—indeed, its origins are lost in prehistory and I argue they are ethnically based. However, the creativity, innovation, and enterprise that would be the natural product of the individualism of northwestern European peoples was throttled by a non-meritocratic aristocratic social system until the English Civil War of the mid-seventeenth century and the gradual overthrow of aristocratic culture (Chapter 6).

As noted in Chapter 4, the individualist family pattern required greater planning and self-control (Conscientiousness) prior to marriage and resulted in a greater likelihood to exhibit what psychologists label “internal locus of control” (i.e., the degree to which people believe that they have control over the outcome of events in their lives, as opposed to a fatalistic perspective resulting from external forces beyond their control.) It’s no accident that the English word kismet has Arabic roots.

Individualist marriage also emphasized individual choice of marriage partner based on the personal characteristics of the spouse, including intelligence, Conscientiousness, and affection (Love/Nurturance). These traits are deemphasized when marriage is embedded within extended kinship networks where marriage is typically entered into with relatives and often determined by parental choice. In individualist culture, reputation in a moral community rather than a kinship-based community was critical, resulting in trust of non-relatives.

The Protestant Reformation, which succeeded only in northwest Europe, is critical. In particular, the English Civil War of the 1640s, which saw the triumph of egalitarian individualism and the beginnings of the end of aristocratic culture based on agriculture, a rigid status hierarchy, and inherited (non-meritocratic) status with very limited opportunities for upward mobility. This upheaval ultimately resulted in relative egalitarianism, the development of a market-oriented economy, industrialization, and opportunities for upward mobility and reproductive success for the intelligent and conscientious, as described by Clark’s A Farewell to Alms.

Baumard supposes that increasing wealth in China and Japan (neither of which ever developed anything like European individualism) would have resulted in an industrial revolution. This is conjecture, and does not take account of greater levels of conformity and relative lack of creativity and innovation in these cultures, despite increased wealth and continuing into the present.[38] As discussed in Chapter 3, Westerners are WEIRD people differing in a large number of psychological characteristics from people in collectivist cultures. As with the data on the individualist family, these findings are compatible with an ethnic interpretation of northwestern European uniqueness.

Finally, given that there has always been an affluent class in Europe and in other societies, in order to be plausible, Baumard’s theory that increased affluence is critical must argue that this process is essentially the result of an increased number of people who are affluent. This is conjecture. My view is that the destruction of aristocratic culture, by allowing the inherent egalitarian individualism of northwest Europeans to come to the fore, was the critical factor.

Go to Part 4.


[1] Richard Lynn, Race Differences in Psychopathic Personality: An Evolutionary Perspective (Arlington, VA: Washington Summit Press, 2018).

[2] Robert Plomin, Blueprint: How DNA Makes Us Who We Are (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2018).

[3] Jeffrey A. Gray, The Psychology of Fear and Stress (2nd ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Jeffrey A. Gray, The Neuropsychology of Anxiety: An Enquiry into the Functions of the Septo-hippocampal System (2nd ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[4] Jaak Panksepp, Affective Neuroscience: The Foundations of Human and Animal Emotions. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998),191.

[5] Kevin MacDonald, “Temperament and Evolution,” in Marcel Zentner and Rebecca L. Shiner (Eds.), Handbook of Temperament (New York: Guilford Press, 2012b): 273–296.

[6] Gray, The Neuropsychology of Anxiety.

[7] The BAS can also be seen in children where it is linked to impulsivity (i.e., seeking rewards without adequate attention to costs), “High Intensity Pleasure,” and aggressiveness. Children who score high on behavioral approach are prone to positive emotional responses, including smiling, joy, and laughter available in rewarding situations and in the pleasant social interaction sought by sociable children.

Mary K. Rothbart and John E. Bates, “Temperament,” in Handbook of Child Psychology, William Damon, Richard Lerner, and Nancy Eisenberg (Eds.), Social, Emotional, and Personality Development (Vol. 3) (6th ed.) (New York: Wiley, 2006): 99–166.

[8] Peter J. LaFreniere, Emotional Development: An Evolutionary Perspective (Boston: Wadsworth/Thompson Learning, 2000).

[9] Nathan A. Fox, “Dynamic Cerebral Processes Underlying Emotion Regulation,” in Nathan Fox (eds.), The Development of Emotion Regulation: Biological and Behavioral Considerations. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development 59, no. 2–3, Serial No. 240): 152–166.

[10] American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.) (Washington, DC: APA Press, 2013).

[11] Kevin MacDonald, Emily A., Patch, and Aurelio J. Figueredo, “Love, Trust, and Evolution: Nurturance/Love and Trust as Two Independent Attachment Systems Underlying Intimate Relationships,” Psychology 7, no. 2 (2016): 238–253.

[12] Paul D. Trapnell and Jerry S. Wiggins, “Extension of the Interpersonal Adjective Scales to Include the Big Five Dimensions of Personality,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59 (1990): 781–790.

[13] MacDonald, “Love, Trust, and Evolution.”

[14] Jay Belsky, Laurence Steinberg, and Patricia Draper, “Childhood experience, interpersonal development, and reproductive strategy: An evolutionary theory of socialization,” Child Development 62 (1991): 647–670.

[15] Andreas Bartels and Semir Zeki, “The Neural Basis of Romantic Love,” NeuroReport 11, no. 17 (2000): 3829–3834.

[16] Trapnell and Wiggins, “Extension of the Interpersonal Adjective Scales to include the Big Five dimensions of personality.”

[17] Jerry S. Wiggins and Ross Broughton, “The Interpersonal Circle: A Structural Model for the Integration of Personality Research,” Perspectives in Personality 1 (1985): 1–47.

[18] American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders-5 (Washington DC, 2012).

[19] Martin L. Lalumiere and Vernon L. Quinsey, “Sexual Deviance, Antisociality, Mating Effort, and the Use of Sexually Coercive Behaviors,” Personality and Individual Differences. 21 (1996): 33–48.

[20] Robert D. Hare, Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) (2nd ed.) (Toronto: Multi-Health Systems, Inc., 2003).

[21] Andrea L. Glenn and Adrian Raine, “Psychopathy and Instrumental Aggression: Evolutionary, Neurobiological, and Legal Perspectives,” International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 32 (2009): 253–258.

[22] Aurelio J. Figueredo et al. “The Psychometric Assessment of Human Life History Strategy: A Meta-analytic Construct Validation,” Evolutionary Behavioral Sciences 8, no. 3 (2014): 148–185.

[23] Kevin MacDonald, Emily Patch, and Aurelio José Figueredo, “Love, Trust, and Evolution: Nurturance/Love and Trust as Two Independent Attachment Systems Underlying Intimate Relationships,” Psychology 7, no. 2 (2016): 238–253.

[24] Mary D. S. Ainsworth, Infancy in Uganda (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967); Robert A. LeVine and Sarah E. LeVine, “Parental Strategies among the Gusii of Kenya,” in Robert A. LeVine, Patrice M. Miller, and Mary Maxwell West (eds.), Parental Behavior in Diverse Societies (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1988): 28–35.

[25] MacDonald, “Effortful Control, Explicit Processing, and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions.”

[26] Ibid.

[27] Oliver P. John and Sanjay Srivastava, “The Big Five Trait Taxonomy: History, Measurement, and Theoretical Perspectives,” in Lawrence A. Pervin and Oliver P. John (Eds.), Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research, 2nd ed. (New York: Guilford Press: 102–138.

[28] Ibid., 121; italics in original

[29] Adrian Raine, “Psychophysiology and Antisocial Behavior: A Biosocial Perspective and a Prefrontal Dysfunction Hypothesis,” in Daniel M. Stoff, James Breiling, and Jack D. Maser (Eds.), Handbook of Antisocial Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1997): 289–304.

[30] MacDonald, “Effortful Control, Explicit Processing, and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions.”

[31] Lynn, Race Differences in Personality.

[32] Lynn notes that Asians are more likely to be willing to donate organs after death than Whites (intermediate) or Blacks (lowest), a finding that fits the general pattern of race differences in IQ and many other traits. However, donations after death are not really costs to the donor and may be influenced by religious beliefs, whereas charitable contributions while living are real costs. As a result, I emphasize the latter. The argument here is that because of the evolution of individualism and consequent elaboration of mechanisms related to personal attractiveness in White populations, race differences in Love/Nurturance do not follow the general pattern, i.e., East Asians, Whites, Africans.

[33] Nicolas Baumard, “Psychological Origins of the Industrial Revolution,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41 (September, 2018): 1–47.

[34] Randall Akee, Emelia Semeonova, E. Jane Costello, and William Copeland, “How Does Household Income Affect Child Personality Traits and Behaviors?, American Economic Review 108, no. 3 (2018): 775–827.

[35] Gregory Clark, A Farewell to Alms: A Brief Economic History of the World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

[36] Peter Frost and Henry Harpending, “Western Europe, Violence, and State Formation,” Evolutionary Psychology 13, no. 1 (January 2015): 230–243.

http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/147470491501300114#articleCitationDownloadContainer

[37] Chi-Yu Cheng, “The Chinese Theory of Criminal Law,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 39(4) (1948): 461-470; see also “Nine-Familial Exterminations,” Wikipedia.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nine_familial_exterminations

[38] C. Harry Hui and Harry Triandis, “Individualism-Collectivism: A Study of Cross-Cultural Researchers,” Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 17, no.2 (1986): 225–248.

The Psychology of Moral Communities, Part 2 of 5: Ethnocentrism and Its Control

Go to Part 1.

Controlling Ethnocentrism: Implicit and Explicit Processing

As noted in Chapter 5, psychological research indicates two different types of psychological processing: implicit and explicit processing. These modes of processing may be contrasted on a number of dimensions.[1] Implicit processing is automatic, effortless, relatively fast, and involves parallel processing (i.e., processing going on independently in different parts of the brain) of large amounts of information; it characterizes the modules described by evolutionary psychologists. Explicit processing is the opposite of implicit processing: conscious, controllable, effortful, relatively slow, and involves serial processing of relatively small amounts of information in a sequential manner (e.g., performing the steps of solving a math problem). Explicit processing is involved in the operation of the mechanisms of general intelligence[2] as well as controlling emotional states and action tendencies (such as anger or frustration tending lead to aggression).[3]

As noted in Chapter 5, religious beliefs are able to motivate behavior because of the ability of explicit representations of religious thoughts (e.g., the traditional Catholic teaching of eternal punishment in Hell as a result of mortal sin) to control sub-cortical modular mechanisms (e.g., sexual desire). In other words, the affective states and action tendencies mediated by evolved implicit processing are controllable by higher brain centers located in the cortex.[4] The same goes for ethnocentrism.

Being able to control impulses of any kind taps into the personality system of Conscientiousness, often labelled “effortful control” because it involves explicit, conscious effort to control impulses (see discussion below). Simply put, conscientious people are relatively better able to regulate the more evolutionarily ancient parts of our brain responsible for many of our passions and desires.

Why is this important for thinking about psychology and White ethnocentrism? Just as conscientious people can inhibit their natural tendencies toward aggression and sexual arousal, they are able to inhibit their natural ethnocentrism. The critical point in the following is that cultural information is of vital importance for enabling people to inhibit their ethnocentric tendencies. This cultural information relies on explicit processing and provides the basis for prefrontal inhibitory control of ethnocentrism.

The conclusion is that the control of ethnocentrism is a direct consequence of the control of cultural information. My book The Culture of Critique is an attempt to understand what happened after the highwater mark of the period of ethnic defense (~1870–1930) discussed in Chapter 6.[5] The rise of the new elite meant that explicit messages about race (e.g., “there’s no such thing as race”) and ethnocentrism (e.g., “White ethnocentrism is a sure sign of psychopathology and disturbed parent-child relationships) were being disseminated by the media and throughout the educational system. Especially since World War II, these messages have been consistently hostile to White ethnocentrism. And that in turn has meant that Whites have been encouraged to inhibit their natural ethnocentrism.

Moreover, as emphasized throughout this book, White people tend to be more individualistic than other peoples, implying that they are less likely than other peoples to make invidious distinctions between ingroups and outgroups and are more likely to be open to strangers and people who don’t look like them. Because Whites are low in ethnocentrism and high in Conscientiousness, controlling ethnocentrism is easier for them on average. Their subcortical mechanisms responsible for ethnocentrism are weaker to start with and hence easier to control.

There is considerable research on the roles of implicit and explicit processing in ethnocentrism and its control. Implicit attitudes on race can be measured, e.g., by performing brain scans when the subjects are looking at faces of people of different races.[6] On the other hand, explicit attitudes on race are typically assessed by filling out questionnaires which tap explicit processing. College student populations of Whites in the West typically exhibit pro-Black attitudes on tests of explicit attitudes. For example, one study found that Whites scored 1.89 on a six-point scale, with 1 meaning strongly pro-Black and 6 being strongly anti-Black.[7]

Another way to measure explicit attitudes is by interview. A recent representative sample of 2000 households found that a surprising 74 percent of Whites thought that racial identity was very important (37 percent) or somewhat important (37 percent).[8] In general, people become more racially conscious as they get older—only 53 percent claimed that racial identity was important while growing up. (I have noticed this also as a feature of Jewish identity.[9]) Even more surprising is the finding that 77 percent of Whites thought that Whites had a culture that should be preserved. However, despite asserting the legitimacy of White ethnic identity, only 4 percent of Whites claimed to be a member of an organization based on racial or ethnic identity. (This presumably includes organizations for, say, Scottish or Polish identity which are politically irrelevant in the American political context.) And 75 percent of Whites state that prejudice and discrimination are important or very important to African-American disadvantage.

In general, Blacks and other minorities have much stronger explicit ethnic identities than Whites do. For example, this same survey found that 90 percent of Blacks thought that racial identity was very important (72 percent) or somewhat important (18 percent), and 91 percent felt that Black culture was worth preserving. Blacks also demonstrate a substantially larger explicit ingroup preference than Whites.[10]

The gap between explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes is made possible by the inhibitory mechanisms of the prefrontal cortex. In one study, subjects were shown photos of Blacks and Whites while hooked up to a Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) machine that takes pictures of the brain in action.[11] When the photos were shown for very brief periods—too short to be consciously processed, the fMRIs showed that Whites had a negative response to the photos of Blacks. This procedure therefore measures implicit negative attitudes toward Blacks.

However, when the photos of Blacks were presented for a much longer period, so that they were consciously experienced, then the difference in reaction to Black and White faces decreased. This happened because the prefrontal region was activated. In other words, people who are consciously aware that they are seeing photos of Blacks are able to inhibit the automatic negative responses from the sub-cortex. Subjects who showed the most prefrontal activation showed the lowest subcortical response. This implies that they were better able to inhibit their negative attitudes toward Blacks.

This study (and there are other studies with similar findings) shows the importance of prefrontal inhibitory control over automatic negative attitudes of Whites toward Blacks. White ethnocentrism exists, but for most Whites, it exists only in a sort of underground world of unconscious, automatic processing: it is an ethnocentrism that dares not speak its name: As soon as the explicit, conscious processor swings into action, it acts to suppress the negative implicit attitudes coming from below so that the subject’s responses align better with the cultural norms of the social environment.[12]

Young children tend to have unabashedly explicit bias in favor of their own race. Explicit race bias emerges early, as young as age three or four, peaks in middle childhood, and then undergoes a gradual decline through adolescence, typically disappearing in adulthood.[13] However, there is no such decline in implicit racial preferences, which remain strong into adulthood.[14] There is also a decline in cross-racial friends and companions as children get older. White schoolchildren are much more likely to have White friends than chance would account for, and this trend increases as they get older.[15]

This means that even as explicit racial preference in White children is declining, they become less likely to actually interact with and form friendships with children from other races. In effect, schools undergo a process of self-segregation. And among adults, Whites are significantly less likely than other racial groups to report interracial friendships and contacts.[16]

The bottom line, then, is that as children get older, they become increasingly aware of the official explicit racial ideology, and they conform to it. Their prefrontal centers of inhibitory control are becoming stronger, so that they are better able to inhibit their implicitly generated negative thoughts about racial outgroups. At the explicit level, they are free from any negative attitudes toward non-White groups and may even be politically liberal or radical. At the same time, however, they are “voting with their feet” by choosing friends and companions of the same race.

And their parents are doing the same thing. Liberals show a greater gap between explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes and behavior than do conservatives. Moreover, while highly educated White parents tend to have liberal explicit attitudes on racial issues, including the desirability of school integration, these same highly educated Whites seek out schools that are racially segregated and are more likely to live in racially segregated neighborhoods. A 2018 article noted that for progressive parents, “more often than not, [their progressive] values lost out” when choosing a school.[17] Indeed, there is a positive correlation between the average education of White parents and the likelihood that they will remove their children from public schools as the percentage of Black students increases.[18] Michael Emerson, an author of the study, is quite aware of the gap between explicit attitudes and behavior: “I do believe that White people are being sincere when they claim that racial inequality is not a good thing and that they’d like to see it eliminated. However, … their liberal attitudes about race aren’t reflected in their behavior.”

The flip side of this is that less affluent Whites are more likely to have explicitly illiberal attitudes on racial issues that are condemned by elites. Yet they are also more likely to actually live in racially integrated areas and send their children to racially integrated schools, presumably due to financial constraints.

Implicit White Communities

Children’s choice of friends and parents’ choice of schools and neighborhoods reflect the raw reality of racial hypocrisy in the United States. These children and their parents are acting on their implicit attitudes, and there is a profound gap between their implicit attitudes and their behavior (which show ingroup racial preference) versus their explicit attitudes (which express the official ideology of racial egalitarianism). In effect, they are creating implicit White communities—implicit because even though these communities are an expression of (implicit) racial preferences, they cannot speak their name: Whites behaving in an implicitly White manner do not explicitly state that their friendship choices or their choice in neighbourhood or school derives from racial preference, because that conflicts with their explicit racial attitudes and with the official racial ideology of the wider culture.

White Americans are gradually coalescing into political and cultural affiliation as Whites, and this trend will continue to strengthen in the future as America ethnic diversity is more of a reality even away from the immigration centers on the East and West coasts and the southern border. But at present, this political and cultural affiliation is not yet consciously and explicitly White, at least partly because conscious White affiliation is a cultural taboo.

In the face of overwhelming sanctions on explicit assertions of White racial identity in the post-World War II world, Whites have adopted a variety of implicit identities which serve as the basis of White association and community. All of these identities exist under the radar of the political correctness enforced by elites in academia, politics, and the media: Republican political affiliation, NASCAR racing enthusiast, evangelical Christian, and country music fan. Each of these identities allow White people to associate with other Whites and even to form a White political base without any explicit acknowledgement that race plays a role.

Implicit White communities have become an increasingly important part of the American landscape as racial polarization increases due to the rise of identity politics—first among non-Whites (and encouraged by the left) but now clearly also among Whites as a reaction. The most important of these implicit White communities results from residential segregation due to White flight. As Kevin Kruse notes, “at the dawn of the twenty-first century, America found itself dominated by suburbs and those suburbs dominated by the politics of White flight and urban secession.”[19] “In the past, the hostility to the federal government, the welfare state, and taxation had been driven by racial resentment, whether in the form of segregationists inside Atlanta or secessionist suburbanites outside it. In the 1990s the new generation of suburban Republicans simply took the politics of White flight to the national stage.”[20]

As Kruse notes, race is never part of the explicit rhetoric of White flight, which tends to be expressed as opposition to the federal government, the welfare state, taxation, and perceived moral issues like abortion and homosexuality. But at the implicit level, the desire for White communities and the aversion to contributing to public goods disproportionately benefiting non-Whites are the overriding motivations.

White flight is part of the fragmented future that lies in store for the U.S. and other Western countries with high levels of non-European immigration. It is a well-established finding that the more ethnically mixed a population becomes, the greater is its resistance to redistributive policies.[21] For example, a study of donations to the United Way of America charity found that White Americans give less when their communities are more than 10 percent non-White. Robert D. Putnam recently showed that greater racial diversity of a community is associated with a loss of trust.[22] Putnam’s result is confirmed by studies conducted at the local community level[23] and, given the recent surge in ethnic diversity, by recent survey data according to which 71 percent of Americans believe that trust in fellow citizens has declined in the last 20 years.[24] Moreover, people are found to be happier living among fellow ethnics than as an ethnic minority.[25] White people living in relatively homogeneous areas like New Hampshire or Montana are more involved with friends, the community, and politics than people in more diverse areas.[26]

At the political level, implicit Whiteness is also reflected in Howard Dean’s famous comment that the Republican Party is the party of White Christians.[27] Non-White ethnic groups tend to vote Democrat even when they have relatively high socioeconomic status, while working class Whites tend to vote Republican—a good indication that this pattern results from identity politics rather than economics. The long-term trend is that since 1992, the Republican share of the White vote has been increasing 1½ percent every four years. Moreover,

it seems a bit touchy to assume that Republicans will max out at around 60 percent of the White vote. This might be the case, but … it’s entirely possible that as our nation becomes more diverse, our political coalitions will increasingly fracture along racial/ethnic lines rather than ideological ones.[28]

Another implicit White community is NASCAR racing, which strongly overlaps with evangelical Christianity, country music, and small-town American culture, particularly that of the South. A famous Mike Luckovich cartoon that appeared in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution shows a Black man and a White man talking with a Confederate flag flying in the background. “We need a flag that isn’t racist … but preserves White southern culture…” The next panel shows a NASCAR checkered flag. The implicit/explicit distinction could not be more obvious. Ninety-four percent of the NASCAR fan base is White, compared to 92 percent for another implicitly White sport, professional hockey.[29]

A large part of the attraction of NASCAR is a desire for traditional American culture. NASCAR events are permeated with sentimental patriotism, prayers, military flyovers, and postrace fireworks. As sociologist Jim Wright notes, “just about everything … you encounter in a day at the track drips with traditional Americana.”[30]

However, “race is the skeleton in the NASCAR Family closet. On the tracks and in the stands, stock-car racing remains a White-person’s sport.” The Whiteness of NASCAR races can be seen from a comment that, after surveying the crowd at the 1999 Daytona 500, “there were probably about as many Confederate flags here as Black people”—i.e., fewer than forty out of a crowd of approximately 200,000.[31] “The near-universal discrediting of the Stars and Bars as a politically incorrect, if not racist, symbol has obviously not yet reached every Winston Cup fan. Either that, or they just don’t care. And, as you might imagine, there was no pussyfooting or self-flagellation about the point among fans at the Southern 500, which was adorned by a profusion of Confederate flags the likes of which I had not witnessed at any other track.”[32]

Wright stresses the link of NASCAR to traditional small town and rural American culture and its links to outdoor pursuits like hunting, fishing, camping, and guns.[33] There is a large overlap between NASCAR fans and gun ownership. There is also a strong Christian religious atmosphere: Races begin with a benediction and a prayer. There is “a visible Christian fellowship” in NASCAR, including entire teams that identify themselves publicly as Christian teams; many of the drivers actively participate in Christian ministry.[34] Other values in evidence are courage in the face of danger—another throwback to traditional American culture, deriving ultimately from the Scots-Irish culture of the English-Scottish border: “As we enter the third decade of women’s liberation and the second decade of the post-communist era, we’ve come to expect, even demand more sensitivity and empathy in our men than bravado or grit, and the traditional manly virtues of courage, bravery, and ‘guts’ strike many as anachronistic at best, even dangerous and moronic.”[35],[36]

While NASCAR is a White sport, the NBA is widely perceived to be a Black sport. Whites, especially nonurban Whites, are a decreasing audience for the NBA, and in general Whites spend the least percentage of time watching NBA games of all U.S. racial/ethnic groups.[37] Moreover, NBA culture is seen as African-American, and the response of the NBA has been to attempt to make the NBA look more like White America in order to restore its fan base. Sports writer Gary Peterson notes that

for decades there has been a racial divide between NBA players (mostly Black) and the paying customers (largely White). That divide has become a flashpoint over the past 15 years. … Never before have the players seemed so unlike the fans. This divide is the top concern at the league office—even ahead of declining free throw shooting and baggy shorts. For proof you need look no further than the league-wide dress code NBA commissioner David Stern imposed last season. It was an extraordinary step—he might as well have told the players, “Quit dressing like typical young, urban African-Americans. You’re scaring the fans.”[38]

Besides banning ostentatious gold chains and mandating business casual attire, the NBA has also handed out draconian penalties for fighting among players. This is because fighting fits into the image of urban, African-American culture. Fines are $50,000 for throwing a punch plus possible suspension (implying loss of pay).[39] It’s interesting therefore that Major League Baseball does not have similar penalties for fighting and indeed, MLB tweeted about a brawl between the Yankees and the Red Sox—in effect, advertising it. The obvious explanation is that the NBA is anxious to avoid the stereotype of Black urban thugs because of its image as a Black sport (80 percent of the players are Black), while MLB has no need to do that because it is not seen as a Black sport.[40]

The point is not that the NBA is more violent than, say, professional hockey—a largely White sport that is notorious for fighting. Rather, the NBA is conscious of racial stereotyping processes among Whites. Part of NASCAR’s attraction for Whites is that it is an implicit White community. By regulating dress and conduct, the NBA seems to be trying to make the NBA more attractive to Whites despite the racial composition of its players.

Managing White Ethnocentrism: The Problem with Non-Explicit White Identity

White people are clearly coalescing into implicit White communities that reflect their ethnocentrism but “dare not speak its name.” They are often doing so because of the operation of various mechanisms that operate implicitly, below the level of conscious awareness. These White communities cannot assert explicit White identities because the explicit cultural space is deeply committed to an ideology in which any explicit assertion of White identity is anathema. Explicit culture operates in the conscious prefrontal centers able to control the subcortical regions of the brain.

This implies that the control of culture is of critical importance. The story of how this explicit cultural space came to be and whose interests it serves is the topic of my book, The Culture of Critique, combined with the material in this volume on European individualism: these cultural transformations are the result of a complex interaction between pre-existing deep-rooted tendencies of Europeans (individualism, moral universalism, and science) and the rise of a new elite hostile to the traditional peoples and culture of Europe.[41] The result has been a “culture of critique” that represents the triumph of the leftist movements that have dominated twentieth-century intellectual and political discourse in the West, especially since the 1960s. The fundamental assumptions of these leftist movements, particularly as they relate to race and ethnicity, permeate intellectual and political discourse among both liberals and mainstream conservatives and define a consensus among elites in academia, the media, business, and government.

Because implicit ethnocentrism is alive and well among Whites and affects their behavior in subtle ways (implicit Whiteness), one might suppose that Whites are in fact able to pursue their interests even against the prevailing wind of the explicit culture of powerful anti-White social controls and ideologies. The problem, however, is that White ethnic identity and interests can be managed as long as they remain only at the implicit level. In general, implicit White communities conform, outwardly at least, to the official multicultural ideology and adopt conventional attitudes and rhetoric on racial and ethnic issues. This allows them to escape the scrutiny of cultural elites that enforce conventional attitudes on racial and ethnic issues. However, it renders them powerless to promote issues that vitally affect their ethnic interests actively and explicitly.

A good example is non-White immigration. During the 2016 presidential campaign and since Donald Trump’s election, there has been much discussion of immigration stemming from Trump’s proposed policies aimed at preventing illegal immigration. His rhetoric tapped into a very large reservoir of public anger about the lack of control of our borders and, I think, the transformations that immigration in general—legal and illegal—is unleashing. Indeed, his rhetoric on immigration may well have been responsible for his election. Although it is common for proponents of illegal immigration to label their opponents “racists,” the fact that illegal immigration is, after all, illegal has made it easy for mainstream conservatives to oppose it without mentioning their racial interests.

This contrasts with the tendency within the establishment media—from far left to neoconservative, libertarian right—of presenting little or no discussion of the over one million legal immigrants who come to the U.S. every year—no discussion of their effect on the economy, social services, crime, or competition at elite universities; no discussion of their effect on the long-term ethnic composition of the U.S. and how this will affect the political interests of Whites as they head toward minority status; no discussion of the displacement of native populations in various sectors of the economy; and no discussion of whether most Americans really want all of this. Indeed, it has been quite common for high-profile conservative opponents of illegal immigration to assert their support for legal immigration as a means of dodging the charge of “racism,” although many are also in thrall to business interests wanting cheap labor. While assertions of ethnic interests by non-Whites are a commonplace aspect of the American political and intellectual scene, mainstream explicit assertions of ethnic interests by Whites have been missing since the 1920s (see Chapter 6).

The result is that leftist ideologies of race and ethnicity have become part of conventional morality and intellectual discourse even within implicitly White communities. As a result, such communities are unable to oppose the forces changing the country in ways that oppose their long-term interest. Because there is no mainstream attempt by Whites to shape the explicit culture in ways that would legitimize White identity and the pursuit of White ethnic interests, implicit White communities become enclaves of retreating, resentful Whites rather than communities able to consciously pursue White interests.

Bottom line: The creation of an explicit culture legitimizing White identity and interests is a prerequisite to the successful pursuit of the interests of Whites as a group.

End of Part 2.


[1] See, e.g.: David C. Geary, The Origin of Mind: Evolution of Brain, Cognition, and General Intelligence (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2005); Kevin MacDonald, “Effortful Control, Explicit Processing and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions,” Psychological Review 115, no. 4 (2008): 1012–1031; Keith Stanovich, Who is Rational? Studies of Individual Differences in Reasoning (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1999); Keith Stanovich The Robot’s Rebellion: Finding Meaning in the Age of Darwin (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004).

[2] Dan Chiappe and Kevin B. MacDonald, “The Evolution of Domain-General Mechanisms in Intelligence and Learning.” Journal of General Psychology 132, no. 1 (2005): 5–40.

[3] MacDonald, “Effortful Control, Explicit Processing, and the Regulation of Human Evolved Predispositions.”

[4] Kevin MacDonald, “Evolution and a Dual Processing Theory of Culture: Applications to Moral Idealism and Political Philosophy,” Politics and Culture (Issue, #1, April, 2010; unpaginated); see also Kevin MacDonald, “Evolution, Psychology, and a Conflict Theory of Culture,” Evolutionary Psychology 7, no. 2 (2009): 208–233.

[5] MacDonald, The Culture of Critique.

[6] Another method of assessing implicit attitudes is use of the Implicit Attitudes Test (IAT) in which subjects are presented with photos of Blacks and Whites in succession and asked to pair positive or negative words (e.g., “intelligent,” “law-abiding,” “poor,” “success”) with the photos. Eighty percent of Whites take longer to associate positive words with Blacks than with Whites. This is interpreted as indicating that Whites have implicit negative stereotypes of Blacks.

Recently, the results of the IAT showing that people higher on the IAT are more likely to engage in discrimination have been called into question. However, these findings do not reflect on studies that do not focus on discrimination; nor do they affect studies based on brain scans.

For a good summary of the controversies surrounding the IAT, see Jesse Singal, “Psychology’s Racism-Measuring Tool Isn’t Up to the Job,” The Cut (January, 2017).

https://www.thecut.com/2017/01/psychologys-racism-measuring-tool-isnt-up-to-the-job.html

[7] Elizabeth A. Phelps, et al., “Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation,” Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 12 (2000): 729–738.

[8] Paul C. Croll, Douglas Hartmann, and Joseph Gerteis, “Putting Whiteness Theory to the Test: An Empirical Assessment of Core Theoretical Propositions,” unpublished manuscript, Department. of Sociology, University of Minnesota American Mosaic Project (2006).

[9] I describe several cases in my trilogy on Judaism, such as Heinrich Heine; see Kevin MacDonald, Separation and Its Discontents, Ch. 2, n. 9.

[10] Brian A. Nosek, Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Anthony G. Greenwald, “Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs from a Demonstration Web Site,” Group Dynamics 6 (2002): 101–115.

[11] William A. Cunningham, et al., “Separable Neural Components in the Processing of Black and White Faces,” Psychological Science 15 (2004): 806–813.

[12] A similar study explains what happens when people confront controversial issues related to race and ethnicity. White subjects were shown pictures of a smiling interracial couple and then told that their response to the photo indicated that they were prejudiced. After being told this, subjects took much longer to respond to later photos. This is interpreted as being due to subjects trying to consciously control their responses to the photos. The photo serves as a “cue for control”—a warning that “the situation is one in which prejudiced responses may occur and that the brakes need to be applied to ongoing behavior.”

Margo J. Monteith, Leslie Ashburn-Nardo, Corrine. I. Voils, and Alexander M. Czopp. “Putting the Brakes on Prejudice: On the Development and Operation of Cues for Control,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83 (2002): 1029–1050, 1046.

[13] Frances Aboud, Children and Prejudice (New York: Blackwell, 1988); Martha Augoustinos and Dana Louise Rosewarne, “Stereotype Knowledge and Prejudice in Children,” British Journal of Developmental Psychology 19 (2001): 143–156.

[14] Yarrow Dunham, Andrew S. Baron, and Mahzarin R. Banaji, “From American City to Japanese Village: A Cross-Cultural Study of Implicit Racial Attitudes,” Child Development 77 (2006): 1268–1281.

[15] James Moody, “Race, school integration and friendship segregation in America,” American Journal of Sociology 107 (2002): 679–716.

[16] Michael O. Emerson, Rachel Talbert Kimbro, and George. Yancey, “Contact Theory Extended: The Effects of Prior Racial Contact on Current Social Ties,” Social Science Quarterly 83 (2002): 745–761.

[17] Margaret A. Hagerman, “White Progressive Parents and the Conundrum of Privilege,” Los Angeles Times (September 30, 2018).

http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-hagerman-White-parents-20180930-story.html

[18] David Sikkunk and Michael O. Emerson, “School Choice and Racial Segregation in U.S. Schools: The Role of Parents’ Education,” Racial and Ethnic Studies 31 (2008): 267–293.

[19] Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 259.

[20] Ibid., 263.

[21] Frank Salter (ed.), Welfare, Ethnicity, and Altruism: New Data and Evolutionary Theory (London: Taylor & Francis, 2005).

[22] Putnam, “E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century”; recent literature: Salter, “The Biosocial Study of Ethnicity”; Peter Thisted Dinesen, Merlin Schaefer, and Kim Mannemar Sønderskov, “Social Trust: A Narrative and Meta-analytical Review,” Annual Review of Political Science 23 (2020), in press. Preprint:

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/335924797_Ethnic_Diversity_and_Social_Trust_A_Narrative_and_Meta-Analytical_Review

[23] See Salter, “The Biosocial Study of Ethnicity.”

[24] “The State of Personal Trust,” Pew Research Center (July 22, 2019).

https://www.people-press.org/2019/07/22/the-state-of-personal-trust/

[25] Salter, “The Biosocial Study of Ethnicity.”

[26] Steve Sailer, “Fragmented Future: Multiculturalism Doesn’t Make Vibrant Communities but Defensive Ones,” The American Conservative (January 1, 2007).

[27] Shailagh Murray, “Dean’s Words Draw Democratic Rebukes,” The Washington Post (June 9, 2005).

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/08/AR2005060800650_pf.html

[28] Sean Trende, “Does the GOP Have to Pass Immigration Reform?,” Real Clear Politics (June 25, 2013).

[29] “Demographics of Sports Fans,” Demographic Partitions.org (July 10, 2017).

http://demographicpartitions.org/demographics-of-sports-fans-u-s/

[30] Jim Wright, Fixin’ to Git: One Fan’s Love Affair with NASCAR’s Winston Cup (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 35.

[31] Ibid., 83.

[32] Ibid., 141.

Wright’s book was published in 2002. Since then, the Confederate flag has been less in evidence and there have been efforts to minimize its presence. In 2015 Brian France, Chairman of NASCAR, called the flag an “offensive symbol,” and asked, but did not require, that it not be shown. Some well-known drivers have discouraged it. In 2019 NASCAR rejected an ad for a semiautomatic rifle. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that NASCAR is any less an implicit White community.

Mike Hembree, “NASCAR Fans: Confederate Flag Still Important Symbol,” USA Today (August 8, 2017).

Awr Hawkins, “NASCAR Shifts on Guns, Rejects Ad Showing Semiautomatic Rifle” Breitbart (September 09, 2019).

[33] Ibid., 156.

[34] Ibid., 37.

[35] Ibid., 156.

[36] Country music is also an implicit White community: The vast majority of people [over 90 percent] who listen to country music on a regular basis are White, while only 3 percent of Hispanics and 5 percent of African-Americans say that they prefer country music to other genres of music.

Brandon Gaille, “49 Curious Country Music Demographics” (May 9, 2016).

https://brandongaille.com/46-curious-country-music-demographics/

[37] “Hoop Dreams: Multicultural Diversity in NBA Viewership” (February 26, 2915).

http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2015/hoop-dreams-multicultural-diversity-in-nba-viewership.html

[38] Gary Peterson, “Brawl puts glaring spotlight on NBA,” Contra Costa Times (Dec. 22, 2007).

[39] Gabe Fernandez, “Baseball Fights Highlight a Double Standard in Sports Perception,” The Sporting News (April 12, 2018).

http://www.sportingnews.com/us/mlb/news/baseball-fights-yankees-red-sox-nba-brawls-players-double-standard/15e4ngugjbiv217ebzyvhzeia8

[40] Ibid.

[41] MacDonald, The Culture of Critique.