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How diversity and immigration annihilated historical Poland

July 18, 2023/8 Comments/in Featured Articles/by Jacek Szela

6618 words

Few countries, if any, have had their borders redrawn so many times and so thoroughly. Few nations, if any, have been entombed for more than a century, subjugated and humiliated, and resurrected. I intend to tell you a story about how immigration and diversity annihilated a nation’s statehood and almost obliterated a nation. I will tell you a story of Poland, a story of a nation that accepted and accommodated huge numbers of Germans, Jews and Russians (Ukrainians), which fact gradually and unavoidably led to the nation’s obliteration from political maps.

[Since generally Slavica non leguntur [Slavic languages are not widely read], I assume the Western reader knows nothing or next to nothing about Central Europe, about such countries as Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Hungary, Romania or Bulgaria, which is why I make oversimplifications and approximations to show a broad picture.]

Introduction

Take a look at the present-day political map of Europe and find Poland. Yes, it is this area between the Oder River to the West and the Bug (/book/) River to the East, between the Baltic Sea to the north and the Sudeten/Western Carpathian Mountains to the south. This territory roughly falls into six big parts (names are Latinized or Anglicized, as usually accepted in English historical publications):

The Baltic Sea

Pomerania Masuria
Greater Poland Mazovia
Silesia Lesser Poland

Sudeten/Carpathian Mountains

Image preview

Pomorze = Pomerania, Prusowie = Masuria (later Prussia), Wielkopolska = Greater Poland, Mazowsze = Mazovia, Śląsk = Silesia, Małopolska = Lesser Poland

Scroll the site down to the very end and see how Polish territory kept changing dramatically and notice that the geographical shape of present-day Poland overlaps to a very large degree with the initial shape a thousand years ago.

More than a thousand years ago the Polish state emerged as if from nowhere into history: the year was 966, the year of the nation’s Christian baptism, with only two or three dates known from German or Czech annals that recorded events connected with Poland prior to 966. Within the first three or four centuries of its existence, Poland – now a principality, now a kingdom, now split into a few principalities as political circumstances allowed – occupied the areas of Pomerania, Greater Poland, Lesser Poland, Silesia and Lesser Poland, roughly overlapping with today’s state area, experiencing constant but relatively slight border changes. The only area not occupied by the Slavic tribes was that of Masuria, which was inhabited by Old Prussians (not to be confused with German Prussians that most of us are familiar with [see below]), a people ethnically and linguistically related to neighbouring Lithuanians. To the east, medieval Poland bordered on Rus’ (again, now one big principality, now several principalities). No Belarus or Ukraine as political entities were known at that time. Just as it is today, the Western Carpathian Mountains separated Poland from what today is known as Slovakia, while across the Sudeten Mountains Poland was bordered by Czechia (in medieval annals and chronicles as well as in present-day historical literature referred to as Bohemia). Thus, medieval neighbours of Poland were – apart from Old Prussians – the same as they are today, with one exception: there was no Germany, no German principality or kingdom across the Oder: these territories (approximately the area of the former German Democratic Republic) were occupied by Western Slavs, who still survive in very small numbers in East Germany in the area around Dresden and Leipzig (toponyms of Slavic origin!)) and are known as Sorbs (think of Serbs in the Balkans!) and Lusatians. Today, names of towns and villages along with names of streets in this area are given in German and simultaneously Sorbian or Lusatian.

Survey names of towns and villages in a detailed map of East Germany: you will discover  Slavic-sounding toponyms. Many of them end in -ow (compare Kraków, anglicized Cracow, Poland’s second largest city), and their strangeness to the German ear is marked by the fact that in German pronunciation their final w is silent. A rather well-known neighbourhood in Berlin that goes by the name of Pankow is pronounced PAHN-kaw. The same is true of German surnames of Slavic origin ending in -ow.

Also, German names in -witz correspond to the Slavic/Polish toponymic ending -ice /eetzeh/, and they are commonly found in East Germany.

Now the linguistic icing on the cake: Germany’s capital city is a Slavic name par excellence! Without resorting to complicated linguistic analysis, consider this simple observation: unlike other “truly” German toponyms, the name Berlin is stressed on the last syllable (not only in German, but also in English). Why? Because Slavs would stress the penultimate syllable irrespective of the form of the word. First German settlers, colonisers or conquerors would hear the name Berlin mostly in grammatical cases other than the nominative because we usually say phrases like I live in Berlin, I go to Berlin, I left Berlin etc. rather than This is Berlin. These other grammatical cases (Slavic languages are highly inflectional; if you know Latin, you get the idea) added a syllable to the name Berlin and the added syllable drew the stress from BER- to -LIN because stress always falls on the last-but-one syllable. The German settlers, colonisers or conquerors would adopt the toponym, without however adopting its grammatical endings as they meant nothing to them, and so Berlin ended up being pronounced as ber-LIN. It goes for all other Germanized names in Eastern Germany, like for instance Schwerin, a large port on the Baltic Sea.

Excuse this longish aside. It was intended to impress upon the reader how big the ethnic changes can be throughout centuries. By way of comparison, names of numerous villages and towns in England retell roughly the history of the many peoples that settled there; consider the Spanish names in southern United States or the toponyms of Indian origin in all of the United States.

Germans

The territories west of the Oder did not belong to medieval Poland, but they were certainly no part of medieval Germany, either. They might have become part of Poland due to ethnic closeness, but they did not; rather, western and northern parts of Poland became Germany. How did it come about?

The Slavic territories West of the Oder were successively conquered and colonised by the Germans, to which end Germans even created special administrative units whose task it was to carry out the process. Medieval Poland tried – weakly – to compete for influence over these territories but was compelled to give up. Westernmost Slavs were slowly but surely subjugated, nationally deracinated or ethnically cleansed. At this juncture the reader will not be surprised to know that there is an appreciable Slavic genetic component among present-day Germans.

Let us consider now Poland proper. Within three centuries from the inception of Polish statehood, Silesia and Pomerania (see the graph above) became German along with Masuria (which was originally inhabited by Old Prussians). You might think such huge ethnic changes must have taken place as a result of a war or – still better – a series of wars. How otherwise do you lose territory? Nothing of the sort happened. In the 12th century, Poland disintegrated into a few principalities, which was the usual phenomenon in medieval feudal Europe (think about the complicated interdependencies between kings, princes, dukes and barons of France and England). Silesian and Pomeranian princes, either greedy for profit or compelled by circumstances, began to voluntarily import German settlers; they also began marrying mainly German princesses. It is of some interest to survey the list of names of Silesian princes: such common Slavic names as Mieszko /MYESH-kaw/, Bolesław /baw-LESS-wahf/, Kazimierz /kah-ZEE-myesh/or Władysław /vwah-DISS-wahf/ were replaced by Heinrich and Konrad. Sure enough, German wives to those Heinrichs and Konrads raised generations of new Heinrichs and Konrads and imbued them with German culture. The trickling German settlement metastasized throughout Silesia or Pomerania – slowly, very slowly – and yet after three or so centuries both provinces eventually lost their Slavic/Polish identity. The name of Silesia’s capital city of Wrocław /VRAWTS-wahf/ was Germanized into Breslau (compare letter with letter and sound with sound in the two language versions of the toponym), while the Baltic port of Szczecin /SHCHEH-chin/ became Stettin (with the stress on the last syllable! just as Berlin). That’s it. Wave after wave after another wave of immigration and the area was lost to Poland for centuries, till 1945. No war was waged over those territories and, indeed, none was needed. Demographics decided all.

Another medieval Polish prince, the one who ruled over Mazovia (see graph above), had trouble with Old Prussians who would make military inroads into his territory. Since the prince was incapable of fending off the threat for himself, on the advice of one of those German princesses married to a Silesian prince, he invited and settled on a piece of his own territory (1226) the Teutonic Knights to do the job for him. Prior to this event the Teutonic Knights or the Teutonic Order known formally as the Order of Brothers of the German House of Saint Mary in Jerusalem had been in trouble. Established in the Holy Land (c. 1190) for the fight against Muslims, when eventually the Christian states had been vanquished by the Muslims, they needed to relocate to Europe and search for land. At first, the Order was invited by a Hungarian monarch to fight the peoples which made inroads into Hungary from the east. The Hungarian monarch was not slow to notice that the Teutonic Order was more after grabbing Hungarian land than defending Hungary against aliens, so he expelled them in no time before they became too strong. (It must run in Hungarian blood to sense the threat immigrants pose: think of Viktor Orban.) The Polish prince proved to be a dupe: he had the Order settle down on his territory – in today’s parlance, he helped the poor immigrants who had been expelled from both the Holy Land and Hungary – and trusted them beyond measure.

The first unit of the Teutonic Knights was made up of… seven (7) men. They built a wooden! castle and called it Vogelsang (=Birdsong). How nice! How innocuous! It took the German knights (with ever growing numbers of them) fifty years to entirely destroy Old Prussians and to establish in Masuria a state of their own, now threatening not only the part of Poland called Mazovia, whose ruler had invited them, but also the whole rest of Poland. When the Polish kingdom was recreated out of Lesser Poland, Greater Poland and the eastern part of Pomerania (the western part of Pomerania and Silesia had dropped off, Germanized as described above), the Teutonic Order conquered the eastern part of Pomerania and held it for over a century and a half. Thus, within three-four centuries Poland lost two component provinces due to immigration to which her rulers had consented.

Another aside. Whenever the European Union presses Poland into accepting immigrants, there is some opposition to it among the ruling circles. If some of them are about to cave in to the EU demands, they keep arguing that they are willing to accommodate a limited number of immigrants providing they are Christians. It only shows for the umpteenth time that history teaches us nothing. The Teutonic Order, Germans in general, Russians and Ukrainians were all Christian and still, and despite that, they all posed the greatest existential threat to Poland throughout centuries.

Consider far-reaching consequences of the ethnic changes taking place on Polish territory not only for Poland, but also for Europe and – dare I say it – for the world. Take a look at the map. Yes, you see a German state in Masuria, a German state in Pomerania and a German state in Silesia. Combine them mentally and – if you are knowledgeable about history – you will recognize the geographic contours of the Prussian state of the 18th and 19th centuries, the state that later united the whole of Germany. The Polish Corridor i.e. the strip of land connecting Poland with the Baltic Sea with its port of Gdańsk/Danzig was a constant bone of contention between German Prussia and later the Third Reich on the one hand, and Poland on the other. It was a matter of either–or. Either Poland has access to the sea, which means that the German state is split, or German territory is integral, which means that Poland is cut off from the sea. That was the primary cause of the partitions of Poland (of which later), that was the cause of the beginning of the Second World War.

In the inter-war period of 1918–1939, Poland had a significant German minority, and Germany had a significant Polish minority. That fact was used by the Third Reich to pressure Warsaw into submissive cooperation with Berlin or else. Obviously, Poland was accused of suppressing the minorities, a trump card always used by interfering powers. In 1945, the old Polish territories were reclaimed (thanks to the Red Army) and the province of East Prussia also known as Masuria was incorporated into Poland. The incorporation of Silesia, Pomerania and Masuria was accompanied with the expulsion of the entire German population. The result? Absolutely no ethnic problems with the German minority ever since because it was… non-existent.

To sum up: German immigrants, invited by Polish rulers, Germanized some of the Polish territories and also established a German state in a place separated from Germany proper by a strip of land belonging to Poland. Those Germanized Polish territories plus the area once inhabited by Old Prussians gave rise to the Prussian state. The state was the most militaristic of the German states: after all, it originated from the Teutonic Order, an order of professional soldiers. Without German Prussia, without the Polish Corridor, Poland would not have been annihilated (of which later), Germany would have been significantly smaller and weaker, and – who knows? – World War One and World War Two might not have happened, at least in the form we know from history.

Jews

In the 13th and 14th centuries large influxes of Jews began to settle in medieval Poland with the connivance of Polish princes. Wherever in Europe Jews were not welcome, they found their way to Poland. Medieval princes would invite them en masse with one of the kings having a Jewish lover who is supposed to have acted upon him for the benefit of her compatriots. Jews soon started to play a big role in Polish history, which is corroborated by the fact that towards the end of the 12th century there must have already been well-established Jewish bankers as many of the coins issued at that time bore legends in Hebraic, which was quite a unique phenomenon in the Europe of that time. The Jewish diaspora on Polish lands was constantly on the increase and it received a number of privileges from consecutive rulers, allowing them much autonomy. In the centuries to come, Jews would create their own communities and – with the permission from the Crown – they would have their own parliament! that existed for approximately three centuries: it was this parliament rather than the parliament of the kingdom that decided about the level of taxation and the Jewish parliament levied taxes on Jewish communities.

What did Jews do for a living? Apart from residing in their own little towns and villages – kind of ghettos or no-go zones of that time – and dealing in trade, typically they acted as intermediaries between the aristocracy and the peasantry. Their favourite professions was running inns and tax farming, which alienated them from Polish and later Russian (of which more below) subjects of the kingdom. When an enemy penetrated the country, they kept neutral at best: after all, they were an alien body and remained indifferent to whether they were ruled by Poles or Swedes or Germans or Russians. This, too, did not ingratiate them with the Polish nation.

The number of Jews grew constantly, which had its consequences in later centuries down to the 2oth century. After Poland had been partitioned by its neighbours – Prussia, Russia and Austria (1772–1795) – the huge Jewish community found itself in the various states as large minorities. Russia’s ruling elites soon found out that the influence of the Jewish communities on the Russian peasantry was destructive: the Jews – as said above – ran inns, and enriched themselves selling alcohol to the peasantry and giving loans. Many peasants hooked on alcohol would pledge their not-yet grown crops to receive money. Hence the idea of the government to limit Jewish influence by confining them to the area in which they could live and run their businesses, known as the Pale of Settlement. Jews would come to resent this restriction, and some of them would later go to great lengths to undermine Russian statehood which they perceived as hostile toward them. Now the Pale of Settlement was a huge chunk of territory, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Seas: it was not a ghetto in any sense of the word. But there you have it.

Jews constituted a nation within a nation, in Poland, a state within a state, and lived separately from the rest of society. There were at that time many German immigrants who settled in towns: these, as a rule, would have been Polonized within two or three generations. It was hardly the case with the Jews, most of whom did not speak Polish at all or spoke it badly. This separation was very much due to their faith – one of the surest factors anywhere, if treated seriously, counteracting the forces of assimilation.

No wonder then that when in the second half of 18th century there erupted a Jewish sectarian movement headed by Jacob Frank, who advocated the adoption of Catholicism and reconciliation with the Christian majority, the Polish gentry and of course clergy were more than positively excited. As a result, Jews who decided to convert to Catholicism were automatically recognized as part of the gentry! This was an act of ethnic aberration on the part of the Polish nobility, who regarded their own peasantry – their ethnic kith and kin – as little more than cattle, but adored Jews the moment the latter turned Christian! This phenomenon also demonstrates the power of any ideology or religion. Since that time, Jews have worked their way into the Polish middle class, later becoming doctors and lawyers and scholars who were referred to as assimilated or Polonized Jews.

One of the honorifics assigned to Austrian emperors was that of King of Jerusalem. Emperor Joseph II Habsburg, after southern parts of Poland had been joined to his monarchy, made a tour of the new lands and was so shocked at seeing so many Jews there that he is reputed to have said: Now I understand why I bear the title of the King of Jerusalem! The same monarch seeing the pernicious influence of the Jews on the peasantry forced them administratively to give up on the buying-and-selling business and tried to make them till the soil. Correspondingly, twenty thousand Jewish families were granted plots of land across that part of Poland that had been incorporated into the Habsburg monarchy. Within a few years almost all of the Jewish families sold their property and reverted to trade, money lending and running village inns. Talk of the ethnic deep-wired characteristics!

When Poland regained its independence in 1918 after 123 years of political non-existence, its Jewish minority made up 3 million against the overall number of 35 million citizens. To put it into perspective: the 1938 Munich Agreement tore away the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia because it was inhabited by 3 million Germans. True, unlike in Czechoslovakia, where the Sudeten Germans (descendants of German colonists from the Middle Ages invited there by Czech monarchs[!] to boost the Czech economy) lived compactly in Sudetenland with but few Czechs among them, Jews in Poland were scattered around the country, living both in towns and in small settlements, of which those that were majority Jewish bore the generic Yiddish/German denomination of Stettl (German for little town or Städlein).

In the years 1918–1939 nothing much changed. Many Jews did not speak Polish or spoke it badly, they continued to constitute a state within a state though officially all citizens were endowed with the same rights and obligations. Their community split into those who either had been assimilated or wanted assimilation and those who felt little or no loyalty toward the Polish state. Resentment born of the feeling of alienation and – as they called it and continue to call it – Polish antisemitism induced many of the Jews to work against the Polish state within national Jewish organizations or as majority members of a political structure ironically called the Communist Party of Poland.

There was constant tension between the Polish and Jewish nations. Jews were satisfied with owning most of the property while leaving to Poles the trappings of sovereignty, which found its expression in the saying addressed by Jews to Poles: yours are the (names of the) streets, ours are neighbourhoods (i.e. the possession of real estate). In pre-war newspapers, ads were frequently posted by Polish entrepreneurs to the tune of informing the Polish reader that: The shop/bakery/barber’s/depot etc. located at Street X is owned by a Jew. Nothing more, nothing less. The conscious Polish patriot understood the message.

At this juncture one might ask why Jews possessed property/real estate and Poles did not. Part of the answer lies in Polish patriotism. After each national uprising, Russians would confiscate the property of the insurrectionists and sell it to either Russians or wealthy Jews.

World War Two saw two dramatic developments in Polish-Jewish relations. In 1939, it was not only Germany that invaded Poland (September 1), but also Soviet Russia (September 17).  Jews in the Western parts of the country naively welcomed the aggressor: after all, when Germans had occupied Polish territories during World War One, they had not done any harm to the local Jews. Jews in the eastern part of Poland welcomed with enthusiasm the Red Army, soon were given administrative posts and were active in identifying and persecuting Polish patriots. The divide between the two nations could not be bigger.

In German-occupied Poland, Jews began to be isolated in ghettos and generally persecuted, with some Poles remaining indifferent to the fact, and with others – including some of the ardent pre-war anti-Semites – trying to extend to them a helping hand. The latter act was extremely dangerous, as in occupied Poland and only in occupied Poland such an act was punishable by the physical extermination of the whole family.

As the Red Army rolled over Poland in 1945, it was accompanied by a small Polish army, formed from the Polish citizens that inhabited pre-war eastern Poland or citizens who had been deported by the Soviets into Russia or Kazakhstan and had the luck to survive the labour camps. A large number of the officers, and especially political officers in this Polish army was made up of Polish Jews, usually former members of the above-mentioned Communist Party of Poland. They were Stalin’s pawns who together with Polish communists would rule post-war Poland. Naturally, they were bitterly anti-Catholic and anti-Polish, hunting down the Polish resistance movement that existed a few years after the war and that had hopelessly tried to combat communists. It was then that the term Judeo-Communism was formed in the consciousness of the Polish nation: people were aware that they were governed by the conglomeration of Polish and Jewish communists. The latter occupied positions especially in the government and the secret police.

Just as in Soviet Russia, so too, in Poland the party members of Polish ethnicity attempted to   free themselves of Jewish preponderance. The first success was reported in 1956 (the year of the Budapest Uprising), on the wave of the post-Stalinist thaw; the second attempt was made in 1968 (the year of student riots in France), when Jews were purged from most of higher state or party positions, with many of them leaving communist Poland and ending up miraculously occupying influential positions in the non-communist West, and in an act of revenge painting a gloomy picture of Poland, the Polish nation, and Polishness ever since. To this day, Jewish newspapers in Poland keep reminding of the year 1968 in an attempt to shame the Polish nation for its alleged unparalleled anti-Semitism. Politically and nationally conscious Poles keep reminding themselves of the joke that made the rounds in 1968: A school headmaster encounters a student on the school playground at the time when the student was supposed to participate in classes, so he asks the boy: Johnny, why are you not in class? Johnny answers: You see, sir, the teacher expelled me from class, but I don’t understand the teacher’s logic. I let out a fart, and the teacher told me to leave. Now I am enjoying fresh air while they are sitting in the stinky classroom.

Russians/Ukrainians

Roughly, east of the River Bug /book there extended vast territories inhabited by eastern Slavs collectively known as Rus’. At that time and many centuries thereafter there was no such notion as Ukraine. Kievan Rus’ stretched from almost the Black Sea to almost the Baltic Sea. In due time, as everywhere in medieval Europe, it split into a number of rivalling principalities, and in the 13th century it was partially overridden by Tartars, who subjugated most of it. The Tartars  neither changed the social structure nor the Christian religion of Rus’; they were satisfied with levying an annual tribute and deciding which of the princes was to occupy the senior position among other princes.

Much though it may come as a surprise, Lithuania – the country that on today’s political maps looks like a teeny-weeny speck of territory – by means of conquest or dynastic marriages  extended its leverage over much of the weakened Rus’, including Smolensk and Kiev. At that time the Polish reunited kingdom (which comprised only two of the five original provinces. i.e., Greater Poland and Lesser Poland) also took advantage of the weakened Rus’ and incorporated a small chunk of it, centered around the town of Lvov, which might be viewed as an attempt to compensate territorially for the provinces lost to Germans. As towards the end of the 14th century Poland and Lithuania felt threatened by the Teutonic Order (see above), their elites came up with an idea of forming a political union. The Lithuanian grand duke became simultaneously a Polish king, and later successfully led the combined Polish-Lithuanian (or rather, Russian) troops against the Teutonic Knights, while his successors on the throne subjugated the Order and incorporated a part of its territory into the Polish Crown: the Order was secularised, made dependent on Poland, and so began the history of modern (German) Prussia.

The union between Poland and Lithuania or between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was later renewed and strengthened a few times, eventually taking on the form of the body politic known in history as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which extended from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, from almost the River Oder to almost Moscow. At its territorial peak it covered an area of one million square kilometers. Ethnically or demographically it was a sight to behold!

Though it was called the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in the mid-17th century Poles made up 40% of the whole population of 11 million, while the name Lithuanian did not reflect reality at all: almost all the remaining millions of people were Russians: present-day Belorusians and Ukrainians. The elites of the latter usually underwent Polonization and conversion to Catholicism, while the lower classes remained Russian and Orthodox Christian. Naturally, religious tolerance was the prime political requirement for such a structure to survive. How could 40 or so percent of Polish Catholics wage war against at least 50% of Orthodox Christians? That this society also comprised Protestants goes without saying: they too – and the Jews – enjoyed tolerance. The principle of tolerance led to the principle of personal freedom (true, at that time limited to the gentry), which in turn rendered royal or central authority weak. Add to it the magnates – something like present-day billionaires – with their private armies and income, both surpassing those of the state and you have the whole picture.

So long as the neighbours were relatively weak, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – a political giant  with feet of clay – continued to function and even operated relatively successfully on the international arena. The moment, however, there rose a European superpower while the Commonwealth experienced a crisis, it was prone to collapsing and disintegration. Sweden was such a European power (think of the Thirty Years’ War), whose troops regularly marched across Germany, the Baltic Seaboard and, in mid-17th century, across almost the whole of Poland. As could be expected, Polish protestants or German protestants domiciled in Poland were more than happy to either oblige the Swedes or at least refrain from putting up a fight. Encouraged by the collapse of the state, neighbouring Russia, an emerging political player, moved westwards. Russian/Ukrainian minorities (where the word minority is a misnomer) rose up and were naturally supported by Muscovy. Magnates cared more about preserving their property than laying down their lives for their country and many of them betrayed their king.

Poland barely survived this first frontal assault, and it never regained its previous might. She lost some of the territories (among others, Poland released its control over German Prussia), while the many acts of treason committed by ethnic and religious minorities turned Catholic Poles against their Protestant co-citizens, against Jews and Orthodox Christians. This in turn resulted in prosecutions for those who helped the neighbouring states – Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia – which were more than happy to seize the opportunity of exploiting internal religious tensions in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Then, at the end of the 18th century – just at the time of the French Revolution and American War of Independence – the three neighbours of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – Prussia (which by now comprised East Prussia, West Pomerania and Silesia along with Brandenburg), Russia and Austria – acting in cahoots, dismembered the state and incorporated its parts into their countries. There was a Poland no more. The nation ceased to exist. The nation?

Enrichment by diversity

That’s how this word is understood in the English-speaking world: you draw a border line, you give a name to the enclosed territory and, lo and behold, you have created a nation. Yet, such artificial structures are by no means nations. At the time when we had two Germanies, did we have two German nations? Did they miraculously merge to create a new one after East Germany had been swallowed by West Germany? That the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was not a nation in the true ethnic sense of the word is easy to prove. The whole of the 19th, i.e., the period when Poland ceased to exist politically, was marked by numerous uprisings against the occupying countries: two against Russia, two against Prussia and one against Austria. Insurrectionists operated almost exclusively on territories that were ethnically majority Polish. No attempts at involving Russian speaking communities in the uprising against Russia were even remotely successful. There was no loyalty to the once glorious Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the part of – to use today’s terms – Ukrainians or Belorusians, let alone Jews or Germans. Polish intellectuals and political activists stubbornly daydreamed about recreating Poland in her previous borders, with millions of Belorusians and Ukrainians, and stubbornly refused to see reality: Belorusians and Ukrainians did not wish to be part of Poland. Jews, naturally, were indifferent whether they were under the rule of a Polish king or a Russian tsar or a German kaiser: none of them was one of their own.

That was the proof of the pudding: a nation is a community that is related by blood, common ancestry, the resultant language, faith and culture. Other ethnicities within the same country are at best good-weather friends. A German, a Ukrainian, a Jew could be proud of being a subject of the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom so long as it benefited him, so long as the Kingdom was powerful. The moment it became weak or collapsed…

The respective powers that dismembered the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth accepted large numbers of Poles and Jews with precisely the same problems that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had had with its minorities. Take Poles in Russia in the cross-hairs. At first they did not have any autonomy. Then came the Napoleonic Wars. As could be expected, Poles pinned a great hope on the French Emperor.: they joined the ranks of his armies and fought under his command in diverse places such as Spain and Russia. In order to placate the Poles after the Napoleonic Wars had come to an end, Austria, Prussia and Russia decided to re-create a makeshift Poland: there emerged the Grand Duchy of Posen (territory of Greater Poland) under Prussian rule, the Republic of Cracow (semi-independent but for all practical purposes under Austrian rule), and the Kingdom of Poland (Mazovia) with a very small territory, under Russian rule. Of the three entities, the Kingdom of Poland enjoyed almost full sovereignty: it had its small army and its own currency, it had a parliament and preserved the national language along with the national symbols of statehood. It could not pursue foreign policy and Russia’s tsar was at the same time the Polish king. It was precisely in this part of Poland that the first and the biggest uprising broke out, crushed after ten months of intense fighting, with the resultant significant reduction of the autonomy.

Poles under Russian rule coalesced haphazardly with Russian society, but only up to a point. Many studied in Petersburg, Moscow or Kiev, and some made a career in the Russian army. Assimilation and integration to the hilt, one might say. No. Some of the Poles would clandestinely do political work, getting involved in anti-Russian conspiracy and prepared the nation for yet another uprising. When it broke out within thirty two years of the previous one, it was headed by high-ranking Polish officers of the… Russian army who, if caught, were shot or hanged as traitors. One of them – Zygmunt Sierakowski (shyeh-rah-KAW-vskee) was an officer of the General Staff (!) in St Petersburg: he had been tasked with the preparation of a new penal code for the Russian army and sent for that purpose to visit with the corresponding military institutions in Prussia, France and England (what enormous trust was put in him!); when the 1863–64 insurrection broke out, he joined. Romuald Traugutt, the longest dictator of the 1863–64 uprising, had been a colonel in the Russian army, fighting with distinction against the French and the English during the Crimean War!

Now, obviously not all Poles conspired against the Russian state. Some remained loyal, some were paralyzed by fear, some did not believe in the success of an insurrection. However, Russians could never figure out who was about to betray them and when. They wanted Poles (and other nationalities) to assimilate or integrate; hence, they did not prevent the alien element from joining the highest ranks of the army or administration. Yet, even those seemingly loyal Poles would have quickly reversed course if an uprising had succeeded.

The same goes for Jews, the inheritance that Russia received from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Their very large numbers and their roles as money lenders, traders and owners of village inns, put the Russian authorities on guard. They recognised especially the deleterious impact that Jews had on the peasantry (selling alcoholic beverages and giving loans), which led the authorities to the establishment of the Pale of Settlement. This caused a lot of resentment among Jews and their later strong participation in the revolutionary movement. Assimilation or integration failed completely: the three probably most feared names of the Bolshevik Revolution were those of Joseph Stalin (Georgian), Leo Trotsky (Jewish) and Felix Dzerzhinsky (Polish). Though they and company saved the empire, they destroyed Russianness and Orthodox Christianity to a very great extent.

Poland after 1945 became nationally and religiously monolithic: White, Polish, and Catholic – a thorn in the flesh of the Western liberals. Sadly, lately millions of Ukrainians have made their way to Poland, with the majority of the Polish nation being entirely oblivious to its past and supporting the immigration, especially to spite hated Russians. I have the gut feeling that the same stories will repeat themselves: [1] numerous Ukrainian uprisings during the time of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, [2] terrorist attacks in inter-war Poland, peaking in the assassination of the Polish minister of internal affairs in 1935 by a Ukrainian terrorist, and [3] the Volhynia massacre of 1943 (i.e., mass killings of Poles by Ukrainians). All these events were characterized by enormous bloodbaths, savagery and ruthlessness.

Conclusions

[1] German mass immigration into Silesia and Pomerania occurring at the invitation of Polish rulers brought about the total Germanization of these territories and their gradual estrangement from Poland. Absolutely no war was needed for those territories to be lost and there was none. One might think about the southern states of the United States in this respect with their ever increasing Spanish-speaking population.

[2] The territorial and demographic compensation when Poland joined vast eastern territories to its ethnic core was a kind of accepting a huge influx of immigrants (by way of shifting borders eastward) and resulted in a bizarre composition of the otherwise Polish (and Lithuanian) state in which aliens – i.e. the Russian speaking population – were the majority. This led to frequent and bloody internal upheavals and the intervention of the neighbours who acted in the interests of their ethnic kith and kin. Once these Russian territories had been lopped off from Poland, they never returned under her rule and no national uprising ever took place there. No assimilation or integration worked.

[3] A large Jewish minority was at best indifferent to the fate of their adopted homeland and one should not even wonder why this might be. Why should they?

[4] The huge Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth disappeared from political maps of Europe within less than 25 years (1772–1795), and remained politically subjugated for 123 years, while small, tiny German or Italian states continued to exist and enjoyed sovereignty by virtue of the ethnic coherence of each.

[5] The then billionaires – i.e., magnates, owners of land, villages and small towns –  driven by greed made successivePolish monarchs expand state territory in order for the former to gain new land and labour. That this weakened the ethnic and religious cohesiveness of the state did not bother them in the least.

[6] Ethnic and religious diversity entailed excessive tolerance, which in turn entailed excessive liberalism – to use the modern term – and excessive freedom of an individual, which in the long run wreaked havoc with the state structure and brought about its disintegration. Of the three neighbouring European powers that partitioned Poland, two – Prussia and Russia – were ethnically relatively homogeneous, and so they have survived in one form or another till this day (Imperial Germany, Weimar Germany, the Third Reich, East/West Germany, Federal Germany; Imperial Russia, Soviet Russia, the Russian Federation); the multinational third power – the Habsburg Monarchy – lived for a time and inevitably disintegrated at the end of World War One. The current European Union is a recreation of the Habsburg monarchy on a grander scale (27 nations as opposed to 10), and so its fate is similarly sealed.

[7] Assimilation or integration works up to a point under favorable circumstances and if it is enforced. Then, unavoidably, the ethnic differences come to the fore. To take one example from the text above: both Russians within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth remained Russian and eventually left the Commonwealth, and Poles within the Russian Empire remained Polish and worked towards the destruction of Russia.

https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/TOO-Full-Logo-660x156-1.png 0 0 Jacek Szela https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/TOO-Full-Logo-660x156-1.png Jacek Szela2023-07-18 06:42:572023-07-18 06:42:57How diversity and immigration annihilated historical Poland

The Parasites’ Paradox

July 16, 2023/12 Comments/in Featured Articles, General/by D. H. Corax

In this vale of tears, there is an almost Newtonian nature to life and events not only in their physical aspects but in their moral ones as well: that is, any action by individuals or groups that pushes their society down a particular path in any direction—whether one leading to freedom, stability, wealth, thrift, and power, or tyranny, chaos, poverty, and degeneracy—tends to contain within it reactive elements that make future pushes in the opposite direction easier in some way.

For example, take the interrelated elements of intelligence, thrift, wealth, and power. And furthermore, take the example of Victorian England. As Edward Dutton has argued, from at least the early modern period into the late nineteenth century, average intelligence was increasing and that, combined with the generally English and particularly Victorian ideals of thrift, honor, hard work, etc., made the English elites masters of technology and wealth such as the world had never seen and allowed them to project their power to all corners of the globe.  But the path beyond that was by no means a straight line in the same direction, and as H. G. Wells showed in The Time Machine, it could easily take the elites that travelled it in an opposite or at least ironic direction.  As Wells showed in rather extreme fashion, the wealth and power that intelligence and thrift built bred led to complacency, decadence, and (through dysgenic laziness and sensualism) stupidity, to the point that by the end (at least in terms of the story) the brilliant elites who once conquered the world ultimately ended up as frivolous dunces, preyed upon by the descendants of their workers.

And quite some time after the Victorian age, a very similar dynamic is playing out in the US in particular and in the West in general, thanks in large part to another peculiar trait that makes nations within the Occident powerful and weak: individualism and high trust individualism.

As Dr. Kevin MacDonald showed in Individualism and the Western Liberal Tradition: Evolutionary Origins, History, and Prospects for the Future, white Europeans, especially northern Europeans, lack tribalism and nepotism due to their evolution in a climate too harshly cold and in an area without a major resource (such as a fertile river basin) that was controllable on a year-around basis by an extended kinship group. They instead developed a high-trust society based on oaths and honor and reputation rather than unquestioned bonds of blood. That in turn led to an extremely flexible social structure in which talent could rise and individuals were freer to pursue scientific truth for its own sake.

But every strength is usually linked to a weakness of some sort, so this high-trust individualism becomes a liability to the nations it helped raise when those nations come under assault by a parasitic elite determined to destroy them or at least enrich themselves at the expense of all others.

The standard composition of this elite appears to be led in almost every case by a mix of international, globalist bankers and financiers—with a large representation of Ashkenazi Jews (high enough to punish people and institutions with views they don’t like), with some non-Jewish Whites and non-Whites, and including a political  class of Whites (with an ever-increasing percentage of non-Whites), often with ties to elite financial corporations: France’s Emmanual Macron is a former Rothschild employee; England’s Rishi Sunak had been a prominent Goldman Sachs employee; and in the US both parties swear fealty to Israel and to George Soros or his GOP counterparts.

As the elites of the European Middle Ages (a far better crowd than our own, in my opinion) gained their wealth and power through control of the land, the court systems, and the military, so our elites ensure their wealth and domination through control of central banking and opinion-making institutions (the media, academia), the buying or rigging of elections (think especially Soros’ criminal-coddling DAs), and the vicious and deadly, if in many ways inefficient, killing machine that is the military-industrial complex—though few of those involved ever get near a battlefield and none is killed on it (I told you the medieval ones were better).

While all this is a sweet deal to our elites who are increasingly disconnected from the people they rule, the corruption and inefficiency they produce amount to a raw deal for everyone else, especially Whites. But it’s a deal that threatens to awaken their wrath against the parasites who then face the paradox: unless they find within themselves the restraint to parasitize their host society only to a non-lethal degree (as almost no parasite can), their activities will soon degrade the wealth, social capital, and order built up prior to the parasitism, which had kept the host population content and fairly indifferent to the parasitism in its early stages. If, on the other hand, they continue to increase their parasitic machinations, their only chance of doing so lies in increasing their power by complete authoritarian control guaranteed to increasingly enrage the host population against them and thereby render the retribution against them all the more ferocious when it comes.

The particular means of maintaining repressive control can vary through time and geography, and in our time and in the West, it has taken the form of ever-increasing censorship, accelerating demographic replacement, and an increasingly incestuous relationship between big business and big government: in other words, muzzle, fire, or outright replace those who object to what’s being done to them and their nation. The last tactic is by far the deadliest, as it ultimately prevents the cohesion that would allow heritage Americans to throw off the parasites’ yoke and take back their nation—and the same goes for the nations of Europe. Ultimately, even with miscegenation and replacement, the parasites cannot escape their own paradox, as even very disparate people do not need perfect union to rebel against and destroy their masters; but it does guarantee that what will emerge from the rubble will be a polyglot patchwork of feuding tribes and regions rather than a nation in the true sense that has regained its freedom. The dissident’s challenge, then, is a race against time to take back or salvage part of his true nation, using the parasites’ paradox against them.

His first task in that is to take measure of the nature and composition of the TWASH (those whom the American system hurts): while most people who aren’t benefitting from our elites’ crooked endeavors are hurt by it to some extent, there are those who are especially, massively affected by it, with the owners of small businesses destroyed by the lock-downs and Whites stuck in the increasingly dark and always dysfunctional public school systems coming readily to mind; these are the people so blatantly punched in the face by the current order that the current platitudes and social taboos on race and gender, etc., are nothing but outrages to them. One of the things making it difficult for dissidents to correctly see and act on the parasites’ paradox is the love those dissidents feel toward their particular group and their desire to appeal to that group as a whole, be it Whites in general, Southerners, etc.— asking them to focus on subgroups makes them feel vaguely disloyal or dishonest. The problem with this ‘everyone in the group’ focus is that only a limited percentage of each group is TWASH (and some TWASH is outside of the group) and the rest still have a comfortable enough existence, at least materially, that the elites can usually threaten them by holding over their heads the prospects of getting them fired, making them unemployable, etc. They make an example of small numbers of them to keep the rest in line.

Thus it is critical to begin with the TWASH, giving unique focus and appeal to each subgroup of them and uniting them to leverage their power to influence, one after the other, the critical groups above them. For immediately above the TWASH lies a larger group of those who still have their jobs and reputations but are hurt enough by the parasitism (in the form of inflation, insults against them with antiwhite propaganda, etc.) that they’d be glad to oppose the regime—nonviolently, I mean, as with everything I say here—if only the effort were not futile. Above them lies an even larger group that would oppose the regime if opposition is either easy or likely to be successful. Together these three groups constitute a critical mass capable of imparting to our ideas legitimacy and respectability in the eyes of the gray men of the world: that is, those who hold no strong beliefs but will swing one way or another based on what everyone else, or at least the respectable majority of them, seems to favor. And once you get the gray men—who at this late stage of the infection are feeling pain from the parasites’ activities as well—on the side of your ideas and plans, you have the means to overwhelm those who yet support the regime either for profit or ideology, allowing you to expel the parasites from the halls of power and take back your old nation or create a new one for your people within your part of the ruins of America’s former imperium.

https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/TOO-Full-Logo-660x156-1.png 0 0 D. H. Corax https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/TOO-Full-Logo-660x156-1.png D. H. Corax2023-07-16 07:32:012023-07-16 07:41:21The Parasites’ Paradox

How the media spread transgender ideology

July 14, 2023/10 Comments/in Featured Articles/by Richard Knight

Introduction

The idea that the media exist to impart information might hold good when the news is something that no one is in a position to deny. In such cases they can state their message plainly, as in: “Reckless driver arrested” or “Body of fourth victim pulled from lake”. The more questionable their message is, however, the more subtly they must convey it, until when it is patently false they must convey it so subtly that they can deny that they ever conveyed it. In short, when the media are intent on outright deception, their modus operandum is covert. With this in mind, let us look at some of the techniques they use to spread transgender ideology.

Exposure

Their most obvious technique is to give the ideology exposure. In Britain the high-point in this seems to have been around 2018, when segments such as “Does Gender Self-Identification Put Women at Risk?”, “Piers Morgan Weighs in on Girl Guides Transgender Row” and “Munroe Bergdorf Clashes With Piers in Heated Debate on Gender Fluidity” continually appeared on breakfast television. It didn’t matter whether Piers Morgan was questioning the ideology or standing up for “transgender rights, freedom and equality”, to quote one of his favourite phrases. Either way, viewers of Good Morning Britain received another ten minutes of the ideology each time.

A discussion programme

A segment from a 2017 television discussion programme began with the presenter Nicky Campbell saying to a strange-looking girl called Emma: “You’re neither male or female, right?”[1] She replied: “That’s true. I identify as non-binary, which means I’m neither male nor female, and corresponding to that I use the ‘they’/‘them’ pronouns”. Nicky Campbell made no comment, failing to point out that calling yourself something doesn’t mean that you are that thing and that she was wrong to say that she used “they”/”them” pronouns, presumably meaning to refer to herself. The pronouns she used to refer to herself were presumably the same ones everyone else uses, namely “I”, “me” and so on. What she meant was that she sought to get others to refer to her using the plural pronouns, which is a fairly tyrannical thing to do. By letting these things pass, Nicky Campbell conveyed the idea that transgenders were a special case. Their statements were exempt from rational appraisal.

Crysta, Feb. 20th 2019, “Smart Woman Leaves Gender Fluid Person SPEECHLESS In Heated Argument.” You Tube comments available here. 

Emma went on to say that because there was a “huge variance of gender presentation and gender identity within humankind”, there weren’t simply men and women. Again, instead of ridiculing her Nicky Campbell treated the comment as though it might be worth listening to, when clearly a person’s “gender presentation” implies nothing about their sex. He went on to give Emma several more turns to speak, signalling that she was the most important person in the studio.

At some point he jocularly asked a journalist whether his newspaper would be using “gender-neutral language”. Peter Foster said that it pretty much already did, citing its use of the word “firefighter”. He had two daughters and would be delighted if they wanted to join the fire service when they grew up, he said, suggesting that they wouldn’t have been able to join it when its employees were called firemen. If that theory was true, no woman could have joined the political party called Brothers of Italy, still less risen to become its leader and then the country’s prime minister, yet there Georgia Meloni is.

As for referring to individuals as “they”, Peter Foster said that it was a question of whether such usages caught on, suggesting that the media follow the public preference. Was he a fool or being disingenuous? The only reason most people adopt a new usage, such as calling male transgenders “her”, is that the media model it. But Peter Foster said he doubted that “they” would stick as a pronoun for one person “because actually that’s not how most people see the world”. Language is organic, he maintained, and reflects the society it comes out of. Perish the thought that it might be influenced by the media!

On the old-fashioned side, a woman named Bethany Brown said: “We mustn’t lose sight of the fact that language does refer to a reality. As a writer I’m very aware of this. It’s very important.” The pronouns “he” and “she” referred to male and female reality, she said. She thought that there was something very serious at stake if we started eroding these concepts.

To judge from comments made by viewers of the video, many agreed with her. One wrote: “Thank you to the lady who spoke out against this insanity”. Another said: “This pronoun stuff is just crap. They need to start worrying about something that deserves to be worried about.” A third observed: “The fact that this is even a discussion shows how far we’ve fallen”. An American compared Bethany Brown to “the no-nonsense teachers we had growing up”, who had “had no problem tongue-lashing idiotic kids who said stupid shit. Good for you, lady!”, he concluded.

But Nicky Campbell asked her: “What about people who are non-binary? What about people who are gender-fluid?”, presupposing the existence of such people and teaching his audience these terms. “We’re all male or female”, replied Bethany Brown, “and the attempt to suggest that there is a third gender, as far as I’m concerned it’s an ideological and a political project. It doesn’t exist.”

Shock, horror!

Another media technique for conveying a falsehood, apart from throwing a spotlight on someone expressing it, is to present the truth as scandalous. Thus a BBC breakfast television segment was entitled “Feminist Blogger Believes Trans-Women Aren’t Real Women”.[2] Not real women? What an extraordinary person this must be!

While presenting the obvious as shocking, the media present the impossible as commonplace, as in their references to people “transitioning”, intended to suggest that they have changed their sex. In the same segment, Eamonn Holmes asked Kelly Jay Keen, the “feminist blogger”: “Why does she threaten you?”, referring to one of the media’s go-to transgenders, who was also in the studio. Kelly Jay Keen said: “I think when you decide that men can come into a women’s space, it’s no longer a woman’s space”. Holmes: “But she sees herself as a woman”. According to him, the other guest saw himself as a woman, therefore he was a woman, therefore what was Kelly Jay Keen worried about?

The need for “respect”

Going back to Emma, she said that using the “wrong language” to refer to transgender people was a mark of disrespect, perhaps “one of the greatest acts of disrespect” it was possible to perform. The media use the same tactic, describing anyone who says something that will not please transgender activists as lacking respect or sensitivity.

When Susie Green as CEO of the charity Mermaids took her sixteen-year-old son to Thailand to be castrated, the Catholic journalist Caroline Farrow put out a series of tweets, only to find herself being interviewed under caution by the police six months later in connection with the Malicious Communications Act, which makes it illegal to send or deliver letters or the like for the purpose of causing distress or anxiety. Susie Green had reported her for “misgendering” her “daughter”.[3]

Caroline Farrow had tweeted that Susie Green had “mutilated” her son and rendered him sterile while he was still a child. She had written: “I think it’s time everyone called out Susie Green and Mermaids for what it is: child abuse”. This was not purely personal, she maintained, because Susie Green was a public figure who ran a lobby group that had access to Westminster and influence over education policy and the police. Susie Green had herself given out highly personal details about her son, as when describing on television how his penis had been so shrivelled by drugs as to make the surgery particularly difficult. The Thai authorities were so outraged when they found out what had happened, Caroline Farrow said, that they had outlawed child castration. The police eventually dropped the case against her.

Susanna Reid, a presenter of Good Morning Britain, deemed the language of Caroline Farrow’s tweets “inflammatory”. We should treat even public figures with respect, she said. Piers Morgan thought that if the trans lobby’s opponents acted as aggressively as the trans lobby, they wouldn’t help themselves. But Caroline Farrow said that she was trying to strip away the lobby’s euphemisms, such as “gender affirmation surgery” and “bottom surgery”, which left many people with only a hazy idea of what such surgery involved. How could she do this if she had to use the euphemisms herself?

The presenters would not be moved. Susanna Reid thought that her guest’s comments were “incredibly personal” and couched in language that was “frankly insensitive”. Piers Morgan thought that there was a “more respectful way”. “But this is the truth”, Caroline Farrow said, “and on this issue we need to tell the truth”. In her opinion we needed a clear and honest discussion. Not according to the media, we didn’t.

The removal of the stigma

Another strategy the media use to spread destructive ideologies is to erode our defences against them, which take the form of stigmas. Thirty or forty years ago there were few transsexuals, as they were then called, because they were shunned and derided as freaks. The media have since taught us that this was wrong. Instead of shunning and deriding transgenders we should embrace them as perfectly normal. Indeed, we should see them as super-normal: so normal that we who are merely normal must defer to them at every turn.

Similar is the war on science and medicine waged by transgender activists and by the media on their behalf. Just as the anti-psychiatrist R.D. Laing taught in the 1960s that schizophrenics were reacting in a sane fashion to an insane world, only to be locked up for it, so today’s transgender ideologues teach that psychiatrists are at fault if they say that transgenders are disordered. Far from it: transgenders have discovered their true, authentic selves. They are luminaries, who have completed a spiritual journey on which the rest of us might just be taking the first few stumbling steps.

Conducive language

In 2018 Susanna Reid, having pointed out that Girl Guides were aged 10–14, referred to a “transgender girl” in the Guides who “still obviously has a male body”. This wasn’t a boy, according to Susanna Reid, but a girl who happened to inhabit a boy’s body.[4] Her guest, Susie Green again, was well prepared to deflect any criticism of the idea of letting boys of this age share tents with girls. It wasn’t surprising, she said, that people thought of “transgender girls” as a safeguarding issue since this was the impression created by the media. In reality it was “trans girls” who were at risk, as we knew from the statistics “around self-harm and suicide”. And so we see that the media are quite willing to broadcast the idea that they themselves have been unjust if it will help to cast transgenders as in need of pity.

Susie Green went on to use the expression “trans girls” innumerable times, stressing that they were children, and insisted that there was “absolutely no evidence whatsoever to say that trans girls are a threat and that any issue around abuse has ever happened”. She went on: “It just seems that every time there’s an opportunity to have a go at trans girls — I mean, these are children!” When asked why parents should not be told that boys might be put in tents with their daughters, which was the main point at issue, she replied that the question was “picking on a marginalized group of children who have already been subjected often to abuse within their environment”. If parents were told, the children would be “othered”.

When Piers Morgan mentioned the recent case of a rapist in a women’s prison who had committed more sexual offences there, Susie Green pleaded for a change of subject. “Can we move away? This is about children, children being allowed to be children, and children — girls, trans girls, who are girls — being allowed take part”. We were conflating sexual predators with innocent children. No we weren’t, said Caroline Farrow, the other guest. We had already seen the case of a Scout leader being asked to advise the Green Party on its transgender policy, who had subsequently been sent to prison for 22 years for raping and torturing girls. “But he’s a man”, said Susie Green, looking puzzled. “He’s not trans.” When Piers Morgan asked Susie Green about a man celebrated as a woman, who only dressed as a woman once a week, she again looked puzzled and asked what this had to do with Girl Guides. The media make a point of giving a platform to such experts in misdirection and evasion.

Conclusion

In short, the media spread transgender ideology by exposing us to it night and day, or at least over breakfast. They obscure the falsity of is doctrines, such as that one can change one’s sex or partake of both sexes, largely by suggesting that words govern reality or by excusing preposterous statements. They show us people who can’t think or who pretend they can’t so as to stop us thinking, and obscure the grisly reality of sex surgery in the name of “respecting” those who undergo it. They do allow common sense to be heard from time to time. They do not present it as common sense, however, but rather as the outlandish voice of yesteryear. They present transgenders as our victims while dismantling our defences against their ideology.

This ideology makes a direct assault on reality and truth. A man is a woman; to classify someone as a member of their sex is to “misgender” them; to deny a person’s sex is to “affirm” it, and so on. It thereby makes an indirect assault on all that is good, for it is always the most reasonable and principled people, often Christians, whom the media oppose and who in the real world are visited by the police or lose their jobs. Correspondingly, it is always the most vicious and moronic who get rid of them. Unfortunate transgenders march behind their ideologues and their ideologues’ advocates in the media with the Father of Lies in the lead.


[1] Crysta, Feb. 20th 2019, “Smart Woman Leaves Gender Fluid Person SPEECHLESS In Heated Argument”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tM5vzvfxJ_M. The programme was The Big Questions. The full segment, without viewers’ comments, is at Simpson Training, Aug. 23rd 2017, “Would Gender Neutral Language be Better for Humankind?”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IX21PukO39g.

[2] BBC, Sept. 28th 2018, “Feminist Blogger Believes Trans-Women Aren’t Real Women | This Morning”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDSOP_j7HZE.

[3] Good Morning Britain, March 25th 2019, “Caroline Farrow on ‘Misgendering’ Tweets Row: ‘I’m Absolutely Not Regretful’ | Good Morning Britain”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rpo4rsZUNPM.

[4] Good Morning Britain, Sept. 25th 2018, “Piers Morgan Weighs in on Girl Guides Transgender Row | Good Morning Britain”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SrQM8VQQ-P8.

https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/TOO-Full-Logo-660x156-1.png 0 0 Richard Knight https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/TOO-Full-Logo-660x156-1.png Richard Knight2023-07-14 06:32:532023-07-14 06:32:53How the media spread transgender ideology

Hunter’s ‘Love Child’ and Conservative Madness

July 13, 2023/2 Comments/in General/by Ann Coulter

Hunter’s ‘Love Child’ and Conservative Madness     

Right-wingers (and The New York Times’ Maureen Dowd) are browbeating President Biden for not embracing his son Hunter’s illegitimate child — the result of drug-crazed, unprotected sex with a stripper.

Conservatives are so enjoying bashing the president that they’re taking a strikingly unconservative position. We don’t believe in polyamorous three-person “families” or “Heather Has Two Mommies” or “Junior, meet your half-brother from Daddy’s unprotected sex outside of marriage!”

We’re the ones who believe that marriage means something. (Thus, our opposition to gay marriage.) Ideally, a man wouldn’t have any “parental rights” to a kid he fathered unless he’s married to the mother, and she wouldn’t get access to the sperm-donor’s bank account unless she’s married to him.

But the law has come a long way from such straightforward rules, so, yeah, Hunter is going to have to pay up — and I hope he has to pay through the nose, pay so much that it hurts. But the idea that a crack-fueled roll in the hay entitles the mother to be treated like an honored member of the family is absurd.

What are conservatives and Dowd imagining exactly? That the stripper — accompanying the 4-year-old child — should be invited to Biden family dinners, weddings and vacations? How will this be explained to the other grandchildren? Uncle Hunter smoked crack cocaine then ejaculated inside a woman who takes her clothes off for a living. Be polite and ask her how she enjoys her work!

Just because Hunter is a total degenerate doesn’t mean society should allow unfit mothers to use their capture of his sperm as a winning lottery ticket, entitling her entrée into someone else’s family.

The stripper is getting 18 years of child support payments and the Biden genes — which I’m sure never even occurred to her when she was having unprotected sex with the son of a former vice president. She could just as easily have forgotten her diaphragm with the guy selling tube socks on the street.

The Kardashians are a bad enough influence. How will a stripper’s “love child” showing up on the White House Christmas card affect other girls looking to upgrade with an “unwanted pregnancy”? Punish Hunter with massive child support payments, not by turning the mother and her child into heroes.

Under English common law, going back to 1235, any child born outside of wedlock had no rights at all, was unable to inherit, and was “looked upon as the son of nobody,” as Sir William Blackstone put it. (If that were still the law, I bet the stripper would have remembered her diaphragm.)

It doesn’t matter that “it’s not the kid’s fault.” Of course it isn’t. This is like the anchor baby argument. We’re supposed to ignore our borders because IT’S NOT THE CHILD’S FAULT! And now we’re supposed to ignore the purpose of marriage because IT’S NOT THE CHILD’S FAULT! We don’t take a sledgehammer to the basic building blocks of civilization to avoid somebody, somewhere, having hurt feelings.

Sorry, but we can’t legislate that all children be born to good parents. We can, however, legislate that marriage, and marriage alone, carries legal consequences unavailable to the unmarried. That’s a pretty good incentive for would-be parents to spare future generations the heartbreak of being born out of wedlock. Rushing to salve the hurt feelings of today’s illegitimate children merely ensures that we’ll have a lot more illegitimate children tomorrow.

It was (of course) the Warren court that cast aside the collective wisdom of 48 states and hundreds of years of common law to nuke the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate kids. Using infantile logic, Justice William O. Douglas (author of Griswold v. Connecticut) announced in Levy v. Louisiana (1968) that illegitimate children ARE NOT NON-PERSONS! Therefore, state laws that required marriage for the creation of certain rights and duties violated the Equal Protection Clause.

Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented, saying it was “preposterous to suggest that the State has made illegitimates into ‘nonpersons,’” pointing out that, a “man may recover for the death of his wife, whether he loved her or not, but may not recover for the death of his paramour.” That does not make the paramour a “non-person.”

That very year, Black people in Detroit released a hit song discouraging illegitimacy (“Love Child“), even as a cranky, four-times-married White man in Washington, D.C. (Douglas) opened the floodgates.

Since the court found it “unconstitutional” to distinguish between the children of married parents and unmarried parents, the illegitimacy rate in the U.S. soared from 24% for Blacks and 3.1% for Whites to 69.4% for Blacks, 28.2% for Whites and 39.6% overall. With that came an explosion in child poverty, criminality, educational deficits, teen pregnancies, behavioral problems and on and on and on.

Conservatives used to care about those things. But the fun of bashing Hunter seems to have overwhelmed their respect for marriage, as well as their understanding of incentives.

     COPYRIGHT 2023 ANN COULTER

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Subscription problems

July 12, 2023/1 Comment/in General/by Kevin MacDonald

People have been complaining that they aren’t being notified of new articles. A reader tells me that if you resubscribe on the site, you will get the notification. You then have to select the title text and click on it to open. Comment here on how that works.

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A Collision at the Intersection

July 12, 2023/6 Comments/in Featured Articles, Multiculturalism, Muslim Immigration/by Mark Gullick

The American term “intersection”, what the British call a “crossroads”, is both a practical solution and a hazard. Aided by traffic lights and signage, it allows the flow of traffic travelling in different, non-parallel directions, but the fact that these differing streams have to traverse common space is what gives it a greater element of risk than driving on a regular road. There are often auto accidents at intersections.

“Intersectionality” is also part of the lexicon used by those under the spell of identity politics. For a definition, who better to turn to than the Center for Intersectional Justice (CIJ)?

The concept of intersectionality describes the ways in which systems of inequality based on gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, class and other forms of discrimination ‘intersect’ to create unique dynamics and effects.

Unique dynamics and effects. Keep that in mind, as this Venn-like model is currently producing both, although not in the way the CIJ passionately strive for. Intersectionality is designed to produce a united front of the oppressed and, presumably, each of the separate identities so put upon will find the others right behind them. However, at one particular intersection, a pile-up has been coming for some time. A recent and apparently insignificant example from England perfectly illustrates a culture clash that was built into the system from the outset.

Until recently, the Mayor of Keighley in Yorkshire was a Muslim, Councillor Mohammed Nazam. He attended a pride festival, and later apologized for his attendance on a Facebook page called “Keighley Pakistanis”, calling his decision to attend “a lapse in judgment”. This did not sit well with his political party, the Conservatives (we will return to Muslim conservatism), and he was forced to resign. One point of interest, from his own defense on Facebook, is that he claimed the ceremony contradicted his “personal religious beliefs”.

This is only partly true. There is a sense in which Muslims have personal religious beliefs in that they are technically individuals. But the Muslim faith is collective, that of the ummah. It is sectarian, certainly, but the Five Pillars of Islam, along with the Koran, are a common center of gravity for Muslims, an amalgam of faith and politics which features certain immutable characteristics. One of these is an explicit rejection of homosexuality.

While homosexuality is illegal in around 70 countries, there are 11 which explicitly impose or can impose a death sentence. They are all Muslim countries, and perhaps Gay Times — or at least its tourism advice department — can be relied to know where they are. This thorough-going inventory includes the relevant clause from the various nations’ penal code. The exception is Saudi Arabia, which has no penal code and instead cuts out the middle-man by applying shariah direct from the Koran.

Muslim parents have also protested against LGBTQ in the classroom in Canada and America, stamping on pride flags and not confining their protests to placards at the school gate. Three sets of Muslim parents in Maryland are taking the Montgomery School board to court on the principle that their inability to opt-out from books they find offensive contravenes their First Amendment rights. Muslims are very effective in the law courts, because what individuals don’t know, their imam does.

Protests in Ottawa caused severe cognitive dissonance among counter-protestors, says the National Post, as the opposing marchers “…appeared to be discomfited by the fact that their protestors weren’t their supposed bogeyman [conservative Whites] but included many people of color, including socially conservative Muslims.”

Socially conservative. Watch that phrase, because it has a big future in the Left’s explanation as to why intersectionality has become, to use their language, “problematic”.

Those on the political right are often accused of “not understanding” Islam. We certainly understand it better than did the White liberal residents of Hamtrack, Michigan. From the UK’s Left-wing Guardian;

In 2015, many liberal residents in Hamtrack, Michigan, celebrated as their city attracted international attention for becoming the first in the United States to elect a Muslim-majority city council … This week [published June 17] many of those same residents watched in dismay as a now fully Muslim and socially conservative city council passed legislation banning Pride flags from being flown on city property. [Italics added]

What exactly did they expect? The dominant far-Left in the West, while they are obsessed with hated conservatism, have overlooked the fact that Muslims are the most hyper-conservative creed on the planet. While an old-school British Tory might want to ease the UK back to the 1950s, many Muslims would prefer to route-march us all back to the eighth century. They make the Amish look like progressives.

And so Muslims can be reasonably said not to devote too much time to doing what the rest of us are mandated to do, which is “celebrate” pride month, or season, or year. By all accounts it is not possible to travel far in any British city without seeing the dystopian bunting of the pride flag, an ensign as ugly as the ideology that forces it on schoolchildren and, by proxy, their parents. But you won’t see the pride flag flown in Tower Hamlets, Newham, Luton or any other “social conservative” majority area of London. You will, on the other hand, see so-called “Shariah zone” posters in those areas.

Early versions of such posters had two men hand-in-hand with a cross struck through, but this was removed as Islamic activists doubtless did not want to be seen as homophobic. It would be inadvisable, however, for two men to walk holding hands in the areas mentioned, and many others in the UK. Muslims are the only British group actively promoting hardline conservative values.

But Muslims are not some ideological cavalry riding to save the timid kufr, who dare not otherwise criticize the forced LGBTQ curriculum. Elsewhere in Yorkshire, a teacher and his family, under new identities, are still in hiding after the teacher showed a cartoon of the prophet Mohammed from French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo to the class he was teaching. No one from the “intersectionality” lobby has ever spoken up to help him.

The gay community are also having problems with the trans lobby, and the latter’s embrace of diversity at every level is making it problematic to be homosexual in an increasingly Islamized society. The French gay community, although staunchly against Marine Le Pen and her Rassemblement National due to its opposition to same-sex marriage, still saw one third of them voting for her in the run-off stage of the last French Presidential election.

Unlike Western politicians, representatives of the extensive Muslim community are quite clear on their tolerance level. In the USA, a document precisely outlining the Islamic position on the LGBTQ community was released in May of this year, and it achieves what no Western politician has been able to in that it makes absolutely clear Islam’s attitude to shifting cultural norms. Navigating Differences: Clarifying Sexual and Gender Ethics in Islam has hundreds of signatories from the Western Islamic infrastructure. And these signatories cannot be dismissed as crank lobbyists unsupported by the heads of their religion. Islam has no head, it has no Pope. Imams and Islamic scholars (the ulama) make a consensus by weight of numbers, not by Papal decree.

In the section Our Constitutional Right to Hold Our Views, an interesting legal juxtaposition is made:

We recognize that our moral code conflicts with the goals of LGBTQ proponents. We also acknowledge their constitutional right to live in peace and free from abuse. Nevertheless, we emphasize our God-given and constitutional rights to hold, live by, and promote our religious beliefs in the best manner (Quran, al-Nahl: 125) without fear of legal reprisal or systematic marginalization.

Despite the document claiming “constitutional” rights, the American Constitution is not referenced, despite the famous First Amendment being explicit about religious freedoms. “Constitutional rights” here refer to the Koran.

The Democrat-media complex took a little while to spin this, but eventually wheeled out Jen Psaki to explain that the GOP are “recruiting” Muslims to oppose transgender policies. They surely know that no recruitment is needed. Muslims are already conscripted, just not to the GOP but what they see as a higher authority.

So-called “woke” ideology is becoming a victim of its own pathological obsession with diversity, its intersectional mainframe rupturing as Muslims — and Blacks — will not tolerate homosexuality and all its works. And there are other stress fractures within “intersectionality”. “Trans Exclusionary Radical Feminists”, or TERFs, have been ostracized by the LGBTQ community for their biologically realist approach. And left-wing feminists are leaving areas controlled by  Muslims for fear of harassment.

The default left-wing riposte to the Islamic injunction on homosexuality is that the Bible says the same thing as the Koran. Quite so, but if you arrange a drag show in Birmingham, Britain’s second city — 34% Christian, 30% Muslim — it won’t be the Seventh-Day Adventists who pay you a visit. The Koran, incidentally, although it condemns homosexuality, does not endorse the death penalty. That occurs in the Hadith, the supposed sayings of Mohammed: “Whoever you find doing the action of the people of Lut (Lot), execute the one who does it and the one to whom it is done”.

The dar al Islam does not recognize the separation of state and religion it sees in the dar al harb and will not tolerate LGBTQ propaganda in its children’s schools — or anywhere else as their presence increases. The British state — an extension of globalist concerns — will not countenance opposition to its LGBTQ agenda. Either an unstoppable force is about to be stopped, or an immovable object is about to move. Stay clear of the intersection.

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Traditional Jewish Separatism and De-humanization of Gentiles: A Review of Stephen Bloom’s Postville

July 9, 2023/11 Comments/in Featured Articles, Jewish Ethnocentrism/by Bernard M. Smith

[W]hat the Postville Hasidim ultimately offered me was a glimpse at the dark side of my own faith, a look at Jewish extremists whose behavior not only made the Postville locals wince, but made me wince.
Stephen Bloom

Postville: A Clash of Cultures in Heartland America
Stephen G. Bloom
Mariner Books, 2001 (originally published by Harcourt in 2000)

7367 words

*        *        *

Did Stephen Bloom write a book that savaged the Jews?

More than twenty years ago, a journalism professor from the University of Iowa, Stephen Bloom, published a highly readable and fascinating book on an incredible culture clash that played out in the Northeastern Iowa town of Postville; a description of the difficulty that the transplantation of a Hasidic Jewish community into a withering, rural Iowa farm town in the 1980s and 1990s posed from both the Jewish and native Iowan perspective alike. The author’s Jewishness, fairly or unfairly, allowed him access to the Hasidic community that no gentile would have been afforded; the author’s secularism and “local” status allowed him access to the native Iowan community as well. What follows then is a sketch of two antagonistic communities from the inside out.

Bloom is a talented writer — he weaves scenes and characters that are compelling. In many ways, Postville reads like a novel in the sense that the characters he introduces and develops become fixtures in the mind of the reader — we know them and are interested in them. While I am not sure that Postville teaches us something we did not already know — it is an intriguing look at the Hasidic movement and the death of rural America, all at the same time. And while Bloom showed an implied hostility against a strongly manifested faith — and that bias is palpable throughout the book — his irreligiosity was not so overwhelming to distract from the overall evenhandedness of the book.

If anything, the years that have passed have made the book more relevant than even when it was published. It is the intersection, and future, of religion in America and America itself — as it was, as it is, and as it is becoming. Not only is the story of Postville one of rural and urban, immigrant and native, and Christian and Jewish, but it is also the account of Jewish versus Jewish — the Jewishness of intense insularity versus the Jewishness of liberal cosmopolitanism, the Jewishness of tribalism versus the Jewishness of universalism. Bloom’s book about the culture clash between Hasidic Jews and rural Iowans is riveting on many levels but one that figures most prominently is the theme of Jewish inward-looking supremacism, and how this theme correlates with Jewish religiosity. Simply stated, the more religious a Jew is, the more he believes that he must turn within the Jewish community and shun the gentile (lest he, the religious Jew, is contaminated by the filth and impurity of the gentile). Not only does he not love the gentile in any conceivable way, but the religious Jew is categorically indifferent to the gentile’s existence as if the gentile does not matter in any essential way—that the gentile has no moral worth. There is then a powerful and undeniable correlation between Jewish religious intensity and observance and insularity from, and indifference to, the “other.” Of course, as I have known from experience, not every religious Jew is hostile and indifferent to gentiles per se. But the gravity exerted within religious Judaism is one that pulls towards itself — fundamentally, religious Judaism is not interested in the world outside of its narrow parameters. By contrast, the more religious a Christian becomes, the more he loves (or should love) all men as his neighbor — Christianity as a creed cannot produce anything approaching Jewish supremacism and insularity because Christianity is uniquely universal. For the Christian, Jew and gentile are essentially equal in dignity before God — for the religious Jew, such a concept would be totally unacceptable. And, as an “ultra” orthodox outpost, Postville recounts appalling episodes of indifference and hostility towards the gentiles by the Postville Jews.

All of it plays out — this brutal culture clash — through the filter and musings of a Jewish author who embodies and personifies the insecurity of the “emancipated” Jew who is home in no place. Because secular Jews have become synonymous, to one extent or another, with modern liberalism and at least the appeal of universal values, the idea of Jewish supremacism that undergirds the Hasidic Jewish religiosity is something that is, to say the very least, an uncomfortable reality. But unlike the secular Jew’s visceral reaction and discomfort with displays of religious fervor by Christians, secular Jews have a more muted and compromised response to intensely religious Judaism. There is something much more forgiving in the secular Jew’s consideration of their religious cousins — a lack of harshness — that distinguishes intra-Jewish relationships. By contrast, apostate or secular Christians are almost universally nasty and unforgiving towards their religious cousins. And, to some extent, that distinction makes sense; Judaism is primarily an ethnicity that has credal aspects while Christianity is primarily a creed with ethnic aspects — as such, disputes about beliefs are often forgiven by “family” members but not by people who are defined by faith and adherence. Bloom, as a secular American liberal and Jew, turns out to be an exception to the rule — a Jew who nonetheless takes his “Americanism” and “liberalism” seriously enough to turn his caustic pen on religious Jews. And he learned this hostility in real time while writing Postville. His book then is more than the account of a kulturkampf that played out in rural Iowa; it was a conscious discovery of the ugliness of Jewish chauvinism in its most religious form.

*        *        *

Working professionally as I do with many Jews who keep Kosher means that I have dined in many Kosher restaurants. Kosher food can be good, and some of the restaurants are excellent. They are also expensive: Kosher food is significantly costlier than non-Kosher food. Kosher food is more than merely Jewishly blessed food — it is a particular method of slaughter, storage, and preparation — and blessing. Kosher meat cannot be sourced from a gentile butcher because the animal must be slaughtered and drained of blood in a precise manner. Obviously then, religious Jews require ready access to meat that is slaughtered and prepared in accordance with religious law. As religious Jews have flourished in the United States — gaining numbers from fecundity and converts from mainstream Judaism, while Reform and Conservative Judaism have floundered — the need to Kosher food has only increased. Thus an underlying theme to Postville is the sizable business opportunity to feed the growing need for Kosher meat throughout the United States and abroad. Postville is eponymously centered in Postville, Iowa — where a group of investors from the Orthodox Lubavitch Jewish community in Crown Heights, New York purchased an abandoned slaughterhouse and turned it into a large Kosher butchery in 1987. In a sense then, Postville is first a story of the seizure of an economic opportunity that is, as such, uniquely an American story. The investors were led by a Russian-born Lubavitcher named Aaron Rubashkin, and Rubashkin led a migration of families to Postville to manage the Kosher slaughterhouse.

Initially, the Postville residents and civic leaders welcomed the investment in their community and the economic impact it would bring. Postville was reeling in the mid-1980s. The United States experienced a major agricultural crisis during the 1980s. Record production during this time led to a plunge in the price of commodities. Exports fell, due in part to the 1980 United States grain embargo against the Soviet Union. Farm debt for land and equipment purchases soared during the 1970s and early 1980s, doubling between 1978 and 1984. Other negative economic factors included high interest rates, high oil prices and a strong dollar. By the mid-1980s, the crisis had reached its peak. Land prices fell dramatically, leading to record foreclosures. Some forty years later, it is hard to imagine a collapse in value of quality farmland, especially in a place as fertile as Iowa, but in the mid-1980s, rural America was decimated in a way that not merely destroyed countless family farms but scarred the American rural way of life forever.

The refurbishing of the abandoned slaughterhouse and the addition of several hundred people to the local economy indeed provided Postville a modest economic bump, but problems between the Hasidic Jews and Iowans began immediately afterwards and persisted for decades. And more than that, the meat-processing plant brought in hundreds of illegal immigrants as workers — thus operating to apply a double pressure of change to what had been a longstanding homogeneous community. The Iowans were expecting new neighbors who would acclimate to the Iowa way of hospitality and cooperation — who would add more than economic value to their community — but instead were matched with religious Jews who viewed those goyim as virtually sub-human and treated them accordingly with vacillations of indifference or hostility.

Bloom was a professor of journalism at the nearby University of Iowa when he came across a reference in the local news of a nearby Hasidic outpost — and accompanying tension — in Postville in the mid-1990s. Bloom was admittedly dealing with a culture clash of his own after relocating from San Francisco after a career as a journalist. While Bloom’s initial interest was the desire to connect with his Jewishness amid Iowa’s overwhelming Christian homogeneity, the deteriorating situation between the Jews and the locals was a news story in its own right — in addition to the sheer peculiarity of Hasidic Jews living in rural Iowa. By the time he arrived in the mid-1990s, tensions were at a breaking point. The Iowans had made their stand against the Jews by deciding to hold a referendum to allow the town of Postville to annex the land on which the kosher meat-processing plant stood. If Postville annexed the land, the Iowans would then be able to raise taxes and better control the Lubavitchers. The annexation issue was thus a vote essentially to shame the Jews in Postville by the native Iowans of the town.

Bloom, like any investigative reporter, interviewed countless locals and tried, initially in vain, to do the same with the Postville Hasidic Jews. On some level, at least by implication, Bloom wanted to believe that the locals were anti-Semitic and, indeed, he found some comments by them to be exactly that. Indeed, there is an arrogance in how Bloom related to the native Postville people — as if he reduced to mere country bumpkins all the gentileswho simply did not know how to relate to outsiders. Thus, Bloom begins his account by frankly describing his suppressed, but deep-seated, dislike of the Iowans. At the same time, he also wanted to connect with the Hasidic Jews for their side of the story, but also because he was, at least in a sense, lost himself. As a coastal and secular Jew, he felt more than out-of-place in Iowa — he resented their version of middle America, and, to the extent that he was attracted to it, he resented that too. But he interviewed a variety of Iowa locals that he grew to like — he identified with them in terms of their values. At the very least, he understood them.

Northeastern Iowa is — or was — German-Lutheran country. And the imprints of neatness, cleanliness and mannerliness were seemingly everywhere in these communities. As Bloom described it in the mid-1990s, it sounded like America in the 1920s or earlier. White, religious, neighborly, civic, and orderly. It was the kind of place with Memorial Day and July 4th parades with the 4H Club, Future Farmers of America, and Chamber of Commerce — where chain stores, and Walmart in particular, were resisted, and people did not lock their doors. It is exactly the type of place that would later become ground zero for two independent phenomena — the opioid crisis and MAGA. But in the mid-1990s, this was still a place where World War II and Korean War veterans congregated in coffee shops in John Deere hats and overalls, where the high school football game was an event that the whole town eagerly waited on, where homes and yards were manicured, where people prided themselves on their sense of belonging and where “city-slicker” was a term that meant something. Understated, honest, lawful and thrifty, the local Iowans were simply not prepared (but, then again, who is) for a group to descend upon them who were shrewd, discourteous, and disorderly.

One way to look at the differences, at the most basic level, is that Jews (and this is not merely the ultra-orthodox) look at rules as pliable, and, in any event, not always applicable to any individual Jew. In this same way that Jews look at bargaining (“to hondle” in Yiddish) as a sign of intelligence, they also take a flexible view with respect to following rules for the sake of rules. German ethnics could not be more different — not only are they rules-oriented, but they are also rules-worshipping. Simple things like observing traffic and zoning laws become flashpoints that are hard for outsiders to understand. In many ways, Bloom was won over by the Iowans in their culture war with the Jews — slowly and surely — because their complaints that the Jews should just follow the rules everyone has to follow resonated with him. He may have been a secular, coastal Jew, but he did not accept a job in Iowa for no reason — he wanted to escape from wherever he was even if he did not realize it or know why. In a sense, he wanted “Ozzie and Harriet” even if it came without pastrami or a good bagel. That he chose to live in Iowa says something more about him than he himself was able to articulate. He was more receptive to the locals’ complaints that the Jews were rude and unneighborly than he wanted to admit.

But that was later — he was still, midstream in the book, searching for something in his own religion. After considerable difficulty, he finally managed to interview Aaron Rubashkin’s son, Sholom, who managed the operation in Postville to discuss the relations with the locals. The Lubavitchers are unique among Jews in that they are religious and proselytizers, at least towards wayward Jews. In many ways, they are like first-century Christians who missioned, at least initially, to other Jews. They are aggressive in their ministry and believe heartily that they can convince any such Jew to join them. Rubashkin began immediately to work on Bloom accordingly — to save his Jewish soul. Part of that outreach involves matching the wayward Jew with a model Lubavitcher family for a Shabbat weekend. Bloom was receptive to this for several reasons — first, he wanted to see the Lubavitchers from the inside out, and second, he was genuinely curious about whether they had something to say to fix, as it were, his longing for something more meaningful in his Jewish life.

Bloom’s weekend with the Lubavitcher was gracious enough. He, along with his young son, took part in every aspect of the worship and dining. He observed a Jewish life that was so far removed from his own that he felt a great divide between himself and the patriarch of that family, Lazar. The model Lubavitcher made any number of comments that chafed at him excessively — from the casual dismissal of every other type of Jewishness as something obviously inferior, to the gross characterizations of gentiles, from the outright racism to the nasty prejudice. He was embarrassed by the willingness to treat the goyim with such disrespect — to view them as worthless. In what would be a theme that runs throughout the book, the Lubavitchers thought about the locals as people to be avoided, to navigate among them, or take advantage of them — but, in any event, never people with whom they would fraternize. If there was friction, and there was, it was universally and categorically chalked up to anti-Semitism.

There was a palpable groupthink among the Jews that refused to see the perspective of the locals, let alone empathize with them. The Jews were strictly transactional with the locals — we live here, you live here, leave us alone. But it was more than mere avoidance for the sake of toleration — it was an almost glee in deceiving the goyim that irked Bloom. The locals were essentially non-entities to the Jews — lacking any inherent value as human beings. To the Jews, however, their theology towards the gentiles made perfect sense — the Jew alone possessed a special relationship with God that required an insularity to protect it. The outside world — the non-observant world — was marked by one overriding theme: contamination and filth. The idea of fraternizing with the locals — of making nice with them — was then, at least to the ultra-orthodox mind, something incomprehensible. By analogy, it would be like asking them to put themselves in the “near-occasion” of sin. The Lubavitchers could never understand why Bloom cared what the locals thought — one way or the other — when he, Bloom, stood at the precipice of entering the fullness of Jewish life which he was gifted with entering by virtue of his birth as a Jew.

Bloom’s foray into religious Jewish life is something, however, that began to grate on him — a lot. Whether he was ever open-minded about it or not, he could not shake off his internal compass of liberalism in assessing the Lubavitcher way of life. In what was an interesting twist in the book, Bloom’s sympathy for the religious Jews did not merely stop as he came face-to-face with Jewish indifference and rudeness to the locals — but when he came to see the exclusionary nature of the religion from the inside out. In a sense, he became like an apostate (even though he was never a believer in that sense) in terms of his disgust with the Lubavitchers. They saw themselves as the best of Jews — he saw them as bigots and pious frauds. During his investigation, Bloom in fact confirmed that the Jews were very offensive to Postville’s civic leaders and the local populace. They often swindled contractors, retailers, and handymen by spreading out their payments over many months — when they did not simply toss the bill, that is. They drove too fast on the roads or simply ignored the parking rules. They drove jalopies with missing mufflers, and they parked them on their front laws. He recounts that one Jewish woman tried to bribe a policeman, and one Rabbi stole some handmade leather sheaths from a retailer, insisting that he had already paid for them. And they made the yards surrounding their homes into shambles — something which may seem insignificant on the surface, but which is nevertheless a sign of disrespect for the Germanic Iowans who took an inordinate pride in well-kept yards and homes as signs of civilization and breeding.

Another issue involved Postville’s municipal swimming pool. The Iowans were alarmed, legitimately at it turned out, that the Hasidic Jews would demand “Jews only” hours. Iowans would thus be displaced from a facility which they had built. As it turned out, the Lubavitchers eventually got their gentile-free time. There were also a great many zoning and building use violations. The Jews simply ignored the zoning rules as if they did not apply to them and built whatever they wanted wherever they wanted. About this, Bloom writes:

If the city of Postville tried to enforce any ordinance the Jews disagreed with, the immediate cry was anti-Semitism. If a local complained about the noise from the shul, if anyone disagreed about annexation, he or she was quickly branded an anti-Semite. Ultimately, I discovered, carrying on a conversation with any of the Postville Hasidim was virtually impossible. If you didn’t agree, you were at fault, part of the problem. You were paving the way for the ultimate destruction of the Jews, the world’s Chosen People. There was no room for compromise, no room for negotiation, no room for anything but total and complete submission.

Bloom’s attitudes grew more hostile to the Lubavitchers — so much so that he inserted himself into the story as someone actively rooted for the annexation vote to win and stick it to the Jews. Beyond the insolence and the refusal to treat the local goyim with even a modicum of respect, Bloom was vexed by the Jewish supremacism that he found among them during their attempts to proselytize him. The Lubavitchers also sensed that Bloom was a lost cause — an irredeemable Jew who did not — and would not — “get” it. Slowly but surely, Bloom became simply one of the non-Jews to the Lubavitchers.

Bloom was probably pushed to his limit when he researched a crime that involved a few dubious Lubavitchers that had happened years earlier. What he found disgusted him on several levels. He describes the September 27, 1991, crime spree of Lubavitchers Pinchas Lew and Phillip Stillman. The pair got drunk, removed the license plate from their car, and robbed two townspeople at gunpoint. They shot one woman — she recovered but the bullet was permanently lodged in her spine, causing her continual pain for the rest of her life. Bloom found out  that in Brooklyn Stillman had been part of the Orthodox underworld, and he left for Iowa after one of his gang’s members was murdered, execution-style. Stillman was a fascinating case — an adopted Colombian street kid and consistent problem and ne’er-do-well who was all but abandoned by the Lubavitcher community when he was arrested. By contrast, the arrest and imprisonment of a “real” Jew with a proud Chabad lineage, Pinchas Lew, caused a tumult in Postville’s Jewish community. The Lubavitchers saw Lew’s imprisonment an unjust kidnapping, and they mustered assistance from their community back in Crown Heights, raising vast sums for Lew’s bail and defense. Bloom describes illegal activities undertaken by the community on Lew’s behalf, like the spoliation and destruction of evidence that clearly implicated Lew in the crime spree. In the end, Lew received little punishment for his crime because Stillman was essentially bribed by the community to take the fall for the whole incident. Stillman and Lew vanished from the memory of the Iowa Lubavitchers — to merely mention them, as Bloom found out, was tantamount to anti-Semitism and insulting the Lubavitchers. Bloom was astounded by the collective indifference of the Lubavitchers to the crimes; they never checked up on the victims, expressed remorse, or even so much as offered them some kosher beef. Instead, the Jews militantly supported their criminals (at least Lew), and, as always, ignored those whom they had harmed. Aaron Rubashkin would only declaim to Bloom, “no matter what we do, the goyim always find fault with us.” Indeed, it is precisely when Bloom began researching and putting the story of the Stillman-Lew case together that the Lubavitchers cut him off altogether.

But in the end, what really pushed Bloom over the edge was how the Lubavitchers, in his view, sought to take advantage of a locally respected Jewish doctor’s death as a publicity stunt. “Doc” Wolf had served northeastern Iowa for fifty years and was a thoroughly assimilated Jew and widower. In his last dying days, Doc Wolf had asked the Lubavitchers to provide him some homemade Jewish food. He got the food — and then some. The Lubavitchers sent dozens of men to minister to him and sought to make him one of their own. They turned his hospice room into a turnstile of Rabbis praying with — and over — Doc Wolf. Not able to push them out — and perhaps lacking the mental acuity to do so — Doc Wolf tolerated their presence for his last few days. Bloom argues that the motivation to minister to Doc Wolf was the Lubavitchers’ view that if they could claim the well-regarded local doctor as their own, it would help in the upcoming annexation vote that was basically seen as a referendum of the locals on the Jews. I think Bloom discounts the sincerity of the Lubavitchers, however, because they probably believed that they were doing right by a wayward Jew in his last hours. Only after he died did Doc Wolf’s secular children forcibly remove the Lubavitchers from Doc Wolf’s room and still-warm body.

The annexation measure eventually passed but it did not make that much of a difference between the Jews and the locals. As a post-script (written a few years later in 2001), Bloom describes the tensions as persisting. The problems associated with the plant had continued, and the changes to the community from the influx of illegal immigrants (Russian, Ukrainian, Mexican, and then Somali) changed the once-sleepy White town of Postville forever. What happened afterwards is even more interesting — in 2008, the federal government ordered a massive immigration raid on the plant and hundreds of people were arrested, including Aaron Rubashkin’s son. Eventually, Sholom Rubashkin was sentenced to prison only to have President Trump pardon him in 2017.  Today, the plant is still Kosher although run by a different Jewish group — and Postville continues to have a large Hasidic community.

*        *        *

Postville is compelling read — I finished it over two days because I could not put it down.

Several themes stand out that warrant further consideration — the first among them is the personal turmoil of the author. Postville, when it came out, generated a lot of interest — reviews in The New York Times and other publications showed that the book touched a nerve about diversity and inclusion in the United States. What I found interesting about some of those reviews as I read them is that the author’s personal story was deemed by some to an intrusion in the overall story of Postville. Some reviewers felt that the book dwelt on Bloom’s inner conflict too much. I find myself in vigorous disagreement with that view. Bloom’s inner conflict — his biographical relationship to the Postville drama — was as much the story as was the conflict between the Hasidic Jews and native Iowans. In many ways, Bloom was the most interesting character in Postville — a sort of tortured and conflicted soul who related the broader conflict through the prism of his turmoil. In a sense, he was the most honest of brokers in telling this tale because the conclusion he reached was not the one he necessarily wanted to reach. In that, Bloom was acutely conscious of his own seemingly traitorous conduct in airing, as it were, the “dirty laundry” of the Jews in publishing Postville. And in the Jewish community, the role of traitor is especially odious, and I give Bloom credit for being willing to withstand that role even if it will stay with him for the rest of his life among most Jews.

But Bloom’s story is more than the turmoil — it is the source of that turmoil, which, at least in a sense, transcends Judaism. Bloom was navigating the threadbare meaning within the secular life and searching for some cure to it. All secular people face, whether they know it or not, the implications of their “faith” — that is, they face the realization that they have embraced a “faith” that posits that life has no essential meaning, that truth has no stable source, that morality is little more than opinion and convention, and that all we are is what we see. For an honest and sensitive secularist, there is a heartbreak within that worldview. No one wants to admit that their life — or the lives of their loved ones — is meaningless, but the materialist ethos of our secular age necessarily implies it. Parenthetically, while some may argue that secularism and irreligion are not overlapping circles, I have yet to meet a committed secularist who was not, at the same time, an irreligious materialist. To some secularists, we should just grow up and face it — life has no meaning, so let us enjoy it and not be overwrought by its the portents of its dismal reality. To others, meaning punctuates too much to be ignored and there exists a palpable tension between that feeling and the implications of meaninglessness. Bloom strikes me as the latter — he wanted meaning, he wanted purpose, he wanted to believe but he found in the Hasidic Jews meaning and purpose that were deeply offensive. In a sense, years of secularism have taken hold of his life and heart — he was essentially egalitarian. Thus, even if meaning and purpose were lacking, he could never find it in a religion that was essentially exclusionary.

His attempt, however, to give Hasidic Judaism a “chance” — at least I thought — was very telling. While I object to the ugliness at the heart of Talmudic Judaism, I feel much in common with it as a Traditional Catholic. My belief, and theirs, in the stark and abiding reality of God is a commonality. My belief, and theirs, in the bankruptcy of the secular world is another. My belief, and theirs, that we must follow the whole of God’s commandments no matter the cost is yet another. My belief, and theirs, that we should not count the cost of children but see each one as a supreme blessing from God is another. Finally, the belief in a rigorous morality, a hierarchal and teaching religion, and a life steeped in prayer for the glory and worship of God are more still. Serious Talmudic Jews, such as the Postville Jews, would dismiss me a non-entity and polytheist, and, in turn, I dismiss them as the blind and stubborn descendants of those who denied the messianic and divine reality of Jesus Christ. All the same, I have, at least on a practical level, more in common with them than I do with Stephen Bloom. And, in that sense, I am for more forgiving towards them than Bloom is — he did not merely reject them, he ratted on them and conveyed to the world the things that Jews say comfortably and discretely to only one another. In a sense then, he really did write a book that savaged them — perhaps not unfairly, but certainly uncharitably.

*        *        *

Another theme that fascinated me about Postville was its depiction of the death of a type of America — a homogeneous America that was marked by the yeoman farmer and local businessman. Small town and rural America before the opioid crisis, before the brain drain, before the sexual revolution, and before Walmart and the shopping mall. There was an element of Postville, Iowa as the last outpost of De Tocqueville’s America — a place where the farm-to-market road was not merely an historical signpost or road name. That America is all but gone — it is a place of changing demographics, addiction, disability, and Trump country. MAGA is a cheap substitute for the time when Americans were genuinely free and independent — and the rearguard action that is MAGA is a political and cultural death rattle for places like Postville. Indeed, the Whites of Postville are aging and contracepting — the high school undoubtedly is filled with Somalis, Mexicans, and other non-Whites. Not that I lament the American dream extending to others; I do not.; But the loss of Postville and the countless other rural places like it is a definitive sign of the demise of at least one version of America. If this is progress, it does not feel like it. I liked the world with Postville, as it was; and I think they should exist somewhere.

If Postville is a death, it is also a birth — a new America is being born there and elsewhere. Setting aside whether it is a better America, it is a different America to say the very least. Homogeneity and heterogeneity are dirty words unless we apply them panegyrically to the cult of diversity. We have no choice, praise diversity or else. So that Postville is now home to many languages, many cultures, many “others” is axiomatically good. And what Postville once was — an enclave of White Christian America — is axiomatically worse.

I happen to live in one of the most diverse places in America. I do not resent it — or the “other” — but I do not celebrate it either. The reality is that people tend to stick with other people most like them in terms of race, religion and, to a lesser extent, socio-economic station. In my town, we are “diverse” inasmuch as we have virtually the entire world’s population represented in microcosm in a small city but, at the same time, there is little overlap in the meaningful social interactions between these groups. It remains to be seen whether a land of many cultures can persist where one culture was once the norm. Certainly, at a minimum, the death of White America as epitomized by Postville’s collapse and the birth of the new multi-racial and multi-cultural America portends new and dramatic ways of living — less trust, less communication, less interaction, and less confidence. And all of that takes place in what is becoming a racial spoils system in which the various groups compete with each other for competitive advantage.

No, I am not bullish on the future of the multi-cultural paradise that liberalism is constructing on the ashes of the old America. Indeed, I am convinced that it portends an impossible situation that will not end well.

But homogeneity, in its racial or religious form, is far from dead. There is something to be said for the Hasidic Jews — and all fervent believers of virtually any type — in this new America. While the multi-racial and multi-cultural America is far more liberal and hostile to religion, and while secularism touches more and more Americans, a distinct and pugnacious religious minority (or minorities) is being born. Hasidic Jews are different from all of the Jews that came before them in the United States — they are militantly Jewish and refuse to make any compromises in the ways that past Jews undoubtedly did. Traditional Catholics are similarly militant. Other offshoots, for the lack of a better word, are taking root all over the country. While the morass of people is slowly and imperceptibly saying “no” to organized religion, a small minority within each tradition is reacting combatively, and they are persevering and growing.

Because of secularism’s hedonism and sterility, the growth of these micro-groups will soon begin to mushroom for two reasons. First, they have children (lots of them). When the average American family is well below the replacement rate of fertility of 2.1 children (because, after all, children exact a sacrifice which is inconsistent with a narcissistic culture), Hasidic Jews, the Amish, Traditional Catholics, and some White nationalists are having seven, eight or more children. And they are also happily rejecting feminism, homosexuality, modern culture, and divorce. The demographic exponential effect of large families birthing many children who, in turn, have large families will be felt much sooner than people realize. Second, an assertive, confident, and happy minority will attract more and more from the doldrums that is the secular hell of hedonism, meaninglessness, and nihilism. The Hasidic Jews will continue to make inroads among secular Jews; Traditional Catholics will do the same among the mass of lapsed and semi-religious Catholics; and racially conscious Whites will attract adherents as they see the burgeoning anti-White hate all around them. The new America will be confusing and hostile, but it will not be able to match the militancy of these groups who know who they are and resist contemporary liberal culture in every conceivable way. In a strange sense, I am comforted by the Hasidic rise in Postville and places like it — not because, of course, I want to live near them or condone their attitudes and behavior, but because they are a brand of Judaism that is growing wildly and rejecting secularism forcefully. In that, Hasidism represents just a type of rejection that transcends Judaism — one in which I myself am participating.

Postville and the takeover of the town by militantly religious Jews is interesting — but the themes it explores could have been written about the community of Traditional Catholics who similarly took over a Kansas town only a few years earlier. Indeed, in a feature article of the January/February 2020 Atlantic magazine Emma Green explored how an outside and militant Catholic group overwhelmed a small Midwestern farming town. The overlapping themes are there — exclusion, self-righteousness and assertiveness, fecundity in the extreme and the accusation of a cult-like atmosphere. As times goes by, I suspect that we will see more intentional communities like Saint Marys, Kansas and Postville, Iowa as militantly religious seek to live their lives in common with like-minded co-religionists.

*        *        *

Another theme that is uniquely Jewish is that of food. Of course, the premise of the Hasidic relocation was based upon the preparation and slaughter of Kosher food for religious Jews, but food is seemingly lurking on every page. Bloom himself reduces his attachment to Judaism to the food of his youth — to the traditional foods of the Jews. The Shabbat dinner, which is the central meal of the Jews each week, stands prominently in the description of the lives of the Hasidic Jews. I must not be the first person to make the connection that the Jewish ritual of Shabbat dinner — its meaning and importance — must provide some antecedents for the Catholic ritual of the eucharistic meal and sacrifice. In a shadowy sense, the Shabbat dinner, and the Catholic Mass share important connections.

Bloom finally cuts himself off from the Lubavitchers, psychologically anyway, during the long discourse that takes place over Shabbat dinner. For the native Iowans, their food — and ironically enough, the pig — are central to their lives as well. Everything that moves the story seems to involve food, or dinners, or coffee shops. The Doc Wolf incident itself was motivated by the old and dying Jew’s desire for some traditional and authentic Jewish food. While I like to eat, like any human being, I cannot relate to the significance of food for Jews. It is not a judgment on my part, but rather an observation. Food is frequently on the mind of the author.

*        *        *

The Hasidic contempt for the gentile is palpable throughout Postville. And in this, the ultra-orthodox stand in a long tradition drawing similar conclusions. According the one source, which appears to be consistent with the Hasidic view outlined in Postville, gentile and Jewish souls are very different — ontologically different. For example, “the people of Israel, the Zohar states, possess a living, holy, and elevated soul (“nefesh ḥayah kadisha ila’ah”), as opposed to the other nations, who are described as akin to animals and crawling creatures, which lack this “Divine” soul and possess only an “animal” soul.” See The Soul of a Jew and the Soul of a Non-Jew by Rabbi Hanan Balk, Ḥakirah, the Flatbush Journal of Jewish Law and Thought. For a variety of reasons, I have seen any number of Jewish sources that have indicated that the souls of Jews and gentiles are different, and, as such, Jews and gentiles are creatures of a different kind. The Jew is, accordingly, a spiritualized creature whose very essence is touched by God; the gentile by contrast is not and, as such, is likened to having an existence that is more animal-like.

These sources state a principle that is, on its face, not biologically grounded per se — who is a Jew is, more or less, assumed. One thing that has always interested me is whether the concept of a Jewish soul is the same as the definition of Jewishness. Would, for example, a man born of a Jewish father and a gentile mother have half a Jewish soul? Would the fact that Jewishness is typically deemed passed matrilineally mean that such a “half-breed” would have the “animal” soul of the gentile or something else? Does only a Jewish woman have the power to pass a Jewish soul down to her child — leaving Jewish men bereft of that power? To be fair, there are sources, and even the article cited above, that make clear that there is no consensus on this point, but the fact that this is something deeply embedded with Hasidic Judaism and the Jewish psyche is deeply disturbing. If it is axiomatic to condemn the Nazis for their dehumanization of Jews as “sub-humans,” what can we say of Jews and their brand of Judaism that say that non-Jews are essentially animals? Is that as objectionable? And, if not, why?

For those who pay any attention, the idea of a Jewish superiority complex should not be surprising. “Chosen-ness” evidently carries with it the implication of “un-chosen-ness,” which means necessarily that gentiles were not chosen. Interestingly enough to me, I have always puzzled over why Jews seem to think that their “chosen-ness” carries with it a superiority — as if God chose them because they were special or different. If the Christian charge is that Jews misunderstand seemingly everything about God, it certainly seems to this Christian that they misunderstand that God did not elevate them because they were different or more special; they became different and more special because God elevated them. But that elevation was never meant to be invitation to glory in themselves as if they were better than other men; it was a responsibility to bring the light of God’s glory to the nations, which, of course, they did in Jesus Christ. What seems lacking — profoundly — among Jews is humility. Their insufferable pride, which was on display in Postville, is there for anyone with eyes to see. And it is profoundly unholy.

*        *        *

Another theme that stood out to me was the obtuseness of Jewishness versus the liberalism of Jewishness. It goes without saying that the Hasidic Jews are not the majority of Jews in the United States or the world — if current demographic trends continue, they might be — but we are probably some time off from that now. Bloom became central to this conflict of Jewish liberalism and Jewish insularity — and, to his credit, he “walked the walk” when it came to what side he chose. I think Bloom is relatively unusual, even as a secular, liberal Jew, because he became the Frank Serpico of the Jews — a complete turncoat. Anyone who reads Postville — religious, non-religious, anti-religious — cannot help but be disgusted with the Hasidic Jews and everything about them. And Bloom is so unusual because my sense is that most liberal Jews like him would never do what he has done because there is a deep hypocrisy that runs through liberal Judaism that condemns every form of tribalism (in the most vicious way) except their own. Bloom took the Hasidic tribalism to task and that makes him someone very different. For example, most liberal Jews see no contradiction in supporting the transparently discriminatory practices of the ethnocentric state of Israel — the tiny and sovereign enclave of Jews increasingly dominated by Orthodox and ethnonationalist Jews much like the Hasidim — while excoriating any political aspirations for other groups to attain a similar place of homogeneous existence and perpetuation.

In the end, Bloom paints a horrible picture of Hasidic life and values. And, for the non-Jew anyway, reading and internalizing the reality of the Postville Jews cannot help but force people to question what they think they know about the Jews generally. True enough, Bloom critiqued his “own,” but the Hasidic Jews are not a different species of Jews — they are just a more extreme version of already existing attitudes among Jews (with the clear implication that even non-Hasidic Jews maintain some of these attitudes, even if more muted and closeted — as indicated by the broad support enjoyed by Orthodox, ethnonationalist Israel within the Jewish diaspora in the West).

It remains to be seen whether Jewish liberalism has a future — clearly, Hasidic Judaism does. My experience of Judaism has taught me that it exerts a gravity unto itself over those born into it — even among liberal Jews. But liberal Jews and Hasidic Jews are literally worlds apart in spirit and practice. Whether liberal Judaism can survive the varied impacts of assimilation, intermarriage, and socio-political distances from Talmudic Judaism is an open question. So is how long the cognitive dissonance between the putative liberal values of most secular Jews and the tribalist predicates for continued support for Israel and Jewish separation can last.

https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/TOO-Full-Logo-660x156-1.png 0 0 Bernard M. Smith https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/TOO-Full-Logo-660x156-1.png Bernard M. Smith2023-07-09 08:26:082023-07-09 08:32:24Traditional Jewish Separatism and De-humanization of Gentiles: A Review of Stephen Bloom’s Postville
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