Jewish Influence

Culture of Critique Expanded and Updated

The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements, 3rd edition
Kevin MacDonald
Antelope Hill Publishing, 2025 (recently banned on Amazon)
666+c pages, $39.89 paperback

In the later half of the twentieth century, the United States of America—hitherto the world’s most powerful and prosperous country—opened its borders to hostile foreign multitudes, lost its will to enforce civilized standards of behavior upon blacks and other “minority groups,” began enforcing novel “antidiscrimination” laws in a manner clearly discriminatory against its own founding European stock, repurposed its institutions of higher education for the inculcation of radical politics and maladaptive behavior upon the young, and submitted its foreign and military policy to the interests of a belligerent little country half way around the world. In the process, we destroyed our inherited republican institutions, wasted vast amounts of blood and treasure, and left a trail of blighted lives in a country which had formerly taken for granted that each rising generation would be better off than the last. One-quarter of the way into the twenty-first century, the continued existence of anything deserving the name “United States of America” would seem very much in doubt. What on earth happened?

While there is plenty of blame to go around, including some that rightfully belongs with America’s own founding stock, the full story cannot be honestly told without paying considerable attention to the rise of Eastern European Jews to elite status.

This population is characterized by a number of positive traits, including high verbal intelligence and an overall average IQ of 111. They typically have stable marriages, practice high-investment parenting, and enjoy high levels of social trust within their own community. In their European homelands they lived for many centuries in shtetls, closed townships composed exclusively of Jews, carefully maintaining social and (especially) genetic separation from the surrounding, usually Slavic population. This was in accord with an ancient Jewish custom going back at least to the Biblical Book of Numbers, in which the prophet Balaam tells the children of Israel “you shall be a people that shall dwell alone.”

If one wants to preserve social and genetic separation, few methods are more reliable than the cultivation of negative affect toward outsiders. This is what was done in such traditional, religiously organized Jewish communities: gentiles were considered treif, or ritually unclean, and Jewish children were encouraged to think of them as violent drunkards best avoided apart from occasional self-interested economic transactions.

Following the enlightenment and the French Revolution, Jews were “emancipated” from previous legal disabilities, but ancient habits of mind are not changed as easily as laws. One consequence was the attraction of many newly-emancipated Jews to radical politics. Radicals by definition believe there is something fundamentally wrong and unjust about the societies in which they live, which disposes them to form small, tightly-knit groups of like-minded comrades united in opposition to an outside world conceived as both hostile and morally inferior. In other words, radicalism fosters a social and mental environment similar to a shtetl. It is not really such a big step as first appears from rejecting a society because its members are ritually unclean and putative idolaters to rejecting it for being exploitative, capitalist, racist, and anti-Semitic. Jews themselves have often been conscious of this congruence between radicalism and traditional Jewish life: the late American neoconservative David Horowitz, e.g., wrote in his memoir Radical Son: “What my parents had done in joining the Communist Party and moving to Sunnyside was to return to the ghetto.”

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Eastern European Jewish population had grown beyond the capacity of traditional forms of Jewish economic activity to support it, resulting in widespread and sometimes dire poverty. Many turned to fanatical messianic movements of a religious or political character. Then, beginning in the 1890s, an increasing number of these impoverished and disaffected Jews started migrating to the United States. Contrary to a widespread legend, the great majority were not “fleeing pogroms”—they were looking for economic opportunity.

Even so, many Jews brought their radicalism and hostility to gentile society with them to their new homeland, and these persisted even in the absence of legal restrictions upon them and long after they had overcome their initial poverty. Jewish sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset has written colorfully of the countless wealthy and successful American Jewish “families which around the breakfast table, day after day, in Scarsdale, Newton, Great Neck, and Beverly Hills have discussed what an awful, corrupt, immoral, undemocratic, racist society the United States is.”

Over the course of the twentieth century, these smart, ambitious, and ethnically well-networked Eastern European Jews rose to elite status in the academy, the communications media, law, business, and politics. By the 1960s, they had succeeded in replacing the old Protestant ruling class with an alliance between themselves, other “minorities” with grudges against the American majority, and a sizeable dose of loyalty-free White sociopaths on the make. Unlike the old elite it replaced, the new rulers were at best suspicious of—and often actually hostile toward—the people they came to govern, and we have already enumerated some of the most disastrous consequences of their rule in our opening paragraph.

Kevin MacDonald’s The Culture of Critique describes several influential movements created and promoted by Jews during the twentieth century in the course of their rise. It is the best book you will find on the Jewish role in America’s decline. First published by Praeger in 1998, a second paperback edition augmented with a new Preface appeared in 2002. Now, twenty-three years later, he has brought out a third edition of the work through Antelope Hill Publishing. In addition to expanding the earlier editions’ accounts of Boasian Anthropology, Freudian Psychoanalysis, various Marxist or quasi-Marxist forms of radicalism, and Jewish immigration activism, he has added an entirely new chapter on neoconservatism. As he explains:

I argue that these movements are attempts to alter Western societies in a manner that would neutralize or end anti-Semitism and enhance the prospects for Jewish group continuity and upward mobility. At a theoretical level, these movements are viewed as the outcome of conflicts of interest between Jews and non-Jews in the construction of culture and in various public policy issues.

This edition is fully 40 percent longer than its predecessor, yet a detailed table of contents makes it easier for readers to navigate.

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We shall have a detailed look at the chapter on “The Boasian School of Anthropology and the Decline of Darwinism in the Social Sciences,” since it is both representative of the work as a whole and significantly augmented over the version in previous editions.

Anthropology was still a relatively new discipline in America at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, but it enjoyed a promising theoretical foundation in Darwinian natural selection and the rapidly developing science of genetics. Darwinists and Mendelians, however, were opposed by Lamarckians who believed that acquired characteristics could be inherited: e.g., that if a man spent every day practicing the piano and then fathered a son, his son might have an inborn advantage in learning the piano. This idea was scientifically discredited by the 1930s, but long remained popular among Jewish intellectuals for nonscientific reasons, as a writer cited by MacDonald testifies:

Lenz cites an “extremely characteristic” statement of a Jewish intellectual: “The denial of the racial importance of acquired characters favours race hatred.” The obvious interpretation of such sentiments is that Jewish intellectuals opposed the theory of natural selection because of its negative political implications.

In one famous case a Jewish researcher committed suicide when the fraudulent nature of his study in support of Lamarckism was exposed.

Franz Boas was among the Jewish intellectuals to cling to Lamarckism long after its discrediting. He had what Derek Freeman describes as an “obscurantist antipathy to genetics” that extended even to opposing genetic research. This attitude was bound up with what Carl Degler called his “life-long assault on the idea that race was a primary source of the differences to be found in the mental or social capabilities of human groups.” He did not arrive at this position as a result of disinterested scientific inquiry. Rather, as Degler explains, he thought racial explanations “undesirable for society” and had “a persistent interest in pressing his social values upon the profession and the public.”

Boas appeared to wear his Jewishness lightly; MacDonald remarks that he “sought to be identified foremost as a German and as little as possible as a Jew.”  Anthropologist and historian Leonard B. Glick wrote:

He did not acknowledge a specifically Jewish cultural or ethnic identity. . . . To the extent that Jews were possessed of a culture, it was . . . strictly a matter of religious adherence. . . . He was determined . . . not to be classified as a member of any group.

Yet such surface appearances can be misleading. From a very early age, Boas was deeply concerned with anti-Semitism and felt alienated from the Germany of his time. These appear to have been the motives for his emigration to America. He also maintained close associations with the Jewish activist community in his new homeland. Especially in his early years at Columbia, most of his students were Jewish, and of the nine whom Leslie White singles out as his most important protegés, six were Jews. According to David S. Koffman: “these Jews tended to marry other Jews, be buried in Jewish cemeteries, and socialize with fellow Jews, all core features of Jewish ethnicity, though they conceived of themselves as agents of science and enlightenment, not Jewish activists.”

Boas was also dependent on Jewish patronage. In the 1930s, for instance, he worked to set up a research program to “attack the racial craze” (as he put it). The resulting Council of Research of the Social Sciences was, as Elazar Barkan acknowledges in The Retreat of Scientific Racism (1993) “largely a façade for the work of Boas and his students.” Financial support was principally Jewish, since others declined solicitations. Yet Boas was aware of the desirability of disguising Jewish motivations and involvement publicly, writing to Felix Warburg: “it seemed important to show the general applicability of the results to all races both from the scientific point of view and in order to avoid the impression that this is a purely Jewish undertaking.”

One of Boas’s Jewish students remarked that young Jews of her generation felt they had only three choices in life—go live in Paris, hawk communist newspapers on street corners, or study anthropology at Columbia. The latter option was clearly perceived as a distinctively “Jewish” thing to do. Why is this?

Many Jews have supplemented Jewish advocacy with activism on behalf of “pluralism” and other ethnic “minority groups.” Boas himself, for example, maintained close connections with the NAACP and the Urban League. David S. Lewis has described such activities as an effort to “fight anti-Semitism by remote control.” And anthropology itself as conceived by Boas was not merely a scholarly discipline but an extension of these same concerns.

Much of the actual fieldwork conducted by Boas and his students focused on the American Indian. In a passage new to this edition, MacDonald quotes from David S. Koffman’s The Jews’ Indian (2019) on the Jewish motivations that frequently lay behind their work:

Jewishness shaped the profession’s engagement with its practical object of study, the American Indian. Jews’ efforts—presented as the efforts of science itself—to salvage, collect, and preserve disappearing American Indian culture was a form of ventriloquism. [Yet they] assumed their own Jewishness would remain an invisible and insignificant force in shaping the ideas they would use to shape ideas about others.

Boasian anthropologists did not draw any sharp distinction between their professional and their political concerns:

Political action formed a part of many anthropologists’ sense of the intellectual mission of the field. Their findings, and the framing of distinct cultures, each worthy of careful attention in its own right, mattered to social existence in the United States. Their scholarship on Native American cultures developed alongside their personal and political work on behalf of Jewish causes.

Koffman highlights the case of Boas’s protegé Edward Sapir:

Sapir’s Jewish background continuously influenced and intersected with his scholarship on American Indians. Sapir’s biography shows a fascinating parallel preoccupation with both Native and Jewish social issues. These tracks run side by side, concerned as both were with parallel questions about ethnic survival, adaptability, dignity, cultural autonomy, and ethnicity.

Some Jews from Boas’s circle of influence even went to work for the US government’s Bureau of Indian Affairs, where they “consistently linked Indian uplift with an articulation of minority rights and cultural pluralism.” In this way, writes Koffman, “Jewish enlightened self-interest impacted the course of American Indian life in the middle of the twentieth century.”

Boas had a number of gentile students as well, of course, especially in the later part of his career. Yet some observers have commented upon differences in the thinking and motivations of his Jewish and gentile followers. While the rejection of racial explanations was a moral crusade for many of the Jews, as it was for Boas himself, his gentile students were more inclined to view the matter simply as a theoretical issue. Alfred Kroeber, for example, once impatiently remarked that “our business is to promote anthropology rather than to wage battles on behalf of tolerance.”

Two of Boas’s best known gentile disciples were Margeret Meade and Ruth Benedict, and it may not be an accident that both of these women were lesbians. As Sarich and Miele write in Race: The Reality of Human Difference (2004): “Their sexual preferences are relevant because developing a critique of traditional American values was as much a part of the Boasian program in anthropology as was their attacks on eugenics and nativism.” More generally, they note, “the Boasians felt deeply estranged from American society and the male WASP elites they were displacing in anthropology.” Jewish or not, they saw themselves as a morally superior ingroup engaged in a struggle against a numerically superior outgroup. In this respect, they formed a historical link between the radical cells and shtetls of the old world and the hostile elite ruling America today.

Boas posed as a skeptic and champion of methodological rigor when confronted with theories of cultural evolution or genetic influence on human differences, but as the evolutionary anthropologist Leslie White pointed out, the burden of proof rested lightly on Boas’s own shoulders: his “historical reconstructions are inferences, guesses, and unsupported assertions [ranging] from the possible to the preposterous. Almost none is verifiable.”

MacDonald writes:

An important technique of the Boasian school was to cast doubt on general theories of human evolution . . . by emphasizing the vast diversity and chaotic minutiae of human behavior, as well as the relativism of standards of evaluation. The Boasians argued that general theories of cultural evolution must await a detailed cataloguing of cultural diversity, but in fact no general theories emerged from this body of research in the ensuing half-century of its dominance of the profession. Leslie White, an evolutionary anthropologist whose professional opportunities were limited because of his theoretical orientation, noted that because of its rejection of fundamental scientific activities such as generalization and classification, Boasian anthropology should be classed more as an anti-theory than a theory of human culture.

Boas brooked no dissent from his followers:

Individuals who disagreed with the leader, such as Clark Wissler, were simply excluded from the movement. Wissler was a member of the Galton society, which promoted eugenics, and accepted the theory that there is a gradation of cultures from lowest to highest, with Western civilization at the top.

Among Boas’s most egregious sins against the scientific spirit was a study he produced at the request of the US Immigration Commission called into being by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1907. This was eventually published as Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants. It maintained the extremely implausible thesis that the skulls of the children of immigrants to the US differed significantly from those of their parents—in spite of the influence of heredity, and due entirely to growing up in America. The paper came to be cited countless times by writers of textbooks and anyone who wished to deprecate the importance of heredity or stress that of environment.

Ninety years later, anthropologists Corey S. Sparks and Richard L. Janz reanalyzed Boas’s original data. While they stop short of accusing him of deliberate fraud, they did find that his data fail to support his conclusions. In MacDonald’s words:

Boas made inflated claims about the results: very minor changes in cranial index were described as changes of “type” so that Boas was claiming that within one generation immigrants developed the long-headed type characteristic of northwest Europeans. Several modern studies show that cranial shape is under strong genetic influence. [Sparks and Janz’s] reanalysis of Boas’s data indicated that no more than one percent of the variation between groups could be ascribed to the environmental effects of immigration.

In short, Boas’s study was not disinterested science but propaganda in a political battle over immigration. At a minimum, he was guilty of sloppy work inspired by wishful thinking.

Boas’s actual anthropological studies, such as those on the Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island, contributed little to human knowledge. But this was not where his talent lay: his true achievement was in the realm of academic politics. He built a movement that served as an extension of himself long after his death, capturing and jealously controlling anthropological institutions and publications, and making it difficult for those who dissented from his scientifically groundless views to achieve professional success. As MacDonald writes:

By 1915 his followers controlled the American Anthropological Association and held a two-thirds majority on its executive board. In 1919 Boas could state that “most of the anthropological work done at the present time in the United States” was done by his students at Columbia. By 1926 every major department of anthropology was headed by Boas’s students, the majority of whom were Jewish.

Boas strenuously promoted the work of his disciples, but rarely cited works of people outside his group except to disparage them. A section new to this third edition explains how his influential student Melville Herskovits also blocked from publication and research funding those not indebted to him or not supporting his positions. Margaret Meade’s fairy tale of a sexually liberated Samoa, on the other hand, became the bestselling anthropological work of all time due almost entirely to zealous promotion by her fellow Boasians at prominent American universities.

Among the more obvious biases of anthropological work carried out by Boas’s disciples was a nearly complete ignoring of warfare and violence among the peoples they studied. Their ethnographic studies, such as Ruth Benedict’s account of the Zuni Indians in Patterns of Culture (1934), promoted romantic primitivism as a means of critiquing modern Western civilization. Works like Primitive War (1949) by Harry Holbert Turney-High, which documented the universality and savagery of war, were simply ignored. As MacDonald explains:

The behavior of primitive peoples was bowdlerized while the behavior of European peoples was not only excoriated as uniquely evil but also as responsible for all extant examples of warfare among primitive peoples. From this perspective, it is only the fundamental inadequacy of European culture that prevents an idyllic world free from between-group conflict.

Leslie White wrote that “Boas has all the attributes of the head of a cult, a revered charismatic teacher and master, literally worshiped by disciples whose permanent loyalty has been effectively established.” MacDonald describes his position as closer to that of a Hasidic Rebbe among his followers than to the leader of a genuinely scientific research program—the results of which can never be known in advance.

Due to the success of Boas’s mostly Jewish disciples in gaining control of institutional anthropology, by the middle of the twentieth century it became commonplace for well-read American laymen to refer to human differences in cultural terms. Western Civilization was merely different from, not better than, the ways of headhunters and cannibals. A vague impression was successfully propagated to the public that “science had proven” the equality of the races; few indeed understood that the “proof” consisted in the scientists who thought otherwise having been driven into unemployment. Objective research into race and racial differences largely ceased, and an intellectual atmosphere was created in which many imagined that the opening of America’s borders to the world would make little practical difference.

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Space precludes us from looking in similar detail at all the book’s chapters, but we must give the reader an idea of the material new to this third edition. Some of the most important is found in an 85-page Preface, and concerns the rise of Jews in the American academic world. Boasian anthropology may be seen in hindsight as an early episode in this rise, but Boas died in 1942 and our main story here concerns the postwar period. As MacDonald writes:

The transformation of the faculty was well under way in the 1950s and by the late 1960s was largely complete. It was during this period that the image of the radical leftist professor replaced the image of the ivory tower professor—the unworldly person at home with his books, pipe, and tweed jacket, totally immersed in discussions of Renaissance poetry.

The old academic elite had been better educated than the public at large, of course, but saw themselves as trustees of the same Christian European civilization, and did not desire radical changes to the society in which they lived. Today’s representative professor “almost instinctively loathes the traditional institutions of European-American culture: its religion, customs, manners, and sexual attitudes.”

This matters, because the academy is a crucial locus of moral and intellectual authority:

Contemporary views on issues like race, gender, immigration are manufactured in the academy (especially elite universities), disseminated throughout the media and the lower levels of the educational system, and ultimately consumed by the educated and not-so-educated public. Newspaper articles and television programs on these issues routinely include quotes from academic experts.

By 1968 Jews, who made up less than three percent of the US population, constituted 20 percent of the faculty of elite American colleges and universities, with overrepresentation most pronounced among younger faculty. Studies found Jewish faculty well to the left of other academics, more supportive of student radicals, and more likely to approve relaxing standards in order to recruit non-White faculty and students. By 1974, a study of articles published in the top twenty academic journals found that Jews made up 56 percent of the social scientists and 61 percent of the humanities scholars.

A possibly extreme but telling example of left-wing bias is Jonathan Haidt’s informal 2011 survey at a convention of social psychologists, reputedly the most left-leaning area of academic psychology. Haidt found only three participants out of 1000 willing publicly to label themselves “conservative.” He acknowledges that this discipline has evolved into a “tribal moral community” that shuns and ostracizes political conservatives, with the result that research conflicting with its core political attitudes is either not performed or is likely to be excluded from peer-reviewed journals.

MacDonald devotes considerable attention to a widely discussed 2012 paper “Why Are Professors Liberal?” by Neil Gross and Ethan Fosse. The authors argue that academics are more liberal than the population at large for three reasons. First and most importantly, due to the higher proportion of academics with advanced educational credentials, an effect they consider independent of the role IQ plays in helping obtain such credentials. MacDonald remarks that this liberal shift may be due either to socialization and conditioning in the graduate school environment or to perceived self-interest in adopting liberal views and/or identifying with an officially sanctioned victim group.

Second, Gross and Fosse believe liberalism results from academic’s greater tolerance for controversial ideas. MacDonald is dismissive of this proposal, writing that in his observation such tolerance does not exist outside the professoriate’s self-conception.

Third, they find that liberalism corelates with the larger fraction of the religiously unaffiliated in the academy. MacDonald points out that many of the religiously unaffiliated are probably Jews, and remarks that the study would have been more informative if race and Jewish ethnic background had been included as variables alongside religious affiliation.

Gross and Fosse acknowledge that their data can be interpreted in a number of ways, but their own argument is that

the liberalism of professors . . . is a function . . . of the systematic sorting of young adults who are already liberally—or conservatively—inclined into and out of the academic profession, respectively. We argue that the professoriate, along with a number of other knowledge work fields, has been “politically typed” as appropriate for and welcoming of people with broadly liberal political sensibilities, and as inappropriate for conservatives.

In other words, academic liberalism is the product of a natural sorting process similar to that which has resulted in a career such as nursing being typecast as appropriate for women. It should be emphasized, however, that much of this sorting is done by the academy itself, not by prospective academics: many professors unhesitatingly acknowledge their willingness to discriminate against conservative job candidates.

The Gross and Fosse study also fails to explore the way the meaning of being liberal or left wing has changed over the years. The academy was already considered left-leaning when the White Protestant ascendency was still intact. But in those days being liberal meant supporting labor unions and other institutions aimed at improving the lot of the (predominantly White) working class.

The New Left abandoned the White working class because it was insufficiently radical, desiring incremental improvements of its own situation rather than communist revolution. The large Jewish component of the New Left, typified by the Frankfurt School, was also shaken by Hitler’s success in gaining the support of German labor. So they abandoned orthodox Marxism in a search for aggrieved groups more likely to demand radical change. These they found in ethnic and sexual minority groups such as Blacks, feminists, and homosexuals. They also advocated for massive non-White immigration to dilute the power of the White majority, leave Jews less conspicuous, and recruit new ethnic groups easily persuadable to cultivate grievances against the dwindling White majority.

Today’s academy is a product of the New Left of the 1960s. While it is more “liberal” (in the American sense) than the general public on economic issues, what makes it truly distinctive is its attitudes on social issues: sexual liberation (including homosexuality and abortion), moral relativism, religion, church-state separation, the replacement of patriotism by cosmopolitan ideals, and the whole range of what has been called “expressive individualism.”

Sorting can explain how an existing ideological hegemony within the academy maintains itself, but not how it could have arisen in the first place. To account for the rise of today’s academic left, Gross and Fosse propose a conflict theory of successful intellectual movements. In particular, they cite sociological research indicating that such movements have three key ingredients: 1) they originate with people with high-status positions having complaints against the current environment, resulting in conflict with the status quo; 2) these intellectuals form cohesive and cooperative networks; and 3) this network has access to prestigious institutions and publication outlets.

This fits Kevin MacDonald’s theory of Jewish intellectual movements to a T. Indeed, since the academic left is so heavily Jewish, we are in part dealing with the same subject matter. Even Gross and Fosse show some awareness of this, as MacDonald writes:

Gross and Fosse are at least somewhat cognizant of the importance of Jewish influence. They deem it relevant to point out that Jews entered the academic world in large numbers after World War II and became overrepresented among professors, especially in elite academic departments in the social sciences.

So let us apply the Gross and Fosse three-part scheme to radical Jewish academics. First, Jews do indeed have a complaint against the environment in which they live, or rather two related complaints: the long history of anti-Semitism and the predominance of White Christian culture.

As MacDonald notes, “it is common for Jews to hate all manifestations of Christianity.” In his book Why Are Jews Liberals? (2009), Norman Podhoretz formulates this Jewish complaint as follows:

[The Jews] emerged from the Middle Ages knowing for a certainty that—individual exceptions duly noted—the worst enemy they had in the world was Christianity: the churches in which it was embodied—whether Roman Catholic or Russian Orthodox or Protestant—and the people who prayed in and were shaped by them.

Anti-Jewish attitudes, however, by no means depend on Christian belief. In the nineteenth century Jews began to be criticized as an economically successful alien race intent on subverting national cultures. Accordingly, the complaint of many Jews today is no longer merely Christianity but the entire civilization created by Europeans in both its religious and its secular aspects.

From this point it is a very short step to locating the source of anti-Semitism in the nature of European-descended people themselves. The Frankfurt School took this step, and the insurgent Jewish academic left followed them. MacDonald writes:

This explicit or implicit sense that Europeans themselves are the problem is the crux of the Jewish complaint. [It] has resonated powerfully among Jewish intellectuals. Hostility to the people and culture of the West was characteristic of all the Jewish intellectual movements of the left that came to be ensconced in the academic world of the United States and other Western societies.

The second item in Gross and Fosse’s list of the traits of successful intellectual movements is that their partisans form cohesive, cooperative networks. All the Jewish movements studied by Kevin MacDonald have done this, as he has been at pains to emphasize. Group strategies outcompete individualist strategies in the intellectual and academic world just as they do in politics and the broader society. It does not matter that Western science is an individualistic enterprise in which people can defect from any group consensus easily in response to new discoveries or more plausible theories. The Jewish intellectual movements studied by MacDonald are not scientific research programs at all, but “hermeneutic exercise[s] in which any and all events can be interpreted within the context of the theory.” These authoritarian movements thus represent a corruption of the Western scientific ideal, yet that does nothing to prevent them from being effective in the context of academic politics.

Finally, Gross and Fosse note that the most successful intellectual movements are those with access to prestigious institutions and publication outlets. This has clearly been true of the Jewish movements Kevin MacDonald has studied, as he himself notes:

The New York Intellectuals developed ties with elite universities, particularly Harvard, Columbia, the University of Chicago, and the University of California-Berkeley, while psychoanalysis and Boasian anthropology became entrenched throughout academia. The Frankfurt School intellectuals were associated with Columbia and the University of California-Berkeley, and their intellectual descendants are dispersed through the academic world. The neoconservatives are mainly associated with the University of Chicago and Johns Hopkins University, and they were able to get their material published by the academic presses at these universities as well as Cornell University.

The academic world is a top-down system in which the highest levels are rigorously policed to ensure that dissenting ideas cannot benefit from institutional prestige. The panic produced by occasional leaks in the system, as when the University of Chicago’s John Mearsheimer teamed up with Harvard’s Stephen Walt to offer some cautious criticisms of the Israel lobby, demonstrate the importance of obtaining and monopolizing academic prestige.

Moreover, once an institution has been captured by the partisans of a particular intellectual perspective, informal scholarly networks become de facto gatekeeping mechanisms, creating enormous inertia. As MacDonald writes: “there is tremendous psychological pressure to adopt the fundamental assumptions at the center of the power hierarchy of the discipline. It is not surprising that people [are] attracted to these movements because of the prestige associated with them.”

What MacDonald calls the final step in the transformation of the university into a bastion of the anti-White left is the creation since the 1970s of whole programs of study revolving around aggrieved groups:

My former university is typical of academia generally in having departments or programs in American Indian Studies, Africana Studies (formerly Black Studies), American Studies (whose subject matter emphasizes “How do diverse groups within the Americas imagine their identities and their relation to the United States?”), Asian and Asian-American Studies, Chicano and Latino Studies, Jewish Studies, and Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies. All of these departments and programs are politically committed to advancing their special grievances against Whites and their culture.

Although it is difficult to specify the exact linkage, the academic triumph of Jewish radicals was followed in short order by the establishment of these other pillars of the cultural left within the university.

As MacDonald notes, women make up an important component of the grievance coalition in academia, and not only in the area of “Women’s Studies.” They make up around 60 percent of PhDs and 80 percent of bachelor’s degrees in ethnic, gender and cultural studies.

Overall, compared to men, women are more in favor of leftist programs to end free speech and censor speech they disagree with. They are more inclined toward activism, and less inclined toward dispassionate inquiry; they are more likely to agree that hate speech is violence, that it’s acceptable to shout down a speaker, that controversial scientific findings should be censored, and that it should be illegal to say offensive things about minorities.

Such differences are likely due to women’s evolutionary selection for empathy and fear. No amount of bravado about “smashing the patriarchy” can conceal women’s tendency to timid conformism, and that is precisely what leads to success in academic grievance studies.

Although MacDonald does not consider feminism a fundamentally Jewish movement, many Jewish women have unquestionably played a prominent role within it, and it is marked by the same disregard of biological realities we observed in Boasian anthropology. The new Preface accordingly offers some brief remarks on Jewish lesbian and academic gender theorist Judith Butler. One of her leading ideas is that gender identity is “performative,” and unconstrained by genetic or hormonal influences. This leaves us free to rebel against the patriarchy by engaging in “subversive performances of various kinds.” Obviously, the contemporary transgender movement would count as an example of such a performance.

Jews have been greatly overrepresented in the student bodies of elite American universities for several decades, to a degree that their intelligence and academic qualifications cannot begin to account for:

Any sign that the enrollment of Jews at elite universities is less than about 20 percent is seen as indicative of anti-Semitism. A 2009 article in The Daily Princetonian cited data from Hillel [a Jewish campus organization] indicating that, with the exception of Princeton and Dartmouth, on average Jews made up 24 percent of Ivy League undergraduates. Princeton had only 13 percent Jews, leading to much anxiety and a drive to recruit more Jewish students. The result was extensive national coverage, including articles in The New York Times and The Chronicle of Higher Education. The rabbi leading the campaign said she “would love 20 percent”—an increase from over six times the Jewish percentage in the population to around ten times.

According to Ron Unz:

These articles included denunciations of Princeton’s long historical legacy of anti-Semitism and quickly led to official apologies, followed by an immediate 30 percent rebound in Jewish numbers. During these same years, non-Jewish white enrollment across the entire Ivy League had dropped by roughly 50 percent, reducing those numbers to far below parity, but this was met with media silence or even occasional congratulations on the further “multicultural” progress of America’s elite education system.

The Preface to this new edition of The Culture of Critique also contains additions on the psychology of media influence and Jewish efforts to censor the internet, along with an updating of information on Jewish ownership and control of major communications media.

Chapter Three on “Jews and the Left” includes a new sixteen-page section “Jews as Elite in the USSR,” as well as shorter additions on Jews and McCarthyism, and even the author’s own reminiscences of Jewish participation in the New Left at the University of Wisconsin in his youth. The additions incorporate material from important works published since the second edition, including Solzhenitsyn’s Two Hundred Years Together (2002), Yuri Slezkine’s The Jewish Century (2004), and Philip Mendes’s Jews and the Left (2014).

Chapter Four on “Neoconservatism as a Jewish Movement” is new to this edition, although its core has already appeared in the author’s previous book Cultural Insurrections (2007) and elsewhere. MacDonald’s account of how the neocons maintained a self-image as a beleaguered and embattled minority even as they determined the destiny of the world’s most powerful country is an impressive testament to the unchanging nature of the Jewish shtetl mindset.

Chapter Five on “Jewish Involvement in the Psychoanalytic Movement” has been expanded with material on Freud’s Hungarian-Jewish disciple Sándor Ferenczi and the Budapest school of psychoanalysis.

Chapter Six on “The Frankfurt School of Social Research and the Pathologization of Gentile Group Allegiances” includes new biographical sketches of the major figures and cites extensively from the recently published private correspondences of Horkheimer and Adorno. A new section on Samuel H. Flowerman (based on the research of Andrew Joyce) throws light on the nexus between the Frankfurt School and influential Jews in the communications media. There is also expanded coverage of Jaques Derrida and the Dada movement.

Chapter Eight on “Jewish Shaping of US Immigration Policy” has been updated and corroborated using more recent scholarship by Daniel Okrent Daniel Tichenor, and Otis Graham, as well as Harry Richardson and Frank Salter’s Anglophobia (2023) on Jewish pro-immigration activism in Australia. MacDonald makes clear that Jewish pro-immigration activism was motivated by fear of an anti-Jewish movement among a homogeneous White Christian society, as occurred in Germany from 1933–1945) Moreover:

Nevertheless, despite its clear importance to the activist Jewish community [and its eventual tranformative effects], the most prominent sponsors of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,

did their best to downplay the law’s importance in public discourse. National policymakers were well aware that the general public was opposed to increases in either the volume or diversity of immigration to the United States. . . . [However,] in truth the policy departures of the mid-1960s dramatically recast immigration patterns and concomitantly the nation. Annual admissions increased sharply in the years after the law’s passage. (Daniel Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America, Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 218)

The Conclusion, “Whither Judaism and the West?” is heavily updated from the previous version. MacDonald speculates on the possible rise of a new non-Jewish elite that might challenge Jewish hegemony in three key areas: the media, political funding, and the academy. He sees Elon Musk, with his support for Donald Trump’s populism and (relatively) free speech, as a possible harbinger of such an elite. Musk has commented explicitly on Jewish hostility to Whites and taken heat for it.

Regarding the media, MacDonald writes:

If the 2024 election shows anything, it’s that the legacy mainstream media is distrusted more than ever and has been effectively replaced among wide swaths of voters, especially young voters, by alternative media, particularly podcasts and social media. […] The influence of the legacy media, a main power base of the mainstream liberal-left Jewish community, appears to be in terminal decline.

A recent sign of the times was the eviction of the New York Times, National Public Radio, NBC and Politico from their Pentagon offices to make room for outlets such as One America News Network and Breitbart.

Jewish financial clout is still in place, but may be of diminishing importance as well. As of August 2024, twenty-two of the twenty-six top donors to the Trump campaign were gentiles, and only one Jew—Miriam Adelson at $100 million—made the top ten. (Musk eventually contributed around $300 million. The author quotes a description of all the wealthy people in attendance at Trump’s second inaugural, and only one of the six men named was Jewish. MacDonald notes that “most of these tycoons were likely just trying to ingratiate themselves with the new administration, but this is a huge change from the 2017 and suggests that they are quite comfortable with at least some of the sea changes Trump is pursuing.”

The university is the most difficult pillar of Jewish power to challenge, as MacDonald notes, “because hiring is rigorously policed to make sure new faculty and administrators are on the left.” There has recently been a challenge to Jewish interests in the academy by students protesting—or attempting to protest—Israeli actions in the Gaza strip. But Ron Unz vividly describes what can happen to such students:

At UCLA an encampment of peaceful protestors was violently attacked and beaten by a mob of pro-Israel thugs having no university connection but armed with bars, clubs, and fireworks, resulting in some serious injuries. Police stood aside while UCLA students were attacked by outsiders, then arrested some 200 of the former. Most of these students were absolutely stunned. For decades, they had freely protested on a wide range of political causes without ever encountering a sliver of such vicious retaliation. Some student organizations were immediately banned and the future careers of the protestors were harshly threatened.

Protesting Israel is not treated like protesting “heteronormativity.” Two Ivy League presidents were quickly forced to resign for allowing students to express themselves.

Despite this awesome display of continuing Jewish power, anti-White “Diversity, Equity and Inclusion” policies are now under serious attack at American universities. MacDonald also notes that the academy is a less important a power base than either the media or political funding.

The Conclusion has also been updated with a consideration of whether multiculturalism may be backfiring on its Jewish creators as some members of the anti-White coalition turn to anti-Semitism.

It should be acknowledged that the insertion of new material into this updated edition required the deletion of a certain amount of the old. I was sorry to note, e.g., the removal of the table contrasting European and Jewish cultural forms, found on page xxxi of the second edition. So while everyone concerned with the question of Jewish influence should promptly procure this new third edition, I am not ready to part with my copy of the second.

The Judeo-Accelerationist Presidency

The Judeo-Accelerationist Presidency

From killing Iran’s top general to legitimizing West Bank annexation, Donald Trump has made U.S. power serve Israel.

Donald Trump’s presidency has been marked by a dramatic intensification of U.S. support for Israel that would make previous presidential administrations blush. This shift is so marked and forceful that it can be understood through the lens of Judeo-Accelerationism. Originating from accelerationist theory, which holds that intensifying a prevailing system’s logic can bring about transformative change, Judeo-Accelerationism describes the abandonment of incremental support for Israel in favor of rapid, sweeping policies that reshape the geopolitical landscape to Israel’s benefit.

While every American president since Harry Truman has maintained a baseline of pro-Israel policy, Trump has gone well beyond this norm. His approach shattered long-standing diplomatic taboos and pushed U.S.-Israel relations into an entirely new and more aggressive phase. Far from merely maintaining the status quo, Trump’s policies reflect a zealous commitment to radically advancing Israeli interests at an unprecedented pace, making even the most hawkish neoconservative administrations of the past appear cautious by comparison.

Trump’s Judeo-Accelerationist Agenda: From First to Second Term

Both of Trump’s presidential terms reflect this relentless pursuit of Israeli objectives. The clearest and most symbolic move came in 2018, when Trump officially moved the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This wasn’t just a symbolic gesture—it was the violation of a long-held international consensus. Although Congress had passed the Jerusalem Embassy Act in 1995, every president since then, including Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama, had deferred the move out of concern it would undermine peace negotiations. Trump not only executed the move but also timed the embassy’s opening for May 14, 2018, the 70th anniversary of Israel’s founding. As Palestinians protested at the Gaza border, Israeli forces killed dozens of demonstrators.

In March 2019, Trump went further by recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. This region has been occupied by Israel since 1967 and unilaterally annexed in 1981. No other country had ever formally accepted this annexation. The timing of Trump’s announcement—just two weeks before Israeli parliamentary elections—suggested it was a deliberate attempt to help Benjamin Netanyahu secure victory. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo justified the move by stating it acknowledged “the reality on the ground,” effectively endorsing Israeli territorial conquest through military force.

Where earlier administrations at least gave lip service to a two-state solution, Trump and his advisors openly abandoned the framework. Jared Kushner, Trump’s senior advisor and son-in-law, declared in May 2019: “If you say ‘two-state,’ it means one thing to the Israelis, it means one thing to the Palestinians. We said, you know, let’s just not say it.” The Trump administration’s so-called peace plan would have confined Palestinians to disconnected territories resembling bantustans, while allowing Israel to annex roughly 30% of the West Bank. This represented the most pro-Israeli “peace” proposal ever advanced by an American administration, one that would have formalized permanent Israeli control over Palestinian territory.

Further entrenching Israel’s power, Trump’s Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared in November 2019 that Israeli settlements in the West Bank were “not inherently illegal,” overturning decades of U.S. policy that had treated settlements as violations of international law. The “Pompeo Doctrine” marked a radical departure from the positions of previous presidents, including ardent Israel supporters like Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.

Trump’s Abraham Accords, heralded by many as a diplomatic success, in fact undermined the long-standing Arab Peace Initiative. By pressuring Bahrain, the UAE, Morocco, and Sudan to normalize relations with Israel without securing any concessions for Palestinians, Trump stripped away one of the last forms of regional leverage against Israel’s intransigence. For groups like Hamas, this shift represented a death knell for Palestinian statehood aspirations. The October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel was in part a daring response to the erosion of regional support for their cause—a gambit designed to re-ignite global attention and leverage international outrage over Israel’s retaliation.

Maximum Pressure, Minimum Restraint: The Trump Doctrine Against Iran

Trump’s sustained hostility toward Iran, Israel’s foremost regional adversary, further illustrates his Judeo-Accelerationist trajectory. His opposition predates his 2016 campaign, going back at least to his 2011 book Time to Get Tough, in which he declared:

“America’s primary goal with Iran must be to destroy its nuclear ambitions. Let me put them as plainly as I know how: Iran’s nuclear program must be stopped–by any and all means necessary. Period. We cannot allow this radical regime to acquire a nuclear weapon that they will either use or hand off to terrorists.”

He repeatedly condemned the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), calling it a “disaster” and “the worst deal ever.”

Though he occasionally struck a peaceful tone with select audiences, Trump’s actual policy toward Iran was one of consistent escalation. After pulling the United States out of the JCPOA in May 2018, he launched the “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign—an aggressive move that clashed with his public image as an antiwar candidate. He dismissed the deal as “the worst deal ever,” claiming it “enriched the Iranian regime and enabled its malign behavior, while at best delaying its ability to pursue nuclear weapons.” Sanctions were swiftly reinstated, hitting Iran’s energy, petrochemical, and financial sectors. Trump also warned of “severe consequences” for any country that continued doing business with Iran.

These measures ranked among the most severe sanctions in modern history, with the explicit aim to “bring Iran’s oil exports to zero, denying the regime its principal source of revenue.” Trump’s administration steadily widened the scope of the sanctions, targeting Iran’s central bank, space agency, and even the inner circle of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

In October 2019, Trump sanctioned Iran’s construction industry, linking it to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which he had previously designated as a foreign terrorist organization in April of that year—the first time the United States had ever applied that label to another country’s military.

At the time of the terrorist designation, Trump bragged: “If you are doing business with the IRGC, you will be bankrolling terrorism…This designation will be the first time that the United States has ever named a part of another government as an FTO [foreign terrorist organization].” These steps were not only economic in nature but also intended to isolate Iran diplomatically, cripple its economy, and prepare the ground for potential military confrontation.

The most dramatic episode came in January 2020, when Trump authorized the drone strike that killed Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad. Trump claimed Soleimani had been “plotting imminent and sinister attacks on American diplomats and military personnel,” a move that brought the United States and Iran to the edge of open conflict. Iran retaliated with missile strikes on U.S. bases, and tensions surged as the world braced for war.

Even after this volatile episode, Trump continued to escalate with Iran. Toward the end of his first term, he reportedly explored military options for targeting Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. According to accounts, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mark Milley and other senior officials pushed back firmly. Milley warned, “If you do this, you’re gonna have a f***ing war,” and began holding daily briefings to prevent an unchecked spiral toward military conflict, a process he described as efforts to “land the plane.”

As tensions with both Iran and Israel intensified, Trump privately gave the green light for preparations to strike Iranian targets. U.S. military assets—including carrier strike groups, bombers, and fighter jets—were moved into strategic positions. According to The Wall Street Journal, Trump informed aides that he “approved of attack plans for Iran, but was holding off on giving the final order to see if Tehran will abandon its nuclear program.”

In June 2025, Trump ordered direct strikes on three Iranian nuclear sites—Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan—using B-2 stealth bombers and bunker-buster bombs. Trump declared that Iran’s nuclear capabilities were “completely and totally obliterated,” despite conflicting reports from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suggesting that the strikes failed to neutralize Iran’s underground infrastructure and only briefly hindered its nuclear capabilities. Rafael Grossi, head of the UN nuclear watchdog, stated Iran could resume uranium enrichment “within a matter of months.”

This escalation went far beyond anything contemplated by previous neoconservative administrations. Even the Bush administration, which went on a nation-building bender in Iraq and Afghanistan, had never authorized such a strike on Iranian soil. Trump’s willingness to risk regional war to directly advance Israeli security interests represents a qualitatively different level of commitment to Zionist objectives that previous administrations would dare not broach.

Unprecedented Support from Israel First Interests

Trump’s policies cannot be divorced from the powerful influence of pro-Israel donors and organizations. According to watchdog group Track AIPAC, pro-Israel interests have contributed over $230 million to Trump since 2020. The vast majority—over $215 million—came from Miriam Adelson’s Preserve America PAC. Trump’s unwavering pro-Israel stance has helped win over former critics in the neoconservative camp, such as Bill Kristol, who endorsed Trump’s Iran strikes, stating, “You’ve got to go to war with the president you have.”

Within his administration, Trump has elevated individuals whose views reflect the most extreme elements of the Zionist project. David Friedman, who served as U.S. ambassador to Israel during Trump’s first term, was a financier of West Bank settlements and later published One Jewish State: The Last, Best Hope to Resolve the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Mike Huckabee, Trump’s current ambassador to Israel and a vocal Christian Zionist, has floated ideas for population transfers of Palestinians while supporting continued Israeli annexation.

In January 2025, Trump proposed moving Gaza’s 2 million Palestinians to Egypt and Jordan: “I’d like Egypt to take people, and I’d like Jordan to take people … we just clean out that whole thing.” Asked if the relocation would be temporary, he responded that it could be “long term.” The following month, Trump stated during a press conference with Netanyahu that the United States would “take over” Gaza and transform it into the “Riviera of the Middle East.” Israeli analyst Noam Sheizaf observed: “Trump accomplished what no Israeli politician has: He transformed ‘population transfer’ from a fringe, near-taboo concept in Israeli political discourse to a viable policy option.”

Domestically, Trump further prioritized Jewish interests through his January 2025 Executive Order to “Combat Anti-Semitism.” This order allowed for the deportation of foreign students participating in pro-Palestinian activism and threatened universities with loss of funding if they failed to suppress such speech. The order marked an unprecedented use of federal power to silence political dissent in service of a foreign nation.

America Last: Trump’s Radical Realignment in Service of Israeli Power

What makes Trump’s presidency uniquely dangerous is not simply the extremity of individual policies, but their cumulative effect in normalizing Jewish supremacist objectives under U.S. protection. By shattering norms around Jerusalem, settlements, and Palestinian displacement, Trump has created new facts on the ground that future administrations may find politically impossible to reverse.

Unlike his predecessors, who operated within international frameworks, respected multilateral diplomacy, and maintained at least nominal distance from Israel’s most extreme demands, Trump has turned the United States into an uncritical enabler of Israeli expansionism. His decisions have gone far beyond even the Bush administration, which pursued nation-building campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan but never attacked Iran directly or endorsed population transfer.

Despite running as an America First candidate, Trump has spent much of his political capital bolstering Israeli military and geopolitical power. In the process, he has revealed the hollow nature of his anti-war image and nationalist rhetoric. His administration, staffed with ideologues committed to Israeli supremacy, has reoriented U.S. foreign policy around the goal of cementing Israel’s regional hegemony, no matter the cost in lives, stability, or American credibility.

By aligning U.S. power with Israel’s expansionist agenda, Trump has steered American foreign policy into dangerous and potentially irreversible territory.

When Uncle Tom Crosses Uncle Shmuel

In America’s NGO space, some topics are so taboo that even renowned public intellectuals aren’t safe when they dare criticize sacred cows such as the state of Israel.

Just ask Black economist Glenn Loury.

A former Reagan-era conservative, Loury has held a distinguished career in the field of economics. After earning his doctorate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Loury began as an assistant professor at Northwestern, then joined the University of Michigan, becoming a full professor in 1980. In 1982, at age 33, he became Harvard’s first Black tenured economics professor.

Loury would later join Brown University in 2005, where he held the title of Merton P. Stoltz Professor of the Social Sciences and Professor of Economics at Brown University. Additionally, he is a Professor of International and Public Affairs at the same institution. In late 2020, Loury joined the Manhattan Institute as a senior fellow and got the conservative think tank to sponsor his podcast “The Glenn Show” for a few years.

Everything was going well for the economist until he crossed into politically dangerous terrain. During his May 9, 2025 interview with Tucker Carlson, Loury revealed that he was fired by the Manhattan Institute for criticizing Israel.

In 2024, Loury started to criticize Israel for the way it conducted its military campaign in Gaza. According to Loury, the Manhattan Institute first expressed concerns about his stance on Gaza after he published his interview with Israeli historian Omer Bartov, who has been critical of the Israeli hard right and the Netanyahu coalition government’s actions in Gaza.

Loury endorsed historian Omer Bartov’s analysis, which aligned with international human rights organizations’ warnings that Israel’s conduct might constitute a genocide. Further, Loury openly condemned Israel’s actions in the summer of 2024 in a post titled “I Was Fired by the Manhattan Institute. Here’s Why.”

Loury conceded that Hamas’ attack on Israel was indefensible but stressed that Jewish state’s response was disproportionate. He wrote:

…killing thousands of noncombatants, subjecting hundreds of thousands to injury and starvation, and destroying the homes of millions is too high a cost to pay for the goal of “eliminating” or “eradicating” Hamas, especially since it is not clear whether and how that goal is to be accomplished. It seems likely that the scope of the death and destruction in Gaza will inspire more people in Gaza, the West Bank, and abroad to take up arms against Israel than would have been the case had the response been less catastrophic.

Interestingly, Lowry praised Ta-Nehisi Coates’ 2024 book The Message for its coverage of the plight of Palestinians living in the West Bank settlements, saying “there’s much to admire in it.”

It was his appearance on Carlson’s show where he finally broke the silence about his departure from the conservative think tank. In the show, Loury discussed the chilling effect that such actions have on open debate. The former Manhattan Institute fellow could no longer tolerate self-censoring and holding his opinions back on Gaza. Carlson summed up the incident: “For decades, conservative think tanks celebrated and supported black economist Glenn Loury. Then he expressed an unauthorized opinion on the Middle East and they dropped him in a second.”

Glenn Loury [00:00:00] And I said, what has been proceeding there in Gaza as a collective punishment that I don’t think is justified. And I got notified the next day the Manhattan Institute was discontinuing its relationship with me as a senior fellow.

Tucker [00:00:13] If you’d said that about the United States, would you have gotten the same reaction?

Glenn Loury [00:00:17] Ah, good ques-

Tucker [00:00:18] Do you think you’ve been bamboozled?

Glenn Loury [00:00:20] Are we really going to go to war with Iran and turn the world economy upside down? Is it really Jim Crow 2.0 if they want to ask for a driver’s license before you cast the ballot in Georgia?

In a follow-up post on Substack, Loury noted that the Manhattan Institute “disapproved of my opposition to the Gaza War, my criticisms of Israel’s prosecution of that war, and my praise of Ta-Nehisi Coates’s meditations on the West Bank settlements. “

Loury’s call for proportionality and Palestinian rights violated an unspoken rule in U.S. politics: unconditional support for Israel supersedes intellectual independence, even for Black thinkers, who are largely privileged by the United States’ anti-White system.

Being the token Black in Conservatism Inc. could not even shield Loury from professional harm at the hands of Manhattan Institute—an organization bankrolled by billionaire Jews such as Paul Singer and John Paulson.

Other Blacks have shared a similar fate as Loury when they dared touch the Hebraic third rail in the post-October 7 world. Progressive Black commentator Briahna Joy Gray learned firsthand about the risks of criticizing Israel’s industrialized child ritual murder project in Gaza.

In September 2022, Gray joined The Hill’s popular web program “Rising” as a co-host. The show was noted for its bipartisan format and focus on breaking political news and analysis. However, her tenure on “Rising” was brief.  On June 4, 2024, Yarden Gonen, the sister of Israeli hostage Romi Gonen, appeared on “Rising.” As a strong advocate of Palestine, Gray was skeptical of the narrative being put forward by Gonen and other defenders of the Jewish state. The interview was suffuse with tension.

At the end of their conversation, Gonen said she hoped that Gray would “believe” Israeli women. Gray rolled her eyes, interrupted Gonen, and ended the segment. This moment sparked backlash, with many perceiving Gray’s reaction as dismissive toward the families of Israeli hostages. Shortly thereafter, Gray was unceremoniously fired from “Rising.”

Addressing her termination, Gray stated: “The Hill has a clear pattern of suppressing speech — particularly when it’s critical of the state of Israel. This is why they fired @kthalps, & it was only a matter of time before they fired me.”

As I’ve written before, the once stout Jewish-Black alliance appears to be fraying. Jews’ historically reliable golems in the Black community are beginning to venture outside of the Zionist plantation, thereby compelling the Jewish community to find new proxy forces to carry out their bidding and even throw Whites a bone.

Blacks are getting a hard lesson that their political relevance is predicated on Jewish funding and organization. Once that funding and support dries up, they become just another non-White minority group fighting for political attention in the Empire of Mongrelia.

When one strips everything away, the real sovereign in American politics is not in Congress, but in a synagogue near you.

An Open Letter to Liberals

My Dear Friends,

It’s a hard time to be a liberal.  I know, because I used to be one.  Or rather, I still am one, but a true liberal, unlike the many fake liberals out there.  Allow me to explain.

Long ago, as an idealistic college student, I valued my high moral principles, my faith in the vague notion of human equality, my trust in authorities, and my open-mindedness.  I believed that most people in positions of power were well-intentioned, if a bit misguided, and that political and economic situations ran into trouble mostly because of bad luck or the occasional bad actor.  I believed that people had to be judged as individuals, and that any assessment of entire groups constituted a sweeping generalization or a caricature that lacked merit.  I believed all people and all races could live together; I believed that we owed something to the less-fortunate of society, no matter who they were.  I believed that, by and large, the American system worked, and that the best would move up in society and prosper.  And I believed that most everyone shared these views.

But I later found out that I was wrong on nearly every count.  Years of hard thinking, research, discussion, personal experience, and observant daily life proved the deficiency of my former views; one by one, they eroded away.  I found out that group characteristics are real and objective, and that they are indicative of broad social trends, even if there exist many individual exceptions.  I saw systemic actions in academia, media, government, and business to promote certain values, to disparage other values, and to advance a certain worldview or mindset that benefited specific people.  I realized that corruption in social institutions was far deeper and more entrenched than I dared believe.  I came to see that religion—and specifically Christianity—was a malevolent force in society, one that again served to benefit a certain group of people at the expense of many others.  I came to understand that much of history was distorted, misrepresented, or outright falsified.  I thought I lived in a largely open-minded and liberal world, but I discovered, to my dismay, that I lived in a controlled and manipulated world.

The final straw, for me, was the realization that many people in positions of authority also knew about many of these things but that they either said nothing, covered them up, or actively participated in them.  In short, I realized that I had been lied to or otherwise deceived on a massive scale, for years, by people at virtually every level of society—people that I trusted and respected.

I don’t know about you, my liberal friends, but if there is one thing I hate in this world, it is being lied to by people in authority.  I can forgive ignorance and I can forgive naiveté, but willful deception is unforgiveable.  “You knew better,” I said (figuratively) to people in power; “You knew this was wrong, you knew what was going on, but you said nothing.”  Worse: “You sustained it, and you profited from it.”  This permanently destroyed my simple-minded liberalism.

Let me offer a few specifics, starting with the question of race.  I had virtually no contact with Blacks growing up, at least until late high school.  I vaguely considered this a good thing, given that my limited knowledge of Black culture was based on those living in our inner city, which was a decidedly unpleasant place to live.  But they had their sphere of life, we had ours, no big deal.  Then when I came to apply for college, I ran into the issue of affirmative action, which was just coming to a head at that time; racial quotas were ruled illegal, but race could still be used as a factor in college admissions.  I was admitted with no problem, but other classmates did not get in, and it is unclear how many lost places to otherwise less-qualified Blacks or other minorities.

The official justification for affirmative action in university admissions has always been “to remedy past and current discrimination”; but how does that relate to the less-qualified Black who got in?  Was it discrimination that caused him to be less-qualified in the first place?  And why penalize my 18-year-old friend who never discriminated against anyone?  Are the children paying for the sins of the fathers?  (How very Old-Testament!)

And was it really helping the less-qualified Blacks, to let them in, only to have them struggle and fail at disproportionately high rates?  According to recent data, 68% of Whites graduate within six years of university study, versus just 45% of Blacks.  Why is that?  Can it be “systemic racism”?

Be that as it may, affirmative action might be tolerable if there were an actual plan with actual objectives.  But there was not; there never is, with our liberal administrators.  If they had said, “Look, we need affirmative action to break the cycle of Black families without college degrees.  So, we need to do this for 20 years, to raise a full generation of degreed Blacks.  Then, everything will be even, and we can go back to normal, merit-based admissions.”  Had they said this, and provided some data supporting it, I might have gone along.  But of course they said no such thing.  Obviously—does any sane person think that after 20 years of preferential treatment, that Blacks would thereafter perform at levels equal to Whites?  Of course not!  Thirty years?  Fifty years?  Of course not.  The reality is that our liberal overseers want affirmative action forever.

This is an admission of failure.  It is an admission that Blacks are congenitally incapable of performing at levels equal to Whites, and that American Whites must pay for the “sins” of slavery forever.  In short, there is no solution to the “Black problem” in America.  Short of ridding ourselves of Blacks, we must pay the price forever.  Or such is the liberal state of affairs.

And then there was history.  I had always been a sort of World War Two buff, and was always fascinated by the German story, by Hitler’s life, and by the drama and grandeur of the entire event.  So it took me a while to realize that World War Two shows up a lot in popular discourse—in fact, far more than might reasonably be expected from an event that was several decades ago and was largely played out on other continents.  And of course, the coverage was so routinely slanted that, for a long time, I never really noticed it.  It took me years to ask myself very basic questions: Why is it that every aspect of Hitler’s Germany gets negative coverage?  Why is Hitler the universal measuring rod for evil?  Why is ‘Nazi’ synonymous with ‘bad’?  Why do we hear so much about the Holocaust?

At about the same time, as I was progressing in my “liberal” education, I started thinking more about the Jewish situation.  Growing up, I had never known any Jews—or at least, none that were public.  Once in college, I encountered a fair number of guys in the residence halls that were, shall we say, rude; they were known to us as “the guys from New York.”  They were loud, pushy, obnoxious. …  Oh well, I said to my liberal self, people are people.  Just stay out of their way.  And don’t make any plans to visit NYC!

Only late in my schooling did I realize that “the guys from New York” were all, to a man, Jewish, and that this fact might well be significant.  I then discovered that my campus was something like 15% Jewish—in a state that was maybe 1% Jewish.  Wait, how does that happen?  Then I realized that my university president was a Jew, that nearly half of the Board of Regents were Jews, and that a large chunk of my humanities professors were Jews—wait a minute, how does that work?  Common sense and basic liberal values dictate that if 1% of my state is Jewish, that roughly one out of a hundred of my fellow students and teachers should be Jews, that one out of a hundred college administrators should be Jews, and so on.  If that were not the case—as it clearly wasn’t, by a factor of 10 or more—then that could only be due to some “systemic racism” in favor of Jews.  Is that fair?  Could all those buildings named after wealthy Jewish donors have something to do with it?  No, never, I told my liberal self.

As I progressed into grad school, earned a PhD in philosophy, and became a lecturer at my alma mater, I became aware of the “BDS” movement—the campus efforts to boycott, divest, and sanction Israel over actions in the occupied territories.  Objectively, the case was clear: Israel was in violation of international law, flouted UN resolutions for decades, engaged in periodic episodes of abuse and torture of the Palestinians, inflicted collective punishment, and committed murder, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  It was an open-and-shut case; of course, any thinking, ethical person would have to agree that Israel was in the wrong—criminally so—and that any moral institution would want to dissociate itself, at least, from such evil.  This was the bare minimum.

So why, then, was virtually all BDS action led by students?  Or so I wondered.  Aren’t faculty ethical as well?  Don’t they claim to be liberal also?  Didn’t many of them have personal histories with Vietnam War protests?  Why weren’t they active in BDS?  And the same with the administrators—the nominal “leaders” of the university.  Shouldn’t they be blazing the trail, pushing for BDS on all fronts?  Wouldn’t that be the best of all messages, from a liberal institution to its liberal student body: that we refuse to invest in, and profit from, cruelty and injustice?  Wouldn’t that be a real lesson for the students?

Oh, no!  The faculty—apart from myself and a literal handful of brave individuals—were invisible on the topic; “we don’t want to get political,” they said.  And the university administration was worse: they actively opposed BDS.  They began imputing ill motives to student and faculty leaders on BDS; they began rigidly enforcing “campus security” rules that no one had ever seen before; they worked to marginalize campus support; and they ensured that no word of publicity got out about any BDS actions.  (If there is one thing that universities hate, it’s bad publicity.)  When pressed for explanations for their resistance, administrators routinely spouted lines about how their investments are “not political” and how “donors give money for specific reasons” and therefore, somehow, the university could not divest from Israel—even though they did precisely that to South African apartheid years before.  And purely academic boycotts against Israeli scholars or institutions never got so much as a single word of support.

And this, my liberal friends, was 20 years ago!

It was also in spending time with our Arab students that I heard murmurings about the “so-called Holocaust.”  Whoa, what’s up with that?  I did a little digging and quickly realized how little I knew, and also how hard it was to find straight answers to apparently simple questions—questions that no one else apparently considered important.  Like:  When and how did they determine that 6 million Jews died?  Where were they killed?  By what means?  How did those infamous gas chambers work?  And where are the bodily remains today?  I was frankly shocked to learn how little clear information was available on this most-important historical event.  As I researched the topic, it quickly became obvious that much of the current story was wrong. The many false witnesses, the internal contradictions, the biased and coerced “confessions,” the technical impossibilities, and the practical absurdities—not to mention the striking fact that claims of “6 million suffering Jews” had been in the news for years, decades, before WW2; all this was highly damning for the conventional story, in my opinion.

As a now-waning liberal, I assumed that others would be curious about this as well.  But when I began to even mention this to my liberal friends, they said things like, “Well, that doesn’t matter,” or, “Everyone knows that the 6-million story is false.”  Really?  Everyone?  But we all just pretend like it’s true?  Why?  To placate whom?  And if it doesn’t matter, why is it thrust into our face so often?  Why are Holocaust books mandatory reading in our schools?  Why does every third film seem to have some reference to Hitler, Nazis, or the Holocaust?  Why is simply asking questions about it prohibited by law in 19 countries?  Why is that?  My liberal friends had no good answers.

A bit more digging on my part, and other troubling questions arose.  Why does the US pump $3 billion to $6 billion annually to Israel as “foreign aid”?  Why do we so often vote alone, or with a handful of client nations, with Israel in the UN?  Why do we provide them with diplomatic cover?  Why are so many of their enemies also our enemies?  Why are so many of our recent military engagements targeted against Israel’s enemies?

Thus I ran directly into the Israel Lobby—otherwise known as the Zionist Lobby or the Jewish Lobby.  I quickly realized that most of the major players in the Israel Lobby were Zionist Jews, that most American Jews were Zionists, and that there was near-unanimity that Jewish interests must be protected at home and Israeli interests protected abroad.  This unanimity is transferred to Congress, where, depending on the context, between 90% and 100% of Representatives and Senators regularly vote in favor of Jewish/Israeli interests.  This is not speculation; it is a matter of public record.

Why?  Money.  I soon learned that at least 25% of Republican money, and at least 50% of Democratic money, comes from Jewish sources.  This, to me, was truly astonishing.  According to Open Secrets, there are something like 13,800 lobbying organizations in Washington.  And yet, of all these, one group donates between 25% and 50% of all campaign funds.  Imagine if you were living off regular donations from 13,000 wealthy friends; and that one friend consistently gave you half of all your money each year, and that the other half was divided amongst the other 12,999 friends.  Which friend would be your best friend?  Who would you listen to the most?  Who would you most like to please?  No surprises there.

In an interview with Tucker Carlson from last year (20 June 2024), US representative Thomas Massie made some interesting statements about the leading component of the Jewish Lobby, AIPAC.  Every congressman, he said, has an “AIPAC minder” or “babysitter,” who watches over you, tracks what you do, and makes sure you do “the right thing.”  And if you don’t do “the right thing,” they will slander you in the press and they will fund a pro-Israel opponent in your next election.  No other lobby does anything close to this.  Perhaps you should watch this interview, my liberal friends—but no!  You absolutely hate Tucker Carlson!  Neither he nor his guests can possibly have anything of value to say!

We need to realize what this means.  It means we have one lobby that works on behalf of American Jews, who constitute perhaps 2% of the US population, and that their interests totally dominate everyone else’s interests:  seniors, students, other minorities, the needy, the disabled, environmentalists.  And I mean, totally dominate; unless your interests happen to align with American Jews, you have almost no chance of getting a fair hearing.  It also means that we have one American lobby that works, globally, on behalf of Israeli Jews, who constitute some 0.19% of the world’s population, to the detriment of the remaining 99.8% of humanity.  What’s up with that, my liberal friends?  Are you satisfied with that situation?  Is it fair?  Is it just?  No?  What are you doing about it?

Perhaps you have been a bit too bamboozled by our American, and Western, media—a media that uniformly operates on behalf of Jewish and Israeli interests. Do you doubt me?  Why are no anti-Israeli or anti-Jewish viewpoints or opinions allowed in any branch of mainstream media?  Why has that been true, for decades, at least?  Do you need proof?  Why are all five of the major American media conglomerates—ABC/Disney, Warner Discovery, NBC/Universal, Fox Corp, and Paramount—owned or operated by Jews or Zionists?  (Shall we check the names?  Oh, no, never that!)  Why are the top five Hollywood studios—Disney, Universal, Sony Pictures, Paramount, and Warner Bros.—run by Jews or Zionists?  In a fair and just world, only 2% of these corporations would be Jewish-owned—which means, in all likelihood, none of them; but in fact, Jews own or manage all of them.  Why is that, my liberal friends?  Do you not care?  Do you not believe in fairness and justice?

My friends:  Let’s bring this up to the present day.  It is clear and beyond dispute that Jews in America, and in Europe, have a virtual monopoly on the press, on academia, and on our so-called democratic governments.  Any monopoly is dangerous, but a Jewish monopoly is deeply and profoundly dangerous, as the world can see in Gaza.  To date, officially over 50,000 people, mostly women and children, have been killed.  Likely the actual numbers are double or triple that.  Some may have been armed fighters, but surely 95% were unarmed civilians.  And yet America, and the world, does nothing, says nothing.  Mass murder and genocide before our eyes, and…nothing.  Worse than nothing:  America supplies weapons and cash to the killers, and political cover in the UN, and the world does…nothing.

What are individual Jews doing?  Worse than nothing; they support the action.  According to surveys from last year, around 80% of American Jews and perhaps 90% of Israeli Jews support the ongoing war effort.  Yes, they want their (now) 59 hostages back, but they think nothing of the 50 or 100 Gazans killed every day, on average, over the course of the year-and-a-half slaughter.  “Cease fire for the hostages!” they scream; but they want neither true peace nor true justice.  If and when they get their hostages, then the ethnic slaughter will surely press ahead unimpeded.  It is Old Testament vengeance in the 21st century.

And what are you doing about all this, my liberal friends?  Wringing your hands?  Feeling badly?  Silently condemning it?  How is that working?

And what are you saying or doing to those who are taking serious, direct action against the Jewish monopoly that has a stranglehold on America and Europe?  Are you helping those people?  Praising them?  No!  You are condemning them!  You call them ‘evil,’ ‘Nazis,’ and ‘far-right extremists’!  You call them ‘haters,’ ‘bigots,’ and best of all, ‘White supremacists’!  Why, the Jewish Lobby couldn’t do a better job themselves if they tried!  And there you are, doing their job for them, attacking those who might expose the danger.  Why?  Are Jews threatening you?  Holding a gun to your head?  No?  Then why do you work so hard on their behalf—my “liberal” friends?

Here is how I see it:  The state of affairs in the world today is like a big sandbox.  And the powers-that-be need to contain your thinking and your outrage, and so they direct it away from the actual cause—themselves—and toward other things.  In this way, they confine you to half the sandbox.  The liberal, leftist Jews who donate to, and run, the Democratic Party, and who monopolize the mainstream media, want you to see the Republicans, or Trump, or conservatives, or White men, as the enemy.  They do everything in their power to demonize these groups.  One need only glance at CNN, or MSNBC, or the New York Times, or the Washington Post, to see that this is true.  For their part, the ‘right wing’ media (Fox) and the Republicans are just as anxious to demonize the leftist Democrats; again, watch any episode of Fox’s evening commentary shows.

But strangely enough, both parties, who hate each other with such vehemence, are in agreement on just one special issue:  Jewish and Israeli interests, which they both bend over backward to serve.  Recall any presidential debate of the past few decades: all candidates and all parties are emphatic that they alone are the “true friends of Israel,” and that they alone can best tackle “the evil of anti-Semitism.”  And you, the viewer, are left with choosing between a left-leaning “friend of Israel” and a right-leaning “friend of Israel.”  Some choice, isn’t it?

In this way, they trap you in half the sandbox: You only see the enemy of their choosing: either “the right” or “the left.”  But never “the Jewish Lobby.”  That’s the half that you are missing.  In fact, you are not even allowed to know that that half exists.  Anyone who dares venture there is, by definition, a “far-right extremist” and “a hater”; and since both the left and the right agree on that, it seems like a unanimous decision.  Clever, isn’t it?

But the Gaza war is a true eye-opener, isn’t it, my liberal friends?  Your fellow liberals have been raised from birth to be hyper-sensitive to everyone’s needs, everyone’s concerns, everyone’s feelings.  Slavery was wrong (of course); colonialization was wrong (yes); and it is the Whites of the world who inflict “systemic racism” on all the people of color (wrong).  Every oppression of a “person of color,” every attack on a vulnerable minority, was seen as the gravest of social ills—until Palestine.  Then, everything changed.  There, the “people of color” are now terrorists, or terrorist sympathizers, or supporters of terrorism, and thus need to be shot, bombed, burned, and otherwise destroyed by the righteous Israeli Jews.  The 2.4 million people of Gaza are now to be held collectively responsible for the actions of a few resistance fighters.  They will be moved here, moved there, and finally removed, as the Israeli Jews complete their ethnic cleansing.  And they will do so with the support of 80% of American Jews and 90% of Israeli Jews.

And what if you should object to these state crimes, my liberal friends?  Oh, I’m sorry, you’re screwed.  Should you choose to join an encampment on your local campus, the university police will haul you off to jail, perhaps expel you from school, and perhaps get you fired—as happened to one young Arabic lady just last week, at my own esteemed alma mater.  Also, the local Hillel Jewish students will photograph you, identify you, and post your personal information online, just to make it harder for you to get a job, join a social group, or become active in any way.  And if you happen to be a foreign student, or a foreigner of any kind, you risk getting booked and deported—by our Jewish-friendly president Trump.  All for protesting a genocide!

So:  Where does this leave us, my liberal friends?  Or perhaps you no longer call yourselves ‘liberal’?  A wise move, my friends!  But are you now conservative?  Oh no, of course not—another wise move.  You are coming to learn that simplistic, dualistic, Manichean terms like ‘liberal,’ ‘conservative,’ ‘left,’ and ‘right,’ are now almost meaningless, so distorted has their meaning become.  Perhaps you are learning that the power structures of America and the West have such a notable Judean orientation that this fact alone becomes decisive in thinking about social dilemmas and social conflicts.  Perhaps you are learning that those “liberals” in academia and politics are really only liberal when it serves their interests; otherwise, they become positively authoritarian.  Perhaps you are learning that Israeli brutality in Gaza is not a consequence of one bad leader but rather a reflection of the mindset of an entire people.  Perhaps you are learning that ‘far right’ is a functional synonym for ‘opponent of the Jewish Lobby.’  And perhaps you are learning that many on the ‘far right’ are at least partially justified in their righteous indignation at the national and global state of affairs.

For my part, call me a true liberal: from the root word liber, ‘free.’  I prefer to live free, think free, speak free, and act free.  But I can’t do this in present-day America, or in present-day Europe, or else the Jewish-oriented powers-that-be will come down upon me with an Old Testament vengeance.  This is a fact.  Therefore, let us (1) openly state this fact, (2) openly state our objection to this fact, and (3) work to create a society and a world where this is not a fact.  What could be more important than that—my liberal friends?

David Skrbina, PhD, is a former senior lecturer in philosophy at the University of Michigan.  He is the author or editor of several books, including The Metaphysics of Technology (2015) and most recently, The Jesus Hoax (2nd edition, 2024).

Ties Abroad: The context and causes of Jewish immigration from 1881

In a previous essay I discussed the causes of the Jewish immigration wave that began in 1881 and the role of the existing Jewish population and their supporters in Britain. Here I expand on the situation of Jews in Britain before 1881, their influence on British foreign and domestic policy, the reasons for the mass immigration from 1881 onwards and the initial reactions of the more settled population to the arrival of the new, drawing on the works of Jewish historians.

Jews in Britain before 1881

A mixture of Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews, amounting to 50–60,000 people, lived in Britain before the inundation from the east began, and they were remarkably free and prosperous compared to their co-religionists elsewhere.1 Todd Endelman tells us that

“The great mass of Jews, who could hardly aspire to sit in Parliament or hold a naval commission, suffered little from legal inequality. There were no restrictions on the trades they might follow, the goods in which they might trade, the areas in which they might live. Nor were they subject to special taxes, tolls, levies, or extortions. The statute book simply ignored their presence…”.2

Some legal disabilities did apply to Jews in statute but had long been enforced inconsistently. As Geoffrey Alderman describes, “professing Jews were prohibited from voting in British parliamentary elections until 1835”, after which they were on par with native Britons, but before that date “the returning officers who supervised constituency election arrangements had the right to demand the swearing of a Christian oath by all intending voters. … [T]his was not a right they were obliged to exercise,” and some chose not to:

“In May 1830 Sir Robert Wilson told the House of Commons that Jews habitually voted in parliamentary elections in Southwark (south London) because no one bothered to insist that they take the Christian oath. In December 1832 Rabbi Asher Ansell of Liverpool was clearly able to vote in the general election without hindrance.”3

After gaining the right to vote, British Jewry was still eluded by

“…full political emancipation – meaning the right of professing Jews to stand as candidates for, and be elected to, the House of Commons. Jews were not the only religious group to be denied this right. Catholics had only won the right in 1829. Unitarians did not then enjoy the right, nor did atheists.”4

Emancipation was achieved largely thanks to the propinquity of wealthy Jews to powerful Britons. The campaign for it, as Endelman says, was “the work of a handful of ambitious, well-connected City men, whose close government contacts allowed them to put the question of Jewish disabilities on the national agenda.”5 Common British folk, and presumably the enemies of Jewry, lacked such contacts or campaigned less effectively; the successful demonstrations against the Jew Bill of 1753 were not replicated.

Overrepresentation in politics followed immediately. As Alderman describes,

“Lionel de Rothschild’s ceremonial entry into the House of Commons to take his seat (28 July 1858) was an occasion of great communal rejoicing, but it also brought into the open a worry. … Jews were overrepresented in the social strata from which the political classes were drawn, and there were enough of them with sufficient private wealth to make their candidatures an attractive proposition regardless of their religious backgrounds. So the Jewish presence in the legislature grew with embarrassing speed. … After the general election of 1865 no less than six Jews sat in the Commons; a further two were returned at by-elections during the lifetime of the 1865–8 Parliament.

Compared with the proportion which Jews comprised of the total population of the United Kingdom, they were already ‘overrepresented’ in the Commons, a state of affairs that has persisted ever since.”6

The Liberal Party was identified as the vehicle for Jewish interests. By the late 1860s,

“[w]ithout exception all the Jewish MPs at this period were Liberals. The first Jewish Conservative MP, the obscure Nottinghamshire coal-owner Saul Isaac, did not make his appearance at Westminster till 1874. Until then the parliamentary Jewish lobby was a Liberal lobby, one which had, moreover, developed during the decade (1859–68) when the Liberal party had taken on a definite form and substance, under the leadership of, first, Lord John Russell and then Gladstone. The triumphs of Liberalism and Jewish emancipation thus seemed to go hand in hand, as products of the same political ethos. On Saturday, 28 April 1866 there was a remarkable demonstration of this fact, when Russell’s Parliamentary Reform bill passed its second reading in the Commons by a majority of five votes; all six Jewish MPs voted for it, the sabbath notwithstanding.”7

Endelman shows that a degree of formal exclusion from the City of London (the financial centre) did not stop Jews trading there.8 Certainly long before 1881, Jews like the Rothschild and Mocatta families were prominent in finance, spanning bond and commodity trading to every sort of brokerage. The Rothschilds in particular were uniquely important in enabling states to borrow and, as they worked as an international partnership, their role in financing wars made their approval a factor in deciding which states could afford to fight and when.

No Jewish family, and no other family, was as rich as the Rothschilds, but Jews in general were ascendant in wealth. As Endelman says,

“At the start of the nineteenth century, most Jews in England were immigrants or the children of immigrants—impoverished, poorly educated, dependent on low-status street trades and other forms of petty commerce, popularly identified with crime, violence, and chicanery, widely viewed as disreputable and alien. Over the next three-quarters of a century, the social character of the Jewish community was transformed dramatically. Poverty ceased to be its defining characteristic. On the eve of mass migration from Eastern Europe, the majority of Jews in Britain were middle class. They were native English speakers, bourgeois in their domestic habits and public enthusiasms, full citizens of the British state, their public and personal identities increasingly shaped by the larger culture in which they lived—even if their gentile neighbors viewed them as less than fully English.”9

Geoffrey Alderman’s description is similar. In 1883,

“Over half London Jewry [the bulk of British Jewry] was now located within the middle‑classes; in 1850 the proportion had been about a third. Moreover, we know from Jacobs’ painstaking examination of commercial directories and other records that within these middle‑classes the greatest single occupational group was to be found within the financial sector—pre-eminently the Stock Exchange—followed by general merchants (over half the dealers in military stores were Jews) and certain manufacturing sectors (cigars, pipes, slippers and boots, furniture, furs, jewellery and watches, and diamonds). Jews still accounted for only 6% of London’s tailors and only 5% of London Jewry was engaged in the professions—barristers and solicitors, surgeons, dentists and architects.”10

Jews were well-positioned to influence British policy in favour of their own tribe, and they did so. They were, however, also forced to adapt to the effects of the far larger numbers of Jews entering from 1881, and in some ways were altered by it. Subsequent essays will show that British history over the subsequent century and a half has been characterised by the part-confrontation, part-collaboration of the older, more settled, wealthier Anglo-Jewry and the later incomers from eastern Europe.

Modern Jewish Politics and foreign policy

The burgeoning of the Jewish population even before 1881 resulted in ever-growing pressure on British politicians to divert British policy in favour of Jewish interests. There has never been a body that speaks for all Jews, but several institutions constitute communal leadership with at least the tacit acceptance of a large majority of Jews in Britain. The Board of Deputies of British Jews is the most ‘central’ of these, and as early as 1836, “the Board notified the chancellor of the exchequer that it was the only official channel of communication for the secular and political interests of the Jews.”11

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Board and the leading families that controlled it increasingly concerned themselves with the interests of Jewry worldwide. The historian C. S. Monaco has described their practices as ‘the rise of modern Jewish politics’ and has shown how they set the pattern for the present and the past century.12 From the 1840s, Jewish interventions in foreign affairs were usually led by Sir Moses Montefiore, the long-standing president of the Board of Deputies, who famously travelled to petition for Jewish interests in several countries.

Moses Montefiore

From 1871, the Board faced competition from the Anglo-Jewish Association. As Alderman describes, “[t]he Association might indeed have become a rival to the Board of Deputies”, and “[a]t first the Board of Deputies held aloof from it. But after its very effective intervention during the Balkan crisis of the late 1870s … the Board came to terms with it, and agreed in 1878 to the formation of a Conjoint Foreign Committee, consisting of seven representatives from the Board and seven from the Association.” The collaboration was productive. Jews thereafter had “an Anglo-Jewish ministry of foreign affairs” whose deliberations “were conducted in secret” and whose “conclusions were reported to neither of its constituent bodies.”13 In addition to the “close contacts” that won Jews the right to enter Parliament, the “overrepresentation” that immediately followed and the proclivities of some powerful Britons to put Jewish interests first, the secret “ministry” ensured that Jewish interests worldwide would be represented immediately and insistently in a way that had never applied to the British people or Christians.

It had become advantageous to be an ethnic minority in Britain. While Jews’ assertive internationality was rewarded, no such ministry for the native British would have been suffered to exist, let alone given any audience by the powerful. As Endelman approvingly describes,

“In Victorian Britain, at least before the end of the century, the pressures that caused Jews elsewhere to abandon traditional notions of peoplehood, collective fate, and mutual responsibility were muted. British Jews were free to express their ties to Jews abroad without fear of endangering their own struggle for civil equality and social acceptance. In this sense, the diplomatic activities of Montefiore and the Board of Deputies … testify to the confidence of communal leaders about their own status. It is important to stress this, for the contrary has been argued … Only toward the end of the century, with classical liberalism under attack and nationalism and antisemitism on the rise, did fears [of emancipation being reversed] gain ground and begin to shape communal policy—especially in regard to the newcomers from Eastern Europe.”14

Earlier in the century, Jews openly tried to steer policy their way. Later they gained reasons to hew closer in their overt conduct to the gentile elite, whose receptiveness to them was already in evidence.

Jewish foreign policy

The first professing Jewish member of Parliament, Lionel de Rothschild, probably the richest man in the world, and others of his family, used their influence in favour of the Ottoman Empire and against Europe, as did their friend and beneficiary Benjamin Disraeli. In 1876,

“Disraeli’s Eastern policy had the warm approval of most British Jews. In the first place Jews had considerable investments in Turkey, and were loath to see them thrown away because of Gladstone’s conscience. Beyond that, British Jews, in common with their co-religionists in Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, and America, looked at the situation from the point of view of Balkan Jewry. Turkish rule had allowed these Jews ‘a degree of tolerance far beyond anything conceded by Orthodox Christianity’. A. L. Green, minister of the prestigious Central Synagogue in London’s West End and ‘a Liberal in politics all my life’, instructed the Liberal Daily News ‘The Christian populations of the Turkish provinces have held, and continue with an iron hand to hold, my coreligionists under every form of political and social degradation.’”

As Alderman describes, “With very few exceptions … British Jews did not merely refuse to be associated with Gladstone’s Bulgarian Agitation; they actively opposed it.” Jewish allegiances in Britain were decided by the perceived interests of Jews at the other end of Europe. The Rothschilds became Tory supporters. “The Daily Telegraph (owned by the Jewish Levy-Lawson family) swung its influence behind Disraeli’s policy.” Then a “conference of European and American Jewish organizations” met to discuss “the reopening of the Eastern Question to improve the lot of Balkan Jewry” and soon afterward the Anglo-Jewish Association lobbied the government to amend British foreign policy. That the Ottoman forces had verifiably slaughtered thousands of Bulgarians while the Jewish organisations were merely vaguely presaging crimes against their co-religionists made no difference. “When war broke out between Russia and Turkey the following year, Sir Moses Montefiore made no secret about where his sympathies lay; he contributed £100 to the Turkish Relief Fund.”15

Alderman complains that “[i]t never occurred to Gladstone to consider the position of Balkan Jews, whom Turkish rule had allowed ‘a degree of tolerance far beyond anything conceded by Orthodox Christianity’.”16 Why that would occur to Gladstone is unexplained. Were Jewish interests already so sharply divergent from British ones, and on major issues? If so, was it Gladstone’s duty to side against his own people? And were Jewish politicians not loyal to Britain first? Evidently not. Then as now, Jewish politicians, activists, journalists and historians openly sided with their own tribe, wherever located, against the host nation, with scarcely any reproach, and no threat of expulsion.

The Rothschilds’ pre-eminence as financiers of states enabled them to be represented by the two main powers at the Congress of Berlin. As Alderman describes,

“While the Anglo-Jewish Association (later in collaboration with the Board of Deputies) petitioned the British Government on the need to secure the civil and political rights of Jews in newly independent Balkan states, the aged Lionel de Rothschild mobilized the considerable resources of his extended European family, and those of his German-Jewish banking associate Gerson von Bleichröder (Bismarck’s banker and adviser) to influence proceedings at the Congress of Berlin called to resolve the crisis, and of which Bismarck was President. The result was that the western European delegates at Berlin refused to sign a final treaty until Jewish anxieties had been allayed. The Treaty of Berlin, when signed in July 1878, thus contained definite guarantees of civil and political rights for the Jews of Romania, Bulgaria, and the Danubian principalities.

For British Jewry this represented a very considerable victory; it was little wonder that when Disraeli returned in triumph from Berlin, Moses Montefiore (despite his ninety-four years) was the first to greet him at Charing Cross railway station.”17

“A very considerable victory” it was, over anyone more sympathetic to Christians than to Jews, as in the common folk of Christendom. The Congress of Berlin is spoken of by derivative historians today as a ‘triumph for Disraeli’, and it was, but for Disraeli as a Jew, not as the Prime Minister of Britain. Establishing the paradigm wherein British interests are treated as the automatic inverse of Russian (and Eastern Christian) ones was also a victory for Disraelites that continues to pay dividends today.

The Liberal Party lost Jewish electoral support, funding and candidates:

“[T]he secession of the Rothschilds had turned a great many City Jews into Conservatives, and seems to have acted as a green light to provincial Jewries also to demonstrate their support for Conservatism. This happened at Liverpool in 1876 and three years later at Sheffield, where the Conservative candidate won the support of Jews specifically because of issues of foreign policy.”18

An Impression of the Congress of Berlin

The loss was fruitless. Disraeli had his way at Berlin anyway, the Conservative Party was accommodating, and Gladstone and the Liberals resisted Jewish demands only to the extent of causing anger, not defeat. As Alderman describes,

“the Bulgarian Agitation had had unpleasant anti-Jewish overtones, in which Disraeli’s own ethnic origins were exploited to the full, particularly by Liberal members of the intelligentsia such as Gladstone’s friend and future biographer, John Morley. Worse still, Gladstone himself had unleashed the full fury of his oratorical powers against Jews and Jewish influence. ‘I deeply deplore’, he told Leopold Gluckstein, author of a pamphlet on The Eastern Question and the Jews, ‘the manner in which, what I may call Judaic sympathies, beyond as well as within the circle of professed Judaism, are now acting on the question of the East.’”19

Gladstone’s deploration only amounted to a campaigning stance while in opposition. His own conduct of foreign policy, after he became Prime Minister in 1880, is generally agreed to have been aimless and ill-informed. And though, as Alderman notes, Gladstone refused “to become moved by the plight of Russian Jewry, or to get up an ‘agitation’ on its behalf,” it was under his premiership that the westward flood of eastern European Jews began, which led to the Jewish population of Britain quintupling by the First World War. The effects of ‘Judaic sympathies’ were multiplied in intensity by Gladstone’s own passivity toward the composition of the demos.

William Gladstone

Reasons for mass migration

Still, it would be misleading to single out Gladstone for condemnation. Jewish immigration on a smaller scale preceded 1881. According to Endelman, “In addition to middle-class immigration from Germany, there was also a small but steady trickle of impoverished Jews from Eastern Europe—contrary to the popular myth that the pogroms of 1881 inaugurated immigration from Poland and Russia.”20 Alderman notes that “The famine in north-east Russia in 1869–70 had brought some migrants to Britain; young Jewish men, seeking to escape service in the Russian army during the war with Turkey in 1875–6, also made their way to England” before ‘the pogroms’.21 Before 1881, chain migration was underway: “as Professor Gartner has noted, a high proportion of Jewish immigrants to Britain before the 1870s appear to have been single men, without family responsibilities.’ But by 1875 this pattern had broken down.”22 Simply, as Lloyd Gartner says, “emigration did not begin on account of pogroms and would certainly have attained its massive dimensions even without the official anti-Semitism of the Russian Government.”23 Endelman’s explanation is worth quoting in full:

“The most fundamental cause of emigration from Eastern Europe was the failure of the Jewish economy to grow as rapidly as the Jewish population. Between 1800 and 1900, the Jewish population of the Russian empire shot from one million to five million persons, exclusive of the one million who emigrated before the end of the century. (The Jews of Galicia, who enjoyed Habsburg tolerance but contributed to the migration current nonetheless, increased from 250,000 to 811,000.) During this same period, tsarist policy toward Jews oscillated between schemes to coerce their russification (through military service or education in state schools, for example) and measures to accomplish the reverse, that is, to isolate them from contact with sections of Russian society considered too weak to resist their alleged depredations—the peasantry, in particular. Measures with the latter goal in mind constricted Jewish economic activity and caused increasing immiseration over the course of the century. As the number of Jews exploded, the government repeatedly imposed limits on their ability to support themselves. With the exception of certain privileged persons, Jews were forbidden to live outside the Pale of Settlement, Russia’s westernmost provinces, and thus were denied access to those cities and regions where industrialization was creating new opportunities. At the same time, the government undertook steps to remove Jews from border regions and the countryside and concentrate them in the Pale’s overcrowded cities. There artisans and petty traders faced mounting competition from each other and, in the case of the former, from factory production as well. General conscription of Jewish males, imposed in 1873, as well as countless arbitrary acts of cruelty, made material immiseration seem even more unbearable.

In this context the pogroms of 1881 and the repressive legislation that followed were more catalyst than cause. Spreading fear and despair throughout Poland and Russia, they convinced the young that they had scant hope for a better future under tsarist rule. They accelerated a decades-old movement, causing migration to assume a momentum and life of its own. Personal exposure or immediate proximity to mob violence was not necessary to set people in motion. The first waves of immigrants to Britain came disproportionately from northern districts in the Pale, which were hardly touched by the pogroms of 1881. In Habsburg Galicia, which remained relatively free of pogroms throughout this period, a higher proportion of Jews migrated than in Russia. Here economic backwardness propelled migration—to Britain, the United States, and the Habsburg capital, Vienna.”24

Susan Tananbaum places more emphasis on Jews’ plight and notes that “pogroms, such as the one in Kishinev in 1903 and elsewhere, and the failure of the 1905 Revolution, provided additional impetus to leave” but agrees that “population increases and poverty had the greatest impact” and says that “[f]or several million Jews, the opportunities of the industrializing West offered their best hope for the future.”25 As Alderman says,

“most emigrants from eastern Europe were not, in the narrow sense, political refugees or, in the narrow sense, the victims of persecution. Most came from Lithuania and White Russia, where there was comparatively little anti-Jewish violence. Of course, the Russian pogroms that followed the assassination of Alexander II [in 1881], and which were renewed and intensified between 1882 and 1889, and again between 1902 and 1906, turned the trickle of Jewish refugees from Russia that had been observed before 1880 into a flood; restrictions imposed by the Russian authorities on Jewish residence, the forcing of Jews off the land while they were prohibited from living in cities, the expulsion of Jews from Moscow in 1891, all made it virtually impossible for most Russian Jews to participate in normal economic life.

In the west, pogroms and persecutions were regarded as the basic causes of Jewish emigration. In truth the picture was much more complex. The overriding reason for Jewish emigration from eastern Europe to England was economic. During the nineteenth century the Jewish population of the Russian Empire increased from one to over six millions. Given the ever more onerous restrictions on Jewish life, this burgeoning population sought better prospects elsewhere. But the towns to which they were drawn could not support them; the flow was driven further west, and, eventually, overseas. Nor did this flow originate only in Russia or Russian Poland. The Jews of Galicia (then part of the Habsburg Empire) were politically emancipated in 1867 and were relatively persecution-free thereafter; but Jews emigrated from Galicia in greater proportion than they did from Russia. From Romania, in 1899–1900, came a stream of fusgayers (walkers), a spontaneous march across Europe by young Jews searching to escape from persecution, famine, and hopelessness.”26

Fusgayers from Romania

Gartner describes the escalation of the migration wave:

“The turn of the century brought a decade of turmoil. In almost consecutive order, East European Jewry underwent the Rumanian ‘exodus’ of 1900, the Kishinev outrage of 1908, the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, the Revolution of 1905, and its trail of pogroms lasting into 1906. Under these hammer blows, the semblance of orderly movement which had been preserved for some ten years vanished. Waves of Rumanian wanderers, fleeing conscripts, pogrom victims, and above all, Jews who simply despaired of improvement in Russia streamed into the British Isles in proportions which bewildered those who tried to organize the flow. An added magnet was the dissolution of the “Atlantic Shipping Ring’ and that price war upon the high seas, the Atlantic Rate War from 1902 to 1904. Previously, English shippers had agreed with Continental firms that they would not sell their cheaper trans-Atlantic tickets to transmigrants. The connivances used by immigrants to outwit the shippers were abandoned and the fare dropped precipitously. Furthermore, a recognizable number of Jews from South Africa sought refuge at the commencement of the Boer War. By 1907, the great waves had spent themselves, and the Aliens Act [of 1905] erected a barrier to uncontrolled torrents.”27

Gartner characterises the easterly flood as “a spontaneous movement of people which flowed unencouraged by outsiders.”28 Yet Jews in America at the time, concerned with limiting immigration as well as helping those who had already immigrated settle, noted that “many of the refugees had been lured by extravagant promises of assistance and ‘glowing accounts of America given them by persons interested in inducing them to emigrate”.29 Many of those who settled in Britain had been in transit to America but found reasons to stop partway. Gartner himself describes how British officials in Odessa “always warned those who are proceeding to England to settle there that England is over crowded with unemployed workmen and that it is most undesirable that people should proceed there… but they invariably insist on going as their friends send them glowing accounts and also money to pay their passage.’”30

Lures

Immigration was also encouraged by and profitable for organised criminals and predators. According to Nelly Las, in large cities in Eastern Europe, “prostitution took place in certain sections known to be controlled by the Jewish underworld, to which the authorities turned a blind eye… In 1908, the American consul in Odessa reported that ‘All the business of prostitution in the city is in the hands of the Jews’.” Amid mass migration, “Jewish criminals … exported prostitution to distant lands.” Some prostitutes chose to move to wealthier countries in the expectation of earning more. Others were trafficked: “To entice their victims, Jewish sex traffickers used newspaper advertisements for jobs, the promise of an immigration certificate, and marriage proposals, all the while taking advantage of the parents’ naiveté and poverty.”31 As Tananbaum describes, “immigrants, particularly women, found travel precarious… Dishonest agents overcharged immigrants, promised them a marriage partner at the end of their journey, tricked them into the white slave trade or raped or harassed them en route.”32 Jewish women entering Britain could also be trapped into prostitution on arrival. “In the chaos of landing, the recruiter could too easily entice some friendless bewildered girls to accept hospitality at a place which would turn out to be a brothel”, according to Gartner.33

Jewish communal leaders were aware that Jews were over-represented in slavery both as victims and as perpetrators. Constance Rothschild co-founded the Jewish Association for the Protection of Girls and Women in 1885 to address the “mixture of Jewish traffickers and Jewish victims”.34 The latter were thought unlikely to seek help from Christian organisations. The JPGAW observed that “the girls have been lured from their parents and natural protectors, to be taken for immoral purposes to lands strange to them where a language they cannot understand is spoken.” According to Tananbaum, “[t]he founders soon learned that local prostitution was only a small part of a worldwide sex slave trade involving a number of Jews and extending from Eastern Europe to South America” and that “[w]hile small in total number, Jews made up a significant proportion of white slavers.”35 “The principal ‘contribution’ made by Jews was the supply of girls to the entrepôts of the system in Buenos Aires, Bombay, Constantinople, and elsewhere, fresh from the East European Pale and London also”, according to Gartner. As Las describes, “Jewish sex traffickers were prominent in major transit points from Europe to Latin America, such as Berlin, London, and Hamburg. In the latter, for example, of 402 sex traffickers caught by police in 1912, 271 were Jewish.”36

Numbers of immigrants

The immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe into Britain and America should be thought of less as a great flight of innocents from persecution and more as a great transposition of a large part of the Jewish population and its ways of life into the receiving countries. The larger the Jewish population in the West grew, the easier it was to avoid adapting or assimilating, even if the setting had changed for some from rural to urban, and some old trades were unviable in the West. The years from 1870 to 1914 “witnessed a phenomenal growth” of the Jewish population “both quantitatively and qualitatively” according to Immanuel Jakobovits. Gartner says that the population movement “was of vast proportions”.37 As Alderman describes,

“On the eve of the Russian pogroms the number of Jews living in London was, as we have seen, about 46,000, and in the country as a whole around 60,000. By 1914 these totals had been dwarfed by the arrival of about 150,000 immigrants; most found their way to London. Merely from a demographic viewpoint this amounted to a revolution. [B]etween 1881 and 1900 London Jewry expanded to approximately 135,000 [and] of these, it was estimated in 1899 that roughly 120,000 were living in the East End.”38

Between 250,000 and 300,000 Jews lived in Britain by the time of the Great War. “Merely from a demographic viewpoint this amounted to a revolution”, says Alderman.39 The inflow also had other revolutionary effects. Assimilation was a threat that was successfully headed off, as Jakobovits describes:

“[T]his influx was no doubt responsible for the intensity of the religious and Zionist commitment, the diversity, and indeed the sheer survival of the community as we know it today. Without this enormous transfusion of new blood, very few descendants of those resident in this country in 1870 would now maintain their Jewish identity, let alone sustain a vibrant Jewish community.”40

Reaction of settled Jews

The position of the older Jewish population was transformed. Through the Jewish Board of Guardians or ad-hoc relief efforts many aimed to help those who had arrived survive and, as seen, avoid being drawn into criminality or slavery, but did not typically encourage more to come. Although, according to Robert Henriques, the influence of the Board of Deputies “had been largely responsible for the liberal immigration policy which had doubled or trebled the numbers of Anglo-Jewry after 1880”41 and, as Gartner says, the “leading families like Rothschild, Montefiore, and Mocatta… would have kept the gates of England always open to all”, they “would give no encouragement and as little aid as possible to immigrants”.42 A typical view was that the “Jewish community could best protect itself from the charge of fostering immigration by ignoring the immigrant.”43 Aid could be expected to beget the demand for more aid. The Jewish Chronicle observed as early as 1880 that “over ninety per cent of our applicants to our Board of Guardians have been subjects of the Czar, and the larger proportion of our poor are invariably immigrants from Russia or Poland.”44 With whatever reluctance, though, aid and other kinds of communal uplift were provided. A typical view at the time was that “[t]hey will drag down, submerge and disgrace our community if we leave them in their present state of neglect”.45 Alderman summarises:

“Jews already settled in Britain objected to foreign-born Jews coming to Britain because these foreign Jews drew attention to themselves, and brought political controversy in their wake, so that the public mind became focused upon Jews as foreigners and a cause for concern at the very time at which the established Jewry was trying its hardest to blend itself, chameleon-like, into its non-Jewish environment… Jews became news.”46

Blending in became impossible, the more so as newcomers brought new ideas and advanced them with vigour and disregard for any pre-existing consensus. The immigrants, unlike the Rothschilds and the cousinhood, were “Poor (for the most part), Yiddish-speaking, Orthodox, socialist and Zionist”.47 As James Appell describes, the immigrants into London also “resented an attitude towards them from their co-religionists which placed low value on the character of the immigrant.”48 There was unanimity on two points, though: “[t]he Yiddish press kept a prudent distance from contentious social and economic questions, except the defence of Jews against anti-Semitism and in favour of free immigration to England.”49 The newcomers outnumbered the older Jewish population manifold, and today “[t]he vast majority of British Jews are third- or fourth-generation descendants of working-class migrants from eastern Europe”, according to Alderman.50 As will be seen in future essays, Britain was altered by the incomers in unprecedented ways. As Alderman says,

“The Jewish immigrants changed the shape of the British polity as surely as they changed the structure of British Jewry: the Jewish experience and the British experience merged and affected each other in a manner far more central than that offered by emancipation itself.”51

My people were refugees, goy

That ‘mass immigration’ into Britain began in 1997 or later is a myth convenient to those who condone the smaller numbers that came before. First as immigrants themselves, then as advocates, instigators and facilitators, Jews have been inseparably involved with mass migration into white countries. Their own movement through Europe, sometimes marching in columns, prefigured that of Muslims in the decades since the Second World War. Angela Merkel, who proudly opened Germany to the entry of more than a million Africans and Asians per year from 2015, has been lavishly acclaimed by Jewish activists and the state of Israel. Vaguely the advocates of immigration speak as though her importees were all refugees, a tactic that continues to work. Except in Israel, Jewish organisations, including the Board of Deputies, routinely cite the experiences of their ancestors to justify their pro-immigration stance. While British electors and leaders continue to respond cravenly, they will do nothing for their own nation. Repudiating the myths may help revive it.


References

1

Modern British Jewry, Geoffrey Alderman, 1992, p117

2

The Jews of Britain, 1656 to 2000, Todd Endelman, 2002, p73-4

3

Controversy and Crisis, Geoffrey Alderman, 2008, p274

4

Geoffrey Alderman in Leeds and its Jewish Community, edited by Derek Fraser, 2019, ch1

5

Endelman, p106

6

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p63-4

7

The Jewish Community in British Politics, Geoffrey Alderman, 1983, p31. The sabbath was to become more withstanding when it came to the controversy over Sunday trading laws, to be covered in a later article.

8

Endelman, p36, 101, 277 (note 36)

9

Endelman, p79

10

Controversy, Alderman, p234

11

Endelman, p106. Endelman adds parenthetically that the Board “continued to make this claim throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although there was no legal basis for it.” For more on the question of the extent to which the Board speaks for Jews, see The Communal Gadfly, Geoffrey Alderman, 2009, p15-28.

12

See The Rise of Modern Jewish Politics, C.S. Monaco, 2013. Today, similar practices are continued by the likes of the World Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League, though Jews’ situation has been transformed since the 1880s.

13

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p96

14

Endelman, p123-4

15

Jewish Community, Alderman, p37-8 and Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p99. See also Alderman, MBJ, p98-9: “[M]ost British Jews supported Disraeli’s Eastern policy.”

16

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p98-9

17

ibid., p99-100

18

ibid., p99-100

19

ibid., p99-100]

20

Endelman, p81. See also p128: “Contrary to popular myth, East European immigration did not begin with the pogroms that swept through Bessarabia and Ukraine in 1881.”

21

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p112. ‘Pogroms’, referring varyingly to organised riots against Jews or to more spontaneous inter-communal violence, had occurred before 1881, but the term ‘the pogroms’ is sometimes used to refer to the violence of 1881-2 and the subsequent mass emigration.

22

ibid., p82

23

The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870-1914, Lloyd Gartner, 1973, p41

24

Endelman, p128-9. See also Gartner, p41. As Gartner says of the population increase, “The economic structure of Jewish life failed to expand with the needs imposed by this unprecedented increase.” See Gartner, p21. “Economic backwardness” was a cause of broader trends in rural-to-urban migration at the same time. According to Gartner, “[b]etween the earlier years of the nineteenth century and 1930 occurred the heaviest voluntary migration of people known in history… 62,000,000 persons… crossed international frontiers in this age of relative ‘free trade’ in human movement… migration, even of such dimensions, was itself partly an aspect of such pervasive nineteenth century trends as industrial development, urban growth, and strivings for personal freedom. Under the heading of migration one may well include tens of millions more who crossed no political boundary, yet traversed an economic frontier by pulling up stakes from a farm or village community and settling in an industrial city within their own country.” Gartner, p270

25

Jewish Immigrants in London, 1880-1939, Susan Tananbaum, 2014, p22

26

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p111-2. Columns of African and Asian ‘fusgayers’ marched through Europe in 2015.

27

Gartner, p46-7

28

Gartner, p12

29

Russians, Jews and the Pogroms of 1881-2, John Doyle Klier, 2011, p373. In the 1940s, the Jewish-owned Gleaner used similar methods to entice Afro-Caribbeans to move to Britain.

30

Gartner, p29. He cites the example of a villager seeing the volume of money being sent from Britain to his neighbours and deciding to move too.

31

White Slavery, Nelly Las, Shalvi/Hyman Encyclopedia of Jewish Women, 2021. Jewish Women’s Archive

32

Tananbaum, p19

33

Gartner, p183. “In 1910, the Jewish Association for the Protection of Girls and Women (JAPGW) called a conference in London to discuss the issue. It was attended by representatives from all over the world and focused on Jewish women from Russia and Romania leaving Europe and becoming involved in prostitution in South America. The editors of Anglo-Jewry were concerned that white slaving was seen as a Jewish issue and that more than just Jews were involved in the trafficking of women. At a Yorkshire level, the Hull Jewish community were sufficiently concerned that they monitored all single Jewish girls who came through the port as lone travellers and checked that they safely reached their destination.” Grizzard in Leeds, edited by Fraser, ch7

34

Constance Rothschild, Lady Battersea, Linda Gordon Kuzmack and Ellery Gillian Weil, Shalvi/Hyman Encyclopedia of Jewish Women, 2021. Jewish Women’s Archive

35

Tananbaum, p132-3

36

Las, 2021

37

Preface by Immanuel Jakobovits to The Jewish Immigrant in England by Gartner, p1, and p45

38

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p117-8

39

Controversy, Alderman, p196-7

40

Jakobovits in Gartner, p1. Endelman concurs with Jakobovits: “[W]ithout this infusion of new blood, the small, increasingly secularized, native-born community, left to itself, would have dwindled into insignificance, as drift, defection, and indifference took their toll.” Endelman p127

41

Sir Robert Waley Cohen, 1877-1952: A Biography, Robert Henriques, 1966, p353

42

Gartner, p50-1

43

ibid., p55-6

44

ibid., p41]

45

James Appell in New Directions in Anglo-Jewish History, edited by Geoffrey Alderman, 2010, p31-2

46

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p120

47

Alderman in Leeds, edited by Fraser, ch1

48

Appell in New Directions, edited by Alderman, p31-2

49

Gartner, p260

50

Controversy, Alderman, p313

51

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p102

 

UFC Fighter Bryce Mitchell’s Pro-National Socialist Remarks Show the JQ Can No Longer Be Fully Censored

Earlier this month fans of mixed martial arts got a much-needed dose of revisionist history, when UFC featherweight fighter Bryce Mitchell made positive remarks about National Socialist Germany.

During an appearance on the ArkanSanity Podcast, Mitchell made everybody lose their minds when he initially defended Adolf Hitler’s leadership of the German National Socialist state.

“I honestly think that Hitler was a good guy based on my own research, not my public education indoctrination. I do really think before Hitler got on meth, he was a guy to go fishing with,” the American fighter said.

“He fought for his country. He wanted to purify it by kicking the greedy Jews out that were destroying his country and turning them all into gays,” he continued. Mitchell noted that the preceding Weimar regime and the degeneracy it presided over created the conditions for the rise of the NSDAP.

“They were gaying out the kids. They were queering out the women. They were queering out the dudes. Do you know where the first tranny surgery ever was? Happened to be in Germany before Hitler took over, “ the UFC fighter observed. (See also Andrew Joyce on Magnus Hirschfeld: e.g., “Hitler referred to Hirschfeld as ‘the most dangerous Jew in Germany.’” See also Joyce on Hirschfeld’s Racism.)

Like clockwork, Anti-Defamation League CEO Jonathan Greenblatt criticized Mitchell for his comments on the ArkanSanity Podcast. “I’m aghast at this podcast interview. There are simply no words,” Greenblatt said to BBC. “In the span of just a few minutes Mitchell manages to express antisemitic, homophobic, and transphobic sentiments. We hope the UFC will take immediate action to make clear that these ideas are noxious and have no place in the sport,” the ADL CEO added.

UFC President Dana White instantly pounced on Mitchell’s remarks, declaring, “Hitler is one of the most disgusting and evil human beings to ever walk the face of the Earth and anyone that even tries to take an opposition position is a moron.”

“That’s the problem with the internet and social media. You provide a platform to a lot of dumb and ignorant people,” White continued.

Surprisingly, Dana White did not cancel Mitchell much less cut him from the MMA promotion like the shrillest voices of organized Jewry wanted him to. Instead, White defended Mitchell’s right to free speech despite taking the “Boomer Truth” line about Hitler and World War II.   “It’s free speech. That’s the beautiful thing about this business, for all of you who hate Bryce Mitchell, you get to see him hopefully get his ass whooped on global television,” White conceded.

“I know a lot of people died in the Holocaust, and that’s a fact,” Mitchell conceded in an image he posted on X. “Hitler did a lot of evil things, I think we can all agree on that. I’m definitely not a nazi, and definitely do not condone any of the evil things Hitler did.” In a caption he added to this post, Mitchell said, “In the future I will b[e] much more considerate [when] talking about the suffering of all peoples.”

What likely prompted White to decry Mitchell’s statement and the featherweight fighter’s eventual apology was pressure from Ari Emanuel, the CEO of Endeavor and the CEO and executive chairman of TKO Group holdings, the parent company of the UFC and WWE.

Ari Emanuel is the brother of infamous former Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, who gained infamy for proclaiming in 2011, “Never let a good crisis go to waste when it’s an opportunity to do things you had never considered or you didn’t think were possible.”

Shifty political behavior courses through the veins of the Emanuel family, which is of Jewish extraction. The two brothers’ father is Benjamin M. Emanuel was a pediatrician who moonlighted as a member of the Irgun — a Zionist terrorist organization active in the 1930s and 1940s carrying out attacks against Palestinian civilians and British troops. Similarly, their mother Marsha Smulevitz was heavily involved in the Civil Rights movement and served as the chair of the Chicago North Side chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) for four years in the early 1960s.

Ari Emanuel is plugged into Democratic Party politics and has held multiple fundraisers for the party. He also contributed $2,700 to Hillary Clinton during the 2016 United States presidential election. Despite his Democratic Party affiliation, Emanuel has maintained close ties with President Donald Trump

Emanuel was Trump’s agent for several years, representing him during certain points of Trump’s career in the entertainment scene. In 2016, Ari Emanuel, as co-CEO of WME-IMG (now part of Endeavor), spearheaded the purchase of the UFC for $4 billion from the Fertitta brothers — Lorenzo and Frank.

Like most of his kinfolk, Emanuel does not like it when Gentiles start speaking their minds about Jewish influence in American society. In October 2022, Emanuel pushed for multiple companies to cut off all business ties with rapper Kanye West, currently known as Ye, for his antisemitic remarks. (Ye hasn’t stopped.)

Curiously, the UFC has positioned itself as an anti-woke sports promotion, with Dana White being the most vocal pro-Donald Trump sports executive in the country, going as far as to speak at the Republican National Convention on multiple occasions, in support of Trump. Sean Strickland, a former UFC champion, has made numerous comments poking fun of homosexuals and other protected groups without facing significant consequences from the organization.

Mitchell is an outspoken fighter who has not shied away from expressing right-wing views outside of the Octagon. During a media event in 2022, Mitchell sharply criticized the Federal Reserve, calling it a “corrupt institution.” The featherweight contender is no fan of the current education system either. In 2024, Mitchell announced he would homeschool his son to prevent him from worshipping Satan or turning into a homosexual.

While Mitchell’s reversal is lame, there is still a silver lining. The cat is out of the bag as far as Judeo-skepticism and the reassessment of National Socialism’s legacy is concerned. His latest outburst demonstrates that for the under-40 demographic, Judeo-skeptic beliefs are so strong to the point that gatekeepers in the Jewish-controlled media, political class, and broader culture can no longer contain such sentiments. No matter what side of the political spectrum young Americans find themselves on, they harbor some form of antisemitism.

Anti-Defamation League (ADL) Director Jonathan Greenblatt views it this way. Barely a month after the Oct. 7, 2023 attacks against Israel, a leaked phone call between Greenblatt and an unknown Zionist compatriot achieved virality all over social media. In the audio, Greenblatt was distraught about Generation Z’s weak support for Israel. Further, the ADL director blamed video sharing application Tiktok for platforming anti-Israeli sentiment.

“We have a major, major, major generational problem,” Greenblatt proclaimed. “All the polling I’ve seen: the ADL’s polling, ICC’s polling, independent polling, suggests that this is not a left, right gap folks. The issue of the United States’ support of Israel is not left and right. It is young and old.”

White should be given credit for not reflexively canceling Mitchell and leaving him on the unemployment line. This shows that certain segments of American culture are no longer as keen to be private enforcers of politically correct standard.

That said, as long as Ari Emanuel is slithering around the halls of UFC headquarters, there’s a hard limit to what politically incorrect statements fighters under the UFC banner can make. More Bryce Mitchells, especially those who don’t back down, will have to step up not only in the UFC but across all corners of American culture for the Jewish Question to become fully normalized in political discourse.

Countless people will take proverbial blows from corporations, legacy media, and even the government throughout this process. But this is the cost of doing business in the grueling Reconquista campaign that must be waged to take back our nation from organized Jewry.

No one said this fight was going to be a walk in the park.

José Niño is a Hispanic dissident who is well aware of the realities of race from his experience living throughout Latin America and in the States.

As a native of lands conquered by brave Spaniards but later subverted by centuries of multiracial trickery and despotic governance, José offers clear warnings to Americans about the perils of multiracialism.

His Substack is at: https://josbcf.substack.com/. Definitely worth supporting.

On the Possibility of a New Elite

I am perhaps best known for documenting a hostile, highly influential Jewish elite in the U.S. and really throughout the West. But I think things are changing in a good direction. With some important exceptions.

Jews ascended to the heights of American society in several stages. In the early twentieth century they were important enough to get on Henry Ford’s radar. Ford noted their prominence in a variety of fields and their hostility to Christianity — see  my discussion of Henry Ford’s The International Jew published from1920 to 1922. Jews also had prominent roles in FDR’s administration, but it wasn’t until after World War II that anti-Jewish attitudes basically disappeared and they really entered the mainstream. Jews then led the 1960s counter-cultural revolution and became a dominant elite in the 1960s, deeply involved in the passage of the 1965 immigration law that eventually radically transformed the country, as well as civil rights legislation and the general ascent of the left to a position of dominance in American culture. Jewish ascendency was accompanied by the decline and eventual eclipse of the previously dominant WASP east-coast establishment.

The main sources of Jewish power since the 1960s have been: 1.) their ownership of media and their creation of media content as writers and producers; 2) their wealth and willingness to contribute to political causes—funding political candidates and establishing nonprofit organizations and lobbying groups able to influence public policy; 3.) their domination of academic culture, ultimately due to their influence in elite universities and trickling down to lower-tier universities and eventually the K-12 educational system.

Is this Jewish power structure still in place? Yes, but there appear to be important changes.

Media. When I was growing up (a VERY long time ago), there were three TV networks, all owned by Jews (CBS, ABC, NBC). These networks are still owned by Jews and the New York Times is still Jewish and reflects of the mainstream liberal-left Jewish community. But fewer and fewer people care.

If the 2024 election shows anything, it’s that the legacy mainstream media is distrusted more than ever and has been effectively replaced among wide swaths of voters, especially young voters, by alternative media, particularly podcasts and social media. Joe Rogan, a former liberal (wasn’t everyone?) has become increasingly conservative and Tucker Carlson has pushed the boundaries of conservative thinking, such as his interview with Darryl Cooper questioning the sacrosanct World War II narrative and his interview with Curt Mills that touches on the neocons and America’s disastrous wars in the Middle East. Another former liberal, Elon Musk, is gleefully taking a sledge hammer to the entrenched, overwhelmingly Democrat-leaning federal bureaucracy.

Just recently, Trump’s Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth evicted The New York Times, NPR, NBC, and Politico from their Pentagon offices to make room for One America News Network, The New York Post, Breitbart News Network, and HuffPo (which did not ask for representation). All of the ones replaced are decidedly on the left and replacements are conservative except HuffPo. None can be considered legacy media.

Thomas Edsall in the NYTimes has noted that “While both Democrats and Republicans have abandoned newspapers in growing numbers, … the drop among Republicans accelerated much faster than it did for Democrats in 2016, the year Trump first ran for president.”

Bottom line: Newspapers are a key source of information for Democrats but not Republicans.

Of course, a problem is that conservative media is slavishly pro-Israel even as they typically oppose liberal-left domestic political policies favored by the mainstream Jewish community, such as:

  1. promoting high levels of legal non-White immigration, enabling illegal immigration, and stopping deporting illegals because they see them as future voters for the liberal left and diluting the power of White Americans;
  2. promoting so-called hate speech laws and other attempts to rein in free speech on racial/ethnic issues, including especially criticisms of Israel;
  3. advocating easy access to abortion, transgenderism, gay rights, etc.

Jews typically vote overwhelmingly Democrat and basically fund the Democratic Party. In the 2024 election they voted 71–79 percent for Harris, thus supporting the liberal-far left policies favored by the Harris campaign. Even though there was some shift to more conservative voting among groups of Jews, they are still on the left when it comes to domestic issues.

Jewish neocons were a long-time fixture in the GOP but bailed with the rise of Trump because of his professed distaste for foreign wars and likely because of Trump’s stated views on immigration and multiculturalism. Predictably, the neocons seamlessly defected to the Democrats where their liberal-left views on domestic policy fit right in. While in the GOP, they moved the party to the left on social issues while promoting pro-Israel wars in the Middle East and now the Ukraine war against Russia. Conservative media by and large support Trump (he “just keeps on winning”), and are thus anathema to most Jews.

The point being that even though conservative media is obsessively pro-Israel, it opposes the attitudes and policies of the mainstream liberal-left Jewish community on domestic policy. The legacy media, a main power bases of the mainstream liberal-left Jewish community, appears to be in terminal decline.

The rise of alternative media is critical. Under Elon Musk, X is clearly open to conservative  views, and indeed, when I go on there, all I see are conservative and even anti-Jewish posts (e.g., by @NickJFuentes and Ye, although I notice Ye’s recent posts appear to have been removed or limited). I recently returned to X under my real name (@realKevinMacDonald) and so far, nothing has happened. X has become a right-leaning media outlet that attracts young people and many others who reject the legacy media—during the run-up to the election it was great entertainment to see the replies to posts by the Harris campaign.

Funding the Left. What about funding the left? Jewish financial clout is certainly still in place, but we are seeing the rise of a very wealthy class of non-Jewish billionaires, prototypically Elon Musk (who reportedly gave Trump’s campaign north of $290 million). Wealthy non-Jews are thus quite willing and able to finance a competitive campaign like Trump’s. In a previous article I cited a survey showing that as of August, 2024, 21 of the top 25 donors to Trump were not Jews—not including Musk. Overall, Democrats ($880 million) spent about twice as much as Republicans ($445 million) on the 2024 presidential election, showing the Jews remain ready and willing to fund the left. But the Trump campaign certainly had enough money to run a credible campaign and even win despite the deluge of hate emanating from the legacy media.

Jewish money is thus not necessary to win, especially if the richest man in the world is on board. Even if Musk gave $300 million, it’s less than 1 percent of his wealth. Indeed, Musk could finance a presidential campaign all by himself—$1 billion would be more than even the Democrats spent on the 2024 presidential campaign, but Musk could easily afford that. As the Jews have known forever, money is power.

All this wealth supporting Trump 2.0  was apparent at Trump’s inauguration:

Here were America’s tech tycoons, members of his court, in a pantheon at his second Inaugural Address, directly across from the former presidents and in front of Trump’s presumptive cabinet. Many members of Congress, the actual elected government, were relegated to the cheaper seats.

The men who control Americans’, eyeballs and, often, emotions got the choicest seats; several have scarfed up big mansions in Washington to be closer to the Oval.

Elon Musk sat behind the vice president’s mother, pumping his arms and giving two thumbs-up when Trump said he’d put an American flag on Mars, where Musk wants to die (just not on impact).

Google’s Sundar Pichai was near Don Jr. and next to Jeff Bezos and Lauren Sanchez, who were near Ivanka and Jared. Shou Zi Chew, the TikTok C.E.O., sat next to Tulsi Gabbard, Trump’s intended director of national intelligence. Tim Cook of Apple was close to Barron Trump. Sam Altman, the head of OpenAI, was also at the inaugural but — perhaps because of his legal duel with Elon — was in the overflow room with Ron DeSantis, Eric Adams and Conor McGregor.

Most of these tycoons are likely just following the power, but this is a huge change from the 2017 inauguration and suggests that they are quite comfortable with the sea changes the Trump is pursuing.

Academia. And then there’s the university—definitely the hardest nut to crack because hiring is rigorously policed to make sure that new faculty and administrators are on the left. Academics who get out of line can expect a lifetime of harassment and hostility, and if they don’t have tenure, they will certainly be fired no matter how good their teaching and scholarship are.

As in other areas, Jews ascended the heights of the academic world after World War II and especially during the 1960s. Once they achieved prominence, they promoted the expansion of departments essentially composed of activists of the left, such as gender studies and various ethnic studies departments for Blacks, Latinos, Asians, Jews, etc., thus expanding the liberal arts faculty and creating a critical mass of leftist activists. This structure is still in place.

Since the Israeli war in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and Syria, there have been a great many protests on campus, but Jewish power has put a rather quick end to that (see “Massive Decline in Protests from Spring to Fall, 2024”): “The policies ranged from banning the erection of tents on campus grounds to limiting the times and places where students are allowed to hold demonstrations. While free speech experts agree that some time, place and manner restrictions are acceptable, they have branded some policy changes unconstitutional.” At UCLA, pro-Israel thugs were allowed to run amok among protesters while the police stood by. Ron Unz:

Even worse scenes took place at UCLA as an encampment of peaceful protesters was violently attacked and beaten by a mob of pro-Israel thugs having no university connection but armed with bars, clubs, and fireworks, resulting in some serious injuries. A professor of History described her outrage as the nearby police stood aside and did nothing while UCLA students were attacked by outsiders, then arrested some 200 of the former. According to local journalists, the violent mob had been organized and paid by pro-Israel billionaire Bill Ackman.

Obviously, these restrictions are a far cry from university responses to the BLM riots.

As Unz noted,

I’d think that most of these students were absolutely stunned at such reactions. For decades, they and their predecessors had freely protested on a wide range of political causes without ever encountering even a sliver of such vicious retaliation, let alone an organized campaign that quickly forced the resignation of two of the Ivy League presidents who had allowed their protests. Some of their student organizations were immediately banned and the future careers of the protesters were harshly threatened, but the horrifying images from Gaza continued to reach their smartphones. As Jonathan Greenblatt of the ADL had previously explained in a leaked phone call, “We have a major TikTok problem.”

So, yes, Jewish power in academia is alive and well.

The Trump administration is pushing back on the academic left but not against Jewish power in the universities, proposing to deport foreign students and professors involved in anti-Israel protests: “The new attorney general, Pam Bondi, created a task force to prosecute antisemitic acts, including on college campuses. The president’s order singles out last year’s university protests against Israel’s war in Gaza, which it says unleashed a barrage of discrimination against Jewish students. The order targets international students who participated in those protests with deportation.”

There is also a campaign to end DEI at universities. Christopher Rufo, interviewed by Jewish activist and New York Times columnist Michelle Goldberg,  stated: “‘If you have the full weight of the White House, the full weight of the Department of Education and a platoon of right-wing lawyers trying to use all of the statutory and executive authority that they have to reshape higher education, I think it could be a thing of tremendous beauty.’ Rufo wants to get rid of DEI in higher education and stop the practice the “‘rampant’ discrimination against white, Jewish and Asian students and faculty members, particularly through D.E.I. programs, which aim to boost the representation of groups deemed underprivileged.”

Trump’s attitude on foreign student protesters will put a further chill into what has already been happening with anti-Israel protests. But fighting DEI at universities will be an uphill struggle against an academic establishment that has devoted huge amounts of money and hired thousands of bureaucrats to administer DEI programs and will likely find ways to continue it even if it is legally prohibited, as they have with affirmative action admissions.

However, of the three main sources of Jewish power, academic influence is least important. Students will notice that DEI jobs are drying up and that spouting and living the old leftist political clichés is not a good route to social and career success. Women in particular are likely to shift political preferences when they see a shift in the status hierarchy, but men will also change their attitudes as they try to advance in the new hierarchy.

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Conclusion: There is a real possibility of the rise of an essentially non-Jewish elite centered outside the traditional legacy media and with the financial resources able to mount successful political campaigns and fund compatible NGOs. Whether this could develop into an anti-Jewish elite is a completely different question—unlikely for the foreseeable future because of the deep personal ties and business relationships among elite Jews and non-Jews. Nevertheless, as noted, the domestic policies of the Trump administration for the most part depart dramatically from policies long favored by the mainstream liberal-left Jewish community. Already we see numerous Jewish organizations protesting any end to DEI or the deportations.

Although the present situation is in flux, it is quite possible that in the future the new elite described here could become far more than a possibility. This new elite may realize that Jewish support and Jewish power in American politics is not what it was and that there is no real need to support the policies favored by the mainstream Jewish community. Indeed, this may have already happened—with the important exception of pro-Israel attitudes that also appeal to some sections of the Republican base (e.g., knee-jerk support of Israel by mainstream conservatives and Evangelicals). Some parts of this new elite may be well aware of the role Jews have played in erecting the multicultural disaster that America has become—a position that was common on the American right for decades, at least until neocons pushed out traditional conservatives during the Reagan administration (here,  pp. 16 and 26) and William Buckley purged the conservative movement of critics of Jewish influence. And they may be well aware that the slavish support that America has  given Israel has been enormously costly in terms of lives and treasure without really serving American interests.

Musk is a good example. From a November 1, 2024 article:

Musk is increasingly off the reservation in his tweets: “The damage was done,” [holocaust activist] Deborah Lipstadt remarked about a Musk post on X. “The endorsement of the Great Replacement theory was very harmful.” Lipstadt added that she disapproved of what she saw as any attempt to “mitigate” Musk’s earlier tweet, without criticizing ADL head Jonathan Greenblatt directly. “You can try to mitigate, but once you open the pillow, it’s like chasing the feathers,” she said.

Musk was replying to a user who wrote, “Jewish communities have been pushing the exact kind of dialectical hatred against whites that they claim to want people to stop using against them. I’m deeply disinterested in giving the tiniest s— now about western Jewish populations coming to the disturbing realization that those hordes of minorities [they] support flooding their country don’t exactly like them too much.”

Musk responded, “You have said the actual truth.”

Greenblatt joined a loud chorus in condemning that post. Other Jewish groups, including the American Jewish Committee, harshly condemned it. Later in the same thread, Musk went after the ADL itself, saying the group “push[es] de facto anti-white racism.” He apologized for a lot of this and made the mandatory visits to Auschwitz and Israel, but it’s hard to believe that he now rejects these ideas.

As always, I am an optimist. I think that a lot of the figures on the right are quite aware of the deleterious effects of Jewish power and influence on the formerly dominant White America. And as I noted, “it’s hard to believe that [Musk] now rejects these ideas.”

And it’s hard to believe that Jews are able to retain their position as paragons of tolerance and virtue in view of Israeli actions in Gaza and the support these actions have received by the American Jewish community.

We can take our country back.