Featured Articles

First Thoughts on the Breach of the Capitol by Trump Backers: The Left Will Now Enact Permanent Hegemony

1. The obvious: violence and property destruction all summer by the left—still continuing in Portland et al.— tolerated by politicians and ignored by most of media which is now outraged by the breach of the Capitol. Sedition!! Insurrection!! How quickly they forget all the violence by the left, including the riots in DC before, during, and after Trump’s inauguration. Imagine the rioting if Trump had won. It would have made what happened at the Capitol seem like child’s play. And the media and the left would have talked about “mostly peaceful” protests.

2. With control of Congress (assuming Ossoff wins, which seems like a done deal), the Democrats will make victory permanent by adding DC and Puerto Rico as states, giving amnesty to millions of illegals so they can vote, ramp up legal immigration, and finish the demographic revolution ahead of schedule.

3. Big  Tech will ramp up censorship, and Congress may well enact “hate speech” laws with prison and fines for the dissident right, which Biden will be only too happy to sign. Websites like this one may well be targets.  If SCOTUS strikes down such laws, they will pack the Court. Or maybe just pack the Court anyway, as seems to be mainstream among Democrats.

3. A large percentage of the right believes the election was stolen (it was). I don’t think this attitude will go away, and when they realize they can’t win elections because of what the new government is doing, all bets are off. The left will use violence from the right to rationalize left authoritarianism, and with all that media power and political hegemony, they may succeed; again, fines and prison for rightest dissenters. There may well be very serious secession movements by Red State America. In any case, it’s not over until it’s over.

4. Ultimately this has come about because of the anti-White demographic revolution set into motion by the 1965 immigration law and the gradual increases in numbers of legal immigrants and illegal immigrants whose children become citizens. There’s no way that Georgia would vote for leftist radicals like Ossoff and Warnock without the demographic shift. The revolution was rationalized by the leftist media and academic culture which is now preaching Critical Race Theory aimed at inducing guilt in Whites and convincing Whites to punish other Whites who dissent from the new —what is called altruistic punishment by evolutionists (White people are particularly prone to this—long story). It’s redundant here to point out the outsize Jewish role in all this, but suffice it to say that this is the endgame dreamed of by the activist left for the last century. Their take-home message from the 2016 election was that Trump’s populist rhetoric was popular with a majority of Americans and if given enough time could have been enacted into policy. The policies Trump enunciated in 2016 had the prospect of  at least slowing down the White demographic disaster, especially if these attitudes became even more entrenched with four more years of Trump and followed by someone with fewer rough edges, more political skill, and more of a mandate to do what needs to be done. The implicit mantra on the left was “Never Again,” and they pulled out all the stops to defeat him—not only the election fraud but also but the huge boost from most of the media in ginning up Trump hate and bogus impeachment Inquisitions while ignoring (mainstream media) or censoring (Twitter, Facebook) anything bad about Biden. Most notably Hunter Biden’s scandalous deals in China and Ukraine, with a cut for the “Big Guy.” Of course, there may well be a Democrat Plan B to get serious about Biden corruption and impeach him in favor of Harris.

5. There will be a big fight in the GOP over Trump’s legacy and whether Trumpists will be the future of the party. The neocons will try to make a comeback and the Chamber of Commerce types never left. But IMO there’s no way they can get a majority of the GOP behind them. The GOP is a populist party now and it’s not going away.

6. But like I said, it’s not over until it’s over. It’s just that the hole we were in, already deep, just got a whole lot deeper. But remember, when the Roman Republic ended, there was no great regret because the Republic was dysfunctional. It’s increasingly obvious that the US is dysfunctional. Which suggests that ultimately there will be an authoritarian government of the left (more likely right now) or right. Or secession.

Addendum: Conservatives on FOX News are saying things like “It was a bad election, but we have to fix that by changing the laws and going to court, not violence”—e.g., Trey Gowdy. The problem is that the left realizes that this could happen and that’s why they will do all they can to make it permanent. “Never Again.” As always, principled conservatives are happy to go down believing in the principles.

Addendum 2: I get the argument that storming the Capitol will strengthen the left. But should Trump supporters have just gone home when they sincerely & not without reason think the election was stolen? The left wouldn’t have. Stealing election is the ultimate political crime in a democracy.

A Southern Robert E. Lee Lookalike visits the northern Australopithecus: Review of Tito Perdue’s Love Song of the Australopiths

Tito Perdue, Love Song of the Australopiths, 2020)

No one knows the true intent of the nameless character in Love Song of the Australopiths who is about to turn in his latest anti-Semitic report to his elderly associates. His accent and his phenotype, however, point to Lee Pefley, the eternal Southerner, using different aliases in order to better terminate his life in a suicidal killing spree. The plot of the book revolves around his similarly gloomy lookalikes Greta, Fred, Frank, Taw et al., all of whom defy positive identification and all of whom are living outside what we think of as normal time sequences.  Tito Perdue, in this latest installment of his doomsday scenarios, plants his atemporal Robert E. Lee lookalike back to square one. Times Square? Thirty years earlier, Lee-Lookalike had managed to make his escape from New York and managed to return to home sweet home Alabama. Now, however, as expected in his beliefs of eternal return, he is being thrown anew into the Manhattan manhunt, ready for a final showdown with the forces of Brownness and darkness.   Prior to his return, Lee had nurtured dreams about the revival of the South, only to realize that the New York cesspool had already infected the South. Now back in New York, the rules of the survival game have changed dramatically over the last 30 years. Unlike in his previous sojourns in the Big Apple, he must resort to different combat procedures. Alas, times have changed and his rebel nature obliges him to live not in a 50- or 60-year-old body, but instead lug around the body of a man approaching the age of 80 something.

During his return, New York, or what remains of it, is hit by floods and with winds blowing over 300 miles an hour.  The City fauna teems with defecating colored bipeds, overweight mischlings, and the surplus of waste from the antipodes.  Scavenging, dying and killing of sorts have become the only sport in town.  The lookalike Lee returnee meets with pockets of his confederates at closed-off locations — most of them being his former fellow travelers, quite a few his ex-beneficiaries, and some hopeless would-be right-wing literati, all hoping to jump-start the combination of Fortuna and Fatum in a desperate effort to alter the course of history.  The disconnected plots in the novel occur mostly in Manhattan, oftentimes in old run-down apartments located on upper floors along 54th Street.

In the first half of the book the ageing Lee-Lookalike reminisces about his past travelogues which would later turn into geriatric monologues. He meets with a few equally-decrepit ex-Codreanu devotees from Eastern Europe and crosses paths with a few wannabe progeny of ex-Soviet-Gulag escapees who fantasize about launching a proactive Antisemitic Combat League. His first, second and third ex are also somewhere around, but can rarely be spotted, except when auscultated on his voicemail. The biggest plight for Lee-Lookalike, however, is holding in check his incontinence which pesters him all along the way, especially when climbing up the stairs to the second or third floor of his alternate residence. Hence the reason his mind is primarily focused on a search for a solid toilet bowl somewhere in the neighborhood.

Like most of his earlier novels Perdue’s Love Song of the Australopiths is an allegorical story requesting from the reader full immersion into his language and good acquaintance with every figure of his speech. The present novel represents what the French call roman à clef, a prose that needs a special master key to decoding the plot.  In which literary genre should one therefore classify Perdue’s latest novel?  One could hastily portray him as a first-class doomsday seer who, similar to Ambrose Bierce, has learned the ropes of post-mortem survival. Oftentimes, though, one cannot help but decipher in the New York Lee-Lookalike marks of author’s own autobiographical self-derision, especially when he listens to his associates’ palavering about how to terminate the Jews. He has learned all the ins and outs of how to use his Austrian Glock and drive his Romanian Dacia clunker, yet he has a hard time learning how to load the Glock properly or put the car into the right gear.

With his knack for morbid humor (the Germans use the word “Galgenhumor”, i.e. “gallows humor”) Perdue’s prose fits best into dark romanticism featured in the early 19th century by the works of E. T. A. Hoffmann and Joseph von Eichendorff and their own encounters with alien doppelgangers. At the end of their tales, their dark doubles turn as a rule against their original heroes, dispatching them either into insane asylums or suicide. Following 1945, hundreds of now memory-holed European poets and novelists chose the latter. Similar doubles are now stalking every step of the New York based Lee-Lookalike, often leading him astray and making him pick false targets.

Tito Perdue, however, is unsurpassable in his unique comprehension of circular flows of time — a trait he inherited from his Greek muses and Roman vestals, and which can best be observed in ancient European myths. Perdue uses similar timeless procedures from the Beyond when depicting Lee Lookalike’s adventures in which the past, present and future are lumped together into one comprehensible whole.

Some of Lee Lookalike’s memorable sentences in regard to the meltdown of the time flow carry the unmistakable whiff of Martin Heidegger’s treatises and Ernst Jünger’s war dairies and will hopefully become the heritage of Western literature:

“Historians come and go, but none has ever yet been able to truly delineate the actual look and feel of any past period.”

Or this:

“What is time? A transparent material unreliable as smoke.

Understandably, such a noble, above-the-fray circular and pagan mindset exhibited by Lee-Lookalike bypasses the minds of retarded world-improving politicians and their fake doubles, given that they have always been avid promoters of linear, Bible-inspired times.

 

The goal of Lookalike-Lee to set up the Anti-Semitic society sounds like an additional oddity considering that critical research of the Jewish question is labeled today as “hate-speech,” whatever this means in the EU or US legal vernacular. No longer is anti-Semitism treated as a subject of academic opinion; instead, it is prosecuted as a felony.  In this respect and in retrospect, France and Germany of the late nineteenth century, with their renowned academic anti-Jewish think tanks, such as Die Deutsche Antisemitische Vereinigung and Ligue antisémitique de France, were far more open to free academic inquiry than the media and academia in America and the EU today. Its founders and promoters, the scholars Heinrich von Treitschke and Édouard Drumont advocated  separation at best, or assimilation at worst, rather than awaiting popular discontent which always  leads to violent pogroms and killing sprees. Modern scholars often hide the unpleasant truth that both Drumont and Treitschke, in their correspondence with the Jews, were also the most consistent adversaries of Jew-baiting.

The biggest enigma in the book consists in the author’s choice of the title. Probably the book, instead of carrying the title Love Song, should sport the title Swan Song in view of the fact that Perdue describes the devolution of miscegenated Whites into mixed-race Rehoboth bastards, who a few centuries down the road will rejoin their antediluvian australopithecine cousins in Namibia or in the Great Victoria Desert. If that’s the case, well then, the title does make sense. When reading the  book, a cartoon from the satirical magazine Kladderadatsch, printed in Weimar Germany in 1932, comes to mind, showing wealthy, self-hating, self-isolated and aping Whites who are being looked down upon by the equally aping westernized Blacks. The premonitory caption reads in English translation: “Negrification of France in 100 Years” — the last noncolored French make the biggest attraction in the Paris Zoo.”

The good news is that Perdue’s novel is the first sign of the forthcoming chaos in America and Europe. The preceding century-long aping of the alien-other will surely make many remaining Whites turn suicidal in 2021.

White Politics and Secession in South Africa

It seemed like an act of desperation. Twenty-five years after the fall of apartheid, South Africa’s Whites were counting on a Black man to save them from the corruption and malignancy of Black-majority rule. Its failure should have surprised no one.

By all appearances, Mmusi Maimane was a South African Barrack Obama. Smooth and polished, he seemed like the ideal candidate to win just enough Black votes from the tottering ANC to fulfill the promise of a multi-racial democracy.

The Democratic Alliance (DA) had long been viewed as the party of White people, but that was a handicap when Whites were just eight percent of the population. The party traced its roots back to the Progressive Party, the liberal opposition during the apartheid era, but few Black voters cared about that. Instead, the party drew most of its non-White support from the nation’s “coloured” population, a mixed-race group that shared just one thing in common with the nation’s Whites: a mutual fear of Black domination in the allegedly harmonious “Rainbow Nation.”

Maimane was supposed to be the DA’s ticket out of this electoral dead end.  The “Obama of Soweto” would lead them in the 2019 elections to a promised land where everyone would be treated equally and race no longer mattered.

It blew up in their faces.

The Afrikaners

It all could have worked out very differently. Nearly 30 years ago, in November 1993, President F.W. de Klerk convened his cabinet to inform them that he had accepted Nelson Mandela’s demands for majority rule in the new government.  Upon hearing the news, Tertius Delport, one of his negotiators, was stunned. They had given in on virtually everything. Resolved to resign, he walked down the hall to confront the president directly.

When de Klerk opened the door Delport grabbed him by his jacket lapels and cried out, “What have you done?  You have given the country away!  You allowed children to negotiate!”

“What are you going to do?” de Klerk asked coolly.

“I intend to rally enough colleagues,” Delport answered. “Together with the Conservative Party caucus, you will no longer have a majority.”

“Then there will be civil war,” de Klerk responded.

It was not out of the question. De Klerk had always viewed the military with a mixture of suspicion and disdain. Many of them viewed him as a traitor. He had already removed Magnus Malan, his widely respected defense minister. In late 1992, he resolved to clean out the rest of the dissidents in the military ranks.

“We are not playing with children,” one of his ministers warned him. “We are governing because the Defense Force allows us to do so. … The top command could decide to get rid of us and seize power. And where are we then?”

That did not dissuade de Klerk. The following day, he suspended or forcibly retired 23 senior army officers in what later came to be known as the “Night of the Generals.”

When retired General Constand Viljoen entered politics in 1994 to launch the Freedom Front, some viewed him as the country’s last chance. Many thought him capable of raising an army of up to 50,000 men from various defense forces and civilian paramilitary units that were loyal to him. Anticipating this, General Georg Meiring warned de Klerk and then met with Viljoen to sound him out.

“You and I and our men can take this country in an afternoon,” Viljoen reportedly told him. “Yes,” Meiring replied, “but what do we do in the morning after the coup? The internal resistance and foreign pressures and the stagnant economy will still be there.”

For Viljoen, the lack of support from the armed forces was decisive. “I could have stirred things up in 1994—but for what purpose?” he later said. “I don’t think any action from my side would have resulted in a major part of the Defense Force siding with me.”

Viljoen’s decision was controversial among some Afrikaners, many of whom were more than willing to fight and die to save their country. Instead, Viljoen decided to use the threat of war to win an Afrikaner homeland — a volkstaat — by peaceful means.  To placate him and his supporters, de Klerk and the ANC readily agreed to create a council to review the options. But it was just a ploy. Neither de Klerk nor the ANC ever took the idea seriously.

In the 1994 elections, the first held after the end of apartheid, Viljoen’s Freedom Front earned a little over two percent of the vote. The party was, and remains, an important voice for Afrikaners, as are advocacy organizations like AfriForum and Suidlanders, a civil defense group. But their power is limited by numbers. Whites are a small minority in South Africa. Conservative Afrikaners are just a minority within the minority.

Viljoen never had any illusions about this. His primary focus had always been the creation of an Afrikaner homeland. Consistent with the accord he signed with the ANC, a council was soon created to consider the creation of a such a volkstaat. But then, as now, the council soon faced a major obstacle: Afrikaners were spread too thinly across too many areas of the country for any single region to stand out as the obvious location.

The council considered several options, including one based primarily in the Northern Cape that eventually drew the endorsement of the Freedom Front (shown in the map below). Other proposals included carve-outs in and around Pretoria, where the largest numbers of Afrikaners live.

But each of these proposals would have required large numbers of Afrikaners to uproot and move to the new state for it to be viable. Instead, a 1993 poll indicated that just 29 percent of White South Africans backed the creation of such a homeland. Just 18 percent said they would consider moving there if one were created.

“Afrikaners do not want their own homeland,” Johann Wingard, chair of the council, eventually concluded. “They want to live anywhere in their beautiful country where they can make a decent living.” Interest in the idea soon dissipated and the council was dissolved. For many, the dream of a volkstaat seemed dead and buried.

Carel Boshoff, son-in-law of former South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd, had different ideas. In 1990 he bought a patch of land on the banks of the Orange River at the far eastern edge of the volkstaat proposed by the Freedom Front. The first few residents of the new Afrikaner town, called Orania, arrived the following year. The population has since grown to over 1,700, over a third of whom are children.

“They initially drew support from idealists,” said Dan Roodt, an Afrikaner activist. “They struggled financially in the beginning. In the early 2000s, you could buy a plot of land for a couple a hundred dollars. Now the price is 50 times that much.”

The town’s growth was powered by a strong desire for shared community and growing disenchantment with the rest of South Africa. It would have grown even faster if not for its commitment to using Afrikaner labor. “Orania does not use black labor,” Roodt said, “so it can’t build fast enough to build all the new housing they need.”

Orania had shown that the idea could work. And before long, public opinion would change.

Democratic Alliance

The Freedom Front — later renamed the Freedom Front Plus after it merged with the Conservative Party — was never the primary party of South Africa’s Whites. In the 1994 election, that distinction fell to the Nationalists under F.W. de Klerk. But there was also a third party contending for the White vote that year. The Democratic Party was barely a footnote, receiving fewer votes than the Freedom Front.  But in time — and with the backing of most of the White establishment, the media, and a healthy dose of luck — it soon propelled itself forward to become the nation’s primary party for Whites, second in size only to the ANC.

In 1994, however, it was caught in a bind. Its traditional base of support had always been urban, politically liberal Whites. That became a problem when de Klerk lifted the ban on the ANC. Suddenly the party found itself being squeezed on both sides — by the ANC on the left, which drew away some of its White liberal support, and by the Nationalists on the right, who were viewed by most Whites as the only viable check against the ANC’s growing power.

Instead of capitalizing on this advantage, however, de Klerk fumbled it away. Thinking he could retain power and influence by working with the ANC, he allied with them in a post-election “unity government.” But this only alienated the Nationalists from their base of White voters. Worse, they were blamed for failing to stop the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which persecuted numerous White officials and military officers for their role in apartheid.

The Democratic Party took full advantage of the situation, challenging the Nationalists from the right in the 1999 elections. With the rallying cry “Fight Back!,” the party gained ground among White voters. After the election, the Nationalists continued to hemorrhage White support until 2005, when the party finally disbanded.

With its principal competition for White voters now gone, the newly renamed Democratic Alliance was free to expand its outreach to other racial groups, first to the “coloured” vote and later to the Black middle class. Like White establishment parties just about everywhere, it downplayed race and emphasized colorblind individualism and classical liberalism to maximize its cross-racial appeal. Using this strategy, it gained support in every subsequent election until 2014, when it peaked at 22 percent of the overall vote.

After that election, Helen Zille, the party’s leader, began looking for a successor. Her ideal candidate would be someone like Barrack Obama, who was then closing out his second term. Mmusi Maimane seemed to fit the bill. With Zille’s backing, he drew overwhelming support from the party in 2015.  The party then marketed him in ways that amounted to virtual plagiarism — including blatantly copying Obama’s “Hope” poster and substituting Maimane’s image instead.

But Maimane did not play along. He was not interested in being the Black face of a White party. If the DA wanted his leadership to reach Black voters, then he would force it to swallow his message — and that message was one of Black nationalism.

In his acceptance speech, he warned the party that colorblindness was not enough. “These experiences shaped me, just like they shaped so many young Black people of my generation,” he said, echoing the criticisms of South Africa’s woke left. “I don’t agree with those who say they don’t see color. Because, if you don’t see that I’m Black, then you don’t see me.”

It was not long before Maimane was locked in a power struggle with senior members of his own party, advocating for affirmative action and straying from its emphasis on non-discrimination. Under his command, the party soon came to be seen as ‘ANC-lite,’ and the DA’s White leadership was not happy.

Neither were some of its other Black leaders, but for different reasons. ”I feel powerless when my activists come to me and say they are victims of racism from senior people in the party, who say they should be grateful that the DA keeps them busy because otherwise they would probably be out stealing and killing people somewhere,” one grumbled. “I mean, what is that?”

The DA paid the price for these divisions at the ballot box. In the 2019 elections, the party lost ground for first time since 1994, failing to gain any traction against the ANC and losing White voters on the right to the Freedom Front Plus. The ANC also lost ground, but not to the “colorblind” DA. Instead, it lost votes to the explicitly Black nationalist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) under Julius Malema, who had pledged to “cut the throat of Whiteness.”

The lesson from the election was clear. In an increasingly chaotic nation, Black nationalism was the future. White voters and their parties had gone as far as they were going to go.

After the election, the knives came out. Helen Zille, the DA’s previous leader, was elected to a powerful party position by the old guard and she quickly challenged Maimane from within. Her predecessor, Tony Leon, chaired an internal party review that laid the blame squarely at Maimane’s feet. The Institute for Race Relations, an establishment-backed think tank, said he had abandoned the party’s cherished principles.

Maimane saw the writing on the wall, but he did not go quietly. At his resignation speech he called out the DA’s White leadership in explicit terms. “Over the past few months it has become more and more clear to me that there exists those in the DA who do not see eye-to-eye with me, who do not share the vision for the party and the direction it was taking,” he said. “There have been several months of consistent and coordinated attacks on me and my leadership, to ensure that this project failed, or I failed.”

Other Black party leaders followed him out the door. “I cannot reconcile myself with a group of people who believe that race is irrelevant in the discussion of inequality and poverty in South Africa,” said Herman Mashaba as he resigned from the party and as mayor of Johannesburg, the nation’s largest city.

Malema’s EFF released a gloating statement calling the DA a “White political party in which Whites and their interests as Whites must always dominate and come first.” Maimane was later seen hobnobbing with Julius Malema in what some called an emerging ‘bromance.’

Last November, the party overwhelmingly elected a new White leader, John Steenhuisen. He trounced his primary Black challenger, Mbali Ntuli, with 80 percent of the vote. The party, it seemed, was no longer pretending. Some are now questioning how it could possibly avoid a backlash by non-White voters in the next election.

Secession

Two decades ago, the idea of a White homeland in South Africa seemed dead in the water. Any area reserved for Whites that was too far away from the cities or from employment opportunities seemed impractical. Many Whites at the time also believed, or at least hoped, that South Africa would soon become the harmonious and prosperous multiracial nation that had been promised.

That hope is now gone. A worsening economy, ever-present crime, and rising corruption have all left their mark (detailed in my previous article, South Africa’s Protection Racket). According to public opinion polls, South Africans have grown increasingly pessimistic. The situation briefly stabilized when Cyril Ramaphosa replaced Jacob Zuma as president in 2018, but his promised reforms never materialized. Now public sentiment seems to be worsening again. The DA’s failed “colorblind” political strategy has only further darkened the mood among those who had hoped for more.

These negative views are most prevalent among Whites in general and in the Western Cape in particular, one of the few regions in the nation where Blacks are not a majority. In 2009, Whites in the province allied with the local coloured population and ousted the ANC in local elections. It has been ruled by the DA since then.

“Ever since the DA came to power in Cape Town and in the Western Cape one has heard a growing chorus from visitors that ‘It feels like a different (and better) country down here!’” wrote one local observer. “The public hospitals and schools work far better here than anywhere else in South Africa, the traffic lights work better, the city center is safer, there is less litter and generally there is better governance.”

Local rule was a step in the right direction, but some activists wanted more. In 2007, they formed the Cape Party to fight for genuine independence. The party never gained traction in the few elections it contested — partly because the timing was wrong and partly because voters inclined to support separatism already had a political home in the Freedom Front Plus.

Nine years of Jacob Zuma’s presidency changed that, however, and several new organizations have emerged. Following the success of the Brexit vote in Britain, CapeXit was founded in 2018 to seek independence through international law. Another organization, the Cape Independence Advocacy Group (CIAG), was launched in 2020.

It seemed like public opinion had changed, but independence advocates decided to sponsor a poll to be sure. Unsurprisingly, the poll found overwhelming opposition among Black voters. But it also showed that Whites now strongly supported the idea, especially those who were supporters of the Freedom Front Plus.

Coloured voters — who constitute a majority of the Western Cape’s population — were more divided. While most were not yet ready to endorse full independence, the majority (68%) agreed that the Western Cape should be given more power to choose its own policies. Advocates now believe that this bloc of voters can be won over, particularly if the nation’s economy continues to deteriorate.

These poll results, which drew wide attention, have put the DA in a box. Much of its White leadership privately supports independence, but it has remained publicly silent to avoid alienating voters both inside and outside the province who do not support the effort. The Freedom Front Plus, which has endorsed independence, sees this as an opportunity. They plan to challenge the DA on this issue in the upcoming 2021 municipal elections.

Despite this growing support, however, some have condemned the independence movement as unrealistic. “Fringe groups have long advocated for the secession of the Western Cape from the rest of South Africa,” wrote Pierre De Vos, a constitutional law professor at the University of Cape Town. “Obviously, the Western Cape is not going to secede and there is no chance of the creation of an independent state.”

“Even if the Western Cape Premier calls a referendum (he won’t), and even if a majority of voters vote for secession (they won’t either), the referendum will have absolutely no impact as the president and his party will have no legal or ethical obligation to adhere to the results,” he wrote. Critics argued that the ruling ANC would inevitably reject Cape independence, not least because the Western Cape and Gauteng, the two provinces with the bulk of South Africa’s White population, provide most of the tax dollars that line the ANC’s pockets.

Supporters counter that international law, not the South African constitution, is the final word on the matter. “Countries secede on a regular basis, and the constitutional law of the parent state is almost never an insurmountable object if the other conditions required by international law are in place,” wrote Phil Craig, CIAG’s co-founder. Political will, not constitutional law, would decide this issue, as it has in nearly every other case of secession.

Bangladesh seceded from Pakistan despite the latter’s objections. Kosovo seceded from Serbia despite Serbia’s objections, and with the International Court of Justice advising that there is no prohibition of the (unilateral) declaration of independence under international law. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, Slovenia, East Timor, South Sudan. The list goes on.
Closer to home, did the previous South African constitution prevent the end of apartheid, or Namibian independence? Countries secede on a regular basis, and the constitutional law of the parent state is almost never an insurmountable object if the other conditions required by international law are in place.

Whatever the objections, the politics of the issue are clearly trending in the supporters’ direction.  Numerous economic experts and political analysts now see South Africa entering a death spiral. Last year, the nation lost its last investment-grade credit rating when Moody’s downgraded it to “junk” status. Investors have been fleeing the country for years. According to IMF estimates, unemployment is fast approaching 40 percent. The Covid crisis has only made matters worse, contributing to widespread protests. At least one analyst estimates that if its existing economic policies are not reversed, the country faces economic and political collapse by 2030.

Despite such warnings, President Cyril Ramaphosa seems powerless to implement needed reforms. According to analysts at the establishment-backed Institute of Race Relations, power in the ANC has now shifted decisively to leftist Black nationalists. If Ramaphosa were to challenge the party’s top leadership in any meaningful way, they would remove him from office.

This worsening economic and political outlook will only heighten public support for secession over time. The final trigger could be an independence referendum in the Cape, an IMF bailout that imposes cuts on ANC-favored spending priorities, a forced removal of Ramaphosa by the ANC leadership, or a national election that forced the ANC into a governing coalition with the far-left EFF to maintain Black majority rule.

Regardless of the cause, if the Western Cape seceded, it would probably trigger similar efforts in other parts of the country. This might include some or all of the Northern Cape, which has similar demographics and is home to Orania. Another possibility is the Whiter regions in and around Pretoria and Johannesburg, which might also demand increased local autonomy. Absent that, many of these Whites might flee to a newly independent Western Cape, just as Whites fled Zimbabwe to South Africa during Robert Mugabe’s reign.

The Rainbow Nation’s days may be numbered, but now there is something new to hope for. An independent Western Cape would not be the volkstaat — nor indeed an ethnostate of any kind. But it would at least free the nation’s White population from the worst excesses of majority Black rule and reestablish the right of self-determination.

When reporters travel to Orania, they sometimes ask the residents why they chose to move there. “We want to build a better place for our children and ourselves,” one recently said.

It is a simple answer, one that anyone could have given, but now more people are beginning to realize that it is something that cannot be taken for granted. Self-rule has long been an aspiration for many White South Africans. Now, after all these years, it may finally be within reach.

Patrick McDermott is a political analyst in Washington, DC.

Three Fine Films

The past couple of weeks, I watched three films that, tied together, I found artistically superb, personally moving, and very thought-provoking.  I streamed them on the Criterion Channel—a subscription service I recommend if you are a film buff—and Amazon Prime, but between Vudu and Google Play, you’ll be able to rent them.

In the order I saw them:

  • “Sorry We Missed You.” British, 2019.
  • “Measure of a Man.” French, 2015. There is a 2018 film with this same title.  The one I’m referring to is with the actor Vincent Lindon, who won the Best Actor award at the Cannes Film Festival for his performance in this film.
  • “I, Daniel Blake.” British, 2016.

“Sorry We Missed You” and “I, Daniel Blake” were directed by the great British filmmaker Ken Loach, who, incidentally, was 83 when he made “Sorry We Missed You.”  Loach co-wrote the film with his long-time collaborator, Paul Laverty.  “Measure of a Man” was directed by Stéphane Brizé, French, who also wrote the screenplay.

What tied these three films together for me is that they were all compelling dramas about the lives of the White working poor, people rarely the protagonists in contemporary cinema.  If this is a topic that interests you, you could also look into the films of the outstanding Belgian directors Luc and Jean-Pierre Dardenne (“The Promise,” “Rosetta,” “The Son,” “The Child”).

The meaning of art is the outcome of an exchange between the work of art and a particular person—you, me, anyone—at a particular point in his or her life.  What I took from these films will be different from what you do.  But perhaps reading a bit about my experience with them will encourage you to do the same sort of thing for yourself.

The first thing that comes to mind for me is that these three films are top quality.   They have superior artistic merit, and they are true, they touch down on the reality of life.  I ended the last writing I did—an essay/review of the 1999 Stanley Kubrick film “Eyes Wide Shut,” a film I disdained—with this:

Really, the only thing that’s come out of this consideration for me is a commitment to do my best to stay clear of creations as base as “Eyes Wide Shut.” 

Since writing that, I’ve been attending to using high quality as a guide.  Is this book, film, top rank, worth encountering?   Does it enrich me, is it truly rewarding, or is it just a pleasant diversion that kills time I’ll never get back and leaves an aftertaste akin to that of a second Snickers bar.  I’ve had enough Snickers bars in my life, and not just in the arts.   So far, so good with that commitment, and I’m better off for it.

The time spent with these three films reminded me that film is a literal medium, in contrast to print—books, articles, opinion pieces.  In film, you can see and hear what’s going on right in front of you; there it is, it isn’t a lifeless abstraction.  In fictional film, as opposed to documentaries, you know there’s a script and that those are actors and it’s a feigned reality, but still, you can see it happening.  And fictional or real life, it’s happening to particular people.   It’s not words on a page, it’s these people—see them, hear them, feel for them.  It reminds us that whatever we are talking about, advocating, declaring to be true and just, ultimately comes down to individual human beings getting their lives done for better or worse in their immediate circumstances, and that human beings and circumstances differ from one another.  In this example, they differ by social class and social advantage.  At its best, film can show us the reality—or better, multiple realities—beneath the words and ideas employed to depict it.

In these three films, we are shown what it is like to be uneducated and poor and struggling to survive in a world that is at best indifferent to your existence.    The people working checkout counters and delivering packages being talked down to and demeaned when they aren’t invisible.  The young mother with her two children in the food bank who frantically tears open a can of food and begins engulfing it right there and then.  “I’m sorry, I’m sorry . . . I’m . . . so hungry . . . I’m sorry.”  The small, deferring older man caught shoplifting meat at a super market looking terribly alone.  “Pay for it and we’ll let this pass.”   “I can’t . . . I’ve just got this [he puts a few coins on the table in front of him].”  “Is there someone in your family who can pay for you?”  “No.”  “A friend?”   “No.”  “Anyone at all?”  “No, there’s no one.”

I grew up poor.   I know what it’s like to live in rented rooms on the second floor of Mister Jensen’s house and have him tell Mother, Dad, and me that we’d have to move because his daughter Mary Jean was getting married and wanted to live temporarily where we were.  But then Mary Jean changed her mind and we could stay.   To live frightened that they will tell you to leave.  To this day, I’m frightened they’ll tell me to leave.

I read a lot of theorizing and prescribing, including in magazines like this one, by people who have lived middle-class lives and have college educations who don’t seem to get what it’s like to be the kind of people depicted in these three remarkable films and what it takes for them to get by in their worlds and to make it out of the fix they are in, or to personalize it, to have been six-years-old living behind a plywood partition in the back of a downtown barber shop with a bed and a radio and the toilet down the hall and keeping quiet so no one knows you are there.

I suggest you watch these three films and see what comes out of it for you:

What was their worth as an artistic, aesthetic experience?

What feelings, memories, insights into your life, did they prompt?   What’s happened to you over the course of your life, what have you become, who you are to yourself and the world?

Did these films make any difference in how you perceive reality and think about things?   About politics, race, social conditions, ideology, your currently favored analyses and solutions to problems, whatever you care about.

Did these films speak to what you are doing with your life and ought to be doing with it?

I hope you have as rich an experience with these three films as I did.

Triggered by Beethoven: The Cultural Politics of Racial Resentment

2020 was meant to be a year of celebration for Beethoven who was baptized 250 years ago (his exact date of birth is unknown) in Bonn on December 17, 1770. COVID-19 prompted the cancelation of commemorative concerts of Beethoven’s music, but the pandemic didn’t quell efforts by anti-White activists to attack the composer’s reputation and dominant place in the cultural pantheon of the West. Rather than a year full of performances of the great composer’s sonatas, string quartets, concertos and symphonies, 2020 saw repeated attacks on Beethoven for the crime of being a White male genius and for embodying the European musical tradition.

Beethoven is the most-performed composer in the repertoire, and his anniversary year was planned to be no exception. Before the widespread cancellation of concerts, 15 to 20 per cent of the repertoire programmed by leading orchestras was music by Beethoven. Widely regarded as the greatest composer of all time, Beethoven is inescapable because he remade almost every genre of concert music that matters. The concerto and symphony in his hands became driving musical narratives of heroic struggle. His late string quartets open a profound window on to the soul. Unlike his predecessors who were craftsmen who supplied a commodity to a paymaster, Beethoven ushered in the age of Romanticism by insisting on his creative independence and the absolute importance of self-expression: “What is in my heart must come out so I write it down.” This was manifested in his refusal to take a secure, salaried position like his one-time tutor Joseph Haydn who was the master of music for a feudal landowner in what is now Hungary.

Beethoven’s heroism in overcoming the worst thing that can happen to a composer — worsening deafness from young adulthood — to compose some of the greatest music ever has awed generations and become emblematic of triumph over adversity. All the stories of Beethoven’s misanthropy, his eccentricity and wildness, date from the decline in his hearing, which often caused him acute physical pain. Only his art prevented him from taking his own life: “It seemed to me impossible to leave the world until I had brought forth all that I felt was within me.” While Beethoven’s confidence as a pianist and conductor gradually diminished with his creeping deafness, his imaginative powers as a composer grew stronger and stronger, and he cast a daunting shadow over his successors: Brahms did not feel confident tackling a symphony until he was in his forties.

Beethoven excelled at his trade because he was born with a gift and worked at it as hard as it is possible to work. Swafford notes how his sketches and manuscripts reveal that:

Nothing came easily to him, least of all composing. Where Mozart could dream up a whole piece in his head while playing billiards, Beethoven had to worry and whip every note into place in his sketches. The sketchbooks are amazing documents: gold being refined from raw ore, pedestrian ideas becoming revolutionary concepts, incoherence being forged into clarity and purposefulness. Even the final manuscripts are a morass of scrawls and blots and revisions on top of revisions.[1]

Beethoven’s Faustian spirit made him into the kind of figure that dominated the imagination of nineteenth century Europeans: the superhuman genius, the revolutionary hero, the master of his own fate and transformer of the world. This reputation carried over into the twentieth century with the influential French writer Romain Rolland holding the composer up as a role model for a less heroic age, epitomizing personal sincerity and self-denial — in a word, authenticity.[2]

Attacks on Beethoven

Laudatory references to White male geniuses like Beethoven inevitably trigger rage from anti-White commentators who huff that it has “long been an argument of white supremacists, Nazis, Neo-Nazis, and racial separatists that ‘classical music,’ the music of ‘white people,’ is inherently more sophisticated, complicated, and valuable than the musical traditions of Africa, Asia, South America, or the Middle East, thus proving the innate superiority of the ‘white race.’” Seen through the Cultural Marxist lens of critical race and gender theory, Beethoven’s music dominates the concert repertoire not because of its exceptional quality, but because White-male privilege and assumptions about White-male genius keep it there. Linda Shaver-Gleason insisted Beethoven’s dominant place in the canon was the result of a White supremacist conspiracy which “intentionally suppressed” the music of non-White composers “in the service of a narrative of white — specifically German — cultural supremacy (because, alas, that too is part of Western culture).”

Slate online recently rebuked Beethoven for his mononym: the fact he is known by a single name, like Michelangelo or Shakespeare. This practice supposedly gives the pedestal of nomenclature to “straight white men at the expense of everyone else.” White male composers, it is claimed, “became so ensconced in elite musical society’s collective consciousness that only one word was need to evoke their awesome specter. Mouthfuls of full names became truncated to terse sets of universally recognized syllables: Mozart. Beethoven. Bach.” The works of composers with mononyms are therefore assumed to be “on a different plane,” whereas this assumption is, we are told, actually the product of “centuries of systematic prejudice, exclusion, sexism and racism.”

In a recent Vox podcast and article, musicologist Nate Sloan and songwriter Charlie Harding claim the opening bars of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony (the famous da-da-da-DUM motif) should not be given their traditional interpretation — the sound of fate knocking on the door and Beethoven’s resilience in the face of encroaching deafness — but should be construed as the sound of the gate slamming shut on minorities, such as “women, LGBTQ+ people, people of color.” They assert (without evidence) that “wealthy white men” embraced the Fifth Symphony as a “symbol of their superiority and importance.” Black clarinetist Anthony McGill agrees, likening the inescapability of the Fifth Symphony to a “wall” between classical music and new, racially-diverse audiences.

Jewish music writer Norman Lebrecht defended Beethoven against Sloan and Harding’s polemic by citing Beethoven’s “liberal” credentials, claiming, for example, that they “fail to explore how Beethoven’s Fifth served for millions as a symbol of freedom in the war against Nazism.” Unmentioned by Lebrecht is the fact that, despite Beethoven’s politics — which were liberal for their time (he had republican sympathies) — the composer made repeated comments critical of Lebrecht’s own ethnic group. On one occasion, he rejected the idea of selling his Missa Solemnis to the Jewish music publisher Adolf Schlesinger in favor of the German publisher C.F. Peters, informing the latter that: “In no circumstances will Schlesinger ever get anything more from me, because he too has played me a Jewish trick.” Beethoven’s disgust with Schlesinger was prompted by repeated experiences of being short-changed with “such insulting niggardliness, the like of which I have never experienced.”[3] In a letter of 1823, Beethoven called Schlesinger “a beach peddler and rag-and-bone Jew.” In his negotiations with another publisher, Beethoven noted the publisher was “neither Jew nor Italian” and that as he himself was also neither of these, “perhaps we shall come to some agreement.”[4]

Sloan and Harding are on stronger ground in arguing the thematic complexity of the Fifth Symphony necessitated unprecedentedly close listening to fully grasp, and this, in turn, led to the establishment of new norms of concert behavior. These norms — sitting still, staying quiet and not clapping mid-piece — led to the strict culture of classical music that persists to this day, and which allegedly oppresses non-Whites who cannot reasonably be expected to conform to such standards of behavior. Sloan and Harding lament that classical concerts are the sole remaining American institution that typically insists on starting on time. Rather than a sign of respect for all parties involved, these behavioral and procedural norms are, they insist, symbols of White supremacy which alienate “diverse audiences,” and their origins can be traced to Beethoven.

Jewish music writer for The New Yorker, Alex Ross, labelled the planned 2020 Beethoven celebrations “a gratuitously excessive celebration of the two-hundred-and-fiftieth birthday of a composer who hardly needs any extra publicity.” He insists that, in the wake of the Black Lives Matter riots, an examination of the relationship between classical music, which he labels “blindingly white, both in its history and present,” and racism is “sorely needed” because of the genre’s “extreme dependence on a problematic past.” Ross claims that when the classical music tradition was transplanted to the United States, the “white majority tended to adopt European music as a badge of its supremacy. The classical-music institutions that emerged in the mid- and late nineteenth century — the New York Philharmonic, the Boston Symphony, the Metropolitan Opera, and the like — became temples to European gods. … Little effort was made to cultivate American composers; it seemed more important to manufacture a fantasy of Beethovenian grandeur.”

For Ross, classical music can only “overcome the shadows of its past” if it commits itself to a “much more radical confrontation with the white European inheritance,” and by programing more non-White composers like Julius Eastman — a Black composer whose “improvisatory structures, his subversive political themes, and his openness about his homosexuality give him a revolutionary aspect, yet he also had a nostalgic flair for the grand romantic manner.’”

In the frontline of attacks on Beethoven in 2020 was Black music writer and Hunter College academic Philip Ewell, who penned an article titled “Beethoven was an Above-Average Composer — Let’s Leave it at That.” Ewell begrudges the laudatory epithets routinely applied to White composers like Beethoven and their works. For Ewell, adjectives like “genius” and “masterwork,” evoke slavery (master-slave) and sexism (master-mistress), and the classical music lexicon is, in his assessment, overflowing with euphemisms that disguise and reinforce the “white-male frame.”

In addition to “master’ and its derivatives, here are some of the other common euphemisms for white and whiteness in music theory’s white racial frame: authentic, canonic, civilized, classic(s), conventional, core (“core” requirement), European, function (“functional” tonality), fundamental, genius, German (“German” language requirement), great (“great” works), maestro, opus (magnum “opus”), piano (“piano” proficiency, skills), seminal, sophisticated, titan(ic), towering, traditional, and western. Even terms such as “the long nineteenth century” and “fin de siècle” can be considered euphemisms for whiteness and white framing for their close associations with dates and events (and languages) significant to Europe and Europeanism. Such euphemisms are intended to sublimate whiteness into less objectionable forms, thus mitigating the effect of whiteness on music theory and hiding its existence.

Rather than enjoying a merited reputation for the brilliance and originality of his oeuvre, Ewell insists Beethoven’s fame has been upheld by such lexical scaffolding, claiming Beethoven, “along with countless other white males, has been propped up by the white-male frame, both consciously and subconsciously, with descriptors such as genius, master and masterwork.” In Ewell’s jaundiced assessment, Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony is “no more a masterpiece” than Esperanza Spalding’s 12 Little Spells (click the links and judge for yourself). The status of Beethoven’s Ninth is purely, he argues, a product of music theory’s “white-male frame” which “obfuscates race and gender.”

Ewell’s attack on Beethoven is an adjunct of this broader hostility to classical music’s “white racial frame” which, he insists, reinforces the hierarchy of White male composers, and “works in concert with patriarchal structures to advantage whiteness and maleness while disadvantaging POC and non-males.” This frame purportedly encompasses Western tonality itself (with its major-minor harmony and its equal-tempered scale) which is assumed to be the “master” language. Ewell even regards the Gregorian calendar as “white racial framing writ large,” insisting “no one can deny the racial element behind how the world now understands the linear and cyclic nature of time.”

Phillip Ewell

In an article for the journal Music Theory Online entitled “Music Theory and the White Racial Frame,” Ewell argues that “music theory is white [it is]” and the discipline is undergirded by a deep-seated ideology of White supremacy calculated to thwart Black and Brown (but strangely not East Asian) achievement in classical music. The main target of Ewell’s critique is the early twentieth-century music theorist Heinrich Schenker (1868–1935) who initiated the parsing of musical structures into foreground, middle-ground and background to tease out the tonal formulas that underpin large-scale movements. Drawing on poststructuralist critiques of Western civilization, Ewell claims this kind of score-driven analysis of musical works as part of Western musicology (what he dubs the “drive to scientificize music analysis”) represents an effort to “shore up whiteness in music theory’s white frame” and to insulate “whiteness from potential criticism.” In attacking Schenker (who was an Austrian Jew), Ewell inadvertently strayed into forbidden fields of inquiry and faced unexpectedly fierce blowback and accusations of “Black anti-Semitism.”

Ewell’s “white racial frame” purportedly extends to musical education where, in the most commonly used theory textbooks in the United States, only 1.63% of musical examples come from non-White composers. This is also problematic for Linda Shaver-Gleason because studying a particular piece “reaffirms its canonical status; enshrining it in a textbook is deeming it worthy of study.” Constantly referencing White composers “reinforces the idea that they’re the ones who deserve the most respect, as if to say, ‘Marvel at the many techniques Mozart used so perfectly!’” Ethan Hein, a (presumably Jewish) doctoral fellow in music education at NYU, likewise decries the stubbornness of music teachers in teaching “European-descended” classical music over that of “music descending from the vernacular traditions of the African diaspora.” Orienting music education towards the European classical tradition, an “implicit racial ideology,” is, he declares, “insidious” in its “affirmations of Whiteness.”

In 2020, college-level music pedagogy responded to Black Lives Matter by “dramatically reconsidering which composers and musical traditions we do and don’t discuss in the classroom.” Similar dynamics were at work within other musical institutions. The Metropolitan Opera, upon cancelling its 2020–21 season, announced that it would begin its next season with Black composer Terence Blanchard’s Fire Shut Up in My Bones, the first opera by a Black composer to appear on the Met’s stage. Despite such gestures, for Slate journalist Chris White, musicians, academics, and teachers still “have a lot of work ahead to confront the racist and sexist history of classical music.”

Music theory’s white racial frame is also sustained, according to Ewell, by the “citational chain” of white men citing other white men in the musicological literature. He wants to break this chain “in which whiteness begets whiteness and maleness begets maleness.” Meanwhile, Ewell’s own utterly conventional and establishment beliefs are the unreflective product of his engagement with a group of predominantly Jewish critical race and gender theorists: he borrowed the term “white racial frame” from Harvard sociology professor Joe Feagin. Arguing that the entire Western art music tradition is inherently White supremacist, Ewell advocates “overthrowing the existing structure and building a new one that would accommodate non-white music a priori [prior to listening to it??] no reaching for ‘inclusion’ necessary because non-white composers would already be there.”

Beethoven and the “New Musicology”

Ewell postures as an outsider bravely challenging sinister norms entrenched in Western musicology when, in reality, his perspective has been utterly conventional since the advent of the “New Musicology” in late 1980s — when Cultural Marxists to a significant extent overran the discipline. Musicology was one of the last frontiers for poststructuralism and critical theory which had already infested most of the humanities and social sciences by the early 1980s. The New Musicology was founded by the Jewish-American critic and musicologist Joseph Kerman (born Zukerman) whose journalist father William Zukerman (1885–1961) was a prominent figure in the Jewish media and author of the 1937 book The Jew in Revolt: The Modern Jew in the World Crisis.

A key figure in the ascent of the “New Musicology” was Susan McClary whose 1991 book Feminine Endings: Music, Gender and Sexuality is considered a trailblazing text for the movement. McClary gained fame and notoriety for her feminist “analysis” of the first movement of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, where she claimed: “The point of recapitulation in the first movement of the Ninth is one of the most horrifying in music, as the carefully prepared cadence is frustrated, damming up energy which finally explodes in the throttling murderous rage of a rapist incapable of attaining release.” This risible statement was an elaboration of her belief the Western musical convention of sonata form is inherently sexist, misogynistic and imperialistic: that “tonality itself — with its process of instilling expectations and subsequently withholding promised fulfilment until climax — is the principle musical means during the period from 1600 to 1900 for arousing and channeling desire.” The primary “masculine” key (or first subject group) is said to represent the male self, and the secondary “feminine” key (or second subject group) represents the “other,” a territory to be explored and conquered, assimilated into the self and stated in the tonic home key.

Virtually all Cultural Marxist critiques of Western classical music fall back on these kind of entirely speculative metaphors. While purporting to offer additional insight into music, the New Musicology systematically imposes an anti-White male ideology on its subject, and, in this endeavor, happily discards all standards of proof and evidence. The conceit that, before the advent of the New Musicology, the discipline was limited to the rigid boundaries of empiricism and positivism is false; awareness of the context and reception of music has always been a core topic of musicology. There was, however, also a belief in purely musical elements and in the value of studying them. The problem with such “objective” technical analysis, for the likes of McClary and Ewell, is that it invariably leads to “White supremacist” conclusions about the relative quality of different musical traditions. The “problematic dimension” of analyzing “music as simply music,” McClary notes, is that people inevitably point to Western classical music “as evidence of the superiority of European and European-descended people, which marginalizes the rest of the world and, also, minority groups in the U.S.”

Constructing Beethoven as Black

The main alternative to the Cultural Marxist deconstruction (and proposed anti-White reconstruction) of the Western musical canon, has been attempts by Blacks to appropriate Beethoven for themselves. Given Beethoven’s status as the archetypical musical genius, it is unsurprising that aggrieved Blacks have, since the early twentieth century, attempted to propagate the myth that Beethoven had some African ancestry. The basis for this entirely spurious claim was the composer’s slightly swarthy complexion, and the fact part of his family traced its roots to Flanders, which was, for a period, under Spanish monarchical rule. Because Spain had a longstanding historical connection to North Africa through the Moors, a degree of blackness supposedly trickled down to the great composer — this despite the fact the Moors as an ethnic group weren’t even Black.

The myth was eagerly disseminated by Jamaican “historian” Joel Augustus Rogers (1880–1966) in works like Sex and Race (1941—44), the two-volume World’s Great Men of Color (1946–47), 100 Amazing Facts About the Negro (1934), Five Negro Presidents (1965), and Nature Knows No Color Line (1952). Rogers, whose intellectual rigor was basically non-existent, claimed that Beethoven — in addition to Thomas Jefferson, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Robert Browning, and several popes, among others — was genealogically African and thus Black. Despite being thoroughly debunked, the myth still lingers in contemporary culture: in 2007 Nadine Gordimer published a short story collection called Beethoven Was One-Sixteenth Black: And Other Stories. The determination, contrary to all available evidence, to make Beethoven Black is, of course, a desperate attempt to make the composer and his oeuvre a glorious symbol of Black accomplishment.

A pearl of wisdom from Jamaican historian Joel Augustus Rogers (1880–1966)

Otherwise sympathetic commentators have cautioned that such efforts are self-defeating, merely serving to treat the Western canon as fundamental and all other styles as deviations from this norm, thus reinforcing “the notion that of classical music as a universal standard and something that everyone should aspire to appreciate.” Trying to make Beethoven Black and desperately scouring the historical records for examples of non-Whites who wrote symphonies is to accept “a white-centric perspective that presents symphonies as the ultimate human achievement in the arts.”

Among those routinely cited by those desperate to prove the racial diversity of the Western art music tradition are the mixed-race composers Chevalier de Saint George, Samuel Coleridge-Taylor and George Bridgetower. These figures are remembered solely because they were non-White, not because of the excellence of their compositions. Beethoven personally knew Bridgetower, a talented violinist whose father was from the West Indies. Indeed, Bridgetower was the original dedicatee of one of Beethoven’s most celebrated violin sonatas. Beethoven called it the “mulatto sonata” after Bridgetower (before the word took on a more pejorative sense) and the pair gave the first performance but fell out soon afterwards, whereupon Beethoven renamed the piece for another violinist, Rudolphe Kreutzer.

Conclusion

Classical music, like other aspects of Western culture, has been a casualty of the anti-White diversity mania that now infests Western intellectual life. The Cultural Marxist critique of classical music (and of Beethoven) wallows in bad faith arguments and cognitive dissonance: Western classical music is nothing exceptional, yet cannot be invoked to praise White people because this necessarily implies the inferiority of other races; a White supremacist conspiracy thwarts Black and Brown achievement in the genre, but utterly fails to prevent East Asian interest and success; Black composers have written symphonies (and, indeed, Beethoven himself was Black), yet the Western classical music tradition is inherently White supremacist and needs radical deconstruction.

Ultimately, the reason the classical music canon (and Beethoven’s status as a titan of European civilization) is so keenly resented by anti-White activists, is because the gap in civilizational attainment it underscores is an embarrassing affront to regnant egalitarian assumptions. Western art music (with Beethoven as its leading exponent) stands as a glaring testament to the pre-eminence of European high culture, and implicitly of the race responsible for it. The attacks on Beethoven in 2020 are yet another example of warfare waged against White people through the construction of culture.

Brenton Sanderson is the author of Battle Lines: Essays on Western Culture, Jewish Influence and Anti-Semitism, available here and here.


[1] Jan Swafford, The Vintage Guide to Classical Music: An Indispensable Guide for Understanding and Enjoying Classical Music (Knopf, 1993), 184-85.

[2] Romain Rolland, Beethoven the Creator (Rolland Press, 2008)

[3] Jan Swafford, Beethoven: Anguish and Triumph (Faber, 2015), 760.

[4] Lewis Lockwood, Beethoven: The music and the Life (Norton, 2005), 533.

Julien Langella’s Catholic and Identitarian


Catholic & Identitarian: From Protest to Reconquest
Julien Langella
Arktos, 2020.

“The absence of anger is a sign of the absence of reason.”
Saint Thomas Aquinas

For better or worse, I’m fairly certain there hasn’t been a Catholic in my family tree since the Reformation, and I remain unsure about a strict definition of “Identitarianism.” It was with an ambivalent but open mind, then, that I recently read Julien Langella’s Catholic & Identitarian, a furious lament on the present condition of France and a firm apologetic for ethnic activism among Christians. Such a text is surely needed. In May 2016 I wrote a scathing essay on Christian attitudes to, and activism on behalf of, mass migration, prompted by the foot-kissing antics of Pope Francis, described in the essay as “the personification of a sick glorification of humility and weakness.” Although I focused for the most part on the Catholic Church, I took aim at all denominations with the demand that “Those who describe themselves as Christian White advocates need to become more vocal in articulating a more ethnocentric or culture-based theology that their co-religionists will find convincing. It is simply not enough to hope that Nationalists can achieve something politically and then come to the rescue of the churches.” Julien Langella, one of the co-founders of Génération Identitaire and whose text first appeared in French in 2017, has provided an admirable response to this problem that will appeal to, and educate, readers of all religious backgrounds and none.

Is this a Catholic book? Yes and no. Religious elements of the text are, thankfully in my opinion, framed as a backdrop to the primary concern: the French are facing the gradual but imminent replacement of their ethnic group in their own homeland. Langella’s central ambition in the book is therefore to explain and condemn this Great Replacement while stressing how Catholicism (and other important facets of the traditional and ancestral life of the French) could and should be used as an underpinning for a resurgent French “Identitarianism.” Langella helpfully avoids some of the clichés of the “TradCath” social media scene by demonstrating an impressive grasp of historical Catholic literature as well as a mature and wide-ranging understanding of many of the contemporary political, ideological, and economic currents that have combined against the European peoples. Most important of all, he is honest in his criticisms of the prevailing attitudes of the Catholic Church on mass migration and ethnicity, devoting one section of the book to a dissection of Pope Francis himself. Unashamedly local in concern, yet avoiding a parochialism that ignores the need for Europeans to unite on some level, Catholic & Identitarian is the most impassioned warning and call to action that I’ve read since Guillaume Faye’s blistering Ethnic Apocalypse (2019).

The book is divided into five chapters, each of which is subdivided into lesser sections. Some of the latter are just a few paragraphs long, which gives the book a sense of fast pacing despite the heavy subject matter often under discussion. The writing style is punchy and straightforward, and mercifully devoid of jargon. The text opens with an interesting Preface from Abbot Guillaume de Tanoüarn, who has previously made headlines in France for resisting the police-enforced demolition of churches. Abbot Guillaume uses his Preface to make the moral and spiritual case for ethnocentrism among Europeans, commenting that “the crisis we face is a moral crisis, and because of its rootedness, because what is at stake is the identity of each of us, one can even say that, deep down, it is also a spiritual crisis.” Individualism is regarded as a cancer, because the common good, or communicatio, of a nation is “not founded on individuals who are magically stuck together, but on families who, in the Christian model of society which prevailed in the West, represent a union of two sexes in “one flesh,” according to the law of love.” Against the organic community, “it has become fashionable in the media to question identity, to stigmatise attachment to soil and traditions. It is almost as if any prior spiritual wealth, anything greater than the Individual, has become suspicious, or has transformed into some new bizarre metaphysical paradigm.” Abbot Guillaume laments the arrival of a perception that individual “freedom encounters no other limit, no other boundary than the liberty of others in a world where neither good nor evil has the slightest meaning.”

Abbot Guillaume dragged from St Rita church, Paris by riot police in 2016

For Abbot Guillaume, “identity is inherited,” and “among the facts that condition individuals, ethnic origin has its place. … There obviously exist different ethnic origins.” He pours scorn on “the ideology of mandatory miscegenation, which includes an infatuation with quotas and the compulsive glorification of diversity on the “American model,” for which one carefully fails to set limits and ignores in particular the violence it often entails,” and endorses the message of Langella that “miscegenation does not enrich; it impoverishes.” The Abbot closes his Preface with the wish that “the ideology of globalism, as all ideologies, will one day explode like a bubble in response to the urgency of natural politics.”

Julien Langella’s brief introductory chapter sets the scene. Catholicism is on the decline in France, and rather than being incremental, “the collapse is brutal.” More than just a lack of faith and adherence, French society has turned radically to open effronteries to the historical faith: “working on Sundays, homosexual parody of marriage, legalisation of euthanasia, consecration of abortion as a fundamental right, trafficking of women’s bodies through surrogate mothers etc.” The religious decline has occurred alongside massive demographic change, with 20% of the French population now of foreign origin. Langella makes the argument that “De-Christianisation and the Great Replacement go hand in hand,” with Western spirituality, if it exists at all, now being replaced by “an obsession with ‘well-being,’ a kind of Westernized Buddhism” (which I have demonstrated elsewhere is heavily Jewish) and “the cult of the god Consumerism.” Against this spiritual and moral decline, Langella proposes a militant Catholicism typified by the statements of Dom Gérard Calvet, founder of the Sainte Madeleine du Barroux abbey in Le Barroux, who declared his violent antipathy to “the globalist heresy” that wants to “simultaneously eradicate the faith and dissolve the people into a consumerist blob.” Langella asserts that “multicultural societies, sinking ever more each into violence, are doomed to perish,” and celebrates the fact that Catholic voters in France are increasingly turning to ethnocentrism, voting for the Front National in higher percentages than the national average. Langella argues that these voters and activists should gather under the banner of “Identitarianism.”

Why Identitarianism? Langella explains that “nationalist” is a tainted word in France that has “never won general support.” While there is “no academic definition” of Identitarianism because “it does not correspond to any specific school of thought or specific doctrine,” it amounts to an “awareness”: “multicultural societies are multi-conflictual societies, and the homogeneity of a nation determines its survival.” He adds, “to be Identitarian is to reject the commercial standardisation of way of life at the global level, immigration through non-European settlement, and the increasing Islamisation of our streets.” All of which can be summed up in Langella’s stark statement: “If the French disappear, then France dies. … Globalism is a culture of death, and the Identitarian struggle is a march for life.” The introduction closes by making the claim that Christian charity and the struggle for identity are not contradictory:

To claim to accommodate all the misery of the world is not charity. At best, it is weakness and laxity. At worst, it is a calculation in favour of the interest of those who profit from servile labour and a cheap market. The foreigner also has a homeland and a right to live well there, a right to rootedness. Therefore, to accept an uncontrolled flow of immigrants into our country is not the solution to the miseries of Africa and the Middle East. On the contrary, it gives a moral guarantee to those who would transform these unfortunate people into urban slaves. Between the false generosity of pro-immigration lobbies and the cynical “compassion” of certain shady employers, there lies a world of hypocrisy.

The book’s first, and most Catholic, chapter, “Catholic and Indentitarian, Universal and Rooted,” is a prolonged argument against those who have asserted that “total open borders is the only possible Christian position on the subject.” Langella describes the “twisting” of scriptures to defend such an agenda as an act of “moral terrorism,” “perverse ideological manipulation,” and “an idolatry of humanity, a new golden calf, rather than faith in the incarnate God.” For Langella, and the many Catholic thinkers he cites, unity in the Church is not equivalent to the “absurd relativism which prides itself in loving everyone, while it despises everything by placing them on the same level under the pretext of equality.” For Dom Gérard Calvet, such an idea is an example of “ancient Christian virtues twisted into foolishness,” while Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, the future Pope Benedict XVI, once wrote that “Man absolutely cannot by himself bring about world unity, for division is imposed upon him by the sovereign will of God.” Both were echoing the sentiments of Pope Pius XII, who declared that it was not the position of the Church “to attack or underestimate the particular characteristics that each people, with a jealous piety and an understandable pride, retains and considers as a precious heritage. Her purpose is the supernatural unity in universal love felt and practiced, and not in an exclusively exterior, superficial, and thus debilitating, uniformity.”

Identitarian activist and father-of-three: Julien Langella

While Langella proves himself very capable of selecting some choice Traditionalist quotes, he is equally at pains to admit that “certain clergy — priests, bishops, and even cardinals — are among the first to uphold an unnatural Manicheism that opposes the Gospel to patriotism.” These clerics, spouting “nonsense” and endlessly agitating against the Front National, empty France “of much of her substance, reducing her to a collection of principles, at best “Christian values,” which is to say welcoming migrants, while “remaining more indulgent with the politics supportive of the legalisation of divorce, contraception, and abortion.” Citing Pius XII, Augustine, and Thomas Aquinas, Langella makes the argument that Christian charity must always begin at home, in “an order established by God.” In fact, Langella posits that “National preference is a fundamental Christian virtue.” What follows is a brief but interesting historical tour of Catholic mystics and clergy who undertook war against Islamic incursions, with Langella concluding that “defense of the homeland and defense of the Faith are a single entity in the face of the invading Muslim.”

The chapter closes with a survey of the facts demonstrating the reality of race, and the assertion that Catholicism cannot, and should not, deny it. Incorporating everything from Edmund Burke to Pope Pius XI and the findings of modern genetic studies, it’s a powerful apologetic for prejudice, with Langella asserting that “refusing prejudice is a moral blackmail, a weapon of intimidation against Europeans who are disgusted with invasion-migration. … In forbidding us from exercising the virtue of prejudice, the globalists want to force us to consent to our own disappearance under the wave of the Great Replacement.” He closes with a statement from Benedict XVI: “Nations should never accept to witness the disappearance of what made their own identity.”

The text’s second chapter, “The Religion of Miscegenation,” largely departs from spiritual discussion and context, and provides a very interesting exploration of multiculturalism that will provide food for thought for Whites of all religious persuasions —or none. For Langella, “Gender theory and multiculturalism have the same philosophical origin: liberal narcissism. … To fight gender theory and to ignore multiculturalism is totally contradictory.” The chapter moves on to a lengthy exploration of the nature and extent of miscegenation propaganda in France, which includes a national campaign poster promoting breastfeeding featuring blonde women with Black infants pressed to their chests. Langella describes this phenomenon as a “cult of miscegenation” embraced at all levels of society but promoted especially by hostile elites who have ensured that “what was formerly a purely private choice has become a virtue in and of itself.” Langella cites as one example the Jew Bernard-Henri Levy who once wrote: “Everything that’s local, berets, butter, bagpipes, in short anything French, is foreign to us, even repugnant. … I like race-mixing and I hate nationalism.” Langella is blunt in his response: “Miscegenation is a war. By its obsessive nature, it’s even a jihad.” He then describes the links between globalism and the military-industrial complex, arguing that “military imperialism is the enforcement arm for the globalist project, that of a world where the United States and its lackeys can behave like ghetto rats on an international level.” These elites comprise a “nomadic oligarchy” that treats Europeans like sub-humans “and the rest of the world like replacement livestock.”

One of the book’s great strengths is its focus on the role of international finance in advancing globalism and multiculturalism. International money power demands that the peoples of the earth become “an inexhaustible reserve of servile workers and compulsive buyers.” Multiculturalism, “a weapon of mass subversion,” is “indispensable to the good order of a consumer society: without identity, without fixed landmarks, men are empty inside, so they try to fill this void with material goods.” Nations composed of interlinked and rooted families are inferior, in marketing logic, to nations of transient homosexual couples with two incomes and no children. Against the rise of consumerism, Langella calls for a resurgence in activism in areas that are now seen as old-fashioned — like protest against work on Sundays. Pointing to the number of days off work during the Middle Ages (around 190 a year) due to feast days and religious events, Langella argues that reclaiming even one day of the week from consumerism would be a foothold in the struggle that would at least make Catholic activists appear “more credible.” As things stand, Western youth are in chaotic rebellion against all forms of Tradition since “Capitalism encourages young people to rebel against all authority except one: money.” He closes the chapter by remarking:

The arrival of this liquid society, composed of human beings with barely any willpower, is the anthropological sine qua non for the development of the liberal economy. … This is why, everywhere they can, with the complicity of their Left-wing proxies in education and culture, the hyper-nomads propagate the ideology of multiculturalism. And when people like the Serbs try to resist, “humanitarian” bombs rain down upon them. For as a last resort, there always remains armed force to impose through fire and tears what they could not achieve with advertising and moral lessons.

The book’s powerful third chapter, “The Migration Hurricane and the Church,” offers an unflinching look at the Catholic response to the waves of mass migration into Europe that has accelerated since 2015. Langella stresses that we are witnessing an ongoing colonisation of Europe, “for this is indeed an immigration of settlement.” The author posits three main causes of the migration wave: “globalist ideology as a consequence of the Enlightenment and Jacobin Republicanism; the need for a servile labour force, encouraged by the liberal desire to abolish borders; and the dependency promoted by the welfare state.” Faced with this trifecta, and in a pattern witnessed throughout the West, the French “Right” “has always been the first to betray the French people. Large corporate interest in cheap labour and international Marxism go hand in hand to promote a world without borders where the rule of money can extend without limit.” This combined power has been catastrophic, with one ancient village in the Loire region consisting of 188 inhabitants subjected to a dumping of 100 immigrants (in effect, a total destruction of the life of the village) in the name of “population distribution” to areas “without housing shortages.” In “disgusting displays of cynicism,” Big Capital has been propagandizing such new values while crushing native employment, with Uber running campaigns to collect clothing and toys for illegal immigrants while ruining local cab drivers, and Starbucks announcing their intention to employ 10,000 refugees. For Langella,

This is the typical liberal double-game: on one hand, fracture the workers by exacerbating competition among them, and on the other, acquire a brand image in supporting the current humanitarian cause. It’s a win-win for them in terms of profitability and moral reputation.

Following this discussion is a very disturbing exploration of anti-White activity in France, culminating in an exploration of the rape of French women by migrants. Some of the stories are among the most horrific that I’ve encountered, and there’s no benefit in my repeating them here. The predictable result of this endless ethnic crime has been a form of White flight, and the rise of ethnic segregation in France. As Langella puts it, “You can eliminate land borders all you want; ethnic borders will remain. … We are witnessing genuine ethnic division on French territory.” Langella, to his great credit, always retains a grander vision, and is always at pains to avoid degenerating into a Counter-Jihad caricature, which to be honest is something that I, in my ignorance of Langella and his activism, expected prior to actually reading his text. This broader vision is exemplified when the author finally reaches the subject of Islamic terrorism toward the middle of the chapter, where he concludes: “Islamism is the tree that hides the forest: the true cause of the attack in Paris was immigration.” I couldn’t agree more.

From here Langella moves to a discussion of Church attitudes to mass migration. Setting out his case, Langella argues that the Church “does not have a political program, but she offers a moral framework.” The Church’s record in activism on behalf of refugees and migrants is, however, very mixed. In 1914, Pope Benedict XV instituted the World Day of Migrants and Refugees, but this was primarily in response to the Armenian genocide, and was not “a justification of immigration in itself.” A “migrant” in the ecclesiastical language of the time, was always assumed to be fleeing genuine persecution, rather than being an immigrant in a general sense. Over time, argues Abbot Guillaume, the Church has passed from a teaching of duty of charity to the oppressed to the “ideological value of immigration as an absolute.” For Abbot Guillaume and Langella, this is a heresy that essentially posits immigration as “a trampoline for the Second Coming,” and is “profoundly anti-Christian.” Both point to the “universal destination of goods” as “the foundation of the Catholic critique of capitalism.” This idea always posits that social actions must always take place within the context of uplifting the common good. This “Common Good,” argues Langella, should be the compass of political action and is infinitely more important than “diversity.” He cites Pope John Paul II as saying the right to emigrate “should be regulated because applying this right in an uncontrolled way can be dangerous and harmful to the common good of the communities welcoming the migrants.” Pope Benedict XVI, meanwhile, asserted that “States have the right to regulate migratory flows and to defend their borders.”

Langella then moves to a discussion of “the elusive Pope Francis.” Langella is probably correct in stressing that due to media distortions, especially the media’s desire to portray Francis as a Leftist Pope with relaxed attitudes on gays and open arms for migrants, a full picture of the current Pope’s ideological positions is more difficult than usual to discern. That being said, Langella critiques Francis for being intentionally ambiguous, and for “offering to journalists on a platter” an ambiguity that has led to him becoming “the darling of the intellectual Left.” Langella further criticizes the Pope for “improperly appealing to emotion, and more often in favour of illegal immigrants rather than those who pay the price of accepting the migrants, though no one ever asked if the latter wanted to do so.” The author also sees validity in claims that Francis has shown “indifference towards the victims of crimes committed by illegal immigrants” and “a certain disdain for Europeans as well as a kind of preference for the migrant.” Langella is clear:

Pope Francis is more than ever a pope of images and gestures. He knows the media impact of a good phrase, a good word. The Pope likes to disarm his interlocutors. Not to detract from his refreshing spontaneity, but we have to recognise that he is a “good customer,” as they say in the trade.

Faced with such a situation, Langella offers common sense to his fellow Catholics: “The Pope is not infallible when he discusses social questions. … We can — with prudence — criticise the political speech of the Pope if it hurts the common good.” Closing the chapter, Langella appeals to the writings of a host of cardinals that support the right to strong borders and oppose the globalist project of mass migration. In the meantime, Langella suggests waiting for a shift in leadership rather than encouraging division in the Church, opining that “the best way to save the position of the Pope is to refrain from commenting on it.” I don’t agree, but then I’m not Catholic and I will concede that Langella may have a better appreciation of the situation.

The fourth, and in my view most interesting, chapter of the book is titled “What To Do?” As you might expect, it’s a program of action. The first step is to attempt to change terminology, or the interpretation of it. Langella stresses that “migrant/refugee” is a piece of terminology designed to inculcate sympathy where it is not deserved. What most of these foreigners want is not safety but “comfort and modernity. What they wanted was superfluous shiny objects.” Europeans must strip themselves of sentimentalism, of a love devoid of truth. For Langella, most Black and Middle Eastern migrants are mere cowards seeking luxury, and this is the vision of these foreigners that he believes must become endemic among Europeans if a genuine sea-change in attitudes is to take place.

The next step is the return to fundamental notions of homeland as “a bridge between God and men, a gateway between Heaven and earth.” This ecological outlook locates Man firmly inside his habitat, in opposition to liberal anthropocentrism which places Man above all, and in opposition also to “Deep Ecology” (see the work of Pentti Linkola) that posits Man as an animal no higher than any other. In Langella’s view of a Christian ecology, Man’s culture and traditions and his age-old links to the soil are as worthy of preservation as the habitat itself, reversing the trend of deranged leftists to campaign on behalf of endangered squirrels while entire villages are handed over to foreign peoples.

The third step is the fostering of genuine European unity based on common ethnic and cultural feeling rather than on strictly economic and military interests. What Langella proposes is a “European policy of rootedness” resembling the Visigrad Group (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary) which together has been described as “the most secure region on the continent.”

The fourth step is a reversal of the endless quest for increased GDP which has contributed to an “evident form of moral underdevelopment.” Langella is opposed to international finance and posits a return to forms of corporate social financial order resembling the medieval guilds based on local self-sufficiency and accountability. Explaining this turn to Localism, Langella explains:

It is not the extreme Left-wing globalists who are inciting migratory flows, it’s not even the No Border types who help illegal immigrants to cross the borders. It’s global industrial capitalism. The sole alternative to global uprooting is localism. We don’t need to make everyone in the world a farmer, but we do need to allow people to have food sovereignty, which is also economic and political sovereignty. In other words, we must give them back their dignity. This is the best antidote to uprooting.

Finally, Langella moves to the ethnically foreign population residing in France. He asserts that assimilation is an unachievable myth, and that France is not merely an “idea” but a biological reality that is under threat. The only real response, he argues, is forceful repatriation. Here there is no room for sentimentality: “Mass immigration is a cancer. … It is a profound injustice. … It’s a collective kidnapping. It’s murder. They’re killing us.” Repatriation should begin with a return to the law of blood and the end of birthright citizenship, along with a moratorium on labor migration and a ban on family reunification. This would be swiftly followed by the non-renewal of residence permits with automatic deportation at the end of their period of validity. All construction of non-Christian places of worship would cease. All Islamists would then be targeted for systematic expulsion “to the country of their family history.” After this, specialist units of the police and army should be employed in the rapid and massive forceful removal of foreign populations: “Without a show of force on our part, a general explosion will be imposed on us at any rate, because multiculturalism carries within it the seeds for war like clouds carry the storm.”

Prior to this sequence of events, Langella advocates the building of networks of the ethnically aware in rural France, where localism can be seeded and where defense zones can be efficiently constructed. This will be necessary because “France has learned well that from now on, the state is its enemy and that, despite our calls for unity, the police will never side with us.” He therefore advocates the attitude of the partisan, described by Carl Schmitt as someone who “defends a piece of land for which he has a native attachment,” and whose primary strength is “his bond with the land, with the native population, and with the geographic configuration of the country, mountains, forests, jungle, or desert.” Langella expects no sudden collapse of the System, and is prepared to play the long game.

I have to admit that the book’s fifth chapter, “Fall and Reconquest,” struck a bum note with me, and it would have been my preference, had I been editor, to have omitted it entirely. The entire chapter is a re-run of the Book of Maccabees, which Langella offers as a blueprint of reconquest for us to follow. It didn’t resonate with me at all, or indeed with the approach of the rest of the book, and its inclusion continues to baffle me. The book closes with a somewhat poetic two-page conclusion, the central message of which is that we must “kill the bourgeois inside us” and engage in a “crusade of an integral and permanent love. An eternal fire in our heart, a feast of every moment and of every day.”

Julien Langella is to be commended for producing an impassioned, and often furious, message from a dying France. Some bum notes and petty criticisms aside, there is much here to enthuse and enrage the committed Catholic, and to educate and inspire the non-Catholic. Of course, I could critique the lack of engagement with Jewish matters, but I think it’s already a minor miracle, given France’s array of harsh speech laws, that he ever managed to publish this remarkable work. I think Julien Langella is a very intelligent and capable activist who needs no reminding of the influence of certain elements in the tragedy unfolding for his nation. My demand for total honesty, in this instance, therefore wavers somewhat at the prison gates that inevitably loom in France for anyone daring to question that which lies behind so many of the labels (globalists, nomadic oligarchs, etc.) employed in this very mature text.

I’d be dishonest if I didn’t mention that the total collapse of Catholic Church credibility, much of it mired in seemingly endless sex abuse scandals, hasn’t contributed in some part to the massive swing to the Left in nations like Ireland. I don’t think it’s the sole cause, of course, and I believe at least some of these scandals have become a kind of media meme for a reason, but I do believe that the Catholic Church has a credibility issue to address before it can in any way become a focal point for the ethnic revival of its faithful. But, to Langella’s credit, he appears to be planning for a Catholic revival somewhat outside the Church. This strikes me as eminently sensible. For the record, my own experiences in France are limited to a couple of trips to Paris, some seven years apart. The first was disappointing, the second utterly heartbreaking, as I witnessed some of the world’s most beautiful sites and streets sunk in the degradation and filth of mass migration. I sincerely wish Julien Langella the very best of luck in his quest to redeem his homeland for his people and indeed his God.

Lest We Forget: Codename Zebra, the Anti-White Murders of the “Death Angels”

170 days of racial terrorism struck the White residents of San Francisco from October 20, 1973 until April 16, 1974. Known as the Zebra murders or Zebra killings, four Black men—Jessie Lee Cooks, Larry Craig Green, Manuel Moore, and J.C.X. Simon murdered 15 Whites. 13 victims were shot to death, while the killers hacked the other two to death with machetes. Other victims suffered paralyzing bullet wounds, rape, and robbery, plus one survivor managed to cling to life despite being repeatedly hit in the head and left for dead after suffering several deep slashes to his face. The killers sometimes took trophies, including Polaroid pictures of their victims. The motivation for these murders was the same in every case: the killers viewed their White victims as “devils” to be eradicated to make up for the history of African slavery and oppression.

Mystery writer Clark Howard’s history of the case, The Zebra Killings (1979) , exposes some unsettling facts about the Zebra killers. Larry Green, nicknamed Yellow in Howard’s account, “came from a decent home and was a high-school basketball star” [1]. While Jessie Lee Cooks fit the archetypal mold of the career criminal, Simon, called Skullcap, rose above an impoverished background in Texas (where he developed pinworms because of his habit of spreading fecal matter on his face) and became a married father with a good job in a grocery supply warehouse. However, despite never experiencing racial oppression himself, Simon joined the Nation of Islam in 1970 as a devoted believer in Black supremacy [2]. Another member of the killer gang, Anthony Harris, aka Judo, became a member of Nation of Islam despite having a White wife.

True to his first calling of fiction writing, Howard’s The Zebra Killings is full of dramatic recreations, made-up dialogue, and supposition. For instance, one of the characters, Vandyke, is a composite character based on anti-White street preachers and Black Muslims in the National of Islam. Howard portrays Vandyke as the man most responsible for the radicalization of the Zebra killers. Again, no such man existed. On top of that, Vandyke’s relationship with the Nation of Islam, and therefore the relationship between the Zebra killers and the NOI, is uncertain [3]. Despite these flaws, The Zebra Killings is a well-written work. You just have to take it with a massive dollop of salt.

Religion, specifically the Nation of Islam, radicalized these men, both in prison and on the streets. NOI leaders pumped their heads full of nonsense about how slave masters cut Black babies out of wombs to use them as hog feed. NOI “ministers” also told their flocks that the religions of Christianity and Judaism were created by Whites in order to destroy “superior” Black men and their culture. Cooks, Green, Moore, Simon, and Harris proved to be enthusiastic students of the teachings of the NOI. Vandyke dazzled the men with stories about the so-called “Death Angels.” NOI called men Death Angels if they killed nine White men, five White women, and four White children [4]. The Death Angels scattered throughout California killed as many as 135 White men, 75 White women, and 60 White children [5].

The first known murder carried out by the Zebra killers occurred on October 20, 1973. On that day, Cooks, Green, and Harris kidnapped Richard and Quita Hague while the married couple enjoyed an evening walk along Telegraph Hill in San Francisco. The group sexually assaulted Quita in the back of their van. They forced Richard to watch. Then, after reaching some train tracks outside of the city, the group beat and slashed Richard with a wrench and hacked him with a machete. He somehow managed to survive. As for Quita, detectives later struggled to determine which of her “countless wounds might have been fatal.” All told, she suffered stab wounds to her head and neck. She also suffered cuts to her throat that came close to decapitation, plus a series of hacking-like wounds to her spine [6].

A week later, Cooks shot and killed college student Frances Rose, 28, as she tried to get to class on the University of California’s Extension School campus on Laguna Street. 53-year-old Jordanian immigrant Sammy Erakat, the owner of Erakat’s Grocery near the Civic Center, greeted shooter Simon as a fellow Muslim before Simon shot him to death in the store’s bathroom. Artist Paul Dancik, 26, took three bullets to the chest as he used a payphone. Two days after this murder, Art Agnos, the man who would later serve San Francisco as mayor from 1988 until 1992, walked out of a meeting in the majority Black neighborhood of Portrero Hill only to be shot in the back. That same night (December 13, 1973), 31-year-old Marietta DiGirolamo walked three blocks from her apartment at 651 Scott Street to Divisadero. Simon got out of a Black Cadillac and shot DiGirolamo to death. The fact that the victim had a Black boyfriend did not save her [7]. The last to die in 1973 included 81-year-old Ilario Bertuccio (shot to death while walking home from his shift at the 7-Up bottling plant), 19-year-old Neal Moynihan (shot to death while shopping at the Civic Center), 50-year-old Mildred Holser (shot to death while waiting for a bus), and an unidentified homeless man whose remains were not found until February 10, 1974.

This final victim, called John Doe No. 169 by the San Francisco Police Department, experienced the full savagery of the Black Muslim murderers. The unidentified White man suffered prolonged torture. The killers then decapitated him. His hands and feet were removed postmortem, plus the killers cut his torso from hipbone to hipbone [8].

In response to the rash of murders, the SFPD created a special task force codenamed “Zebra” after their use of the “Z” radio frequency (in the phonetic alphabet used by the SFPD in 1973, “zebra” denoted the letter Z). Detectives Gus Coreris and John Fotinos led the task force. Howard’s account presents Coreris as gruff and Fotinos as more humane. Both proved to be dogged investigators who saw the racial implications of the murders early on. Mayor Joseph Alioto, a San Francisco native and a representative of the city’s blue-collar Democrats, took an active role in the investigation. Alioto’s tenure as mayor coincided with some of the worst crimes in the Bay Area’s history. The Zodiac Killer and the Symbionese Liberation Army occurred under his watch. Mayor Alioto tried to crack down on the Zebra killers by instituting a stop-and-frisk policy that targeted young Black men between the ages of 20 and 30 for random questionings by police. The policy proved controversial. Black Panthers leader Bobby Seale called the policy “a vicious and racist action” that threatened the lives of all Black men in the Bay Area [9]. Liberals in the city protested. Reverend Cecil Williams of the Glide Church, a Black pastor, pointed out publicly that White men had not been stopped at random during the hunt for the Zodiac Killer. Ultimately, Judge Alphonso Zirpoli struck the policy down a week after its implementation.

More Zebra murders appeared in the winter of 1974. Black reporter Chauncey Bailey of the San Francisco Sun Reporter would later tie the second round of Zebra murders to the police shooting of Larry “3X” Crosby on January 25, 1974. Crosby and other members of the NOI were stopped by Berkeley, California police officers as they sold fish door-to-door. Crosby fought the officers and even disarmed one before pistol-whipping him. The other officers opened fire on Crosby, striking him in the back and thereby paralyzing him for life [10]. (Crosby still denounces the shooting to this day.) The shooting of Crosby led to a protest at the city’s Mosque No. 26, which Zebra killers Simon, Cooks, Moore, Green and Harris attended. Bailey was the first to connect the Crosby shooting with the string of murders carried out by the Zebras on January 28, 1974. On that day, 32-year-old Tana Smith, 69-year-old Vincent Wollin, 84-year-old John Bambic, and 45-year-old were all shot to death. 23-year-old Roxanne McMillan survived her shooting on the 100 block of Edinburg Street, but was left paralyzed.

In a sick twist of fate, Bailey, who did much to uncover the full extent of the Zebra crimes, would himself fall victim to Zebra wannabes in 2007. On July 12th of that year, Devaundre (some sources spell it Devaughndre) Broussard admitted to Bailey that he and other members of the Your Black Muslim Bakery murdered White restaurant worker Michael Wills in Oakland after the group’s leader, 25-year-old Yusuf Bey IV, hyped his men up with tales about the Zebra murders [11]. 19-year-old Broussard would later shoot Bailey to death with a Mossberg shotgun as the reporter left a McDonald’s. The execution came because of Bailey’s investigation into the Your Black Muslim Bakery’s welfare fraud, as well as its 2006 bankruptcy and allegations of sexual abuse [12].

As for the Zebra murders, they came to an end in April 1974. In that month alone, the murderers gunned down 19-year-old Thomas Rainwater, a Salvation Army cadet, and 23-year-old Nelson T. Shields IV, the son of a DuPont executive. Harris, after seeing a composite sketch of himself, decided to turn his fellow “Death Angels” in. The city’s $30,000 reward money also helped to sway Harris’s mind [13]. The trial of Zebra killers Cooks, Green, Moore, and Simon would be one of the longest and most expensive in California’s history. All four were convicted in 1976 for multiple murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Simon died at age 69 at San Quentin Prison in 2015. The 75-year-old Moore died in 2017 while serving time at the California Health Care Facility in Stockton. As for Cooks, he has admitted his role in the murders (Moore maintained his innocence until his death). Simon told a parole board in 2007 that his conviction constituted a “legal lynching” [14] and died unrepentant. Green, on the other hand, admitted to a parole board last year that he indeed hated Whites as “devils” in the 1970s, but now believes in the equality of all races [15].

The horrific story of San Francisco’s Zebra killers is far from over. The murderous group were not alone in their hatred of Whites during the 1970s. Mark Essex used a Rugger .44-caliber carbine and .38-caliber pistol to murder nine White people in New Orleans between December 31, 1972 and January 7, 1973. Later monsters include the Beltway Snipers John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo, Frederick Demond of Kansas City, and Micah X. Johnson, the former Army Reservist who used a Saiga AK-74 rifle to ambush Dallas police officers and kill five of them during a Black Lives Matter march in that city. Indeed, BLM can be considered the heirs of the Zebras. They have a similar thirst for blood, as BLM-adjacent terrorists like Johnson and Gavin Eugene Long coexist alongside the criminal underclass of rioters who have been destroying America’s cities since May.

Like the Zebras and the NOI, BLM believes in Black supremacy and keeps its members agitated by spewing hatred towards Whites, including harebrained ideas about how Whites have always hated and mistreated blacks. Such rhetoric has already inspired or likely inspired several murders of White innocents this year: the murder of 5-year-old Cannon Hinnant by 25-year-old neighbor Darius Sessoms; the murder of young mother Jessica Doty Whitaker in Indianapolis on July 5th for the crime of saying “all lives matter”; the August 25th stabbing of an AutoZone employee by 19-year-old Jayvon Hatchett, who was inspired to kill a White man by watching hours of police brutality videos (Hatchett subsequently murdered his White cellmate Eddie Nelson, Jr.); and last month’s shooting at Louisville’s Bungalow Joe’s restaurant that killed 26-year-old Toreon Jermaine Hudson, 48-year-old William Scott Smallwood, and 24-year-old Steven Matthew Head. The killer, 33-year-old Michael E. Rhynes Jr., was apprehended by police wearing a “Justice for Breonna” t-shirt, thus indicating that the murders were done in the name of Breonna Taylor, a Black woman with direct ties to illegal guns and drugs who was shot by Louisville police officers on March 13, 2020 following a firefight possibly involving both Taylor and her boyfriend, Kenneth Walker.

The NOI, the Zebras, and BLM all exist because of anti-White hatred engineered by consistent lying. Black supremacists lie about Whites—their history, their accomplishments, etc. Black supremacists are also allowed to lie because the media covers for them while chasing after White supremacist phantoms. The infernal marriage between the liberal media and Black supremacists is built upon one lie after the other. Because of this, innocent Whites and other non-Black Americans will continue to be sacrificed to appease liberal White guilt and the Black desire for endless revenge. This is no hyperbole; as researcher Anthony Walsh uncovered in 2005, 90 of the 413 serial killers who were active between 1945 and 2004 were Black, indicating that Blacks were overrepresented in the ranks of serial killers by a factor of about 2. As far back as the 1980s, the FBI has known that Black killers are more likely to target non-Black victims than vice versa. Add to this mixture the high Black criminality in general, and you have truly toxic mix.


It is surprising that there have not been more Zebra-like murders in American history.

 

 

[1]: Clark Howard, The Zebra Killings (London: New English, 1981): 77.

[2]: Howard, Zebra Killings, 84-85.

[3]: C.F. Robinson, “The San Francisco Zebra Killings,” Counter-Currents, Oct. 27, 2016.

[4]: Peter Vronsky, Serial Killers: The Method and Madness of Monsters (New York: Berkley Books, 2004): 157.

[5]: Vrosnky, Serial Killers, 158.

[6]: Prentice Earl Sanders and Ben Cohen, The Zebra Murders: A Season of Killing, Racial Madness and Civil Rights (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2006): Kindle edition.

[7]: Howard, Zebra Killings, 127.

[9]: Howard, Zebra Killings, 185.

[10]: Nate Gartrell, “Last two living ‘Zebra’ killers denied parole; tied to massive California murder spree targeting Whites at random,” Mercury News, Jan. 28, 2020.  <https://www.mercurynews.com/2020/01/28/last-two-living-zebra-killers-denied-parole-tied-to-massive-california-murder-spree-targeting-Whites-at-random/>

[11]: Ibid.

[12]: Ibid.

[13]: Lee Romney, “Two convicted of murder in shooting of Oakland journalist,” Los Angeles Times, Jun. 10, 2011.

[14]: “Zebra Murders: Remembering Fear That Gripped San Francisco 40 Years Later,” KPIX CBS, Nov. 6, 2014. <https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2014/11/06/remembering-the-zebra-killings-40-years-later-racially-motivated/>.

[15]: Gartrell, “Last two living ‘Zebra’ killers denied parole.”