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The Beauty and the Beast: Race and Racism in Europe, Part I

No  word  in  the  modern  Western   parlance  is  as scary as the word   ‘race.’   It is avoided like the plague by contemporary opinion makers, except when they gleefully use its verbal  derivative “racist” against right-wingers,  White nationalists, forever looming ‘neo-Nazis’ and their proverbial  bed fellows ‘anti-Semites.’In modern science, let alone in the social sciences, the word and the concept of race is denounced as a social construct, not being admitted as biological reality, despite overwhelming evidence that race is not just skin deep and that different races world-wide show marked differences in  behavior, cultural achievements, and in IQ. As professor Daniel A. Beach recently noted: “Race pervades a great deal of social and interpersonal issues with which we must contend, yet we have no effective way of talking about it.”

Unlike their colleagues in the social sciences, many Western biologists and geneticists are well aware of differences among races, yet they prefer to resort to esoteric verbiage and expressions, such as “mapping the genome,” or “different gene pools” or “different haplotypes,” when doing research on the tricky subject of race.

Prior to the early 20th century the words ‘race’ and ‘racist’ were rarely used in the English, French, or German languages in Europe. Everybody knew which race he belonged to.  The etymology of the word ‘race’ is still unclear, although most likely it derives from the old Latin word ‘radix,’ meaning roots, or the German ‘reiza, meaning family lineage. Its significance became ideologically loaded only in the late 1920s. Over the last 50 years, it has undergone a total semantic distortion. Indeed, if one were to follow the logic and discourse of professional antiracists, peoples of European ancestry must be all certified racists. Why? Because it is still an unwritten rule that White males and females all over the West mate and date solely within their own race.

European “Gestalt”: In Quest of Order and Form

The concept of eugenics is now associated with National Socialism and has come to be understood among the educated classes as the epitome of evil. In fact, however, eugenic measures were a standard family practice from time immemorial among European tribes. Undoubtedly, each family had to be prolific with a multitude of children able to work on the land or to guard the household. This meant allowing and frequently facilitating the death of children who were sickly or had disabilities.

Until recently in the European countryside when a young girl and boy were about to start dating, parents first inquired about whether their respective fathers or mothers were alcoholics, whether somebody in their family tree had some serious illness, such as diabetes, tuberculosis, or some nervous disorder — or even inborn proclivity to criminal behavior. A semi-literate, yet intelligent European peasant or farmer did not have to be versed in sociobiology or have a degree in molecular biology in order to realize that hereditary diseases of the unfortunate partner could easily be transmitted to the newborns, with deadly social consequences for the entire family.

In France it is still common to hear the expression “elle est de bonne  race” (“she is of good breed or character”)  for a good looking and healthy woman. In the Croatian or the Serbian language one can hear among young adults the colloquial adjective ‘rasna’ (‘raceful’) when depicting a good and healthy looking woman.  In such particular instances ‘race’ is more a synonym of good health and good looks and less a scientific term for a distinctive European appearance.

After 1945 everything changed. The whole hell of moralizing and do-good pontificating broke loose. The more degenerate, the more maladaptive and the uglier — the better. The role of the environment became a sacrosanct dogma of liberal and communist world improvers, while blind faith in progress became a shining path for a promiscuous end of history. Especially the German word ‘Rasse,’ which was commonly used in the 1920s,  30s and the early 40’s,  came to be highly uncomfortable for postwar German politicians who were themselves to be groomed by the Allies in self-hate and guilt feelings about their race.’Rasse’ is a sharp monosyllabic word whose consonant ‘s’ requires the speaker to emit a hissing sound.

Hence the reason that the legacy of National Socialism and thousands of German titles dealing with race, racial hygiene, racial studies, racial mixing, etc., had to disappear from library shelves, only to reappear as a subject of criminal proceedings in modern Germany. The German ruling class today is quick to raise the red flag against scholars who dare to use this word in a normative and value free manner. Shortly after WWII, thousands of books dealing with race and racial differences were burned and destroyed by the Allies. Institutes specializing in racial hygiene, such as Deutsche Gesellschaft für Rassenhygiene or the prestigious Kaiser Wilhelm Institut für Anthropologie,  were closed down. Hundreds of European doctors and specialists in genetics and biology — if not spirited out furtively to the USA or the USSR — were hunted down as war criminals, or denounced  as proverbial Nazi quacks. (See Manfred Heinemann, Hochschuloffiziere und  Wiederaufbau des Hochschulwesens in Westdeutschland,19441952. See also Reinhard Grohnert,  Die Entnazifizierung in Baden 19451949.)

In Gods We Trust: Ancient “Ethnic Profiling”

The word ‘race’ did not exist but the sense of racial beauty and racial awareness was firmly grounded in the minds of ancient Europeans. In Homer’s Iliad most gods and goddesses are fair skinned and light eyed. Athena is described by Pindar as as the “blond and blue eyed goddess,” whereas tricksters or fickle persons, personified by satires and centaurs had repulsive Levantine features with wooly hair, thick lips and hooked noses.  (R. Peterson, The Classical World, 1985, pp 30–31).

In the Middle Ages one encounters those grotesque images of ugliness on basilicas and cathedrals where gargoyles were used as ornamented water spouts projecting from roofs or water fountains. Those negative images displaying non-European racial traits would be banned today, as our modern multiracial pontiffs do not tolerate racial stereotyping, or what they euphemistically call ‘ethnic profiling.’ Likely, many out-group individuals in modern American or European cities would detect in those figures strange resemblance to their own non-European facial traits.

Gargoyle from Westminster Abbey, London

In a well-researched, yet forgotten book, Professor Allen G. Roper (Ancient Eugenics, 1913) provides a great many citations from ancient Greek and Latin texts describing eugenic practices by the old Greeks and Romans. Infanticide was not considered a barbaric act, but a paramount political necessity for a city-state in perennial crisis and warfare. They did not have a luxury of feeding genetic misfits, potential crooks, or the dregs of racial outgroups. The Spartan leader  Solon drafted the first eugenic laws, and the Stoic Roman philosopher  Seneca encouraged infanticide for misfits. “We drown the weaklings and the monstrosity. It is not passion but reason to separate the useless from the fit.”

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In ancient Rome of the Republic, racial purity and close-knit bonds among kin were extremely valued. The whole concept of the city-state was premised on a small family unit, with the typical pater familias at the helm. Even today in popular unwritten culture in Europe, a saying goes that a “person’s character can best be recognized in his facial features.” Conversely, “a person’s distorted character follows his distorted countenance,” a saying that was common in ancient Rome(“Distortum vultum sequitur distortio morum.”).

It is a dangerous mistake, very widespread among White European American nationalists that the ancient Greeks were all of Nordic ancestry. As I have written elsewhere, the blond dolichocephalic faces that one finds painted on old Greek murals  or pottery, or even bronze busts  of Roman and Greek leaders, had primarily normative value; they were meant as the enhanced ideal type for what White Europeans should be — not the reflection of what  they looked like in real life.

This is particularly relevant because of childish quarrels among European and American Whites nationalists and self-proclaimed Aryans. Such people often imagine ancient Spartan warriors as blond giants — or even picture the Waffen SS as superhuman extraterrestrial  beings.

It should come as no surprise that the concept of beauty and race in prewar Europe, and particular in prewar Germany, witnessed a return to romanticized classicism. Models from antiquity and the Renaissance were adapted to the prevailing spirit of the times. Numerous German sculptors worked on their projects while benefiting from the logistic and financial support of the National Socialist political elite. Their sculptures resembled, either by form, or by composition, the works of Praxiteles or of Phidias of ancient Greece, or those executed by Michelangelo during the Renaissance. The most prominent German sculptors in the Third Reich were Arno BrekerJosef Thorak,  and Fritz Klimsch, who although enjoying the significant logistical support of the National Socialist regime, were never members of the NSDAP.

“Partei” (The Party”) on the left and “Wehrmacht” (“The Army”) on the right, by Arno Breker, at the New Reich-Chancellery, 1939

The Wave/Die Woge, Fritz Klimsch, 1942

Das Urteil des Paris, Haus des Deutschen Kunst, Josef Thorak, 1941

After the Second World War, as the result of pressure from the Allies, Europe — and to a large extent America itself — were forced to open its doors to abstract art (Jackson PollockPiet Mondrian, etc) and, consequently Euro Americans and in particularly the Germans had to stifle the production of their traditional figurative art. A large number of paintings and other works of art executed during the Third Reich were either removed or destroyed. Several hundred sculptures were demolished or trashed during the Allied air bombardments. After the war, a considerable number of works of art were confiscated by the Americans, because of “their pornographic character.” In the spring of 1947, 8,722 paintings and sculptures of German artists were transported to the United States. Of these, only a small number have been returned to the Federal Republic of Germany.

Arno Breker’s work thrown in a backyard, 1945

The concept of racial beauty in ancient Greece or during the Renaissance in the 15th century Italy was often used as a pedagogical and graphic tool to provide the sense of order and form (Gestalt). In traditional Europe and America the vast majority of citizens were never ever the replicas of these hyperreal beauties represented on busts or sculptures.

Paintings of women by the late Italians Botticelli or Titian, or sculptures by the modern Germans Breker or Thorak, did  not suggest that that all Italian and German women have elongated Gothic limbs, thin noses and Nordic cranial index.

The whole purpose of classicism and neoclassicisms, particularly in plastic art, but also in philosophy and literature suggested that Europeans had to abide by the cosmic rules of  racial form and order. Whatever and whoever departs from order — brings in decadence and death.

Go to Part 2.


Tom Sunic (www.tomsunic.infohttp://doctorsunic.netfirms.com/) is an author, former political science professor in the USA, translator and former Croat diplomat. He is the author of Homo americanus: Child of the Postmodern Age ( 2007). Email him.

The Difficult Class

The middle class is not an income bracket. It is a group of people who share values that strengthen the individual. Their strength makes the middle class the most difficult class to rule.

Displacing the middle class has been the trend of recent history. Globalism concentrates wealth in the hands of fewer and fewer people, which starves out the mid-tier of society. Particularly since the end of WWII , Western elites have focused on breaking the mid-tier’s ability to resist their own disenfranchisement.

In his Republic Plato recognized the power of middle class principles. Family loyalty, community participation, self reliance and prizing education are all things that help the individual resist the will of the State. Plato knew that a class of virtuous citizens needed these qualities in order to prevent the state from slipping into tyranny.

Plato also noted that would-be tyrants attack virtuous citizens in specific ways: they bring in foreign helpers to undermine the cultural homogeneity of the state; they set up slave militias to use against their citizenry; and they start propaganda campaigns specifically designed to wipe out middle-class values.  When these attacks are successful the tyrant sets up a government which Plato called “The Tyranny of Slaves.”

“The Tyranny of Slaves” can only come about if enough people adopt slavish values — thereby allowing themselves to be manipulated by the despot. Slaves don’t take personal responsibility, they wait to be handed what they “deserve.” They don’t respect elders, are insolent, intemperate and extravagant. What’s worse, they don’t value reason and logic; they are only moved by emotion-based sophistical arguments. Slaves need a tyrant to rule them. They are people who seek instant gratification, do not consider consequences and are prone to senseless violence. They are mankind debased.

When he wrote the Republic, Plato was describing recent history and what he had seen happen in Athens during his lifetime.

But the pattern has been repeated many times since. Rome’s power was built on its army, which was made up of many landholding farmers. Wealth came after military success; land ownership was concentrated; and the new landlords replaced Roman farmers with a polyglot of slaves. Since that event the empire had to rely on Northern European conquests for soldiers and the City became the international cesspool that Juvenal describes in The Satires.

A similar thing happened with England’s yeomanry. Brooks Adams describes their displacement during the sixteenth century in his book The Law of Civilization and Decay.

But the bad guys don’t always win. An inspiring example of the middle class resisting tyranny is the struggle of the Germanic farmers with Arminius against Publius Quinctilius Varus in the Teutoberg Forrest. When Arminius tried to impose his own dictatorship, the farmers broke him too.

Since Plato’s writing, other philosophers have built on his observations. Plato naively thought that he could get rid of internecine conflict by extending the family relationship across an entire class — in other words, communal property and no nuclear family. Aristotle realized that only ownership made people care for things: traditional families were crucial to the well being of the middle class. In Politics,Aristotle suggested that abolishing private property would be ideal for the slave class, because the resultant discord would make them easier to control.

Plato’s and Aristotle’s work became especially relevant during The Enlightenment. Philosophers turned their thoughts towards how to reconstruct society.

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The Marquis de Sade, a vicious French revolutionary, noticed that when people are bombarded with sex and stripped of family relations, they are distracted and isolated; this makes them totally at the mercy of the State. He recommended plenty of smut in the theater in order to convert the French into “revolutionary citizens.” See his Philosophy in the Bedroom.

Gustave le Bon, a French philosopher writing in the 1890s, saw that when groups of people are very diverse they have few feelings of responsibility towards each other and are more easy to manipulate. (See The Crowd.) The American Conservative’s Steve Sailer noticed this too in his January 2007 articleFragmented Future.

1940s intellectuals inherited a good understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of society — and how to manipulate them. They started out as Marxists but became disillusioned with Marxism because the lower middle class in Germany in the end opted for National Socialism instead of communism. The response of these intellectuals was to develop theories based on psychoanalysis in which the middle class and any sense of social cohesion were pathologized. From their point of view, the problem was the family itself.

At the center of this onslaught on the middle class was a group of refugee Jewish intellectuals from a communist think-tank in Frankfurt called the “Institute for Social Research.” They are now commonly known as “The Frankfurt School.” The most prominent members of the institute were Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. 

A perfect example of Frankfurt School thinking was Herbert Marcuse‘s use of Plato’s idea of “The Tyranny of Slaves.” Plato saw the “Tyranny of Slaves” as the ultimate treachery and akin to patricide: a tyrant uses slaves to oppress his own people — the people who gave the tyrant birth.

Marcuse turns the idea of “The Tyranny of Slaves” on its head. According to Marcuse (following Freud), Western Culture was founded by a band of sons who wanted to sleep with their mother and killed their oppressive father (patricide). In guilt, the sons reestablished the tyranny of the father and the result was European Man. Marcuse speculated that Western tyranny will be broken through a cathartic event: minorities and women would rebel, crushing Western Culture and ushering in a fuzzy utopia that is liberated from logic and reason. This utopia will be led by Frankfurt intellectuals. Marcuse calls this catharsis the “return of the repressed.”

The Frankfurters attacked middle class values from every angle. They attacked the foundations of the Western educational system: reason became a symptom of “oppression,” what was “logical” was whatever supported the Frankfurter’s politics. Science was only useful if it could be twisted into propaganda. The Classics became unfashionable. 

In reality, the Frankfurters were agitating for an education system that would dumb down the populace and make them less able to identify their own interests.

The Frankfurters adopted de Sade’s social destabilization techniques. Sexual perversion became “freedom”. Loving your race, family and culture became “authoritarian”— unless of course you were non-white. Mentally healthy people were those who rejected their family and looked with eager eyes toward the “return of the repressed.”

In reality, the Frankfurters were promoting diversity because it disrupts community — just as Le Bon had observed. Diversity is strength for oligarchical elites, it is not strength for subjugated people. Cultural and ethnic diversity undermine community and open societies up for tyranny.

After the Frankfurt revolution society would supposedly be freed from private property and the State would provide for everyone’s needs.  Being “reified” citizens we would be happy rutting with egalitarian abandon and living our atomistic lives. Ulysses: nil, Lotus-Eaters: one.

The Frankfurters knew full well that distracted and isolated people are weak and the perfect material for the slave class. Single mothers, abandoned children, institutionalized men and the neglected elderly are all dependent on the State and will do as they are told — if they want their benefits.

The Frankfurt school was well connected to the government, particularly the US occupation administration in Germany after World War II. The resources of theOffice of Strategic Services and its successor, the CIA, were used to broadcast the Frankfurter’s morally weakening message across the globe.

In 1949 John McCloy (the American High Commissioner for Germany and CIA heavyweight) arranged a special posting for Max Horkheimer at Frankfurt University.  Horkheimer had written that an outpost in Frankfurt would be necessary to monitor the effects of American ‘anti-prejudice’ programs on Germans. In 1950 McCloy funds supported the reestablishment of the Institute for Social Research, directed by Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno.

Many Frankfurt intellectuals found a home away from home in the American university system.  After serving with the OSS/CIA they returned to the “Ivory Tower” and were given plush jobs. Herbert Marcuse went to Columbia University, Harvard, Brandeis and the University of California at San Diego; Leo Lowenthal(Office of War Information section chief) went to the University of California, Berkeley — from where their protégés continue to assert, repeat and spread the Frankfurt School contagion.

Frankfurters were given jobs analyzing television and radio content to make sure it had the right messages. Their suggestions in art and music were promoted at Allied-funded cultural events in Europe like the “Congress for Cultural Freedom” — the main organization of the anti-Stalinist left. The Congress was organized in 1950 by Michael Josselson with help from Melvin Lasky andNicolas NabokovSidney Hook and other New York Intellectuals were central figures. The Rockefeller-funded Museum of Modern Art in New York (MoMA) was closely linked to the Congress. MoMA was a private conduit for promoting socialist-inspired art that the 1950s US Congress would not support.

The Frankfurt School and the New York Intellectuals developed a common front with non-Jewish elites in the Cold War struggle to attain the intellectual high ground against Stalinism. But it was an alliance made with the devil, because, asKevin MacDonald has shown, the ideology promoted by the non-communist left came to be institutionalized as the ideology of Western suicide. The New York Intellectuals and the Frankfurt School—both movements dominated by strongly identified Jews — developed a widely disseminated theory, based on psychoanalysis (itself a Jewish intellectual movement), in which concern for ethnic displacement and the rise of minority power were indications of psychopathology. White people with no allegiance to their family, their country or their race were seen as the epitome of psychological health.

The Frankfurters and the New York Intellectuals had a great respect for Western Classical Literature. (This was typical of other Jewish-dominated anti-nationalist intellectual movements described by Yuri Slezkine.) Shakespeare and the other Western classics would survive the revolution of the non-communist left, but the rest of Western culture would have to go, as would the predominant racial group — White Europeans. They had read Plato and Aristotle very carefully, and for the most part accepted these writers’ conclusions. The Frankfurters were also familiar with De Sade and Le Bon — and recognized their relevance to Plato. From a synthesis of these ideas sprung a system for attacking the middle class.

It will not be lost on the reader that the time period in question was also the beginning of the “Civil Rights” movement; the “Sexual Revolution”; and massive third-world immigration to the West. What has been the effect of these things on our society? Are we as a people more or less able to defend our own interests and hold our government accountable? Plato would answer “less.”

Elizabeth Whitcombe (email her) is a graduate of MIT in Economics with a concentration in International Economics. She is a financial analyst and free-lance writer living in New York City.

The Culture of Deceit

For those conversant with the Bible, the twin themes of Jewish resource acquisition and deceit will be familiar. For example, in A People That Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy, Kevin MacDonald describes this:

The biblical stories of sojourning by the patriarchs among foreigners are very prominently featured in Genesis. Typically there is an emphasis on deception and exploitation of the host population, after which the Jews leave a despoiled host population, having increased their own wealth and reproductive success. Indeed, immediately after the creation story and the genealogy of Abraham, Genesis presents an account of Abraham’s sojourn in Egypt. Abraham goes to Egypt to escape a famine with his barren wife Sarah, and they agree to deceive the pharaoh into thinking that Sarah is his sister, so that the pharaoh takes her as a concubine. As a result of this transaction, Abraham receives great wealth . . . .

Far from being a unique story, it portrays a pattern. MacDonald concludes, “Like the others, the Egyptian sojourn begins with deception and ends with the Israelites obtaining great treasure and increasing their numbers.”

The most famous Biblical story of deceit is the story of Exodus. Joseph helps his relatives enter by telling them to deny being shepherds because the Egyptians dislike shepherds. The Israelites reside in Egypt and are successful: “And Israel dwelt in the land of Egypt . . . and they got them possessions therein, and were fruitful, and multiplied exceedingly” (Gen. 47:27).

The Book of Esther is another fascinating tale of deceit in which Esther, a beautiful Jewish woman, insinuates herself into the inner court of a powerful king but keeps secret her Jewish identity. Eventually, she is able to both save her fellow Jews and have the king kill her enemy, Haman, and his ten sons. The Jews then kill 75,000 others with the approval of the king: “The Jews struck down all their enemies with the sword, killing and destroying them, and they did what they pleased to those who hated them” (Est. 9:5). Meanwhile, her cousin Mordecai assumes a prominent position in the royal court.

To this day, Jews celebrate these acts of deception and political murder as the holiday of Purim. This is an important indication that fraud and deception are part of the official ideology of Judaism.

In some ways it is sobering to think that some two thousand years after Esther and her cousin Mordecai used cunning to acquire great status and dispatch enemies, a similar pattern exists in the modern world. The most recent example is the arrest of 44 people, including several rabbis, in a money laundering and influence peddling scheme involving  payoffs to public officials in New Jersey. Rather than marginal figures, the rabbis involved were highly respected pillars of the Syrian Jewish community — a traditionalist Jewish group that remains largely separate even from other Jewish groups. What’s fascinating is that Rabbi Israel Dwek,  a founder of the New Jersey synagogue at the center of the scandal, renounced his own son, Solomon Dwek, because the son had cooperated with the FBI after being indicted on bank fraud charges. The father’s actions were entirely within the Talmudic Law of Mesirah — the prohibition of a Jew informing on another Jew. The father will therefore “sit Shiva” for his son — a ceremony observed when an immediate family member has died.

In other words, illegal activities involving deception and deceit are tolerated within the Jewish community. The rabbi does not issue ringing condemnations of the money launderers and the human body parts sellers. Nor does he condemn his son for being involved in bank fraud.  The only real crime is to inform on other Jews. The only ethical principle involved here is the age old “Is it good for the Jews?”

Of course white collar crime is one of the standard stereotypes about the Jews, a description that seems to follow them wherever they go. Apologists for Jews claim that such crime occurs among non-Jews as well. The difference, however, is not only in the greater likelihood among Jews (see here for an academic treatment that tiptoes around the issue), but, more importantly, that Jewish white collar criminals do not face censure within their own communities.

The legitimacy of Jewish white collar crime is  also indicated by the following comment on the New Jersey scandal by Moshe Rosenberg, an Orthodox rabbi:

Unfortunately, unethical and even illegal behavior too often does not face serious censure in our communities. I’m reminded of a hilarious YouTube video that made the rounds last year. It featured a rabbi taking a call from someone inquiring about a young woman from his congregation for match-making purposes. The satirical script, meant to highlight the ridiculous lengths to which some circles go in such background checks and our community’s sometimes misplaced values, had the caller ask, “Has anyone in the family ever been convicted of anything other than a white-collar crime?” The rabbi responds, “Only white-collar, and the sentences were all done in federal, minimum-security places, with Daf Yomi, minyanim, glatt kosher chasidishe shechita.” While the video was a spoof, it conveyed an underlying truth.

A Modern Orthodox blogger complained about the focus within the Jewish community on the actions of the informer Dwek rather than the crimes of the Jews: “Those who continue to complain about [Dwek] and say nothing about these criminal rabbis once again show just how pervasive is the idea that what these rabbis did wasn’t all that bad. What WAS too bad is that they were caught.”

As indicated below, Jewish white collar crime is legitimate not only in traditional Jewish communities like the Syrian Jews in New Jersey and Brooklyn, but in the wider contemporary Jewish community as well.

Indeed, academic historians, including Paul Johnson (A History of the Jews) and Albert Lindemann (Esau’s Tears: Modern Anti-Semitism and the Rise of the Jews), have shown that this pattern of Jewish deception and fraud in pursuit of wealth and its legitimacy within the Jewish community have a long history.

For example, in 1781 Prussian official Christian Wilhelm von Dohm published a tract claiming, in Johnson’s paraphrase, “The Jews had ‘an exaggerated tendency [to seek] gain in every way, a love of usury.’ These ‘defects’ were aggravated ‘by their self-imposed segregation . . .’ From these followed ‘the breaking of the laws of the state restricting trade, the import and export of prohibited wares, the forgery of money and precious metals.’” In short, von Dohm’s describes traditional Jewish communities as far more resembling a mafia-like group engaged in organized crime than what we think of as a religion.

Lindemann notes that during the 19th century in Eastern Europe there were also persistent complaints about Jewish perjury to help other Jews commit fraud and other crimes. For example, in Russia a neutral observer noted that judges “unanimously declared that not a single lawsuit, criminal or civil, can be properly conducted if the interests of the Jews are involved.”  Writing in 1914, American sociologist Edward A. Ross commented on Jewish immigrants to America that “The authorities complain that the East European Hebrews feel no reverence for law as such and are willing to break any ordinance they find in their way. … In the North End of Boston ‘the readiness of the Jews to commit perjury has passed into a proverb.’”

In the modern world, this pattern of organized criminal activity morphed into involvement in financial scandals. The Bernie Madoff scandal of 2008 is a prime example of fraud that was facilitated by Madoff’s many Jewish connections and especially by his standing in the Jewish community — the only difference being that some of his victims were Jews. Jewish involvement in financial scandals became a prominent theme of modern anti-Semitism.  Johnson writes, “The Union Générale scandal in 1882, the Comptoire d’Escompte scandal in 1889—both involving Jews—were merely curtain-raisers” to a far more massive and complex crime, the Panama Canal scandal, ‘an immense labyrinth of financial manipulation and fraud, with [Jewish] Baron Jacques de Reinach right at the middle of it.’”

Lindemann offers a parallel description of the rise of Jewish power paired with Jewish involvement in major financial scandals. In Germany, Jews “were heavily involved in the get-rich-quick enterprises” of the period of rapid urbanization and industrialization of the 1860s and 70s. “Many highly visible Jews made fortunes in dubious ways . . . Probably the most notorious of these newly rich speculators was Hirsch Strousberg, a Jew involved in Romanian railroad stocks. He was hardly unique in his exploits, but as Peter Pulzer has written, ‘the . . . difference between his and other men’s frauds was that his was more impudent and involved more money.’”

Lindemann offers an account that sounds much like what Americans have been hearing about their own economic woes in the last few years:

In the summer of 1873 the stock markets in New York and Vienna collapsed. By the autumn of that year Germany’s industrial overexpansion and the reckless proliferation of stock companies came to a halt. Jews were closely associated in the popular mind with the stock exchange. Widely accepted images of them as sharp and dishonest businessmen made it all but inevitable that public indignation over the stock market crash would be directed at them. Many small investors, themselves drawn to the prospect of easy gain, lost their savings through fraudulent stocks of questionable business practices in which Jews were frequently involved.

Like Johnson, Lindemann believes that accusations of fraud against many European Jews were not based on mere fantasy. With respect to the Panama Canal scandal of 1888–1892, for instance, Lindemann writes:

Investigation into the activities of the Panama Company revealed widespread bribery of parliamentary officials to assure support of loans to continue work on the Panama Canal, work that had been slowed by endless technical and administrative difficulties. Here was a modern project that involved large sums of French capital and threatened national prestige. The intermediaries between the Panama Company and parliament were almost exclusively Jews, with German names and backgrounds, some of whom tried to blackmail one another . . . .

Thousands of small investors lost their savings in the Panama fiasco. . . . A trial in 1893 was widely believed to be a white-wash. The accused escaped punishment through bribery and behind-the-scenes machinations, or so it was widely believed. The Panama scandal seemed almost designed to confirm the long-standing charges of the French right that the republic was in the clutches of corrupt Jews who were bringing dishonor and disaster to France.

In many cases, the Jewish nexus of the financial scandal involves the idea that Jews involved in financial scandals were being protected by other highly placed Jews: As Lindemann notes, “The belief of anti-Semites in France about Jewish secretiveness was based on a real secretiveness of some highly placed and influential Jews. What anti-Semites suspected was not so much pure fantasy as a malicious if plausible exaggeration, since solid facts were hard to come by.” This secretiveness among prominent Jews is another example of the operation of the Talmudic Law of Moser and once again shows that illegal and unethical behavior is sanctioned within the Jewish community. The only crime would be to inform on other Jews.

Dear Readers, my point here is this: Nothing has changed about Jewish behavior in recorded history. The evidence is abundant everywhere we look, never more starkly than when it comes to competition for resources—money in modern terms.

Consider, for example, the sad spectacle of the Wall Street scandals of the 1980s. So much of it was played out on the pages of major newspapers and magazines, so there was no doubt about the identity of the vast majority of culprits—at least for those with eyes to see it.

Two writers who both had the eyes to see it and the talent to write about it intelligently were Connie Bruck—who happens to be Jewish—and James B. Stewart—who is not. Bruck wrote The Predators’ Ball: The Inside Story of Drexel Burnham and the Rise of the Junk Bond Traders. The book has more than enough information to convince the average reader that Jewish financial mischief is rife—and has a massively negative effect on the greater non-Jewish world.

Stewart’s book is even better, beginning with its title, Den of Thieves. For those whose biblical knowledge is sketchy, the title comes from Matthew 21:12–13, where he recounts

And Jesus went into the temple of God, and cast out all them that sold and bought in the temple, and overthrew the tables of the moneychangers, and the seats of them that sold doves. And said unto them, It is written, My house shall be called the house of prayer; but ye have made it a den of thieves.

Stewart goes on to chronicle the misdeeds of Ivan Boesky, Martin Siegel, Dennis Levine (who wrote his own book Inside Out: The Dennis Levine Story), and most of all,  Michael Milken, the mastermind behind it all. Simply by describing all the Jews involved Stewart makes clear that it was a cabal of Jews that pillaged and destroyed some of the most well-known corporations in America at the time by inventing and peddling “junk bonds” as an advance in capitalist operations.

Lindemann was careful to include this in his story as well, writing that it had become clear that “the stock market scandals of the mid-to-late 1980s in the United States saw an overwhelming preponderance of Jews — at least ninety percent was a widely accepted figure.”

Reflecting the legitimacy of white collar crime in the wider Jewish community in the contemporary world, Milken is a pillar of the Jewish community in Los Angeles and a major donor to Jewish causes. Indeed, this is part of a pattern: Ivan Boesky donated $20 million to the library at the Jewish Theological Seminary. And the notorious Marc Rich has donated millions of dollars to a wide range of Jewish causes, including  Birthright Israel, a program designed to increase Jewish identification among young Jews. The list of people supporting Rich’s pardon by Bill Clinton was “a virtual Who’s Who of Israeli society and Jewish philanthropy.” A rabbi concerned about the ethics of these practices notes, “it is a rare Jewish organization that thinks carefully about the source of a donor’s money. … The dangerous thing is not that people make moral mistakes, but that we don’t talk about it.”

Also reflecting the legitimacy of certain kinds of crime within the Jewish community, there are indications that Israel has assumed an important role in Jewish organized crime. A review of Robert I. Friedman’s Red Mafiya: How the Russian Mob Has Invaded America notes that “The state of Israel is a major factor in the rise and power of the Jewish mafia. Jewish drug dealers, child porn pushers and slave traders are free from prosecution in Israel. Israel does not consider these to be crimes … so long as the victims are non-Jews.”

I’ve written mostly about financial chicanery, but one will find a culture of deceit in many other areas in which Jews find themselves active. For instance, consider literary deceit. Just last week I read another story discussing the lifetime of deceit led by famous Nazi-hunter Simon Wiesenthal. The article noted that “He was a liar — and a bad one at that.” They’re all about the same — fabrications where the end (reinforcing the Good Jews/Bad non-Jews theme) justifies the means. The criterion is usefulness to the Jewish community, not truth. The author concludes

He was at heart a showman and when he found a role as the world’s head Nazi hunter, he played it well. As with so many popular performances, it was impossible for the critics to tell the public that the Great Wiesenthal Show was little more than an illusion. Ultimately, it was an illusion mounted for a good cause. (my emphasis)

Another well-known example is The Painted Bird, Jerzy Kosinski’s controversial 1965 “non-fiction” account of Poles gouging out the eyes of Jewish children with spoons. Well, Kosinski made it up. Allow non-tenured Jewish scholar Norman Finkelstein to tell the story:

Embedded in the Holocaust framework, much of the literature on Hitler’s final solution is worthless as scholarship. The first major Holocaust hoax was The Painted Bird by Polish émigré Jerzy Kosinski. The book was “written in English”, Kosinski explained, so that “I could write dispassionately, free from the emotional connotation one’s native language always contains”. In fact, whatever parts he actually authored (an unresolved question) were written in Polish. The book purports to be the autobiographical account of a solitary child wandering through rural Poland during WWII. In fact, Kosinski lived with his parents throughout the war. The book’s motif is the sadistic, sexual tortures perpetrated by the Polish peasantry. Pre-publication readers derided it as a “pornography of violence” and “the product of a mind obsessed with sadomasochistic violence”. The book depicts the Polish peasants he lived with as virulently anti-Semitic. “Beat the Jews,” they jeer. “Beat the bastards.” In fact, Polish peasants harboured the Kosinski family, fully aware of their Jewishness and the dire consequences they themselves faced if caught. Kosinski invented most of the pathological episodes he narrates.

Honestly, the whole trend of Holocaust museums and Holocaust remembrance days has become such a ritual now that even non-Jews are trying to capitalize on it. Consider Finkelstein’s account of a tale that turned out to be totally false: “Translated into a dozen languages, winner of the Jewish National Book Award, the Jewish Quarterly Prize, and the Prix de Mémoire de la Shoah, Fragments: Memories of a Wartime Childhood was widely hailed as a classic of Holocaust literature. Star of documentaries, keynoter at Holocaust conferences and seminars, fund-raiser for the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Binjamin Wilkomirski [not a Jew] quickly became a Holocaust poster boy.”

Nevertheless, the truth of Wilkomirski’s memoir is not relevant to its usefulness for the Holocaust industry. When confronted by evidence that it was fabricated, Holocaust activist Deborah Lipstadt declared that if it was false, it “might complicate matters somewhat, but it’s still powerful.” As a reviewer of a book on the  fabrication noted, “so when the truth was revealed, the myth refused to die.” The criterion is usefulness, not truth.

In any case, my aim is to buttress my argument that deceit is a common aspect of Jewish behavior, and we should be mature enough to accept this, even without passing moral judgment.

To the extent there is a problem, it ultimately rests with us. After all, why do we again and again accept fraudulent Jewish behavior or stories that are obviously ludicrous? Consider those junk bonds scandals of twenty years ago, where Lindemann noted “an overwhelming preponderance of Jews — at least ninety percent was a widely accepted figure . . .” I now complete his quote by noting that the “clear correlation [between Jews and financial scandal] seemed to interest the broad American public scarcely at all, or at least it elicited few public expressions of anti-Semitic indignation, and overwhelmingly non-Jewish journalists and politicians skirted the issue.” Why? Fear of the Jews alone? My experience is that American non-Jews mostly willed themselves not to think about it.

Is it any wonder then that those who so brazenly loot the U.S. Treasury now are from the same tribe? Goldman Sachs, for one, is in the news yet again, this time accused by some of massive malfeasance, even leading Jewish blogger James Howard Kunstler to charge that “Goldman Sachs has become the ‘front-runner’ of a criminal syndicate defrauding US taxpayers.”

I wrote about  another tangle of Jewish players in my previous TOO article, noting how former Treasury Secretary and Harvard President Larry Summers and economic advisers associated with Harvard such as Andrei Shleifer and Jeffrey Sachs are still on the scene. American goyim seem to care even less about this than they did the junk bonds scandals of the 1980s.

Andrew Hamilton touched on these circumstances in his fine but depressing essay Prisoners of Fate?, quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt as saying “Men are not prisoners of fate, but only prisoners of their own minds. They have within themselves the power to become free at any moment.” Hamilton points out that “contrary to his words, Roosevelt’s speechwriters understood perfectly well that men’s minds are the prisoners of whoever controls the media of mass communications — in 1939: Hollywood, the great newspapers, magazines, book publishers, and radio broadcasters. Whites today remain prisoners of fate precisely because they are prisoners of their own minds — minds controlled by others.” (See also his Demented Religion.)

The issue of mind control made possible by cultural control stands out in Kevin MacDonald’s trilogy on Jews (often under the index heading of “deception”). As he wrote in The Culture of Critique, “Jewish crypsis and semi-crypsis are essential to the success of Judaism in post-Enlightenment societies.” This is particularly true regarding Jewish involvement in the construction of the culture of Western suicide:

Although these theories [discussed in The Culture of Critique] were directed at achieving specific Jewish interests in the manipulation of culture, they “could not tell their name”; that is, they were forced to minimize any overt indication that Jewish group identity or Jewish group interests were involved …. The Jewish contribution to the wider gentile culture in nineteenth-century Germany was accomplished from a highly particularistic perspective in which Jewish group identity continued to be of paramount subjective importance despite its “invisibility.” Similarly, because of the need for invisibility, the theories and movements discussed here were forced to deemphasize Judaism as a social category—a form of crypsis discussed extensively in SAID (Ch. 6) as a common Jewish technique in combating anti-Semitism. In the case of the Frankfurt School, “What strikes the current observer is the intensity with which many of the Institute’s members denied, and in some cases still deny, any meaning at all to their Jewish identities” (Martin Jay, The Dialectical Imagination. The originators and practitioners of these theories attempted to conceal their Jewish identities, as in the case of Freud, and to engage in massive self-deception, as appears to have been common among many Jewish political radicals. Recall the Jewish radicals who believed in their own invisibility as Jews while nevertheless appearing as the quintessential ethnics to outside observers and at the same time taking steps to ensure that gentiles would have highly visible positions in the movement (CofC, pp. 91–93). The technique of having gentiles as highly visible exemplars of Jewish-dominated movements has been commonly used by Jewish groups attempting to appeal to gentiles on a wide range of Jewish issues (SAID, Ch. 6) and is apparent in the discussion of Jewish involvement in influencing immigration policy in the following chapter. As an additional example, Irving Louis Horowitz (The Decomposition of Sociology) contrasts the “high-profile,” special-interest pleading of the new ethnic and sexual minorities within sociology with the Jewish tendency toward a low-profile strategy. Although Jews dominated American sociology beginning in the 1930s, specifically Jewish interests and political agendas were never made salient.

Examples of Jewish crypsis and deception in the intellectual world and the political arena in the US are endless: from neocons posing as American patriots in order to further the interests of Israel, to Jewish immigration enthusiasts advocating massive non-White immigration not as an aspect of ethnic competition and furthering their interest in the decline of White America, but as as fulfilling the highest humanitarian ideals — ideals they would never apply to their Jewish ethnostate in Israel.

Wiki tells us that “In ecology, crypsis is the ability of an organism to avoid observation. A form of antipredator adaptation, methods range from camouflage, nocturnality, subterranean lifestyle, transparency or mimicry.”

In The Extended Phenotype, British biologist Richard Dawkins describes an instance of crypsis, showing how one bird species gets another to feed and raise its young:

Not all parasites live physically inside their hosts. They may even seldom come into contact with their hosts. A cuckoo is one such parasite, but it is a whole-organism parasite rather than a tissue parasite or a cell parasite. The practical difference is that the cuckoo does not live inside the reed warbler’s body, so has less opportunity for manipulating the host’s internal biochemistry. It has to rely on other media for its manipulation, for instance sound waves and light waves. It uses a supernormally bright gape to inject its control into the reed warbler’s nervous system via the eyes. It uses an especially loud begging cry to control the reed warbler’s nervous system via the ears. Cuckoo genes, in exerting their developmental power over host phenotypes, have to rely on action at a distance.

Cuckoos gape their mouths wide to trigger the genetic instinct to feed a gaping mouth. But the one who does the feeding, a warbler or whatever, is being manipulated into acting in favour of cuckoo genes and against its own warbler genes. The warbler’s body is part of the cuckoo genes’ extended phenotype.

I think the point is clear: Western man has been facing this kind of deception and manipulation for hundreds of years now. Yet today, unlike so often in the past, most Whites freeze like deer in the headlights of a car when confronted with evidence.

My accounts of Jewish perfidy do not constitute revelation; this information has been available since Biblical times and can be found now with no effort at all. Never before, however, did it seem to represent such a genocidal threat to Western man. Perhaps the only good news, as a blogger notes, is that “There is a tiny percentage of white people who have not inherited, and therefore do not possess, this maladaptive trait. The survival of the white race is now entirely dependent upon these few righteous Gentiles.”

Who is willing to step forward?

Edmund Connelly (email him) is a freelance writer, academic, and expert on the cinema arts. He has previously written for The Occidental Quarterly.

Eric P. Kaufmann’s The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America

July 29, 2009

Editorial note: This is an elaborated version of an article appearing on VDARE.com: Suicide Or Murder? Kaufmann’s Rise and Fall of Anglo-America

Table of Contents

Part I

Introduction

19th-Century Trends

Four American Liberal Intellectual Traditions from the late 19th century to the present

Part II

The Period of Ethnic Defense: 1880–1965

The Rise of Jewish Influence

Conclusion: The Fall of the Anglo-Saxons

Introduction

Eric P. Kaufmann’s The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America presents the case that Anglo-America committed what one might call “suicide by idea”: White, Anglo-Saxon Protestants were motivated to give up ethnic hegemony by their attachment to Enlightenment ideals of individualism and liberty. Anglo-Americans simply followed these ideals of the Enlightenment to their logical conclusion, with the result that immigration was opened up to all peoples of the world, multiculturalism became the cultural ideal, and Whites willingly allowed themselves to be displaced from their preeminent position among the elites of business, media, politics, and the academic world.

Kaufmann explicitly rejects the proposal that the decline of Anglo-America occurred as a result of some external force. His view is therefore an important contrast to my view that the rise of Jews to elite status in the United States and particular Jewish intellectual and political movements (e.g., the movement to open immigration to all the peoples of the world) were critically necessary (not sufficient) conditions for the collapse of White America. My view is that the outcome was the result of ethnic conflict over the construction of culture. Indeed, the fall of Anglo-Saxon America is a textbook case of how deadly the conflict over the construction of culture can be.

In this review, I will show where Kaufmann goes wrong — mainly by committing sins of omission in ignoring the Jewish role in the decline of Anglo-America. But it must be said that he provides a fascinating historical overview of the decline of Whites in the US. As he notes, it was not very long ago that America strongly asserted that it was a nation of Northwestern Europeans and intended to stay that way. The 1924 Johnson-Reed Act was carefully designed to preserve the ethnic status quo as of 1890, thereby ensuring the dominance of Anglo-Americans. In 1952, the McCarran-Walter Act reiterated the bias toward Northwestern Europe and was passed over President Truman’s veto.

But only a decade later, in the 1960s, White America began the process of ethnic and cultural suicide:

By the 1960s, as if by magic, the centuries-old machinery of WASP America began to stall like the spacecraft of Martian invaders in the contemporary hit film, War of the Worlds. In 1960, the first non-Protestant president was elected. In 1965, the national origins quota regime for immigration was replaced by a “color-blind” system. Meanwhile, Anglo-Protestants faded from the class photos of the economic, political, and cultural elite — their numbers declining rapidly, year upon year, in the universities, boardrooms, cabinets, courts, and legislatures. At the mass level, the cords holding Anglo-Protestant Americans together began to unwind as secular associations and mainline churches lost millions of members while the first truly national, non-WASP cultural icons appeared. (pp. 2–3)

While it is certainly true that other ethnic groups have gone into historical decline or have been replaced by force, the decline of Anglo-America seems mysterious. There are no conquering armies that would easily explain their impending exit from the stage of history.

But despite its obvious importance as an historical phenomenon, as Kaufmann notes, there has been almost no academic attention to the causes of this very precipitous decline. Perhaps some things are better left unsaid, at least until the losers of this revolution are safely relegated to a powerless position.

In the first section, I sketch how a segment of elite White intellectuals saw themselves and America in the nineteenth century. This is an important part of Kaufmann’s narrative because he argues that the seeds of the displacement of Whites were sown in earlier centuries and merely came to fruition in the 1960s and later. The following are the main conclusions:

Many elite White intellectuals and political figures correctly saw that individualism and universalism were ethnic traits traceable to their Germanic ancestors.

White liberals during the 19th century often had a muddled view of race, thinking that environmental changes would quickly alter racial traits.

Even White liberals imagined that in the future America would be populated by people like them — White Anglo-Saxon Protestants.

Liberal attitudes on race were part of elite culture emanating from the Puritan strand of American culture, and already in the 19th century there was a gap between elite and popular attitudes.

19th-Century Trends

Freedom, Representative Government, and Individualism as Anglo-Saxon Ethnic Traits

Confident assertions of White ethnic identity are virtually non-existent these days. However, Kaufmann shows that in the 18th and 19th centuries, Anglo-Americans had a strong sense that they were the biological descendants of freedom loving Anglo-Saxon tribes: “The New England town meeting was likened to the Anglo-Saxon tribal council, and the statements of Tacitus regarding the free, egalitarian qualities of the Anglo-Saxons were given an American interpretation” (p. 18). (For example, Tacitus: “The king or the chief, according to age, birth, distinction in war, or eloquence, is heard, more because he has influence to persuade than because he has power to command. If his sentiments displease them, they reject them with murmurs; if they are satisfied, they brandish their spears.”)

The “Yeoman farmer” was considered the ethnic prototype. After drafting the Constitution, Thomas Jefferson stated that Americans are “the children of Israel in the wilderness, led by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire by night; and on the other side, Hengist and Horsa, the Saxon chiefs from whom we claim the honour of being descended, and whose political principles and form of government we have assumed” (pp. 17–18; emphasis in text).

Similar statements of ethnic confidence were common among intellectuals and politicians in the period preceding the Mexican-American war. For example, in 1846 Walt Whitman wrote, “What has miserable, inefficient Mexico … to do … with the mission of peopling the New World with a noble race?” (p. 22).

As a cultural historian, Kaufmann interprets ethnic self-conceptions as myths. But in fact it is entirely reasonable to look for the peculiar traits and tendencies of Europeans as adaptations to prolonged life in a situation characterized by harsh climates and the relative absence of between-group competition. I have arguedthat evolution in the North has predisposed Europeans to the following two critical traits that are entirely unique among the traditional cultures of the world:

1. A de-emphasis on extended kinship relationships and a relative lack of ethnocentrism.

2. A tendency toward individualism and all of its implications: individual rights against the state, representative government, moral universalism, and science.

In other words, Jefferson was quite probably correct to view the Anglo-Saxon tendencies toward individualism and representative government as ethnic traits. A critical feature of individualism is that group boundaries are relatively permeable and assimilation is the norm. As Kaufmann notes, even in the 19th century, individualism resulted in assimilation rather than maintaining impermeable boundaries with other Whites: “Interethnic relations followed a pattern of Anglo-conformity. … Immigrants were to be made into American WASPs by absorbing American English, American Liberty, and American Protestantism and, ultimately, by intermarrying with Americans” (p. 19).

For example, in the late 18th century, the response to large-scale German settlements in Pennsylvania was to reject German-American separatism and a multicultural model of America. Attempts to make German an official language and have laws written in German were rebuffed. German-Americans began Anglicizing their names to better fit into the American milieu.

There was an assumption, even among many liberals, that these ethnic others would look and act like Anglo-Americans. In the 19th century, liberals typically had “an optimistic, expansionist Anglo-conformism that accepted the immigrants, provided they looked like Anglo-Protestants and assimilated to the WASP mytho-symbolic corpus” (p. 37).

Double Consciousness: The Tension between Individualism and Ethnic Identity

Nineteenth-century American intellectuals tended to have what Ralph Waldo Emerson called a “double consciousness” — a tendency to think of America as committed to a non-racial liberal cosmopolitanism as well as a tendency to identify strongly with their Anglo-Saxon ethnicity. This fits with individualism because the ideal is to assimilate others rather than to erect strong ethnic boundaries.

During this period expressions of double consciousness can be found among the intellectual elite in which assertions of Anglo-Saxon ethnicity coexisted with statements of universalism.

Emerson himself was an example of double consciousness. He wrote that America was “the asylum of all nations. … [T]he energy of Irish, Germans, Swedes, Poles and Cossacks, and all the European tribes, of the Africans and Polynesians, will construct a new race … as vigorous as the new Europe which came out of the smelting pot of the Dark Ages.” This very clear statement of universalism co-existed with the following statement from around the same time: “It cannot be maintained by any candid person that the African race have ever occupied or do promise ever to occupy any very high place in the human family. … The Irish cannot; the American Indian cannot; the Chinese cannot. Before the energy of the Caucasian race all other races have quailed and done obeisance” (pp. 44–45).

Despite Kaufmann’s claims, these ideas are not really contradictory — the idea that there are differences between the races is compatible with the idea that eventually the races will amalgamate and be better for it. In his book English Traits, Emerson acknowledges racial differences:  “Race is a controlling influence in the Jew who, for two millenniums, under every climate, has preserved the same character and employments. Race in the negro is of appalling importance” (p. 27). However, he maintains that racial boundaries are weak and that “the best nations are those the most widely related; and navigation, as effecting a worldwide mixture, is the most potent advancer of nations” (p. 28).

What is odd is Emerson’s belief that the English race could remain the English race even after absorbing other races. Emerson thought that immigrants to America would literally be assimilated to the English race: The “foreign element [in America], however considerable, is rapidly assimilated,” resulting in a population of “English descent and language” (my emphasis). This is an example of the muddled thinking on race that was characteristic of many intellectuals during the 19th century.

Kaufmann reviews the various strains of 19th-century liberalism that de-emphasized White or Anglo-Saxon identity. These were not majority views, but they do point to a robust strand among secular and religious intellectual elites associated with a New England Puritan background in the direction of a deracinated cosmopolitanism. Emerson, certainly, was a liberal, as were his fellow Transcendentalists and Unitarians.

Muddled Thinking about Race: The influence of Lamarck

The bottom line is that, as Kaufmann says, “a good case can be made that ethnic (“race”) thinking in the nineteenth century was largely a muddled, incoherent enterprise” (p. 54). The basic problem was that these thinkers wereLamarckians — that is, they believed that people could inherit traits that their ancestors had acquired during their lifetimes. With Lamarck rather than Darwin as inspiration, race and culture were conflated. Liberal intellectuals thought that blacks would become white with more education, like “the running of a dirty stream into a pellucid lake which eventually clears leaving no trace of mud” (p. 56). Immigrants of all strains could become good Anglo-Saxons.

Lamarck’s theory has always been a darling of the left because it holds the promise that inherited traits can easily be changed simply by changing the environment. It is no accident that Lamarckism became official ideology in the Soviet Union (and among many Jewish leftists) precisely because it implied that it would be quite easy to mold the new Soviet man — or, as Lysenko thought, to develop crops that could flourish in cold climates.

In the hands of the Anglo-Saxon  assimilationists, Lamarckism was part of the optimistic spirit of elite 19th-century liberal intellectuals who envisioned a future America to be people just like themselves, no matter what their origins.

Self-interest and Liberal Ideology. An ethnic tendency toward individualism makes people less likely to erect barriers to other groups. But individualists are certainly capable of developing a sense of ethnic identity. In fact, we have seen that it was quite common for Anglo-Saxons to think of individualism as resulting from their ethnic heritage. However, individualists are relatively less ethnocentric, and as a result it is relatively easy for other motivations to predominate. These motivations can range from libertarian self-actualization to self-interested business practices that, for example, promote non-White immigration if there are economic benefits to be had.

Kaufmann points to a general tendency — still apparent today — in which elite Protestants made alliances with immigrant groups (including non-White immigrants such as Chinese on the West Coast in the 1870s) to encourage immigration. These forces opposed the forces of ethnic defense represented by middle and working class Anglo-Protestants of both parties. “To quell dissent within their party, Republican elites accused their populist wing of racism and ethnic bigotry” (p. 59) — a trend that remains quite common today.

As is the case today, people with the most liberal attitudes were not personally threatened by upholding liberal attitudes (e.g., pro-Chinese immigration in areas where there were no Chinese). Or liberals imagined that “divine providence … would keep Chinese numbers in the United States to a minimum” (p. 65). Again, there is quite a bit of muddlement: Republicans like William Seward “who backed equal rights for blacks and favored Chinese immigration, fervently believed in the separation of the races and in the homogeneity of the nation” (p. 65).

Four American Liberal Intellectual Traditions from the late 19th century to the present: Libertarian Anarchism, Liberal Protestantism, Academic Cultural Determinism, and the Secular Left

Americans like myself who are distressed at the decline and displacement of Whites, the rise of multiculturalism, and massive non-White immigration must acknowledge the strong strands of American culture that have facilitated these phenomena. On one hand, individualism and its cluster of related traits (moral universalism, science) are the basic features of Western modernization — the features that have allowed Western cultures to dominate the world and to colonize areas far away from their European homeland.

On the other hand, because of its relative lack of ethnocentrism and its tendencies toward assimilation rather than erecting ingroup/outgroup barriers, an important strand of American individualism has been to develop wildly optimistic and idealistic theories of the American future. We have seen that liberal theorists of the 19th century saw a future America as dominated by people who looked and thought like themselves: Even people from different races would ultimately become White Anglo-Saxon and Protestant no matter what their racial background.

Kaufmann points to four different liberal intellectual traditions all of which had their origin in the 19th century and all still present today. Each of them may be seen as a different expression of individualism.

Libertarian Anarchism. The 19th-centuiry liberal intellectual tradition of the Transcendentalists and Unitarians stemmed from the Puritan tradition centered in New England and its elite universities. Another strain of New England liberalism is represented by the libertarian anarchists, typified by Benjamin Tucker, a believer in unfettered individualism and opposed to prohibitions on non-invasive behavior (“free love”, etc.). But even these libertarians were conscious that their attitudes sprang from their ethnic heritage. As Kaufmann notes, “the radical tradition [of anarchic individualism] did not necessarily point in a cosmopolitan direction, but, as with radical figures, such as Thomas Jefferson, Horace Greeley, Emerson, and Walt Whitman, often reinforced ethnonational pride. … Anarchist logic did not wipe clear all traces of white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant attachment. Evidently, the cosmopolitan paradigm had yet to fully shake its cognitive ballast of dominant ethnicity” (pp. 88–89).

A large part of the vision of what Kaufmann calls the “expressive pathfinders” in the early 20th century was a rebellion against small-town Protestant America, its sexual repression, and its other mores which resulted in exclusion of some (e.g., homosexuals). This expressive individualist avant-garde culture of New York was not significant in the 19th century, being overshadowed by the genteel radicalism emanating from New England. The new Bohemians in Greenwich Village (ca. 1910–1917) were led by Max Eastman (1883–1969) and defined themselves by cultural liberation defined as freedom from constraints—an early version of 1960s hippies: self discovery, emotion over logic, intuition, rebellion, free love, Black jazz, and leftist politics. They developed an ingroup ideology that functioned like a pseudo-ethnic identity: They had shared attitudes as boundary markers, founding myths, iconic figures, and a utopian vision of an expressive, egalitarian future. Another important figure in this mold was H. L. Mencken(1880–1956) who opposed Puritanism as “moralistic, aesthetically barren and an impediment to American intellectual development” (p. 153).

Many were in open rebellion against the Christian, small-town culture they grew up in. Rebels like Hutchins Hapgood were attracted to Jews because they were the “other”: “I was led to spend much time in poor resorts of Yiddish New York, through motives neither philanthropic nor sociological, but simply by virtue of the charm I felt in men and things there.” Horace Kallen, the Jewish philosopher of cultural pluralism, commented in 1915 on the effects of the individualism of American intellectuals of the period:

The older America, whose voice and spirit were New England, has … gone beyond recall. Americans of British stock still are prevailingly the artists and thinkers of the land, but they work, each for himself, without common vision or ideals. They have no ethos, any more. The older tradition has passed from a life into a memory. (quoted by Kaufmann as an epigraph to Chapter 7, p. 144)

Expressive individualism remained a marginal phenomenon until it became an integral part of the counterculture of the 1960s — especially the hippie component of the 1960s counterculture. At that point, it became ingrained in American mass culture as a component of “Left-wing modernism” (p. 204), spreading “from the intellectual elite to the better-educated sections of the political and economic elite: the mass media, executive, judiciary, and top bureaucrats” (p. 205). The movement of expressive individualism to the center of American culture therefore followed rather than preceded the major cultural changes brought about, in Kaufmann’s view, by the success of the New York Intellectuals (see below). Expressive individualism therefore cannot be seen as causing the eclipse of Anglo-America.

Liberal Protestantism. Kaufmann notes several strains of liberal Protestantism in 19th-century thought. The Free Religious Association (founded in 1867) was a more liberal offshoot of the Unitarians — the most liberal strain of American religion. But again the members of the FRA thought of their liberal attitudes as stemming from their ethnic heritage. After stating that his religious movement intended to humanize (not Christianize) the entire world, Francis E. Abbot, founder of the FRA, stated “The rest I need comes no longer from spiritual servitude, but must be sought and found in the manly exercise of freedom. It is to those who feel this Anglo-Saxon instinct of liberty stirring in their hearts that my words are addressed, — not to those who feel no galling pressure from the easy yoke” (p. 90; my emphasis).

Merrill Gates (1848–1922), President of Rutgers College and a Congregationalist preacher, also combined his religious commitments with a belief that his political attitudes stemmed from his ethnic heritage: “There is no other ‘manifest destiny’ for any man [than Liberty]…. To this we [liberals] are committed, by all the logic of two thousand years of Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon history, since Arminius … made a stand for liberty against the legions of Rome” (p. 90). Kaufmann points out that “we should bear in mind that FRA members at this point had failed to relinquish their Anglo-Protestant psychic redoubts, and none spoke of stripping the nation of its implicitly white, Anglo-Saxon, or Protestant heritage” (p. 91).

Many Protestants believed that all Americans would eventually voluntarily become Protestants. Religious leaders, particularly Methodists and Baptists, rejected the idea of writing Christianity into the US Constitution, but they retained the belief that the U.S. government was Christian. “Anglo Protestants wanted their tradition to be supreme, but their universalist liberal commitments would not countenance boundary-defining measures of legislative origin” (p. 47). Christianity would retain its special place by persuasion, not coercion. As indicated below, the liberal cosmopolitanism of the late 20th century has taken the opposite strategy: Once it achieved power, it developed strong overtones of coercion, including attempts to limit freedom of speech and remove people from their jobs for beliefs and attitudes that conflict with the cosmopolitan zeitgeist — an indication that liberal cosmopolitanism of the late 20th century is in a critical sense not in the individualist tradition of America.

Moreover, even though they did not approve of Catholicism, Protestant religious leaders in the 1840s did not oppose Catholic immigration, believing that they could convert them to “the ‘American’ faith” (p. 47) and absorb them into the Anglo-Saxon race. Indeed, all races would immigrate to America for the new millennium: In the words of a prominent Baptist, “In the gathering of all nations and races upon our shores, do we not witness the providential preparation for a second Pentacost that shall usher in the millennial glory?” (p. 49). All races would be absorbed into the Anglo-Saxon race, their better qualities absorbed, “yet remaining essentially unchanged” (p. 49). Kaufmann comments that “it is necessary to understand that liberal and Anglo-Protestant attitudes were not opposing viewpoints, but part of the same myth-symbol complex of dualistic ethnic beliefs whose contradictions were obscured by a giddy, expansionist spirit of optimism’ (p. 50).

Indeed, this is an extreme form of egocentrism. What the good minister is saying is that all peoples will eventually assimilate in race and religion to look and behave pretty much like he does.

The period from 1900–1910 also saw the beginnings of a liberal Protestant elite willing to sacrifice the dream of conversion for universalist, humanitarian ethics. The idea that Anglo-Saxons would convert the world to Protestant Christianity—common in the late 19th century—faded after 1910. This elite was more open to religious relativity and criticized the implicit Whiteness of Christian missionaries. The Federal Council of Churches (FCC, estab. 1908) became a key organizing body for liberal Protestantism. In 1924, at the time when the US Congress was overwhelmingly passing an immigration restriction bill biased toward immigration from Northwestern Europe, the FCC resolved that

the assumption of inherent racial superiority by dominant groups around the world is neither supported by science nor justified by ethics. The effort to adjust race relations on that basis and by the use of force is a denial of Christian principles of the inherent superiority of ethical values and the supreme worth of personality. As it applies to the white and Negro people in America it is a philosophy that leads only to suffering and despair. (p. 124)

The FCC used universalist passages from the New Testament rather than passages reflecting Jewish ethnic interests from the Old Testament. This was an elite point of view, and there was a major gap with popular attitudes. The 1920s saw the Protestant masses devoted to immigration restriction and fearful of Communism and other forms of political radicalism associated with immigrants, with many sympathetic to the Ku Klux Klan. Despite these popular sentiments, the Protestant media and ministers in the North and the South attacked the KKK throughout the 1920s. Some liberal ministers were forced to leave their congregations because of popular attitudes.

This elite established itself at the highest levels of the culture well before the final fall of Anglo-America: “From 1918 to 1955, the concept of national identity held by Anglo-Protestant university administrators, intellectuals, federal bureaucrats and the federal executive underwent a shift from a WASP conception to a more pluralist construct” (p. 130). This elite attitude embraced pluralism rather than assimilation.

But Liberal Progressivism was not characteristic of the great mass of American Whites: Liberal Progressives “soon found themselves marginal not only to American society, but to the Progressive mainstream as well” (p. 105). During the 1920s there was a rise of fundamentalist, non-elite Protestantism typified by figures like Billy Sunday, and Carl McIntire in opposition to the liberal elite establishment. The masses of Protestants, even in liberal denominations, did not buy into the cosmopolitanism of the elites. The FCC and the religious media opposed the Reed-Johnson act of 1924—a position which was very much a minority point of view. During the 1930s and the early stages of WWII, the only successful attempt to get Protestants to respond positively to refugees was when they were British. Jewish refugees were harder to place and the response was not enthusiastic (p. 137). The FCC had no success in lobbying for the Wagner-Rogers Bill that called for 20,000 German Jewish children to be admitted outside the quotas.

The FCC entered the mainstream when it condemned communism after WWII. But the leadership of the FCC (now called the NCC) remained well to the left of its constituents throughout. A study in the late 1960s showed that 33% of laity advocated civil rights activism versus 64% of clergy; 89% of laity felt Black problems were their own fault, versus 35% of clergy. 42% of laity backed the national origins provisions versus only 23% of clergy. Kaufmann says that the elite had little effect on the attitudes of the laity.

The Liberal Progressives and ecumenical Protestants were an elite of university-educated people who self-consciously thought of themselves as a “better element” — that is, they had a sense of moral superiority. But Kaufmann acknowledges that this “genteel Liberal Progressive vision was limited” (p. 144) and by itself probably would not have resulted in profound cultural change. In general, the liberal elite among the religions moved in step with their secular liberal brethren. That is, they followed secular trends rather than led the trends, and as a result they are ultimately of little importance for understanding the fall of Anglo-Saxon America.

Academic Cultural Determinism and Anti-Darwinism. In academic history in the late 19th century, Frederick Jackson Turner thought of America as a melting pot in which the frontier environment fused immigrants into an American race. The new race would not be Anglo-Saxon or English but distinctively American. Turner was therefore a Lamarckian — a believer in the idea that acquired traits could be inherited: The American frontier environment shaped the characteristics of the new race which were then passed down as genetic traits.

Nevertheless, Turner was not sympathetic to the new immigrants. “Evidently, Turner had merely emphasized one part of his inherited American ethnic mythology (frontier, liberty, agrarianism) without jettisoning the other symbols (Protestantism, Nordic whiteness)” (p. 52). But, as Kaufmann, notes, it was a short step from Turner’s ideas to even more radical forms of liberal cosmopolitanism. His general perspective was assimilationist — distrust of new immigrants combined with hope that they would become culturally assimilated to Anglo-Saxon culture and a common racial identity.

In the  20th century, Franz Boas and his students dominated the American Anthropology Association and had a wide influence in other academic disciplines. Boasian anthropology is the premier cultural determinism theory of the 20th century and may be considered a Jewish intellectual movement. Kaufmann almost completely ignores Boas’s influence, but, as discussed below, the Boasians were critical to the demise of Darwinism in the social sciences and the demise of Darwinism was a critical linchpin in underlying any viable intellectual basis for Anglo-Saxon ethnic defense. As discussed below, without a Darwinian theory, the way was open to the erection of a culture in which the intellectual establishment would view the eclipse of Anglo-America as a moral imperative.

The Secular Left. Kaufmann credits two Jews, Felix Adler (1851–1933) and Israel Zangwill (1864–1926), with pushing the 19th-century American universalist tendencies to the point of completely rejecting ethnicity altogether. Adler founded the New York Society for Ethical Culture in 1876 and became president of the Free Religious Association (see above) in 1878. Kaufmann quotes Adler as advocating the dissolution of Judaism via assimilation and eventually withering away: “Individual members of the Jewish race [will] look about them and perceive that there is as great and perhaps greater liberty in religion beyond the pale of their race and will lose their peculiar idiosyncrasies, and their distinctiveness will fade. And eventually, the Jewish race will die” (p. 92). However, Adler believed that Jews should only “universalize themselves out of existence when the task [of ethnic dissolution of non-Jews] was complete” (p. 92). Indeed, Adler declared that “So long as there shall be a reason of existence for Judaism, so long the individual Jews will keep apart and will do well to do so” (p. 92).

According to Adler, then, the “reason for existence” of Judaism was to evangelize his new universalist religion of ethical culture until the whole world was converted. Kaufmann observes that under Adler’s influence “Anglo-Protestant thinkers would call for [Anglo-Protestantism’s] termination as forthrightly as Adler did for the Jews” (p. 92). In fact the Anglos applied Adler’s doctrine more thoroughly than he advocated for his own ethnic group.

Indeed, Adler’s ideas are remarkably congruent with the ideas of prominent Reform Judaism rabbis of the period. Kaufmann Kohler (1843–1926) is an important example of the Reform tendency (also seen, e.g., in Kohler’s mentor, David Einhorn (1809–1879), and Samuel Hirsch (1815–1889 ) to assert that Jewish ethics is universalistic while at the same time maintaining that Israel must remain separate while presenting a moral beacon to the rest of humanity — a beacon of universalism and ethnic dissolution of non-Jews. As I note inSeparation and Its Discontents (Ch. 7), “one cannot underestimate the importance of the fact that the central pose of post-Enlightenment Jewish intellectuals is a sense that Judaism represents a moral beacon to the rest of humanity.”

This suggests that Adler retained a Jewish identity.  Adler was married to a Jewish woman and maintained Jewish associates — for example, a close friendship with Louis Brandeis. Brandeis, who was an important Zionist activist of the period, was married to a sister of Adler’s wife. But Adler “left Judaism for a more rigorous, universalist and humanist non-theistic ministry that was combined with progressive social action.”

Adler was thus the prototype of the 20th-century secular, leftist Jewish political activist: opposing Anglo-Saxon ethnic hegemony and making alliances with non-Jews with similar political sympathies.

My review of Jewish leftists shows that they typically retained a strong sense of Jewish identification — often not explicitly and not religiously, but rather in their friends, associates, spouses and attitudes toward Jewish issues, especially anti-Semitism. Many Jewish leftists who denied having Jewish identities found that they had a profound commitment to Judaism with the rise of National Socialism in Germany and to Israel during the Six-Day War of 1967. In general, Jewish identification of non-religious Jews is complex, with Jewish identity more likely to surface during perceived threats to Jews.

Israel Zangwill, the other Jewish advocate of ethnic dissolution highlighted by Kaufmann, had a strong Jewish identity. Despite marrying a non-Jew and advocating the dissolution of all ethnic groups, Zangwill was a prominent advocate of a Jewish homeland and was active in Jewish politics throughout his life.

Indeed, Zangwill was well aware that Anglo-Saxon ideals of individualism and universalism could be used in the battle against immigration restriction. During the debate on the 1924 immigration law, the House Majority Report emphasized the Jewish role in defining the intellectual battle in terms of Nordic superiority and “American ideals” rather than in the terms of an ethnic status quo actually favored by the committee:

The cry of discrimination is, the committee believes, manufactured and built up by special representatives of racial groups, aided by aliens actually living abroad. Members of the committee have taken notice of a report in the Jewish Tribune (New York) February 8, 1924, of a farewell dinner to Mr. Israel Zangwill which says:

Mr. Zangwill spoke chiefly on the immigration question, declaring that if Jews persisted in a strenuous opposition to the restricted immigration there would be no restriction. “If you create enough fuss against this Nordic nonsense,” he said, “you will defeat this legislation. You must make a fight against this bill; tell them they are destroying American ideals. Most fortifications are of cardboard, and if you press against them, they give way.”

Although Kaufmann represents Zangwill as advocating the melting together of all racial groups, the reality is a bit more subtle. Zangwill’s views on Jewish-gentile intermarriage were ambiguous at best and he detested Christian proselytism to Jews. Zangwill was an ardent Zionist and an admirer of his father’s religious orthodoxy as a model for the preservation of Judaism. He believed Jews were a morally superior race whose moral vision had shaped Christian and Muslim societies and would eventually shape the world, although Christianity remained morally inferior to Judaism. Jews would retain their racial purity if they continued to practice their religion: “So long as Judaism flourishes among Jews there is no need to talk of safeguarding race or nationality; both are automatically preserved by the religion” (Zangwill, quoted in Israel Zangwill, by Joseph Leftowich, 1957, 161).

Despite the fact that the country as a whole had moved toward ethnic defense, often with an explicitly Darwinian rationale, Adler was part of a network of leftists who worked to undermine the cultural and ethnic homogeneity of the US. An important node in this network was the Settlement House movement of the late 19th century–early 20th century. The settlements were an Anglo-Saxon undertaking that exhibited a noblesse oblige still apparent in some White leftist circles today. They were “residences occupied by upper-middle-class ‘workers’ whose profile was that of an idealistic Anglo-Saxon, university-educated young suburbanite (male or female) in his or her mid-twenties” (p. 96). The movement explicitly rejected the idea that immigrants ought to give up their culture and assimilate to America: “To put the immigrants (as individuals) on an equal symbolic footing with the natives, a concept of the nation was required that would not violate the human dignity of the immigrants by denigrating their culture” (p. 97). Cultural pluralism was encouraged: “The nation would be implored to shed its Anglo-Saxon ethnic core and develop a culture of cosmopolitan humanism, a harbinger of impending global solidarity” (pp. 97–98).

The leader of the Settlement House movement, Jane Addams, advocated that America shed all allegiance to an Anglo-Saxon identity. Addams came from a liberal Quaker background — another liberal strand of American Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture, like the Puritans stemming from a distinctive British sub-culture. In general, the Quakers have been less influential than the Puritans, but their attitudes have been even more consistently liberal than the Puritan-descended intellectuals who became a dominant intellectual liberal elite in the 19th century. For example, John Woolman, the “Quintessential Quaker,” was an 18th-century figure who opposed slavery, lived humbly, and, most tellingly for the concept of ethnic defense, felt guilty about preferring his own children to children on the other side of the world.

A connection between Jane Addams and the Puritan intellectual tradition was that Harvard philosopher William James influenced Addams and approved her ideas. James was a member of Felix Adler’s Ethical Culture society— a group that Kaufmann terms “the fount of Jewish cosmopolitanism” (p. 101), and his student was Horace Kallen, the premier theorist of a multicultural America—and an ardent Zionist. William James was a moral universalist: “Moral progress is a value that outweighed group survival,” a point of view that “reaffirmed Felix Adler’s cardinal dictum that particular ethnic groups had a duty to sacrifice their existence for the progress of humankind. … The dominant Anglo-Saxon group had no case for its preservation but instead needed to devote itself to bring about the new cosmopolitan humanity” (p. 102). This was a rarified phenomenon of a small but elite minority — even many settlement workers believed in an Anglo-Saxon America and favored immigration restriction.

Randolph Bourne’s Atlantic Monthly article (1916) is a classic statement of a multicultural ideal for America. Bourne (who, as Kaufmann notes, was a disciple of Horace Kallen; see also here) acknowledged the concern that different nationalities hadn’t blended, but he advocated that America become the first “international nation” — a “cosmopolitan federation of national colonies.”  All other ethnic groups would be allowed to retain their identity and cohesion. It is only the Anglo-Saxon that is implored to be cosmopolitan. In particular, Bourne wrote that “it is not the Jew who sticks proudly to the faith of his fathers and boasts of that venerable culture of his who is dangerous to America, but the Jew who has lost the Jewish fire and become a mere elementary, grasping animal.”

People like Bourne, H. L. Mencken, and Sinclair Lewis had a strong sense of intellectual elitism and rebellion against Protestant, small-town America. A character in Sinclair Lewis’s Main Street complains that the townspeople have a “standardized background … scornful of the  living. … A savourless people, gulping tasteless food … and viewing themselves as the greatest race in the world” (p. 158). The character was mildly excited by Scandinavian immigrants but deplored the fact that they were absorbed without a trace into the mainstream Protestant culture of America.

These attitudes could also be found among Jewish intellectuals. Walter Lippmann called America “a nation of villagers” (p. 156)—a harbinger of the hostility of Hollywood to small-town America discussed below. 

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The Period of Ethnic Defense: 1880–1965

We have seen that the view that America was the product of Anglo-Saxon ethnicity coincided with optimistic ideas among elite liberal intellectuals about an Anglo-Saxon future. Towards the end of the 19th century, however, as America was coming to grips with large-scale immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, such optimistic views of an Anglo-Saxon future were more and more difficult to defend, especially because a large number of the immigrants were (correctly) seen as politically radical and inassimilable. The decades leading up to the passage of the 1924 immigration law were a period of ethnic defense. Optimistic, liberal views on immigration persisted among a small group of intellectuals, but they were politically powerless.  And among many intellectuals, Darwinism rather than Lamarckism won the day.

The result was an effective alliance between the Boston, Puritan-descended intellectual elite and rural Whites in an effort to prevent being overwhelmed by this threat. “Whenever the northeastern ‘WASP’ elite make common cause with their less prestigious but more numerous provincial kin, Anglo-Protestant ethnic nationalism revives” (p. 26).

In 1885 a Congregationalist minister noted that “Political optimism is one of the vices of the America people…. We deem ourselves a chosen people, and incline to the belief that the Almighty stands pledged to our prosperity. Until within a few years probably not one in a hundred of our population has ever questioned the security of our future. Such optimism is as senseless as pessimism is faithless” (pp. 68–69). Optimistic, laissez-faire attitudes ended, and Protestant thinkers started to take labor’s side rather than capital’s because of a felt need for social cohesion. By the 1890’s the need for immigration restriction was “universally accepted” (p. 71) among Baptists, and similar trends were apparent in other Protestant sects, even including the elite and liberal-tending Congregationalists. True to their universalist intentions, Protestants did not oppose immigration until they realized that the new immigrants were not susceptible to conversion.

Kaufmann notes that business interests remained opposed to immigration restriction, but he fails to mention the very strong role that Jewish organizations played in delaying immigration restriction until the 1920s—long after popular opinion advocated restriction. For example, writing in 1914, the sociologist Edward A. Ross believed that liberal immigration policy was exclusively a Jewish issue:

Although theirs is but a seventh of our net immigration, they led the fight on the Immigration Commission’s bill. The power of the million Jews in the Metropolis lined up the Congressional delegation from New York in solid opposition to the literacy test. The systematic campaign in newspapers and magazines to break down all arguments for restriction and to calm nativist fears is waged by and for one race. Hebrew money is behind the National Liberal Immigration League and its numerous publications. From the paper before the commercial body or the scientific association to the heavy treatise produced with the aid of the Baron de Hirsch Fund, the literature that proves the blessings of immigration to all classes in America emanates from subtle Hebrew brains. (E. A. Ross, The Old World and the New: The Significance of Past and Present Immigration to the American People. 1914, 144–145)

Kaufmann attributes the rise in restrictionist sentiment to Social Gospel concerns among religious people: The Social Gospel movement “galvanized the process of ethnic closure by concentrating Protestant minds on this-worldly social factors such as the rise of the industrial city, capital-labor conflict and the need for legislation — forces they had traditionally been loathe to consider” (p. 81). But he also attributes it to the realization that the new immigrants would not convert to Protestantism and to the rise of race theories, although he doesn’t really discuss the latter.

The lack of emphasis on race theories is a major omission. One of the most important trends beginning around 1900 was the rise of Darwinian racial theories. As I noted elsewhere:

Christianity was a deeply embedded aspect of the culture of the Northern Europeans, but it played a remarkably small role in the battles with the emerging Jewish elite.  Far more important for framing these battles were Darwinian theories of race.  The early part of the 20th century was the high water mark of Darwinism in the social sciences.  It was common at that time to think that there were important differences between the races — that races differed in intelligence and in moral qualities.  Not only did races differ, but they were in competition with each other for supremacy.  Schooled in the theories of Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, Henry Pratt Fairchild, William Ripley, Gustav Le Bon, Charles Davenport, and William McDougall, this generation of U.S. military officers [and other American elites] viewed themselves as members of a particular race and believed that racial homogeneity was the sine qua non of every stable nation state.  They regarded their racial group as uniquely talented and possessed of a high moral sense.

But, more importantly, whatever the talents and vulnerabilities of their race, they held it in the highest importance to retain control over the lands they had inherited as a result of the exploits of their ancestors who had conquered the continent and tamed the wilderness.  And despite the power that their race held at the present, there was dark foreboding about the future, reflected in the titles of some of the classic works of the period: Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race and Stoddard’s The Rising Tide of Color Against White World Supremacy and The Revolt Against Civilization: The Menace of the Under‑Man.

Bluebloods like Henry Cabot Lodge and Madison Grant who descended from the Puritans were extolling the virtues of Northern Europeans and funding the movement to end immigration — a battle that ended with the ethnically defensive immigration law of 1924. A. Lawrence Lowell, President of Harvard, Vice President of the Immigration Restriction League, and descendant of Puritans opposed the nomination of Louis Brandeis as a Supreme Court Justice because of Brandeis’ ardent Zionism, supported quotas on Jewish students (15%), supported racial segregation, and opposed homosexuality.

The prominence of Darwinian theories of race was not confined to the US but was dominant among intellectuals in Europe, including Benjamin Disraeli,Arthur de GobineauHouston Stewart ChamberlainGustave Le Bon, and a large number of Jewish racialist theorists mostly associated with Zionism (seeSeparation and Its DiscontentsCh. 5).

Kaufmann’s lack of discussion of the eclipse of racial Darwinism is a major omission because the defeat of racial Darwinism was a major thrust of Jewish intellectual and political movements, particularly Boasian anthropology:

The defeat of the Darwinians “had not happened without considerable exhortation of ‘every mother’s son’ standing for the ‘Right.’ Nor had it been accomplished without some rather strong pressure applied both to staunch friends and to the ‘weaker brethren’—often by the sheer force of Boas’s personality” (Stocking 1968, 286).

By 1915 the Boasians controlled the American Anthropological Association and held a two-thirds majority on its Executive Board. By 1926 every major department of anthropology was headed by Boas’s students, the majority of whom were Jewish.

As John Higham noted, by the time of the final victory in 1965, which removed national origins and racial ancestry from immigration policy and opened up immigration to all human groups, the Boasian perspective of cultural determinism and anti-biologism had become standard academic wisdom. The result was that “it became intellectually fashionable to discount the very existence of persistent ethnic differences. The whole reaction deprived popular race feelings of a powerful ideological weapon.”

As indicated in the following section, the demise of Darwinism had major implications because it removed the only intellectually viable source of opposition to cosmopolitan ideology and a cultural pluralist model of America. In the absence of an intellectually respectable defense, ethnic defense was left to conservative religion and the popular attitudes of the less educated. These were no match for the cosmopolitan intellectuals who quickly became ensconced in all the elite institutions of the US—especially the media and the academic world.

The Rise of Jewish Influence

In the 1930s the secular tradition of the American left was energized by Jewish radicalism centered around Partisan ReviewThe Nation, and the New Republic. The crux of the issue is the relative weight of Anglo-Saxon and Jewish influence in this movement. Kaufmann claims that the Anglo-Saxon and Jewish influences were equal and influenced each other in dialectical fashion. In making this claim, Kaufmann relies on intellectual historian David Hollinger in his 1985 book In the American Province: “In David Hollinger’s estimation, these new intellectuals were formed from an equal fusion of Jewish and Anglo-Saxon radicalism and should be considered a united community, if not a surrogate ethnie. Nor was there asymmetry of influence: the two groups of ethnic exiles influenced each other in dialectical fashion,” citing (Hollinger 1985, 58, 63; emphasis in Kaufmann).

This view acknowledges Jewish influence but finds an equal influence coming from Anglo-Saxons. I believe that such an interpretation is inadequate for the following reasons:

1. Interpreting the New York Intellectuals as a Jewish movement. In a later work, Science, Jews, and Secular Culture, Hollinger (1996, 160) places more emphasis on Jewish influence, drawing attention to “a secular, increasingly Jewish, decidedly left-of-center intelligentsia based largely but not exclusively in the disciplinary communities of philosophy and the social sciences.” Rather than focusing on the suicide of White Protestants, Hollinger (1996, 4) notes “the transformation of the ethnoreligious demography of American academic life by Jews” in the period from the 1930s to the 1960s, as well as the Jewish influence on trends toward the secularization of American society and in advancing an ideal of cosmopolitanism (p. 11). Kaufmann at several points notes the importance of John Dewey as a White Protestant leftist critic of American culture. However, Hollinger notes the role of Jewish intellectuals in magnifying the influence of people like Dewey: “If lapsed Congregationalists like Dewey did not need immigrants to inspire them to press against the boundaries of even the most liberal of Protestant sensibilities, Dewey’s kind were resoundingly encouraged in that direction by the Jewish intellectuals they encountered in urban academic and literary communities” (Hollinger 1996, 24).

Other authors, including me, have interpreted the New York Intellectuals as a Jewish movement. Cooney notes “a continuity of perspective in the work of the New York Intellectuals running through the 1930s and 1940s. . . . [T]he New York Intellectuals embraced cosmopolitan values. . . . [T]heir loyalty to those values was intensified by their consciousness of being Jewish, and [that] consciousness helped to make the Partisan Review variant of cosmopolitanism a discrete intellectual position” (p. 245). Michael Wreszin (1994, 33) refers to Dwight Macdonald, another Trotskyist contributor to Partisan Review, as “a distinguished goy among the Partisanskies.” See also here.

2. Jewish Identification among the New York Intellectuals. It is certainly true that non-Jewish members of the New York Intellectuals had no sense of ethnic identity. However, Kaufmann implicitly interprets the New York Intellectuals as deracinated cosmopolitans and this is not the case. In Chapter 6 of The Culture of Critique I show that the Jewish members of the New York Intellectuals typically had a strong Jewish identity. For example, Clement Greenberg, the prominent art critic, took a leadership role in combating the last vestiges of anti-Semitism in the literary world during the 1940s. He stated, “I believe that a quality of Jewishness is present in every word I write, as it is in almost every word of every other contemporary American Jewish writer.” Philosopher Sidney Hook— who was a leader among the New York Intellectuals — had a strong Jewish identification; he was a Zionist, a strong supporter of Israel, and an advocate of Jewish education for Jewish children — and he was a strong advocate of the view that the principles of democracy required ethnic and cultural diversity.

Hollinger notes that Jewish identification of the New York Intellectuals became apparent after WWII. From the beginning, the New York Intellectuals were deeply concerned about anti-Semitism, and, as E. S. Shapiro notes (Judaism, 38, 1989), the fact that the “supposedly ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectuals should concern themselves with such a parochial matter as Jewish identity reveals the hold which Jewishness has had on even the most acculturated” (p. 286, 292). Shapiro shows quite clearly that New York Intellectuals such as Alfred Kazin, Irving Howe, Sidney Hook, and Philip Rahv had strong Jewish identifications — an analysis that accords with mine.

Indeed, the origins of the New York Intellectuals lie with Trotskyism, which, asSydney Hook noted, was often seen by outsiders as a Jewish group to the point that non-Jewish Stalinists used anti-Jewish arguments against them. (As I noted elsewhere (see also here), there is a strong pattern in which Jewish leftists idolized other Jewish leftists, especially Trotsky and Rosa Luxembourg. In my view, this is an aspect of the ethnic nexus of the Jewish left.) This suggests that even at its origins in the 1930s, the nascent New York Intellectuals had a subtle, perhaps self-deceptive Jewish identity of the sort not at all uncommonamong Jewish leftists generally. And the final resting place of many New York Intellectuals was neoconservatism — an attachment that was motivated by attachment to Israel and concern about the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union.

Moreover, New York Intellectuals, such as future neocon Norman Podhoretz, had a life-long antipathy toward White Anglo-Saxon Protestants related to their Jewish identity. Like their radical cousins, Jacob Heilbrunn points out that they sought

to overturn the old order in America. . . . After all, no matter how hard they worked, there were still quotas at the Ivy League universities. Then there were the fancy clubs, the legal and financial firms that saw Jews as interlopers who would soil their proud escutcheons and were to be kept at bay. Smarting with unsurpassed social resentment, the young Jews viewed themselves as liberators, proclaiming a new faith.” (p. 28)

Heilbrunn mentions “the snobbery of the Columbia English department, where Jews were seen as cultural interlopers. This attitude, which also prevailed on Wall Street and at the State Department, produced a lifelong antipathy toward the patrician class among the neocons and prompted them to create their own parallel establishment” (p. 73). The result, as Norman Podhoretz phrased it, was to proclaim a war against the “WASP patriciate” (p. 83). It was a war that was motivated by their Jewish identity.

3. Jewish Intellectual Movements that Influenced the New York Intellectuals. Kaufmann fails to acknowledge that the major influences on the New York Intellectuals were other Jewish intellectual movements — in particular psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School. Kaufmann does note that there was a flight of intellectuals to New York from Germany in the 1930s, but fails to note that many of the most influential refugees from National Socialism were Jews and that this group gave rise to the Frankfurt School and its landmark work, The Authoritarian Personality.

The elitist, anti-populist attitudes of the Frankfurt School paralleled the attitudes of the New York Intellectuals and likely influenced them; indeed some of the New York Intellectuals are also associated with the Frankfurt School (see Ch. 5 ofCofC). Common themes in this body of writing are hostility to American populism, the need for leadership by an elite of intellectuals, and the belief that concern by Whites about ethnic displacement and the rise of the power of ethnic minorities is irrational and indicative of psychiatric disorder.

This point should be emphasized. The New York Intellectuals and the Frankfurt School developed a widely disseminated theory, based on psychoanalysis (itself a Jewish intellectual movement [see Ch. 4 of CofC]), in which concern for ethnic displacement and the rise of minority power were indications of psychopathology— a result of the ease with which psychoanalysis could be used to rationalize political goals. Although this theory lacked empirical support and would have been viewed as ridiculous had Darwinism prevailed in the social sciences, the displacement of Whites had developed an intellectually respectable and thus powerful theoretical rationale.

Although these intellectuals began their careers as Marxists, they framed their ideas in language that was more acceptable to an American audience and often appealed to American ideals of democracy and freedom. For example,  Sidney Hook argued that democracy required multiculturalism. An influential paradigm of this approach is The Authoritarian Personality, a product of the Frankfurt School that was funded by the AJCommittee — and the subject of Chapter 5 of The Culture of Critique.

The Frankfurt School advocated radical individualism not because of their allegiance to the Enlightenment, but as a useful tool for ending anti-Semitism and preventing mass movements of the right. As I noted of Theodore Adorno, the lead author of The Authoritarian Personality, “The former communist had become an advocate of radical individualism.” The epitome of psychological health for the authors of The Authoritarian Personality is the individualist who is completely detached from all ingroups, including his or her family. They have a strong sense of personal autonomy and independence.

The Authoritarian Personality influenced a number of influential Jewish sociologists and historians associated with the New York Intellectuals either centrally (Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Seymour Martin Lipset, David Riesman, and Edward A. Shils) or peripherally (Richard Hofstadter, Oscar Handlin). All of these writers were professors at prestigious academic institutions (Harvard, Columbia, University of California-Berkeley, University of Chicago). Several of these academics, notably Oscar Handlin, wrote about the desirability of ending the national origins provision of US immigration law.

4. The Role of the Organized Jewish Community. Jewish organizations were involved in funding research in the social sciences (particularly social psychology, and there developed a core of predominantly Jewish academic activists associated with the New York Intellectuals who worked closely with Jewish organizations. For example, the American Jewish Committee financed theAuthoritarian Personality project and the research of Franz Boas. It also published Commentary, a flagship journal of the New York Intellectuals. The ADL funded the Patterns of American Prejudice Series that included books written by New York Intellectuals and Jewish activists such as Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab.

There was also smooth congruence between the New York Intellectuals and the organized Jewish community in their support for ending the Western European bias of US immigration policy throughout the entire period leading up to the 1965 law. The organized Jewish community was the most important force in enacting the 1965 law which changed the ethnic balance of the country, ensuring that Whites will be a minority in the US well before 2050. In historical perspective, the 1965 law will prove to be the biggest single factor in the decline of Anglo-America.

Stuart Svonkin shows that cultural pluralism was a hallmark of the intergroup relations movement that was spearheaded by the organized Jewish community following World War II. The Boasian ideology that there were no racial differences as well as the Boasian ideology of cultural relativism and the importance of preserving and respecting cultural differences deriving from Horace Kallen were important ingredients of educational programs sponsored by these Jewish activist organizations and widely distributed throughout the American educational system.

By the early 1960s an ADL official estimated that one-third of America’s teachers had received ADL educational material based on these ideas. The ADL was also intimately involved in staffing, developing materials, and providing financial assistance for workshops for teachers and school administrators, often with involvement of activist social scientists from the academic world—an association that undoubtedly added to the scientific credibility of these exercises.

Finally, the organized Jewish community was pivotal in advancing the cause of civil rights — another pillar of the cosmopolitan revolution. Jews contributed from two thirds to three quarters of the money for civil rights groups during the 1960s. Jewish groups, particularly the American Jewish Congress, played a leading role in drafting civil rights legislation and pursuing legal challenges related to civil rights issues mainly benefiting Blacks. David Levering-Lewis notes that “Jewish support, legal and monetary, afforded the civil rights movement a string of legal victories. . . . There is little exaggeration in an American Jewish Congress lawyer’s claim that ‘many of these laws were actually written in the offices of Jewish agencies by Jewish staff people, introduced by Jewish legislators and pressured into being by Jewish voters.’”

5. Anti-Nationalist Tendencies among Jewish Intellectuals in Other Countries. Yuri Slezkine shows that Jewish intellectuals were associated with anti-nationalist cultural movements throughout Eastern and Central Europe in the period prior to WWII. Thus, their activities in opposition to the traditional culture of America is part of a larger pattern. Indeed, Kaufmann correctly points to the fierce criticism of regionalism by the New York Intellectuals, as represented, for example, by Meyer Schapiro’s critique of Thomas Hart Benton:

The appeal to national sentiment should set us on guard, whatever its source. And when it comes as does Benton’s with his conceited anti-intellectualism, his hatred of the foreign, his emphasis on the strong and masculine, his uncritical and unhistorical elevation of the folk, his antagonism to the cities, his ignorant and violent remarks on radicalism, we have good reason to doubt his professed liberalism.

Thomas Hart Benton: From His “The Sources of Country Music” Series

Thomas Craven, an ally of Benton, returned the favor, describing Alfred Stieglitz, “a prominent village radical” as “a Hoboken Jew without knowledge of, or interest in, the historical American background” (p. 163). Clearly the New York Intellectuals were attacking populism in favor of themselves as an intellectual elite. The New York Intellectuals associated rural America with

nativism, anti-Semitism, nationalism, and fascism as well as with anti-intellectualism and provincialism; the urban was associated antithetically with ethnic and cultural tolerance, with internationalism, and with advanced ideas. . . . The New York Intellectuals simply began with the assumption that the rural—with which they associated much of American tradition and most of the territory beyond New York—had little to contribute to a cosmopolitan culture. . . . By interpreting cultural and political issues through the urban-rural lens, writers could even mask assertions of superiority and expressions of anti-democratic sentiments as the judgments of an objective expertise. (Cooney 1986, 267–268; italics in text)

The last line bears repeating. The New York Intellectuals were engaged in a profoundly anti-democratic enterprise given that they rejected and felt superior to the culture of the majority of Americans. The battle between this urbanized intellectual and political establishment and rural America was joined on a wide range of issues. Particularly important was the issue of immigration. In this case and in the entire range of what became mainstream liberal politics, the New York Intellectuals had the enthusiastic support of all of the mainstream Jewish organizations.

Conclusion: The Fall of the Anglo-Saxons

In the final analysis, I agree with Kaufmann that “What occurred, therefore, was an attempt by the  new avant-garde ‘ethnic’ community to replace the Anglo-Protestants as the culturally dominant group in the nation, an event that was to hasten the WASP-to-Cosmopolitan shift in the nation’s identity” (p. 165; emphasis in text). The only difference is that I would delete the quotation marks around ‘ethnic’: This was not an imaginary or quasi-ethnic community but an actual community that had as its background a cohesive group of intellectuals dominated by people who were not only Jewish ethnically but also identified as Jews and were motivated at the psychological level by typically Jewish fear and loathing of Anglo-America as the culture of an outgroup. And, at the end of the day, this assault on Anglo-America furthered Jewish goals in displacing Anglo-Saxons as a dominant elite.

As Kaufmann notes (p. 165), a critical source of the success of the New York Intellectuals (and, I have argued, the other influential intellectual movements discussed in CofC) was that they were welcomed by elite universities and the media. Kaufmann states that there emerged “The new liberal value consensus, in which artists, writers, academics, and the U.S. government were united, was social democratic, cosmopolitan, and modernist” (p. 166). The New York Intellectuals achieved “cultural hegemony” (p. 166); they had captured America from the top-down, leaving American dominant ethnicity “rudderless. It was now only a question of time before cosmopolitanism would achieve the institutional inertia necessary for it to triumph as a mass phenomenon” (p. 166). As noted above, it would be more accurate to say that American dominant ethnicity was left defenseless because of the triumph of Boasian anthropology and the demise of Darwinism in the social sciences.

The new cosmopolitan culture occupied the high grounds in American society, particularly the mass media and the academic world. Kaufmann cites sociologist Mario Diani: “Social movements tend to succeed to the extent that leaders of a movement possess ‘social capital,’ in the form of social ties to the mass media, corporate cultural intermediaries, and the state intelligentsia—where dominant interpretations of reality are generated.” This was certainly true of the New York Intellectuals and the other Jewish intellectual and political movements discussed in The Culture of Critique.

Kaufmann also stresses the rise of the national media with liberal values, resulting in broad exposure to “the New York/Washington/Hollywood elite” (p. 189), with the result that “increased exposure to social idealism brought on by higher education and, vicariously, by a higher-educated media, socialized a larger proportion of Americans into a liberal worldview” (p. 190). Kaufmann stresses the role of expressive individualism and its promotion by the media as a factor in Anglo-Saxon decline. Expressive individualism is confined to Anglos, while embracing ethnic identification is for other ethnic groups. “In aggregate, this individualism results in a transcendent attitude toward the ‘bland’ WASP background culture but endorses a conservationist posture toward what are perceived to be more interesting ‘foreground’ ethnic cultures” (p. 227). Ethnic identification by non-Whites is welcomed, partly “as a means of increasing the diversity of experience available to the expressive self” (p. 227). A good example is modern art where abstract forms produced by Anglos co-exist with expressions of ethnic assertiveness by non-Whites.

Although he emphasizes the role of the media in the decline of Anglo-Saxon America, Kaufmann fails to discuss the very prominent role of Jews in the media. My review of this topic is here where I note that “ethnic Jews have a very large influence on the media — far larger than any other identifiable group” (See alsohere, p. 53 ff.) .” And I show that the attitudes promoted by Jews in the media are influenced by their Jewish identity and reflect the liberal/left/cosmopolitan attitudes of the wider Jewish community.  Relevant to Kaufmann’s emphasis on expressive individualism as contributing to the decline of Anglo-Saxon America, the difference between the Hollywood elite and both the traditional elites and the general public is clearest on “expressive individualism”—a dimension tapping ideas of sexual liberation (including approval of homosexuality), moral relativism, and a disdain for religious institutions. The movie elite is also more tolerant of unusual or deviant lifestyles and of minority religions and ethnic groups.

Like the New York Intellectuals, the media also has a very negative attitude toward small-town America, as noted by Ben Stein among writers in Hollywood:

The typical Hollywood writer … is of an ethnic background from a large Eastern city — usually from Brooklyn [i.e., they have a Jewish background]. He grew up being taught that people in small towns hated him, were different from him, and were out to get him [i.e., small town people are anti-Semites]. As a result, when he gets the chance, he attacks the small town on television or the movies….

The television shows and movies are not telling it ‘like it is’; instead they are giving us the point of view of a small and extremely powerful section of the American intellectual community — those who write for the mass visual media…. What is happening, as a consequence, is something unusual and remarkable. A national culture is making war upon a way of life that is still powerfully attractive and widely practiced in the same country…. Feelings of affection for small towns run deep in America, and small-town life is treasured by millions of people. But in the mass culture of the country, a hatred for the small town is spewed out on television screens and movie screens every day…. Television and the movies are America’s folk culture, and they have nothing but contempt for the way of life of a very large part of the folk…. People are told that their culture is, at its root, sick, violent, and depraved, and this message gives them little confidence in the future of that culture. It also leads them to feel ashamed of their country and to believe that if their society is in decline, it deserves to be.

The result was that even people in Middle America who fancied themselves intelligent wanted to have attitudes approved by their intellectual superiors. Whereas from 1900–1920 magazines typically featured biographical sketches of military leaders, politicians, and businessmen, thereafter the media promoted “idols of consumption and leisure” (particularly entertainment figures), leading to modernist consumerism. Kaufmann concludes that “the American myth-symbol complex was purged by the nation’s cultural leaders of its white, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant components. With this intellectual backing removed, American dominant ethnicity had only its less educated, traditionalist population to fall back on, a constituency that would decline markedly in the decades ahead” (p. 174).

Kaufmann also highlights the importance of the “education explosion” after WWII in the context of the fact that academics were overwhelmingly liberal, especially in the social sciences and humanities from the 1930s on. This is a key theme also of The Culture of Critique: Boasian anthropology, Marxism, psychoanalysis, the Frankfurt School, and the New York Intellectuals attained the pinnacle of academic respectability and collectively dominated thinking in the social sciences and humanities. As a result, educated people were socialized within these mutually reinforcing frameworks, and academics engaged in status competition within the boundaries defined by these movements.

Public opinion surveys bear out attitude change in a liberal direction correlated to greater education in children than parents. If education level remained the same, there was little change in attitudes (p. 191). Kaufmann notes that in 1965 only 32% favored eliminating the national origins provisions from US immigration law. Since 1965, the public has become more restrictionist and has always favored a decrease in numbers of immigrants. For example, in 1992, 74% of Anglos said there were “too many immigrants” in the US, a percentage similar to other groups. However, college-educated people have more liberal attitudes on immigration, religious toleration, and racial boundary issues. Kaufmann proposes that the national media and education are the prime movers of attitude change as the country became more literate and educated and more middle class as opposed to working class. I agree, but my point is that ultimately these changes would not have happened without Jewish ethnic activism among Jewish intellectuals, Jews in the media, and the organized Jewish community.

Kaufmann charts the decline of Anglo-Saxons and the rise of the Jews in all areas of the American elite, from university departments of Political Science to the federal civil service. “For twenty years, the de-WASP-ing of the ruling elite in America has proceeded at a breathtaking pace.” Kaufmann cites the important study  of Lerner et al. (American Elites, 1996) showing that Jews were highly overrepresented in several areas of the elite, especially in the media and the legal profession. Jews outnumbered Anglo-Saxons 58–21 among elites in television, 48 to 25 among “public interest” elites, and 40 to 21 among legal elites. The same study found that, “in stark contrast to the Jews, WASPs were not overrepresented within the ranks of the national elite.”  Frank Salter has shownthat on issues of concern to the Jewish community (Israel, immigration, ethnic policy in general), Jewish groups have four times the influence of European Americans despite representing approximately 2.5% of the population.

These are very high overrepresentations indeed. White Protestants became underrepresented in corporate elites by the 1980s, and there is a steady decline in political power in Congress. Even people of mixed European heritage tend to identify with the non-Anglo-Saxon side of the family. For example, people of Italian-Scottish descent chose to identify themselves as Italian by a 3-1 ratio. There was also a heavy decline in White associational patterns and social capital, as described by Robert Putnam: Elks, Shriners, Jaycees, Masons all suffered major declines.

Kaufmann is also correct in noting the gap between elite and non-elite White opinion.  Kaufmann emphasizes the class difference among Whites: “We may even surmise a long-run scenario in which lower-status whites retreat to a rural, interior ethnic ‘homeland,’  while upper-status whites pursue their  modern lifestyle orientation in the nation’s more dynamic, increasingly hybridized, white-minority cities” (pp. 262–263).  Kaufmann quotes Michael Lind: “during the years that the political class has been almost unanimously in favor of present or higher levels of legal immigration, an overwhelming majority of Americans of all races have favored restriction, a fact that speaks volumes about the alienation of the American ascendancy from the majority’s interests and  concerns … like free-market globalism, immigration is an issue that pits the affluent top 20 percent against the wage-earning majority below.”

Kaufmann’s theory is that the rise of expressive individualism (which attacks ethnic identification) and cultural egalitarianism (which attacks the idea of dominance) led to the decline of dominant ethnicity. This is compatible with my analysis, but I argue that the New York Intellectuals were a Jewish movement and I argue that two other intellectual movements, psychoanalysis and the Frankfurt School, provided the intellectual basis for the decline of ethnic identity and the movement of expressive individualism to the center stage of American culture. And I argue that another Jewish movement, Boasian anthropology, was the intellectual basis for the decline of legitimacy of cultural and racial/ethnic dominance by Anglo-Saxons. (It is no accident that while Jewish intellectuals were the main force for the decline of Darwinism in America, the racial Zionists have triumphed in Israel where there is an obvious Jewish interest in subscribing to a theory that rationalizes ethnic dominance.)

As noted above, this mutually reinforcing set of ideas was promoted not only by  Jewish intellectuals, but by  Jews with access to the media. And it was lavishly funded by Jewish organizations and promoted by activists targeting public policy (e.g., activism in Congress) and other areas important for shaping public opinion (e.g., the educational system).

Another strong influence on egalitarianism was Marxism — an important component in the ideology of the Frankfurt School (Ch. 5 of CofC) as well as among the Jewish radicals who formed the backbone of political radicalism in the US throughout the 20th century (Ch. 3 of CofC). Indeed, another large gap in Kaufmann’s treatment is the lack of coverage given to the Stalinist Jewish subculture in America from the 1920s through the 1960s. The Stalinist Jewish subculture was much more numerous than the Trotskyite subculture that developed into the New York Intellectuals, and it was quite influential — for example as the stalking horse for Joe McCarthy and as the main protagonist in the cultural battles of the 1950s. (This was at a time when prominent New York Intellectuals, such as Sidney Hook, had become staunch anti-Communists and Hook himself was working in a CIA-funded operation to seize the high ground in the intellectual Cold War.) The large number of Jews among McCarthy’s targets and the response of the organized Jewish community are topics of a recent book on the period. Moreover, the Red Diaper Babies — children of Stalinist Jewish radicals from the 1930s and 1940s — became a very important force in the 1960s campus radicalism (see Ch. 3 of CofC; see also my “Memories of Madison”). Kaufmann’s analysis identifies the 1960s as a critical decade in the decline of Anglo-Saxon America, but he fails to address yet another important Jewish influence on the 1960s counterculture.

Also congruent with the argument in The Culture of Critique, Kaufmann proposes that  once the new value set was institutionalized, it became the focus of status competition within the boundaries set by these movements (p. 247). Kaufmann rejects a rational explanation for Anglo-Saxon decline due to “mass mobilization from below.” However, he does not even consider Jewish influence as a factor, even though he does cite data showing that  Jews are vastly overrepresented in the new post-Anglo-Saxon elite. (Kaufmann does claim that half of the New York Intellectuals were Jewish, but never links their attitudes to their Jewish identity.) Kaufmann also correctly rejects business interests as the moving force for the end of the Western European bias in American immigration policy. The decisive Jewish role in the passage of the 1965 immigration law is the subject of Ch. 7 ofThe Culture of Critique.

Another critical lapse in Kaufmann’s argument is that he never mentions coercion and the penalties that are imposed on people who dissent from the elite consensus. However, Whites who violate these strictures are severely censured — a phenomenon with which I have considerable personal experience. Kaufmann presents the views of elite Whites who are cooperating in the demise of their own people as nothing more than the enlightened opinions of an intellectual and moral elite. But it is far more than that. At least since the 1960s, Whites who depart from the cosmopolitan consensus have been penalized in a wide variety of ways — from lack of access to the mainstream media, to firing from their jobs, to social opprobrium.

Moreover, the same forces that have legitimated and institutionalized the cosmopolitan zeitgeist for Whites are endeavoring to make this revolution permanent by enacting “hate speech” laws prohibiting the expression of ideas that conflict with their version of reality. For example, the organized Jewish community is deeply involved in advocating restrictions on free speech in America and throughout the West. The result is that conservatives are forced to couch their ideas in the universalist language of cosmopolitanism. Kaufmann points out that even measures of White ethnic defense (such as English-only measures and immigration restriction) have had to be couched in the language of civic universalism. Indeed, Kaufmann, who is part Jewish, part Chinese, and part Hispanic ethnically, is entirely on board with the idea that cosmopolitanism will have to resort to social controls on White consciousness to make its victory permanent: “Institutional pressure must be brought to bear on ethnic revival [of Whites], prompting the communitarian impulse to discharge itself along liberal lines” (p. 301).

This shows that although the cosmopolitan revolution took advantage of pre-existing Anglo-Saxon tendencies toward individualism, in the end the institutional structure that is being pursued after attaining power is profoundly anti-individualist. Indeed, the future of the West is likely to be far more like traditional Jewish society (or, ironically, traditional Puritan society) with high levels of social control over behavior and thoughts than America as envisioned by the Founding Fathers.

America remains somewhat of an exception to these trends throughout the West because of the First Amendment. But other Western societies, lacking such formal declarations of rights, have succumbed to a stifling political correctness that essentially legislates the triumph of cosmopolitanism and the suicide of the West. In his classic 1975 essay “Ethnic Diversity, cosmopolitanism, and the emergence of the American liberal intelligentsia,” David Hollinger makes the point that “cosmopolitanism … is difficult to maintain as a prescription for society at large unless one is willing — as most American intellectuals have not been — to attribute to the general population a prodigious capacity for growth” (p. 73). He is quite right, but it’s also clear that Americans will have no choice but to express cosmopolitan attitudes and engage in cosmopolitan behavior, except perhaps in the privacy of a closet in their home.

My alternate view of the 20th century in America is that if a robust Darwinian intellectual elite had remained in place despite the assaults of the Boasians, the Frankfurt School, the Marxists, and the New York Intellectuals, the cosmopolitan revolution never would have occurred and the Anglo-Saxon movement of ethnic defense culminating in the immigration law of 1924 would have succeeded and become institutionalized. The liberal, cosmopolitan Anglo-Saxon tradition would have persisted at the fringes of American society, advocated by those for whom the confining Anglo-Saxon small town culture was an overly confining burden. And, quite possibly, with a more sophisticated biological and evolutionary understanding of human behavior, Anglo-Saxon culture itself would have changed in a direction to be more inclusive of various forms of recurrent, biologically-based non-conformity, such as homosexuality.

But a robust, sophisticated Darwinian culture would have provided a powerful argument for ethnic defense. Critically, such a Darwinian ethnic defense would have emphasized creating a culture in which individualism was seen as a valuable Anglo-Saxon ethnic trait — as was the case during the 18th and 19th centuries. Immigration policy would have been carefully formulated to ensure that immigrants were genetically similar to the founding stock and to ensure the continued dominance of peoples prone to individualism — just as American immigration policy was crafted until 1965.

This ethnic defense would have been energized by the sociobiological revolution of the 1970s and the firm mathematical grounding for the understanding that all peoples have ethnic genetic interests. Instead, in cosmopolitan America, even the sociobiological revolution has been stripped of its most dangerous and powerful ideas. As Frank Salter has shown, the revolution in population genetics of the1970s showed very clearly that people controlling a piece of land have a huge genetic interest in preserving their control. But this finding has been suppressed and misinterpreted by people at the highest levels of the academic hierarchy.

This suppression will continue because cosmopolitanism has a hopelessly shaky intellectual basis. Built on theories that were motivated far more by ethnic interests of the rising elite of Jewish intellectuals than by a respect for scientific truth, cosmopolitanism has no choice but to secure its future by coercion.

And for the Anglo-Saxons and the rest of White America, it is a defeat of cataclysmic proportions.

Kevin MacDonald is a professor of psychology at California State University–Long Beach.  Email him.

Communication: The Terror of the Hyperreal

One of the secret lies of liberal democracy is the dogma of free speech. The word ‘propaganda’ has obtained over the last six decades a nasty flavor; hence the need to use the word ‘communication.’  However, as much as everybody in modern society craves to communicate, traditional community ties, or in-group ties, are more than ever before subject to the process of disintegration. It is worth recalling that etymologically the terms “community” and “communication” are of the same origin. But how can one communicate if community no longer exists?

To provide a make-believe image of absolute freedom of speech, the media and the modern Prince resort to a hyperbolic language filled with hyperreal metaphors and qualifiers. This is especially true regarding the terms ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’. These terms have assumed the emotional role in rallying political allegiance formerly reserved for terms evoking nationhood and patriotism.  Opinion makers in Europe and America are not so much concerned with the content of their language, but rather with the appropriate packaging of the language and its emotional impact on the masses.

For effective communication a modern politician (or the modern Prince?) is required to use images with a cheerful setting and a happy ending scenario. His looks are important too. An aspiring presidential candidate must be concerned more with his dentures than with his deontology. A well-fitting Armani suit and polished Gucci shoes are far more important than his IQ.  The image is essential since it does not encourage reflection, but obliterates all reflection. The hyperreal image on TV screens with all the trappings of wealth, power, and personal appeal is ideal for propagating new political lies and, by extension, for instituting horrendous political censorship.

For a European or American politician who aspires to high office, the ritual of repentance has become de rigueur.

Presidential Candidate John McCain visits Jerusalem’s Yad VaShem Holocaust Memorial

The exception, of course, is President Obama who capitalizes on his Black identity to induce guilt in his audience.

President Obama Speaks at a Slave Depot in Ghana

Not long ago Europeans were proud of their colonial exploits. Not long ago the exclusion of the Other (Blacks, Jews, Arabs) was perceived as a normal thing — typical of human societies from time immemorial. Today the exclusion of the Other is replaced by the hatred of oneself. Ceaseless national-masochistic sermons about Euro-American real or surreal crimes bear witness to a quasi-pathological desire to cleanse oneself of a past that evokes guilt rather than pride.

Public language must be “soft” and didactic — conveying a self-deprecating message and requiring the modern Prince to formulate his statements in the conditional tense — or by using evasive sentences starting with adverbs such as “admittedly,”  “considerably,” “presumably,” etc. No politician wishes to stick out his neck by using affirmative sentences that would clearly enunciate his value judgments or depict his potential foe.  After reading mainstream newspaper editorials, a student of  political semiotics is struck with convoluted locutions such as ‘one could say, ‘one might say,’ ‘one should consider bombing Iran,’ or ‘help democracy become transparent in East Timor.’  Such vague locutions provide a safe retreat for the liberal ruling class, as they signify nothing and everything at the same time.

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Political language must be neutral or neutered; it must reflect the desire for a world of stasis — not of global liberal metastasis. The only exceptions are modern heretics who must endure the most violent epithets. Thus the $PLC, a principal architect and enforcer of modern discourse on race and immigration, likes to use expressions preceded by the noun ‘hate,’ or followed by the adjective ‘extremist’: ‘hate groups’, ‘hate speech’, ‘hate crimes’; ‘White extremists,’ ‘political extremism’, etc. Contemporary politicians and their media watchdogs love to compare absolute Evil to absolute Good, using words that are loaded with emotional significance, such as “fascism” vs. “antiracism”: the horrors of the Auschwitz on the one hand versus the Hollywood-like fantasy of multicultural conviviality.

Nothing new under the sun, as the old Latins used to say. This idea is well captured by the late Christopher Lasch, the best American visionary and the theorist of narcissistic democracy. He noted a long time ago in his book The True and Only Heaven that “Liberals’ obsession with fascism … leads them to see fascist tendencies or ‘proto-fascism’ in all opinions unsympathetic to liberalism.”

As much as Lasch was right he was also wrong. Today he would be accused of “fascist, revisionist tendencies”  by the masters of political discourse — thus giving further credit and credence to the paranoid liberal mind.  Historically, both the fascist and communist temptations did not drop from the moon. They were logical responses to the failures of liberalism — to the “democratic deficit” of the liberal experiment. Therefore one must not rule out the revival of the fascist temptation, albeit in a new garb, as a third option in our late postmodenity: If a good man in a village is constantly and publicly called a crook, he will eventually embody those accusations. White nationalism, which is on the rise in the US and the EU, is the logical response to the chaotic policies of the liberal class and its promotion of all ethnic prides world-wide — except for white Europeans.

In postmodernity, political messages are transmitted by visual images and the sound bite — not the written word. Rėgis Debray, the ex-leftist guerrilla who ascended to high office in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs — and probably the best observer of the perverse nature of liberal democracy, notes that the traditional ‘graphosphere’ has been completely devoured by the “videosphere.” Books and prose are relics; the virtual video message has become omnipresent. It is no accident that a dissident or a violent radical no longer dreams of storming the Prince’s palace, but rather contemplates the seizure of the TV tower.

Postmodern political imagery does not reflect the lack of reality, but rather mirrors the excess of reality. Henceforth any political debate on a TV screen is not designed to hide the truth, but ironically, to hide the absence of all truth. Everywhere the media and the modern Prince simulate fictitious events such as terrorist attacks as if they wish to have them happen, while at the same time they try to prevent them from happening. The bogeymen of the left —”hate groups” and “extremists” — appear to be nowhere near the horizon. Yet, as was the case in the ex-Soviet Union, they must be reinvented over and over again in order to provide legitimacy and solid funding to groups like the $PLC who love to dress up in the  apparel of “tolerance” and “humanity.” Everything is stage-managed as if everything were true.

What we are witnessing today in the West, in all spheres of official political discourse, is a gigantic display of lies — far worse than in the notorious totalitarian despotisms of the 20th century which the postmodern liberal pretends to abhor.

Political Metastasis

In his recent editorial in the quarterly Elėments (summer 2009), under the title “Une époque de basses eaux” — literally translated as  “An epoch of low tide,” or loosely and metaphorically as “Stalemate Times” — Alain de Benoist gives us a bleak picture of the forthcoming darkness:

In the catalogue of the ephemeral and the superficial, images and noise are following one after the other. Their goal is to capture attention and distract, and to make us think about other things, or more precisely, to make us cease to think altogether. The insignificant becomes a general rule. What comes to mind is the world depicted by the Wachowski brothers in the movie, Matrix (1999). In the movie everybody takes for real what is actually inauthentic; everybody is manipulated from the very moment he imagines himself to be free.  Never have people thought to be able to do what they wish, yet never ever have they been subject to so many regulations.  In fact they do not really know what they desire because it is the system that formulates their desires.

The biggest victory of the system is to have persuaded everybody not of its qualities, but of its fatal character. The system does not claim to be perfect; it claims that there are no other alternatives. Hence, if one cannot dream of a better world, then there is nothing that can be done.

High politics follows the same hyperreal lead. There is no longer any need to await disasters or the proclamation of a state of emergency, since they are constantly evoked and artificially provoked —creating thereby the genuine feeling of a state of emergency and impending disasters and setting the stage perfectly for a judicial or police clamp down. The security checks that one must endure at all airports in the West inevitably give the feeling of a creeping state of emergency. Depictions of catastrophic images on fictional television drama shows inevitably influence people’s perceptions of real catastrophic events. The image no longer follows reality; it precedes reality. Modern politics is the show of hyper-reality — as witnessed for the first time during the recent ex-Yugoslav and Iraqi wars, which were getting bloodier and bloodier the more they were shown on TV.

The Books of the Dead

The same applies to modern historiography and to the sudden surge among Third World nations for the resurrection and beatification of their dead. The more dead they manage to hold up as icons of Western evil the better able they are to affirm their own ethnic identity. One of the best theoreticians of political hyper-reality, the late Jean Baudrillard, describes Auschwitz “not as a site of annihilation, but the site of dissuasion” (The Evil Demons of Images, 1988, p. 24).  It is no longer a site of suffering; it is a site of deterrence and didactics, designed to be the ultimate symbol of postmodern Western culture as psychotherapy for Europeans.

The Jewish narrative regarding the “singular” and “unique” historical event of the Holocaust has already given birth to similar “singular” and “unique” narratives among other peoples, notably Armenians and (ironically) the Palestinians, with dozens more nations waiting in the wings.

Diversity obliges. Soon our postmodernity will be forced to open up post-graduate studies on political necrology or (more precisely) political necrophilia, as more and more groups clamor for their forgotten real or hyperreal dead. However, political necrophilia carries its own dangers for groups that see themselves solely through the lens of victimhood. In attempting to avoid the repetition of disaster, the Jewish narrative of “never again” does exactly the opposite: By focusing solely on a decontextualized event of persecution, it runs the risk of failing to rationally comprehend Jewish history — with unforeseen consequences.

Almost thirty years ago, Baudrillard wrote memorable words to illustrate the metastasis of liberal democracy:

The energy of the public sphere, the energy that creates social myths and dogmas is gradually disappearing. The social arena turns obese and monstrous. It grows like a mammal and glandular corpse. Once it was illustrated by its heroes but today it refers to its handicapped, its weirdos, its  degenerates, its asocial  persons — and all of this in a gigantic effort of therapeutic  maternity. (Les strategies fatales, 1983) (Fatal Strategies.)

The system puts forward the transparency of evil by parading images of evil in the form of maladaptive individuals. The ruling class and its mediacracy need to display the proof of their power by showing that those who transgress the most basic values of the multicultural zeitgeist are psychologically deranged — literally insane. Proverbial ‘revisionists, ‘bigoted anti-Semites,’ and ‘Nazi pseudo-scholars,’ are cherished demon images of liberal democracy. They need to be constantly put on exhibition in public places — like wayward Puritans of old — in order to lend further credibility to the eroding system.

17th-Century Puritan in the Stocks

Americans and Europeans are constantly put on false alerts by the media about pending terrorist threats. The invocation of terrorism is often fictitious, yet it engages the media machinery in a gigantic show of lies and mendacity. The purpose of the negative imagery is to scare the masses into submission. In a world that encourages narcissism and extreme individualism, one is not only the victim of the image. One becomes the image himself at the price of deforming his own tragic reality.

Tom Sunic www.tomsunic.infohttp://doctorsunic.netfirms.com/) is an author, former political science professor in the USA, translator and former Croat diplomat. He is the author of Homo americanus: Child of the Postmodern Age ( 2007). Email him.

Rastas and the World Bank

Rastafarianism (here’s the Wikipedia version) is not about love and justice, but about rejecting Western culture in favor of international socialism. Rastafarian ideas are useful for elites who see traditional Western culture as an obstacle to their vision of a better world. The following is a history of the movement and how it became a tool of globalism.

Rastifarianism was created by Leonard Percival Howell. The movement is a product of Black supremacist and communist ideas that Howell, a Jamaican, acquired while in New York City.

Leonard Percival Howell

In 1920s New York, communism was fashionable. Major New York banking houses were openly sympathetic to the Bolsheviks in Russia and funded the Revolution and the early years of the USSR. But all was not well in the Party.

Howell was introduced to communism during a crisis in communist thought. The Great War was supposed to precipitate a proletarian revolution which never happened. Intellectuals at the Frankfurt School attributed the failure of their cause amongst the people to brainwashing. These intellectuals though that Western Culture had blinded people to the superiority of international socialism. Therefore, Western Culture had to go.

Communists needed a total rejection of Western values. Traditional ideas of monogamy, sexual restraint and gender became “repression.” The African American community became a target for communist intellectuals, who saw Blacks as likely supporters of property redistribution and ambassadors for sexual license. Black communist representatives like Claude McKay did little to disabuse the Bolsheviks of these notions. To achieve their ends, the Communist Party in New York attacked the Black middle class economically. This was the political climate that Howell entered in 1924.

In New York, Howell befriended George Padmore and later turned to him for financial assistance. Padmore was a Trinidadian involved in COMINTERN — the Bolshevik’s revolution-exporting bureau and head of the Negro Bureau of the Communist International of Labour Unions.

Howell was also influenced by Black nationalist leaders and spiritualists such asMarcus Garvey and Robert Athlyi Rogers. Howell’s Black supremacist influence (and much of the language of Howell’s  tract The Promise Key) comes from the The Royal Parchment of Black Supremacy by Rev. Fitz Balintine Pettersburgh.

When Howell returned to Jamaica he patched together the ideas he collected in New York in order to form the basis of his new religion, which he summarized inThe Promise Key. Every important premise in The Promise Key had been taken from somewhere else. None of Howell’s ideas were new, but they were put together in a way that suited Howell’s personal ambitions.

Howell created a religion that used the weakness of his target group — lower class Blacks — to his advantage. He used the cultural-assault tactics that he learned from his communist teachers in New York.

Howell built a politically cohesive group by encouraging tribalism among his followers. He preached Black supremacy to counter feelings of inferiority among the Black lower class.  Black supremacy is not equality or social justice — it is simple, unrestrained privilege for the Black race. Howell’s teaching was hypocritical but excellent demagoguery. He took religious justification for this by re-interpreting “Israelites” in the Old Testament to mean his followers. He claimed “chosen-ness” for the Blacks.

While part of The Promise Key sets out “cleanliness” laws, most of it is a rant against Western civilization. Howell, like his communist teachers, was attacking the culture that stood in the way of international socialism.

The Promise Key claims that Ethiopians (meaning all Black peoples) have been in a six thousand year struggle against Western civilization. Western culture is the “indomitable, incurable, accursed, deadly disease” that has infected “Abraham Adam Anglo Saxon the White.”

Just like his brethren in New York, Howell attacked the Black middle class in Jamaica. Howell condemns Black people who work alongside White people or don’t reject Western culture. They are “crooks”, “hypocrites” and “Black-White”. He calls people of mixed-race “third-class people” and forbids intermarriage between the races. Howell calls for complete “race enmity.” [All quotations are from The Promise Key.]

Both Howell’s teaching and communism attack traditional morality as taught by the Church.  In The Promise Key, Howell calls the Pope “Satan.” He says that that Christianity is a lie because it is a “smoke screen to keep people in ignorance.”

Howell’s Rastafarianism is materialistic. Like communism, power and wealth are desirable as long as they benefit the man in charge. The Promise Key states that the “Anglo-Saxon King” (of the British Empire) has bowed down to the MessiahHaile Selassie, to whom “all the Kings of the earth (are) surrendering their crowns.” Howell calls Emperor Selassie and his wife “paymasters of the world, Bible owner and money mint,” which he means as praise.

A Rastafarian Image of Haile Selassie

Howell departs from his communist teachers on the subject of racial equality. New York communists attracted followers by promising that everyone could be equally wealthy. Howell’s religion attracted followers by promising privilege. Howell realized that “scapegoat” politics — blaming all Whites for the problems of the Black Diaspora — would be a more effective message than equality. Howell’s hatred of anything Caucasian matches his communist teachers’ hatred for anything bourgeois. 

Howell preached that poverty stems from Europeans, as there will be “gross prosperity as soon as the Anglo Saxon White peoples all die out.” Howell even calls for genocide: “Adam Abraham Anglo-Saxon the leper has no place on this earth if you please.” [Again, all quotations are from The Promise Key.]

Howell chose Haile Selassie, the despotic emperor of the last Black-ruled territory in Africa, to be the Rastafarian messiah-figure. Ironically, Selassie considered himself Semitic, not Black.

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Howell claimed that Selassie would give Black people supremacy in Africa and over all other peoples. The Promise Key says that under Emperor Selassie, White people will “sit in the dust on the ground”; White people will be denied political sovereignty; and that “Adam Abraham-Anglo-Saxon whit[e] people are not entitled to any eternal reward.”

The choice of Haile Selassie was remarkably convenient. The Ethiopian Emperor was very popular among Western intellectual elites and bankers who supported Woodrow Wilson’s plans for a world government under the League of Nations. Selassie’s cachet as a noble African ruler standing up against Mussolini (the fascist who threatened banking interests) was highly attractive. Selassie was paid homage with waves of complimentary press in the Anglophone West. Selassie was not popular in Ethiopia and he was eventually deposed during a military coup in 1974.

Howell taught dis-empowering behavior so that his followers would be more dependent on him, the self-styled “great teacher” or “Gong.” He was an expert at manipulation.  Howell showed his followers an African emperor dressed in all the trappings of a European king and told them Selassie was divine. He used racism to turn people against their neighbors. Howell used the desire for privilege to help build a new type of tyranny: communism. He promoted intoxication (marijuana) as a method to get closer to God. Education beyond Rastafarian teachings was “college filth.” The family was not sacred: He slept with his married and unmarried female followers alike (to the point of his upper-class Jewish wife Tyneth committing suicide).

Howell and His Heirs Enter the Establishment

Leonard Percival Howell went into the drug trade and helped finance the British elite’s puppet government in Jamaica. By 1944, Howell controlled a marijuana plantation where 4500 Rastafari (mostly women and often single mothers) worked for him for room and board. The Gong lived well, chauffeured around in his own limousine. Leonard Percival Howell was not in the business of empowering his people, but exploiting them more perfectly.

Howell became a major supplier of marijuana in Jamaica. The Jamaican drug trade was tolerated for some time, but in 1953 Norman Manleyleader of the opposition party in the colonial Jamaican government, was told by Winston Churchill that he needed to bring an end to the lucrative business. In order to carry out Churchill’s command, Manley called Howell’s collaborator Mortimo Planno.

Mortimo Planno

Mortimer “Mortimo” Planno is more than a gangster. He is the bridge between Howell’s teaching and the popular modern Rasta movement. He is a key figure in the connection between the Rastafarian sect and politically powerful circles in Jamaica and abroad.  Mortimo was reggae star Bob Marley‘s manager/spiritual advisor and is credited with the idea of using commercial music as a vehicle for spreading Howell’s teaching. Mortimo re-fashioned Rastafarianism as a tool of globalism.

Bob Marley: Reggae Star and Promoter of Rastafarianism

Bob Marley (self-styled “Tuff Gong”) trumpeted social change and glorified the Rastafarian lifestyle. Marley’s promoter, Chris Blackwell, is from a wealthy Jamaican family who founded the first synagogue on the island.  Marley, like Howell, rejects traditional Western Culture, but the racist element is toned down. (Which makes the message more palatable to mainstream international socialists.) Marley was consciously marketed for world-wide appeal.

The World Bank loves Bob Marley. In February 2005 a celebration called “Africa Unite” was held to commemorate what would have been Bob Marley’s 60th birthday. The event had venues in Ethiopia and Jamaica, and was organized by the Bob and Rita Marley Foundations, the African Union, the government of Ethiopia, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), UNICEF and The World Bank.

The aim of the celebration was that the “entire world recognize Bob (Marley) as the world’s greatest music icon,” according to event manager Jacqueline Knight-Campbell, who also pushed for Marley to become a national hero in Jamaica and that his birthday be made a national holiday.

video documentary of the celebrations was produced by UNICEF, Tuff Gong Pictures and Louverture Films. It is supposed to showcase Marley’s message of “revolution by any means necessary” but especially “the process of re-education and re-orientation of values and belief systems which would lead to social transformation over time.” The documentary makes special note of Marley’s regime-change activities in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

South Africa and Zimbabwe are the two countries where Howell’s teaching has been most perfectly implemented. Mugabe’s racist government has destroyed the middle class in the name of “ousting White rule.” South Africa’s former president, Thabo Mbeki, refused to recognize Mugabe’s atrocities as a “crisis,” while South Africa is careening towards the same fate.

So why is the World Bank — the public relations organ of the debt system — so in love with Bob Marley?

Marley is an asset to the debt system because his songs defect criticism from its heart. Instead Marley lays the problems of the Diaspora at the feet of “oppressive” Western culture, while pushing communist ideas that have always been supported by financial elites. By hiding the cause of the debt problem, Marley and Planno have done more for oppressors than a boatload of gun shock troops could ever do.

The debt system is possible because corrupt local rulers cooperate with private banking interests to steal from their constituents. The deal is sweetened for both parties by Western governments (who are also heavily indebted) agreeing to make the payments or negotiate refinancing if the local rulers default. The losers are Western and local constituents.

International banks benefit most from the debt system. They make money selling bonds based on debts that the World Bank organizes. This is easy money with little risk of default, thanks to developed-world taxpayers.

You won’t get any of this information from the platitudes of Bob Marley’s songs.

The result of the globalist system is perpetual, crushing debt. The ex-British colonies in Africa and Jamaica are much more heavily in debt now than they were under the British. Jamaica is a typical example: Since the 1960s their economy has grown by a multiple of three, but their debt has increased by a multiple of 1400 (at least!) as of 2005. If corrected for population growth, Jamaican debt has grown seven hundred times faster than their ability to pay.1

The “debt forgiveness” movement is also a boon to international banks. Groups like “Jubilee 2000” have spearheaded debt forgiveness campaigns, resulting in a massive write-off in 2005. As soon as the forgiveness was implemented bank lending to the same debtor countries started to grow again2 By getting Western governments to pay to cancel these debts, “Jubilee 2000” gave the bankers an opportunity to create and sell even more debt-bonds. Thanks, Bono!

Turning racial grievance into a religion is a great way to manipulate people. So is lying. The Rastafarian message which is spread by the international media and the World Bank uses both tools to promote globalism while attacking their strongest enemy: traditional Western Culture.

Planno — now dead — is regarded as a Rasta philosopher by adoring acolytes. Bob Marley is canonized as a symbol of peace and love. It all works in the bankers’ favor: Imagine the entire world as a pot plantation…but never missing a payment.

Elizabeth Whitcombe (email her) is a graduate of MIT in Economics with a concentration in International Economics. She is a financial analyst and free-lance writer living in New York City.

Anger in White America

Sarah Palin emerged in the presidential campaign of 2008 as the candidate of the Republican base — the people the globalist elites in the party pander to every four years so that if everything breaks right, they may have a chance of winning. Palin is the very image of White fertility and small town Americana — all that the globalist Republican elite despises. ‘Despises’ is  much too mild a word for how the Democrats see her.

Palin resigned her position as governor of Alaska, so the media indulged itself with yet another hate-fest. Frank Rich’s op-ed in the New York Times was more interesting than most because he sees the big picture. And he is very happy with what he sees:

[Sarah Palin] is not just the party’s biggest star and most charismatic television performer; she is its only star and charismatic performer. Most important, she stands for a genuine movement: a dwindling white nonurban America that is aflame with grievances and awash in self-pity as the country hurtles into the 21st century and leaves it behind. …

[Nonurban Whites are] a constituency that feels disenfranchised — by the powerful and the well-educated who gamed the housing bubble, by a news media it keeps being told is hateful, by the immigrants who have taken some of their jobs, by the African-American who has ended a white monopoly on the White House. Palin is their born avatar. She puts a happy, sexy face on ugly emotions, and she can solidify her followers’ hold on a G.O.P. that has no leaders with the guts or alternative vision to stand up to them or to her.

My Translation: The elites in the financial sector with the blessings (or at least the naiveté of the political class) created this wonderful housing bubble that created a lot of illusory wealth. The collapse after the bubble burst has cost the US trillions of dollars, has cost millions of people their jobs, and has resulted in a deep recession. Nonurban Whites — the people who support Palin — were so stupid and uneducated that they actually trusted these elites, and now they are paying the price while the folks who got us into this mess are still collecting their bonuses — often with the help of government bailout money. These rubes should have been smart enough to game the system, but they weren’t.

These country bumpkins are also upset because they are losing political power and are being pushed aside by millions of non-White immigrants. They hate the media even though the mainstream media — as personified by Frank Rich — is a fount of wisdom and rationality — immune to the ugly emotions of the losers.

The end game in the long campaign against nonurban Whites is near. Rich writes that “The Palinist ‘real America’ is demographically doomed to keep shrinking.”

And of course that’s the bottom line. Never before in American history has it seemed so obvious that demography is destiny. Whites were 77% of the electorate in 2004, but slipped to 74% in 2008, and the percentage will continue to decline. If Whites are 71% of the electorate in 2012, then the Republicans would have to attract around 63% of Whites to get a majority (assuming Whites continue to represent 90% of the Republican vote). This is quite a bit higher than Bush in 2004 (58%) or McCain in 2008 (55%).

I recently heard Rush Limbaugh say confidently and soothingly to his listeners that politics is cyclical and the Republicans will be back in power soon. But the reality is that they won’t come back without some dramatic changes in voting patterns. And if the dramatic change is an increase in Black or Latino votes — as quite a few influential Republicans advocate, the result certainly won’t be good for nonurban  Whites.

This in turn means that a great many White voters will feel that they are in a permanent position of powerlessness if present trends continue, and that will lead to anger and a sense of political desperation.

Rich’s comments are partially fueled by an article in Politico describing the rage of a lot of ordinary White people — a rage that has led to a surge in conservative media:  “The emotions fueling this media boomlet sometimes border on a barely suppressed rage.” This hostility is driven by “a sense of frustration and anger among the Republican Party’s core conservative base — and a power vacuum at the top of the party that lacks a national leader to set its course.”

Examples:

“I CANT SLEEP SEEING this country being destroyed DAMM IT OVER my dead body i will let this happen/THESE BASTARDS HAVE GOT TO BE STOPPED IMMEDIATELY.”

“Bottomline, do you know of any way we can remove these idiots before this country goes down the crapper? I WILL HELP!!! Should I buy a gun? Should I store produce, etc?”

“Another American revolution will have to be fought — there will be blood.”

Some of the commentary on the Sonia Sotomayor hearings also brought up charges that the real subtext was angry White people — in this case Republican senators:

The GOP senators “were playing to the angry white male voter. Some of the remarks were clearly about saying that ‘you’ can say things that ‘we’ can’t,” said Julian  Zelizer, a professor of history and public affairs at Princeton University.

“These kinds of comments attacking ethnic pride and the benefits of diversity in any institution — which is really what her remark was about — combined with the Ricci case looked like backlash politics, pure and simple.”

Such ugly emotions! Or at least that’s what Rich labels them. For intellectuals like Rich and Zelizer, the value of diversity trumps the legitimate interests of Whites every time. Any protest is “backlash politics” or mindless emoting by angry White males.

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But of course such emotions are absolutely normal for people who are seeing their country taken away from them. The fact that only certain people are allowed to have ethnic pride or a sense of ethnic interests makes no logical sense and clearly tramples on legitimate interests of Whites. Bloody revolutions have been motivated by far less grievance — legitimate and well-founded grievance — than ordinary Whites have right now. Certainly the behavior of the British government prior to the Revolutionary War was far less dispossessive of the colonists than the behavior of the contemporary American elites is to ordinary White Americans.

The fact is that elites in politics, the media, and the financial sector have completely abandoned ordinary White folks in America, and particularly the “nonurban Whites” who are the focus of Rich’s article. The only thing that’s surprising and perhaps depressing is that the main outlet for this anger is to purchase mainstream conservative media, the vast majority of which does little more than redirect this anger into harmless and ineffective sideshows like libertarianism or small government. If it doesn’t talk about stopping and reversing the effects of immigration and developing an explicit sense of White identity and interests, it’s not worth talking about.

The Republicans seem bent on committing suicide rather than abandoning their principled hostility to ethnic identity politics for Whites. But, as Peter Brimelow notes, if that is the policy of the Republican Party, another party must and will be formed that do exactly that.

So how did normal anger about being dispossessed come to be an “ugly” emotion to the point that a third-rate mind like Frank Rich can confidently describe it that way in a prestigious publication like the New York Times? The paper trail can be traced to the Frankfurt School and their allies and publicists among the New York Intellectuals.  These intellectuals developed theories based ultimately on psychoanalysis in which hostility about being displaced by other groups was attributed to all sorts of repressions and anxieties. People who opposed their own displacement were described as irrational and as suffering from psychopathology. (Tell that to the Palestinians.)

And if professors connected to Harvard and the University of Chicago can call such emotions “ugly,” certainly Frank Rich can. It’s all about controlling the moral high ground via control of the most prestigious academic and media institutions. Intellectually insecure Whites, including a great many who are well-educated, will silently nod their heads in agreement and think that they are very moral indeed for having the same attitudes as Frank Rich.

The only difference is that Frank Rich’s attitudes are entirely congruent with his ethnic interests, while the silently nodding, morally uplifted White folks are agreeing with attitudes that are entirely opposed to their ethnic interests.

An interesting feature of the literature produced by the Frankfurt School and the New York Intellectuals is hostility toward lower middle class Whites. Historically, this was motivated by the realization among many Jewish intellectuals that the lower middle class in Germany in the end opted for National Socialism instead of communism at a time when sympathetic views of communism dominated the mainstream among Jewish intellectuals. The behavior of the German lower middle class violates Marxist dogma because Marxists believe that class interest should be stronger than racial allegiances. The response of these intellectuals was to develop theories in which the lower middle class was the root of all evil.

Translated to America, these intellectuals were quite wary of American populism because of its tendency to be responsive to the demands of ordinary Americans rather than elites on issues such as immigration policy. Throughout the 20th century non-urban Whites —”the common people of the South and West,” as John Higham called them — were steadfastly against liberal immigration policies and they remain opposed to such policies today.

This intellectual elite represented by Frank Rich despises these people. As Chrisopher Lasch noted some time ago, from the perspective of these intellectuals, this class

clung to outworn folkways—conventional religiosity, hearth and home, the sentimental cult of motherhood—and obsolete modes of production. It looked back to a mythical golden age in the past. …  Lacking liberal culture, it fell easy prey to all sorts of nostrums and political fads.

Frank Rich is happy because he thinks these people are in irreversible demographic decline brought on by massive non-White immigration. He may be right. But by the looks of things, they are pretty upset about the way things are going, and that is bound to have political repercussions.

Kevin MacDonald is a professor of psychology at California State University–Long Beach. Email him.