Harvey’s Homies: The Weinstein Scandal as Paradigm of Collectivist Jewish Predation on Atomized Gentiles


Catch and Kill: Lies, Spies and a Conspiracy to Protect Predators
Ronan Farrow
Fleet paperback 2020

Ideas always sound classier in French: Lisez le blanc, lisez ce que je n’ai pas écrit et ce qui y est pourtant – “Read the white, read what I did not write and what is there nonetheless.” That was the eighteenth-century Italian economist Ferdinando Galiani (1728–87) urging a French correspondent to read one of his books with greater care. Galiani couldn’t express himself openly or he would have made dangerous enemies in the church and aristocracy.

Unorthodox thoughts

And so he concealed his true opinions from hostile eyes,  trusting that an intellectual elite in his audience would nevertheless know how to “read the white” and discern his true meaning. I came across that quote by Galiani in a fascinating compilation made by the probably Jewish political scientist Arthur M. Melzer to accompany his book Philosophy Between the Lines: The Lost History of Esoteric Writing (2014). Melzer is a Straussian and says that Galiani, like Homer, Plato, Aristotle, Tacitus, Machiavelli and a host of other influential figures, was an adherent of “philosophical esotericism,” the practice of “communicating one’s unorthodox thoughts ‘between the lines’.” After all, as Tacitus (c.55–c.117) himself said: “Seldom are men blessed with times when they may think what they please and say what they think.”

Many centuries after Tacitus, Westerners are definitely not blessed with times to speak freely. Jonathan Sacks, then the Chief Rabbi of Britain, pointed out in 2007 that Western politics had been “poisoned by the rise of identity politics, as minorities and aggrieved groups jockeyed first for rights, then for special treatment.” Sacks next said something that would have got him into serious trouble if he hadn’t been Jewish himself: “The process … began with Jews, before being taken up by blacks, women and gays.” Sacks was right: the process did begin with Jews. And it’s continued with Jews, as they use their verbal fluency, psychological intensity and massive over-representation in the media and law to intensify what I call minority worship, or the treatment of minorities like Jews and Blacks as the saintly victims of White oppression.

Clear patterns of Jewish misbehaviour

For example, the anti-White hysteria and criminality of the Black Lives Matter movement have clear Jewish connections. And so do lots of other pathologies, from vulture capitalism to the flooding of Western nations with hostile, corrupt and low-IQ Third-Worlders. But it’s dangerous to refer even obliquely to the central Jewish role in these pathologies. Or it’s “verboten,” as Newt Gingrich put it when he was rebuked on Fox News for identifying “George Soros-elected, left-wing, anti-police pro-criminal district attorneys” as enablers of the BLM riots that have racked America during the “Summer of George.” Yes, the pro-criminal attorneys are indeed elected with money from the Jewish billionaire Soros, but you can’t say so, because it’s “anti-Semitic” to link a Jew with political subversion and the misuse of wealth. In other words: “Reality shmeality, so shut your truth-telling traps, goyim!”

These taboos on discussing clear patterns of Jewish misbehaviour in Western politics and culture mean that lots of mainstream writers are staying quiet, despite seeing perfectly well what is going on. But I also wonder whether some mainstream writers are resurrecting philosophical esotericism, the “writing between the lines” that Arthur Melzer defines as relying “not on secret codes, but simply on a more intensive use of familiar rhetorical techniques like metaphor, irony, and insinuation.” I think Ronan Farrow (born 1987), the journalist who exposed the Jewish sex-criminal Harvey Weinstein, may well have used esotericism in his book on the Weinstein scandal, Catch and Kill: Lies, Spies and a Conspiracy to Protect Predators (first published in 2019). As I described in my own article “Lies, Spies and Harvey Weinstein” (published in 2017, some time before Farrow used the same rhyming words), the Weinstein scandal is a clear example of Jewish predation on gentile victims. Weinstein behaved like the Jewish “movie magnate” Jack Woltz in Mario Puzo’s novel The Godfather (1969). Woltz was “rough-spoken, rapaciously amorous, a raging wolf ravaging helpless flocks of young starlets.”

Two Jewish predators: Philip Green and Harvey Weinstein

That was in the 1930s and ’40s, according to Puzo’s book. By the 1950s, Woltz had become a paedophile, “aroused now only by very young girls” and raping twelve-year-old shiksas on his private plane. But Puzo didn’t explicitly identify Woltz as Jewish or describe his behaviour as inter-ethnic sexual predation. That was “verboten.” And it’s “verboten” today for Ronan Farrow to write openly that Weinstein was continuing the same Jewish-on-gentile sexual predation that Mario Puzo saw all those decades ago.

“Something good for Israel”

But Farrow could write esoterically. And what do you find on the first page of the first chapter of his book about the Weinstein scandal? You find a journalist called Rich McHugh and his inability to use the Yiddish word “fakakta” right (“fakakta,” or verkakte, means “shitty” or “crappy”). On the next page you learn that Rich McHugh “was barrel-chested, with ginger hair and a ruddy complexion, and wore a lot of gingham work-shirts.” He “looks like a farmer.” (p. 4) In short, he’s a goy! And I think Farrow was using McHugh and his difficulties with Yiddish to represent gentiles and their failure to understand the true “Yiddish” nature of the Weinstein scandal. Like Woltz in The Godfather, Weinstein was a Jewish wolf preying on shiksa starlets. When the hounds of goyish law were on his trail, Weinstein called on the help of Jewish foxes at an Israeli spy-agency called Black Cube. And it was the former Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak who brought Weinstein and Black Cube together. (p. 12)

And here’s what one Black Cube agent says to another agent of his highly unethical work for Weinstein: “To me, this is like doing a mitzvah. I’m doing something good for Israel.” (pp. 331-2) In that context, a mitzvah means “a divinely approved deed for a fellow Jew or to serve Jewish interests.” And presumably the Guardian journalist Seth Freedman, also working for Black Cube and Weinstein, thought he was performing a mitzvah and doing good for Israel. Freedman had been a “London stockbroker, then moved to Israel and served in the Israel Defence Forces – IDF – for fifteen months in the 2000s.” (p. 310) Then he began working for the fiercely feminist and anti-rape Guardian. This didn’t stop Freedman spying on female victims of the Jewish rapist Harvey Weinstein and trying to help Weinstein evade justice.h

“I am his people”

The feminist credentials of the Jewish lawyer Lisa Bloom didn’t stop her working for Weinstein either. Ronan Farrow had trusted Bloom and “expressed astonishment” that she had betrayed his confidences to Weinstein’s “people.” Bloom replied: “I am his people.” (p. 237) The reply can be read in two ways, of course. Bloom was one of Weinstein’s employees, but she was also one of Weinstein’s  ethnic group. Bloom might not have consciously meant to convey both meanings, but Farrow’s reporting of her words fits a pattern of “metaphor, irony, and insinuation” in his book. As we’ve already seen, Catch and Kill begins with a ruddy-faced goy who “looks like a farmer” and gets the Yiddish word “fakakta” wrong. Farrow uses the same word for the title of the first chapter of Part III, called “Army of Spies.” The goy Rich McHugh is back in that chapter, again getting the word wrong. Farrow tells him: “Please, Rich, no more Yiddish.” (p. 199) The full goy McHugh doesn’t get it, you see, but the Jew-wise Ronan Farrow does.

Or so I would claim. I think Farrow gets the Jewish nature of the Weinstein scandal – the sexual predation, the Jewish spying and the Jewish solidarity – and wants his readers to “read the white, read what I did not write and what is there nonetheless.” After all, Farrow is Jew-wise because his mother is the shiksa actress Mia Farrow (born 1945) and his legal father is the Jewish director Woody Allen (born 1935) (but his possible biological father was Frank Sinatra). Straight after reporting that Rich McHugh “looks like a farmer,” Farrow wrote about his father being “accused of sexual assault by my seven-year-old sister, Dylan,” and beginning “a sexual relationship with another of my sisters, Soon-Yi, eventually marrying her.” (p. 4) In chapter 5, Farrow describes how his father reacted à la Weinstein to the accusations of abuse: “Allen hired what his lawyer estimated to be ten or more private detectives through a network of attorneys and subcontractors. They trailed law enforcement officials, looking for evidence of drinking or gambling problems.” (pp. 32–3)

Singularly Semitic Scandals

Farrow sided with his sister and mother against his Jewish father: “so much of [Mia Farrow’s] talent and reputation was consumed by the men in her life.” (p. 32) And having seen one devious and unrepentant predator at work, he was ready to help when the actress Rose McGowan told him about being raped by another devious and unrepentant predator, Harvey Weinstein. (pp. 30-5) But does Farrow see Jewishness as central to the sexual predation of Allen, Weinstein and the media superstar Matt Lauer, also discussed here? I think he does, and I think Catch and Kill is “communicating unorthodox thoughts ‘between the lines’.”

The unorthodox thoughts are that Jews like Harvey Weinstein are predators on naïve and trusting gentiles. And that Jewish organizations like Black Cube conspire in Jewish solidarity to keep Jewish predators from justice. To repeat the words of that Black Cube agent, as reported by Farrow: “To me, this is like doing a mitzvah. I’m doing something good for Israel.”

It was “verboten” for Ronan Farrow to express those anti-Jewish thoughts openly, but I think he decided to express them esoterically in Catch and Kill. The dumb goy who opens the book misusing Yiddish is a proxy for the dumb goyim who gaped at Weinstein’s crimes, but failed to understand what was really going on. Like Avital Ronell’s abuse of academic power and Jeremy Newmark’s financial fraud, Harvey Weinstein’s sex-crimes were a singularly Semitic scandal.

Ryan Dawson: The Epstein-Mossad Connection

https://youtu.be/e6hC4_xy2YY

Why I Vote

I recall having a discussion/debate decades ago with a well-respected White advocate regarding the efficacy of voting. I’m not going to mention his name because I don’t know if he still holds the same position today, but back then he claimed that participating in elections was legitimizing a perverted political order, or as another commentator put it, voting gives symbolic affirmation to the system.  I believed then, however, as I do now, that voting is a worthwhile activity.

There is no doubt that our present political arrangement is malfeasant beyond reform. But is the passive resistance of non-participation in the electoral process effective? How about the old adage: silence equals assent? The establishment does take notice of voter turnout, giving lip service to promoting participation. The reality on the ground is they’re mainly concerned about motivating their own constituencies.

Even if boycotting elections sends a message that message is rather unclear. Are non-voters on the Left or on the Right? Are non-voters apathetic, or simply satisfied with the status quo?  It should be noted that voter turnout in the US is already low by Western standards. About fifty to sixty percent of those eligible participate in presidential elections, and forty to fifty percent in off-year elections. Yet this low rate has not brought about beneficial political change. So nonparticipation is not an effective strategy for transformation.

A nonvoter might argue that his individual vote is insignificant, so why bother. In an election with hundreds of thousands, or even millions of votes what difference does one vote, more or less, make? Of course if everyone on our side had that attitude we would completely surrender the ballot box to the opposition. Plus low turnout can work to our benefit if we take advantage of it. Several years ago a referendum in my town had a turnout of seventeen percent.  Thus mobilizing just nine percent of the electorate carried the day.

The Left appears to appreciate the efficacy of voting more than the Right.  The Left is better organized and more motivated on the local level. Trump carried my city and county in 2016, yet the city council and board of education are controlled by Leftists. Shame on us for our indolence and apathy.

Another argument against voting: With no candidates worthy of support, it is tiresome to vote for the lesser of two evils. The lesser of two evils is still evil.  First, it should be remembered that a ballot is not like a multiple-choice test. The voter does not have to take his best guess on every candidate for office.  As long as one candidate has been selected it is a valid ballot. Vote for a third party candidate. Even if he or she does not completely reflect your views, it is still a vote against the establishment.  Still no one to vote for? Most states have provisions for write-in votes that must be duly recorded.

Many years ago William Pierce made the oft repeated observation that we’re never going to vote our way out of this mess. Yet Peirce himself was a registered voter and voted in West Virginia elections. Of course what Pierce meant was that voting and electoral politics is not the solution, but it can be one part of our strategy.

Some might point to the 2016 election as an example of the futility of voting. Certainly Donald Trump has been a huge disappoint, even for someone such as myself who had a rather low expectations from the beginning. I have to believe that those who are most bitterly disillusioned had unrealistic hopes for the Trump presidency.

There were many indications during 2016 that if elected Mr. Trump would have a rough time of it. First, he ran against both the Democratic and Republican parties.  Thus after his surprise victory he did not have firm control of his party in Congress. As for his own executive branch, he did not have a likeminded cadre to staff his administration. This might not have been an insurmountable problem if Trump had had patience and a firm ideological grounding. But his temperament interfered with finding and supporting strong lieutenants with administrative skills.

Trump was elected as an outsider, a businessman, a game changer. Is politics the only profession where a lack of experience is considered an asset? Reflect on Lyndon Johnson who came to the White House after thirty years as first a legislative aide, then a congressman, senator, and vice president. Johnson knew how get his agenda implemented. Who would want to fly with a neophyte pilot whose claim to fame is as an expert entomologist?

So now in 2017 Trump, without firm party backing and with limited experience, had to confront the Deep State. The term Deep State may have the whiff of conspiracy theory, but it simply refers to the permanent bureaucracy, especially the security and intel community. Any intro to political science textbook will confirm that career bureaucrats have quite a bit of discretionary authority when interpreting and implementing policy.  This entrenched bureaucracy is guided by the neoliberal/neocon elite consensus. They saw the Trump administration as illegitimate, so, in coordination with the Democrats in Congress, they attempted what amounted to a not entirely unsuccessful coup attempt.

With his executive branch stonewalling and subverting his policies, with a largely hostile media and judiciary, and without the full support of his own party, it is no wonder Trump has floundered. It was naïve to believe that Trumpism could quickly take over the Republican Party whose operatives have long-standing vested interests. The party coopted Trump rather than the other way around. It is possible that a nationalist-populist ideology could take over the Republican Party, but it would take many years and much effort to accomplish.

To sum up Mr. Trump: The transformation he promised and we had hoped for in 2016 would have required a skilled and focused politician who could have rallied his party and public opinion to support the radical changes the system needs.  That would have taken the determination of a revolutionary genius such as V. Lenin. In the end we received more rhetoric than action, and much of the rhetoric was not very articulate.

Did Trump energize the Left? To an extent yes, but any reassertion of White identity has and will continue to enrage the Left regardless of who is in the White House. The bottom line is this: would a Clinton administration have been better for our people? Will a Biden administration benefit our cause?

I’ve acknowledged that the system is terminally corrupt, and that electoral politics has limited capacity to effect change. Why then is it still important to vote? First, we should keep in mind that voting involves no risk, no expense, and very little effort. Thus any benefit obtained from this activity comes at a low cost. The main value in voting is derived from civic engagement. It is important for our people to stay involved in the process.  Under present political and social conditions, it is easy to become discouraged and resigned to degeneracy. Our young people especially need to avoid the severe alienation that can impact their ability to function in the real world, to establish careers and families. I hesitate to make a biblical reference, but we need to be in this world, but not of it.

Participating in electoral politics can build connections and provide valuable experience. At present we cannot elect a president or senator, but how about a city councilman, school board member, or county commissioner? (One caveat: do not contribute money to establishment candidates or organizations. Our people and organizations need those funds.)  Voting should be part of a broader community participation. While it is important to prepare ourselves and our families for stormy weather, we cannot retreat into a bubble or ideological ghetto. Write a well-crafted letter to the editor of your local fish wrap, join a local organization, a garden club or a gun club or both. Stay informed. If you live in an area where such opportunities are not available to you that’s strong evidence you need to move to a more congenial locale.

Vampires vs Crosses: Why Jews and Leftists Hate White Men, Christianity and Western Civilization

“The most merciful thing in the world,” said H.P. Lovecraft, “is the inability of the human mind to correlate all its contents.” But what’s the most risible thing in the world? That’s the inability of the Guardian to correlate all its contents. Here, for example, the Guardian exposes the racist stereotyping of “black, Asian and minority ethnic men” in Britain:

Prejudice against black men in the department [Department for International Development] came to the fore last year after Dfid published two images that appeared to portray black, Asian and minority ethnic men as sexual predators. … “Whilst black male voices have largely been silent on the issue of race, that changed in August 2019 when an image was posted on the front page of Insight [Dfid’s intranet] to publicise Dfid’s new sexual harassment guidance, showing a black male aggressor’s hand over [the hand of] a white woman,” it claimed. A few weeks later, another image warning of sexual harassment appeared again on the front page of the department’s magazine, this time showing a white woman being followed by a BAME [Black And Minority Ethnic] man, prompting further anguish. (Racism endemic at DfID, staff claim, The Guardian, 26th August 2020)

Chiller killers: Zahid Younis and Mujahid Arshid

But if the Guardian could correlate its own contents, it would discover that “black, Asian and minority ethnic men” are indeed sexual predators at much higher rates that White men — and often in much worse ways. A few days later, for example, the Guardian ran the headline: “Man jailed for murder of two women found in freezer in London flat.” You won’t be surprised to learn that the man’s name was Zahid Younis or that he was a “convicted sex offender” with a long history of exploiting and abusing women. His two known victims — there could easily be many more — had suffered “very significant violence” and seem to have been stamped or kicked to death before lying undiscovered in Younis’s freezer for years.

“The world’s most unsafe country for women

Back in 2018, the Guardian had news of another femicidal freezer feature, when another “man” was jailed for “kidnapping, raping and slitting the throat of his niece before putting her body in a deep freezer.” This man was called Mujahid Arshid. So that’s two Muslim men, three horrendously brutal and misogynistic murders. But the Guardian has also recently informed its readers that a non-Muslim nation is no slouch at murderous misogyny either:

Over the past month, the Lakhimpur Kheri district of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh has witnessed four incidents of girls being raped and brutally murdered. At least two of the girls were Dalits, the lowest caste in the Hindu system of social hierarchy, who were previously referred to as “untouchables” and cast out from society. Last week, a 14-year-old girl Dalit girl was found hanging from a tree in a village, having been raped and murdered. Just a few days before, a three-year-old girl was raped and strangled to death. On 14 and 24 August, two girls, a 13-year-old and a 17-year-old, were both raped and killed in Lakhimpur Kheri. … India remains the most unsafe country for women in the world, with a woman raped every 20 minutes. Lower caste women in particular bear the brunt, with little to no access to justice. It first came to light in a 1999 report by Human Rights Watch that documented how Dalit women in Bihar were raped and then had their breasts cut off and were shot in the vulva. (Dalits bear brunt of India’s ‘endemic’ sexual violence crisis, The Guardian, 16th September 2020)

The Guardian claims to have a deep concern for women’s welfare, but refuses to tell the truth about which kind of men pose the biggest threat to women. It’s “black, Asian and minority ethnic men.” The Guardian also refuses to admit that mass immigration from the Third World is therefore very bad for Western women. After all, the Guardian and other leftists react to truth in the same way as vampires react to crucifixes: with horror and loathing. And that comparison is entirely apt, because leftists hate Christianity quite as much as they hate White men and Western civilization. This is perfectly logical for leftists, because the three things go together. The Anglo-French writer Hilaire Belloc summed it up in a pithy formula: “The Faith is Europe and Europe is the Faith.”

Anti-White, anti-male, anti-Christian

And so leftists are very eager to promote everything that attacks White men, Christianity and Western civilization. For a paradigmatic example, take the BBC’s remake of its own acclaimed television series Civilisation (1969), which was presented by the White male Christian Kenneth Clark as a celebration of European art. In 2018, the BBC attacked its own legacy in a new series called Civilisations, with three presenters, David Olusoga, Mary Beard and Simon Schama, who seem to have been deliberately chosen as the antithesis of the White male Christian Kenneth Clark. David Olusoga is Black, Mary Beard is female and Simon Schama is Jewish. In other words, the three presenters are anti-White, anti-male and anti-Christian. And while Clark was a genuinely brilliant and subtle critic and historian, Olusoga, Beard and Schama are united in their mediocrity and slavish adherence to leftist orthodoxy: “White bad, non-White good; male bad, female good; Christian bad, non-Christian good.”

Anti-White, anti-male, anti-Christian: the three presenters of Civilisations

For reasons that will be obvious to anyone who reads the newspaper, the Guardian has no problem with mediocrity. And it was very pleased with the BBC’s attack on its own legacy, noting with approval that while the “first part of Civilisation went to France, Italy and Middlesex,” the new and improved Civilisations “visits Switzerland, Spain, South Africa, Greece, China, Mexico, and Honduras.” Not to mention “New Mexico, Egypt, Greece, and China.” The plurality of the new title — Civilisations — is of course an implicit rebuke of Clark’s belief in the supremacy of Western civilization. The new title promotes instead the leftist dogma of equality between different cultures, which are all civilised in their own special way. But that dogma isn’t honest, because the leftist intent all along is undermine and destroy Western civilization. As George Orwell might have put it: “All cultures are equal, but some are more equal than others.”

And while David Olusoga and Mary Beard were very useful as collaborators in the project of negating Clark and attacking his legacy, there was no doubt who was in charge. As the Jewish Chronicle put it: “Simon Schama takes the lead on BBC’s new art history show Civilisations.” The Guardian reported that “Schama begins and ends the series — and presents five of the total nine shows.” Andrew Joyce has documented at the Occidental Observer that Schama is an energetic agent of Jewish supremacism and anti-White activism. Indeed, you could almost say that Kenneth Clark foresaw Schama’s attack, because Clark said this in the last episode of the original series: “It is lack of confidence, more than anything else, that kills a civilisation. We can destroy ourselves by cynicism and disillusion, just as effectively as by bombs.”

A core tradition of Judaism and leftism

The Jewish culture of critique is designed to promote exactly that despair, cynicism and disillusion in White Europeans. And Schama’s ethnocentrism was obvious in the series, as the Jewish Chronicle was pleased to report: “For the final episode in Civilisations, [Schama] looks at some of the pictures painted by children incarcerated by the Nazis in Theresienstadt concentration camp which are on display in the Pinkas Synagogue, Prague.” I didn’t see (or want to see) the new series, but I would guess that the pictures upheld a core tradition of Jewish art down the ages: active and unrepentant ugliness. Ugliness is, of course, also a core tradition of leftism. As Steve Sailer has pointed out: “white Antifa rioters seem disproportionately to be … physically unattractive.”

It should be no surprise, then, that Antifa are so enthusiastic about setting fire to Western civilization, both literally and metaphorically. Personal ugliness goes naturally with the urge to destroy beauty, order and harmony, and to overturn the aesthetic and artistic standards whereby one is judged. Hilaire Belloc once again had a pithy summation of how things stand: “[T]here is (as the greatest of the ancient Greeks discovered) a certain indissoluble Trinity of Truth, Beauty and Goodness. You cannot deny or attack one of these three without at the same time denying or attacking both the others.”

Leftists know that the same is true of White men, Christianity and Western civilization. You cannot attack one of these three without at the same time attacking both the others. And leftists are indeed energetically attacking all these three things. At the same time, they’re attacking the “indissoluble Trinity of Truth, Beauty and Goodness.” Leftists obviously think that the two sets of three go together. And leftists are right. After all, they have to recognize truth in order to hate it, deny it and seek to destroy it.

Semitism and Capitalism: The Merits and Inadequacies of Middleman Minority Theory in Explaining the Jews, Part II

Go to Part I

“American Jews do not fit the sojourner pattern, since their political involvement goes far beyond the support of Jewish causes. … Much Jewish political activity, whether right, center, or left, can be related to a perception of how to make America and the world safe for Jews. American Jewish support for domestic liberalism and internationalism can be interpreted in this way.”
Walter Zenner, “American Jewry in the light of Middleman Minority Theories,” 1980.[1]

Merits of Middleman Minority Theory

The most obvious merit of middleman minority theory is that, like Kevin MacDonald’s theory of a group evolutionary strategy, it places an unusual and welcome emphasis on rational resource competition as the basis for social conflict involving certain minorities. By offering a socio-economic explanation for hostility toward Jews, middleman minority theory represents a unique space within academia where the otherwise ubiquitous “pure prejudice” idea that host hostility is self-generated (from psychological problems or cultural traditions) is summarily and comprehensively dismissed. Although this has not come without criticism, as seen in Robert Cherry’s denunciation of Edna Bonacich’s work as reinforcing bigotry[2], this emphasis has been able to continue largely untroubled thanks to its advancement under a hardline traditional Marxist interpretive veneer.

Middleman minority theory, especially the variant advanced by Bonacich, also insists that host populations do have interests, and that these interests are genuinely and seriously threatened by middleman minorities who drain away resources. These minorities then use their accumulated resources to build up power and influence, sometimes even to the extent of gaining considerable economic, social, and political monopolies over the hosts. Since these monopolies can be very difficult to dislodge, and since monopolies may satisfy some interests of host populations or segments of host populations, middleman minority theory insists that it is rational and somewhat inevitable that increasingly harsh and even violent measures will be taken against the offending minority. As a result, middleman minority theory offers a far more plausible and objective understanding of group conflict than many of the ideas that dominate the academic discussion of group conflict, especially conflict involving Jews. In addition, the outright rejection of “scapegoat” theories as “superficial,” and the lack of appeals to concepts of victimhood in such a framework, can only be described in the context of the current academic climate as utterly refreshing.

A second major merit of middleman minority theory is the emphasis that some strands place on the characteristics of the minorities themselves. Middleman minority theory contains within it three basic theoretical approaches. Context-based theories like that of Roscher, and revived to some degree by Nathan Cofnas (who is particularly concerned with the urban environment-context), argue that middleman minorities are essentially creatures of the societies in which they are found, and are for the most part created by opportunities, status gaps, and vacuums over which they have no control and which have nothing to do with their inherent characteristics (a slight advantage in intelligence being the only characteristic that Cofnas feels comfortable in applying). Situational theories, like that advanced by Simmel are similar, but place more emphasis on the culturally-located role of the trader, the Stranger, and the “sojourner as trader,” as the determinant factor in the creation of middleman minorities. Culture-based, or characteristic-based, middleman minority theories, however, tend to be more numerous, and more convincing. These theories, like that advanced by Weber and given tacit assent by Bonacich and Zenner, place strong emphasis on the broad range of traditions, ideologies, behaviors, and aptitudes of middleman minority groups.

The most frequently highlighted of such traits within middleman minority theory is ethnocentrism, which again dovetails with the primary emphasis of Kevin MacDonald’s theory. Ethnocentrism is acknowledged as a central factor in the maintenance of self-segregation among middleman minority groups, and is often supported by ideological beliefs such as the caste system, or what Zenner describes as “the Chosen People complex.”[3] Ethnocentrism in middleman minorities is presented as crucial to understanding host hostility not only because of the way it facilitates the draining of resources from the host population, but also because of highly antagonistic correlates such as dual loyalty and a willingness to engage in lucrative but morally destructive (for the host) trading. Walter Zenner speaks of a “double standard of morality” that is

Expressed in dealings with outsiders, such as lending to them with interest, unscrupulous selling practices, and providing outsiders with illicit means of gratifying their appetites, while at the same time, denying the same means to in-group members.[4]

An excellent example of this process in action is the fact Israel is the largest producer and host of international online gambling sites, while making it illegal for its own citizens to use such sites. Of course, we are talking here about a nation state rather than a minority population, but this contradiction, and the nature of Israel within the international community, will be discussed in a critique of the narrowness of middleman minority theory later.

A further merit of middleman minority theory is the heavy emphasis the cultural-characteristic interpretation places on group strategies. Middleman minorities, again with Jews being held up by both Zenner and Bonacich as an exemplar or especially acute case, are said to engage in constantly adaptive activity in order to manage their visibility, ensure their safety, advance their interests, accumulate power and wealth, and entrench themselves ever deeper within the host. Bonacich has indicated that Jews are especially keen to remain entrenched in the West, and the United States in particular, because it is financially and politically lucrative, and only a catastrophic weakening of their monopolies would bring an end to existing strategies.[5] Zenner goes as far as to claim that “much of the content of American Jewish life can be seen as visibility strategies. Strategy here includes both unconscious mechanisms of coping with situations and consciously formulated plans.”[6] Zenner speaks of a “dynamic process” whereby Jews minimise visibility to avoid hostility, maximise visibility when pursuing certain interests, and generally work unceasingly to make their image more favorable in the minds of the host. Again, all of this corresponds very well with one of the central themes of the Culture of Critique — the idea that Jewish involvement in certain intellectual movements could be seen in the context of a pursuit of Jewish interests either consciously or in ways that involved unconscious motivations and self-deception. It also maps very closely to MacDonald’s framework on Jewish crypsis and other attempts to mitigate anti-Semitism, advanced in the sixth chapter of Separation and Its Discontents.

Problems in Middleman Minority Theory

Given the prevalence of Jews in the development and promotion of the modern incarnation of middleman minority theory, including Georg Simmel, Edna Bonacich, Abner Cohen, Abram Leon, Walter Zenner, Werner Cahnman,[7] Donald Horowitz,[8] Gideon Reuveni,[9] Ivan Light, Steven J. Gold,[10] and Robert Silverman,[11] a reasonable concern might be that middleman minority theory is itself an intellectual “visibility strategy.” Just as it has been posited that Jews tend to support mass migration because it will result in Jews becoming “one among many” ethnic minorities, and thus in their logic less conspicuous and therefore safer, middleman minority theory can act to reduce Jewish visibility by offering the idea that Jews are just one among many diaspora trading groups and their history and behavior is therefore not unique or worthy of special attention. It remains the case that even in those interpretations which highlight negative Jewish behavior and portray host responses as rational (e.g. the work of Bonacich and Zenner), the proposed framework still insists on some level of commonality, no matter how tenuous, with the experiences of other minority groups, and it ultimately places the blame for conflict on a much broader context, often the impersonal historical development of capitalism.

In other words, while the framework can deny that Jews are “victims” of host nations, these theories also deny that host nations are truly the victims of Jewish exploitation. Both are simply argued to be the victims of capitalism, and any sense of individual or group agency is rhetorically dissolved. Again, this acts to lower Jewish visibility and culpability and remains attractive for that reason. There are certainly good reasons along this line of thought for proposing that Steven Pinker’s promotion of the theory over Kevin MacDonald’s ideas has less to do with a serious engagement with the content of the work of Bonacich et al. and significantly more to do with deflecting the entire conversation into an area of discussion in which Pinker feels Jews are less visible.

A major problem with middleman minority theory is that it has a very uncomfortable and unsatisfactory way of handling the obviously unique aspects of the Jewish experience, especially in relation to the unprecedented involvement of Jews in post-Enlightenment Western culture and politics, something for which there is absolutely no parallel among other diaspora trading groups anywhere. As has been discussed, middleman minority theory was essentially first created, consciously or unconsciously, by scholars anxious to find a way to explain the Jewish experience. Attempts to connect this experience, amounting to some two millennia of history, with the much more modern and straightforward experiences of, for example, the Chinese in the Philippines or the Japanese in America, have been doomed to the grossest of generalizations and the clumsiest of associations. This has resulted in a steady stream of admissions within the field that the best way to interpret middleman minority theory is simply that it proposes an “ideal type” (essentially the Jews) with unfortunate “problems of fit between any actual ethnic group and this picture [the Jewish experience].”[12] Zenner has conceded that the concept has been very “difficult to define so as to cover all groups so designated.”[13] All of which calls into question whether this concept possesses any real efficacy as an analytical or predictive tool in a comparative sense at all.

An interesting point of difference between the Jewish experience and that of other diaspora trading peoples is that the latter are acknowledged as possessing a genuine sense of sojourn. In other words, their first generations tend to be truly temporary, semi-nomadic groups who aim to make money before eventually returning to a homeland. A subtly different experience is observed in the Jews, as noted by Jack Kugelmass in his 1981 PhD thesis Native Aliens: The Jews of Poland as a Middleman Minority. For Kugelmass, “the so-called “middleman” character of the Jew is seen as an aspect of the Jewish sense of sojourn, which unlike most sojourns is ideological rather than sociological in nature.” [emphasis added] Another way of phrasing this would be to say that the Jewish sense of sojourn is cultural-biological rather than contextual, and since the concept of sojourning has been a major feature of Jewish life since at least the writing of the Exodus, this difference between other groups is really so stark as to require a distinct analysis — something offered to an unparalleled degree in Kevin MacDonald’s A People That Shall Dwell Alone. In this analysis, it would appear that, unlike a relatively small number of other peoples who have merely adopted some tactics in order to pursue a specific diaspora trade role, Jews have, from time immemorial, given themselves over entirely to these strategies as an entire way of life — the “middleman minority” as a raison dêtre.

This absolutely crucial distinction is linked to the remarkable fact of contemporary political life that the state of Israel exists largely according to the same strategies employed by Jews when in a diaspora condition. As stated above, an excellent example of the dual morality process in action is the fact Israel is the largest producer and host of international online gambling sites, while making it illegal for its own citizens to use such sites. The creation of the state of Israel has also exacerbated, rather than ameliorated, issues of dual loyalty in Jewish minority populations, even if these issues are more or less kept out of the public eye through diplomatic soothing around Israeli spying and the maintenance of certain taboos in the mass media. Israel itself would appear to be a kind of middleman minority archetype within the international community, cultivating close and lucrative ties with the elite (the United States), while engaging in more or less unchallenged exploitative and oppressive activities against lower social orders (Palestinians, and other vulnerable or indebted population groups in South America).

Like the “ideal type” of middleman minority, Israel heavily drains the resources even of its allies (U.S. military and diplomatic aid) and pursues its strategies in a ceaseless quest for security, while maintaining moral double standards and being rather shameless in engaging in what Zenner has described as the classic overrepresentation of middleman minorities in “morally shady” activities.[14] Even in recent years, Israel has become notorious in the international organ trade, moneylending, and allegations of humanitarian atrocities. Israeli newspapers have also described their country as a “monopoly nation” due to the intense tendency towards economic monopoly in the country’s business life — a key feature of middleman minority life that Jews appear to continue to embody to an extent unparalleled in any other ethnic group. Further evidence for the apparently deep-seated, rather than contextual, nature of “middleman” traits in Jews might be found in studies indicative of a biological underpinning to Jewish ethnocentrism, such as that described by Kevin MacDonald in the Preface to the Culture of Critique:

Developmental psychologists have found unusually intense fear reactions among Israeli infants in response to strangers, while the opposite pattern is found for infants from North Germany. The Israeli infants were much more likely to become “inconsolably upset” in reaction to strangers, whereas the North German infants had relatively minor reactions to strangers. The Israeli babies therefore tended to have an unusual degree of stranger anxiety, while the North German babies were the opposite — findings that fit with the hypothesis that Europeans and Jews are on opposite ends of scales of xenophobia and ethnocentrism.

As well as dealing poorly with obviously unique aspects of the Jewish experience, a significant portion of middleman minority theory is devoted to context-based narratives that are often in stark contrast to, or completely disproven by, the historical record. With the exception of the work of Kevin MacDonald, which demonstrates a very extensive engagement with works of history, a general weakness in all of the late twentieth-century sociological studies discussed above is the fact that, despite their incredibly ambitious claims about the historical trajectory of capitalism or middleman minority populations, there is a quite serious neglect of any of the relevant historiography. This leads, in the case of the modern adherents of Simmel, Roscher, and Leon, to the constant repetition of error-laden tropes such as the idea that Jews turned to commerce because they were prohibited from owning land (rather than arriving as profit-seeking financiers), that Jews were most often invited into nations by elites seeking a financial stimulus, or that Jews were banished from countries once their position as loan merchant was superfluous. In fact, these three tropes, all of which remove Jewish agency and characteristics from consideration, are essentially the pillars of context-based middleman minority theory pertaining to Jews, and are absolutely crucial to Roscher’s ideas in particular.

The historical record is now acknowledged as more or less complete in relation to the issue of the Jewish ownership of land. It has been conclusively established, for example, that the general trend across Europe was that Jews were in fact able to possess and own land during the centuries immediately following their initial spread and expansion in Europe (c.1000–1300). Restrictions on land ownership were later enacted as penalties for exploitation or as part of a system of elite land transfer—e.g., the desire of the English kings to obtain the land of indebted lesser knights, and doing so by financially compensating Jewish moneylenders for forfeited lands they could no longer legally hold.

One of the correlates of the land ownership trope is the astonishingly naive assumption that land ownership would preclude involvement in financial speculation. Again, the historical record contradicts this. Mark Meyerson’s Princeton-published A Jewish Renaissance in Fifteenth-Century Spain (2010), for example, offers an expansive analysis of Jewish landowners in Spain who “did not necessarily cultivate the land themselves” and combined wine production operations worked by non-Jewish peasants with “lending operations and tax farming.”[15] Pointing to the prevalence of early Jewish land ownership in Poland, France, and Germany, in which Jews enjoyed a “privileged status available to few Christians,” Norman Roth has described the trope that Jews were forced out of agriculture by restrictive laws and the violence of the Crusades as “patently absurd.”[16]

The theory that Jews, and by tenuous implication other middleman minorities, were most often invited into nations by elites seeking a financial stimulus or to fill a “status gap,” is also contradicted by the historical record. The early entry and expansion of Jews in Europe is relatively well-documented, the dominant trend being that Jews either presented themselves before elites in order to solicit business, or that they acted as financiers for conquest and then followed in the wake of the conquerors (e.g., the well-documented role of Jewish financiers in Norman Conquest of England and Strongbow’s conquest of Ireland).[17] Ireland’s Annals of Innisfallen (1079 A.D.) record: “Five Jews came from over sea with gifts to Tairdelbach [King of Munster], and they were sent back again over sea.” Unless Tairdelbach (Turlough O’Brien, 1009–86) had undergone a dramatic change of mind, it’s likely that the arrival of the Jews hadn’t been preceded by an invitation. In fact, unsolicited approaches for request to settle and establish financial activities are in evidence from the time of O’Brien to the 1655 “Humble Address” of Manasse ben Israel to the English government.

A very common form of government documentation found in the study of Early Modern Jewish communities are the charters outlining their terms of settlement, and these are very revealing. Rather than act as economic catalysts, Jews are more frequently observed following the trail of already economically improving areas, hoping to profit from their advancement. As Felicitas Schmeider has pointed out, in terms of the German context, “permission to settle Jews in a newly privileged town is one thing kings were frequently, if not regularly, asked for, especially in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.”[18]

The theory that Jews were banished from countries once their position as loan merchant or general role as a middleman minority was superfluous is also forcefully contradicted by the historical record. Just as medieval Jews perceived that they were the innocent victims of evil Gentiles, so Jewish historiography has overwhelmingly portrayed the expulsions as the result of “rumors, prejudices, and insinuating and irrational accusations.”[19] Context-based middleman minorities theories absorbed these tropes and reinvented them in narratives that blamed the expulsions on the fact that Capital had simply exhausted the usefulness of the Jews. Such understandings of the expulsions have only very recently come to be revised, most saliently in the work of Harvard historian Rowan W. Dorin, whose 2015 doctoral thesis and subsequent publications have for the first time helped to fully contextualize the mass expulsions of Jews in Europe during the medieval period, 1200–1450.[20]

Dorin points out that Jews were never specifically targeted for expulsion qua Jews, but as usurers, and notes that the vast majority of expulsions in the period targeted “Christians hailing from northern Italy.” Jews were expelled, like these Christian usurers, for their actions, choices, and behaviors. What the period witnessed was not a wave of irrational anti-Jewish actions, or for that matter an impersonal reflex of glutted Capital, but rather a widespread ecclesiastical reaction against the spread of moneylending among Christians that eventually absorbed Jews into its considerations for common sense reasons. A number of laws and statutes, for example Usuranum voraginem, were designed in order to provide a schedule of punishments for foreign/travelling Christian moneylenders. These laws contained provisions for excommunication and a prohibition on renting property in certain locales. The latter effectively prohibited such moneylenders from taking up residence in those locations, and compelled their expulsion in cases where they were already domiciled. It was only after these laws were in effect that some theologians and clerics began to question why they weren’t also applied to Jews who, in the words of historian Gavin Langmuir, were then “disproportionately engaged in moneylending in northern Europe by the late 12th century.”[21] The Church had historically objected to the expulsion of Jews in the belief that their scattered presence fulfilled theological and eschatological functions. It was only via the broader, largely common sense, application of newly developed anti-usury laws that such obstructions to confrontations with Jews became theologically and ecclesiastically permissible, if not entirely desirable. And once this Rubicon had been crossed, it paved the way for a rapid series of expulsions of Jewish usury colonies from European towns and cities, a process that accelerated rapidly between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries.

The lack of engagement with developments in historiography is worsened to a large extent by the absence of a truly cross-disciplinary approach in most, if not all, existing middleman minority analyses. This is particularly glaring in the works of Bonacich and Zenner which, while making multiple and apparently crucial references to conscious and unconscious group “strategies,” fail to engage in any kind of historiographical or psychological scholarly contextualization. How exactly such strategies as “visibility strategies” can operate at group level are left completely unexplained and without any substantial evidence beyond common sense observations of Jewish behavior. The lack of a cross-disciplinary approach in such instances doesn’t necessarily mean that these ideas are wrong, or that “visibility strategies” don’t exist, but it does mean that explanations and evidence are still required. To date, the only convincing attempt to fill in such gaps, and offer a truly cross-disciplinary approach (incorporating history, sociology, and psychology) to the idea of group strategies, is found in the work of Kevin MacDonald.

Conclusion

As stated at the outset of this essay, it isn’t at all clear how any of the aspects of middleman minority theory obviate the need for a deeper theoretical framework in which to understand the behaviors and contexts under study. Middleman minority theory, as remarked above, is an incomplete tool, and has little to offer in terms of deeper explanatory value for such relevant key concepts under discussion as resource competition, ecological strategies, visibility strategies, and social identity theory. Middleman minority theory, or at least some strands of it, is useful and valuable in the study of Jews to the extent that it places an unusual emphasis on group conflict as arising from resource competition, the characteristics of Jews (including Jewish ethnocentrism), and the existence of group strategies. There are, however, multiple, serious inadequacies in middleman minority theory, including the possibility that it is in part itself a “visibility strategy,” that is has a general problem of definitions, that it fails to adequately deal with unique qualities of the Jews and their experiences, that it generally fails to engage with the historical record, and that it has no real explanatory or predictive frameworks for many of the ideas it discusses, including group strategies. I am forced to concur with Edna Bonacich that, in regards to the study of Jews, middleman minority theory should be conceived, at best, as “a useful sensitiser to a host of interrelated variables.”[22]


[1] W. Zenner, “American Jewry in the light of middleman minority theories,” Contemporary Jewry, 5:1 (1980), 11-30, 18.

[2] R. Cherry, “American Jewry and Bonacich’s Middleman Minority Theory,” Review of Radical Political Economics, 22 (2-3), 158-173, 161.

[3] W. P. Zenner, Minorities in the Middle: A Cross-Cultural Analysis (Albany: State University of New York, 1991), 18.

[4] Ibid.

[5] E. Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman Minorities.” American Sociological Review 38, no. 5 (1973): 583-94, 592.

[6] W. Zenner, “American Jewry in the light of middleman minority theories,” Contemporary Jewry, 5:1 (1980), 11-30, 23.

[7] W. Cahnman, ”Pariahs, Strangers and Court Jews,” Sociological Analysis 35, 3 (1974): 155-66.

[8] D. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

[9] G. Reuveni (ed) The Economy in Jewish History: New Perspectives on the Interrelationship Between Ethnicity and Economic Life (Berghahn, 2011).

[10] I. Light & S. J. Gold, Ethnic Economies (Bingley: Emerald, 2000).

[11] R. Silverman, Doing Business in Minority Markets (New York: Garland, 2000).

[12] E. Bonacich, The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in the Japanese American Community (Berekely: University of California Press, 1980), 22.

[13] W. Zenner, “American Jewry in the light of middleman minority theories,” Contemporary Jewry, 5:1 (1980), 11-30, 13.

[14] Ibid, 15.

[15] M. D. Meyerson, A Jewish Renaissance in Fifteenth-Century Spain (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 111.

[16] N. Roth, Medieval Jewish Civilization: An Encyclopedia (New York: Routledge, 2003),

[17]  J. Hillaby, “Jewish Colonisation in the Twelfth Century,” in P. Skinner (ed), The Jews in Medieval Britain: Historical, Literary, and Archaeological Perspectives (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2003), 36.

[18] F. Schmeider, “Various Ethnic and Religious Groups in Medieval German Towns? Some Evidence and Reflections,” in, Segregation, Integration, Assimilation: Religious and Ethnic Groups in the Medieval Towns of Central and Eastern Europe (Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), 15.

[19] Joseph Pérez, History of a Tragedy: The Expulsion of the Jews from Spain (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2007), 60.

[20] R. W. Dorin, Banishing Usury: The Expulsion of Foreign Moneylenders in Medieval Europe, 1200—1450 (Harvard PhD dissertation, 2015); R. W. Dorin, “Once the Jews have been Expelled,” Intent and Interpretation in Late Medieval Canon Law,” Law and History Review, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2016), 335-362.

[21] G. Langmuir, History, Religion, and Antisemitism (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), 304.

[22] Ibid, 24.

Semitism and Capitalism: The Merits and Inadequacies of Middleman Minority Theory in Explaining the Jews Part I

“The middleman and the host society come in conflict because elements in each group have incompatible goals. To say this is to deny the viewpoint common in the sociological literature that host hostility is self-generated (from psychological problems or cultural traditions).”
Edna Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman Minorities,” 1973.[1]

An interesting accompaniment to Nathan Cofnas’s 2018 attempted debunking of Kevin MacDonald’s work on Jews was the subtle resurfacing of Steven Pinker’s claim that a more plausible theory of the Jewish historical experience can be found in “Thomas Sowell’s convincing analysis of ‘middleman minorities’ such as the Jews, presented in his magisterial study of migration, race, conquest, and culture.” Pinker first involved himself in criticism of MacDonald’s work in a letter to Slate, in January 2000, where he made the above comment. A mere teenager in January 2000, it was only in the wake of the Cofnas affair that I first discovered and read Pinker’s initial response to MacDonald’s theory. It goes without saying that I disagreed with almost everything Pinker had to say, but I was especially vexed by his invocation of the “middleman minority” theory, something I’ve been familiar with for over a decade and always found strongly lacking. Pinker himself, of course, has relatively little expertise in the area, his only comment on the theme coming from a quasi-memoir on Jewish intelligence written for New Republic. Additionally, his gushing use of persuasive language (“convincing,” “magisterial”) to describe Thomas Sowell’s extremely derivative and now rather dated Migrations and Cultures: A World View (1996) struck me as a wholly contrived inflation of what isn’t really a rival theory at all, and certainly not a Sowell innovation. In fact, the history of “middleman minority” theory, and especially its application to the Jews, has a patchy, chequered, and ambiguous history that is worth exploring in its own right. The following essay is intended to provide such a history, as well as to broadly assess the merits and inadequacies of exploring Jewish history through this lens, and also the ways it complements, and falls short of, Kevin MacDonald’s theory.

History of the Theory

The comparing of Jews with other sojourning or diaspora trading peoples is far from new, and has even been a staple of anti-Jewish writing since at least the Enlightenment. Voltaire, for example, wrote in his Oeuvres Complètes (Geneva, 1756) and Dictionnaire Philosophique (Basle, 1764) that “The Guebers [Parsis in the modern terminology], the Banyans [Indian merchants] and the Jews, are the only nations which exist dispersed, having no alliance with any people, are perpetuated among foreign nations, and continue apart from the rest of the world.”[2] In the course of his essay, however, Voltaire concluded that, some surface similarities aside, “It is certain that the Jewish nation is the most singular that the world has ever seen.” Bruno Bauer (1809–1882), the German Protestant theologian, philosopher and historian, also used the example of the Parsis and Overseas Indians, writing in The Jewish Problem (1843),

The base [of the tenacity of the Jewish national spirit] is lack of ability to develop with history, it is the reason of the quite unhistorical character of that nation, and this again is due to its oriental nature. Such stationary nations exist in the Orient, because there human liberty and the possibility of progress are still limited. In the Orient and in India, we still find Parsees [sic] living in dispersion and worshipping the holy fire of Ormuz.[3]

After Voltaire, commentary on the relationship between the economic activity of the Jews and other aspects of their behavior and history, a key theme in modern middleman minority theory, were common points of discussion and debate. Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773–1843), an avowedly anti-Semitic German philosopher, argued in his essay On the Danger to the Well-Being and Character of the Germans Presented by the Jews (1816), that Jews adopted their historical middleman role willingly, out of a hunger for profit and an innate sense of separateness, rather than being forced into it by broader economic structures and contexts (which again are a major focus of modern middleman minority theory). For Fries,

Both in Germany and abroad the Jews had free states where they enjoyed every right, and even countries where they reigned—but their sordidness, their mania for deceitful, second-hand dealing always remained the same. They shy away from industrious occupations not because they are hindered from pursuing them but simply because they do not want to.

Following Bauer and Fries—and before modern scholarship on the subject, the most prominent invocation of ideas similar to modern middleman minority theory can be observed in the work of Karl Marx. In fact, Marx’s essay On the Jewish Problem is an explicit reply to Bauer, with Marx accusing Bauer of “a one-sided conception of the Jewish problem.”[4] Marx decried Bauer’s focus on religious matters, perceiving the roots of the Jewish problem to reside instead in resource competition and raw economics. In many of his arguments and assessments of the economic and sociological position of the Jews, Marx anticipated Edna Bonacich (1940–), the Jewish Marxist anti-Zionist sociologist who essentially invented middleman minority theory in its modern form (and whose work will be discussed below), in arguing for a structural-contextual explanation of the middleman role of the Jews. In this view, the historical development of Capital essentially invites and entices certain sojourning or diaspora groups, including the Jews, to adopt lucrative but exploitative and antagonistic roles within society. In the words of Marx, “we recognize therefore in Judaism a generally present anti-social element which has been raised to its present peak by historical development, in which the Jews eagerly assisted.” [emphasis added] These antagonistic roles then generate host hostility, which reinforces ethnocentrism and negative characteristics in the minority, accelerating and deepening conflict.

Marx’s emphasis on economic opportunity and the capitalist superstructure influenced later writers such as the German economist Wilhelm Roscher (1817–1894), Werner Sombart (1863–1941), Max Weber (1864–1920), and Georg Simmel (1858–1918), all of whom attempted in some form to trace the relationship of ethnicity to occupational choice (a major concern of modern middleman minority theory), with particular attention paid to the Jews. In keeping with his flamboyant Marxism, Sombart was closest to Marx’s ideas on the Jews, arguing in The Jews and Modern Capitalism (1911) that Capital had drawn Jews into their influential, exploitative, and lucrative roles in such a comprehensive manner that Jews had become a kind of ur-middleman minority, and thus were both the prime movers of modern capitalism and the very embodiment of exploitative capital itself. Later, in Der moderne Kapitalismus (1913), Sombart claimed that the middleman nature of the Jews had become endemic in society, creating generations of mere “traders,” a bourgeois “Jewish species” whose entire intellectual and emotional world is “directed to the money value of conditions and dealings, who therefore calculates everything in terms of money.” This “spirit of Moloch” compelled the entrepreneur to “make money relentlessly until at last he conceives this as the real goal of all activity and all existence.”[5]  For Sombart, the origins of the worst of modern capitalism can be found in the early middleman role of the Jews, their medieval semi-nomadic quest for usury-derived profit and Victorian hawking of shoddy goods being a precursor to modern advertising and the mass production of superfluous and quickly obsolete consumer products.

Max Weber’s interpretation of the Jewish middleman role was slightly softer, with Weber advancing the notion of “pariah capitalism.” Pariah capitalists, who include the Jews as well as the Parsis, the Overseas Indians, and the Overseas Chinese, are groups whose characteristics and situational contexts make them prone to willingly adopt socially negative positions in order to obtain wealth and influence. For Weber, capitalism itself was not intrinsically bad. The Puritans, with their industry and hard work, were held up in Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1904/5) as exemplars of positive, “rational” capitalism. Jews, and other pariah capitalists, however, invariably advanced a negative “irrational” capitalism typified by consumer credit, speculation, and colonialism. According to Weber, middleman minorities or “pariah capitalist groups” perverted the essentially good nature of capitalism because of their practice of “dual ethics,” or moral double-standards, which was itself a product of their sojourning nature and situational context. Weber also perceived Judaism itself as reinforcing the Jewish preference for pariah capitalism.[6]

Softer still were the ideas of Wilhelm Roscher, one of the founders of the historical school of political economy. Roscher was part of the historical economist or European Institutionalist movement (which also influenced Weber) that argued for a study of economics based on empirical work that laid special methodological emphasis on context, rather than logical philosophy. Roscher’s emphasis on context and the historical development of capitalism are exemplified in his 1875 essay “The Status of the Jews in the Middle Ages Considered from the Standpoint of Commercial Policy.”[7] In this essay, Roscher presented capitalism as neither inherently good or bad, and he made the argument that Jews, who like other middleman minorities were economic modernizers, were positive influences and crucial to the development of a burgeoning economic trading system. Gideon Reuveni offers the following summary:

According to Roscher, the modernizing role of the Jews explains the change in attitudes within the social majority: from tolerance and acceptance to exclusion and persecution. In other words, once, in the eyes of the majority the role of the Jews becomes superfluous, resentments towards the Jews become more prevalent. This cycle in relations towards Jews, Roscher observed, was not specific to the relationship between Jews and non-Jews but was rather a general development among many peoples who allow their economies to be administered by a foreign and more highly cultivated people, but later, upon having reached the necessary level of development themselves, often after intense struggles, try to emancipate themselves from this tutelage. According to Roscher, “one may defiantly speak in this connection of a historical law here.”[8]

Similar to Roscher’s ideas were the theories of the Jewish Marxist anti-Zionist Abram Leon (1918–1944). Leon, a Polish Jew said to have been executed at Auschwitz at the age of 26, published The Jewish Question: A Marxist Interpretation around 1942, in which he proposed that Jews were a “people-class.” For Leon, “Judaism mirrors the interests of a pre-capitalist mercantile class.” He explains,

Judaism was an indispensable factor in precapitalist society. It was a fundamental organism within it. That is what explains the two-thousand-year existence of Judaism in the Diaspora. The Jew was as characteristic a personage in feudal society as the lord and the serf. It was no accident that a foreign element played the role of “capital” in feudal society. Feudal society as such could not create a capitalist element; as soon as it was able to do so, precisely then it ceased being feudal. Nor was it accidental that the Jew remained a foreigner in the midst of feudal society. The “capital” of precapitalist society existed outside of its economic system. From the moment that capital begins to emerge from the womb of this social system and takes the place of the borrowed organ, the Jew is eliminated and feudal society ceases to be feudal. It is modern capitalism that has posed the Jewish problem. Not because the Jews today number close to twenty million people (the proportion of Jews to non-Jews has declined greatly since the Roman era) but because capitalism destroyed the secular basis for the existence of Judaism. Capitalism destroyed feudal society; and with it the function of the Jewish people-class. History doomed this people-class to disappearance; and thus the Jewish problem arose. The Jewish problem is the problem of adapting Judaism to modern society.

Georg Simmel, an ethnically Jewish sociologist, philosopher, and critic, moved in much the same theoretical direction as Roscher and Leon, as evidenced in his famous and still influential essay “Der Fremde” (“The Stranger”) (1908). Simmel argued that certain groups like Jews and other diaspora peoples may be members of host nations in a spatial sense but not in a social sense. They may be in the nation, but not of it. These groups are both near and far, familiar and foreign. This contextual scenario influences the behavior of “stranger” groups by permitting them freedom from convention and allowing them access to an alleged greater objectivity. For Simmel, “the Stranger,” the classic example of which in his estimation is the Jew, is “the person who comes today and stays tomorrow. He is, so to speak, the potential wanderer: although he has not moved on, he has not quite overcome the freedom of coming and going.”[9] This freedom, argues Simmel, makes “the Stranger” ideally suited to fulfil the role of middleman minority.[10] As with Roscher’s theory, which is markedly contradicted in several key areas of the historical record, there are a number of obvious logical and evidential problems with Simmel’s theory, and these will be discussed later.

Between Simmel’s 1908 essay and the 1970s, middleman minority theories continued to be advanced. With the exception of Philip Curtin and his Cross-cultural Trade in World History (1984), these efforts were developed primarily by Jewish scholars, and overwhelmingly within the context of trying to explicitly or implicitly explore, explain, or offer apologetics for the Jewish experience. For example, Abner Cohen (1921–2001), was an anthropologist at the University of London, who advanced, in his influential work Urban Ethnicity (1974) and numerous other publications, the idea that there are “trading diasporas.”[11] Of particular interest are Cohen’s ideas about “visibility strategies” pursued by such groups:

The use of symbols to maintain group boundaries can thus be seen as a cultural strategy. In fact, many groups in traditional and modern societies find that their interests are guarded better through invisible organisations such as cousinhoods, membership in a common set of social clubs, religious ties, and informal networks, than through a highly visible, formally recognised institution. At times, ethnic groups may need to heighten their visibility as strangers to maintain their interests while in other instances they may wish to lower their profile and appear to be an integral part of the society.[12]

This bears a striking similarity to the sixth chapter of Kevin MacDonald’s Separation and Its Discontents, which is concerned with visibility strategies, especially among crypto-Jews, and concludes with the argument that “this attempt to maintain separatism while nevertheless making the barriers less visible is the crux of the problem of post-Enlightenment Judaism.”[13] In fact, beginning in the 1970s, middleman minority theory began to develop several ideas that dovetail very well with the concept of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the work of Edna Bonacich.

Although the modern refinement of middleman minority theory is often traced to Hubert Blalock’s 1967 Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations, the greater scholarly interest has been shown in Edna Bonacich’s 1973 American Sociological Review article “A Theory of Middleman Minorities.”[14] Bonacich sought to refine and systematize Blalock’s theory within an anti-capitalist framework, essentially making the argument that all group conflict in such scenarios is the result of a rational competition for resources in which group characteristics and interests play a crucial role. A Jewish Marxist and anti-Zionist, Bonacich’s interpretations borrow heavily from Marx, Sombart, Weber, Roscher, and Leon, to the extent that Bonacich essentially concurs that capitalism created opportunities for exploitative middleman communities and the Jews and other middleman minorities, who possess certain predisposing characteristics including dual loyalty and a level of unscrupulousness, willingly and enthusiastically engaged in these roles.

Bonacich is well-known for her work on East Asian middleman minorities in the United States, especially her 1980 monograph The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in the Japanese American Community, but her earliest work on middleman minorities clearly demonstrates a concern with the Jewish experience.[15] In her discussion of middleman minorities in the 1973 article, Bonacich describes Jews as “perhaps the epitome of the form.” Some of the key features of the 1973 article include the arguments that Jews and other middleman minorities are essentially economic “teams,” and that these teams rely upon very high levels of ethnocentrism and related social and economic strategies, which in turn enable them to succeed in individualistic societies. Bonacich writes,

The modern industrial capitalist treats his workers impartially as economic instruments; he is as willing to exploit his own son as he is a stranger. This universalism, the isolation of each competitor, is absent in middleman economic activity, where primordial ties of family, region, sect, and ethnicity unite people against the surrounding, often individualistic economy. [emphasis added][16]

Bonacich makes some very interesting, and controversial, remarks on the nature of conflict between middleman minorities and their hosts, with special reference to Jews. For Bonacich, accusations that Jews have simply been scapegoats for the woes of Europeans are based on nothing more than a “surface impression.”[17] While noting that middleman minorities “are noteworthy for the acute hostility they have faced,” it remains that,

host members have reason for feeling hostile toward middleman groups. … Even the extremity of the host reaction can be understood as “conflict” behavior. The reason is that the economic and organisational power of middleman groups makes them extremely difficult to dislodge. … The difficulty of breaking entrenched middleman monopolies, the difficulty of controlling the growth and extension of their economic power, pushes host countries to ever more extreme reactions. One finds increasingly harsh measures, piled on one another, until, when all else fails, “final solutions” are enacted.[18] [emphasis added]

Bonacich has also argued that Jews and other middleman minorities do engage in economic and social “dual loyalty,” and that middleman minorities do in fact “drain” resources away from host populations and can become very powerful as a result. This then frequently causes host elites and masses to unite against the sojourning element, a conflict that can escalate rapidly if the sojourning element refuses to give up its monopolies. Bonacich explicitly rejects any idea that “host hostility is self-generated (from psychological problems or cultural traditions),” arguing instead that “the middleman and the host society come in conflict because elements in each group have incompatible goals.” With her apparent justification of host violence against middleman minorities, including Jews, as well as her objective view of certain Jewish characteristics, Bonacich’s theory has been heavily criticized in some quarters, despite its ongoing influence in contemporary sociology. Robert Cherry, for example, has lamented that Bonacich’s ideas on middleman minorities “reinforce persistent, negative Jewish stereotypes.”[19]

Discussion

Before moving to an assessment of the merits and inadequacies of middleman minority theory in explaining Jewish history, it’s worth reflecting on the history of the theory in light of Steven Pinker’s claim that it represents a rival, or “more convincing,” analysis of the Jewish historical trajectory. The first problem, of course, is that, despite Pinker’s lavish praise, Thomas Sowell is not remotely regarded within scholarship as a leading or original thinker in the area of middleman minority theory. Not only does discussion of middleman minorities form a relatively small element of Sowell’s Migrations And Cultures, but what does appear is highly derivative of the work of Edna Bonacich, Walter Zenner, and others.

A further problem is Pinker’s assumption that there exists a single, unified theory on middleman minorities that will help explain the Jewish historical experience, and that somehow this will also be sufficient to counter the theory of Kevin MacDonald, or at least offer a more convincing framework that would allow MacDonald’s ideas to be dispensed with. As should already be clear from this brief, and incomplete, bibliographical overview, within middleman minority theory there is a plethora of often competing interpretations, as well as a general problem of definitions. Walter Zenner, a key proponent of middleman minority theory, concedes that “we tend to make our definitions and models fit the prototypical group. For decades, the Jews were the archetype.”[20] In other words, for a considerable time, middleman minority theory was built around trying to explain the experience of Jews, with other groups haphazardly mapped onto the theory in way that tried to give the impression of similarity, even where these similarities were thin to non-existent. Bonacich has made roughly the same argument, asserting that middleman minority theory should be regarded as incomplete because it can only point to an “ideal type,” and

In reality there are problems of fit between any actual ethnic group and this picture, problems in establishing which or how many of the traits a population need have before it can be classified as a middleman minority.[21]

Bonacich, very reasonably in my opinion, proposes that middleman minority theory, of which she herself is a pioneer, is something of a misnomer and should be regarded as little more than “a useful sensitiser to a host of interrelated variables.”[22] One is therefore pressed by Pinker’s claim to ask not only which of the many strands of middleman minority theories Steven Pinker is praising, but also just how “convincing” and “magisterial” he can find it given the field’s leading contemporary thinkers regard their work in such ambiguous terms.

Finally, it is not at all clear how any of the aspects of middleman minority theory obviate the need for a deeper theoretical framework in which to understand the behaviors and contexts under study. Middleman minority theory, as remarked above, is an incomplete tool, and has little to offer in terms of deeper explanatory value for such relevant key concepts under discussion as resource competition, ecological strategies, visibility strategies, psychological attitudes toward the majority, and social identity theory. One of the strong points of Kevin MacDonald’s work, which is truly cross-disciplinary and unusually well-equipped in terms of the relevant historical literature, is that is does offer such an analysis, and can be argued to fill a lot of the logical and evidential gaps of middleman minority theory. This is not to say that the two frameworks are in opposition, but that the concept of a group evolutionary strategy can be usefully and seamlessly integrated into middleman minority theory, especially in relation to Jews.

It’s been continually remarked by many scholars in the field that Jews should be regarded as either an “ideal type,” “the epitome of the form,” a singular example, or otherwise unique case—even within the context of broad comparative approaches with other trading diaspora peoples. The qualities that have made Jews so unique — cultural, historical, religious, and even biological — are rarely remarked or elaborated upon in sociological studies of middleman minorities, which are often lacking in depth in terms of their historical analysis. As will be discussed below, Zenner, in particular, has highlighted ways in which Jews do not fit the standard middleman minority pattern, especially in terms of their extravagant and influential involvement in the culture and politics of the host nation (see also MacDonald’s Diaspora Peoples on the Overseas Chinese, xlii ff). Unfortunately, middleman minority literature has little to say in terms of further explanatory theory on how or why Jews came to both define and exceed the middleman typology. Here, middleman minority theory not only isn’t a rival for MacDonald’s work, it positively cries out for it.

Continued in Part II


[1] Bonacich, Edna. “A Theory of Middleman Minorities.” American Sociological Review 38, no. 5 (1973): 583–94, (589).

[2] Francois-Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Oeuvres Complètes (Geneva, 1756), Vol. 7. Ch.1. See also Dictionnaire Philosophique (Basle, 1764), Vol. 14.

[3] B. Bauer, The Jewish Problem (Die Judenfrage, 1843) ed Ellis Rivkin and trans. Helen Lederer (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College—Jewish Institute of Religion, 1958).

[4] K. Marx, On the Jewish Problem (Zur Judenfrage, 1844) ed Ellis Rivkin and trans. Helen Lederer (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College—Jewish Institute of Religion, 1958).

[5] W. Sombart, Der moderne Kapitalismus, Munich and Leipzig 1913. This work was published in an English translation by E. Epstein under the title, The Quintessence of Capitalism, London, 1915.

[6] W. P. Zenner, Minorities in the Middle: A Cross-Cultural Analysis (Albany: State University of New York, 1991), 5.

[7] W. Roscher, “Die Stellung der Juden im Mittelalter, betrachtet vom Standpunkt der allgemeine Handelspolitik,” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft Bd. 31 (1875) S. 503–526.

[8] G. Reuveni, “Prolegomena to an “Economic Turn” in Jewish History,” in G. Reuveni (ed) The Economy in Jewish History: New Perspectives on the Interrelationship Between Ethnicity and Economic Life (Berghahn, 2011), 3.

[9] As the son of Catholic and Lutheran converts from Judaism, Simmel’s relationship to his Jewishness is fascinating in itself. See A. Morris-Reich, The Quest for Jewish Assimilation in Modern Social Science, (New York: Routledge, 2008), chapter 4. For the influence of Simmel’s stranger minority theory see Werner Cahnman, “Pariahs, Strangers, and Court Jews — A Conceptual Classification,” Sociological Analysis, 35 (1974); C. R. Hallpike, “Some problems in Cross-Cultural Comparison,” in The Translation of Culture, T. Beidelman (ed), (London: Tavistock, 1971); Hilda Kuper, “Strangers in Plural Societies: Asians in South Africa and Uganda,” in Pluralism in Africa, Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith (eds) (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); Jack H. Porter, “The Urban Middleman: A Comparative Analysis,” Comparative Social Research, 4 (1981);  R. A. Reminick, “The Evil Eye Belief among the Amhara of Ethiopia,” Ethnology, 13 (1974), W. Shack and E. Skinner, Strangers in African Societies (Berkelely: University of California Press, 1979); Paul Siu, “The Sojourner,” American Journal of Sociology, 58, (1952).

[10] J. Stone, Racial Conflict in Contemporary Society, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 96.

[11] This coinage is frequently attributed to Philip Curtin, who employs the term in his Cross-cultural Trade in World History (1984), but the term was in use by Cohen, within a strict thematic sense, as early as the latter’s 1974 chapter “Cultural Strategies in the Organisation of Trading Diasporas,” in C. Meillassoux (ed) The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa (London, 1971).

[12] Quoted in W. P. Zenner, Minorities in the Middle: A Cross-Cultural Analysis (Albany: State University of New York, 1991), 8.

[13] K. MacDonald, Separation and Its Discontents: Toward an Evolutionary Theory of Anti-Semitism, 187.

[14] E. Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman Minorities.” American Sociological Review 38, no. 5 (1973): 583–94.

[15] E. Bonacich, The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in the Japanese American Community (Berekely: University of California Press, 1980).

[16] Ibid, 589.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid, 592.

[19] R. Cherry, “American Jewry and Bonacich’s Middleman Minority Theory,” Review of Radical Political Economics, 22 (2–3), 158–173, 161.

[20] W. P. Zenner, Minorities in the Middle: A Cross-Cultural Analysis (Albany: State University of New York, 1991), 10. See also W. Zenner, “American Jewry in the light of middleman minority theories,” Contemporary Jewry, 5:1 (1980), 11–30, 18. Zenner argues that “As a synthetic concept, the phrase “middleman minority” is difficult to define so as to cover all groups so designated.”

[21] E. Bonacich, The Economic Basis of Ethnic Solidarity: Small Business in the Japanese American Community (Berekely: University of California Press, 1980), 22. See also E. Bonacich, “A Theory of Middleman Minorities.” American Sociological Review 38, no. 5 (1973): 583–94, 585.

[22] Ibid, 24.

A sociologia como religião

The Sacred Project of American Sociology
Smith, Christian
New York: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Já se sabia, faz algum tempo, que a esquerda mantém a academia sob sequestro. O livro de Christian Smith O projeto sagrado da sociologia americana é um estudo de caso sobre esse fenômeno numa disciplina em que o controle da esquerda é quase total, analisado da perspectiva de sua especialidade — a sociologia da religião.

Smith, professor da Universidade de Notre Dame, acredita que a sociologia acadêmica teve auspicioso começo enquanto empresa científica, secular e naturalística. Com o passar do tempo, entretanto, ela perdeu muito de sua objetividade acadêmica. Atualmente, “A sociologia americana é melhor compreendida como projeto profundamente sagrado” (p. X). O autor emprega o termo “Sagrado” no sentido que lhe dá Durkheim, ou seja, alguma coisa sacrossanta, reverencial e inquestionável.1

Na minha opinião, o projeto sagrado que Smith descreve no Capítulo 1 mostra impressionante semelhança com a ideologia do marxismo cultural ou da justiça social, embora ele não faça uso dessas expressões. Esse projeto sagrado (daí as maiúsculas: O Projeto) consiste numa perquirição espiritual, num tipo de religião secular que busca abolir a desigualdade humana, as hierarquias humanas, os constrangimentos sobre os homens da parte de outros homens ou até mesma da natureza. Tais objetivos inalcançáveis e utópicos provocaram frustração e fanatismo no passado, não se podendo esperar efeito diverso da mesma causa no futuro.

As ideologias políticas podem, às vezes, reunir conceitos nebulosos, e a alguns estudiosos não agrada a tentativa de entendê-las segundo o esquema de esquerda e direita. Mas esse é um modelo útil aqui para efeito de contraste. A autêntica Direita acredita na nobreza dos laços do dever e da lealdade que ligam um homem à sua família, à sua comunidade e à sua etnia. Antes que a igualdade, a Direita celebra a excelência — força, beleza, inteligência. A desigualdade e a hierarquia são intrínsecas à condição humana, e alguma coação sobre indivíduos e grupos é, com frequência, necessidade positiva. E a Direita, quando no poder, busca acabar com a injustiça, a exploração e a pobreza, mas seus esforços nesse sentido não são de alcance global, limitando-se ao âmbito de suas próprias comunidades étnicas.

Ao contrário, O Projeto consiste num individualismo autocentrado. Ele procura “a emancipação, a igualdade, a afirmação moral de toda a humanidade como conjunto de indivíduos enquanto agentes autônomos de si mesmos […] que devem viver suas vidas como bem entenderem e construir para si a identidade que desejarem, estabelecendo as relações e vivências como for de sua vontade […]” (p. 7-8). Embora Smith reconheça que O Projeto tenha recebido conteúdo “revolucionário e socialmente utópico” da “tradição marxista”, como também “sentido terapêutico   […] da tradição freudiana”, de não poucas consequências em termos de influência, esse autor acredita que O Projeto consiste, essencialmente, em simples individualismo ocidental, no contexto maior da tradição iluminista (p. 9). Esse é um ponto de vista, ou seja, O Projeto como o liberalismo levado ao extremo da sua falta de lógica. Eu discordo dessa perspectiva, e Smith volta a tratar da origem do Projeto no Capítulo 4, assim falaremos disso mais adiante.2

O autor não pertence, certamente, à Direita dissidente, e embora ele pareça se enquadrar em algumas visões sociais tradicionais, ele mesmo diz não ser conservador. Eu o situaria, talvez, como um centrista cristão no espectro ideológico. Embora altamente crítico quanto ao Projeto, Smith tem sentimentos ambíguos em relação aos seus fins. Ele decerto censure mais os meios do que os fins. A agenda atual do Projeto é simplesmente uma ponte longe demais. Pior ainda, O Projeto sequestrou a sociologia, “a rainha das ciências sociais”, fazendo dela sua ancila, com o que comprometeu a imparcialidade científica da disciplina e a integridade acadêmica.3

Smith caracteriza O Projeto como “transformador”, “radical,” até “revolucionário”, mas não como remediador ou reformista. Isso parece contraditar a afirmação dele acima referida sobre a inserção do Projeto em tradições anteriores. O Projeto é elitista porque “afinal, as pessoas comuns não são confiáveis (já que não pegam o ‘espírito da coisa’)”. (p. 13).

Um dos objetivos do Projeto é a redefinição da família. Meias-medidas, a exemplo da união civil para casais homossexuais, são inaceitáveis. Só o casamento entre pessoas do mesmo sexo pode “assegurar o devido reconhecimento moral e social oficialmente formulado, com a aprovação, a validação, a apreciação de que as pessoas precisam para que se sintam bem consigo mesmas” (p. 14). O Projeto tem por certo que identidades herdadas e adscritivas tais como a raça e o sexo podem ser reconstruídas conforme se queira. Daí que Rachel Dolezal possa ser uma ativista negra; e a senadora Elizabeth Warren, uma princesa xeroqui — bem, pelo menos por um tempinho. De qualquer forma, esse é um objetivo que os “religiosos” continuam a perseguir.

Quão hegemônico é O Projeto na sociologia acadêmica? Smith estima o número de fiéis dogmatizados entre 30% e 40% dos sociólogos. Entre 50% e 60% seriam aderentes, mas não tão zelosos de sua fé. Esses números indicam que, no máximo, 20% podem não seguir o credo, mas se comportam como Maria vai com as outras para levar algum tipo de vantagem.

No Capítulo 2, de longe o mais extenso, Smith aponta as evidências de que O Projeto apoderou-se da sociologia. Ele começa examinando os títulos numa exposição de livros durante uma conferência anual da Associação Americana de Sociologia (sigla inglesa: ASA). Alguns desses títulos: The price of paradise: the cost of inequality and a vision for a more equitable America; Breaking women: gender, race and the new politics of imprisonment; The hip-hop generation fights back: youth activism and post-civil rights politics; e Punished: policing the lives of black and latino boys (p. 32). Muitos livros defendiam explicitamente O Projeto; nenhum deles opunha-se explicitamente.

A seguir o autor examina os livros resenhados numa edição recente da Contemporary Sociology, a revista oficial da ASA. Poucos livros são selecionados para resenha, assim a ASA considera os escolhidos como especialmente importantes. Entre os títulos, constavam estes dois: Equality with a vengeance: men’s rights groups, battered women, and the antifeminist backlash; e Creating a new racial order: how immigration, multiracialism, genomics, and the young can remake race in America (p. 38).

Além de livros e resenhas de livros, O Projeto abrange ainda artigos em periódicos. Smith nota que os artigos podem parecer “mais científicos” do que as monografias supracitadas, mas muitos deles também são lanças e escudos da causa sagrada. O autor examina ainda trabalhos recentes saídos na American Sociology Review (ASR). Assim como a Contemporary Sociology, a ASR é publicação oficial da ASA, sendo geralmente considerada “a melhor revista americana de sociologia” (p. 47). Qualquer área de pesquisa é um campo aberto para o avanço da Cruzada. O trabalho de Robert Putman, por exemplo, sofre campanha de descrédito. Tudo porque ele indica a “perda de capital social” e o crescente isolamento social nos Estados Unidos. Alegam mil e uma questiúnculas metodológicas, “denunciando” supostas falhas que vão da coleta dos dados à sua interpretação. Alguns dos alvos visados estudam “o colapso das famílias nucleares estáveis” e “a perda de linguagem cultural compartida de comunidade e responsabilidade” (p. 48). Porquanto estas sejam preocupações associadas aos conservadores, e em virtude de O Projeto “estar implicado nas mudanças socioculturais que podem ser criticadas por seu caráter socialmente destrutivo”, os Projetistas tentam fazer crer que “todas as mudanças socioculturais operadas desde os anos sessentas — as quais críticos situam na origem do declínio do capital social, da conectividade e da comunidade — não representam, na realidade, nenhum tipo de problema” (p. 49).

Continuando, Smith observa que O Projeto envolve não apenas “academismo”, mas também ativismo. “A ASA tem organizado uma série de programas de conferências para ativistas nos seus encontros nacionais” com a finalidade de promover mudanças sociais e inclusão como forma de combate à opressão e à desigualdade. (p. 60). “The ASA declara sem meias-palavras que a sociologia americana não se ocupa apenas com a condução e a divulgação de trabalhos acadêmicos, mas também com a indução da mudança social por meio do ativismo (p. 62).

Outro conjunto de evidências é apontado nos livros didáticos de sociologia. Geralmente, os cursos de introdução à sociologia integram o currículo básico exigido nos cursos universitários de graduação. Assim, a cada semestre, milhares de estudantes de 18 a 21 anos, portanto muito sugestionáveis, seguem esses cursos. Eu não me lembro muito do curso de introdução à sociologia que fiz há muitos anos, mas hoje esses cursos mais se parecem como classes de doutrinação para a formação de marxistas culturais. De acordo com Smith, num típico curso de sociologia, os estudantes são “despojados da visão de senso comum sobre a liberdade e a responsabilidade […], são ‘habilitados’ para a tarefa de se juntar a outros para mudar a sociedade […] e são desconvencidos do valor do modo de vida de sua cultura, o que pavimenta o caminho para um tolerante multiculturalismo” (p. 73). O capítulo sobre “Sexo e sexualidade” de um livro de sociologia bastante usado inclui tópicos como “homofobia, teoria queer, transas eventuais (suas vantagens e desvantagens)” e sexo extramarital (em tempos de mais “repressão”, chamado de adultério) (p. 84).

Deixando os livros-textos, Smith passa a tratar de outro conjunto de provas que ele chamou de “histórias reveladoras”. Aqui ele escreve que a obtenção de estabilidade no magistério superior pode depender da “correta perspectiva” do candidato sobre questões sociais e políticas. Cabe mencionar que a estabilidade é o último obstáculo para se chegar ao cargo de professor universitário em tempo integral. Primeiramente um estudante deve ser admitido num programa de doutorado, deve escrever e ter aprovada a sua tese sob a orientação (vigilância, na verdade) de um titular, para então ser contratado como professor, depois do que ele poderá conseguir jornada de trabalho de tempo integral. Cada uma dessas fases serve de grade epistemológica para impedir o ingresso de acadêmicos dissidentes nas universidades. Trata-se de um sistema fechado com pouca ou nenhuma forma de responsabilização externa. Ao longo dos anos esse esquema conduziu à hegemonia esquerdista nas profissões liberais e ciências sociais.

Desse consenso institucional excludente [no original: groupthink] resultam pesquisas fraudulentas que só são descobertas depois de anos; e, depois de décadas, refutadas. O melhor (ou pior) exemplo disso é o “estudo” de Lenore Weitzman sobre as consequências do divórcio. Weitzman, judia e feminista radical, publicou trabalho “concluindo” que, após o divórcio, o nível de vida das mulheres cai 73%, e o dos homens sobe 42%.4 “A pesquisa dela mereceu premiação da ASA em 1986 por ‘importante contribuição à investigação acadêmica’. Foi resenhada em pelo menos 22 revistas de ciência social e 11 revistas jurídicas. As revelações de Weitzman foram citadas em mais de 170 artigos de revistas e jornais, 348 artigos de ciências sociais, 250 artigos jurídicos, 24 causas de cortes estaduais e numa decisão da Suprema Corte. (p. 100).

Pelo menos um sociólogo, Richard Peterson, permaneceu altamente céptico em relação às “descobertas” de Weitzman. Ele pediu os dados da pesquisa para revisão. Weitzman negou-se a atender à solicitação, tergiversando. Depois de resistir por 10 anos, Weitzman finalmente cedeu e cedeu os dados, ao ser advertida pela “National Science Foundation, financiadora do trabalho, de que não receberia mais recursos se não o fizesse” (p. 98). O que Peterson constatou foi um emaranhado de muitas incorreções, inconsistências e dados omitidos. Então ele refez todo o trabalho como melhor podia. Os resultados a que chegou: uma queda de 27% no padrão de vida da mulher e uma elevação de apenas 10% no padrão de vida do homem. Nesse meio tempo, outra investigação, maior e realizada em melhores condições, revelaria que tanto os homens quanto as mulheres saíam mais pobres de um divórcio.

Smith destaca que a pesquisa sobre o divórcio que ele contestou não esteve restrita ao debate acadêmico. Ela teve consequências no mundo real. As “informações” de Weitzman subsidiaram cortes e legislaturas na reformulação do marco legal do divórcio e acarretaram perdas financeiras sérias para os homens. “No final das contas, os enormes erros reconhecidos no trabalho de Weitzman — os quais motivaram grandes mudanças legais e culturais quanto ao divórcio, inclusive algumas que afetaram profunda e negativamente os homens divorciados — não prejudicaram a carreira dela. Atualmente ela integra o programa Clarence J. Robinson da George Mason University, Fairfax, Virgínia, como professora de Sociologia e Direito” (p. 101). E agora o remate de toda essa encenação: 20 anos depois de ter caído em descrédito, “o desarrazoado de Weitzman continua a ser citado ainda hoje no mais vendido livro de introdução à sociologia do mercado” (p. 104).

O escândalo de Weitzman é exemplo frisante do viés confirmatório e dos dois pesos e duas medidas para a avaliação da pesquisa nas ciências sociais. Se acontece, como costuma acontecer, de a pesquisa chegar às conclusões “corretas” — isto é, aquelas de acordo com a agenda do Projeto, como foi o caso assustador do que Weitzman “descobriu” sobre o divórcio — então a investigação é aceita de olhos fechados. Por outro lado, se os resultados da pesquisa estiverem em desacordo com O Projeto, isso indicará erros de concepção e análise no trabalho. Neste caso, nem todas as evidências do mundo bastarão para livrar qualquer trabalho de resultados indesejados da condenação como “pseudociência”, termo de que os esquerdistas gostam muito, aliás. Mas, na realidade, pseudociência é a deles, que rasgam seda para os “irmãos” do Projeto pelo testemunho de sua “fé” acadêmica, enquanto atacam com as críticas mais extremas os trabalhos dos “hereges” que lhes profanam a “divindade”.

No Capítulo 3, Smith trata desse aspecto religioso, mostrando a forte semelhança entre as práticas dos sociólogos acadêmicos e aquelas do que seria uma comunidade mística de espíritos iluminados. Primeiramente, aqueles iniciados chegados à pós-graduação, portanto já adiantados no palmilhar da senda luminosa, são aí submetidos a “longo e rigoroso processo de ensino-aprendizagem, no qual assimilam o conhecimento da verdade última sobre a realidade do mundo. Então, da posição elevada que alcançam pela contemplação da Essência superior, os iniciados chegam a transcender a inteligência desprezível dos homens e mulheres profanos” (p. 115). Uma vez integrados plenamente ao corpo eclesiástico, os pastores buscam novas ovelhas entre os mais promissores catecúmenos de seu redil, aqueles que mais claramente obedecem ao Chamado e se mostram capazes de melhor servir aos desígnios sagrados do Projeto (p. 116). Finalmente, os eleitos devem estar “sempre alerta e vigilantes contra os lobos em pele de ovelha, os hereges, os infiéis, os traidores que podem estar à espreita dentro da própria congregação e levar o Projeto à perdição”. (p. 118).

O autor volta a falar das origens do Projeto no Capítulo 4, e aqui eu discordo da análise de Smith. Como mencionado na discussão do Capítulo 1, o autor vê O Projeto como a última fase do desenvolvimento do liberalismo ocidental e do individualismo. Eu vejo O Projeto mais como descontinuidade, não apenas em relação à tradição ocidental em geral, como também, especificamente, em relação aos homens que criaram a sociologia enquanto disciplina acadêmica no fim do século XIX e no começo do século XX.

Em primeiro lugar, deve ser considerado que o liberalismo e o Iluminismo foram produtos da mente de homens brancos ocidentais; bem ao contrário, O Projeto é explicitamente antiocidental, antibranco e antimasculino. Em segundo lugar, não obstante tenha o Iluminismo celebrado o indivíduo, ele o fez de forma restrita. Neste ponto cumpre examinar os efeitos políticos e sociais do pensamento iluminista mais do que o Iluminismo como movimento puramente filosófico. Na Europa Ocidental e na América do Norte, o Iluminismo pode ser representado pelo republicanismo dos Patriarcas da Independência Americana e seus precursores. Esses homens frequentemente escreviam e falavam sobre a necessidade da virtude e do autocontrole, sobre a riqueza coletiva, sobre o bem comum. Na Europa Central e na Europa Oriental, o Iluminismo foi incorporado pelos Déspotas Esclarecidos, os monarcas absolutistas dispostos a reformar suas sociedades de cima para baixo. Ambas as variantes eram bem diferentes, talvez a própria antítese do delicado vale-tudo em que todo o mundo pode fazer o que bem entende, conforme preconiza o  individualismo do Projeto. Em terceiro lugar, o Iluminismo e a Revolução Científica desenvolveram-se pári-pássu. Um dos topos de Smith é a perda da objetividade científica na sociologia. O Projeto tem base na fé, trata-se de uma religião secular. Seus alicerces não se constituem cientificamente. Nele opera-se sofisticada manipulação das ciências sociais e biológicas para que sirvam a sua agenda. A Direita Dissidente tem base mais firme na ciência do que a esquerda contemporânea.

O autor tece breves considerações sobre Lester Ward, Edward Ross e outros dos “primeiros sociólogos americanos que escreveram livros didáticos” (p. 122). O que Smith não quis reconhecer foi a profunda influência da teoria evolucionária, do racialismo e da eugenia sobre as nascentes ciências sociais da época. 5 Veja-se, por exemplo, Lester Ward, o primeiro nome na lista de Smith. Ward criou o Departamento de Sociologia da Brown University e foi o primeiro presidente da ASA. Nascido em Illinois de família provinda da Nova Inglaterra, ele lutou na Guerra de Secessão pelo exército da União, chegando a ser gravemente ferido. Não obstante, Ward era dotado de forte consciência racial. Ele “estabeleceu uma distinção entre as raças ‘históricas’ ou ‘mais bem dotadas’ originárias da Europa e outros grandes grupos raciais de negros, vermelhos e amarelos […] Ele falou abertamente de raças ‘superiores’, ‘inferiores’ e ‘decadentes’”. 6  E apesar de seu contexto cultural, Ward mostrava sincera preocupação com a segurança das mulheres brancas do Sul.

As raças inferiores, argumentava Ward, tinham extraordinário apetite sexual por membros das raças superiores, porque obscura e instintivamente nisso percebiam via para o melhoramento da sua própria raça. Um negro que viola a mulher branca, declarou Ward, é compelido por algo mais do que a simples luxúria. “Esta é a voz inaudita mas imperiosa da natureza a comandá-lo, mesmo sob o risco da lei de linchamento”, disse Ward, “para erguer sua raça a nível um pouco mais alto.” Por outro lado, a fúria da comunidade branca onde tal ato tem lugar é da mesma forma natural. 7

Assim pensava o primeiro presidente da Associação Americana de Sociologia.

No passado, quando o estabilismo era confrontado com o racialismo dos fundadores da sociologia, a exemplo de Ward, a reação era tentar minimizar ou desconsiderar tais convicções como meras prevenções ultrapassadas de que já se havia defecado a sociedade, da forma como também se expurgara das visões errôneas no campo da medicina ou astronomia. No ambiente mais polarizado de hoje, tais convicções são vistas como prova de um alastrante racismo, ao mesmo tempo individual e institucional, antigo e novo, de que se deve cortar os ramos e arrancar as raízes.  A consciência racial branca e a preferência pela raça branca eram, obviamente, parte do senso comum no passado. A experiência de Ward como militar da União não enfraqueceu as preocupações dele com o bem-estar das mulheres brancas do Sul. O sangue fala mais alto do que diferenças regionais. É evidente que ele refletiu profundamente sobre a questão e analisou-a de perspectiva evolucionária.

Outro nome na lista de Smith, Edward A. Ross explicitou de forma ainda mais precisa suas visões sobre a raça. Homem alto e forte, defensor de hábitos rigorosos e de uma vida enérgica, amigo de Teddy Roosevelt, Ross foi quem cunhou a expressão “suicídio racial”, depois empregada por Roosevelt e Madison Grant. Ross concluiu o seu curso de doutorado na Universidade Johns Hopkins e a seguir participou da criação do Departamento de Sociologia da Universidade de Wisconsin, onde lecionaria por 31 anos. Ele também presidiu a ASA como o seu terceiro presidente. Ross não via utilidade em dar direitos eleitorais aos negros: “O voto não faz o negão virar Platão”.8 Ele também lutou, com firmeza, pela limitação da imigração. Ele acreditava que “O dinheiro judaico […] estava financiando a campanha pela imigração ilimitada, pretensamente em benefício de todos os imigrantes” e que, na verdade, “Uma só raça estava por trás dessa campanha, agindo pelo próprio interesse”. Conforme Ross, “Os judeus responderam ao benefício do asilo americano com tremendo malefício: eles minaram o controle dos Estados Unidos sobre o seu próprio destino racial”.9 Ross escreveu um dos primeiros livros de introdução à sociologia, Foundations of Sociology (1905). Algumas partes desse livro poderiam ter sido escritas por Madison Grant. Deve-se enfatizar que homens assim como Ward, Ross e mesmo Grant eram progressistas que combatiam o interesse das corporações e apoiavam os trabalhadores, aos quais mostraram-se solidários. Eles eram verdadeiramente progressistas, e o estudo das ciências sociais conduziu-os para o realismo racial. Eu não posso entender por que escritores da Direita chamam hoje os seus oponentes de “progressistas”.

As evidências apontadas acima indicam o revertério havido na sociologia durante o século XX. O Projeto é, de fato, revolucionário. Foi dado um giro de 180 graus nas questões sociais, especialmente quanto a raça e sexo. Embora Smith reconheça a influência do marxismo e do feminismo na sociologia contemporânea, eu não acredito que ele tenha plena consciência de quão graves foram as mudanças operadas. O Projeto adotou elementos da teoria trotskista da revolução permanente para a mudança social, a par de princípios da contínua Revolução Cultural maoísta, as quais não têm prazo de encerramento.

Smith termina o Capítulo 4 dizendo que o sequestro da sociologia pelo Projeto não era inevitável. De novo, as evidências acima confirmam essa conclusão. As ciências sociais como um todo poderiam ter continuado na via do naturalismo ao longo do século XX, tendo por referência as ciências da vida, especialmente a biologia evolucionária. Existe certa tendência natural de leitura da história num sentido reverso, ou seja, da frente para trás, por onde eventos ou processos de décadas ou séculos passados são considerados teleologicamente, assim como se tivessem existido como preparação para o irresistível advento das condições do presente. Uma visão mais equilibrada do passado percebe caminhos abandonados nas encruzilhadas da história que poderiam ter sido os escolhidos.

O Capítulo 5 intitula-se “Consequences”, mas eu acho que um título melhor seria “Os sete pecados capitais da Sociologia”. Estes pecados são os seguintes:

  1. 1. Desonestidade: “A disciplina tem sido desonesta consigo mesma, com os estudantes e seus pais, com os administradores e doadores das universidades e com os contribuintes americanos”. (p.134). Com muita frequência a sociologia torna-se propaganda disfarçada de ciência social.
  2. 2. Hipocrisia: “Apesar de disciplina muito obsedada pela mazela americana da desigualdade social, a sociologia mostra-se elitista, estruturando-se em termos de estratificação segundo hierarquias de status e poder que operam processos sociais excludentes para a proteção de privilégios, tanto quanto qualquer outra instituição na sociedade”. (p. 136).
  3. 3. Proselitismo gramscista: transformada em veículo institucional de propaganda política, o aparato acadêmico-editorial da sociologia tem servido à doutrinação “progressista” em favor de toda sorte de inversão política e social nas guerras culturais pela “revolução”, agora assimilada a uma religião que promete o paraíso a toda minoria descontente. A subversão minoritária volta-se não só contra a sociedade, mas também contra a própria natureza.

Os quatro pecados restantes estão estreitamente relacionados:

  1. 4. Padronização pensamental: toda ideia dissidente é proscrita. A seleção por conformidade e o isolamento e expurgo de estudantes e professores que não pensam da forma politicamente correta são processos conducentes à formação de sociólogos alienados, perdidos na confusão que fazem entre fatos sociais e artigos de uma fé intolerante, embora cultuada em nome da tolerância.
  2. 5. Miopia social: a incapacidade para pensar “fora da caixa”. Tudo o que a religião acadêmica do esquerdismo não pode enquadrar é visto como abominação. Toda resistência política ou cultural ou simplesmente comportamento autônomo de oposição sofre estigmatização como preconceitos diversos: sociais, raciais, sexuais… Estes “males” recebem o castigo expiatório num gradiente que vai do simples ostracismo ao extremo da prisão e até mesmo da pena de morte, passando por censura e multas, no que se configura como processo repressivo dinamizado pelos interesses da burocracia da indústria judiciária a serviço do capital transnacional e outras forças globalistas.

 

  1. Corrupção da avaliação interpares: caso paradigmático deste sexto pecado foi o escândalo de que tratamos, o qual teve Weitzman como impenitente protagonista. “Asinus asinum fricat”, diriam os latinos.
  2. 7. Incapacidade de autocrítica: este sétimo pecado decorre do que parece ser a óbvia correção da teologia do Projeto aos olhos de seus crentes. Estes, em sua cegueira sectária, “não percebem o dogmatismo religioso do Projeto, que assim passa por ser a realidade autoevidente”. (p. 176).

O Capítulo 7 inicia com a interrogação “What Is Sociology Good For?” [“Para que serve a Sociologia?”]. Nota-se que Smith sentiu embaraços na resposta. Às vezes, o autor manifesta que “a sociologia, como uma empresa, deveria ser fechada, simplesmente”, ou que devesse, “talvez, ser enxugada” (p. 184). A Sociologia pode ser muito boa para a descrição das características sociais, os problemas começam quando ideologia e política se misturam “sob o disfarce de teoria e interpretação”, distorcendo a pesquisa sociológica. A solução evidente consiste em substituir a perversa e destrutiva ideologia do Projeto por orientação mais saudável e objetiva que corresponda às necessidades da sociedade.

O Capítulo 8 finaliza o texto recapitulando sumariamente os principais pontos. Há um apêndice onde o autor descreve brevemente suas crenças pessoais. No começo do livro, Smith havia dito que era contrário ao Projeto Sagrado – o qual eu identifico com a Esquerda – mas que não era conservador, que não chegava a ser da verdadeira Direita. Sua própria ideologia – o Personalismo Realista Crítico – valoriza “mais a pessoa do que o indivíduo, defende a solidariedade comunitária contra a atomização” (p. 200). Esta curta descrição não deixa claro o entendimento que tem o autor do conceito de comunidade. O Personalismo Realista Crítico é minudenciado em outro trabalho de Smith: To Flourish or Destruct: A Personalist Theory of Human Goods, Motivations, and Evil (2015).

O que então, afinal, podemos aprender com o livro? Eu diria, antes de tudo, que estudantes e professores de sociologia devem ler esse livro, assim como qualquer um simplesmente interessado nessa disciplina ou que pretenda ser aluno ou professor da matéria. Esta rápida resenha, é óbvio, não pode expor de forma abrangente as teses de Smith, nem questionar todas as alegações dele. Além disso, meus pontos de vista e os de meus leitores podem não coincidir. De qualquer forma, cabe indicar aos leigos as principais questões discutidas, o que faço a seguir:

(1) A Esquerda contemporânea é uma religião secular. Esta é, claramente, a principal mensagem do livro, e não há nada de novo nisso. Analistas de um século atrás já haviam comparado o Partido Bolchevista a uma ordem religiosa. As religiões, seculares ou sectárias, pautam-se pela fé, de sorte que a razão ou a evidência empírica não pesa sobre a consciência dos crentes mais apaixonados. Eles não querem o diálogo, eles não aceitam a contradição. Os justiçadores sociais de hoje são tão facciosos quanto aqueles das guerras religiosas do passado.

(2) O livro mostra que aqueles contrários à tomada da sociologia pelo Projeto omitiram-se diante do assalto ou, no máximo, ofereceram resistência passiva. O mesmo se passou na mais ampla arena social e política. A ciência e a razão não bastam. Alguma coisa espiritual está faltando. A Direita precisa de um “intenso engajamento emocional” numa causa comum e de uma “subordinação a propósito coletivo mais alto”, que Smith observa na Esquerda. Os conservadores não têm esse espírito e nunca o terão. É óbvio que, se a Esquerda não for confrontada por contraforça superior, ela irá prevalecer.

(3) Os departamentos acadêmicos são sistemas fechados a par dos quais as guildas medievais deixariam os seus mestres envergonhados. Na contratação e promoção de professores universitários, ou no recrutamento de estudantes para cursos de pós-graduação, prevalecem critérios de base ideológica. Esses departamentos não se sujeitam a nenhuma forma de supervisão ou responsabilidade.

Uma observação final: livros de crítica à academia como os de Christian Smith vão sendo editados cada vez mais e em maior número, indício de que mais gente possa estar tomando consciência do perversivo efeito da Esquerda no labor acadêmico ocidental. Não obstante, entre todas as instituições da sociedade, a educação superior dá mostra de ser, pelas razões vistas acima, a de mais difícil reestruturação.

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(1) O sociólogo Emile Durkheim, judeu francês, escreveu As formas elementares da vida religiosa (1912), obra na qual define o conceito de “Sagrado” de que se valeu Christian Smith.

(2) Eu concordo com o acadêmico canadense dissidente Ricardo Duchesne em que a culpa pelo marxismo cultural não é do Iluminismo. Cf. CANLORBE, Gregoire. A conversation with Ricardo Duchesne. The Occidental Quarterly, v. 19, n. 2, p. 32-35. 2019.

(3) Numa nota de rodapé na página 9, Smith cita aprovativamente Gordon Marshall: “A Sociologia é, algumas vezes,     vista (ao menos pelos sociólogos) como a rainha das ciências sociais, concertando e ampliando o conhecimento e as perspectivas de todas as (conceitualmente mais restritas) ciências afins”.

(4) WEITZMAN, Lenore. The divorce revolution: the unexpected social and economic consequences for women and children in America. New York: The Free Press, 1985.

(5) Cf. LEONARD, Thomas C. Illiberal reformers: race, eugenics, and american economics in the progressive era. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016. Reviewed in: The Occidental Quarterly, v. 16, n.2, p.105-113. 2016.

(6) GOSSETT, Thomas F. Race: the history of an idea in America. Dallas TX: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963. p. 164.

(7) Ibid, 166.

(8) Ross citado em Leonard, Illiberal reformers, p. 50.

(9) Ibid. 158.

Fonte: The Occidental Observer. Autor: Nelson Rosit. Títulos originais: Sociology as Religion, Part 1; e Sociology as Religion, Part 2. Data de publicação: 31 de outubro de 2019 (Part 1) e 1.º de novembro de 2019 (Part 2). Versão brasilesa: Chauke Stephan Filho.