Religion, Race, and Ethnicity in Greco-Roman Antiquity New Perspectives on The Lordship of Jesus, Judaism, and the “Truthiness” of Christianity, Part 4

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Conclusion: Relevance to Anglos

What lessons should crypto-Anglo White or Christian nationalists take away from the first-century Jesus movement?  First, notice that this movement emerged among a people in which the diaspora population outnumbered their co-ethnics in Judea.  In addition, both at home and in the dispersion, Jews were experiencing a spiritual identity crisis.  Perhaps Paul’s mission to resurrect the lost sheep of Israel has unexpected relevance to those of us who long for the restoration of the lost tribes of Greater Britain.[i]

Paul’s push for the resurrection of Israel presupposed a deep-seated, ancestral inseparability of ethnicity and religion.  That is to say that the family, the tribe, the nation can, jointly and severally, serve as the syngeneic medium through which the divine, God or the gods, expresses itself in the collective life of a people.  For his followers, the messianic myth of Jesus Christ incarnated the perfected telos of national Israel.  Today, it is impossible to imagine the renaissance of British race patriotism apart from the reunion of Anglo-Saxon ethnicity with an ancestral religion.  Such an ethnoreligious revival must develop both within the Anglo-Saxon diaspora and its ancestral homeland (where the native English and Celtic peoples are undergoing demographic replacement at the hands of a hostile plutocratic elite).

The sacred mythology of Jesus the Christ inspired Paul’s ethnoreligious movement.  The resurrection of British race patriotism, too, must draw on ancestral traditions of sacral kingship rooted in both history and Arthurian legend.  A counter-cultural ethnoreligious movement across the Anglosphere could summon into being our own long-awaited messiah, the Patriot King prophesied by Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke during the Financial Revolution of the eighteenth century.[ii]

British race patriotism could find legitimate expression once again, not in the godless transnational corporate welfare states now mismanaging the Anglosphere, but through a patriot prince devoted to the spiritual welfare of the British peoples.  The modern counterpart of the first-century Jesus movement could emerge in the form of an Angelcynn Network of ekklesia.  Its members would work to secure the independence of the British monarchy in its constitutional role as defender of the faith.  The chief aim of the Angelcynn movement would be to re-consecrate the Crown as head of reformed Anglican churches throughout the Anglosphere, including the USA.  Clearly, King Charles III is unlikely to seek or accept such a role.  The goal must therefore be to shame some honourable man among his heirs and successors into defending the ethnoreligious identity and biocultural interests of the Anglo-Saxon peoples outside and apart from the governments of the historic White Commonwealth.

Such a movement would revise and reform, not reject, the Christian heritage of the Anglican church.  Rather, Jesus and Paul would recover their rightful place in the Angelcynn tradition.  As historical figures, Jesus and Paul would be honoured as Israelite ethnoreligious patriots.  They must also continue to be exalted for their divine agency in consummating the covenantal history of Israel.  Drawing inspiration from both, Anglo-Saxons world-wide could begin the process of exalting gods of our own.  It is long past time, for example, to “translate” Alfred the Great, recognizing him, at long last, as an English David, a Son of God in his own right, who modelled his English kingdom on Old Covenant Israel.

As a practical matter, such an ethnoreligious strategy means that “nationalists” such as Joel Davis and Stephen Wolfe (to name but two) must come out of the WASP closet.  In Australia, Joel Davis would no longer conceal his Anglo-Saxon identity under a White skin suit worn within a supposedly secular political space.  One might also hope that he would cease to profess a universalist Catholic faith altogether detached from his ethnic identity.  Stephen Wolfe, on the other hand, foreswears his ancestral WASP identity in favour of a civic-minded Americanism.  His inner faith, however, exalts the supernatural truths of a worn-out Augustinian metanarrative; his Lord Jesus is a cosmic Christ, sitting at the right hand of the Father in the heavenly City of God.  Like other members of the invisible race, Wolfe eschews both Whiteness and Anglo-Saxondom.  Here in the City of Man, he retains “Anglo-Protestantism” only because it is the “true religion” of creedal Christianity.  Every other earthly source of ethnoreligious identity is adiaphorous, a matter of indifference in the eyes of God.

As a spiritual diet, this is thin gruel indeed.  Looking instead to the original Jesus movement for inspiration, WASPs can and must rise from the dead.  We desperately need a messianic new covenant Angelcynnism.  Come, Patriot King.  Come!


[i] The idea of Greater Britain dates from the mid- to late nineteenth century at the peak of British imperialism.  Historians now look back upon the Greater Britain project as a failed utopian vision.  Could a Greater Britain really rise from the dead, like the first-century idea of Israel, within an Anglo-Saxon diaspora under the thumb of the transnational corporate welfare state?  As one might expect, recent scholarship provides ample grounds for pessimism.  See, Sir John Robert Seeley, The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures (New York: Cosimo Classics, 2005) [Original Edition, 1891]; John Wolffe, God and Greater Britain: Religion and National Life in Britain and Ireland, 1843-1945 (London: Routledge, 1994); and two books by Duncan Bell, The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007); and idem., Dreamworlds of Race: Empire and the Utopian Destiny of Anglo-America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020).

[ii] See, “The Idea of a Patriot King,” in David Armitage, (ed.) Bolingbroke: Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 217-294.

Religion, Race, and Ethnicity in Greco-Roman Antiquity New Perspectives on The Lordship of Jesus, Judaism, and the “Truthiness” of Christianity, Part Three

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The “Truthiness” of Christianity 

In short, Miller “challenges the classic conception of what many regard as the most sacred narrative of Western civilization, namely, that the New Testament stories of Jesus’ resurrection provided alleged histories variously achieving credibility among their earliest readers.”  Instead, he provides “the first truly coherent case that the earliest Christians comprehended the resurrection narratives of the New Testament as instances within a larger conventional rubric commonly recognized as fictive in modality.”  Modern scholarship, by contrast, mistakenly assumes that these texts were intended to present “a credible, albeit extraordinary account of an historical miracle.”  On that assumption, one may then approach the question “from one of two polarized loci: (1) with a faith-based interest in honoring (defending) the most sacred tenet of Christianity; (2) with an atheistic interest to disprove the claims of orthodox Christian doctrine.”  Both positions are unsound.  The first thesis mistakenly supposes that gospel writers proposed the resurrection of Jesus as a historical reality; the second, antithetical, possibility is that the narrative was peddled as an early Christian hoax.  In dialectical terms, Miller advances an “authentic synthesis (tertium quid): the early Christians exalted the leader of their movement through the standard literary protocols of their day, namely, through the fictive, narrative embellishment of divine translation.”[i]

It should be obvious that a sincere, honest response to Miller’s investigation by Christian nationalists such as Stephen Wolfe will demand “a fearless, rational, unwavering commitment to the pursuit of truth.”[ii]  Unfortunately, Christians, generally, appear ill-equipped to meet this intellectual challenge.  Faith-driven presentations of the gospel resurrection tales seem historically plausible only so long as one’s audience knows nothing of their classical literary provenance.  The quarantine protecting the New Testament resurrection stories from exposure to their ancient cultural analogues is unlikely to be lifted anytime soon.

Given Wolfe’s personal preference for the work of older theologians, he has been isolated from critical currents in contemporary New Testament scholarship.  On social media, Wolfe has expressed admiration for the work of the early twentieth-century Orthodox Presbyterian scholar, J. Gresham Machen (1881–1937).  My guess is that Machen has influenced Wolfe’s understanding of the twin “supernatural truths” which upon which his case for Christian nationalism is grounded: “Jesus is Lord” and “Christianity is the true religion.”  In 1921 Machen published a study entitled The Origins of Paul’s Religion.  There, he argued that the truth of Christianity was to be found in a study of its origins.  Machen acknowledged Jesus as the Founder of Christianity but, because He Himself wrote nothing and “the record of his words and deeds is the work of others,” Machen turned to the testimony of Paul as “a fixed starting point in all controversy.”  As Paul was such a central figure in the early history of the Jesus movement, Machen was confident that if one could “explain the religion of Paul … you have solved the problem of the origin of Christianity.”[iii]

Gresham Machen

According to Machen, the religion of Paul “was something new.”  His mission to the Gentiles “was not merely one manifestation of the progress of oriental religion, and it was not merely a continuation of the pre-Christian mission of the Jews.”  Certainly, “the possession of an ancient and authoritative Book” was “one of the chief attractions of Judaism to the world of that day.”  Authority in religion was in short supply.  Paradoxically, however, “if the privileges of the Old Testament were to be secured … the authority of the Book had to be set aside.  The character of a national religion was … too indelibly stamped upon the religion of Israel.”  At best, Gentile converts could “only be admitted into the outer circle around the true household of God.”  For Paul, Machen declares, Gentile freedom (i.e., from the law) “was a matter of principle.”  This principle had, of course, been “anticipated by the Founder of Christianity, by Jesus Himself.”  But, if so, the doctrine of Gentile freedom was based “upon what Jesus had done, not upon what Jesus, at least during His earthly life, had said.”  It was unclear what He intended with respect to the universality of the gospel.  The “instances in which He extended His ministry to Gentiles are expressly designated in the Gospels as exceptional.”  Certainly, as far as his disciples were concerned, “Gentile freedom, and the abolition of special Jewish privileges, had not been clearly established by the words of the Master.”  This meant that there was “still need for the epoch-making work of Paul.”[iv]

Machen contends that Paul’s distinctive achievement was not the geographical expansion of the Church.  Seas or mountains were not “really standing in the way of the Gentile mission.”  Instead, it was “the great barrier of religious principle.”  Paul “overcame the principle of Jewish particularism in the only way in which it could be overcome; he overcame principle by principle.”  The real apostle to the Gentiles, Machen believed, was Paul the theologian, not Paul the practical missionary.  It was his achievement to exhibit “the temporary character of the Old Testament” by enriching the historical, logical, and intellectual understanding of the death and resurrection of Jesus.  Consequently, “Gentile freedom, and the freedom of the entire Christian Church for all time, was assured.”[v]

Machen declares that, by convincing others, Jews, and Gentiles alike, that Jesus is Lord, Paul compelled the religion of Israel to go forth “with a really good conscience to the spiritual conquest of the world.”  Henceforth, “when Christian missionaries used the word ‘Lord’ of Jesus, their hearers knew at once what they meant.  They knew at once that Jesus occupied a place which is occupied only by God.”  In the final chapter of his book, Machen defends “the historical character of the Pauline message.”  The religion of Paul, he concludes, “was rooted in an event … the redemptive work of Christ in his death and resurrection.”  It was based on “an account of something that had happened … only a few years previously.”  The facts of that event, the death and resurrection of Jesus, “could be established by adequate testimony,” Machen writes.  Moreover, “the eyewitnesses could be questioned, and Paul appeals to the eyewitnesses in detail” (cf., 1 Cor. 15:3-8).  He staked everything on the truth of what he said about Jesus’ crucifixion, death, and resurrection.  Machen poses the issue in uncompromising terms: If Paul’s account of that event “was true, the origin of Paulinism is explained; if it was not true, the Church is based upon an inexplicable error.”[vi]

Richard C. Miller’s mimetic criticism of the gospel resurrection narratives presents defenders of Machen’s Christian apologetic, such as Stephen Wolfe, with a stark choice.  If the Resurrection of Jesus was, as a matter of fact, just one among many classical fictive narratives of divine translation, in what sense (if at all) can one still proclaim that “Jesus is Lord” and that “Christianity is the true religion?”  Neither Paul’s nor Machen’s appeal to “eyewitness” testimony will be sufficient to close the case.  That possibility has been foreclosed by Miller’s detailed examination of the “eyewitness” tradition that became “the political protocol in the consecration of those most supremely honored in Roman government” during the Julio-Claudian dynasty.[vii]

The legendary example of Julius Proculus, the alleged “eyewitness” to the post-mortem appearance of Romulus, contributed to the “senatorial tradition of the eyewitness to the apotheosis of the Roman emperors” between 27 BC and 284 AD.  The chief historians of the period typically devoted considerable space to the tale.  The “senators (as an act of consecration), plebes, and successors assigned glory and deification to a deceased emperor through the process of formal “eyewitness” testimony to the monarch’s translation.”  For example, following the death of Caesar Augustus, “the Roman senators carried an effigy of his body in grand procession to the Campus Martius, the location where Romulus achieved apotheosis.”  In accordance with the structured requirements of the translation fable, this “public funeral did not involve the actual corpse of the emperor, but a substituted wax effigy.”  According to tradition, “the witnesses must not find any charred bones, once the pyric flames have gone their course.”  The scenario also provided for a prominent eyewitness “who took oath that he had seen the form of the Emperor on its way to heaven, after he had been reduced to ashes.”[viii]

One suspects, however, that Anglo-Protestant evangelicals are unlikely to be impressed by such scholarly skepticism as to the historicity of the Resurrection of Christ Jesus.  Faith-based conservative evangelicals still condemn as a “heretic” any supposed Christian questioning—what Stephen Wolfe might call the “supernatural truth” of—the futurist eschatology outlined in various creeds.  Accordingly, Pastor Douglas Wilson (whose Canon Press publishes Wolfe’s book on Christian nationalism) recently joined many other religious leaders in signing an open letter which calls upon Gary DeMar (head of the American Vision ministry) to recant his alleged refusal to affirm “the future, bodily, and glorious return of Christ, a future, physical, and general resurrection of the dead, the final judgement of all men, “and the tactile reality of the eternal state.”  DeMar was accused of denying “critical elements of the Christian faith” by declining to label full preterism as “heretical”[ix] (preterists hold that all of God’s promises to Old Covenant were fulfilled at the time of the destruction of the Jerusalem temple in 70 AD).[x]

But what is “truth?”  A correspondence theory of truth holds that a statement “is true if it corresponds to the facts; and, conversely, if it corresponds to the facts, it is true.”  It would be difficult to maintain that any of the propositions put to Gary DeMar by his critics satisfies a correspondence theory of truth.  On the other hand, the scholarly field of “mimetic criticism” lends credibility to a coherence theory of truth.  Here, truth is defined “as a relation not between statement and fact, but between one statement and another.”  On this view, “no actual statement … is made in isolation: they all depend upon certain presuppositions or conditions and are made against a background of these.”[xi]  A practitioner of mimetic criticism such as Richard C. Miller might agree, therefore, that it is true that Romulus, Caesar Augustus, and Jesus Christ were all resurrected (or translated) from the dead through exaltation to divine status.  But would Wolfe or Pastor Wilson concede that Jesus’ resurrection, along with the Second Coming of Christ, are truths anchored, not in history as it happened, but in the realm of myth, legend, or fiction?  If not, creedal Christianity is characterized, at best, less by its demonstrable “truth” than by its “truthiness.”

Was Paul a Jew, an Israelite, or a Christian?

It may still be, however, that the religion of Jesus and Paul was true in another, pragmatic, sense.  Miller hints at this issue when he observes that “the mythic dimensions of cultural stories, rather than being the mere arbitrary product of a supposed whimsical human imagination, arise out of the innate anthropological, psychic disposition of the peoples who produce and value them.”  In other words, myths “arise out of the subconsciously discerned survival and adaptive needs” of individuals and groups in relation to their “social and physical environment.[xii]  Robyn Faith Walsh more pointedly observes that Paul was “constructing a myth of origins for his audience.”  Many of his rhetorical strategies were “constituent of Paul’s larger project of religious and ethnopolitical group-making.”  She characterizes Paul as “a religious and ethnopolitical entrepreneur” for whom “ethnicity is not a blunt instrument; it is an authoritative frame for achieving cohesion among participants, and one that calls for a sense of shared mind and practice.”  Accordingly, Paul “proposes that God’s pneuma is intrinsically shared among his addressees, binding them together.”[xiii]  On a purely pragmatic view, Paul’s ethnotheology became true or false depending upon whether it worked.  Of course, any assessment of the degree of practical success achieved by Paul and the Jesus movement turns on our understanding of the goals they pursued.

Practitioners of mimetic criticism, such as Walsh, Miller, and Dennis R. MacDonald, locate New Testament writers within the discursive realm of Greco-Roman literature.[xiv]  They show that the work of Paul and the gospel writers functioned as a strategy for constructing new, or resurrecting old, social identities, aiming in the first instance at Hellenized Jews and God-fearing Gentiles in both Judea and, more broadly, throughout the Dispersion.  Other scholars have moved beyond literary analysis to examine the geopolitical breadth of the movement’s aims as well as the deep historical roots of its ethno-religious identity.  Together, both approaches effectively undermine J. Gresham Machen’s claim the “universalism of the gospel” was incarnate in both Jesus, whose redemptive work made possible the Gentile mission, and Paul, who discovered the true, theological significance of Gentile freedom.[xv]

Certainly, Machen found it difficult to deny that Jesus attached an ethnic identity to the God of Israel.  He conceded that Jesus’ disciples would not have been “obviously unfaithful to the teachings of Jesus if after He had been taken from them they continued to minister only to the lost sheep of the house of Israel.”[xvi]  Closer to our own day, another prominent Pauline scholar, James Dunn acknowledged that Jesus recognized the covenantal boundary around Judaism by “his choice of twelve to be his closest group of associates, with its obvious symbolism (12 = the twelve tribes)” and in “the picture of the final judgement in terms of the twelve judging the tribes of Israel (Matt. 19:28/Luke 22:30).”  But, like Machen, Dunn gives Paul credit for making clear the importance of “Gentile freedom.”  Paul brought the universal significance of the gospels into the light of day.  He taught that “faith in Christ is the climax of Jewish faith, it is no longer to be perceived as a specifically Jewish faith; faith should not be made to depend in any degree on the believer living as a Jew (judaizing).” [xvii]

But did Paul really refuse to require his Gentile converts to judaize as Dunn claims?  This raises an even more fundamental question: What were the goals of Paul and the Jesus movement?  Were Jesus and Paul on the same page with respect to those goals?  Jesus certainly looked forward eagerly to the imminent end of the age and the promised restoration of the twelve tribes of Israel.  He was not alone.  “Whether in the diaspora or (however defined) in the homeland,” restoration theology occupied a prominent place in the Jewish mind in the first century.  Diaspora Jews may have lived in pleasant and prosperous circumstances but they never “dropped traditional restoration eschatology in favor of a more positive perspective on the dispersion.”  In fact, educated Hellenistic Jews regularly portrayed diaspora as exile.  At the same time, most believed that “the diaspora would ultimately turn out for the best.”  Staples suggests that “exile and diaspora simultaneously serve[d] as punishment for sin and the means for redemption, the greater good brought out of redemptive chastisement.”[xviii]  Amidst such a tense but expectant socio-cultural atmosphere, Jesus’ direction to his disciples to serve the lost sheep of Israel launched an apocalyptic, ethno-religious movement aiming to resurrect the twelve tribes of Israel.

But how could Paul’s mission to the Gentiles serve the goals of a restorationist theology focused on the idea of Israel?  The standard Christian answer turns on a reading of Romans 11:25–26.  There, Paul suggests that the salvation of “all Israel” will not happen “until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in.”  Creedal Christian theologians, such as Manchen and Dunn, interpret such passages as downplaying the specifically, and narrowly, Jewish restoration eschatology in favour of an apocalyptic vision embracing the whole of humanity.  Dunn, for example, writes that Paul’s “apocalyptic perspective … looked beyond the immediacy of the situation confronting his mission and the Israel of God.”  In doing so, he “set the local or national crisis of Israel’s identity within a cosmic framework.”  The coming Kingdom of God “had a universal significance.”  Like Machen, Dunn maintains that Paul was against “Jewish privilege” and in favour of Gentile freedom and equality in the eyes of God.  “No national or ethnic status, or we may add, social or gender status (cf. Gal. 3:28), afforded a determinative basis for or decisive assurance of God’s favour.”  That universalist principle applied not just to Israel but to the world at large.[xix]

Paula Fredriksen and Derek Lambert of MythVision

Paula Fredriksen takes issue with this interpretation of Paul’s mission.  She flatly rejects any reading of Paul’s letters from which he “emerges as the champion of universalist (‘spiritual’) Christianity over particularist (‘fleshly’) Judaism.”  She sets herself in opposition to scholars such as Machen and Dunn for whom “Paul stands as history’s first Christian theologian, urging a new faith that supersedes or subsumes the narrow Ioudaϊsmos of his former allegiances.”  In her view, far from superseding his Jewish identity, Paul preached “a Judaizing gospel, one that would have been readily recognized as such by his own contemporaries.”  His “core message to his gentiles about their behavior was not ‘Do not circumcise!’  Rather, it was “Worship strictly and only the Jewish god.”  He required Gentile “ex-pagans” to abandon the “lower gods” of their kinfolk.  They would retain their native ethnicity but live, in a certain sense, outside and apart from their co-ethnics.  Having received the holy spirit, these Gentiles “were to live as hagioi, ‘holy,’ or ‘sanctified’ or ‘separated-out’ ethne, according to standards of community behavior described precisely in ‘the Law.’”  But he did not expect, much less require, Gentile males to undergo circumcision.  On the other hand, he nowhere “says anything about (much less against) Jews circumcising their own sons. … He opposed circumcision for gentiles, not for Jews.”  Israel must remain Israel.  God’s coming Kingdom “was to contain not only gentiles, but also Israel, defined as that people set apart by God by his Laws (e.g., Lev 20.22–24).”[xx]

Paul, according to Fredriksen, “maintains and nowhere erases the distinction between Israel and the nations.”  At the same time, however, his rhetoric erases “the distinctions between and among ‘the nations’ themselves.”  The nations or “ethnē function as a mass of undifferentiated ‘foreskinned’ idol-worshippers (if outside the movement) or of ‘foreskinned’ ex-idol-worshippers (if within).”  The God of Israel is also the god of other nations as well.  “But the nations by and large will know this only at the End.”  And the point to bear in mind here is that “Paul, a member of a radioactively apocalyptic movement, sees time’s end pressing upon his generation now, mid-first century.”[xxi]  Moreover, “for Paul, the more intense the pitch of apocalyptic expectation, the greater the contrast between Israel and the nations.”  It was this “ethnic-theological difference between Israel and the nations, the nation’s ignorance of the true god, is what binds all of these other ethnē together in one undifferentiated mass of lumpen idolators.”  At the End, “this sharp dichotomy is resolved theologically, but not ethnically: Israel remains Israel, the nations remain the nations (cf. Isa 11.10; Rom 15.10).”[xxii]

According to Paul’s “eschatological arithmetic” the world consists of the seventy nations listed in the Table of Nations (Genesis 10) and the twelve tribes of Israel.  At the End, all “will, somehow, receive Christ’s pneuma” (spirit).”  Gentiles-in-Christ (who Fredriksen describes as “eschatological Gentiles”) will “rejoice with saved Israel, but they do not ‘become’ Israel. … Even eschatologically—that is, ‘in Christ’—Jews and Gentiles, though now in one ‘family’ are not ‘one’.”[xxiii]  Yet, paradoxically, while Paul’s ethnē-in-Christ are not-Israel, they are not only “enjoined to Judaize to the extent that they commit to the worship of Israel’s god alone and eschew idol-worship,” they “must behave toward each other in such a way that they fulfill the Law.”  For Paul, “the only good gentile is a Judaizing gentile.”[xxiv]

Clearly, there are unbridgeable differences between Fredriksen, a convert to Judaism, on the one hand, and Anglo-Protestants such as Machen, Dunn, and Pastor Doug Wilson, on the other.  But, on one issue, at least, they all agree: both Jesus and Paul must be considered failed prophets.  Fredriksen is confident that “the historian and theologian know something that the actors in this [eschatological] drama could not; namely, that Jesus Christ would not return to establish the Kingdom within the lifetime of the first (and, according to their convictions, the only) generation of his apostles.”[xxv]  Unsurprisingly, atheistic/agnostic scholars such as Bertrand Russell, Bart Ehrman, and Richard C. Miller share that view.

Consequently, few scholars of any stripe, Jewish, Christian, or non-believer, will appeal to a pragmatic theory of truth to uphold the truth of the eschatology of the first-century Jesus movement.  Fredriksen even expresses surprise that Paul remained convinced even at mid-century that the End would come within his own lifetime: How, after a quarter-century delay, could he reasonably assert that ‘salvation is nearer to us now than when we first believed?’”[xxvi]

Despite Fredriksen’s incredulity, Paul’s expectations turn out to have been reasonable on the assumption that he looked forward to the end of the Old Covenant age, not the end of the world.  Tom Holland, to cite but one prominent scholar, suggests that both Jesus and Paul framed their eschatological expectations as a New Exodus.  Paul insisted “that Israel’s experience of Exodus whether from Egypt or Babylon was only a rehearsal of the forthcoming eschatological salvation.”  Israel was separated from God and “shut up under Sin,” refusing to heed the message of the gospel.  Israel herself “was now behaving like Pharoah” in opposing the Exodus of the people of God.  In the mimetic character of that New Exodus, Paul could hardly be surprised that forty years would elapse before judgement was visited upon Old Covenant Israel and “the holy city, new Jerusalem” came “down from God out of heaven” (Rev. 21:2).[xxvii]  And, remembering the death of Moses, Paul must have known that he might not live to see that day (Deut. 34:1-8).  In other words, prima facie, a pragmatic case can be made for the credibility of the eschatology foreshadowed in the religion of Paul.  Certainly, the covenant eschatology of Don K. Preston and other preterist biblical scholars does just that.[xxviii]

The work of Jason A. Staples on Paul and the resurrection of Israel lends additional support to the biblical truth of both restoration theology and covenant eschatology.  It is important here to note the difference between Staples’ thesis and Fredriksen’s claim that both Jesus and Paul were working “within Judaism.”  Fredriksen has no doubt that Paul was “an ancient Jew, one of any number of whom in the late Second Temple period expected the end of days in their lifetimes.”  She is no less confident that, in Paul’s mind, “whether ‘now’ (mid-first century) or in the (impending) End time, ‘Israel’ is the Jews.”[xxix]  Staples calls both propositions into question.  He points out that Paul prefers “to identify himself as ‘of the nation of Israel, of the tribe of Benjamin’ (Phil 3:5; Rom 11:1; 2 Cor 11:22) rather than using the more generic term ‘Jew’.  In addition, Paul frames his ministry in ‘new covenant’ language, suggesting the centrality of the restoration of all Israel to his gospel.”[xxx]

Paul’s “new covenant” theology echoes Jeremiah 31:31 but, Staples reminds us, “Jeremiah’s prophecy primarily concerns the reconstitution of all Israel—that is, that both Israel and Judah will be restored by means of God’s writing the law on their hearts.”  This implies, however, that “the covenant will be madeonly with Israel and Judah,” given that Gentiles are not mentioned in the prophecy.  But it turns out “that faithful Gentiles (those with ‘the law written on their hearts’; see Rom 2:14–15) are the returning remnant of the house of Israel, united with the faithful from the house of Judah (cf. the ‘inward Jews’ of Rom 2:28–29).”  It matters not “whether Paul actually imagines that all redeemed Gentiles are literal descendants of ancient Israelites.”  Gentile inclusion was to be the means of Israel’s promised restoration because the seed of the northern tribes was mixed “among the Gentiles—thus God’s promise to restore Israel has opened the door to Gentile inclusion in Israel’s covenant.”  Staples cites Hosea 8:8 to sum up the situation: “Israel [the north] is swallowed up; they are now in the nations [Gentiles] like a worthless vessel.”[xxxi]

By means of this process, God has provided for the salvation of the Gentiles by scattering the northern tribes “among the nations only to be restored.”  By this means, the new covenant also “fulfills the promises to Abraham that all nations would be blessed, not ‘through’ his seed (i.e., as outsiders) but by inclusion and incorporation in his seed (Gal 3:8).”  These faithful Gentiles need not, however, “become Jews (that is, Judah) in order to become members of Israel—rather they have already become Israelites through the new covenant.”

Go to Part 4.

[i] Richard C. Miller, Resurrection and Reception in Early Christianity (New York: Routledge, 2015), 180–182.

[ii] Ibid., 182

[iii] J. Graham Machen, The Origins of Paul’s Religion; The James Sprunt Lectures Delivered at Union Theological Seminary in Virginia, Leopold Classical Library, [Original publication, 1921], 4-5.

[iv] Ibid., 12-15.

[v] Ibid., 17, 19.

[vi] Ibid., 13, 316.

[vii] Miller, Resurrection and Reception, 75.

[viii] Ibid., 66-75.

[ix] “An Open Letter to Gary DeMar of American Vision,”

https://reformation.substack.com/p/an-open-letter-to-gary-demar

[x] See, e.g., Don K. Preston, Who is this Babylon? (Ardmore, OK: JaDon, 2011) and https://bibleprophecy.com/

[xi] W.H. Walsh, Philosophy of History: An Introduction (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), 73, 76.

[xii] Miller, Resurrection and Reception, 104.

[xiii] Walsh, Origins of Early Christian Literature, 37-39.

[xiv] Dennis R. MacDonald, Synopses of Epic, Tragedy, and the Gospels (Claremont, CA: Mimesis Press, 2022).  This reference work based on MacDonald’s mimetic criticism provides a comprehensive collection of parallels between New Testament writers and classical Greco-Roman literature.  There is no space here to discuss those examples.

[xv] Machen, Origin of Paul’s Religion, 13-14.

[xvi] Ibid., 15.

[xvii] Dunn, Partings of the Ways, 114, 133.

[xviii] Staples, The Idea of Israel, 204, 208.

[xix] James D.G. Dunn, The New Perspective on Paul, Revised Edition (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.Eerdmans, 2008), 328-329.

[xx] Fredriksen, Paul, 108, 111-113.

[xxi] Paula Fredriksen, “Paul, Pagans and Eschatological Ethnicities: A Response to Denys McDonald,” (2022) 45(1) Journal for the Study of the New Testament 51, at 56.

[xxii] Fredriksen, Paul, 114-116.

[xxiii] Ibid., 88; Matthew Thiessen and Paula Fredriksen, “Paul and Israel,” in B. Matlock and M. Novenson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Pauline Studies 365, at 378.

[xxiv] Fredriksen, Paul, 117, 125.

[xxv] Paula Fredriksen, “Judaism, the Circumcision of Gentiles, and Apocalyptic Hope: Another Look at Galatians 1 and 2,” (1991) 42(2) Journal of Theological Studies 532, at 533.

[xxvi] Ibid., 533 n.4.

[xxvii] Tom Holland, Contours of Pauline Theology: A Radical New Survey of the Influences on Paul’s Biblical Writings (Fern, Scotland: Mentor, 2004), 211.

[xxviii] Don K. Preston, “We Shall Meet Him in the Air:” The Wedding of the King of Kings! (Ardmore, OK: JaDon, 2010).

[xxix] Paula Fredriksen, “What Does it Mean to See Paul ‘within Judaism’?” (2022) 141(2) Journal of Biblical Literature 359, at 379; Fredriksen, “Reply to McDonald,” 60 (emphasis added).

[xxx] Staples, “What Do the Gentiles Have to Do with ‘All Israel,’” 378.

[xxxi] Ibid., 380-381.

Religion, Race, and Ethnicity in Greco-Roman Antiquity New Perspectives on The Lordship of Jesus, Judaism, and the “Truthiness” of Christianity, Part Two

Go to Part 1.

What Do We Know About Jesus and His Movement?

For Christians such as Stephen Wolfe, the declaration that “Jesus is Lord” signifies that Jesus is God.  It is, however, not at all obvious that the historical Jesus considered himself to be a divine being, on a par with the ruler of all creation, the Lord of lords and King of kings.  Nor did his disciples.  James Dunn contends, however, that the “earliest forms of the Jesus tradition were the inevitable expression of their faith in Jesus.”  The first forms of that disciple faith were not yet the “Easter faith, not yet of the gospel as it came to be expounded by Paul and the other first apostles.”  They were nonetheless “born of, imbued with, expressive of [a] faith” produced by “the impact Jesus had made severally upon them.”  Dunn insists that there is no point in scholarly efforts to distinguish the “historical Jesus” from the Christ of faith.  There is only one Jesus available to us; namely, “Jesus as he was seen and heard by those who first formulated the traditions we have.”  According to him, “we really do not have any other sources that provide an alternative view of Jesus or that command the same respect as the Synoptic Gospels in providing testimony of the initial impact made by Jesus.”[I]

But, of course, the earliest written versions of the pre- and post-Easter disciple faith did not appear until twenty or so years after the death and reported resurrection of Jesus.  Dunn appeals to a process of oral transmission to bridge the gap between the death of Jesus in 30 AD and the earliest manifestation of a written tradition of faith in the Lordship of Jesus Christ.  He assumes that “the great majority of Jesus’ first disciples would have been functionally illiterate.”  So, too, would most of the earliest followers of the Jesus movement.  Accordingly, we cannot assume that Jesus himself was literate.  That being so, “it remains “overwhelmingly probable that the earliest transmission of the Jesus tradition was by word of mouth.”  Inevitably, therefore, oral faith tradition was a group tradition “used by the first churches and [was] presumably at least in some degree formative of their beliefs and identity.” [II]

Having grown accustomed to the written forms of the Jesus tradition, we naturally prefer such literary explanations.  While Dunn presents a case for confidence in the oral histories lying behind the written gospels, he acknowledges the “brutal fact…that we simply cannot escape from a presumption of orality for the first stage of the transmission of the Jesus tradition.”  As a “living tradition” of oral performances, the early Jesus tradition must have been both stable and variable, fixed and flexible.  Dunn maintains, however, that the variability of the oral tradition “is not a sign of degeneration or corruption.  Rather, it puts us in touch with the tradition in its living character, as it was heard in the earliest Christian groups and churches, and can still be heard and responded to today.”[iii]

Dunn’s thesis begs at least two important questions.  One such issue, whether the earliest ekklesia of the Jesus movement can properly be described as “Christian,” will be dealt with below.  The other is whether the gospels really were histories or biographies.  In other words, did they transmit a true and historical witness to the characteristic features of the Jesus tradition, thereby reflecting “the original impact made by Jesus’ teaching and actions on several at least of his first disciples?”[iv]  On this issue, Dunn reflects the conventional approach to the Synoptic gospels.  Ever since the nineteenth century, most scholars have characterized the gospel authors as literate spokespersons for their religious communities.

Robyn Faith Walsh, however, doubts that the gospel writers were engaged in “documenting intragroup ‘oral traditions’ or preserving the collective perspectives of their fellow Christ-followers (e.g., the Markan, Matthean, or Lukan ‘churches’).”  Instead, she argues, “that the Synoptic gospels were written by elite cultural producers working within a dynamic cadre of literate specialists—including persons who may or may not have had an understanding of being ‘in Christ’.”  Her recent work on early Christian literature compares “a range of ancient bioi (lives), histories, and novels” to the gospels, concluding that the latter works “are creative literature produced by educated elites interested in Judean teachings, practices, and paradoxographical subjects in the aftermath of the Jewish War” (66–73 AD).[v]

Walsh contends that the gospel writers were not “strictly concerned…with writing histories.”  Nor, however, should their works be treated “principally as religious texts.”  New Testament scholars, she believes, “muddle” the social context in which the gospel writers worked by presuming antecedent “oral traditions, Christian communities, and their literate spokesmen.”  Like Dunn, they “continually look for evidence of socially marginal, preliterate Christian groups…treating the gospel writers not as rational actors but as something more akin to Romantic Poets speaking for their Volk.”[vi]

In contrast, Walsh approaches the gospels as a classical scholar “would any other kind of Greco-Roman literature.”  She observes that “Greek and Roman authors routinely describe themselves writing within (and for) literary networks of fellow writers—a competitive field of educated peers and associated literate specialists who engaged in discussion, interpretation, and the circulation of their works.”  Given “such a historical context, the gospel writers are not the ‘founding fathers’ of a religious tradition.”  Rather, they are better understood as “rational agents producing literature about a Judean teacher, son of God, and wonder-worker named Jesus.”  The gospels, therefore, “represent the strategic choices of educated Greco-Roman writers working within a circumscribed field of literary production.”[vii]

Walsh calls into question Christianity’s own myth of origins, treating it as an example of the “invention of tradition.”[viii]  Unlike Dunn, she rejects the “limiting perspective that accepts the first-century Jesus movement as a recognizable and coherent social formation.”  It is only the “uncritical acceptance of Christianity’s myth of origins” that authorizes the assumption that “Christianity” emerged in the first century as a “spontaneous, cohesive, diverse, and multiple” movement.  She does acknowledge that “it is possible that the authors of the Synoptic gospels were associated in some measure with a group of persons either interested in or actively participating in practices pertaining to the Jesus or Christ movement.”  But, “ultimately,” she says, that “remains conjecture.”[ix]

Speaking of conjecture, it is significant that Walsh blithely asserts that the Synoptic gospels were produced in the “aftermath of the Jewish War” while, in the next paragraph, remarking that her study does “not scrutinize dates for these writings.”[x]  The cognitive dissonance created by the juxtaposition of those two statements immediately called to my mind the vivid impression left by the professor in my first-year honours history class as he repeatedly and forcefully emphasized the importance of accuracy in the dating of historical documents and events.  This is a perennial issue in New Testament scholarship.  Despite the existence of several solid studies dating, not just the Synoptic gospels, but the New Testament, as a whole, to the period prior to the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in AD 70, it is commonplace for scholars to assign later dates to the book or books under discussion.[xi]  Studies of the Book of Revelation are particularly prone to this practice since a post-70 date allows scholars to ignore the destruction of Jerusalem and instead to treat the book as a prophecy of the doom awaiting the Roman empire, the papacy, or modern-day America.  Agnostics and atheists who, by definition, deny the credibility of biblical prophecies of a providential divine judgement on Old Covenant Israel also have an obvious incentive to assume late dates for the New Testament writings as do theologians committed to a futurist eschatology.

Walsh clearly prefers a late date for the Synoptic gospels.  On her account, their authors were independent of oral tradition, producing creative literature by employing the conventional tools of their trade.  The stories they crafted were “beholden to the dictates of genre, citation, and allusion” arising from within a circle of peers.  No mere reflection of oral tradition, their literary choices presented “an idealized view of Jesus and his life using details more strategic than historical.”  Consequently, their work now presents scholars seeking to reconstruct the past based on such creative literary artefacts with a problem: “how can we meaningfully distinguish between fiction and history?”  But is it necessary to choose between “oral tradition” emanating from functionally illiterate, religious “communities” and the “creative literature” produced by gospel authors who “were similarly trained and positioned, working within cadres of fellow, cultural elites?”[xii]

Walsh doubts that whatever faith might have been engendered by Jesus among his disciples and those who heard their stories was sufficiently powerful to inspire a spontaneous, cohesive, and autonomous ethnoreligious movement operating in his name before the Jewish War.  Given such skepticism, Walsh’s assumption of a late date for the gospels makes sense.  By the late first century, if Hellenistic writers had little more than Paul’s letters to work with, they clearly would have been on their own in fleshing out the story of a Judean Christ.

But there is a strong case for an early date for each of the Synoptic gospels.  Moreover, something like Walsh’s literary community of educated Hellenized Jews was certainly present in both Judea and the diaspora well before AD 70.  Members of a Hellenistic Jewish intelligentsia already steeped in the Septuagint version of the Hebrew Bible must have been influenced by a widespread sense of impending doom spreading among first-century Jews of all social classes.  Writers steeped in such an apocalyptic interpretation of restoration theology would have been well-placed to serve as “organic intellectuals” and publicists for the embryonic Jesus movement in major urban centres throughout the empire.[xiii]  Such an ethnoreligious movement had little need for well-researched and fully documented biographies of the historical Jesus.  Instead, the authors of the Synoptic gospels competed with other writers (and each other) to generate idealized mythic portrayals of a god-like messiah come to usher in the kingdom of God.

Jesus as Lord

In Mark, the shortest and probably the first of the Synoptic gospels, the very first verse identifies Jesus as the Son of God.  For Christians, ever since the Council of Nicaea in the early fourth century, “Son of God has been the key title for Christ.”  As such, it “has all the overtones of the full-blown Trinitarian formula— ‘Son of God’ means second person of the Trinity, ‘true God from true God, begotten not made,’ etc.”  But, as James Dunn points out, this was not the case in Jesus’ lifetime.  In the Hebrew Bible “it could be used collectively of Israel…or in the plural in reference to angels, the heavenly council…or in the singular of the king.”  Indeed, more generally still, the title could be used to characterize anyone “who was thought to be commissioned by God or highly favoured by God.”  Even in relation to Jesus, “initially at least, ‘son of God’ did not necessarily imply any overtones of divinity.”[xiv]  In time, of course, the title, as applied to Jesus, did suggest that he was divine in some sense.  But, even though first-century Jews “believed that there was only one God Almighty,” as Bart Ehrman reminds us, “it was widely held that there were other divine beings—angels, cherubim, seraphim, principalities, powers, hypostases.”  Moreover, there was no impassable gulf between the human and the divine.  “Angels were divine, and could be worshipped, but they could also come in human guise.”  Conversely, it was possible for humans to become angels or demi-gods.[xv]

What about Jesus?  In all three Synoptic gospels, when (1) Jesus is baptized by John; (2) the heavens were torn asunder; (3) a voice from heaven was heard; (4) the voice declared Jesus to be his Son; and (5) the Spirit descended.  Similarly, the temptation narratives which follow agree that (1) the Spirit led Jesus into the wilderness; (2) Jesus’ sojourn there lasted forty days; and (3) he was tempted by Satan.  Whether Matthew and Luke predate the gospel of Mark or expand upon it, their temptation stories provide essential insight into how Satan tempted Jesus in the desert.  They reveal the psychic fault line within Jesus’ messianic consciousness.  The Son of God is bound by filial loyalty to the Father; yet Jesus is also by right the uncrowned king of the Jews, and presumably of a restored Israel as well.  Hence, he is bound by religious obligations rooted in blood, law, and tradition to share and respect the worldly ambitions of his tribe and people.  In Mark’s mythic image of Paradise Restored, Jesus remains curiously passive while Satan actively works his wiles.  By contrast, in Matthew and Luke, Jesus resolutely resists three powerful temptations.[xvi]

Knowing that Jesus has fasted for forty days and nights and is bound to be famished, Satan challenges him to demonstrate that he really is the Son of God by commanding that the stones at his feet be made bread (Matt. 4:2).  Satan’s first temptation calls to mind John the Baptist’s rebuke to the Pharisees and Sadducees several verses earlier in the text.  There, John warns them “not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father: for I say unto you, that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham (Matt. 3:9).  John expects the carnal pride displayed by these representatives of the Jewish religious establishment to be followed by a fall.  Anticipating Paul’s mission to the Gentiles (Rom. 11:11), John is certain that the ethnoreligious movement soon to be launched by Jesus will produce so many children of Abraham (according to the spirit) that Abraham’s seed (according to the flesh) will be provoked to jealousy.  In effect, when tempting Jesus to flaunt his miraculous powers as the Son of God, Satan serves as a stand-in for the Pharisees and Sadducees.

Having failed in his first attempt, the tempter holds out another enticement calculated to fire the imagination of first-century Jewish Zealots keen to restore Israel to her former imperial glory.  Satan takes Jesus to the top of the highest mountain, pitching the prospect of dominion over all the kingdoms of the world if only he will “fall down and worship me (Matt. 4:9; Lk. 4:7).  Jesus rejects this temptation as well.  Nor is he moved to weaken his determination not to tempt God when Satan sets him upon a pinnacle of the Jerusalem temple, inviting Jesus to prove that he is the Son of God by jumping off the edge, trusting in angels to save him from certain death (Matt. 4:5-7; Lk 4:9-12).

Matthew 4:1-11 and Luke 4:1-13 help us to see that Satan’s three temptations reflect the irrepressible conflict between the two personae incarnate in Jesus’ messianic consciousness, the exalted Son of God, and the historical king of the Jews.  During those forty days in the desert, Jesus struggled to reconcile those potentially contradictory roles.  In both gospel narratives, Jesus resolves his messianic identity crisis.  In doing so, he learns how to preach the Word to his people—the lost sheep of Israel (Matt. 10:6)—in accordance with the will of the Father.  He also learns that Satan will dog his footsteps to the cross and beyond.  Clearly, the temptation narratives in the Synoptic gospels encapsulate the world-historical conflict between the spiritual Israel of God and Old Covenant Israel according to the flesh.  In fact, the seismic shift in the foundations of the cosmic temple during the first century drove the entire cast of characters in the gospels towards the creation of a new heaven and a new earth.[xvii]

It is a mistake to read the temptation stories as an account of the sort of existential crisis that might face any human being in any time and any place.[xviii]  Jesus faced those temptations, not because he was a human being but as a remarkably gifted and devout Jewish holy man descended through the royal line of David from the seed of Abraham.  Scot McKnight demonstrates that “Jesus’ God is the national God of Israel, not some abstract universal deity.  He is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; he is the God of David and of the prophet; he is the God of the Maccabees and of John the Baptist.”  Jesus’ vision of the kingdom of God was animated not “by an abstract religious feeling but [by] a concrete realistic vision for God’s chosen nation.”  It “concerned Israel as a nation and not a new religion”.  Accordingly, “[w]hen Jesus taught his disciples to pray for the kingdom to come (Matt 6:10), he surely had in mind more than an existential encounter with the living God that would give his followers an authentic experience”.  For McKnight, it follows that “[t]he most important context in which modern interpreters should situate Jesus is that of ancient Jewish nationalism.”[xix]

Both John and Jesus “had one vision for their contemporary Israel, and that was for Israel to become what God had called it to be.”[xx]  For Jesus, God was not a universal deity.  Israel stood in a covenantal relationship with the Father known to no other nation.  Throughout the narrative of the Hebrew Scriptures, “God never destroys his offspring…but rather pursues them in order to bring them to perfection.”[xxi]  The telos of that covenantal history was to be perfected in the Lord Jesus and the righteous remnant of Old Covenant Israel; they alone were the true Israelites, forever separated from the false Israelites when the nation faced its final judgement (Matt 13:41-43).  Jesus’ messianic mission was “to lead Israel away from a national disaster and towards a redemption that would bring about the glorious kingdom.”  From the time of his confrontation with Satan in the wilderness it became clear to him that he would have “to offer himself consciously and intentionally to God as a vicarious sacrifice for Israel in order to avert the national disaster.”[xxii]

But there was more than one vision of Israel’s destiny in the popular imagination of first-century Judaism.  Steeped in a tradition of chauvinistic religious rhetoric dating back to the Maccabean revolt in the second century BC, most first-century Judeans scoffed at the notion that “true Israelites” were not “destined to be part of God’s eschatological people…on the basis of heredity.”  They rejected the charge made by John the Baptist and Jesus that Israel according to the flesh had “forfeited their enjoyment of covenant blessings and was in exile “because of unfaithfulness and sinfulness.”  Certainly, they did not believe that “God was forming a new people” based solely on repentance, righteous obedience, and covenant faithfulness.”[xxiii]

Most first-century Jews were confident that the God of Israel would rest forever in a temple made by hands in Jerusalem.  Few took seriously Jesus’ warning that in their lifetime a newly inaugurated kingdom of God would pronounce final judgement on Old Covenant Israel and throw the “false Israelites” into the flames of hell. (Matthew 13:40-43).  Jesus knew his fellow Jews longed instead for the restoration of national Israel according to the flesh.  Indeed, inspired as he was by his own national vision for Israel, he shared the messianic longing resonating within the blood faith of his people.  In his heart of hearts, Jesus could not properly deny the satanic spirit of the Maccabees and the zealots a fair hearing.[xxiv]  Indeed, Jesus saw that spirit at work even in his disciples, most notably on the occasion in Mark 8:31–33 when he administered the sternest possible rebuke to Peter: “Get thee behind me, Satan; for thou savourest not the things that be of God, but the things that be of men.”[xxv]

To put the matter plainly, it was not his generic humanity tempting Jesus with bread, universal dominion, and independence from the Father.  Rather, it was his inner Jew.  The historical Satan emerged within the breast of the historical Jesus Christ.  As a charismatic personality, at ease in crowds, recognized in childhood as the king of the Jews, and by the Father as his Son, Jesus could hardly fail to empathize with all but the most grandiose aspirations of his own once-holy people.

Did Jesus Think He Was God?

In the New Testament, Jesus is often given the title “Christ,” a Greek translation of the Hebrew word for messiah, meaning “one who is anointed.”  As with a “Son of God,” to be anointed was to be “chosen and specially honoured by God…in order to fulfill God’s purposes and mediate his will on earth.”  Both titles could be “used to refer not to a divine angelic being, but to a human being.”  Some Jews “deeply committed to the ritual laws given in the Torah” had the idea that the messiah would appear as a great and powerful priest who would serve as a future ruler of Israel, interpreting and enforcing the law of God.  More commonly, first-century Jews looked forward to the appearance of a messiah as a mighty warrior who would overthrow the oppressors who had taken over the promised land, thereby restoring both the Davidic monarchy and the nation of Israel.  Others held to a more apocalyptic vision in which the coming of the messiah would bring a new creation, not just a political revolution, but “the Kingdom of God, a utopian state in which there would be no evil, pain, or suffering of any kind.”[xxvi]

According to Bart Ehrman, it seems likely “that Jesus’s followers, during his lifetime, believed that he might be this coming anointed one.”  But they certainly did not expect him to die and rise from the dead.  Nor did Jesus.  But he did think of himself as the messiah.  He did expect to become the king of Israel, not by means of political struggle or military victory, but when God intervened in history to destroy the forces of evil and to make Israel a kingdom once again ruled through his messiah.  He prophesied, publicly and privately, that the kingdom would arrive when the Son of Man came in judgement against everyone, and everything opposed to God.  In fact, Ehrman observes, “Jesus told his disciples—Judas Iscariot included—that they would be seated on twelve thrones ruling the twelve tribes of Israel in the future kingdom.”  Ehrman is convinced that “Jesus must have thought that he would be the king of the kingdom of God soon to be brought by the Son of Man.”  Everyone knew that the future king of Israel would be the anointed of God, the Messiah.  “It is in this sense that Jesus must have taught his disciples that he was the messiah.”[xxvii]

Both Jesus and his disciples expected that the messiah was destined to defeat the enemy; instead, the putative messiah was “arrested, tortured, and crucified, the most painful and publicly humiliating form of death known to the Romans.”  Such an outcome “was just the opposite of what Jews expected a messiah to be.”  But then “they came to believe that Jesus had been raised from the dead, and this reconfirmed what had earlier been disconfirmed.”  Their faith was restored: “He really is the messiah.  But not in the way we thought!”[xxviii]

Dr. Bart Ehrman

Ehrman hastens to add that, while the historical Jesus did think of himself as “a prophet predicting the end of the current evil age and the future king of Israel in the age to come,” he never—not in the Synoptic gospels at least—called himself God.  Of course, in the gospel of John, “Jesus does make remarkable claims about himself.”  For example, in John 8:58, “Jesus appears to be claiming not only to have existed before Abraham, but to have been given the name of God himself.”  Ehrman argues that not only was the gospel of John produced later than the Synoptics, but verses, such as Jesus’ proclamation that “I and the Father are one” (John 10:30), “simply cannot be ascribed to the historical Jesus.”  Instead, Ehrman tells us, “What we can know with relative certainty about Jesus in that his public ministry and proclamation were not focused on his divinity; in fact, they were not about his divinity at all.”  Rather, they were about what “the kingdom that God was going to bring.  And about the Son of Man who was soon to bring judgement upon the earth.”[xxix]

But, if the historical Jesus never claimed to be God, how did this messianic Judean prophet become a Hellenized cosmic Christ?  That story, Ehrman explains, begins with the crucifixion and death of Jesus.  “It was only afterward, once the disciples believed that their crucified master had been raised from the dead, that they began to think that he must, in some sense, be God.”[xxx]  Before his death, the followers of Jesus believed that he was the messiah, the king of the future kingdom.  After the discovery of the empty tomb, they were convinced that he had been exalted to the heavenly realm.  It was then that they knew he was the future king and fully expected him to come from heaven to reign as the Son of Man.  In his role as the Son of Man, Jesus would have been understood to be a divine figure.  Indeed, in one sense or other, in all four of his exalted roles—as messiah, as Son of God, as Son of Man, and as Lord—Jesus was divine.  But, in no sense did his followers understand Jesus to be God the Father.  Ehrman emphasizes that:

whenever someone claims that Jesus is God, it is important to ask: God in what sense?  It took a long time indeed for Jesus to be God in the complete, full, and perfect sense, the second member of the Trinity, equal with God from eternity, and “of the same essence” as the Father.[xxxi]

How Did Jesus Become God?

Even if Jesus did not become fully God until the fourth century, his divine status was assured at the resurrection.  As a historian, however, Ehrman does not think “we can show—historically—that Jesus was in fact raised from the dead.”  When “it comes to miracles such as the resurrection,” he declares, “historical sciences simply are of no help in establishing exactly what happened.”  In other words, Ehrman is not saying “that the resurrection is what made Jesus God.”  Rather, “it was the belief in the resurrection that led some of his followers to claim he was God.”  In short, Ehrman denies the historicity of the resurrection.  As far as he is concerned it never happened.  As for the empty tomb, it too is no more than legend.  Victims of crucifixion were not given proper burials.  Indeed, he claims there is good reason to accept “the rather infamous suggestion,” made by John Dominic Crossman, “that Jesus’s body was not raised from the dead but was eaten by dogs.”[xxxii]

Other historians make the similarly unorthodox suggestion that the facticity of the empty tomb and resurrection narrative may not have mattered, as such, to those who constructed it.  Richard C. Miller, for example, contends that the gospel resurrection narratives were never intended to demonstrate historical truth through research and evidence.  Sometime around 150 AD Justin Martyr admitted as much in his 1 Apology.  As summarized by Miller, the burden of Justin’s Christian apologia was as follows: “We, O Romans, have produced myths and fables with our Jesus as you have done with your own heroes and emperors; so why are you killing us?”  This appears to be an admission “that the earliest Christians had composed Jesus’ divine birth, dramatically tragic death, resurrection, and ascension within the earliest Christian Gospel tradition as fictive embellishments following the stock structural conventions of Greek and Roman mythology.”[xxxiii]  In other words, the gospel accounts of the risen Jesus differ in detail but not in kind from fables surrounding antique Mediterranean demigods such as Hermes, Dionysus, and Heracles, as well as emperors such as Caesar Augustus.

Indeed, Miller observes, Justin’s argument does “not even qualify as an ‘admission’ per se but merely arose as a statement in passing, as though commonly acknowledged both within and without Christian society.”  Justin’s point, however, was not just that there was “nothing unique” or sui generis about the “dominant framing contours of the Jesus narrative.”  His apology also “asserted that the classical pantheon was, in truth, a cast of demons.”  Nor was this assertion the product of a reasoned line of argument.  Rather, Justin flatly declared “that the gods were to be understood as wicked and impious.  Only out of ignorance did the classical world regard such demons as deities.”  It might seem that the Greeks were saying the same things as the Christians but, Justin affirms, the Greek legends “arose by the inspiration of ‘evil demons’ through the ‘myth-making of the poets’” By contrast, Justin simply pronounces the Christian narratives to be “true” without providing any further evidence or reasoned argument to support his claim.[xxxiv]

This was a rhetorical rather than philosophical or historical strategy.  Justin was attempting “to assign archaic precedence to Judeo-Christian tradition.”  He simply proposed “that demons inspired the classical writers to produce lies or fictions that proleptically mimicked the Christian Gospel narratives.”  Miller suggests that Justin’s apology marked a step beyond the task facing the gospel writers in the first century.  That is to say that, at first, the gospel “stories succeeded inasmuch as they were capable of appropriating, riffing on, and engaging the conventions of the classical literary tradition” in ways which appealed to an audience comprising both Hellenistic Jews and Gentile God-fearers in diaspora synagogues.  By the middle of the second century, however, “early Christians had their sights on a higher prize: a comprehensive cultural revolution of the Hellenistic Roman world.”  In this strategic context, it was no longer “enough that Jesus should join the classical array of demigods. … [H]e must obtain a sui generis stature, while condemning all prior Mediterranean iconic figures.”  Such ambitions placed new demands on the rhetorical style of Christian apologetics, requiring “an underlying shift in the proposed modality of the Gospel narratives, moving along the continuum from fictive mythography towards historical fact.”[xxxv]

At their appearance in the first century, however, the gospels, the letters of Paul, and the Acts of the Apostles already reflected a “fundamental metanarrative or theme” which amounted to “the systematic abrogation of nearly every isolationist, separatist practice of early Judaism.”  According to Miller, “the forms of these urban early Christian constructions were, more often than not, at their core lifted from the structures of classical antique culture, often with a mere outward Judaistic decor.”  The resurrection narratives of the New Testament were “first composed, signified, and sacralized in the Hellenistic urban world of Roman Syria, Anatolia, Macedonia, and Greece, these works typically reflected and played on crudely stereotypical myths of Jewish Palestine.”  Their syncretic language reflected the adaptation by early Judeo-Christian theology of antique Greco-Roman forms such as “Zeus-Jupiter, with his own storied demigod son born of a mortal woman.”[xxxvi]

So outlined in the neutral scholarly language of “comparative analysis,” it is easy to miss the explosive significance of Miller’s thesis.  But, simply by refusing to apply the definite article in reference to the allegedly “unimaginable miracle” which is collectively supposed to be “the singular impetus for the birth of Christianity, Miller challenges the fundamental presuppositions of contemporary Christian apologetics.  He denies that one can speak, in the context of Greco-Roman antiquity, of the Resurrection, the Empty Tomb, the Event, the Mystery.  He condemns the tacit agreement according to which classicists designate and relinquish to New Testament scholars a uniquely partitioned and sacralized discursive space surrounding “the question of the historicity of Jesus’ narrated resurrection.”  His own study identifies “a detailed, shared conventional system between the Gospel resurrection narratives” and what are known to classicists as “the extant translation narratives of Hellenistic and Roman literature.”[xxxvii]

Miller subsumes the “resurrection” language of the Gospels under the broader “translation topos” found in Hellenistic and Roman cultures.  He demonstrates how the latter “tradition functioned in an honorific capacity.”  In other words, “the convention had become a protocol for honoring numerous heroes, kings, and philosophers, those whose bodies were not recovered at death.”  He points to “the translation of Romulus … as the quintessential, archetypical account for a pronounced ‘apotheosis’ tradition in the funerary consecration of the principes Romani.”  The Romulus fable relates how the

legendary founding king of Rome, while mustering troops on Campus Martius, was caught up to heaven when clouds suddenly descended and enveloped him.  When the clouds had departed, he was seen no more.  In the fearsome spectacle, most of his troops had fled, but the remaining nobles instructed the people that Romulus had been translated to the gods.  An alternate account arose that perhaps the nobles had slain the king and invented the tale to cover up their treachery.  Later, however, Julius Proculus stepped forward to testify before all the people that he had been eyewitness to the translated Romulus, having met him travelling on the Via Appia.  Romulus, according to this tale, offered his nation a final great commission and again vanished.[xxxviii]

Miller provides a lengthy catalogue of similar translation fables and contends that such tales “provide a mimetic background for the Gospel narratives.”  Like Robyn Faith Walsh, Miller finds that Greek, Roman, and first-century Hellenistic Jewish writers competed, not just with each other, but with older authors such as Homer to mimic, improve upon, and embellish existing examples of the translation topos, or genre.  He argues, very persuasively, “that the textualized Romulus indeed figured prominently within early Christian resurrection narrative construction.”  He then discusses what such mimetic, rhetorical performances “achieved within the cultural milieu of a Romano-Greek East, that is, in the primitive centuries of the rise of Christianity.”  In a distinctly understated fashion, Miller remarks that his “book also tacitly delivers a rather forceful critique of standing theories regarding the likely antecedents of the early Christian ‘resurrection’ accounts.”  In particular, he takes careful aim at modern Christian apologetics which deny any antecedents.  He attributes such efforts to endow the Resurrection of Jesus Christ with a sui generis status to “a perspective typically arising out of ‘faith-based discourse.’” [xxxix]

Miller “sets forth a more satisfying thesis, a model that more comprehensively explains the available data, namely that such narratives fundamentally relied upon and adapted the broadly applied cultural-linguistic conventions and structures of antique Mediterranean society.”  In this cultural context, the early Christian resurrection tale functioned “as an ideology and not as an argued event of history.”  Early Christian writers, Miller writes, “did not attempt a case for the historicity of the resurrection of their founding figure.”  Instead, Jesus was deployed in the gospel resurrection narratives as “a mythic literary vehicle.”  Miller defines “myth” as “a sacred narrative or account” that served to frame the present for the Jesus movement.  The resurrection myth functioned, like the Greco-Roman translation fable, “to undo tragic loss, reclaiming the hero in a modal reverie of heroic exaltatio.”[xl]

Miller argues that the innovation of the Gospel postmortem accounts did not reside in the employment of the translation fable convention per se, but in the scandal of the application of the embellishment to a controversial Jewish peasant, an indigent Cynic, otherwise marginal and obscure on the grand stage of classical antiquity.”  Jesus emerges as a mythic literary figure in the gospels rather than as a historical actor.  As Miller puts it, the risen Jesus became the iconic “image of a counter-cultural ideology” through the conscious appropriation by the gospel writers of the literary protocols of the ancient Hellenistic Roman world.[xli]  In accordance with such protocols, Paul and the gospel writers presented Jesus as unique, not because he was exalted as a god following his death, but because he was better than the other gods of the classical world.


[I] James D.G. Dunn, A New Perspective on Jesus: What the Quest for the Historical Jesus Missed (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005), 25, 31.

[II] Ibid., 41, 36, 43.

[iii] Ibid., 53, 125.

[iv] Ibid., 69-70.

[v] Robyn Faith Walsh, The Origins of Early Christian Literature: Contextualizing the New Testament within Greco-Roman Literary Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), xiii-xiv.

[vi] Ibid., 3-6.

[vii] Ibid., 5-6.

[viii] Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, (eds.), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

[ix] Walsh, Origins of Early Christian Literature, 32-33, 35.

[x] Ibid., xiii-xiv.

[xi] Cf. John A.T. Robinson, Redating the New Testament (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1976) and Jonathan Bernier, Rethinking the Dates of the New Testament: The Evidence for Early Compostion (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2022).

[xii] Walsh, Origins of Early Christian Literature, 4-6.

[xiii] The term “organic intellectuals” was coined by the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), but it is not at all anachronistic when transposed into the context of an ethnoreligious movement with geopolitical ambitions in the first century.  See, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, (eds. and trans.) Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 5-23.

[xiv] Dunn, Partings of the Ways, 170-171.

[xv] Bart D. Ehrman, How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee (New York: Harper One, 2015), 83.

[xvi] Andrew Fraser, Dissident Dispatches: An Alt-Right Guide to Christian Theology (London: Arktos, 2017), 424-446.

[xvii] On the Old Testament account of the creation of the cosmic temple, see John H. Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One: Ancient Cosmology and the Origins Debate (Dover Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009).

[xviii] See, e.g., Helmut Thielicke, Between God and Satan: The Temptation of Jesus and the Temptability of Man [orig. ed., 1938] (Farmington Hills, MI: Oil Lamp Books, 2010).

[xix] Scot McKnight, A New Vision for Israel: The Teachings of Jesus in National Context (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1999), 69, 83, 6, 10.

[xx] Ibid., 6.

[xxi] Anthony D. Baker, Diagonal Advance: Perfection in Christian Theology (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2011), 77.

[xxii] McKnight, New Vision, 147, 13.

[xxiii] Ibid., 62, 110-115.

[xxiv] Ibid., 136-137, 146-147, 96.

[xxv] Mark does not identify Satan’s three temptations in 1:13, but in 14:30 (just before standing trial before the Sanhedrin) Jesus predicts, accurately, that a satanic impulse will cause Peter to “disown me three times” before the cock crows twice.  Shortly afterward, the disciples fall asleep three times while on guard duty, revealing the tempter within at work again with a suite of counter-Trinitarian snares likely to entrap Jesus’ closest followers (Mark 14:37-41).

[xxvi] Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 113-115.

[xxvii] Ibid., 115-119.

[xxviii] Ibid., 116-118.

[xxix] Ibid., 124-128

[xxx] Ibid., 128.

[xxxi] Ibid., 208-209.

[xxxii] Ibid., 132, 157.

[xxxiii] Richard C. Miller, Resurrection and Reception in Early Christianity (New York: Routledge, 2015), 2.

[xxxiv] Ibid., 1-3.

[xxxv] Ibid., 4-5.

[xxxvi] Ibid., 12-13.

[xxxvii] Ibid., 15-16 (emphasis added).

[xxxviii] Ibid., 16.

[xxxix] Ibid., 16.

[xl] Ibid., 16-17, 158, 162.

[xli] Ibid., 180.

EVREII ȘI MODELAREA GÂNDIRII NOASTRE

Nimănui care citește asta nu trebuie să i se spună că evreii au avut o mare influență asupra Occidentului în ultimele decenii. Ceea ce ar putea să nu fie înțeles pe scară largă este efectul pe care l-au avut în mod specific asupra modului în care gândim.

De-a lungul veacurilor, mintea occidentală s-a arătat a fi directă, pozitivistă și empirică, mai degrabă decât mistică, intuitivă sau magică. Dacă omul occidental vede ceva, el crede că este acolo și crede că modalitatea de a-l înțelege este prin a-l privi mai atent. El nu presupune că ochii lui îl înșală sau că realitatea este așa cum este descrisă de o autoritate care nu trebuie pusă la îndoială.

Faptul că ceva arată diferit din puncte de vedere diferite nu îl face să creadă că este creat de percepțiile sale și nici nu își imaginează că este un produs al preferințelor sau afirmațiilor sale. El distinge ceea ce este acolo, obiectul, de el însuși, subiectul și încearcă să facă afirmațiile sale să se potrivească cu realitatea. În acest fel, el caută să prindă lumea din jurul lui.

Cel puțin, așa a fost întotdeauna, dar după cel de-al Doilea Război Mondial a început să se schimbe, în principal din cauza a trei mode intelectuale, și anume relativismul, construcția socială și postmodernismul, care sunt cauza unei mari pagubece Vestul si le-a făcut singur în acea perioadă. Si toate astea le datorăm în mare parte evreilor.

Relativismul vine în trei soiuri: moral, cultural și epistemic. Relativismul moral neagă că există valori morale absolute. Relativismul cultural afirmă că nicio cultură nu are o valoare mai mare decât alta și nici nu trebuie să judecăm o altă cultură după standardele noastre.

Potrivit relativismului epistemic, cunoașterea unei persoane este relativă la presupunerile sau punctul de vedere al acesteia. Cineva care pretinde că știe ceva nu știe cu adevărat; este așa cum li se pare din „perspectiva” lor.

Efectul principal al relativismului este subminarea încrederii cuiva. „Am crezut că acest lucru este corect și asta este greșit”, se gândește unul, „dar poate că m-am înșelat”. „M-am gândit că este destul de rezonabil să mă aștept ca vecinul meu să nu mai cânte muzică tare la ora unsprezece, dar poate că asta este doar cultura mea.” „Credeam că gheața plutește pe apă, dar poate că nu știam cu adevărat. Poate că nimeni nu știe nimic cu adevărat.”

Relativismul moral poate face moralitatea relativă la multe lucruri. Într-un documentar, Louis Theroux a făcut-o relativ la individ. El a descris o lucrătoare sexuală ca având o educație dificilă. Ea a explicat că atunci când ai paisprezece ani și nu mergi la școală, nu îți dai seama că este doar un interes sexual dacă cineva se arată interesat de tine. Acum, ea a avut atât de multe experiențe încât poate face sex cu oricine. Adresându-se spectatorului, Theroux nu a întrebat dacă a vinde sex este greșit, ci dacă a fost greșit pentru ea. Poate că nu a fost, a sugerat el, deși ar putea fi greșit pentru altcineva.

Relativismul cultural a fost promovat intens în anii 1990. „Toate culturile sunt de valoare egală” a fost o mantră constantă a mass-media. Un exemplu concret a apărut când o haitiană care locuia in Long Island a angajat un voodooist pentru a alunga spiritele pe care credea că tatăl ei le-a eliberat în casa ei, Voodoistul aprovocat sunete tulburătoare să vină din subsol. A aruncat apoi un cearșaf peste ea, a stropit-o cu apă de colonie, i-a dat foc si nu a dus-o la spital cu arsurile de gradul trei până în după-amiaza următoare.

Când a fost acuzat de tentativă de omor, apărarea voodoistului a fost că își practica doar religia. Un purtător de cuvânt haitian a explicat că haitienii, ca și alte minorități etnice, și-au adus cultura în America cu ei. Cine erau americanii să judece?

Nici relativismul epistemic nu are prea multe de spus. Poate fi adevărat că cunoștințele științifice sunt doar provizorii, deoarece se îndreaptă spre adevăr sau fac ocazional cotituri greșite, dar asta nu înseamnă că este relativă la un punct de vedere. S-ar putea chiar spune că o cantitate considerabilă de cunoștințe a fost stabilită incontestabil de-a lungul secolelor.

Câte dintre miile de afirmații dintr-un manual medical la întâmplare ar putea fi greșite, de exemplu? Dar relativismul epistemic s-a infiltrat atât de departe în cultura noastră încât a afectat modul în care gândim, dar a făcut acest lucru cu o întorsătură. În loc să îi facă pe oameni să se îndoiască de cunoștințele lor, îi face să se simtă îndreptățiți să descrie orice afirmație pe care ar putea să o facă ca fiind adevărată pentru ei, în timp ce probabil cred că alți oameni ar putea „ști” contrariul. De fapt, astfel de oameni se descurcă si fără conceptul de cunoaștere.

Relativismul epistemic a fost popularizat de Thomas Kuhn în Structura revoluțiilor științifice (1962), care susținea că cunoștințele științifice sunt relative la o „paradigmă”. Thomas Kuhn era evreu. Cu decenii mai devreme, relativismul cultural și implicit moralul a fost introdus de Franz Boas, care era și el evreu.

Construcționismul social este moda urmată de oricine spune că ceva este doar o construcție socială, ceea ce este un lucru extrem de popular de spus. Ce înseamnă nu este clar. Poate că prin „construiți” cei care spun că înseamnă concept. Un construct social este în minte, iar dacă este doar un construct social, nu există nimic care să îi corespundă în realitate. Dar pentru a arăta acest lucru, construcțiile sociale ar trebui să producă un argument pentru a spune la ce pare se referă cand conceptul nu există. În schimb, par să creadă că au dovedit la fel de mult, pur și simplu numind-o doar un construct social.

Uneori, atunci când oamenii numesc lucrurile doar constructe sociale, ei spun, subliniind aspectul social, că singurul motiv pentru care credem că există este că am fost de acord că există. Dar pentru a stabili acest lucru, ei ar trebui să arate din nou că credința noastră că există este greșită
Ce poate fi mai dăunător decât o modă intelectuală care determină o societate să se complacă într-o asemenea autopersuasiune? Va continua pe baza unei înțelegeri false a realității și va irosi energia încercând să scape de lucruri, foarte posibil uitând de ce crede că trebuie să scape de ele, care nu vor dispărea niciodată.

Sursa principală a construcționismului social a fost o carte numită Construcția socială a realității (1966) de Peter Berger și Thomas Luckmann, ambii evrei.

Postmodernismul este o colecție fără sens de idei menite să facă apel la voința de putere și să ajute transformarea revoluționară a societății. Este atribuită în principal lui Michel Foucault, autorul cărții The Order of Things (1966), dar la fel de mult se datorează lui Jacques Derrida, care a scris Writing and Difference și On Grammatology (ambele 1967). Foucault nu era evreu; Derrida era.

Ideea principală a lui Derrida este că ne aflăm într-o închisoare a limbajului din care nu putem scăpa. Departe de a ne lăsa să înțelegem realitatea, limbajul ne împiedică să luăm contact cu ea, prin urmare o afirmație nu reprezintă lumea, ci poate fi numită doar „narațiune”, care nu poate fi apreciată ca adevărată sau falsă.

Postmodernismul oferă adepților săi un sentiment îmbucurător al puterii. Confruntându-se cu o carte de istorie care spune lucruri care nu le plac, ei o pot respinge ca purtând doar prejudecățile scriitorului. Ei pot râde de pretențiile sale de obiectivitate, spunând că obiectivitatea este de neatins. Apoi, când pun ei înșiși pixul pe hârtie, ei își pot transmite propriile prejudecăți până la conținutul inimii lor, căci ce poate face o narațiune decât să transmită prejudecățile scriitorului?
Ei nu trebuie să încerce să fie obiectivi, căci cine poate fi obiectiv?

O carte nu are nevoie de calitate pentru a fi influentă; ceea ce are nevoie este să fie promovată. Editorul o promovează jurnaliştilor, care o promovează publicului prin recenzii admirative sau comandă recenzii admirative de la cadrele academice. Cartea umple fiecare vitrine de librărie și începe să apară pe listele de lecturi ale colegiului. Oricine dorește să fie la curent se asigură că a citit-o.

Pentru a realiza toate acestea, cartea trebuie doar selectată ca un schimbător de lume de către cineva care se află într-o poziție cheie într-o rețea de oameni potriviți, cum ar fi, în cazul unei cărți scrise de un evreu, un evreu pe care alți evreii il vor asculta. Dar există o astfel de rețea?
Există evrei în publicație, publicitate, mass-media și mediul academic?
Urșii trăiesc în pădure?

Îngreunați de sentimente inutile de vinovăție, cu cererile de dispariție a acestora răsunând în urechi și după decenii de expunere la relativism, construcționism social și postmodernism, nu este de mirare că mulți nonevrei au acum probleme să gândească corect. Fără influența evreilor, probabil că nu ar fi așa. Am fi în continuare la fel de capabili mintal ca odinioară.

Sursa: https://www.theoccidentalobserver.net/2023/09/26/jews-and-the-shaping-of-our-thought

Traducerea CD

Religion, Race, and Ethnicity in Greco-Roman Antiquity New Perspectives on The Lordship of Jesus, Judaism, and the “Truthiness” of Christianity, Part One

Introduction

On the dissident right down-under, the intellectual, spiritual, and moral bankruptcy of mainstream Australian “conservatism” is a well-worn topic.  Everyone expects conservatives to cuck when the question of White genocide or the great replacement is raised.  Should attention shift away from racial politics to the relationship between politics and religion, however, most conservatives and radical rightists reveal a shared loyalty to a secular regime separating church and state.

This became evident to me while listening to a recent podcast discussion between Blair Cottrell (a photogenic, patriotic chad and working-class, “tradie,” activist from Melbourne) and Sydneysider Joel Davis (an on-line activist of a more educated and intellectual bent. [1] At first, both stuck to the usual script, agreeing that Anglo-Australian (or White) nationalism will never become a serious contender for state power in Australia so long as the Labor-Liberal duopoly retains its long-established stranglehold on mainstream party politics.  But then, the conversation briefly strayed off the beaten path.  Frankly clutching at straws, Cottrell wondered whether religion—Christianity, in particular—might offer an alternative medium for fruitful nationalist activism, outside and apart from the state.  Davis immediately demurred, advising against mixing religion and politics.  While avowing his personal faith in Catholicism as the “true religion,” he worried that making race a religious issue (or vice versa) would undermine the already fragile unity of the embryonic nationalist movement among White Australians.

In a supposedly secular society such as contemporary Australia, such a view passes as the conventional wisdom.  Significantly, what goes unmentioned here is the relationship between ethnicity, specifically Anglo-Australian, or White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) ethnicity, in its relationship to both state and church.  This is especially remarkable in Australia where WASPs are still a (shrinking) majority of the population.  How, then, did religion become separated from Anglo-Australian ethnonationalism?  Indeed, how was Anglo-Australian ethnicity itself relegated to the margins of political discourse on the dissident right?  Why should an Anglo-Protestant ethnic majority adopt instead a generic “White” or “European” racial identity?   Why should they forswear their collective birthright to an ancestral stock of social, cultural, and spiritual capital—the common blood, language, and religion—generated in the course of a unique history played out on a global stage?

After all, not so very long ago, Irish Catholics in Australia and elsewhere routinely employed the church in pursuit of their ethnic interests, in opposition, if need be, to their Anglo-Protestant “fellow Whites.”  Interestingly, the secularization of politics in Ireland has coincided with the accelerating demographic displacement of the Irish people.  Apart from the Irish, do Jews not mix religion and politics?  Who can deny that Judaism is an ethnoreligion with a distinctive political theology of its own grounded, nowadays, in the Holocaust mythos?  Significantly, in Canada, “Holocaust denial” is now a crime under a newly enacted blasphemy law which came hot on the heels of the 2018 repeal of blasphemy laws originally intended to protect the Christian religion.[2]  In the rest of the Anglosphere, social conventions alone still enforce public respect for Jewish political theology by governments, the corporate sector, and society at large.  Moreover, synagogues have long been a significant vehicle for Jewish ethnopolitical action.  What prevents Anglo-Protestants from viewing “their” churches in a similar light?

It is not that either Catholic or Anglo-Protestant churches seek to build a wall between religion and politics (understood as who gets what, when, where, and how).  Rather, they refuse to mix religion with ethnicity (much less race).  Or to be more precise, while countenancing ethnic congregations for non-White minorities, churches expect Anglo-Protestant parishioners to maintain a strict separation between their “ethnicity” and their “religion.”  Christian clerics, across denominations, turn a blind eye to the enchanted world of Greco-Roman antiquity, where religion, as such, did not actually exist.  In fact, in the Roman empire of the first century, not even Jesus (or his apostle Paul) distinguished religion from ethnicity.

For Jews, no less than Samaritans, Greeks, and Romans, one’s identity, fate, and destiny derived from kinship with the gods of one’s family, tribe, and city.  “What modern people think of as ‘religion,’ ancient people articulated and experienced as family inheritance, [and] ‘ancestral custom.’”  In such a world, “ethnic distinctiveness and religious distinctiveness are simple synonyms, and native to all ancient peoples.”  Moreover, Paula Fredriksen adds, “ancient peoples, Jews included, did not ‘believe’ or ‘believe in’ their ancestral customs.  They enacted them; they preserved them; they respected them; they trusted or trusted in them.” In pre-Christian antiquity, the two key populations were gods and humans.  Ancient societies “could thrive only if gods were happy.  Cult was the index of human loyalty, affection, and respect.”  Just as “cult was an ethnic designation,” so too “ethnicity was a cult designation.”  In other words, “gods ran in the blood.  Peoples and their pantheons shared a family connection.” [3]

Accordingly, it was only because Jesus of Nazareth was acknowledged as the Son of Israel’s God that he could expect to be exalted as King of the Jews.  Indeed, he declares explicitly that he “was not sent except to the lost sheep of the house of Israel” (Matt. 15:24). How then can Anglo-Protestants, or even Anglo-Catholics, deny the religious roots of their racial kinfolk both “at home” and “abroad” in the Anglo-Saxon diaspora?  The contemporary Anglo-Protestant diaspora resembles the dispersion of Hellenistic Jews among whom the apostle Paul worked during his mission to the God-fearing pagans of the Roman Empire.  Indeed, Paul sought to reconnect with those “lost Israelite sheep” during that mission.  As we will see, Jesus and Paul shared an ethno-theology in which the history of Israel according to the flesh was the medium through which the spiritual destiny of the Israel of God was to be fulfilled.

What prevents churches throughout the Anglosphere from developing an ethno-theology enabling White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs) to recover a shared ethnoreligious spirit of meaning, value, and purpose?  I believe that Blair Cottrell had some such intuition at the back of his mind during his discussion with Joel Davis.  Joel, by contrast, confines (dare I say, dooms) the Anglo-Australian nationalist movement to a secular, explicitly “one-dimensional” strategy of racial politics.  Looking back on the Jesus movement of the first century, however, I am convinced that the regeneration of deracinated, spiritually anemic Anglo-Australians will require a multi-pronged and transnational, three-dimensional movement.  The goal must be to reinvigorate the historic bonds of religion, race, and ethnicity within and between the peoples of the British diaspora.  Nothing less than a broad spectrum, deep-seated renaissance of British race patriotism will overcome the soul-destroying, nihilistic materialism of globalist plutocracy.  Any such Great Awakening in our time requires a religious reformation reconnecting Anglican (and other Anglo-Protestant) churches to their ancestral roots in the Angelcynn church fostered by Alfred the Great (849–899).

The Problem with Christian Nationalism

Why then, have I criticized the American-style Christian nationalism championed by Stephen Wolfe?[4]  Certainly, in many respects, we are on the same side.  Not only is Wolfe opposed to the globalist regime headquartered in Washington D.C. and New York, but he is also critical of the evangelical Protestant establishment.  Before publication of his best-selling book on Christian nationalism, Wolfe had already written a series of online articles deploring “the sorry state of evangelical rhetoric.”[5]  There he charged that American evangelicals have become addicted to the use of shopworn rhetorical devices designed to capture the moral high ground from their critics without ever having to take them seriously.  Most obviously, virtue-signalling Christians routinely remind those advocating an end to mass Third World immigration that we must “love our neighbours.”  Wolfe rightly complains that serious moral and political discourse, is impossible so long as such rhetorical devices are automatically invoked to short-circuit debates with anyone who could lead evangelicals down the path to ethnonationalism.

Wolfe presents a persuasive critique of “christianizing rhetorical devices.”  He refers there to the evangelical habit of grounding arguments in what they take to be “an undeniable Christian truism” (e.g., “all of us are made in the image of God”).  This rhetorical tactic forces opponents “to contend with an undeniable statement offered for a predetermined moral conclusion.”[6]  For my own part, I first began to push back against the unreflective moral certitude of Anglo-Protestant discourse when, as a bookish teen-ager in small-town Ontario, I discovered the English philosopher Bertrand Russell.

A callow youth with an embryonic goatee, I relished my new-found vocation as the village atheist.  I was amazed by the ease with which I could confound church-going classmates with talking points I lifted from Russell’s treasure trove of skeptical essays.[7]  Still, I was no more a militant atheist than Russell himself, being much more taken by his skeptical agnosticism.  After high school, as I studied history through to an honours degree and graduate school, I simply lost interest in the milk-and-water sermonizing style of Anglo-Protestantism, Canadian-style.[8]

Not until my late twenties was my childhood Sunday School receptivity to Christianity fortuitously rekindled.  Having, at long last, graduated from law school in Canada in the mid-seventies, I seized the opportunity to avoid the grind of legal practice by teaching law in Australia.  Fortunately, I soon landed a job in a new law school in Sydney where I developed and convened a first-year foundation course on the history and philosophy of law.  That course was based on the premise that the common law tradition grew out of a Greco-Roman civilization reshaped by the triumph of Christianity.  So, while remaining an unchurched agnostic, I gradually absorbed the sort of cultural Christianity now stoutly defended by Stephen Wolfe.

Not long afterwards, while working on a master’s degree at Harvard Law School, I discovered the fascinating interplay between Anglo-American Protestantism and the classical republican traditions shaping the federal constitution of what seemed, by comparison with European absolutism, the almost stateless character of American civil society.  Although it has attracted accusations of authoritarian statism, Wolfe’s Christian nationalism owes a lot to the Anglo-Protestant evangelical tradition of anti-institutional populism.  Long story short: American constitutional history has been shaped by the political theology of evangelical Protestantism which exalted the double majesty of the Divine Economy and good King Demos.  Over the years, I have written good deal on that subject.[9]  Decades later, after leaving legal education behind (let us say, involuntarily) I began to wonder, as Blair Cottrell did above, whether Christianity, particularly the Anglican church, could ever develop an effective response to the spiritual, moral, and intellectual crisis of WASP managerial, professional, and political elites.  I persuaded myself that I should at least get some skin in the game by getting baptized in a local Anglican church.  Having lamented the collapse of English Canadian nationalism as a young man, I am now deeply disturbed by the disastrous decline of WASP hegemony everywhere in the Anglosphere.[10]  Embarking on a search for the spiritual roots of that crisis, I decided to earn a degree in theology.

I therefore possess personal, political, and professional interests in the prospects for an ethnoreligious solution to the existential crisis now facing the Anglo-Saxon peoples.  Unfortunately, Wolfe rests his own case for Christian nationalism upon an a priori faith in a pair of “undeniable Christian truisms.”  Hoping to establish the legitimacy of a Christian nation ruled by a Christian prince, he simply asserts the truth value of two “mixed syllogisms” which combine natural law with certain “supernatural truths,” or theological presuppositions revealed by grace.  He claims, for example, that the catchphrase “Jesus is Lord” is a “universally true statement.”  Likewise, the proposition that “Christianity is the true religion,” grounded as it is in revelation rather than reason, requires no argument.[11]  But surely, even if one accepts the presupposition that those statements are “true,” one is entitled to ask: “In what sense are they true?”  What if the most that can expect to find in such “undeniable Christian truisms” is some sort of “truthiness[12]?

Wolfe’s political theory of Christian nationalism aims to secure the Lordship of Jesus by resurrecting blasphemy and Sabbatarian laws designed to drive atheism and heresy from the public sphere.  In principle, this political program knows no borders.  If Christianity is the true religion, it must be “a universal religion—a religion for all nations.”  But, Wolfe concedes, “it does not eliminate nations.”  Rather, Christianity completes, indeed, it perfects nations as well as individual recipients of divine grace.[13] A non-Christian nation (or person) is, therefore, an imperfect nation (or person).

So long as America retained its identity as a Christian nation, Wolfe contends, it was entitled to defend itself against advocates of atheism and immorality.  And so, it did.  For example, even in secular and cosmopolitan New York City and, as late as 1940, concerned citizens successfully campaigned to prevent Bertrand Russell from taking up a teaching position at the City College in the fields of logic, mathematical theory, and the philosophy of science.  The justification for this violation of academic freedom: As the author of notorious (but, to many, high-minded, measured, and persuasive) essays such as those collected in my broken-backed copy of Why I Am Not a Christian, Russell was allegedly an unrepentant advocate of atheism, public nudity, and free love.[14] Clearly, at that time, American Anglo-Protestants had few qualms about using state power to enforce creedal conformity.  The churches then were still a force to be reckoned with and Wolfe clearly hankers after those days.

But that was then; this is now.  In the past fifty years or so, Protestant churches and their denominational theological colleges have offered little resistance, and more than a little support and encouragement to the rise of Woke America.  Wolfe, of course, recognizes that the ascension of an evangelical “Christian Prince” to state power is unlikely to occur anytime soon.  Nor does he expect “really existing,” mainstream Protestant churches to enter the political arena themselves, fighting to reverse the browning of America, overturn the gynocracy, or dismantle the Global American Empire (GAE).  At most, churches might be third-party beneficiaries of a lay, pan-Protestant, nationalist movement combatting demonic powers and principalities on their behalf.  A more counter-intuitive threat to Globohomo is hard to imagine.

Nevertheless, Wolfe has become a prominent figure on social media, regularly sniping at an evangelical establishment on board with the globalist agenda of the transnational corporate welfare state.  In his view, the globalist regime threatens both his religion and his nation.  As a Reformed Presbyterian political theorist, however, Wolfe rides two unruly horses—ethnicity and religion—simultaneously.  Only by keeping both his ethnic identity and his religious faith on a steady diet of blood thinners can he keep his seat.  But any Christian nationalism worthy of the name must recognize, sooner or later, that strong gods demand the unapologetic fusion of race, ethnicity, and religion.

Religion and Ethnicity: Then and Now

On Wolfe’s political theory, ethnicity is, by nature, a particularistic phenomenon situated within earthly kingdoms governed by civil magistrates, the realm Augustine of Hippo described as the City of Man.  Reformed theology and Protestant churches, on the other hand, are oriented by grace towards a heavenly kingdom, the eternal City of God, where the Lord Jesus reigns, sitting at the right hand of the Father.  Civil magistrates must accommodate the ethnic identities, needs, and interests of his subjects, but the triune God of Reformed theology is colour-blind.  Many New Testament scholars now contend, however, that this presupposition contradicts an undeniable historical truism fundamental to the cosmology shared even by Jesus of Nazareth and Paul, his apostle to the Gentiles.  In the enchanted realm of Greco-Roman antiquity, religion and ethnicity were indistinguishable; they were literally syngeneic, originally a Greek word signifying both kinship and citizenship.

In those days, every member of the same genos shared a family connection extending “not only horizontally, between citizens of the Hellenistic polis; it also extended vertically between heaven and earth.”  In short, Greco-Roman cities “were not secular spaces.  They were family-run religious institutions.”[15]  That enchanted world was saturated with gods; every forest and river, every family, tribe, and city had its own gods who must not be offended lest they visited retribution on those subject to their supernatural powers.  For Jews, Greeks, and Romans, one’s religion was not about beliefs, creeds, and confessions of faith.  In the world we have lost, religion was synonymous with the ritual rites and obligations prescribed by one’s mythological ethnic identity and ancestral allegiances.[16]

Wolfe, however, is loath to ground Christian nations in a syngeneic fusion of religion and ethnicity.  Instead, he thinks of ethnicity as the “phenomenological topography” of a “people in place.”  Rather grudgingly, Wolfe acknowledges that ethnicity may run in the blood.[17]  But Christian identity, he believes, transcends primitive notions of kinship with the ancestral gods of family, tribe, or nation.  Like Wolfe, Anglo-Protestants generally remain stubbornly resistant to the notion that spirit is fused together with blood, indissolubly, in holy communion with the water of life (1 John 5:8).

At the same time, Wolfe’s Christian political theory remains resolutely old-fashioned in its respect for ecclesiastical authority.  Anglo-Protestantism may be a bloodless religion, but it still adheres to ancestral creeds formulated in late antiquity by the Church Fathers.  Notably, in preparation for his book, Wolfe immersed himself in the works of seventeenth-century Reformed theologians largely unknown to more than a few of his fellow Anglo-Protestants.  Even more anachronistic is his reliance upon the Thomist tradition of natural law dating back to the Middle Ages.  Biblical exegesis, on the other hand, is conspicuously absent from his work.  Like most Anglo-Protestants, he is content to leave that task to the pastors and theologians who stand behind the Westminster Confession of Faith.  Nor has he engaged with the growing body of contemporary New Testament scholarship ready, willing, and able to challenge the foundational “supernatural truths” of Wolfe’s old-time religion.

Wolfe’s brand of Christian nationalism will need more than recycled theological truisms dredged up from dusty Calvinist tracts to gain traction outside the echo chambers of pious evangelicalism.  Mindlessly repeating that “Jesus is Lord” carries little weight outside that charmed circle.  Similarly, after four centuries of experience with Anglo-Protestantism, it will be a hard sell to persuade Moslems, Jews, and nihilistic atheists, much less millions of marginalized White men, that “Christianity is the true religion” destined to “perfect” the already perfectly fictional “American nation.”  As Wolfe recognizes himself, the conventional attachment to a non-creedal, unchurched, cultural Christianity reaches its vanishing point when one’s nation turns into a gay disco.

Indeed, already in 1940, it was evident that Bertrand Russell was far from being a lone skeptic in opposition to the merely voluntary Protestant establishment.  At home, religious diversity was an established fact: Catholics, Jews, and Mormons had secure beachheads in America.  Abroad, the country would soon join godless Soviet communists in its war on Germany.  Hardly surprisingly then that, within a few decades after the war, the USA was to be utterly transformed by a civil rights revolution and its corollary, mass Third World immigration.  Mainline Protestant churches put up only token resistance before they obediently fell in line with the entire progressive agenda.

Nowadays, secular humanists, rationalist skeptics, mythicists, historicists, and atheists aplenty have found influential platforms in the religious studies departments of major American universities.  Offering challenging new perspectives on once undeniable Christian truisms, they present a solid prima facie case for free thought in religious matters.  Their claim that the “supernatural truths” asserted by Christian churches rest less on reason and revelation than on myth and fable cannot easily be swept under the carpet.

Pushed beyond the pale by both evangelical theological seminaries and mainstream Protestant churches, independent preterist scholars and dissident churches question the creedal promise that, some time in our future, the Lord Jesus “will come again in glory to judge the living and the dead.”  Conservative evangelicals insist that Jesus will return physically (“as a 5̍ 5̎ Jewish man,” in Don K. Preston’s wry phrase) riding on clouds of glory, at the end of the Christian age, to usher in a new heaven and a new earth.  By contrast, preterists employ a Hebrew hermeneutic in defending their persuasively biblical covenantal eschatology.  They hold that the Parousia (i.e., the Second Coming of Jesus Christ), occurred, as prophesied in the Old and New Testaments, with the destruction of the Jerusalem Temple in AD 70.  Hence, many New Testament scholars, skeptics and preterists alike, can agree that, for those of us in the present, the futurist eschatological hope, as preached in the creedal churches (though differing as to its pre-millennial, post-millennial, or amillennial timing) is little more than a chimera.

Do bible-believing preterists and skeptical scholars deserve a respectful hearing from creedal Christian nationalists?  In principle, Stephen Wolfe approves the restoration of Sabbatarian and blasphemy laws to exclude political atheism and public heresy “from acceptable opinion and action.”[18]  Wolfe publicly affirms creedal orthodoxy on eschatology; he “looks to the future coming of Christ (Tit. 2:13)” and hopes “for the glorification of the body promised to us in Christ (Phil. 3:21).”[19]  One cannot but wonder whether he would vote to convict preterists such as Don K. Preston were he to sit on a jury in a prosecution for public heresy.

Don K. Preston

Wolfe certainly believes that “public heresy has the potential to harm other’s souls by causing doubt or distraction or by disrupting public peace.”  According to his Christian political theory, therefore, the civil “magistrate, who must care for the souls of his people, may act to suppress that heresy.”  Note as well that Wolfe agrees in principle with Francis Turretin, his favourite seventeenth-century theologian, that arch-heretics “publicly persistent in their damnable error … can be justly put to death.”[20]  Having endorsed Don K. Preston’s views on fulfilled eschatology, repeatedly and in public, I fear that a “Christian prince” would convict me of arch-heresy.  I can only hope that he might find it imprudent to condemn me to death.

Anglo-Protestant “nationalists” proposing to outlaw atheism and heresy could ease the minds of those who might be accused of public atheism by explaining just how the historical Jesus became the eternal Lord of the Anglo-Saxon, British-descended peoples.  WASP agnostics will ask why only a bloodlessly cosmic “Christianity” can be their “true religion.”  Looking further afield for potential defendants, Wolfe’s pan-Protestant program to enshrine the “supernatural truths” of creedal Christianity into public and criminal law is sure to generate powerful pushback from a multitude of other groups.  Massive resistance will come, not just from mild-mannered academics and pious preterists, but from marginalized Muslims, deeply entrenched Jewish elites, miscellaneous unbelievers, and moral degenerates, not to mention businesses, large and small, which profit from the abolition of Sunday blue laws and the concomitant licencing of atheistic, materialist nihilism seven days a week.

Note as well that the heretical theological voices discussed below have found mass audiences on, inter alia, YouTube channels such as MythVision Podcast.[21]  Many Christian nationalists such as Stephen Wolfe (as well as White nationalists who happen to be Christian, such as Joel Davis in Australia) are themselves adept in the use of social media.  But, wedded as they are to the “supernatural truths” enshrined in traditional church creeds, they are certain to be pushed onto the political and intellectual defensive.  Indeed, as we have seen, Davis prudently prefers not to mix his Catholic religion with his ethnopolitics.  And for good reason, since what churchgoers take to be the most self-evident of theological truisms—the notion that Jesus and the apostle Paul were Christians—is now up for debate.  Certainly, among contemporary New Testament scholars, no consensus supports the proposition that Jesus was sent or that Paul was called to found a new religion, especially one cleansed of his own ethnic identity.

Jews, Judaism, and the Idea of Israel in the First Century AD

My argument is an ethno-theological interpretation of the origins and outcome of the Jesus movement in the first-century world of Greco-Roman antiquity.  In a nutshell, Jesus and Paul inspired a dissident ethnoreligious movement “within Judaism”; neither presented himself as the Founder of Christianity.  The movement first emerged in Judea after the death and reported resurrection of Jesus.  By the time Jerusalem was destroyed by Roman armies in AD 70, the gospel had been carried to the ends of the known world through the social networks and synagogues established within the far-flung diaspora of Hellenistic Jews.

Not all Jews, either in Judea or in the diaspora were supporters of the Jesus movement.  The Jesus movement was at odds with ethnonationalist Judeans involved in a long-simmering rebellion against Rome, leading to the Jewish wars in 66AD.  Those Judean nationalists followed in the footsteps of the Maccabean rebellion against Hellenistic influence in the second century B.C.  During his ministry, Jesus also came into conflict with the leaders of the Temple cult centred on Jerusalem.  The Jesus movement stood for an ethno-theology with two central features.  First, its aims were explicitly geopolitical in scope, extending beyond Judea to the entire known world (oikumene); and, secondly, the movement was driven by the sense of urgency inherent in its apocalyptic eschatology.  Both Jesus and Paul taught that the “end of the age” was nigh.  They and their followers looked forward to the long-promised but now imminent restoration of “all Israel” in a new heaven and new earth.

The suggestion made in the previous paragraph that the Jesus movement developed “within Judaism” is a deceptively simple claim.  To the modern mind, the term “Judaism” connotes a “religion” which itself is misleading.  Moderns associate “religion” with a set of doctrines pertaining to the nature of the divine or supernatural realm.  Even the term “Judean” is anachronistic when used to signify an “ethnicity” as distinct from the modern category of “religion” supposedly implicit in the word “Jew.”  But, as we have already seen, the very attempt to distinguish religion and ethnicity in the ancient world is itself anachronistic.[22]  In particular, it makes no sense to distinguish the ethnic and religious aspects of Jewishness in this period.  In translations of ancient texts, however, the English word ‘Judaism’ is often supplied in place of phrases literally denoting “the ancestral traditions, laws, and customs of the Jews.”  This suggests that the “various elements that constitute our religion” were “inextricably bound up with other aspects of their life.”  In the Greco-Roman world, generally, there were “a variety of modes in which people could think about and interact with the divine world,” including ritual and myth.  These aspect of ancient life “overlapped and interacted in various ways” without forming the sort of “integrated system” or “unified understanding of the divine” that we call “religion.”[23]

Certainly, there were no ancient Hebrew or Aramaic words which correspond to our ‘Judaism’.  There were Greek and Latin words that appear to do so (namely, Ίουδαϊσμός and Iudaismus) but, before the period 200–500 AD, they are used only a very few times, in Greek, most during the Maccabean period of the second century, BC.  The very restricted usage of that Greek word for Judaism usually occurs “in explicit or implicit contrast with some other potential affiliation, movement, or inclination.”  This brings us to Hellenism and its cognate verb, Hellenize.  The basic meaning of Hellenize was “to express oneself in Greek,” occurring “chiefly in contexts where there are doubts about the speaker’s ability because he is a foreigner or uneducated.”[24]

Significantly, the first attestation of the word Hellenism is in the same second-century BC text that hosts the first occurrences of the word ‘Judaism’.  The latter word “appears to have been coined in reaction to cultural ‘Έλληνισμός’ (Hellenism).  In that context, ‘Judaism’ signified “a certain kind of activity over against a pull in another, foreign direction,” specifically Hellenism which “introduced foreign ways—Greek cultural institutions, education, sports, and dress—into Jerusalem.”  It therefore refers to “a defection that threatens the heart and soul of Judean tradition.”  The Maccabean revolt “was a counter-movement, a bringing back of those who had gone over to foreign ways: a “Judaizing” or Judaization, which the author of 2 Maccabees programmatically labels Ίουδαϊσμός (Judaism).[25]

The term ‘Judaism’, therefore, has a double meaning corresponding to the difference between what anthropologists call an etic meaning, derived from an external or observer’s point of view and the emic or insider’s view that a first-century Jew would have as a participant in his own collective way of life.  From that emic point of view, it makes no sense to distinguish between ethnicity and religion.[26]  A further source of confusion over terms such as ‘Jew’ and ‘Jewishness’ has to do with the difference between modern and ancient understandings of the relationship between Jews, Judeans and the idea of Israel.  Jason Staples points out that moderns usually presume that, after the Babylonian Exile, the term ‘Israel’ is synonymous with ethnic Jews.[27]  In fact, historically speaking, “Israel is an entity larger than (but including) the body of ethnic Jews.”  Here, ‘Jews’ or ‘Judeans’ “refers to persons descended from the southern kingdom of Judah [whether they live outside Judea or not], which is only a part of the larger historical entity called Israel.”  By contrast, “Israel” is a polyvalent term with at least four distinct references in the Hebrew Bible: (1) the patriarch Jacob/Israel; (2) “the nation composed of his descendants, that is, all twelve tribes of ‘Israel,’ including Judah”; (3) the northern kingdom, the ten tribes of the “house of Israel,” excluding the southern kingdom, the “house of Judah”; and (4) the returnees from Judah after the Babylonian Exile.[28]  The Ioudaioi (Judeans) were the only Israelites who returned from Babylon.  According to the late first-century Jewish historian, Josephus, the other ten tribes were scattered “beyond Euphrates till now and are a boundless multitude, not to be estimated by numbers.”[29]

Keep in mind that the Hebrew Bible came into being after the disappearance of those ten lost tribes.  This fact is crucial to an understanding of the Jesus movement in the first century.  Staples emphasizes that “the Hebrew Bible is scripture collected and edited by Jews, for Jews, about Israel.”  He observes that “interpreters have been too quick to assume that the (actual) Jewish audience of these texts is the same as the Israel to which the texts are rhetorically addressed.”  Instead, most of Israel existed only in the historical imagination after the Babylonian Exile.  Accordingly, “through the collection and redaction of the prophetic literature and authoritative historical narratives that ultimately comprised the Hebrew Bible, exilic and post-exilic Jews established a continual reminder of the broken circumstances of the present, constructing an Israel not realized in the present.”  These early Jews, in other words, located “themselves in a liminal space between the memory of a past ‘biblical’ Israel and the hope for a future restored Israel.”  They created a “restoration eschatology” which looked forward, not to “the end of the world, but rather the end of the present age and the dawn of a new one.” In that new creation “all Israel” was to be restored by the in-gathering of all twelve tribes of the Dispersion into Zion.[30]  The Lordship of Jesus the Christ was closely associated with the longed-for restoration of “all Israel.”

Although the ten lost tribes remained but a ghostly presence during the first century, a highly visible Jewish diaspora had been a well-established historical presence in major centres of the Greco-Roman world for hundreds of years.  In fact, the Hellenized Jews of the diaspora greatly outnumbered those living in Judea.  Rodney Stark estimates that while there were about one million Jews in Palestine, there were somewhere between four and six million to be found in wealthy and populous urban communities throughout the Roman empire.  Indeed, “Jews had adjusted to life in the diaspora in ways that made them very marginal vis-à-vis the Judaism of Jerusalem.”  The result was that  the Hebrew language skills of most Hellenized Jews “had decayed to the point that the Torah had to be translated into Greek.”  The Septuagint itself, therefore, became another medium through which Hellenistic perspectives found expression.  Jews of the diaspora were Hellenized to the point that they needed the sort of cultural compromise allowing a Jew to remain a Jew while claiming full entry into “the elect society of the Greeks.”  As for the other side of the ethno-cultural divide, many so-called God-Fearers, or Gentile “fellow-travellers,” were attracted to Hellenized Jewish traditions and customs, especially their moral teachings and monotheism, without being willing to “take the final step of fulfilling the Law” by giving up their own cultic gods and undergoing circumcision.[31]

Stark suggests that, when Jewish authorities decided not to require god-fearing Gentiles to observe the Law in full, they went some way towards the creation of a “religion” free of ethnicity.[32]  This claim is seriously misleading.  Paula Fredriksen observes that it was “a normal aspect of ancient Mediterranean life” to show respect for gods not one’s own, for Jews no less than pagans.  To forge “an exclusive commitment to a foreign god, however—an act unique to Judaism in the pre-Christian era—was tantamount to changing ethnicity” and, hence, would have been perceived as an act of disrespect to the gods of the host city.  At the same time, however, majority cultures were “religiously commodious.”  Interested Gentiles “were free to frequent Jewish gatherings,” assuming “whatever Jewish practices, traditions, and customs they wished, while continuing unimpeded in their own cults as well.”[33]

The Jesus movement therefore found receptive audiences throughout the Hellenized Jewish diaspora among both Jews and Gentiles.  Even so, Stark contends, the movement “offered twice as much cultural continuity to the Hellenized Jews as to Gentiles.”[34]  On this point, Stark’s interpretation gains added force if one takes the view, contra Stark, that the first century Jesus movement developed “within Judaism” and, hence, pre-dated the “parting of the ways” which marked the historical beginning of Christianity proper in the second century.[35]  Given “the marginality of the Hellenized Jews, torn between two cultures,” the Jesus movement “offered to retain much of the religious content of both cultures and to resolve the contradictions between them.”  Not only were diasporan Jews “accustomed to receiving teachers from Jerusalem,” but movement missionaries (such as Paul) “were likely to have family and friendship connections with at least some of the diasporan communities.”  The Jesus movement, in short, built a distinctly Hellenized religion on Jewish foundations, injecting “an exceedingly vigorous other-worldly faith” into the abstract universalism of Platonic philosophy.[36]  It was in that cross-cultural context that Jesus became God.

Go to Part 2.


[1] The Joel & Blair Show https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y1ZRketjuIY&t=3532s

[2] Andrew Fraser, “Friend or Foe? The Holocaust Mythos, Global Jesus, and the Existential Crisis of Anglican Political Theology,” (2022) Vol. 22(3) The Occidental Quarterly 63.

[3] Paula Fredriksen, “Divinity, Ethnicity, Identity: ‘Religion’ as a Political Category in Christian Antiquity,” in Armin Lange, et.al., Comprehending Antisemitism through the Ages: A Historical Perspective (Open Access: De Gruyter, 2021), 101-120, at 102-103; idem, “Judaizing the Nations: The Ritual Demands of Paul’s Gospel,” 56 New Testament Studies 232, at 234-235.

[4] Andrew Fraser, “Sweet Dreams of Christian Nationalism (But What About the Protestant Deformation, Globalist Churches, and Jewish Political Theology?),” 2023(2) The Occidental Quarterly 37.

[5] Stephen Wolfe, The Case for Christian Nationalism (Moscow, ID: Canon Press, 2022); idem, “The Sorry State of Evangelical Rhetoric,” http://sovereignnations.com/2018/06/22/sorry-state-evangelical-rhetoric/

[6] Ibid.

[7] Bertrand Russell, Sceptical Essays (London: Unwin Books, 1960).

[8] Pierre Berton The Comfortable Pew: A Critical Look at Christianity and the Religious Establishment in the New Age (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1965).

[9] See, Andrew Fraser, The Spirit of the Laws: Republicanism and the Unfinished Project of Modernity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), esp. 31-40, 129, 216; The WASP Question: An Essay on the Biocultural Evolution, Present Predicament, and Future Prospects of the Invisible Race (London: Arktos, 2011), 241; and Reinventing Aristocracy in the Age of Woke Capital: How Honourable WASP Elites Could Rescue Our Civilisation from Bad Governance by Irresponsible Corporate Plutocrats (London: Arktos, 2022) 16.

[10] Cf. George Grant, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1988 [orig. ed. 1965).

[11] Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 120, 183.

[12] Defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as: a truthful or seemingly truthful quality that is claimed for something not because of supporting facts or evidence but because of a feeling that it is true or a desire for it to be true.

[13] Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 26.

[14] Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian, Edited with an Appendix on the “Bertrand Russell Case” by Paul Edwards (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957).

[15] Paula Fredriksen, “How Jewish is God? Divine Ethnicity in Paul’s Theology,” (2018) 137(1) Journal of Biblical Literature 193, at 194-195.

[16] Fredriksen, “Divinity, Ethnicity, Identity,” 106.

[17] Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 134-137.

[18] Ibid., 384-387.

[19] Stephen Wolfe, “The Church Among Nations,” August 1, 2023, American Reformer http://americanreformer.org/2023/08/the-church-among-the-nations/

[20] Wolfe, Christian Nationalism, 387-388, 391.

[21] https://www.youtube.com/@MythVisionPodcast

[22] See also, Jason A. Staples, The Idea of Israel in Second Temple Judaism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 17-18.

[23] Steve Mason, “Jews, Judeans, Judaizing, Judaism: Problems of Categorization in Ancient History,” (2007) 38 Journal for the Study of Judaism 457, at 480, 482.

[24] Ibid., 463-464.

[25] Ibid., 464-467.

[26] Ibid., 458-460.

[27] Staples, Idea of Israel, 25.

[28] Jason A. Staples, “What Do the Gentiles Have to Do with ‘All Israel’? A Fresh Look at Romans 11:25-27,” (2011) 130(2) Journal of Biblical Literature 371, at 373-375.

[29] Quoted in Staples, Idea of Israel, 49.

[30] Ibid., 89, 94-95.

[31] Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christianity: How the Obscure, Marginal Jesus Movement Became the Dominant Religious Force in the Western World in a Few Centuries (New York: Harper One, 1996), 57-58.

[32] Ibid., 59.

[33] Paula Fredriksen, Paul: The Pagan’s Apostle (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2017), 54, 60.

[34] Stark, Rise of Christianity, 59.

[35] See, generally, James D.G. Dunn, The Partings of the Ways: Between Christianity and Judaism and their Significance for the Character of Christianity (London: SCM Press, 1991); cf. Paula Fredriksen, “What ‘Parting of the Ways’? Jews, Gentiles, and the Ancient Mediterranean City,” in Adam H. Becker and Annette Yoshiko Reed, The Ways that Never Parted: Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 35-63.

[36] Stark, Rise of Christianity, 59-62.

Martyr-Cults and Meteor-Murders: How Leftism Inverts the Truth about Inter-Racial Murder

BL? BS! That’s what I used to think. In other words, I used to think that the blood libel was bullshit. Then I read Ron Unz’s article “Oddities of the Jewish Religion” (2018). And it completely changed my mind. The blood libel is the accusation that wicked Jews kidnapped Christian children and ritually tortured them to death in order to use their blood for black magic. I once accepted all the standard refutations of the blood libel: that blood is ritually unclean to Jews, that Christians were cruelly projecting their own psychoses onto an innocent outgroup, and so on.

Not so ridiculous after all

But I accepted those refutations only because I was ignorant about post-Christian Judaism and about that strange and disturbing text known as the Talmud. Unz’s article changed that (see also Bernard M. Smith’s essay). He summarized the work of the “extremely erudite” Israeli Jewish scholar Ariel Toaff, whose book Passovers of Blood (2007) argues that the blood libel had a solid basis in fact:

It appears that a considerable number of Ashkenazi Jews traditionally regarded Christian blood as having powerful magical properties and considered it a very valuable component of certain important ritual observances at particular religious holidays. Obviously, obtaining such blood in large amounts was fraught with considerable risk, which greatly enhanced its monetary value, and the trade in the vials of that precious commodity seems to have been widely practiced. … Furthermore, as extensively discussed by [Israel] Shahak, the world-view of traditional Judaism did involve a very widespread emphasis on magical rituals, spells, charms, and similar things, providing a context in which ritualistic murder and human sacrifice would hardly be totally unexpected. (“Oddities of the Jewish Religion: The Surprising Elements of Talmudic Judaism,” The Unz Review, 16th July 2018)

As so often, the mainstream view may not merely be wrong but the opposite of the truth. Jews were not the innocent victims of a psychotic and sadistic conspiracy theory by Christians. Indeed, most or all of the psychosis and the sadism seems to have been on the Jewish side. The blood libel isn’t fully proven, but Ariel Toaff has clearly demonstrated that Jews used Christian blood in magical rituals, traded in it, and may have committed murder to obtain it. William of Norwich and Little Hugh of Lincoln weren’t so ridiculous after all. And who were William and Hugh? Child-martyrs in medieval England, that’s who. They were tortured and slain by wicked Jews whose crimes were then miraculously exposed. Or so the old stories run. I’m much less inclined to dismiss those stories now. In fact, I think England’s medieval martyr-cults were much saner and much less harmful than England’s modern martyr-cult.

Demonizing Whites, sanctifying Blacks

And what is England’s modern martyr-cult? It’s the cult of Stephen Lawrence, the Black teenager who, as politicians and the media endlessly remind us, was murdered by a “gang of white racists” in 1993. Thousands of other young Black men have been murdered since then, often in much worse ways, but none of them — with one exception — has received prolonged attention and veneration like Stephen Lawrence. The one exception is Anthony Walker, who was also murdered by “white racists.” Walker has a martyr-cult too, albeit a much smaller and less well-publicized one. The cult of Stephen Lawrence is enough, you see: it does the job it is intended to do, namely, to demonize Whites, promote lies, and present Blacks as the virtuous victims of omnipresent White racism.

Martyr-cult vs meteor-murders: leftism inverts the truth by ignoring the far more numerous White victims of non-White savagery

In other words, it’s a new blood libel that turns the old blood libel on its head. This martyr-cult of Stephen Lawrence is a very strange thing. It’s wholly unnatural. The martyr-cults of William of Norwich and Little Hugh of Lincoln were on the side of the White Christian majority against the Jewish minority. Even if they weren’t based on fact, they were a healthy reaction to Jewish predation and anti-Christian animus. So were similar martyr-cults in the rest of Europe. And those medieval cults rose from below, from among the ordinary Whites who were exploited and preyed upon by Jews. But now Britain has a martyr-cult that demonizes the White majority and sanctifies the Black minority. And that cult is imposed from above by the elite. For example, when the physically and ideologically repulsive Theresa May was our so-called “conservative” prime minister, she added Stephen Lawrence Day to Britain’s official calendar. It’s strategically positioned on 22nd April, just before St George’s Day on 23rd April. Britain’s government, media and academia now work against the interests of Whites, not for them.

What is going on? Well, I’ve drawn parallels elsewhere with parasites that subvert and redirect the brains and bodies of their hosts, forcing them to work against themselves and for their alien controllers. It should come as no surprise, then, that a Jewish “racial equality activist” called Dr Richard Stone has played a central role in the martyr-cult of Stephen Lawrence. He has supplied the intelligence, verbal dexterity, and Machiavellian skills lacked by the martyr’s mother, the Black Jamaican Doreen Lawrence, who was elevated to the House of Lords by David Cameron, another so-called conservative prime minister, and unofficially serves as the ethical overseer of policing in Britain.

White traitor, Jewish subvertor: the repulsive Theresa May and the Machiavellian Dr Richard Stone (images from Wikipedia)

Jamaica has a much higher murder rate than Britain. The discrepancy gets even bigger if you take murderous Jamaican immigrants out of the British statistics and add judicial executions by Black Jamaican police to the Jamaican statistics — just see the Guardian article “Jamaica police commit ‘hundreds of unlawful killings’ yearly.” The sight of a Black Jamaican like Doreen Lawrence lecturing Whites on their ethical failings ought to provoke nothing but incredulous laughter. But it doesn’t. Instead, it wins hushed respect and promises to do better. But dim Doreen Lawrence could never have won her elevated status by her own efforts. She owes it to intelligent subversives like Richard Stone. As I described in “The Ruling Stones” and “Black Saints, White Demons,” this Jewish “anti-racist” was acting in what he regards as the interests of Jews as he worked so hard in the martyr-cult of Stephen Lawrence.

Concealing the truth about inter-racial murder

But I don’t think that Dr Stone has any real concern for the welfare of Blacks. If he does, his untiring work has been woefully misdirected, because the cult of Stephen Lawrence has done exactly what the later cult of George Floyd has done in America: caused huge harm to Blacks. The cults have discouraged the police from enforcing the law against Blacks, with the inevitable result that many more Blacks have been murdered and maimed by other Blacks. When White civilization retreats, Black savagery advances. That’s what the martyr-cults of Stephen Lawrence and George Floyd have achieved. They’re perfect examples of the Iron Law of Leftism at work, namely, that leftists most harm those they claim to care about most. But that doesn’t matter to leftists, because they’re not interested in reality or truth. Instead, they’re interested in feeding their narcissism and pursuing what are, to them, the most important things in life: power for themselves and punishment for their enemies.

The pursuit of power radically simplifies politics for leftists, because it means that they don’t have to worry about facts or logic or any other messy aspect of reality. Leftists subject all social and cultural propositions to a single simple test: does this advance the cause of leftism? If it does, it must be enthusiastically accepted and energetically promoted. If it doesn’t, it must be censored or minimized. The martyr-cults of Stephen Lawrence and George Floyd are based on a gigantic lie, namely that cruel and hate-filled Whites are an ominous and omnipresent threat to the lives and welfare of gentle and virtuous Blacks. But so what if that’s a lie? The lie advances the cause of leftism, therefore leftists like Dr Richard Stone and crypto-leftists like Theresa May have energetically promoted it. At the same time, leftists are entirely uninterested in stories like the following, which reveal the truth about inter-racial murder in modern Britain. Inter-racial murder is committed overwhelmingly by non-Whites against Whites — and especially by Blacks against Whites.

Susan Hawkey, the elderly White victim whose cruel murder leftists want to be forgotten (image © Metropolitan Police / SWINS)

Grieving widow was brutally “stripped and murdered by young couple” who then used her bank cards in £13,000 spending spree while her body decomposed, court told

A grieving pensioner was stripped and murdered in her own home by a young couple, who left her body to decompose while they went on a ‘massive spending spree’, a court heard. Susan Hawkey, a 71-year-old who lived alone, was described as ‘highly vulnerable’ when she was fatally attacked last September.

Prosecutors said Chelsea Grant, 28, and boyfriend Xyaire Howard, 23, ‘preyed’ on their slightly built victim, who was ‘struggling to cope’ following the death of her parents and a partner. Police found her body after friends reported that Miss Hawkey — who was found with her lower clothing removed, and her T-shirt slashed — had not been seen for weeks.

The suspects are alleged to have blindfolded, tied and murdered Miss Hawkey in her home, before stealing her bank cards and PIN and frittering away £13,000 of her money during a three-week spending spree.

Opening the trial at the Old Bailey today, prosecutor Annabel Darlow KC said: … ‘Miss Hawkey had been tied up, with both her hands tied together, her eyes had been taped shut and a ligature knotted around her neck. Her body was found under a duvet and had been decomposing for some time after her death. [The suspects] were boyfriend and girlfriend and lived in a flat a short walk away from Miss Hawkey. At some stage during the summer of 2022, they had clearly spotted Miss Hawkey and recognised in her an ideal victim.’

The court heard the pair mugged her twice on the street, and then used her stolen keys to enter her home in Neasden, north west London, within the space of a few weeks, to take her card, making a small number of transactions. [S]hortly after, the pair are alleged to have returned, extracting the PIN to her bank card which Miss Hawkey had ‘committed to memory’. Ms Darlow said it was ‘only if she was the victim of considerable violence and aggression that she would hand over’ the four-digit number.

The court heard the pair made nearly 150 transactions, with the vast majority of Miss Hawkey’s savings ‘burnt away’ in three weeks. The couple are alleged to have bought ‘luxury’ items including watches, a new television and speakers, with money spent on brands including John Lewis, Michael Kors and Puma, the court heard. Grant is alleged to have conducted internet searches about body composition, while Howard is said to have researched transaction limits. (Grieving widow was brutally “stripped and murdered by young couple” who then used her bank cards in £13,000 spending spree while her body decomposed, court told, The Daily Mail, 6th September 2023)

Sadism and stupidity: the two Blacks accused of savagely murdering the helpless White Susan Hawkey

That story seems to be an excellent example of both the exceptional sadism and the exceptional stupidity of Blacks. The accused couple seem to have committed a very cruel murder that was very easy for the police to solve. But that sadism and stupidity are precisely why the trial is receiving almost no attention in the leftist media. If the Black couple are found guilty, their crime will become what I call a meteor-murder: something that flashes through the headlines and then disappears for ever. And leftists will never ask whether the relentless leftist demonization of Whites contributed in any way to the cruel death of the elderly White woman Susan Hawkey. The two Blacks who are accused of killing her, Chelsea Grant and Xyaire Howard (his given name means “Zairean”), have been bombarded throughout their lives by the message that Whites are cruel oppressors and Blacks are virtuous victims. Did that influence their behavior? Does anti-White propaganda influence the behavior of other Blacks?

Leftism is ethically and intellectually bankrupt

Of course it does. Anti-White propaganda incites non-Whites to commit murder, rape, and other crimes against Whites throughout the West. And after leftism pumps out the propaganda that incites those crimes, it ignores the crimes or gives them minimal attention. Ideally the former. The fiercely feminist Guardian, for example, has not given even a single short paragraph to a horrible crime recently committed in France. An 18-year-old woman was brutally and repeatedly raped, and also left with a perforated colon after she was sodomized with a broom. Hardened medical staff are said to have been shocked and traumatized by the extent of her injuries. But reporting on that rape does not advance the cause of leftism, because the victim is White and the alleged perpetrator, Oumar Ndiaye, is non-White. That’s why the Guardian has ignored it. But the Guardian, BBC and rest of Britain’s leftist media have given exhaustive coverage to the over-enthusiastic kiss bestowed on a White female Spanish soccer-player by a White male Spanish soccer-official at the Women’s World Cup.

If feminism were an ethically and intellectually serious ideology, feminists would not react hysterically to a kiss and ignore an exceptionally brutal rape. But feminism is part of leftism, so it isn’t ethically and intellectually serious. Instead, feminists and other leftists are interested in power, not in truth. That’s why they’ve turned the murder of Stephen Lawrence into a martyr-cult and countless other murders into meteors. The other murders are much more frequent and often much more brutal, but they’re committed by non-Whites against Whites, so they can’t be used to promote the lies of leftism. That’s why they’re meteor-murders, flashing through the headlines and then disappearing for ever.

Leftists are guilty by leftist standards

Or so leftists fondly imagine. But when leftism loses control of politics and media, those murders of Whites by non-Whites will return to the headlines as White traitors like Theresa May and Jewish subvertors like Richard Stone are put on trial for their crimes. And the charges against them won’t be confined to the way they’ve incited non-Whites to commit murder, rape, and other crimes against Whites. No, they’ll also be charged with inciting non-Whites to commit the same crimes against their own kind.

The truth is that leftists are horrendously guilty even by leftist standards. The martyr-cults of Stephen Lawrence and George Floyd have also done huge harm to non-Whites. As Steve Sailer has repeatedly shown, leftist organization like Black Lives Matter (BLM) have been responsible for a horrible rise in the number of Blacks murdered and maimed by other Blacks. And also in Blacks killed by dangerous Black driving. Therefore the leftists who go on trial will have a simple choice: either admit that their loudly expressed concern for non-Whites was fake or accept that they are guilty of the most monstrous and murderous racism. Leftism is a cult of lies that is working very hard to destroy White civilization. In the end, it will destroy only itself.

Jews and the shaping of our thought

Nobody reading this needs to be told that Jews have had a great influence on the West in the last few decades. What might not be widely understood is the effect they have had specifically on the way we think.

Through the ages the Western mind has shown itself to be straightforward, positivist and empirical rather than mystical, intuitive or magical. If Western man sees something, he believes that it is there and thinks that the way to understand it is by looking at it more closely. He does not assume that his eyes deceive him or that reality is as described by an authority that must not be questioned. The fact that something looks different from different points of view does not make him think that it is created by his perceptions, nor does he imagine that it is a product of his preferences or statements. He distinguishes what is out there, the object, from himself, the subject, and tries to make his statements match reality. In this way he seeks to apprehend the world around him.

At least, this always used to be the case, but after the Second World War it began to change, mainly on account of three intellectual fashions, namely relativism, social constructionism and postmodernism, which are the cause of a great deal of the damage the West has done to itself in that period. We owe them largely to Jews.

Relativism comes in three varieties: moral, cultural and epistemic. Moral relativism denies that there are absolute moral values. Cultural relativism asserts that no culture is of greater value than another, nor must we judge another culture by the standards of our own. According to epistemic relativism, a person’s knowledge is relative to their assumptions or point of view. Someone who claims to know something doesn’t really know it; it’s just the way it seems to them from their “perspective”.

The main effect of relativism is to undermine one’s confidence. “I thought this was right and that was wrong”, one thinks, “but perhaps I was mistaken”. “I thought it was fairly reasonable to expect my neighbour to stop playing loud music at eleven o’clock, but perhaps that’s just my culture.” “I thought ice floated on water, but perhaps I didn’t really know it. Perhaps no one really knows anything.”

Moral relativism can make morality relative to many things. In a documentary, Louis Theroux made it relative to the individual. He described a sex worker as having had a difficult upbringing.[1] She explained that when you’re fourteen and don’t go to school, you don’t realise that it’s just sexual if somebody shows an interest in you. Now, she’s had so many experiences that she can have sex with anyone. Addressing the viewer, Theroux didn’t ask whether selling sex was wrong but whether it was wrong for her. Maybe it wasn’t, he suggested, although it might be wrong for someone else.

Cultural relativism was intensively promoted in the 1990s. “All cultures are of equal value” was a constant mantra of the media. A case in point arose when a Haitian living on Long Island hired a voodooist to cast out the spirits she thought her father had let loose in her house, causing troubling sounds to come from the basement.[2] He threw a sheet over her, doused it with cologne and set fire to it, not taking her to hospital with her third-degree burns until the following afternoon. When he was charged with attempted murder, his defence was that he was only practising his religion. A Haitian spokesman explained that Haitians, like other ethnic minorities, had brought their culture to America with them. Who were Americans to judge?

Nor does epistemic relativism have much going for it. It may be true that scientific knowledge is only ever provisional as it inches its way towards the truth or makes occasional wrong turns, but this does not mean that it is relative to a point of view. One might even say that a considerable amount of knowledge has been established beyond question over the centuries. How many of the thousands of statements in a random medical textbook might be wrong, for example? But epistemic relativism has seeped so far into our culture as to affect the way we think, yet it has done so with a twist. Instead of causing people to doubt their knowledge, it makes them feel entitled to describe any statement they may care to make as true for them, while they presumably believe that other people might “know” the opposite. In effect such people do without the concept of knowledge altogether.

Epistemic relativism was popularised by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), which held that scientific knowledge was relative to a “paradigm”. Thomas Kuhn was Jewish. Decades earlier, cultural and by implication moral relativism were introduced by Franz Boas, who was also Jewish.

Social constructionism is the fashion followed by anyone who says that something is just a social construct, which is an extremely popular thing to say. What it means is unclear. Perhaps by “construct” those who say it mean concept. A social construct is in the mind, and if it is just a social construct there is nothing that corresponds to it in reality. But to show this, social constructionists would need to produce an argument to say that what the concept appears to refer to isn’t there. Instead they seem to think that they have proved as much simply by calling it just a social construct.

Sometimes when people call things just social constructs they mean, stressing the social aspect, that the only reason we think that they exist is that we have agreed that they do. But to establish this, they would again need to show that our belief that they exist is mistaken.[3]

In a third scenario, social constructionists accept that social constructs exist but emphasise that we have constructed them, and what we have constructed we can deconstruct or cease constructing. A feminist might apply this to differences between the sexes. Yes, she might say, the sexes differ, but we construct the differences by bringing boys and girls up differently, therefore to get rid of the differences we only need to change our child-rearing practices. But this has been tried, and it has not worked. In any case, every parent knows that boys and girls differ by nature. Adults are not needed to socially construct the differences.

The one sort of thing that social constructionists do not describe as social constructs are those that really are social constructs, like money.[4] All that makes a piece of paper a ten-dollar bill and means that we can use it to buy things with is the fact that we have agreed that it is a ten-dollar bill, which we have agreed means that we can use it to buy things with. Social constructionists aren’t interested in this kind of example because they’re not really interested in social constructs. What they’re interested in is a sophisticated-sounding term that they can use to persuade themselves that things they don’t like, such as sex differences, either don’t exist or can be got rid of.

What could be more damaging than an intellectual fashion that induces a society to indulge in such self-persuasion? It is going to proceed on the basis of a false understanding of reality and waste its energy trying to get rid of things, quite possibly having forgotten why it thinks they need to be got rid of, that will never go away.

The main source of social constructionism was a book called The Social Construction of Reality (1966) by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, both of whom were Jews.

Postmodernism is a nonsensical collection of ideas designed to appeal to the will to power and aid the revolutionary transformation of society. It is mainly attributed to Michel Foucault, author of The Order of Things (1966), but is as much due to Jacques Derrida, who wrote Writing and Difference and On Grammatology (both 1967). Foucault was not Jewish; Derrida was.

Derrida’s main idea is that we are in a prison of language from which we cannot escape. Far from letting us grasp reality, language stops us making contact with it, therefore a statement does not represent the world but can only be called a “narrative”, which cannot be appraised as true or false. If we think that a narrative is true, we are deceived by a group such as White people or men, who have the power to impose their narratives on others. This is what a feminist meant when she described objectivity as nothing but male subjectivity.[5] A statement a man describes as objective, meaning that it is true for all, only expresses his prejudices and seeks to advance his sectional interests, presumably at the expense of women.

To counter such unpleasant groups, postmodernists decided that it was necessary to “privilege” the narratives of women and non-Whites. It is thus postmodernism that we have to thank for the idea adopted by the British police as long ago as in 1983 that if a Black person “perceives” themselves to have been racially attacked by a White person, then this is what has happened.[6] Any definition of a “hate crime” in use today is of this type. The #MeToo movement was similarly postmodern. For a case of a man mistreating a woman to be discovered, all that was needed was for a woman to say that she had been mistreated. Thus non-Whites and women were “empowered”.

When it feels the need, postmodernism forgets that language forms an impenetrable barrier between us and reality and says that it can “construct” it. We become magicians, making things true by mere assertion. This side of the philosophy was illustrated by a social psychologist who wrote a paper called “Self-fulfilling stereotypes”, which explained how stereotypes such as of Italians as passionate persist.[7] He did not deny that the stereotypes were true. Italians really are passionate, he maintained, but only because that is how they are described. Presumably they started out being no more passionate than others, then for some reason people took to calling them passionate, which made them passionate. The narrative constructed the reality; the stereotype fulfilled itself. Incidentally, this writer was Jewish, and his article appeared in a collection edited by a Jewish woman.

From academics like this, via the intellectuals who spread their ideas, postmodernism came through to the general public, again in the 1990s, the first decade of political correctness.[8] It is now so familiar that one hardly raises an eyebrow when a man writes: “I am a woman because I say I am. Nothing else is needed”. But postmodernists are quietly selective about the bits of reality they think their words can govern. When this man finds that he has run out of milk, he won’t say: “I have milk because I say I have. Nothing else is needed”. He will go out and buy some, like anybody else.

Postmodernism gives its followers a gratifying sense of power. Confronting a history book that says things they don’t like, they can dismiss it as only purveying the writer’s prejudices. They can laugh at its claims to objectivity, saying that objectivity is unattainable. Then when they put pen to paper themselves, they can purvey their own prejudices to their hearts’ content, for what can a narrative do but purvey the writer’s prejudices? They do not need to try to be objective, for who can be objective?

A book does not need quality to be influential; what it needs is to be promoted. The publisher promotes it to journalists, who promote it to the public in admiring reviews or commission admiring reviews from academics. The book fills every bookshop window and starts appearing on college reading lists. Anyone who wants to be up-to-date makes sure that they have read it. To bring all this about, the book only needs to be selected as a world-changer by someone in a key position in a network of the right people, such as, in the case of a book written by a Jew, a Jew whom other Jews will obey. But is there such a network? Are there Jews in publishing, advertising, the media and academia? Do bears shimmy in the woods?

Another influential Jewish book was The Authoritarian Personality (1950), a piece of pseudoscience which purported to show that the typical White American male was an incipient Fascist. It drew on interviews which it is tempting to think were interpreted in view of a pre-ordained conclusion, marking subjects on the “F scale”, where a traditional husband and father would score high. Jewish men were not included in the sample. The book was taken by a generation of social scientists to reveal a deep malaise in American society, which liberalism and permissiveness might cure. Published by the American Jewish Committee with Theodor Adorno as lead author, it was the first major product of the Frankfurt School.

The Institute had been founded in the 1920s by Felix Weil, who was Jewish, as were Theodor Adorno and the school’s other main members, namely Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm and Herbert Marcuse. Its associates, such as Georg Lukacs, Walter Benjamin and Wilhelm Reich were also Jews. Fromm and Marcuse wrote books that influenced the youth of the 1960s.[9] Marcuse became the “godfather” of the campus radicals of that decade, the main ones being Art Goldberg, Jackie Goldberg, Abbie Hoffman, Michael Rossman, Jerry Rubin, Mario Savio, Jack Weinberg, Steve Weissman and, in France, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, all of whom were Jews apart from Mario Savio. These activists implemented the implicit agenda of The Authoritarian Personality by opposing authority, succeeding so far as to spell the end of it, often known as the end of deference, especially deference to White men. Their followers went on to be well represented among those who have been running our institutions for the last 25 years.

If there is one idea that started to bear in on White people after the Second World War, it was that of essential racial equality, the idea that the races, no matter how different they might appear, are basically the same. This meant that any differences in their circumstances must be due to environmental factors such as the mistreatment of Blacks by Whites, therefore as the idea was spread, so was the notion of White guilt. For decades now the idea of essential racial equality, though hard to reconcile with evident facts, has been closed to questioning.[10] Having started with Franz Boas, it was popularised after the War by his pupil Ashley Montagu, who was Jewish, and then notably by Stephen Jay Gould, Leon Kamin, Richard Lewontin and Steven Rose, all of whom were Jews.[11]

Today we commonly hear calls for White people to be exterminated or to commit suicide. Headlines from the American press between 2015 and 2017 include: “Professor tweets that white people should commit mass suicide”, “All I want for Christmas is white genocide” and “USC professor calls for holocaust against all white people”.[12] These calls can be traced back to two sources. In 1967 Susan Sontag famously described the White race as the cancer of human history.[13] White people threatened “the very existence of life itself”, she wrote. What does one do with a life-threatening cancer? Then in 1992 Noel Ignatiev of Harvard University founded the magazine Race Traitor with the motto “Treason to whiteness is loyalty to humanity”. The way to save humanity was to “abolish whiteness”. As we know, this is the great abolitionist movement of today. Susan Sontag and Noel Ignatiev were both Jews.

What calls itself “critical race theory”, from which demands for the wiping of White people off the face of the earth now emanate, is descended from “critical theory”, the basic method of cultural Marxism, later called political correctness, now called wokeness, which began with the Frankfurt School.

Burdened by unnecessary guilt feelings, with demands for their extinction ringing in their ears and after decades of exposure to relativism, social constructionism and postmodernism, it is little wonder that many White people now have trouble thinking straight. Without the influence of Jews, this would presumably not be so. We would still be as mentally capable as we once were.


[1] BBC, Jan. 12th 2020, “Selling sex”, https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m000dbcf/louis-theroux-selling-sex?page=1.

[2] American Renaissance, June 1998, “O Tempora, O Mores!”,  https://www.amren.com/news/1998/06/o-tempora-o-mores-june-1998/.

[3] In Culture of Critique, Kevin Macdonald explains that Jewish intellectuals have never seen a difference  between truth and consensus, meaning their consensus. “Jewish religious ideology was an infinitely plastic set of propositions that could rationalize and interpret any event in a manner compatible with serving the interests of the community. … It never occurred to the members of this discourse community to seek confirmation of their views from outside … by trying to understand the nature of reality itself.” See Kevin Macdonald, 2002 (1998), Culture of Critique, www.1stbooks. com, Chapter 6, “The Jewish Criticism of Gentile Culture: A Reprise”, available at http://www.kevinmacdonald.net/CofCchap6.pdf.

[4] This example is due to John Searle. See e.g. Searle, 1995, The Construction of Social Reality, London: Penguin.

[5] Adrienne Rich (1979) was quoted by Dale Spender, who was quoted by Roger Scruton in “Ideologically Speaking” in Leonard Michaels and Christopher Ricks (eds.), 1990, The State of the Language, Berkeley: University of California Press.

[6] In 1983 the Metropolitan Police adopted a definition of a racial incident as “any incident which includes an allegation of racial motivation made by any person” (from “Race Equality in the UK Today: Developing Good Practice and Looking for Reform: The Police”, a handout distributed by John Newing, President of the Association of Chief Police Officers, on December 8th 1998 at QMW Public Policy Seminars: Developing New Legislation and Strategies on Race Equality, Royal Over-Seas League, London SW1). Thus the racial nature of the incident lay in the allegation, not in any evidence.

[7] Mark Snyder, 1988, “Self-fulfilling stereotypes”, in Paula Rothenberg (ed.), Racism and Sexism: An Integrated Study, New York: St. Martin’s Press.

[8] I use the word “intellectuals” in the sense of Friedrich Hayek, 1998 (1949), The Intellectuals and Socialism, London: IEA Health and Welfare Unit, pp. 9-18, who meant by it the media, academics and any others who make a living out of conveying ideas to the public, such as teachers, priests, novelists and cartoonists.

[9] For example, Erich Fromm wrote The Fear of Freedom (1941), Man for Himself (1947) and The Art of Loving (1956). Herbert Marcuse wrote Eros and Civilization (1955), One-Dimensional Man (1964) and Repressive Tolerance (1965).

[10] A fact that is hard to reconcile with the doctrine of essential racial equality is that Asian women have wider hips than White women, who have wider hips than black women. This is because women of the three races need to be able to give birth to babies with heads of different average sizes. Thus the doctrine of essential racial equality is refuted by an observation anyone can make. This is before one goes on to note that Asians with their bigger brains have higher IQs than Whites, who have higher IQs than blacks, or the dozens of other ways in which the races line up in the same order.

[11] In 1942 Ashley Montagu (real name Israel Ehrenberg) wrote Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race. In 1947, with Theodosius Dobzhansky (also Jewish), he wrote a paper stating that man had “escaped from the bondage of the physical and biological” and was “almost wholly emancipated from dependence upon inherited biological dispositions” (“Natural Selection and the Mental Capacities of Mankind”, reprinted from Science, vol. 105, 1947, in Ashley Montagu [ed.] 1975, Race and IQ, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 104-13). In 1950 Montagu edited UNESCO’s first Statement on Race (UNESCO, 1969, Four Statements On The Race Question, https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000122962), which stated: “For all practical purposes ‘race’ is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth”. In 1967 another UNESCO statement averred that current biological knowledge did not allow us to impute cultural achievements to differences in genetic potential. Other vehicles for this idea were The Mismeasure of Man (1981) by Stephen Jay Gould and Not in Our Genes (1984) by Leon Kamin, Richard Lewontin and Steven Rose. For a review of the no-race idea, see Steve Sailer, May 31st 2000, “Cavalli-Sforza II: Seven Dumb Ideas about Race”, V-Dare, https://vdare.com/articles/cavalli-sforza-ii-seven-dumb-ideas-about-race.

[12] Mark Collett clips, Oct. 7th 2020, “Racism’s New Anti-White Definition — Mark Collett”, https://odysee.com/@markcollettclips:3/racism-s-new-anti-White-definition-mark:f. Other headlines were: “Trinity College professor calls White people ‘inhuman’: ‘Let them f-ing die’”, “Professor: ‘Some White People May Have to Die’ to Solve Racism”, and “White Professor calls all White people to mass suicide over slavery”. Slides put up during lectures included: “How White people plagued society” and “White people are a plague to the planet”.

[13] Susan Sontag, 1967, “What’s Happening to America? (A Symposium)”, Partisan Review, 34 (1): pp. 57-58.