Ex Cathedra: Language, Truth, and Racism

We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express. A J Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, 1936.

The English language is a lumber-room of odd artefacts from the past. Indo-Germanic, Anglo-Saxon, the Romance languages; all these are jumbled together to produce the language of Shakespeare, Johnson and Orwell. And this of course means the presence of Latin. We still use Latin phrases whole. We defend or attack the status quo, speak of ongoing court cases as sub judice, negotiate with quid pro quo, shorten a list with et caetera. Now, however, we should dust off a lesser-known Latin term; ex cathedra.

The phrase originated with 19th-century Pope Pius IX, after he codified the supremacy of the Pontiff by ecumenical council to end a debate that had raged for centuries in the Catholic Church, and relates to Papal pronouncements. It looks as though it means ‘from the cathedral’, but the word ‘cathedral’ itself comes from cathedra, meaning ‘chair’ and referring to the Pope’s throne. The defining quality of ex cathedra statements was that they were indemnified by Papal infallibility, which meant that they could not be doubted. They were true in and of themselves because of their divine provenance and had no need to be debated or examined intellectually. In fact, to do so would be dangerous to the enquirer. If the Pope decreed the number of angels that could dance on the head of a pin, then that was the number, no more and no less. If the Pontiff announced that Christ did not own his own clothes, then that became, as we say now, ‘gospel truth’.

This infallibility sets a very dangerous precedent. Post-Enlightenment, Western thought has reason as its core processor, as it were; the arrival at a feasible conclusion by inductive means from the available evidence or argument. Nothing is true until and unless proven to be so. A statement should be analyzed as to its relationship with truth. Pronouncements made ex cathedra from propositions formed ex nihilo  — or, “from nothing” — were quite dangerous for those who questioned them; indeed, they were in danger of being burnt at the stake. But the ex cathedra pronouncement is making a return, and the infallibility may not be Papal, and heretics may not face the flames — at least, not yet — but they do face excommunication.

It has been noted many times that ‘woke’ culture, incorporating as its central gospels Critical Race Theory (CRT), transgenderism, the promotion of homosexuality, miscegenation and other deviations from nature, has analogues in religion. ‘Woke’, and CRT in particular, has its high priests, its heretics, its Inquisition, its scriptures, its own version of High Latin, or a privileged, elitist, non-vulgate language, and so on. It also has its ex cathedra pronouncements, every bit as binding as those uttered by any Pope. Let’s take a famous example:

Only white people can be racist because only they have power.

Non-white people, by this premise, cannot be racist because they lack power (this is, in itself, a de facto absurdity). What has happened is the co-opting of the original meaning of ‘racialism’ to be the definition of ‘racism’, which used to be a straightforward recognition that racial difference exists. This is the equivalent of giving the answer to a mathematics question without giving the workings and without being marked down if the answer is wrong. It has no substantial premise, no historical validity, and is nothing but its own utterance. It is, in effect, ex cathedra. The new Papacy hath spoken.

The Left’s newly imposed lexicon works in exactly the same way as the traditional magic spell of the magician or occultist. Words of power are uttered. What the words are or mean literally is not important; what matters is their power. ‘Systemic racism’, ‘white privilege’, ‘climate change denier’, ‘inclusivity’, ‘unconscious bias’, ‘black lives matter’; these jingles and others like them are now divested of meaning but invested with the power to bind. None of the phrases above has any referent in the real world. Epistemologically, they are not tethered to anything that exists. They are invented abstractions trying to be real things. But Leftist epistemology is such that language does not have to conform to familiar, tried-and-trusted rules, but to politicized regulations structured according to the need for power. And language is the delivery system for power.

There is great power in empty language. It is worth quoting Plato, from the Theaetetus, at length. He is talking of the Sophists, the travelling teachers of rhetorical argument often hired by richer Athenians. We recognize today the profile Plato draws:

If you ask any of them a question, he will produce, as from a quiver, sayings brief and dark, and shoot them at you; and if you inquire the reason of what he has said, you will be hit by some other new-fangled word, and will make no way with any of them, nor they with one another; their great care is not to allow of any settled principle either in their arguments or in their minds, conceiving, as I imagine, that any such principle would be stationary; for they are at war with the stationary, and do what they can to drive it out everywhere.

They are at war with the stationary. Plato has predicted cultural relativism almost two-and-a-half millennia before Lyotard and Foucault began unravelling truth and meaning. Once true meaning ceases to be a fixed point and becomes just a shifting relativity maintained by an engineered and meaningless vocabulary then, epistemologically speaking, all bets are off. Is truth fixed and objective or is it relative and subjective? We must listen again to Pontius Pilate’s question; What is truth?

Truth is the guiding, if not always attainable, principle of all intellectual endeavor. The problem is that it can be mistaken for one standard calibration rather than an operative concept with quite separate functions. When those disparate functions are conflated into a yardstick, like the meter-long lines you can still see on walls in Paris, and against which sellers of linen would measure their wares, there is a problem. As an example of this epistemological multi-tasking, here are four truths concerning the number four:

  1. 2 + 2 = 4.
  2. Japan is composed of four islands.
  3. There are four horsemen of the Apocalypse.
  4. The Chinese word for ‘four’ sounds almost exactly the same as the Chinese word for ‘death’, and is therefore considered unlucky.

All of these statements are true, but I am sure you can see that they are not true in the same way. (Incidentally, Chinese apartment blocks are unlikely to have a number 4, just as there is rarely a number 13 in Western blocks).

The difference between statement 1 and the other three is that 1 is necessarily true, the others contingently true. Put simplistically, you don’t have to check statement 1, but you might feel the need to check the other three if you were a ruthless empiricist. Two and two made four when Plato was alive, and will still be true if or when the earth finally spirals into the sun. Two and two make four whether you are in Manhattan or Iceland. Of course, two plus two having the sum of four doesn’t get you very far, it’s just an unpacking of the simple concept of whole numbers. This is what worried Russell and Whitehead in Principia Mathematica, as well as Poincaré, the French mathematician—that mathematics might just be some endless and pointless extrapolation of the simple function of the copula. The mathematical formula is true prima facie, but the utter integrity of its truth function cannot be replicated in the real world outside of mathematics and logic. Spinoza tried and failed, magnificently, in Ethics.

I am not a mathematician, and my point is not a mathematical one. Rather, there is a dangerous attempt by the ‘woke’ hegemony and their sponsors to impose the order of mathematical truth not just on things the truth of which ought to be debatable, but on things which are patently absurd and untrue. If the enemy takes your castle, you can-retake it. But if the enemy takes not just your truth, but truth itself by way of your language, then the fight will be a good deal harder. And it is your truth we need to consider next.

If you are familiar with the history of Western philosophy, and were asked to pick a key moment in the analysis of truth, you might choose Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Descartes’ famous cogito ergo sum argument, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and each would be justified. But there has recently been such a moment from a rather different cultural source, and it may be far more incendiary than the texts mentioned.

In 2021, Oprah Winfrey interviewed the British royal Prince Harry, the Duke of Sussex, and his wife, Meghan Markle. A half-caste, Markle’s charge is that Buckingham Palace has been a hotbed of racism since she joined the Royal Family. A famous English chat-show host, Piers Morgan, called her a liar and lost his job over the remarks. Winfrey is noted for her encouragement of interviewees to ‘speak your truth’, with the emphasis on ‘your’, and this is precisely what she urged Markle to do, with an immediate and compliant response. Markle told her truth, that the British Royal Family was inherently racist, and that became the truth, and this due to the requirements of the media rather than those of epistemology. Due to the fascination with the Royal couple, ratings were huge and the Right-of-center media caught hold of Winfrey’s bombshell.

Speak your truth and that will stand as true. This is epistemological anarchy, the equivalent of talking to people who are on hallucinogenics. Rather than transact with the reality of what is or what happened, we stake our belief in what your perception of the truth is. So, instead of having a world on which most of us can agree most of the time, we have millions of morally defective monads in Brownian motion, each with their own truth. Given that each generation in the West is successively less well-educated — largely due to the ‘woke’ distaste for classical education — then the prospect of letting truth off the leash just at the moment doesn’t inspire confidence in civilization’s staggering on much farther.

Truth cannot be expressed without meaning and meaning must be communal. They are two sides of the same coin and you cannot have a one-sided coin. Wittgenstein’s famous language game cannot be solitaire.  Truth can’t be solipsistic or the serial killer is on the same moral plane as the charity worker because they are both speaking their truth. Meaning and truth have an analogous relationship with currency — that is, what economists call M1, or basically notes and coin — and the financial reserve. The former is the practical, transactive category of the latter, while the latter is a guarantor of validity, of tender, for the former. This makes the re-definition of meaning, the genetic modification of semantics and etymology, the epistemological equivalent of printing money.

If this seems like semantic hair-splitting then, firstly, welcome to philosophy. Secondly, don’t be so sure of its triviality. The re-engineering of the relationship between language and truth is central to possibly the most over-referenced — although not over-rated — book of the last decade, Orwell’s 1984, which has taken on a Koranic role for the dissident Right, as it should. When O’Brien holds up four fingers and asks Winston how many he sees, he does not wish for a compliant reply, a self-serving acquiescent falsehood. He doesn’t want Winston to lie and say he sees five fingers to save his own skin. He wants Winston actually to see five fingers. This is the most important observation Orwell made; truth itself is being modified not just within language, in some removed, Derridean way, but in the real world.

If you lose your liberty, you can fight to take it back. But if you lose the ability to assess what is true and what is not — aka meaning — not through insanity but because of what is effectively state-engineered intervention — because ‘woke’ is not an organic phenomenon — then the best of luck.  The most dangerous thing happening to the indigenous white West is not that history is being re-written, it is that dictionaries are.

Romanian translation of Brenton Sanderson’s Tristan Tzara and the Jewish Roots of Dada

Partea a 3-a – ultima – April 14, 2023 – in Featured ArticlesWestern Culture

de Brenton Sanderson;

Original here

Jacques Derrida

Mergi la Partea 1.
Dada și deconstrucția ca vectori de atac al evreilor

O ultimă moștenire distructivă a Dada și una care merită mai multă atenție este modul în care antiraționalismul său a prefigurat deconstrucția lui Jacques Derrida ca o mișcare intelectuală evreiască aliniată împotriva civilizației occidentale. Paralelele dintre Dada și Deconstrucție au fost remarcate de numeroși savanți. Robert Wicks observă cât de puternic rezonează Dada „cu concepția definitiv poststructuralistă a deconstrucției avansată de Jacques Derrida în anii 1960.”[i]

Pegrum notează, de asemenea, „legatura puternică dintre Dada și teoria artistică postmodernă, cel mai evident punct de contact fiind cu opera lui Derrida.”[ii] Criticul literar Frank Kermode urmărește, de asemenea, deconstrucția din influențele Dada, în timp ce Richard Sheppard îi consideră pe poststructuraliști „ca fiind mai introvertiți, mai puțin politizați [o afirmație dubioasă] și mai puțin carnavalești ai tăticilor lor Dada”. [iii]

Pentru dadaiști, civilizația europeană a constat dintr-un „amalgam generator de alienare de gândire raționalistă, știință și tehnologie care a aderat la păstrarea ordinii, sistematicității și metodicității”. Ei credeau ferm că „valorile culturale europene nu merită păstrate.” [iv]

Tzara a declarat odată că „logica este întotdeauna falsă”, iar un concept de bază în gândirea sa a fost „atâta timp cât facem lucrurile așa cum credem că le-am făcut cândva”, nu vom putea realiza nici un fel de societate trăibilă.”[v]

Dadaiștii celebri „au scuipat în ochii lumii”, înlocuind logica și bunul simț cu absurdul și sfidarea.[vi] Chiar și cuvântul „Dada” însuși, sugerând impulsuri de bază și comportament copilăresc, a fost în mod conștient absurd, chiar și batjocoritor și un imn subversiv de rezistență la un discurs mai complet instrumentalizat și o raționalitate disciplinată.

A ridiculizat încrederea occidentală în „autonomia eului rațional și eficacitatea rațiunii”. Dadaiștii au denunțat concepția occidentală post-Renaștere despre realitate, care „a presupus că lumea a fost organizată conform unor legi inteligibile din punct de vedere uman” și „au condamnat „culturile burgheze” care atenuează determinarea de a stabiliza și clasifica toate fenomenele.”[vii]

Dadaiștii chiar au criticat „raționalitatea și formalismul excesiv” al cubismului, în special în perioada sa analitică.[viii] În mai 1922, la o înmormântare simulată pentru Dada, Tzara a proclamat: „Dada este un microb virgin care pătrunde cu insistența aerului. în toate acele spații pe care rațiunea nu a reușit să le umple cu cuvinte și convenții.”[ix]

Dickerman notează cum: „Rezistența la sensul fix” a rămas o caracteristică cheie a Dada.[x] Godfrey observă, de asemenea, că: „În inima Dada”. a fost o critică implicită a limbajului ca presupus transparent.”[xi]

Dada a acționat ca o punte între modern și postmodern, anticipând deconstrucția lui Derrida și analiza puterii lui Michel Foucault, care, la fel ca Dada, a atacat noțiunea de adevăr obiectiv care fusese piatra de temelie a gândirii occidentale și a producerii cunoștințelor încă din perioada Iluminismului.

Pentru a deconstrui cultura occidentală, Derrida a trebuit să identifice un defect fundamental cu ea – despre care a decis că era „logocentrismul” acesteia.

Prin aceasta, el a vrut să spună că cultura occidentală a privilegiat vorbirea față de cuvântul scris (o afirmație dubioasă) și că se bazează pe credința falsă că lumea este într-adevăr așa cum o descriu conceptele noastre (adică, în conformitate cu realismul filozofic).

Ca și Barthes și Foucault, Derrida a folosit nominalismul (concepția conform căreia conceptele nu sunt altceva decât artefacte umane care nu au nicio legătură cu lumea reală) pentru a deconstrui și a submina realismul occidental. Făcând acest lucru, el a imitat abordarea dadaiștilor:

Din respingerea lor a credinței în progres, în natura îmblânzită și în omul rațional, a rezultat că dada ar trebui să pună la îndoială puterea limbajului, a literaturii și a artei de a reprezenta realitatea.

Informațiile pe care simțurile le-au comunicat oamenilor erau înșelătoare, chiar și ideile despre „personalitatea” individuală și despre lumea exterioară erau evazive și incoerente. Cum ar putea limbajul, prin definiție un instrument de comunicare publică, să facă altceva decât să deformeze și să trădeze caracterul autentic al vieții ca o secvență discontinuă de experiențe imediate?

Dada au răspuns că cuvintele sunt simple ficțiuni și că nu există nicio corespondență între structurile limbajului și cele ale realității. Astfel, credința în ordinea în care puterea unei limbi comune, moștenite, a fost inculcată a fost iluzorie.[xii]

Pentru a ataca realismul occidental, Derrida și dadaiștii au împrumutat de la lingvistul elvețian Ferdinand de Saussure noțiunea de „diferență” – pe care Saussure a folosit-o pentru a desemna natura arbitrară a semnelor lingvistice.

Nu contează ce semne folosim pentru a însemna „noapte” și „zi”; ceea ce contează este că folosim semne pentru a semnala o anumită diferență, iar această proprietate structurală a fost, pentru Saussure, adevăratul purtător al sensului. Francezul différer înseamnă și a amâna, în sensul de amânat, și pe această bază etimologică de coincidență Derrida a decis că Saussure a dovedit definitiv că sensul este întotdeauna amânat de text.

Consecința este că procesul de semnificație este ceva care nu începe niciodată: sau mai degrabă, dacă și când începe sensul este o decizie umană arbitrară. Textele nu au un singur sens autoritar: mai degrabă, există un „joc liber de sens” și orice merge.

În consecință, suntem eliberați de sens. Mai mult, textul este „emancipat de autor”.

Odată scris, autorul dispare și un text devine un artefact public. Este pentru noi să decidem ce înseamnă textul și suntem liberi să hotărâm după bunul plac și, din moment ce „toată interpretarea este o interpretare greșită”, nicio lectură specială nu este privilegiată.[xiii]

Sheppard notează că: „Derrida, dinamizând modelul lui Saussure al semnului, vede umanitatea prinsă într-un flux nesfârșit de textualitate în care semnificațiile se fracturează și se recombină perpetuu. În consecință, el concluzionează că nu există nimic în afara textului.”[xiv]

Sub deconstrucția lui Derrida „începe astfel să apară treptat un nou text, dar și acest text este în subtilă variație cu el însuși, iar deconstrucția continuă în ceea ce ar putea fi infinit. regresul lecturilor dialectice.”[xv]

În timp ce Derrida s-a pozat ca un intelectual parizian de stânga, un secularist și un ateu, el a descins dintr-un lung șir de cripto-evrei și s-a identificat în mod explicit ca atare: „Sunt unul dintre acei marrani care nu mai spun că sunt evrei nici măcar în secretul propriilor inimi.”[xvi]

Derrida s-a născut într-o familie de evrei sefarzi care a emigrat în Algeria din Spania în secolul al XIX-lea. Familia lui era cripto-evrei care și-au păstrat identitatea evreiască timp de 400 de ani în Spania în perioada Inchiziției. Derrida și-a schimbat prenumele în francezul creștin care sună „Jacques” pentru a se integra mai bine în scena franceză.

Mai mult, și-a dus cripto-iudaismul în mormânt: Când Derrida a fost înmormântat, fratele său mai mare, René, a purtat un tallit la cimitirul francez suburban și și-a recitat Kaddish-ul în interior, deoarece Jacques nu ceruse rugăciuni publice. Această abordare discretă, extrem de personală, dar semnificativă din punct de vedere emoțional și spiritual, a recunoașterii iudaismului lui Derrida pare emblematică pentru acest gânditor complex, imperfect, dar valoros nuanțat.[xvii]

Derrida a fost un cripto-evreu până la sfârșit, chiar și-a instruit familia să participe la șaradă. Kevin MacDonald notează motivul evident: „Din punct de vedere intelectual, ne întrebăm cum ar putea fi un postmodernist și un evreu devotat în același timp. Consecvența intelectuală ar părea să necesite ca toate identificările personale să fie supuse aceleiași logici deconstructive, cu excepția cazului în care, desigur, identitatea personală în sine implică ambiguități profunde, înșelăciune și autoînșelăciune.”[xviii]

În caietele sale, Derrida subliniază centralitatea problemelor evreiești în scrisul său: „Circumcizie, asta este tot ce am vorbit vreodată”. Experiența sa de antisemitism în timpul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial în Algeria a fost traumatizantă și a dus la o conștiință profundă a propriei sale origini evreiesti. A fost exclus de la școală la vârsta de 13 ani, sub guvernul de la Vichy, din cauza limitelor oficiale ale numărului de studenți evrei, descriindu-se ca „un evreu negru și foarte arab, care nu a înțeles nimic despre asta, căruia nimeni nu i-a dat niciodată cel mai mic motiv, nici părinții, nici prietenii săi.”[xix]

Mai târziu, în Franța, „suferința sa atenuat. Am crezut naiv că antisemitismul a dispărut. … Dar în timpul adolescenței, a fost tragedia, a fost prezent în orice altceva.” Aceste experiențe l-au determinat pe Derrida să dezvolte „o aptitudine epuizantă de a detecta semne de rasism, în configurațiile sale cele mai discrete sau dezaprobările sale cele mai zgomotoase.”[xx]

Caputo notează modul în care activismul etnic evreiesc stă la baza deconstrucției lui Derrida: Ideea din spatele deconstrucției este de a deconstrui funcționarea unor state naționale puternice cu politici puternice de imigrare, de a deconstrui retorica naționalismului, politica locului, metafizica pământului natal și a limbii natale. … Ideea este de a dezarma bombele… de identitate pe care statele-națiune le construiesc pentru a se apăra împotriva străinului, împotriva evreilor și arabilor și a imigranților,… toți… sunt cu totul alți.

Spre deosebire de afirmațiile criticilor mai neglijenți ai lui Derrida, pasiunea deconstrucției este profund politică, deoarece deconstrucția este un discurs necruțător, chiar dacă uneori indirect, despre democrație, despre o democrație viitoare. Democrația lui Derrida este o politică radical pluralistă care rezistă terorii unei unități organice, etnice, spirituale, a legăturilor naturale, native ale națiunii (natus, natio), care macină în praf tot ceea ce nu este o rudă de genul conducător și genul (Geschlecht).

El visează la o națiune fără închidere naționalistă sau nativistă, la o comunitate fără identitate, la o comunitate non-identică care nu poate spune eu sau noi, căci, până la urmă, ideea însăși a unei comunități este să ne întărim (munis, muneris) pe noi înșine. în comun împotriva celuilalt. Opera sa este condusă de sentimentul pericolului desăvârșit al unei comunități identitare, al spiritului „noi” din „Europa creștină” sau al unei „politici creștine”, compuși letali care înseamnă moartea arabilor și evreilor, pentru africani. și asiatici, pentru orice altceva.

Suspinul acestui spirit creștin european este un aer letal pentru evrei și arabi, pentru toți les juifs [adică evreii ca alții prototipi], chiar dacă se întorc la tatăl Avraam, un mod de a-i gaza atât conform scrisorii și spiritului.[xxi]

Preocupările sociologice ale lui Derrida (și soluțiile sugerate) le-au replicat pe cele ale lui Tristan Tzara.

Sandqvist leagă revolta profundă a lui Tzara împotriva constrângerilor sociale europene direct de identitatea sa evreiască și de furia lui față de persistența antisemitismului. Pentru Sandqvist, tratarea evreilor în România a alimentat revolta liderului Dada împotriva civilizației occidentale.

Bodenheimer notează că: Ca evreu, Tzara a avut multe motive să pună sub semnul întrebării așa-numitele adevăruri și raționalizări dezastruoase ale gândirii europene, un rezultat al căruia a fost Primul Război Mondial – discriminarea evreilor de secole fiind un altul. … El provenea dintr-un mediu în care argumentele jingoiste și antisemite le reproșau de mult evreilor că foloseau un limbaj impur, falsificat, de la exemplele timpurii din secolul al XVI-lea… până la argumentele intelectualilor români din vremea lui Tzara, care atacau evreii ca „străini” importând „idei bolnave” în literatura şi cultura română.

[Tzara, în consecință] încearcă să demascheze limbajul în sine ca o construcție care își trage valoarea și, uneori, pretenția de superioritate, dintr-un concept egal construit de identități și valori. În sine, toate limbile sunt egale, dar egale în diferențele lor. Această revendicare a dreptului la egalitate în timp ce susține diferența este revendicarea de bază a evreilor la o societate seculară.

Dar popoarele europene, fie că mai întâi din motive religioase sau mai târziu din motive naționaliste, nu au reușit niciodată să înțeleagă efectiv acest drept, cu atât mai puțin să-l acorde societăților minoritare[xxii].

Unul dintre catalizatorii dizolvării Dada la Paris a fost îngrijorarea liderului suprarealist André Breton că nihilismul lui Dada a reprezentat o amenințare pentru „procesul de salubrizare intelectuală” care a devenit necesar odată cu ascensiunea fascismului.[xxiii]

Evident, este nevoie de un criteriu de adevăr întemeiat pe realism pentru a combate ideile fasciste. Boime susține, de asemenea, că dadaiștii în „atacul lor asupra iluminismului și liberalismului burghez de la Zurich și apoi la Berlin au jucat în cele din urmă în favoarea fasciștilor și naționaliștilor de dreapta. Deși aceste din urmă grupuri au condamnat spectacolul dadaist și gândirea modernistă, respingerea de către Dada a politicii parlamentare și a instituțiilor democratice a ajutat la deschiderea drumului pentru atacul direct al nazismului asupra idealurilor umanitare.”[xxiv]

Derrida a fost criticat în mod similar de unii evrei, deoarece scrierile sale „duc la „nihilism”, care amenință, în negarea noțiunii de adevăr obiectiv, „să ștergă multe dintre diferențele esențiale dintre nazism și non-nazism””[xxv]. ]

Cu toate acestea, scrierile lui Derrida nu au avut cu siguranță niciun efect asupra puterii industriei Holocaustului și, într-adevăr, unii dintre cei mai mari susținători ai lui Derrida au fost activiști intelectuali ai Holocaustului.

Această stare de lucruri ciudată poate fi explicată prin faptul că pentru unii evrei, precum Derrida, recunoașterea posibilității adevărului obiectiv este periculoasă din cauza posibilității ca adevărul să fie întins împotriva „celuilalt”. În mod similar, pentru dadaiști, principiile raționalității occidentale „au fost considerate a fi extrem de problematice, din cauza conexiunilor sale instrumentale cu represiunile sociale și dominația.” [xxvi]

În consecință, o lume în care adevărul a fost deconstruit este o lume foarte dezirabilă. După cum subliniază Kevin MacDonald în Culture of Critique:

O astfel de lume este sigură pentru iudaism, celălalt prototip, și nu oferă nicio garanție pentru tendințele de universalizare ale civilizației occidentale – ceea ce s-ar putea numi deconstrucție ca de-helenizare sau de-occidentalizare.

Conștiința grupului minoritar este astfel validată nu în sensul că se știe că se bazează pe un fel de adevăr psihologic, ci în sensul că nu poate fi dovedit neadevărat. Pe de altă parte, interesele culturale și etnice ale majorităților sunt „hermeneutizate” și astfel devin impotente — impotente deoarece nu pot servi drept bază pentru o mișcare etnică de masă care ar intra în conflict cu interesele altor grupuri.[xxvii]

Când Școala de la Frankfurt s-a stabilit în Statele Unite, a făcut un efort conștient de a oferi activismului său intelectual evreiesc un aspect „științific” prin strângerea de „date empirice” (cum ar fi cele care au stat la baza Personalității Autoritare) pentru a contesta teoriile științifice existente văzute ca fiind osnice intereselor evreiești (cum ar fi antropologia darwiniană).

Derrida și poststructuraliștii au căutat în schimb (ca evreii din Dada) să discrediteze conceptele amenințătoare subminând noțiunea de adevăr obiectiv care stă la baza întregii gândiri occidentale. La fel ca dadaiștii, poststructuraliștii au decis, dacă nu-ți place puterea dominantă, atunci să te străduiești să-i strici conceptele. Dada a folosit prostii și absurditate pentru a atinge acest scop, în timp ce Derrida și-a dezvoltat metodologia de deconstrucție.

Coperta unei hagiografii evreiești a lui Derrida din 2005

Promovarea individualismului subiectiv

În ciuda diferențelor tactice, un fir etno-politic evreiesc străbate Dada lui Tzara, deconstrucția lui Derrida și teoria critică a școlii de la Frankfurt. Fiecare a încercat să încurajeze individualismul subiectiv pentru a deconecta masele neevreiești de legăturile lor familiale, religioase și etnice – reducând astfel importanța evreilor ca exgrup prototip și slăbind astfel status quo-ul antisemit în cadrul societăților occidentale.

Această încercare de a promova individualismul radical (cel puțin în rândul europenilor) prin criticarea bazei logice a limbajului a fost un obiectiv declarat explicit al Dada, liderul timpuriu al mișcării Hugo Ball declarând că: „Distrugerea organelor vorbirii poate fi un mijloc. de autodisciplină. Când comunicările sunt întrerupte, când orice contact încetează, atunci apar înstrăinarea și singurătatea, iar oamenii se scufundă înapoi în ei înșiși.”[xxviii]

Dickerman observă modul în care utilizarea dadaiștilor a abstracției în artele vizuale și limbajul „lucrează împotriva structurilor de autoritate comunicate prin intermediul limbajul” și că „atacul dadaist asupra „limbajului ca ordine socială” ar contracara socialitatea însăși, producând în schimb o formă productivă de solipsism”.

Dadaistul evreu Hans Richter a declarat limba abstractă a dadaiștilor „dincolo de toate frontierele lingvistice naționale” și a văzut în abstracția dadaistă un nou tip de comunicare „liber de toate felurile de alianțe naționaliste”.[xxix]

Pictorul evreu dadaist Arthur Segal a exprimat o viziune similară, susținând că „principiul compozițional al echivalenței este o încercare de a aboli ierarhiile, astfel încât forțele dominante și subordonate să nu mai existe”.

Hockensmith subliniază că: „Abstracția a oferit astfel lui Segal un mijloc de a teoretiza o lume fără forță autoritară, una în care oamenii și lucrurile ar sta în relație liberă unul cu celălalt.”[xxx]

Tristan Tzara a afirmat în mod similar că: „Dada a propus să elibereze omul de orice sclavie, indiferent de origine, intelectuală, morală sau religioasă.”[xxxi]

Tocmai aceasta a încercat Derrida să facă cu deconstrucția, unde „Tot ce rămâne după aceea este subiectul care poate alege ce să gândească, ce să gândească”. simți și ce să faci, eliberat de constrângeri exterioare și răspunzător față de nimic și față de nimeni.”[xxxii]

Walter Serner (Seligmann)

În cartea sa The Jewish Derrida, academicianul israelian Gideon Ofrat relatează cum, în 1990, Derrida a participat la un simpozion la Torino, Italia, pe tema „Identității culturale europene”.

După ce a absorbit în însăși ființa sa cultura europeană în care fusese crescut, evreul algerian s-a apucat acum să definească „europenismul” prin referire la ororile celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial și nazism și la o analiză a zilelor noastre, cu „ crime de xenofobie, rasism, antisemitism, fanatism religios sau național.”

Probabil că această arhivă l-a determinat pe Derrida să vină cu definiția sa oarecum paradoxală a identității culturale europene: „Caracteristica unei culturi este să nu fie identică cu ea însăși”; cu alte cuvinte, identitatea culturală constă în separarea de sine. Mai mult, cunoașterea propriei identități culturale este condiționată de cunoașterea culturii celuilalt. …

[Derrida] propune simultan o modificare fundamentală a gândirii despre Europa, în termeni de Alteritate non-europeană. Europa se va cunoaște ca fiind Europa dacă va avansa spre ceea ce nu este. … Aici identitatea ta constă în propria ta lepădare de sine, în moartea ta (în identitate). Mai mult, Derrida subliniază o contradicție de bază între căutarea universalității de către cultura europeană și, implicit, sentimentul de exemplaritate: o aroganță națională individuală, care se deosebește de restul lumii.

Este contradicția dintre mesajul valorilor desemnate pentru întreaga lume și pretenția unei societăți de a deține monopolul acelei Evanghelii.

Derrida propune un alt concept: deschiderea Europei către alteritate, către celălalt, extratereștri, ca recunoaștere a culturii Celălalt și adoptarea ei în societate în ansamblu – posibil o propunere pentru deconstrucția Europei, adică un studiu al celuilalt, rădăcina esenței europene și înlocuirea acesteia cu un pluralism de eterogenitate[xxxiii]

În mod clar, deconstrucția a fost o mișcare intelectuală evreiască care a fost o manifestare post-Iluminism (într-adevăr postmodernă) a iudaismului ca strategie evolutivă de grup. Inevitabil, ca și în cazul celorlalte mișcări intelectuale evreiești discutate în Cultura criticii a lui Kevin MacDonald, soluția pentru toate problemele sociale constă în a-i convinge pe europeni să comită sinucidere rasială, națională și culturală prin îmbrățișarea Celuilalt, prin acceptarea diversității rasiale și culturale.

Toate drumurile intelectuale evreiești duc la imigrație în masă în lumea a treia și la multiculturalism.

De asemenea, în mod inevitabil, ca și în cazul școlii de la Frankfurt, bisturiul deconstructiv al lui Derrida nu este niciodată îndreptat împotriva evreilor înșiși sau a Israelului, care se află întotdeauna în afara cadrului de referință critic din punct de vedere cultural.

Astfel, „pluralismul eterogenității” nu este niciodată recomandat ca o modalitate de a deschide Israelul către Alteritate și, prin urmare, ajutând evreii să-și înțeleagă mai bine identitatea „prin avansarea către ceea ce nu sunt”. De ce?

Deoarece scopul acestui exercițiu intelectual este de a găti rațiuni îndoielnice, universaliste din punct de vedere moral, cu suficientă forță persuasivă pentru a-i convinge pe albii să devină complici la propria lor autodistrugere rasială și culturală – promovând astfel obiectivul nedeclarat de a elimina antisemitismul european și făcând întreaga lume occidentală sigură pentru evrei.

Exercițiul lui Derrida de etno-politică evreiască a fost, desigur, preocupat în primul rând de deconstruirea culturii occidentale și a sistemelor de credințe care au susținut civilizația europeană în trecut (de exemplu, creștinismul, naționalismul) și a celor care ar putea fi desfășurate pentru a o salva acum și în viitor, cum ar fi realismul rasial și teoriile evoluționiste ale bazei etnice a conflictului cultural în Occident. În schimb, credințele evreiești șovine care au susținut societățile și cultura evreiască timp de milenii au scăpat de atacul deconstructiv al lui Derrida.

În ceea ce privește poststructuralismul în general, Scruton observă că, de la analiza lui Foucault a cunoașterii ca ideologie a puterii până la „virusul deconstructiv” eliberat în aerul academic de Derrida, „această cultură a repudierii se poate prezenta ca „teorie”, în maniera criticului.

Teoria lui Horkheimer, Adorno și Habermas, dezvoltând „metodologii” grele cu care să scoată din rădăcină semnificațiile secrete ale operelor culturale, să-și expună pretențiile ideologice și să le trimită în trecut.” Cu toate acestea, scopul poststructuraliștilor „nu este cunoașterea în sensul post-iluminist, ci distrugerea vasului în care a fost conținută cunoștințele nedorite.”[xxxiv]

Poststructuralismul și deconstrucția au infestat rapid mediul academic occidental în anii șaptezeci și optzeci, devenind abordări de bază în critica literară, științele umaniste și științele sociale.

Această abordare critică a fost prevestită de dadaiști care, ca răspuns la primul război mondial și la persistența antisemitismului, și-au transformat treptat mișcarea într-un dezgust față de raționalism ca trăsătură definitorie a culturii europene post-iluminism.

Dadaiștii erau foarte conștienți de natura paradoxală a revoltei lor împotriva logicii și rațiunii. Robert Wick observă că „frazele auto-contradictorii se presără în manifestele Dada – fraze care proclamă că totul este fals, că Dada este nimic, că nu există adevăr ultim, că totul este absurd, că totul este incoerent și că nu există logică. Sunt fraze care se prezintă în manifeste ca fiind adevărate, semnificative, coerente și logice, în timp ce neagă tot adevărul, sensul, coerența și logica.”[xxxv]

Dadaiștii au recunoscut că au fost prinși într-o „dublă hermeneutică” prin aceea că au fost obligați să folosească formele societății burgheze pentru a face o critică a acelei societăți. Într-un mod analog, Foucault și Derrida au încercat să dezvolte o „ontologie a prezentului” care să le permită să se „abstragă” din mediul lor cultural.

Caracterul paradoxal și autoinvalidant al acestui demers nu a limitat însă imensa influență pe care o exercitau poststructuralismul și deconstrucția.

Defectul logic din inima întregului edificiu intelectual poststructuralist este pur și simplu ignorat – aceasta fiind aceeași eroare logică săvârșită de Nietzsche atunci când a exprimat opinia că nu există adevăruri, ci doar interpretări.

Fie poziția lui Nietzsche este adevărată – caz în care nu este adevărată, deoarece nu există adevăruri, fie este falsă.

Argumentele centrale ale lui Derrida și Foucault echivalează cu aceeași chestiune făcută mai puțin brusc și, deși și-au prezentat argumentele într-un limbaj pseudo-profund opac pentru a ascunde paradoxul, acesta rămâne totuși.

Foucault și Derrida își datorează reputația intelectuală umflată rolului lor de a acorda autoritate respingerii autorității și angajamentului lor absolut față de imposibilitatea angajamentelor absolute.

Cei care subliniază defectul evident în analiza poststructuralistă a puterii a lui Foucault și analiza deconstrucționistă a limbajului a lui Derrida – și anume că o critică rațională presupune exact ceea ce pun în discuție – sunt pur și simplu acuzați că se aliniază forțelor opresive, hegemonice ale burghezului Eurocentric, patriarhatul prin asumarea cadrului de referință pe care acest grup l-a normalizat.

Într-adevăr, li se spune că însăși credința în anchetele neutre nu este o credință neutră, ci mai degrabă expresia viziunii hegemonice asupra lumii care are cea mai mare nevoie de deconstrucție. Prin urmare, nu există nicio poziție din care să poată fi criticată deconstrucția. Dacă ar exista un asemenea punct de vedere, el s-ar baza pe argumente raționale; dar raţionalitatea însăşi a fost deconstruită.

Prin urmare, deconstrucția se justifică pe sine și oferă culturii repudierii acreditările sale spirituale, dovada că „nu este din lumea aceasta” și vine în judecată asupra ei. Bineînțeles că acea intenție subversivă nu interzice în niciun fel ca deconstrucția să devină o ortodoxie, pilonul noului așezământ și ecusonul conformismului pe care trebuie să îl poarte acum aparatchikul literar.

Dar în aceasta nu este diferit de alte doctrine subversive: marxismul, de exemplu, leninismul și maoismul. Așa cum pop devine rapid cultura oficială a statului post-modern, tot așa și cultura repudierii devine cultura oficială a universității post-moderne.[xxxvi]

În poststructuralism și deconstrucție, spiritul Dada sa extins cu mult dincolo de ceea ce se sperase de cei mai mesianici propagandisti ai săi precum Tristan Tzara și Walter Serner.

Pentru istoricul britanic Paul Johnson: „Dada a fost pretențios, disprețuitor, distructiv, foarte șic, dornic de publicitate și, în cele din urmă, fără rost.” [xxxvii]

Johnson greșește la ultimul scor. Dada a avut consecințe intelectuale și culturale de anvergură – în revoluționarea artei, subminarea încrederii în noțiunea de adevăr obiectiv și în lansarea unui vector de atac asupra civilizației occidentale, preluat ulterior de activiști intelectuali evrei precum Derrida.

AVIZ:

Brenton Sanderson este autorul cărții Battle Lines: Essays on Western Culture, Jewish Influence and Anti-Semitism, interzis de Amazon, dar disponibil aici.

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[i] Robert J. Wicks, Modern French Philosophy: From Existentialism to Postmodernism (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007), 11.

[ii] Mark A. Pegrum, Challenging Modernity: Dada between Modern and Postmodern (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 269.

[iii] Richard Sheppard, Modernism-Dada-Postmodernism (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1999), 365.

[iv] Wicks, Filosofia franceză modernă: de la existențialism la postmodernism, 9-10.

[v] Beitchman, Sunt un proces fără subiect, 29.

[vi] Irwin Unger și Debi Unger, The Guggenheims — A Family History (New York: Harper Perennial, 2006), 354.

[vii] Scurt, Dada și suprarealismul, 12.

[viii] Loredana Parmesani, Arta secolului XX — Mișcări, teorii, școli și tendințe 1900-2000 (Milano: Skira, 1998), 36.

[ix] Richter, Dada. Artă și antiartă, 191.

[x] Dickerman, „Introduction & Zurich”, Leah Dickerman (Ed.) Dada, 33.

[xi] Godfrey, Conceptual Art, 44.

[xii] Scurt, Dada și suprarealismul, 17.

[xiii] Roger Scruton, Modern Philosophy (Londra: Penguin, 1994), 478-9.

[xiv] Sheppard, Modernism-Dada-Postmodernism, 363.

[xv] Roger Poole, „Deconstruction”, Alan Bullock și Peter Trombley (eds.) The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (Londra: HarperCollins, 2000), 203.

[xvi] Jacques Derrida, „Circumfession”, în Jacques Derrida, Ed. G. Bennington & Jacques Derrida, Trad. G. Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 170.

[xvii] Benjamin Ivry, „Suveran sau fiară?” Înainte, 1 decembrie 2010. https://forward.com/culture/133536/svereign-or-beast/

[xviii] Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Bloomington, IN: 1stbooks Library, 2001), 198.

[xix] Derrida, „Circumfesiune”, op. cit., 58)

[xx] Jacques Derrida, Puncte… Interviuri, 1974-1994, Trad. P. Kamuf şi colab. (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 120—21.

[xxi] J.D. Caputo, Rugăciunile și lacrimile lui Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1997), 231—2.

[xxii] Alfred Bodenheimer, „Dadaism Judaism: The Avant-Garde in First World War Zurich”, În: Gelber, Mark H. și Sjöberg, Sami. Aspecte evreiești în avangardă: între rebeliune și revelație, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110454956

[xxiii] Malcolm Haslam, The Real World of the Surrealists (Londra: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1978), 93.

[xxiv] Boime, „Dada’s Dark Secret”, Washton-Long, Baigel & Heyd (eds.) Jewish Dimensions in Modern Visual Culture: Anti-Semitism, Assimilation, Affirmation, 102.

[xxv] Benjamin Ivry, „Suveran sau fiară? Jacques Derrida and his Place in Modern Philosophy” (The Jewish Daily Forward, 1 decembrie 2010. http://www.forward.com/articles/133536/

[xxvi] Matthew Biro, The Dada Cyborg: Visions of the New Human in Weimar Berlin, (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 154.

[xxvii] Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Bloomington, IN: 1stbooks Library, 2001), 205.

[xxviii] Dickerman, „Introduction & Zurich”, Leah Dickerman (Ed.) Dada, 29.

[xxix] Hockensmith, „Artists’ Biographies”, Leah Dickerman (Ed.) Dada, 482.

[xxx] Ibid., 486.

[xxxi] Codrescu, The Posthuman Dada Guide: tzara și lenin joacă șah, 176.

[xxxii] Scruton, Modern Philosophy, 479.

[xxxiii] Gideon Ofrat, The Jewish Derrida (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2001), 30-1.

[xxxiv] Roger Scruton, Culture Counts — Faith and Feeling in a World Besieged (New York: Encounter Books, 2007), 70.

[xxxv] Wicks, Filosofia franceză modernă: de la existențialism la postmodernism, 10.

[xxxvi] Scruton, Cultura modernă, 138.

[xxxvii] Paul Johnson, Arta — O nouă istorie (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 669.

823 – 2023: 1200 years ago: Agobard’s letter to Louis the Pious about the “insolence of the Jews”

It is remarkable that complaints about Jewish behavior have been so consistent through the centuries, in very different cultural and social eras.

Twelve centuries ago, between 823 and 828, the actual date is not precisely known,  Saint Agobard (769 – 840), bishop of Lyon (France), who contributed to making his episcopal city one of the centers of the Carolingian Renaissance, addressed to Louis the Pious (successor of Charlemagne) a letter in Latin (English translation here) with a startling title:

AD EUMDEM IMPERATOREM, DE INSOLENTIA JUDAEORUM

or

ON THE INSOLENCE OF THE JEWS TO LOUIS  THE PIOUS

See also Andrew Joyce’s article “Agobard and the Origins of the Hostile Elite” on the eventual futility of the letter:

Unfortunately for Agobard, he was summoned to the Court at the instigation of the Jews. Bernard Bachrach comments that “The Jews…were forcefully represented by a powerful advocate. They also had influential friends at court. … The court not only found against Agobard, but the emperor added the personal humiliation of dismissing him from the palace in a preemptory manner. Louis provided the Jews with a diploma bearing the imperial seal that bore witness to their victory.”[15] Persisting in his conviction that the emperor couldn’t possibly side with the Jews over his own people, Agobard continued to deliver sermons against Jews and to write to Louis explaining himself (as seen in the above extracts from one such letter). He insisted that Louis had been misinformed or that the edicts bearing his seal were forgeries.[16] Bachrach writes that Agobard believed Louis and other elites at court “were either pawns of Jewish interests or acting from a misunderstanding of the situation.”[17] What he failed to consider was the possibility these figures were willing accomplices of the Jews, together comprising a hostile elite.

The patience of the hostile eventually wore thin. As the missi dominici [envoy of the ruler] set off for Lyon “with a plethora of pro-Jewish documents and a plentitude of power to enforce government policy, Agobard fled.”[18] Agobard noted from his exile “the Jews were made joyful beyond measure.” He added that many of his associates “fled or hid or were detained.” Priests loyal to him were threatened by Jews and royal agents, and, as a consequence, “did not dare to show their faces.” Subsequent efforts to confront Jewish influence in the Frankish lands were forced into more abstract and indirect forms rather than “opposing imperial policy overtly or by attacking the Jews directly.”[19] Jeffrey Cohen remarks that, in the end, Agobard utterly failed to alter Carolingian Jewish policy, or prevent its further evolution.[20] Despite this failing, Agobard entered the Jewish consciousness as an emblematic hate figure, with the nineteenth-century Jewish activist and historian Heinrich Graetz comparing him to the “villainous Haman” of the Book of Esther.[21] He was only dislodged from the bitter expanse of Jewish memory when the twentieth century provided Jews with a new “Haman,” and a new chapter in their lachrymose self-authored history.

The story outlined here is important in the history of the Jewish Question for a number of reasons. The first is that it is a very early Western European example of non-religious clashes of interest, by which I mean that although we see two religious communities in confrontation the basis for that confrontation is not rooted in the spiritual. As Jeffrey Cohen concedes, Agobard’s “well-known complaints regarding the Jews hardly amounted to a systematic theological exposition.” Rather than theology, his complaints “address an array of specific, practical issues.”[22] These “specific, practical issues” concerned Jewish hostility towards Europeans, the abuse of Europeans by Jews, and the extent of Jewish wealth, privilege, protections, and political influence in European societies.  These issues, more than the putative “prejudices,” “neuroses,” or “religious pathologies” posited by Jewish intellectuals, have been the perennial elements underpinning the Jewish Question for more than a thousand years. They provoked an entirely rational response — European efforts to fight back, or, as it would eventually come to be known, “anti-Semitism.”

Perhaps the most important aspect of Agobard’s tale is that it exposes the origins of one of the most uncomfortable aspects of Jewish influence — its reliance on cooperation with our own elites. Only by engaging in a symbiotic relationship with our own corrupt rulers can Jews gain full access to power and an impunity when wielding it. As such, we should grow in the understanding that answering the Jewish Question will by necessity involve a reckoning with the issue of how we govern ourselves and by what qualifications we select our elites. If Whites possess a weak sense of ethnocentrism and high sense of individualism (certainly when compared with Jews and other non-Whites), then this should provoke a discussion on how to tie the fate of our rulers or governments to our people. In ancient times, both Celtic and Nordic societies took this idea to an extreme, sacrificing their kings in times of famine or hardship (see for example, the Ynglinga Saga). The fate of the king was quite literally tied to the people — if the people suffered, the king would suffer more than anyone. As time progressed, kings became ensconced in their hierarchy, their palaces ever larger and ever more distant. Then came the parliaments and the politicians, they too ever more distant from the needs of the masses and the direction of their interests. Accountability in all instances was reduced to nothing.

This letter is considered by the scholars to be “The first testimony relating to the abduction of children by Jewish merchants active in the trade flowing into Arab Spain,” as it was phrased by Ariel Toaff , professor of Medieval and Renaissance History at Bar-Ilan University in Israel, who states in his book, Blood Passover (p. 189) that:

The first testimony relating to the abduction of children by Jewish merchants active in the trade flowing into Arab Spain, comes down to us in a letter from Agobard, archbishop of Lyon in the years 816–840. The French prelate describes the appearance at Lyons of a Christian slave, having escaped from Cordoba, who had been abducted from a Leonese Jewish merchant twenty four years before, when he was a child, to be sold to the Moslems of Spain. His companion in flight was another Christian slave having suffered a similar fate after being abducted six years before by Jewish merchants at Arles. The inhabitants of Lyons confirmed these claims, adding that yet another Christian boy had been abducted by Jews to be sold into slavery that same year. Agobard concludes his report with a comment of a general nature; that these were not considered isolated cases, because, in everyday practice, the Jews continued to procure Christian slaves for themselves and furthermore subjecting them to “infamies such that it would be vile in itself to describe them”.

Precisely what kind of abominable “infamies” Agobard is referring to is not clear; but it is possible that he was referring to castration more than to circumcision. Liutprando, bishop of Cremona, in his Antapodosis, said to have been written in approximately 958–962, referred to the city of Verdun as the principal market in which Jews castrated young slaves intended for sale to the Moslems of Spain. During this same period, two Arab sources, Ibn Haukal and Ibrahim al Qarawi, also stressed that the majority of their eunuchs originated from France and were sold to the Iberian peninsula by Jewish merchants. Other Arabic writers mentioned Lucerna, a city with a Jewish majority, halfway between Cordoba and Malaga in southern Spain, as another major market, in which the castration of Christian children after reducing them to slavery was practiced on a large scale by the very same people.

During this period, Jewish merchants from the cities in the valley of the Rhône, Verdun, Lione, Arles and Narbonne, in addition to Aquisgrana, the capital of the empire in the times of Louis the Pious [Louis I]; and, in Germany, from the centers of the valley of the Rhine, from Worms, Magonza and Magdeburg; in Bavaria and Bohemia, from Regensburg and Prague — were active in the principal markets in which slaves (women, men, eunuchs) were offered for sale, by Jews, sometimes after abducting them from their houses. From Christian Europe the human merchandise was exported to the Islamic lands of Spain, in which there was a lively market. The castration of these slaves, particularly children, raised their prices, and was no doubt a lucrative and profitable practice

Ariel Toaff argues that these abductions are at the origin of the rise of the ritual murder stereotype (and, maybe, of our modern adrenochrome urban legends.)

That Christian Europe of the Middle Ages feared the Jews is an established fact. Perhaps the widespread fear that Jews were scheming to abduct children, subjecting them to cruel rituals, even antedates the appearance of stereotypical ritual murder which seems to have originated in the 12th century. As for myself, I believe that serious consideration should be given to the possibility that this fear was largely related to the slave trade, particularly in the 9th and 10th centuries, when the Jewish role in the slave trade appears to have been preponderant.

Be that as it may, Toaff dare not mention the title of the letter and so we could easily miss the rest of it. It is worth quoting in full, its seething tone not faltering for a moment.

For example, all those who think that “Democracy was always nothing more than the screen for the Jewish dictatorship (Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Bagatelles pour un massacre [1937], éd. Denoël, 1937, p. 51) will have to think twice: the proximity and the connivance of the Jews with power are already denounced as such in Agobard’s letter — at a time that was not particularly democratic.

In a short article on Jeune Nation, 1917: le Rond-point Poincaré, it can be seen, by quoting a few extracts from his memoirs, how easily Raymond Poincaré (President of French Republic, 1913–1920) could contact Rothschild and the members of the consistory while the secularism of the Republic prohibited him from meeting bishops. So, there is nothing new under the sun since Agobard. The sole difference, strictly speaking, is the fact that in the past, every now and then, the kings and the emperors would take steps that would be considered by today’s democratic standards as antisemitic — a burning at the stake during the Inquisition for example.

And last but not least surprise, Kosher slaughter was already a touchy issue at the time of Agobard, the meat considered to be unclean by the Jews being sold to the Christians: the same occurs today, obliging the Gentile to eat meat from a ritual slaughter that they consider does not to meet the standards of Jewish religious law.

So below the letter in its full extent, both in English and in Latin. (The letter can be found in Latin and  French here: Abogard : LETTRE A LOUIS LE PIEUX SUR L’INSOLENCE DES JUIFS (remacle.org) 

In English: Internet History Sourcebooks Project (fordham.edu)

Louis le Pieux 778 – 840 painting by Jean-Joseph Dassy 1791–1865

On the Insolence of the Jews To Louis the Pious

To his most Christian, truly pious, and always august emperor Louis, the most fortunate triumphal victor in Christ, Agobard, the most downcast of all your servants.

When omnipotent God — Who knew before time itself and foreordained that you would be a pious rector in these truly demanding times — raised your prudence and zealous religion over the other mortals of your time, there is no doubt but that you were prepared as a remedy for the dangerous times about which the Apostle speaks: In the last days the dangerous times shall begin, and there shall be men who love themselves, greedy, puffed up, etc.[II Timothy 3:1-2] and who, although they have the appearance of piety, nullify its strength.[II Timothy 3:5] From times such as these nothing more should be expected than what is already seen, except for the release of Satan and the public trampling of the holy City for the forty-two months, which shall occur through the head of all the iniquitous, Antichrist.[cf. Apocalypse 11:2]

Therefore since this is the way things are, I beseech your most tranquil long-sufferingness that you lend your most patient ear to the words with which I, the least of your servants, consider it most necessary to admonish your most holy solicitude concerning such a vital matter, a matter which is either uniquely or especially one to which your governance more than all others should bring aid.

If I could pursue my account of the matter while passing over in silence the names of the responsible parties, I would gladly do so. But because it cannot be done, I commit myself to your goodness and patience as I surrender myself to the dangers and inform you of what is ruinous to pass over in silence. There came Gerric and Frederick who were preceded by Evrard,[1] your agents (missi) in fact yet not doing your will completely but rather acting on behalf of another. They showed themselves to be terrible to the Christians and mild to the Jews, especially in Lyon, where they set up a persecuting faction (pars persecutionis) against the Church and they goaded the church to many groans, sighs, and tears.

Because this persecution was directly principally against me, I should not recount the whole, unless perchance your most clement concern should wish to know. But if your kindness allows, I shall begin to intimate it briefly, insofar as it was injurious to the Church of Christ.

When the Jews first arrived, they gave me a message in your name and another one to the man who rules the district of Lyon in place of the count; [this message] ordered him to offer aid to the Jews against me. We absolutely did not believe that such messages as these issued from your judgment, although they were read out in your sacred name and sealed with your ring. The Jews began to rage with a certain odious insolence, threatening that we would be afflicted with every sort of injury by the agents whom they had obtained to take vengeance upon Christians. After them, Evrard arrived and repeated the same thing and said that your majesty was truly angry with me because of the Jews. Then the aforementioned agents arrived, holding in their hands a tax code(?) (stipendialis tractoria) and a capitulary of sanctions which we do not believe exists by your command.

For these reasons, the Jews were made joyful beyond measure and the Christians saddened — and not only those who fled or hid or were detained, but the rest as well who saw or heard. In particular, it was because the Jews’ opinion received such confirmation that they irreverently began to preach to the Christians what they ought to believe and hold, openly blaspheming the Lord God and our Savior Jesus Christ. This perversity was strengthened by the words of your agents who whispered in the ears of certain people that the Jews are not abominable, as many think, but are held dear in your eyes and because some of their people were saying that they are considered better than Christians.

I, your unworthy servant, was not in fact in Lyon [at the time] but was far away on the case of the monks of Nantuadensium, who were fighting among themselves because of a certain rivalry. Nonetheless I sent our agents with a short letter to those men [saying] that they should command whatever they wanted and we would obey what they had enjoined. But we received no indulgence from them. Consequently, certain of our priests whom they threatened by name, did not dare to show their faces.

We suffered these things from the Jews’ supporters and for no other reason but that we preached to Christians that they should not sell Christian slaves to them; that they should not allow these Jews to sell Christians to Spain nor to possess them as paid domestics lest Christian women celebrate the Sabbath with them, work on Sundays, eat with them during Lent, and their paid servants eat meat on these days; and that no Christian should buy meats sacrificed and butchered by Jews and sell them to other Christians; and that they should not drink their wine or other things like this. [my emphasis]

For it is the practice of the Jews that when they slaughter an animal to eat and kill it using three cuts so that it is not strangled, if the liver appears to be damaged when the entrails are opened, or if a lung clings to the side or breath inflates it, or bile is not found, and other things like this, the meat is considered to be unclean by the Jews and sold to the Christians and these meats are called by the insulting expression “Christian beasts” (christiana pecora). With regard to the blood which the Jews both consider to be unclean and do not use except to sell it to Christians, if it should happen to flow into the earth anywhere, even into a filthy place, they swiftly draw it out of the ground and put it in a vessel to preserve. And as for how they do other things worthy of reproach concerning the blood, there are not only many Christian witnesses but also many Jews.

That the Jews daily curse Jesus Christ and the Christians in all their prayers under the name “Nazarenes” not only the blessed Jerome attests, who writes that he knew them intimately and was inside their skin,[2] but many of the Jews also bear witness to this. On this matter, for the sake of example, I spoke to the Christians in this way: If there is a man who is faithful and a lover of his elder and lord and he senses that someone is his lord’s enemy, detractor, reviler, and a threat to him, he does not wish to be this man’s friend, table companion, or sharer in his food. But if he should be [this man’s friend, etc.] and his elder and lord learns this, [the lord] would judge that the man was not faithful to him. And therefore, since we know that the Jews are blasphemers and men who curse, so to speak, the Lord God Christ and his Christians, we should not be joined to them through the sharing of food or drink in accordance with the rule (modus) that was given long ago and commanded by the holy fathers in their words and examples. For the rest, because they live among us and we should not be wicked to them nor act contrary to their life, health, or wealth, let us observe the rule (modus) that has been ordained by the Church. The way in which we should be cautious or human towards them, is not at all obscure but has been clearly expounded. [my emphasis)

Most pious lord, I have mentioned only a few out of the many things concerning the faithlessness of the Jews, our admonition, and the wounding of Christianity that is occurring through the supporters of the Jews, since I do not know whether [this news] can even come to your attention. Nonetheless, it is absolutely necessary that your pious solicitude know how the Christian faith is being harmed by the Jews in certain ways. For when they lie to simple Christians and boast that they are dear to you because of the patriarchs; that they enter and leave your sight with honor; that most excellent people desire their prayers and blessings and confess that they wished they had the same author of the law as the Jews; when they say that your counselors are aroused against us for their sake, because we forbid Christians from drinking their wine; when, in trying to claim this, they boast that they have received from Christians many, many pounds of silver from the sale of wine and cannot find out, after running through the canons, why Christians should abstain from their food and drink; when they produce commands signed with golden seals in your name and containing words which, in our opinion, are not true; when they show people women’s clothes as if they were sent to their wives by your kinsmen or matrons of the palaces; when they expound upon the glory of their forefathers; when they are permitted, contrary to the law, to build new synagogues — [when all this occurs] it even reaches the point when naïve Christians say that the Jews preach to them better than our priests. And this was particularly true when the aforementioned agents ordered that the markets that usually occur on Saturdays should be moved lest [the Jews’] Sabbatism be impeded, and they let [the Jews] choose on which days they had to go to market from then on, claiming that this suited the utility of the Christians because of the Sunday vacation. In the end, it proved to be more useless to the Jews since those who are near, because they buy the necessary food on Saturday, spend Sunday more freely at the celebration of the Mass and at preaching, and those who come from a distance on the occasion of the market, attend the evening and morning offices after the celebration of the Mass has been performed and return home with edification.

Now then, if it should please your most benign kindness to listen, let us say what the Churches of the Gauls and their rectors, kings as well as bishops, should hold to regarding the separation of the two religions, namely that of the Church and that of the Jews, and what they should pass down in writing and leave to posterity to be maintained, and how it is consonant with authority, that is the Acts of the Apostles and takes its origin from the Old Testament. From these it is shown how detestable enemies of the truth should be considered and how they are worse than all unbelievers, as divine Scripture teaches, and what unworthy things they think about God and heavenly matters. We have discussed all of these things with our brethren and have sent [these writings] to be presented to your most expansive excellence.

After the preceding note had been dictated, a certain man from Cordoba arrived, fleeing from Spain. He said that he had been stolen as a little boy by a certain Jew of Lyon 24 years before and sold, and that he had fled this year with another boy from Arles who had been likewise stolen by a Jew six years earlier. When we sought out those known to the man who was from Lyon and found them, some said that others had been stolen by this same Jew, others bought and sold, and that this year another boy was stolen and sold by a Jew. At that moment it was discovered that many Christians are sold by Christians and bought by Jews and that many unspeakable things are perpetrated by them which are too foul to write. [my emphsia]


AGOBARDUS: AD EUMDEM IMPERATOREM, DE INSOLENTIA JUDAEORUM.

Christianissimo, et vere piissimo, et in Christo victori ac triumphatori Ludovico imperatori felicissimo, semper Augusto Agobardus abjectissimus omnium servorum vestrorum.

Cum Deus omnipotens, qui vos ante tempora praescivit et praeordinavit rectorem pium futurum temporibus valde necessariis, sublimaverit prudentiam vestram et studium religionis supra caeteros vestri temporis mortales; dubium non est praeparatum vos ad remedium temporibus periculosis, de quibus apostolus loquitur : In novissimis diebus instabunt tempora periculosa, et erunt homines se ipsos amantes, cupidi, elati, et caetera , et habentes quidem speciem pietatis, virtutem autem ejus abnegantes; de quibus nihil est exspectandum quod jam non videatur, nisi solutio Satanae, et publica calcatio sanctae civitatis mensibus quadraginta duobus, quae futura est per caput omnium iniquorum Antichristum. Cum haec igitur ita se habeant, obsecro tranquillissimam longanimitatem vestram, ut praebeatis patientissimam aurem vestram verbis quibus ego infimus servorum vestrorum nimis necessarium puto admonendam sanctissimam sollicitudinem vestram de re tam necessaria, quae aut sola, aut praecipua est, cui prae caeteris succurrere debeat gubernatio vestra; cujus narrationem si prosequi potuissem tacitis nominibus auctorum, vellem omnino. Sed quia fieri non potest, committo me bonitati et patientiae vestrae, dando me periculis, et innotescens vobis quae tacere perniciosum est.

Venerunt Gerricus et Fredericus, quos praecurrit Evrardus missi quidem vestri non tamen per omnia vestra agentes, sed ex parte alterius; et ostenderunt se Christianis terribiles et Judaeis mites, maxime Lugduni, ubi partem persecutionis adversus Ecclesiam depinxerunt, quam multis gemitibus, suspiriis et lacrymis stimulaverunt. Quae persecutio, quia praecipue adversum me acta est, tota a me prodenda non est, nisi forte clementissima sollicitudo vestra scire voluerit. Tamen in quantum Ecclesiae Christi noxia est, si vestra patitur mansuetudo, breviter intimare exordiar.

Venientes itaque primum Judaei, dederunt mihi indiculum ex nomine vestro, et alterum ei qui pagum Lugdunensem vice comitis regit, praecipientem illi ut auxilium ferret Judaeis adversum me.

Quos indiculos, licet ex sacro nomine vestro recitarentur, et vestro annulo essent signati, nullatenus tamen credimus ex judicio vestro tales prodisse. Coeperunt autem efferri quadam odibili insolentia Judaei, comminantes omnibus injuriis nos afficiendos per missos quos adepti fuerant ad exsolvendam vindictam de Christianis.

Post eos venit Evrardus, eadem iterans, et dicens majestatem vestram commotam esse valde adversum me propter Judaeos.

Deinde venerunt et praedicti missi, habentes in manibus tractoriam stipendialem, et capitularia sanctionum, quae non putamus vestra jussione existere talia.

His causis laetificati sunt Judaei ultra modum, et contristati Christiani, non solum illi qui fugerunt, aut qui absconditi sunt, vel qui districti, sed et caeteri qui viderunt, vel audierunt; maxime ideo, quia sententia Judaeorum ita confirmata est, ut auderent irreverenter praedicare Christianis quid potius credendum esset ac tenendum; blasphemantes coram eis Dominum Deum ac Salvatorem nostrum Jesum Christum.

III. Roboratur quoque haec perversitas ex verbis missorum, quibus susurrabant quorumdam auribus, dicentes quod Judaei non abominabiles, ut plerique putant, sed chari essent in oculis vestris, et hominibus eorum dicentibus ex parte meliores eos habitos quam Christianos.

Et ego quidem indignus servus vester non eram Lugduni; sed aberam longe, causa Nantuadensium monachorum, qui quadam dissimultate inter se laborabant. Tamen direxi missos nostros et litterulas ad illos, ut praeciperent quidquid vellent, aut eis injunctum esset, et nos obediremus. Sed nihil veniae adepti sumus; ita ut etiam aliqui ex sacerdotibus nostris, quibus nominatim minabantur, non auderent praesentiam suam eis exhibere. Haec passi sumus a fautoribus Judaeorum, non ob aliud nisi quia praedicavimus Christianis, ut mancipia eis Christiana non venderent, ut ipsos Judaeos Christianos vendere ad Hispanias non permitterent, nec mercenarios domesticos habere, ne feminae Christianae cum eis sabbatizarent, et ne diebus Dominicis operarentur, ne diebus Quadragesimae cum eis pranderent, et mercenarii eorum iisdem diebus carnes manducarent, ne quilibet Christianus carnes a Judaeis immolatas et deglubatas emeret, et aliis Christianis venderet, ne vinum illorum biberent, et alia hujusmodi. Est enim Judaeorum usus, ut quando quolibet pecus ad esum mactant, ut subactum idem pecus tribus incisionibus non fuerit jugulatum; si apertis interaneis jecur laesum apparuerit, si pulmo lateri adhaeserit, vel eum insufflatio penetraverit, si fel inventum non fuerit, et alia hujusmodi; haec tanquam immunda a Judaeis repudiata, Christianis venduntur, et insultario vocabulo Christiana pecora appellantur.

De vino vero, quod et ipsi immundum fatentur, et non eo utuntur nisi ad vendendum Christianis, si contigerit ut in terram defluat quolibet loco licet sordido, festinantes hauriunt iterum de terra, et ad conservandum in vasa remittunt. Qualiter vero et alia improbanda circa illud agant, non solum de Christianis, sed et de Judaeis multi sunt testes. Quod autem Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum et Christianos in omnibus orationibus suis sub Nazarenorum nomine quotidie maledicant, non solum beatus Hieronymus, qui se scribit novisse illos intrinsecus et in cute, testis est, sed et de ipsis Judaeis plerique testantur. In hac re sumens exempli gratiam, dixi Christianis hoc modo: Si aliquis homo seniori suo vel domino fidelis et amator existat, et quempiam hominum senserit illi esse inimicum, detractorem, conviciatorem, et comminatorem, non vult ei esse amicus, nec socius mensae, nec particeps ciborum. Quod si fuerit, et hoc senior ipsius vel dominus deprehenderit, nec fidelem sibi eum esse existimat. Et ideo cum procul dubio noverimus blasphematores et, ut ita dicam, maledictores esse Judaeos Domini Dei Christi et fidelium ejus Christianorum, non debemus eis conjungi participatione ciborum et potuum, juxta modum duntaxat a sanctis Patribus et exemplis datum et verbis praeceptum. Caeterum, quia inter nos vivunt, et maligni eis esse non debemus, nec vitae aut sanitati vel divitiis eorum contrarii; observemus modum ab Ecclesia ordinatum, non utique obscurum, sed manifeste expositum, qualiter erga eos cauti vel humani esse debeamus.

Haec, piissime domine, de multis pauca dixi de perfidia Judaeorum, de admonitione nostra, de laesione Christianitatis, quae fit per fautores Judaeorum, nesciens utrum pervenire possit ad vestram notitiam. Tamen summopere necesse est ut sciat piissima sollicitudo vestra, quomodo nocetur fides Christiana a Judaeis in aliquibus. Dum enim gloriantur, mentientes simplicibus Christianis, quod chari sint vobis propter patriarchas; quod honorabiliter ingrediantur in conspectu vestro, et egrediantur; quod excellentissimae personae cupiant eorum orationes et benedictiones, et fateantur talem se legis auctorem habere velle, qualem ipsi habent; dum dicunt consiliatores vestros commotos adversum nos eorum causa, eo quod prohibeamus Christianos vinum eorum bibere; dum hoc affirmare nitentes, plurimas argenti libras ob emptionem vini se ab eis accepisse jactant; et decursis canonibus non inveniri quare Christiani debeant abstinere a cibis eorum et potibus; dum ostendunt praecepta ex nomine vestro, aureis sigillis signata, et continentia verba, ut putamus, non vera; dum ostendunt vestes muliebres, quasi a consanguineis vestris vel matronis palatinorum uxoribus eorum directas; dum exponunt gloriam parentum suorum; dum eis contra legem permittitur novas synagogas exstruere; ad hoc pervenitur, ut dicant imperiti Christiani melius eis praedicare Judaeos quam presbyteros nostros; maxime cum et supradicti missi, ne sabbatismus eorum impediretur, mercata, quae in sabbatis solebant fieri, transmutari praeceperint, et quibus diebus deinceps frequentari debeant, in illorum opinione posuerint, dicentes hoc Christianorum utilitati propter diei Dominici vacationem congruere; cum Judaeis magis probetur inutile: quia et hi qui prope sunt, sabbato ementes victus necessaria, liberius die Dominico missarum solemnitatibus et praedicationibus vacant; et si qui de longe veniunt, ex occasione mercati tam vespertinis quam matutinis occurrentes officiis, missarum solemnitate peracta, cum aedificatione revertuntur ad propria. Nunc igitur, si placet benignissimae mansuetudini vestrae audire, dicamus quid Ecclesiae Galliarum, et rectores earum, tam reges quam episcopi de discretione utriusque religionis, ecclesiasticae videlicet et Judaicae, tenuerint, tenendumque tradiderint, et scriptum posteris reliquerint, et quomodo consonum sit auctoritati vel actibus apostolicis, et a Veteri Testamento originem trahens. Ex quibus demonstratur quam detestabiles habendi sint inimici veritatis, et quomodo pejores sint omnibus incredulis, Scripturis divinis hoc docentibus, et quam indigniora omnibus infidelibus de Deo sentiant, et rebus coelestibus. Quae omnia cum confratribus contulimus, et amplissimae Eccellentiae vestrae praesentanda direximus.

Et cum praecedens schedula dictata fuisset, supervenit quidam homo fugiens ab Hispaniis de Cordoba, qui se dicebat furatum fuisse a quodam Judaeo Lugduno ante annos viginti quatuor, parvum adhuc puerum, et venditum, fugisse autem anno praesenti cum alio qui similiter furatus fuerat Arelate ab alio Judaeo ante annos sex. Cumque hujus, qui Lugdunensis fuerat, notos quaereremus, et inveniremus, dictum est a quibusdam et alios ab eodem Judaeo furatos, alios vero emptos ac venditos; ab alio quoque Judaeo anno praesenti alium puerum furatum et venditum: qua hora inventum est plures Christianos a Christianis vendi et comparari a Judaeis, perpetrarique ab eis multa infanda quae turpia sunt ad scribendum. 

Matthew Goodwin: A cynical Establishment type, or a future friend of British Nationalism?

This article was posted by Anglo-Celtic.org on Wednesday 12 April 2023.

Matthew Goodwin

Matthew Goodwin 

Matthew Goodwin is not a British Nationalist. He is Professor of Politics at Kent University. He is well in with the likes of Penguin/Pelican Books and the BBC.

He is a respectable figure and he wants to stay that way. Occasionally, he is one of four guests on the BBC2 lunchtime programme, Politics Live, where I learned of his latest book, Values, Voice and Virtue – The New British Politics.

The hostess there is Jo Coburn, an active member of the Ealing Liberal Synagogue. She is married to Mark Flanagan, former head of strategic communications for both the Labour government and the following Conservative and Liberal Democrat coalition government. Coburn’s guests frequently include another Jew of some variety.

I do not know whether Coburn personally chooses her guests, or whether that is done for her from either above or below. But we can tell the kind of company that Matthew Goodwin keeps.

As an academic, Goodwin has to demonstrate a certain amount of objectivity, although a host of Marxist sociology lecturers etc. seem to get by quite nicely without doing that. Just as the BBC is obliged by its charter to be politically impartial. Martin Webster and Philip Gegan have shot down that myth, on the Anglo-Celtic website. “Anglo-Celtic is campaigning to abolish the BBC”.

Matthew Goodwin has co-authored a number of books where British Nationalism is either implied to be, or openly stated to be, “fascist” or “far right”. But Nationalism seems to be a major interest of Goodwin’s. I do not know what first attracted him to his subject.

But as he developed his interest, he also developed an understanding, and an empathy with some modern nationalist ideological positions. He might have developed a sympathy with moderate nationalist positions. But, as he is based at a politically correct university, he dares not say so openly, if in fact that is the case. Many have been driven out of universities for not taking the right line.

In 2018, Goodwin co-wrote with Roger Eatwell, National Populism – The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy. They concentrated on ‘national’ populism, rather than populism in general. In that book they wrote:

One point that has recurred throughout is that people who support national populism are not merely protesting: they are choosing to endorse views that appeal to them. So we need to look more closely at the promises being made by these politicians and examine whether, contrary to the popular claim that it is a new form of fascism, national populism strives towards a new form of democracy in which the interests and voices of ordinary people feature far more prominently.

I enjoyed that book and even wrote a letter to the Hull Daily Mail about it – see the published text below.

Goodwin’s new book

The back cover of Values, Voice and Virtue states:

What has caused the recent seismic changes in British politics, including Brexit and a series of populist revolts against the elite? Why did so many people want to overturn the status quo? Where have the Left gone wrong? And what deeper trends are driving these changes?

British politics is coming apart. A country once known for its stability has recently experienced a series of shocking upheavals. Matthew Goodwin, acclaimed political scientist and co-author of National Populism, shows that the reason is not economic hardship, personalities or dark money. It is a far wider political realignment that will be with us for years to come. An increasingly liberalised, globalized ruling class has lost touch with millions, who found their values ignored, their voices unheard and their virtue denied. Now, this new alliance of voters is set to determine Britain’s fate.

In chapters one and two, Goodwin discusses the new political elite and how it accomplished a revolution. He writes in chapter two:

It opened the economy to a new and very disruptive model of hyper-globalization. It opened the country’s borders to a new and unprecedented era of mass immigration. And it opened up and hollowed out its national democracy, handing much greater power, influence and control to supranational institutions.

Nowhere in the book is there any mention of the Jewish role in all of this. Some time ago, I wrote to Matthew Goodwin and asked him if he was aware of the books by Kevin MacDonald. I did not receive either a reply or an acknowledgement of my letter.

But I am reminded of Ruling the Void – The Hollowing of Western Democracy, by the Irish academic, Peter Mair, and Coming Apart, Charles Murray’s commentary on United States society. Edward Dutton has things to say about some of this in his co-authored book, The Past is a Future Country.

Kevin MacDonald has much to say in his fourth book, Individualism and the Western Liberal Tradition, in the last two chapters, eight and nine. This includes comments on another book, by Joseph Henrich, The Weirdest People in the World, a book describing how Westerners (read White people) do not look after their own, like other peoples in the Third World do, and the way this situation developed.

I think that there is hope for some Establishment academics. Remember, even Kevin MacDonald started out as a leftist, and later became a Reagan-supporting conservative. Only later did he become a racial nationalist.

All of these books, including the two mentioned of Goodwin’s books, are worth reading. Because British Nationalists should be well-read and well-informed.

There is some evidence that Establishment academics, in Britain and America, and elsewhere, are aware of the political situation, and are currently cautiously commenting on it. Of course, most of them will not mention the Jews. MacDonald is the honourable exception.

Some intelligent people know that there is a potentially revolutionary situation developing. The Establishment is trying hard to crush all Nationalist thinking. I have little doubt that people like Charles Murray in the United States, and Matthew Goodwin in the UK, would furiously deny having any sympathy with racial nationalism (at this stage, probably honestly). But they are noticing things that we know about.

All political revolutions start off as an Idea, and then develop slowly at first. Later, when they have gained momentum and more public support, there are always some among the old Establishment who come over to the new regime. Some of those people are braver than others. Some want to see which way the political winds are blowing before they will jump ship. Some are cynical and self-serving, but want to be well in with the new rulers — and they can be used by the new regime.

But I almost think that it is a pre-condition of the success of all revolutions that they win some  sympathisers among the old order that they want to replace. Are we seeing the first tentative signs of that with people like Goodwin and Murray?

If we do not make significant progress, such types will turn their professional interest elsewhere and play down their previous comments.

But a revolutionary situation demands a revolution. Goodwin’s book has five chapters. The first two are, The Rise of the New Elite, and Revolution, by which he means Cultural Marxism’s revolution. He does not call it that, but chooses “Hyper Liberalism” instead. In this he echoes the Tory writer, Nick Timothy, in his book, Remaking One Nation – The Future of Conservatism. Timothy refers to “Ultra Liberalism”.

Chapters three, four and five are about how the political elite are out of touch with the public. He devotes these chapters to the “Values, Voice and Virtue” of his title to the book. But interestingly, the conclusion to the book is called “Counter Revolution”.

Is he advocating that, or warning against it? Read the book and form your own opinion! I hope to comment again on this book, in a future letter.

Best Wishes

Will

© Will Wright 2023

*****

Published in the Hull Daily Mail, on Friday November 30, 2018, as:

Local politicians could learn a lot from this book 

Recently, I read National Populism, the Revolt Against Liberal Democracy by Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin. Although this book is by a couple of academics, it is an easy read and a good buy at £9.99 from Pelican books. Published on 25th October, 2018 it is right up to date and in my opinion, a must read for anyone who is interested in contemporary politics.

But more than that, I think some of our local politicians could benefit from reading it. Colin Inglis and David Nolan might find it useful in understanding why they were on the losing side in the EU referendum. But they are not the only ones.

Stephen Brady, who thought that immigration had been good for Hull, might see things from a different perspective once he has read this book. Regular Mail contributor, Michael Somerton, might realise that not everyone thinks in purely economic terms. Middle class feminists might gain insight into why America rejected Hilary Clinton and embraced Donald Trump.

Most of all I hope lots of Mail readers rush out to buy this book. The writers devote a chapter to each of the four ‘D’s:

• The distrust of the political class.

• The threatened destruction of nation states and indigenous populations by super-states and mass immigration.

• The relative deprivation of ordinary people compared to the global, jet-setting super-class.

• The de-alignment of the old political parties with their traditional voters.

Trump, Brexit and the rise of continental nationalist movements — the new force is populist nationalism.

The writers explain that this is different to fascism. This nationalism threatens the future of ‘centre-right’ parties and ‘centre-left’ parties.

According to the authors, the right’s only answer is to steal nationalist policies. The left hasn’t found an answer and faces terminal decline. The left cannot please both politically correct, middle class liberals and immigrants on the one hand — and their traditional working-class supporters on the other.

Much of Labour’s new recruits are in London, rather than that party’s traditional northern heartlands.

This is a very timely message, let’s see it in a few Christmas stockings!

Will Wright

Jim Goad: The Film

Editor’s note: I think you’ll agree that this video combines excellent insight (e.g., “There never were any goalposts”) with an entertaining presentation.

 

 

Tristan Tzara and the Jewish Roots of Dada — PART 3 of 3

Jacques Derrida

Go to Part 1.
Go to Part 2.

Dada and Deconstruction as Jewish Attack Vectors

A final destructive legacy of Dada, and one which merits more attention, is how its anti-rationalism prefigured Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction as a Jewish intellectual movement arrayed against Western civilization. The parallels between Dada and Deconstruction have been noted by numerous scholars. Robert Wicks observes how strongly Dada resonates “with the definitively poststructuralist conception of deconstruction advanced by Jacques Derrida in the 1960s.”[i] Pegrum likewise notes the “strong link between Dada and postmodern artistic theory, the most obvious point of contact being with the work of Derrida.”[ii] The literary critic Frank Kermode also traces deconstruction back to Dada influences, while Richard Sheppard regards the poststructuralists “as more introverted, less politicized [a dubious assertion], and less carnivalesque descendants of their Dada daddies.”[iii]

For the Dadaists, European civilization consisted of “an alienation-generating amalgam of rationalistic thinking, science, and technology that adhered to the preservation of order, systematicity, and methodicality.” They believed firmly that “European cultural values were not worth preserving.”[iv] Tzara once stated that “logic is always false,” and a core concept in his thought was “as long as we do things the way we think we once did them, we will be unable to achieve any kind of livable society.”[v] The Dadaists famously “spat in the eye of the world,” replacing logic and sense with absurdity and defiance.[vi] Even the word ‘Dada’ itself, suggesting basic drives and childlike behavior, was self-consciously absurd, even self-mocking, and a subversive anthem of resistance to more fully instrumentalized speech and disciplined rationality. It ridiculed Western confidence in the “autonomy of the rational ego and the efficacy of reason.” Dadaists denounced the post-Renaissance Western conception of reality which “assumed that the world was organized according to humanly intelligible laws,” and “condemned ‘bourgeois cultures’ deadening determination to stabilize and categorize all phenomena.”[vii]

The Dadaists even criticized the “rationality and excessive formalism” of Cubism, particularly during its analytic period.[viii] In May 1922, at a mock funeral for Dada, Tzara proclaimed: “Dada is a virgin microbe which penetrates with the insistence of air into all those spaces that reason has failed to fill with words and conventions.”[ix] Dickerman notes how: “Resistance to fixed meaning” remained a key feature of Dada.[x] Godfrey likewise observes that: “At the heart of Dada was an implicit critique of language as supposedly transparent.”[xi] Dada acted as a bridge between the modern and the postmodern in anticipating Derrida’s deconstruction and Michel Foucault’s analysis of power, which, like Dada, attacked the notion of objective truth which had been the cornerstone of Western thinking and knowledge production since the Enlightenment.

In order to deconstruct Western culture, Derrida had to identify a fundamental fault with it — which he decided was its “logocentrism.” By this he meant Western culture privileged speech over the written word (a dubious assertion), and that it is founded on the false belief that the world really is as our concepts describe it (i.e., in accordance with philosophical realism). Like Barthes and Foucault, Derrida used nominalism (the view that concepts are nothing more than human artifacts that have no relation to the real world) to deconstruct and subvert Western realism. In doing so, he mimicked the approach of the Dadaists:

It followed from their rejection of the belief in progress, in tamable nature and rational man, that the Dadas should cast doubt on the power of language, literature and art to represent reality. The information which the senses communicated to men was misleading, even the ideas of the individual “personality” and the external world were elusive and incoherent. How then could language, by definition an instrument of public communication, do other than deform and betray life’s authentic character as a discontinuous sequence of immediate experiences? The Dadas answered that words were mere fictions and that there was no correspondence between the structures of language and those of reality. Thus the belief in order which the power of a common, inherited language inculcated was illusory.[xii]

In order to attack Western realism Derrida and the Dadaists borrowed from the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure the notion of “différence” — which Saussure used to denote the arbitrary nature of language signs. It does not matter what signs we use to mean “night” and “day;” what matters is that we use signs to signal a certain difference, and this structural property was, for Saussure, the true carrier of meaning. The French différer also means to defer, in the sense of put off, and on this coincidental etymological basis Derrida decided that that Saussure had definitively proven that meaning is always deferred by the text.

The consequence is that the process of meaning is something that never gets started: or rather, if and when meaning starts is an arbitrary human decision. Texts do not have a single authoritative meaning: rather, there is a “free play of meaning” and anything goes. Consequently, we are liberated from meaning. Moreover, the text is “emancipated from authorship.” Once written, the author disappears and a text becomes a public artifact. It is for us to decide what the text means, and we are free to decide as we please, and since “all interpretation is misinterpretation” no particular reading is privileged.[xiii] Sheppard notes that: “Derrida, dynamizing Saussure’s model of the sign, sees humanity caught in an endless flow of textuality where signifieds and signifiers perpetually fracture and recombine anew. Consequently, he concludes that there is nothing outside the text.”[xiv] Under Derrida’s deconstruction “a new text thus gradually begins to emerge, but this text too is at subtle variance with itself, and the deconstruction continues in what could be an infinite regress of dialectical readings.”[xv]

While Derrida posed as a leftist Parisian intellectual, a secularist and an atheist, he descended from a long line of crypto-Jews, and explicitly identified himself as such: “I am one of those marranes who no longer say they are Jews even in the secret of their own hearts.”[xvi] Derrida was born into a Sephardic Jewish family that immigrated to Algeria from Spain in the nineteenth century. His family were crypto-Jews who retained their Jewish identity for 400 years in Spain during the period of the Inquisition. Derrida changed his first name to the French Christian sounding ‘Jacques’ in order better blend into the French scene. Furthermore, he took his crypto-Judaism to the grave:

When Derrida was buried, his elder brother, René, wore a tallit at the suburban French cemetery and recited the Kaddish to himself inwardly, since Jacques had asked for no public prayers. This discreet, highly personal, yet emotionally and spiritually meaningful approach to recognizing Derrida’s Judaism seems emblematic of this complex, imperfect, yet valuably nuanced thinker.[xvii]

Derrida was a crypto-Jew until the end, even instructing his family to participate in the charade. Kevin MacDonald notes the obvious reason: “Intellectually one wonders how one could be a postmodernist and a committed Jew at the same time. Intellectual consistency would seem to require that all personal identifications be subjected to the same deconstructing logic, unless, of course, personal identity itself involves deep ambiguities, deception, and self-deception.”[xviii]

In his notebooks, Derrida underscores the centrality of Jewish issues in his writing: “Circumcision, that’s all I’ve ever talked about.” His experience of anti-Semitism during World War II in Algeria was traumatic and resulted in a deep consciousness of his own Jewishness. He was expelled from school at age 13 under the Vichy government because of official caps on the number of Jewish students, describing himself as a “little black and very Arab Jew who understood nothing about it, to whom no one ever gave the slightest reason, neither his parents nor his friends.”[xix] Later, in France, his “suffering subsided. I naively thought that anti-Semitism had disappeared. … But during adolescence, it was the tragedy, it was present in everything else.” These experiences led Derrida to develop “an exhausting aptitude to detect signs of racism, in its most discreet configurations or its noisiest disavowals.”[xx] Caputo notes how Jewish ethnic activism underpins Derrida’s deconstruction:

The idea behind deconstruction is to deconstruct the workings of strong nation-states with powerful immigration policies, to deconstruct the rhetoric of nationalism, the politics of place, the metaphysics of native land and native tongue. … The idea is to disarm the bombs… of identity that nation-states build to defend themselves against the stranger, against Jews and Arabs and immigrants, … all of whom… are wholly other. Contrary to the claims of Derrida’s more careless critics, the passion of deconstruction is deeply political, for deconstruction is a relentless, if sometimes indirect, discourse on democracy, on a democracy to come. Derrida’s democracy is a radically pluralistic polity that resists the terror of an organic, ethnic, spiritual unity, of the natural, native bonds of the nation (natus, natio), which grind to dust everything that is not a kin of the ruling kind and genus (Geschlecht). He dreams of a nation without nationalist or nativist closure, of a community without identity, of a non-identical community that cannot say I or we, for, after all, the very idea of a community is to fortify (munis, muneris) ourselves in common against the other. His work is driven by a sense of the consummate danger of an identitarian community, of the spirit of the “we” of “Christian Europe,” or of a “Christian politics,” lethal compounds that spell death of Arabs and Jews, for Africans and Asians, for anything other. The heaving and sighing of this Christian European spirit is a lethal air for Jews and Arabs, for all les juifs [i.e., Jews as prototypical others], even if they go back to father Abraham, a way of gassing them according to both the letter and the spirit.[xxi]

Derrida’s sociological preoccupations (and suggested solutions) replicated those of Tristan Tzara. Sandqvist links Tzara’s profound revolt against European social constraints directly to his Jewish identity, and his anger at the persistence of anti-Semitism. For Sandqvist, the treatment of Jews in Romania fueled the Dada leader’s revolt against Western civilization. Bodenheimer notes that:

As a Jew, Tzara had many reasons to call into question the so-called disastrous truths and rationalizations of European thinking, one result of which was the First World War — with the discrimination of Jews for centuries being another. … He came from a background in which jingoistic and anti-Semitic arguments had long reproached Jews for using impure, falsified language, from early examples in the sixteenth century… all the way to the arguments of the Romanian intellectuals in Tzara’s time, who attacked Jews as “foreigners” importing “diseased ideas” into Romanian literature and culture.

[Tzara consequently] seeks to unmask language itself as a construction that draws its value, and sometimes its claim to superiority, from an equally constructed concept of identities and values. In themselves, all languages are equal, but equal in their differences. This claim to the right of equality while upholding difference is the basic Jewish claim to a secular society. But the European peoples, be it first for religious or later for nationalist reasons, have never managed to actually understand this right, let alone grant it to minority societies.[xxii]

One of the catalysts for the dissolution of Dada in Paris was Surrealist leader André Breton’s concern that Dada’s nihilism posed a threat to the “process of intellectual sanitation” that became necessary with the rise of fascism.[xxiii] Obviously, one needs a criterion of truth grounded in realism to combat fascist ideas.  Boime likewise claims the Dadaists in their “assault on the Enlightenment and bourgeois liberalism in Zurich and then in Berlin eventually played into the hands of the Fascists and right-wing nationalists. Although these latter groups condemned Dadaist spectacle and modernist thinking, Dada’s rejection of parliamentary politics and democratic institutions helped pave the way for Nazism’s direct assault on humanitarian ideals.”[xxiv]

Derrida has been similarly criticized by some Jews because his writings “lead to ‘nihilism,’ which threatens, in their denial of the notion of objective truth, to ‘efface many of the essential differences between Nazism and non-Nazism.’”[xxv] However, Derrida’s writings have certainly not had any effect on the power of the Holocaust Industry, and indeed, some of Derrida’s biggest backers were intellectual Holocaust activists. This strange state of affairs may be explained by the fact that for some Jews, like Derrida, acknowledging the possibility of objective truth is dangerous because of the possibility that truth could be arrayed against the “other.” Similarly, for the Dadaists, the principles of Western rationality “were held to be highly problematic, because of its instrumental connections to social repressions and domination.”[xxvi] Consequently, a world where truth had been deconstructed is very much a desirable world. As Kevin MacDonald points out in Culture of Critique:

Such a world is safe for Judaism, the prototypical other, and provides no warrant for the universalizing tendencies of Western civilization — what one might term deconstruction as de-Hellenization or de-Westernization. Minority group consciousness is thus validated not in the sense that it is known to be based on some sort of psychological truth, but in the sense that it can’t be proved untrue. On the other hand, the cultural and ethnic interests of majorities are ‘hermeneuticized’ and thus rendered impotent — impotent because they cannot serve as the basis for a mass ethnic movement that would conflict with the interests of other groups.[xxvii]

When the Frankfurt School established itself in the United States, it made a conscious effort to give its Jewish intellectual activism a “scientific” veneer by gathering “empirical data” (such as that which formed the basis for The Authoritarian Personality) in order to challenge existing scientific theories seen as inimical to Jewish interests (such as Darwinian anthropology). Derrida and the poststructuralists instead sought (like the Jews within Dada) to discredit threatening concepts by undermining the notion of objective truth underpinning all Western thought. Like the Dadaists, the poststructuralists decided, if you dislike the prevailing power, then strive to ruin its concepts. Dada used nonsense and absurdity to achieve this goal, while Derrida developed his methodology of deconstruction.

The cover of a 2005 Jewish hagiography of Derrida

Fostering subjective individualism

Despite the tactical differences, a Jewish ethno-political thread runs through Tzara’s Dada, Derrida’s deconstruction, and the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. Each attempted to foster subjective individualism to disconnect the non-Jewish masses from their familial, religious and ethnic bonds — thereby reducing the salience of the Jews as the prototypical outgroup, and thus weakening the anti-Semitic status quo within Western societies.

This attempt to foster radical individualism (at least among Europeans) through critiquing the logical basis of language was an explicitly stated goal of Dada, with the early leader of the movement Hugo Ball declaring that: “The destruction of the speech organs can be a means of self-discipline. When communications are broken, when all contact ceases, then estrangement and loneliness occur, and people sink back into themselves.”[xxviii] Dickerman notes how the Dadaists’ use of abstraction in the visual arts and language “work against structures of authority communicated through language” and that the Dadaist “assault on ‘language as a social order’ would counter sociality itself, producing instead a productive form of solipsism.” The Jewish Dadaist Hans Richter declared the abstract language of the Dadaists “beyond all national language frontiers,” and saw in Dadaist abstraction a new kind of communication “free from all kinds of nationalistic alliances.”[xxix]

The Jewish Dadaist painter Arthur Segal expressed a similar view, contending that “the compositional principle of equivalence is an attempt to abolish hierarchies so that dominant and subordinate forces would no longer exist.” Hockensmith points out that: “Abstraction thus provided Segal with a means of theorizing a world without authoritative force, one in which people and things would stand in free relation to one another.”[xxx] Tristan Tzara similarly affirmed that: “Dada proposed to liberate man from all servitude, whatever the origin, intellectual, moral, or religious.”[xxxi] This is precisely what Derrida attempted to do with deconstruction, where “All that remains thereafter is the subject who can choose what to think, what to feel and what to do, released from external constraints, and answerable to nothing and to no one.”[xxxii]

Walter Serner (Seligmann)

In his book The Jewish Derrida, Israeli academic Gideon Ofrat relates how in 1990 Derrida took part in a symposium in Turin, Italy, on the theme of “European Cultural Identity.”

Having imbibed into his very being the European culture in which he had been raised, the Algerian Jew now set about defining “Europeanism” by reference to the horrors of World War II and Nazism, and to a survey of the present day, with its “crimes of xenophobia, racism, anti-Semitism, religious or national fanaticism.” It was probably this archive that prompted Derrida to come up with his somewhat paradoxical definition of European cultural identity: “The characteristic of a culture is not to be identical with itself;” in other words, one’s cultural identity lies in separation from oneself. Moreover, a knowledge of your own cultural identity is contingent upon knowledge of the culture of the Other. … [Derrida is] simultaneously proposing a fundamental alteration in thinking about Europe, in terms of non-European Otherness. Europe will know itself as Europe if it advances toward that which it is not. … Here your identity lies in your own self-denial, in your death (in identity). Moreover, Derrida points out a basic contradiction between the pursuit of universality by European culture, and, by implication, the sense of exemplariness: an individual national arrogance, setting itself apart from the rest of the world. It is the contradiction between the message of values designated for the whole world, and one society’s claim to a monopoly of that gospel. Derrida puts forward a different concept: opening up Europe to Otherness, to the other, the aliens, as recognition of the Other culture and its adoption into society overall — possibly a proposal for the deconstruction of Europe, that is, a study of the Other root of the European essence, and its substitution by a pluralism of heterogeneity[xxxiii]

Clearly, deconstruction was a Jewish intellectual movement that was a post-Enlightenment (indeed postmodern) manifestation of Judaism as a group evolutionary strategy. Inevitably, as with the other Jewish intellectual movements discussed in Kevin MacDonald’s Culture of Critique, the solution to all social problems lies in convincing Europeans to commit racial, national and cultural suicide by embracing the Other through acceptance of racial and cultural diversity. All Jewish intellectual roads lead to mass third-world immigration and multiculturalism.

Also inevitably, as with the Frankfurt School, Derrida’s deconstructive scalpel is never turned on the Jews themselves, or Israel, who are always outside the culturally critical frame of reference. Thus the “pluralism of heterogeneity” is never recommended as a way of opening Israel to Otherness and thereby helping Jews to better understand their identity “by advancing to what they are not.” Why? Because the whole point of this intellectual exercise is to cook up specious, morally universalistic rationales of enough persuasive force to convince White people to become complicit in their own racial and cultural self-destruction — thereby furthering the unstated goal of eliminating European anti-Semitism and making the entire Western world safe for Jews.

Derrida’s exercise in Jewish ethno-politics was, of course, primarily concerned with deconstructing Western culture and the belief systems that had sustained European civilization in the past (e.g., Christianity, nationalism) and those which could be deployed to save it now and in the future, such as race realism and evolutionary theories of the ethnic basis of cultural conflict in the West. By contrast, the chauvinistic Jewish beliefs that have sustained Jewish societies and culture for millennia escaped Derrida’s deconstructive attack.

Regarding poststructuralism generally, Scruton notes that, from Foucault’s analysis of knowledge as ideology of power to the “deconstructive virus” released into the academic air by Derrida, “this culture of repudiation may present itself as ‘theory,’ in the manner of the critical theory of Horkheimer, Adorno, and Habermas, developing ponderous ‘methodologies’ with which to root out the secret meanings of cultural works, to expose their ideological pretensions, and to send them packing into the past.” Nevertheless, the aim of the poststructuralists “is not knowledge in the post-Enlightenment sense, but the destruction of the vessel in which unwanted knowledge has been contained.”[xxxiv]

Poststructuralism and deconstruction rapidly infested Western academia during the seventies and eighties, becoming stock approaches in literary criticism, the humanities and social sciences. This critical approach was presaged by the Dadaists who, in response to the First World War and the persistence of anti-Semitism, gradually morphed their movement into a disgust at rationalism as a defining feature of post-Enlightenment European culture. The Dadaists were keenly aware of the paradoxical nature of their revolt against logic and reason. Robert Wick notes how “self-contradictory phrases sprinkle themselves across the Dada manifestos — phrases which proclaim that everything is false, that Dada is nothing, that there is no ultimate truth, that everything is absurd, that everything is incoherent and that there is no logic. They are phrases that present themselves in the manifestos as being true, meaningful, coherent, and logical, while they deny all truth, meaning, coherence, and logic.”[xxxv] The Dadaists recognized that they were trapped inside a “double hermeneutic” in that they were compelled to use the forms of bourgeois society to mount a critique of that society. In an analogous way, Foucault and Derrida attempted to develop an “ontology of the present” that would enable them to “abstract” themselves from their cultural surroundings.

The paradoxical and self-invalidating nature of this endeavor did not, however, limit the immense influence that poststructuralism and deconstruction exerted. The logical flaw at the heart of the entire poststructuralist intellectual edifice is simply ignored—this being that same logical fallacy perpetrated by Nietzsche when he expressed the view that there are no truths, only interpretations. Either Nietzsche’s position is true—in which case it is not true, since there are no truths, or it is false. Derrida’s and Foucault’s central arguments amount to the same point made less brusquely, and while they presented their arguments in opaque pseudo-profound language to conceal the paradox, it nevertheless remains.

Foucault and Derrida owe their inflated intellectual reputations to their role in giving authority to the rejection of authority, and their absolute commitment to the impossibility of absolute commitments. Those who point out the obvious flaw in Foucault’s poststructuralist analysis of power and Derrida’s deconstructionist analysis of language — namely, that a rational critique assumes precisely what they put in question — are simply accused of aligning themselves with the oppressive, hegemonic forces of the Eurocentric bourgeois patriarchy through assuming the frame of reference that this group has normalized. Indeed, they are told that the very belief in neutral enquiries is not a neutral belief, but rather the expression of the hegemonic worldview most in need of deconstruction. There is, therefore, no position from which deconstruction can be critiqued. If there were such a vantage point, it would be founded on rational argument; but rationality itself has been deconstructed.

Deconstruction is therefore self-vindicating, and provides the culture of repudiation with its spiritual credentials, the proof that it is “not of this world” and comes in judgment upon it. Of course that subversive intention in no way forbids deconstruction from becoming an orthodoxy, the pillar of the new establishment, and the badge of conformity that the literary apparatchik must now wear. But in this it is no different from other subversive doctrines: Marxism, for example, Leninism and Maoism. Just as pop is rapidly becoming the official culture of the post-modern state, so is the culture of repudiation becoming the official culture of the post-modern university.[xxxvi]

In poststructuralism and deconstruction, the spirit of Dada extended far beyond what had been hoped for by its most messianic propagandists like Tristan Tzara and Walter Serner. For the British historian Paul Johnson: “Dada was pretentious, contemptuous, destructive, very chic, publicity-seeking and ultimately pointless.”[xxxvii] Johnson is wrong on the last score. Dada had far-reaching intellectual and cultural consequences — in revolutionizing art, undermining trust in the notion of objective truth, and in pioneering a vector of attack on Western civilization subsequently taken up by Jewish intellectual activists like Derrida.

Brenton Sanderson is the author of Battle Lines: Essays on Western Culture, Jewish Influence and Anti-Semitism, banned by Amazon, but available here.


[i] Robert J. Wicks, Modern French Philosophy: From Existentialism to Postmodernism (Oxford: Oneworld, 2007), 11.

[ii] Mark A. Pegrum, Challenging Modernity: Dada between Modern and Postmodern (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 269.

[iii] Richard Sheppard, Modernism-Dada-Postmodernism (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1999), 365.

[iv] Wicks, Modern French Philosophy: From Existentialism to Postmodernism, 9-10.

[v] Beitchman, I Am a Process with No Subject, 29.

[vi] Irwin Unger & Debi Unger, The Guggenheims — A Family History (New York: Harper Perennial, 2006), 354.

[vii] Short, Dada and Surrealism, 12.

[viii] Loredana Parmesani, Art of the Twentieth Century — Movements, Theories, Schools and Tendencies 1900-2000 (Milan: Skira, 1998), 36.

[ix] Richter, Dada. Art and Anti-art, 191.

[x] Dickerman, “Introduction & Zurich,” Leah Dickerman (Ed.) Dada, 33.

[xi] Godfrey, Conceptual Art, 44.

[xii] Short, Dada and Surrealism, 17.

[xiii] Roger Scruton, Modern Philosophy (London: Penguin, 1994), 478-9.

[xiv] Sheppard, Modernism-Dada-Postmodernism, 363.

[xv] Roger Poole, “Deconstruction,” Alan Bullock & Peter Trombley (Eds.) The New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought (London: HarperCollins, 2000), 203.

[xvi] Jacques Derrida, “Circumfession,” In Jacques Derrida, Ed. G. Bennington & Jacques Derrida, Trans. G. Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 170.

[xvii] Benjamin Ivry, “Sovereign or Beast?” Forward, December 1, 2010. https://forward.com/culture/133536/sovereign-or-beast/

[xviii] Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth‑Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Bloomington, IN: 1stbooks Library, 2001), 198.

[xix] Derrida, “Circumfession,” op. cit., 58)

[xx] Jacques Derrida, Points… Interviews, 1974-1994, Trans. P. Kamuf et al (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 120—21.

[xxi] J.D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1997), 231—2.

[xxii] Alfred Bodenheimer, “Dada Judaism: The Avant-Garde in First World War Zurich,” In: Gelber, Mark H. and Sjöberg, Sami. Jewish Aspects in Avant-Garde: Between Rebellion and Revelation, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110454956

[xxiii] Malcolm Haslam, The Real World of the Surrealists (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1978), 93.

[xxiv] Boime, ‘Dada’s Dark Secret,’ Washton-Long, Baigel & Heyd (Eds.) Jewish Dimensions in Modern Visual Culture: Anti-Semitism, Assimilation, Affirmation, 102.

[xxv] Benjamin Ivry, “Sovereign or Beast? Jacques Derrida and his Place in Modern Philosophy” (The Jewish Daily Forward, December 1, 2010.  http://www.forward.com/articles/133536/

[xxvi] Matthew Biro, The Dada Cyborg: Visions of the New Human in Weimar Berlin, (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 154.

[xxvii] Kevin MacDonald, The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth‑Century Intellectual and Political Movements (Bloomington, IN: 1stbooks Library, 2001), 205.

[xxviii] Dickerman, “Introduction & Zurich,” Leah Dickerman (Ed.) Dada, 29.

[xxix] Hockensmith, “Artists’ Biographies,” Leah Dickerman (Ed.) Dada, 482.

[xxx] Ibid., 486.

[xxxi] Codrescu, The Posthuman Dada Guide: tzara and lenin play chess, 176.

[xxxii] Scruton, Modern Philosophy, 479.

[xxxiii] Gideon Ofrat, The Jewish Derrida (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2001), 30-1.

[xxxiv] Roger Scruton, Culture Counts — Faith and Feeling in a World Besieged (New York: Encounter Books, 2007), 70.

[xxxv] Wicks, Modern French Philosophy: From Existentialism to Postmodernism, 10.

[xxxvi] Scruton, Modern Culture, 138.

[xxxvii] Paul Johnson, Art — A New History (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), 669.

 

Comment on ZMan’s blog: “Cofnas Versus MacDonald”

The ZMan wrote an interesting blog on the conflict between Cofnas and me. My comment:

I completely agree that Cofnas is a sophist who cares nothing for the truth and keeps making the same arguments while ignoring my counterarguments. But re group selection: My perspective is cultural group selection which is entirely in the mainstream of evolutionary thinking these days. It’s not important to get into how it works genetically. From my review of Joseph Henrich’s The WEIRDest People in the World:

Without mentioning cultural group selection, Henrich describes social norms as “arising directly from cultural learning and social interaction, that is via cultural evolution” (p. 69). Within the group, reputation is important; people with a bad reputation may be penalized, exiled, or even murdered — essentially acknowledging that human groups become, like a military unit, vehicles of selection because they are able to police group membership by expelling cheaters who accept the benefits of group membership without paying the costs. Groups with better norms, especially the ability to inculcate high levels of intragroup dependence and cooperation, are able to prosper by growing faster, and this has genetic consequences. “Wherever we look, from the Arctic to Australia, hunter-gatherer populations compete, and those with the best combinations of institutions and technologies expand and gradually replace or assimilate those with less effective cultural packages”; e.g., the Inuit replaced the “fragmented and isolated communities that had lived there for millennia” (p. 80). The relevance to the expansion of the West after 1500 is obvious.

This is my approach to Judaism, as presented in my first book, A People that Shall Dwell Alone: Judaism as a Group Evolutionary Strategy: The culture of ethnic separation, endogamy, dietary restrictions, promoting marriages of high IQ people, within-group altruism, enforcing penalties for Jews who violated community norms (which likely selected for ethnocentrism), etc. They developed a culture that had evolutionary advantages (at times Jewish population growth has far exceeded non-Jewish, as in 19th-century Russia; but, as the history of anti-Semitism shows, there are serious disadvantages as well). There are obviously genetic payoffs for groups with successful strategies, as Henrich’s comment shows. But Jews are also highly ethnocentric, as you seem to agree.

I rather doubt that my use of the word ‘strategy’ was a trigger. The first book got good reviews. What triggered people is that in The Culture of Critique I discussed conflicts of interest between Jews and Europeans over the construction of culture, Jews as a substantial part of the post-WWII elite in America, Jewish influence on culture, immigration, multiculturalism, etc. Anyone who takes a less than positive view of Jewish influence will certainly trigger a lot of people. And yes, Jewish cultural influence has been an evolutionary (genetic) disaster for European peoples.