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A Clown Called Chleo: Fetishism, Feminism and the Toxicity of TERFs

A puzzled patriarch. That was me in March 2025. To be specific, I was puzzled by a pervert. I read a headline and it didn’t compute: “Woman jailed for recording hundreds of men using the toilet in Aldi.” Huh? I thought. But women don’t do that kind of thing. When I clicked on the link and read the story, all became clear. As clear as Chleo, in fact:

A sex offender who secretly took nearly 800 pictures of men using the toilets in Aldi has been jailed. Chleo Sunter, 37, was caught with 790 pictures and 15 videos of men inside toilet cubicles and standing at urinals. She took the photos in the men’s loos at an Aldi supermarket, a shopping centre in Middlesbrough, and at Darlington Train Station between January and November 2023.

Sunter, previously known as John Leslie Graham, admitted to two counts of voyeurism at Teesside Crown Court. She also admitted six breaches of a sexual harm prevention order after she was found to be in possession of extreme pornographic images in 2014 when Sunter was named John Leslie Graham. Sunter was caught with the material when her sex offender manager turned up at her home in Thornaby, to check she was complying with the court order.

Photos and videos of victims using public conveniences near Middlesbrough’s Captain Cook Square shopping centre, at a Middlesbrough Aldi; and at Darlington station, were stored on her phone. Paul Newcombe, prosecuting, told the court: “Some of the males were stood at the urinals. Some were recorded under the cubicles.”

On a police visit in November 2023, Sunter wasn’t at home, but was found nearby. Police investigators found she had deleted 695 chats, 712 photos, and four videos from the gay dating app, Grindr, the court heard. Sunter has also been using her phone in incognito mode so that her internet history couldn’t be seen. She further breached the terms of the order by resetting her phone to factory settings.

Mitigating, John Nixon said Sunter has a history of alcohol abuse and “no longer has a phone or laptop with internet access.” Sunter’s barrister asked the judge to consider a court order instead of prison — as if imprisoned would mean she would lose her accommodation and face homelessness when released. Judge Geoffrey Marson said he was aware of Sunter’s mental health difficulties and “particular circumstances, but they have little, or no effect on the offences.” The judge jailed Sunter, of Avon Close, Thornaby, for 26 months, telling her that he accepted she is “emotionally vulnerable and custody will be difficult.” (“Woman jailed for recording hundreds of men using the toilet in Aldi,” Metro News, 22nd March 2025)

A clown called Chleo: the entirely and obviously male pervert “Chleo Sunter,” a.k.a. John Leslie Graham

The story wasn’t about a female fetishist, but about a male mini-clown, one of the multitude sprouting like mushrooms in the manure spread by the rulers of Clown World. The manure consists of lies like “Transwomen are women” and “Non-Whites enrich the West.” Both those lies are about breaking boundaries and enabling invasion. Clown World wants male perverts to invade female territory and non-White savages to invade White territory. Anyone who objects to the invasions is a hate-filled bigot, because although leftism preaches equality, it practises hierarchy. If you’re higher in the leftist hierarchy, like Blacks or “transwomen,” you can invade the territory of those who are lower in the leftist hierarchy, like Whites or real women. 

A cutie called Cleo: the attractive actress Amanda Barrie as Cleopatra is contrasted with Linda Bellos

As I pointed out in “Power to the Perverts!,” this leftist principle of “Preach Equality, Practise Hierarchy” has created an astonishing anomaly: some straight White men have risen far above a Black-Jewish lesbian in the eyes of Clown World. But it’s not an anomaly when you look at it right. Doing that, you’ll see that it’s in perfect accordance with the rules of Clown World and the principles of leftism. The Black-Jewish lesbian in question is called Linda Bellos (born 1950) and she’s a TERF or Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminist. In other words, she correctly denies that men can become women. That’s a very bad thing to do in the eyes of Clown World, which celebrates lies, not truth. As a Marxist feminist, Bellow has always promoted some leftist lies: that men and women are identical in their intellects and abilities; that women will benefit from having complete control over their own lives; that beautiful and useful words like “actress,” “poetess,” and “heroine” are best abandoned in favor of uniforming unisex words like “actor,” “poet,” and “hero.”

Context cancels clam-diver

But she has refused to accept the giant leftist lie of “transgenderism.” And so her hybrid heritage and committed clam-diving now count for nothing when she enters a dispute with perverted White men who claim to be women and who habitually threaten real women with rape, mutilation and murder. Suddenly, she’s the hater and they’re the heroes. How could this happen? Doesn’t leftism automatically grant power and privilege to Black women over White men? In fact, no, it doesn’t. Not automatically. Instead, leftism grants power and privilege according to context. The fixed principle of leftism is to champion the unnatural, abnormal and ugly. And that’s why Bellos did so well for most of her life. In the 1980s, she rose to power and fame as the leader of a radical left-wing council in London. In the early 2000s, she began to shovel in the shekels, telling the Guardian that “I get paid a lot of money giving advice” through “her own consultancy on equality and diversity.” The newspaper noted that “On matters such as rape, policing and diversity, opinion has come round to her way of thinking.”

Hero of Clown World #1: one of the perverted and narcissistic “transwomen” who threaten real women with rape, mutilation and murder

Hero of Clown World #2: a leftist male who wants to see “all Republican women” “gang-raped on national television” (see video)

The context in which Bellos did so well was that of opposition to the straight White majority and its interests. Her Blackness and lesbianism were suitably unnatural and abnormal in that context. But then the context shifted and Bellos came up against a group that was even more unnatural, abnormal and ugly than she was, namely, male perverts who claimed to be women. Naturally — or unnaturally — enough, leftism sided with the male perverts, not the Black lesbian. Indeed, Blackness is a perfectly natural category in the right context, that of Africa. It only becomes unnatural and abnormal outside Africa, which is precisely why Clown World wants Blacks to leave Africa and invade the West. That’s where their lower average intelligence and higher average criminality, which are natural to Blacks in Africa, can harm and subvert Whites and White society.

Lesbianism too is in some sense natural. It only becomes unnatural and abnormal when it’s celebrated and when lesbians are allowed power or leadership among other women. That’s when they can act on their resentment of men and harm the interests of straight women, whose psychology and tastes they don’t share. And something else about lesbians has contributed to leftism shifting its allegiance from muff-munchers to patriarchal perverts. As I pointed out in “Dykes Are Dull! Why Lesbians Lose to Translunacy,” real lesbians are boring. And particularly so by comparison with “transwomen,” who continually quench the adolescent leftist thirst for stimulation and sensation. When has a lesbian ever hit the headlines as abnormally and entertainingly as that clown called Chleo?

We’re all obscurantists now: how the media class copes with democratic loss

In the UK, legions of Labour supporters are realising that their party is hardly different in government to the previous Conservative administration. Guardian writers and below-the-line comments initially blamed the penny-pinching policies of Keir Starmer and Rachel Reeves on the ‘black hole’ left by the Tories (and Brexit, of course). But as the swingeing cuts continue, and Labour takes from the poor to give to the rich, discontent is rising.

Welcome, Labour followers, to the reality that Conservative voters have experienced since 2010. The dichotomy of Left and Right, which originated in the French national assembly of the late 18th century (nobility sitting on the right and revolutionaries on the left) seems irrelevant to the party in power. The only difference is in presentation: Labour pretends to serve one side while the Conservatives pretend to support the other. Did Cameron, May or Johnson stem the tides of immigration, Green and Woke? No – but they made the right noises to fool the electorate. The establishment wants us to keep the faith in a political pantomime.

The old divide is becoming unsustainable, despite mainstream media efforts. In the latest Atlantic monthly magazine, Anne Applebaum tries to explain what ‘far right’ means in context of Donald Trump’s return of to the White House. How could former Democrats Tulsi Gabbard and Robert F Kennedy Jr. serve a man that the likes of the Atlantic and Washington Post had deemed fascist?

Applebaum is starting to get it, but her prejudices prevent her from really understanding why the Left / Right paradigm is becoming meaningless. She focuses entirely on supposedly problematic ‘populism’, failing to consider how conventional political parties have abandoned the ordinary people to become like the nobility of revolutionary France.

Confusing for Applebaum is the phenomenon of politicians of the Right pursuing causes associated with the Left. She cannot believe that the likes of Trump and Viktor Orban really care about the common people; instead, she sees demagogues exploiting economic and cultural woes in a rapidly changing world. They are conmen, pretending to help the poor while building an oligarchy: –

This rising international elite is creating a society in which superstition defeats reason and logic, transparency vanishes, and the nefarious actions of political leaders are obscured behind a cloud of nonsense and distraction. There are no checks and balances in a world where only charisma matters, no rule of a law in a world where emotion defeats reason — only a void that anyone with a shocking and compelling story can fill.

She has a new word for the Right: ‘obscurantism’. The movement led by Trump and other figures manifests in a nebulous spiritualism, nativist narratives, and covid and climate change denial. The trajectory Applebaum describes is from Enlightenment values to darkness, through cultivation of fear. Ironically, she believes that humanity should be very afraid of viruses and a purported climate emergency, while most Trump voters simply want more freedom and less government, especially government that massively subsidises the left. It’s the establishment that has cultivated fear, from nuclear Armageddon to ‘global boiling’.

I first read Applebaum’s neocon missives two decades ago when I subscribed to the new magazine Standpoint, which I naively regarded as an antidote to subversive identity politics. Like neocons generally, Applebaum was obsessively concerned about Russia, which under Vladimir Putin was a counterweight to the Western-driven new world order emerging after the fall of communism.

Today, such rhetoric is normalised. But Applebaum knows that so-called populists in the West do not see Russia as our enemy or believe that Putin wants to invade Europe. Instead they see NATO and the EU as the warmongers, while the biggest threat to civilians in Western countries is not Putin but their own governments (as JD Vance remarked in his address to a security conference in Munich).

The Right, Applebaum asserts, has abandoned conservatism and caution for a wrecking ball. Democratic institutions are at risk. Again displaying lack of insight, she began her article with a scathing account of the Romanian presidential candidate Calin Georgescu, who was arrested and barred from standing after his first-round election win was annulled. The reason given was supposed Russian influence on TikTok, but it was foreign interference by the EU and globalists that cancelled the election and its likely winner.  Some democracy there, Anne!  Meanwhile Orban has ‘impoverished his country’, she claims, ignoring the EU clamouring for punishment because of the Hungarian government’s legitimate policies.

Applebaum has a litany of slurs for anyone patriotic or traditionalist: law-breakers, thieves, misogynists. And, of course — conspiracy theorists. The latter should be worn as a badge of honour nowadays, because undoubtedly there is a global conspiracy to undermine sovereignty and install an oppressive technocracy. Wild conjecture may abound, but that does not invalidate the obvious truth, as blatantly stated by the World Economic Forum.

She gets something right, by stating that ‘techno-optimism has given way to techno-pessimism, a fear that technology controls us in ways we can’t understand’. But who is controlling this technology? And why is the internet, initially liberating, now used for surveillance and censorship? Populists are not the powerful clinging to the status quo.

Applebaum scoffs at a mystical belief in the ‘deep state’ as a dark force taking humanity in a dystopian direction. Anyone remotely paying attention to politics in the West realises the deep state is a horrifying reality.

The problem with pro-establishment concepts of public opinion and politics is that the disfavoured side is labelled not with its own identification but by smears. ‘Far-right’ is not how most conservative patriots would describe themselves. But this term is used so excessively that libertarians and even socialists have been caught in the net, if they commit heresy against the climate cult or doubt the safety and efficacy of vaccines.

The Right / Left construct is a divide-and-rule strategy that we must overcome if we are to build a unified resistance to the globalist agenda. Applebaum, for all her verbosity, is a useful idiot for the predatory elite. Or more likely, she realises that as an entirely kosher, card-carrying member of the predatory elite, she is quite aware of where her ethnic, social, and economic interests lie: Definitely not with populism.

News from Nowhere: HOPE Not Hate’s 2025 Report

HOPE Not Hate (HNH) are a British organization monitoring and reporting on what is described in the UK as the “far Right”. They are the British equivalent of America’s Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) and fulfil a similar function, that of unofficial government adviser. That may well change for the SPLC under President Trump, but HNH are quite safe with the Starmer government in Britain as they are on-message. For the left, since they have created a totally dysfunctional society, it can only be about hope — the ever-elusive goal of a multi-ethnic utopia that is just around the corner if we could only destroy and de-legitimize White people’s interests.

In fact, they could be said to produce a large part of the message. HNH produce an annual report entitled State of Hate (SoH), and the 2025 edition has just been published. With an 11-strong production team and solid funding, SoH is lavish and exhaustively researched. It can be downloaded, but is also available in glossy magazine form. It might make a nice coffee-table ornament, an office I’m sure it will perform in parts of north London.

As a serious journalistic source, should you happen to be writing about the British far Right, SoH is first-rate. But all it really is in essence is an almanac with a very disapproving tone. The allegations are largely petty indiscretions, the “problematic rhetoric” is very often just facts unpalatable to the Left, and simply appending the phrase “far-Right” to anyone of whom you disapprove is an ideological parlour-game Orwell exposed in 1946 in Politics and the English Language.

Also, when people whine about “rhetoric”, it’s likely that they have never read Aristotle’s ars rhetorica in their intellectually sheltered lives, this being too classical and therefore too White for them. But these midwits are more powerful than one might think, and are taken extremely seriously by those who fund them. Then again, so are many writers of fiction.

Like the SPLC in the US, HNH are not officially the government’s advisers, and Starmer would rather keep things as they are. That way, HNH are deniable should they do anything too crass, which they almost did last summer. At the height of the rioting following the attack in Southport in which three young girls were butchered, HNH CEO Nick Lowles posted on X that a Muslima had had acid thrown in her face. This was simply untrue and, viewed in context, with a number of volatile situations in progress and armed Muslims taking to the streets, incredibly irresponsible. HNH were fortunate that no charges were pressed. Fortunate, or something else.

Their status as a NGO (Non-Governmental Organization) notwithstanding, HNH seem to derive a fair portion of their funding directly from governmental sources—as DOGE is finding out in the U.S. The London Mayor’s Office, under the long reign of Muslim Mayor Sadiq Khan, gave money to HNH in 2019, and under the previous supposedly conservative government, HNH sent paid advisers to the Home Office to lecture its staff about extremism.

But SoH is its central pillar, and it is worth remembering that all of the various characters who appear in the 140 pages of the report have one thing in common, in the opinion of HNH; they hate. They are “haters”. Hatred is their natural habitat. Hating, of course, is what children do. “I hate you, Mummy!” It is also what ethnic adversaries do, and perhaps ethnicity is the greatest driver of genuine hatred, rather than that confected by HNH. In SoH, of course, the word “hatred” and its cognates are just stage props in a production as theatrical as it is ideological. The word “hate” itself is carefully manipulated by HNH, although hatred is an emotion understood by all. One thinks of the Messerschmitt busts which show hatred and other disagreeable emotions. This is how HOPE Not Hate wish us to be pictured in the mind’s eye of the great British public. So, let the hatred begin.

The report’s cover features two of HNH’s bêtes noires, Nigel Farage and Tommy Robinson, the leader of the rapidly rising Reform UK, and effectively a political prisoner respectively. As always, they both have large sections of SoH dedicated to them.

Robinson having been in prison for some time, there is not much to report on him (absent the fact that the deep state is trying to kill him in jail, which HNH are unlikely to mention). Thus, being something of a veteran of these reports, I detect a fair bit of cut-and-paste in the production of SoH 2025. But, as noted, it is exhaustive, and the updates maintain the illusion of what I called the “Pepper’s Ghost” of the British far Right, here at The Occidental Observer three years ago. Not much has changed.

HNH’s mission statement accompanies a request for donations:

“We take on and defeat nazis.

Will you step up with a donation to ensure we can keep fighting the far right?”

This is an old advertising technique as well as more evidence of the little-league neuro-linguistic programming (NLP) which infects every ward of the Leftist sanitorium. Association, verbal or typographical, is a device the Left use consistently, and they like to link certain familiar images in the minds of their followers. Nazis, far-Right, fascists, radical Right; these smear-phrases must be kept in circulation, melding and conflating into one single meaning.

As the report progresses, certain phrases recur. Axel Rudakubana, the Southport killer whose crime sparked last year’s riots in England, is mentioned three times in the first 12 pages of SoH, each time with a variation on this theme:

“We are also seeing rising numbers of young men who through ideologically fluid means — picking elements of different and even contradictory ideologies — are drawn together through a desire to commit extreme violence. The Southport killer fitted this mould…”  (p. 6)

Decoded, this means that Rudakubana’s being a Muslim was, if anything, a very minor and insignificant factor in his murdering three small girls. The way HNH work is by association, whether it exists or not.

Because of this methodological need to make links in a chain, HNH particularly like structure. This is from Lowles’ editorial introduction to SoH:

[The Southport riots] were primarily a product of the ‘post-organisational’ far right. Most of the disturbances were planned organically, often by local people unaligned to any formal organisation, but who were plugged into decentralised far-right networks online. (p. 12).

Unless cretinism is either a condition you actually suffer from, or the hobby it seems to be for many on the Left, this is nonsense on stilts. What does, what can, “post-organizational” actually mean? What are “decentralized far-Right networks”? If those of us on the political Right don’t know it yet, much of our battle takes place on the terrain of language, and the ex cathedra terminology of Critical Race Theory has allowed the Left to exercise their apparent right to use language as though it were malleable and has meaning only as subject to the requirements of the user.

HNH have their own lexicon, and it is every bit as semantically fluid as one would expect:

We use the term ‘trigger events’ to describe incidents that generate large-scale reactions. These reactions spread beyond the individuals involved in the event to those in the in-group attacking the out-group: what some social psychologists call ‘vicarious retribution’.  In the case of anti-migrant hatred, trigger events are most commonly crimes committed or alleged to have been committed by people of migrant backgrounds. (p. 84).

The Southport killings are thus reduced to the status of a simple causative formula rather than the massacre of White girls by a second-generation immigrant. Language is once again co-opted in order to smear perfectly understandable reactions to horrors which are becoming increasingly commonplace across Europe.

Language is also key to the self-damning of its “far-Right” users, although the bar is set low enough to challenge the doughtiest limbo-dancer, and is not confined to political pariahs:

But crucially, this [language] is not only confined to Reform or Conservative politicians. Although far less common and extreme, Labour have at times dipped their toes in this rhetoric. In 2007 Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown announced a ‘British jobs for British workers’ policy, which many viewed as nativist and contrary to anti-discrimination laws. (p. 24).

As for the cast of this stage-play, hell is empty and all the devils are here. Farage and Reform UK, Elon Musk (despite not being British), Andrew Tate, GB News, Patriotic Alternative; the gang’s all here. But there are some new faces in this hall of shame.

One of the high-profile media arrivistes in this year’s SoH is Professor Matt Goodwin. He is a Jewish professional statistician with an academic background, articulate and forthright, and has found himself a target for HNH:

He [Matt Goodwin]… emphasised that the Cardiff-born murderer [Rudakubana] was ‘the son of immigrants from Rwanda’, in a clear attempt to frame the horrifying attack as a result of immigration. (p. 46).

The attacks were a result of immigration, literally and de facto, but HNH are not going to let facts stand in the way of a good story.

Goodwin merits four pages and has, it seems, been “radicalized”, another word which has been requisitioned and genetically modified by HNH. The word is immediately associated with Islamic terrorism, and HNH know this perfectly well. Thus, an equivalence is set up between a mild-mannered academic and a screaming jihadi with machete or backpack-bomb.

HNH are not entirely politically illiterate, and make the occasional astute observation. The endorsement made by Laura Loomer and Steve Bannon of Tommy Robinson’s “Unite the Kingdom” rallies in London (successful, well attended, and entirely peaceful so far, and with another planned for September) has something of an internal problem:

While Bannon and Loomer’s presence will undoubtedly excite Lennon’s [Robinson’s real name] supporters, one person who will not be impressed is Elon Musk. Bannon and Loomer have nothing but contempt for the billionaire and have been leading the MAGA campaign against his influence. (p. 43).

Musk has previously helped fund Robinson’s legal team, and HNH have correctly pointed out a potential cause of future conflict.

In the quaintly named “Rogues Gallery” section of SoH, we see all 23 White human oddities convicted last year for terrorist offences. Many of these miscreants were jailed, at least partly, for offences concerning terrorist literature. This is another flexible category, despite being defined in the UK Terrorism Act 2006:

Section 2 makes it an offence to distribute a terrorist publication with the intention of encouraging acts of terrorism. A terrorist publication is one which could be useful to a person in the commission or preparation of acts of terror, and the maximum sentence in respect of this offence is 15 years’ imprisonment.

These “terrorist publications” could be The Anarchist’s Cookbook (and often is), or it could be The Turner Diaries.

It is a racing certainty that, should you be White and in possession of proscribed literature, you will go to jail. But UK Counter Terrorism Police arrested 248 people under terrorism laws last year, including those involved in three “late stage” attacks. Who were the other 225 not mentioned in HNH’s report? From SoH:

The offences of those who were arrested range from suspicion of possessing a firearm, to those who have allegedly shared terrorist material online, and to those who were thought to be preparing acts of terrorism. (p. 68).

The faces in the Rogues Gallery speak of snake-eye genes and sub-85 IQs, but HNH are determined that these dropouts be seen as representing the vanguard of a wave of terror which could break over the righteous at any moment.

Race science is also in HNH’s crosshairs, and Edward Dutton —  of this parish — makes an appearance, something which is becoming a badge of honor for those questioning the narrative, like a duelling scar at an old German public school. HNH only recognize state-endorsed science.

If HNH’s portrait of the British far Right is in any way accurate, then what a diverse bunch they are. Odinists rub shoulders with Conservative Woman magazine. Bubbly feminist Posie Parker mingles with the skinheads of Blood & Honour (who haven’t actually existed for some time, although no one seems to have told HNH). Affable, elderly YouTuber Simon Webb, of the channel History Debunked, shares the limelight with the UVF. That’s right. This extraordinary document actually finishes its inventory of far-Right organizations with the Ulster Volunteer Force. Strange times.

I can’t recommend SoH 2025 highly enough, and for two reasons. Firstly, and as noted, it is an exhaustive inventory of anyone in the UK even vaguely to the right of Mao Zedong. If you want new pen-pals on the British political Right, this is effectively one of those old-fashioned telephone directories. I shall certainly be contacting some of the groups who have merited inclusion since SoH 2024, with a view to interviews. Thank you for the contact list, HNH.

Secondly, this document is an extraordinary snapshot — like one of those MSI brain-scans — of the pathology of the British Left and, by extension, all Westerners of that persuasion. I hope that those readers who actually know a fair bit about psychology will forgive me, but I can’t resist a bit of a layman’s prognosis. I think Lowles and most of his crew (although I would bet not all) know perfectly well that SoH 2025 is a Potemkin Village. The frontage is impressively and meticulously decorated, but there is nothing behind it. Lowles is a snake-oil salesman, a used-car dealer who understands the importance to profit of counterfeit parts and the necessity of occasionally filing the number off an engine-block. HNH is a laboratory in which is produced controlled cognitive dissonance. It is also, to use a term taken up by those who understand the mechanics of the race industry, a grift.

The best grift I ever saw was 40 years ago on Guy Fawkes’ Night (aka Bonfire Night) at a crowded railway station in England. It was traditional when I was a boy to make a dummy of Guido Fawkes, the man who attempted to blow up the Houses of Parliament in 1605, and often wryly known as “the only man to enter Parliament with honest intentions”. Boys would stuff old shirts and Dad’s work trousers with rags, make a papier maché head, and toddle off to the town centre to cry “Penny for the Guy!” in the hope that passers-by would throw them a few coppers for their artistic efforts. The boys at this bustling Brighton station full of commuters returning home from work in London were doing just that, but when they asked me for money, I asked them something which was troubling me:

“Where’s the Guy?”

They looked at me with feral distrust and sloped off to ply their trade elsewhere. There was, of course, no Guy, but people still gave them money without bothering to seek out the famous effigy. This is a perfect metaphor for HNH and SoH. It is also (to me) a nice irony that the website doing much to expose HNH’s troubles is the notorious Westminster insider Guido Fawkes.

As a source of juvenile revenue, a penny for the Guy has rather dried up now, as Bonfire Night is one of several celebrations smothered by the British version of the deep state (far too many White people enjoy, or used to enjoy, the fireworks and celebrations). But HNH are also seeing a bit of a dip in their revenue stream. Their last financial report shows that they took in £417,000 last year, compared with £715,000 the previous year, and over £1 million the year before that. It will be of interest to see the next figure in the wake of the forensic accounting President Trump’s Department of Governmental Efficiency (DOGE) is carrying out, and we perhaps discover that some of USAID’s money was finding its way across the Atlantic. In terms of HNH’s status as an employer, in place of their previous long-term contracts for employees and interns, they are increasingly offering contractual terms as short as four months.

So, another year, another SoH report. But how long can HNH and Nick Lowles maintain the illusion? And, if the grift is done, who will save us from the imaginary monsters of the British far Right?

Decadence, the Corruption of Status Hierarchies, & Female Hypergamy: A Response to Rob Henderson’s Article “All the Single Ladies” – Part 2

Go to Part 1.

My Response Part Two: The Effect of Corrupt Status Hierarchies on Female Hypergamy

I could go on at much greater length denouncing the absurd, grotesque, surreal levels of corruption plaguing Western institutions of higher learning, but I bite my tongue to return to the point from which we set out, viz., Rob Henderson’s article “All the Single Ladies” and its touching portrayal of the loneliness of contemporary women who cannot find sufficiently educated men.

These sound like extraordinary ladies, and quite unlike any I ever knew or dated. Do they find men’s stock of knowledge and ideas insufficient to stimulate their own constantly buzzing intellects? Have male minds not been honed to enough razor sharpness to spot logical fallacies a mile off? Do the lady’s suitors have an insufficient appreciation of the fundamental principles upon which Western Civilization is based? Might an ability to parse Cicero help? How about solving differential equations, or explaining competing theories about why the industrial revolution occurred at the place and time it did? The poor fellows are certainly going to have to bone up before they can hope to become worthy of such exalted female minds!

Coming back down to earth, it is obvious Henderson is using the term “education” not in its proper sense—relating to the genuine practice of higher education—but with exclusive reference to contemporary institutions of “education.” And these are scandalously corrupt. The young women are “educated” only in the sense that they have demonstrated proficiency at negotiating a credentialing process that serves to protect a status hierarchy that has lost all mooring to the practice of higher education universities were originally meant to foster and promote. Those best able to rise within such a hierarchy turn out to be idle young women adept at chattering about olfactory oppression. (Competent women scholars obviously exist, but any survey of the contemporary academy would surely reveal that the remaining serious scholars are disproportionately male while the fakes are disproportionately female.)

Most of the noncollege young men these women despise—the 84 percent who are employed, in any case—do not engage in such chatter because they are too busy fixing leaks, delivering cargo on time, stringing electrical wire, repairing engines, hurrying to accident sites, putting out fires, preventing dusky barbarians from cutting our throats, bringing life-sustaining foods to market, and generally keeping the world around us running. They are operating competently toward the lower end of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, as most men have had to do throughout history. And they are the only reason Western Civilization has not already collapsed entirely. The travesties of scholarship produced within the contemporary academy, by contrast, never benefit anyone apart from the mandarins who produce them. It is simply obvious that an electrician, carpenter, or auto mechanic is more valuable to the world than an olfactory racism “scholar.”

Why are women more successful than men at climbing today’s corrupt academic status ladder? In considerable part for the same reason they are better at knitting sweaters: they have a higher tolerance for monotonous, repetitive work of a sedentary kind. To spend his peak physical years culling examples of olfactory racism from the novels of Virginia Woolf and then—worse—to compose a long, formal dissertation on the subject would amount to positive torture for many young men, something I think does our sex credit. I myself had difficulty with restlessness in graduate school, which I dealt with through long walks and other physical exercise. I kept slogging away at the academic task because I was fascinated by big, serious, consequential philosophical ideas. But I could never have done the same for the sake of most of what gets “studied” in the contemporary academy.

Dutton mentions the probability that our newly minted olfactory racism scholarette has received public funding. Again, the particular case hardly matters—the point is that most young women in the academy benefit from such funding. This means working men have had a portion of their earnings confiscated to allow her to peruse Virgina Woolf novels and grind out empty verbiage about oppression. It is a crying injustice that should not be tolerated one minute longer. Yet in return for such support, the young lady looks down her snout at the men funding her! They are simply not “educated” enough to be worthy of her consideration.

What explains such women’s limitless faith in the objective validity of academic credentials? In part, their own mediocre intelligence and the limits precisely of their education in the authentic sense. Learning and acquired mental acuity are goods difficult to appreciate except by those who already have them in significant measure themselves. It is hard to judge uphill on education because people by definition cannot know what they do not know. Dull and untrained minds cannot have a proper sense of what they are lacking. All they can judge by is externalities—such as academic credentials. Any fool can see a degree hanging on someone’s wall in a way he cannot so easily see the benefit a gifted mind has derived from, for example, extended immersion in the Latin classics. Hence we find women in the tragicomic situation Henderson describes: lonely and miserable even as they reject legions of men on the basis of meaningless credentials. And we are asked to believe they do so because they value education. I feel myself crashing into the limits of the English language’s capacity for expressing contempt.

The relation of the genuine life of the mind to today’s corrupt academy might be illuminated by comparison with the ancient Christian doctrine of the church invisible. Christians believe the church derives from God himself, yet this presents an obvious problem. God is perfect, while the church is made up entirely of imperfect, sinful men (wise theologians admit that ecclesia semper reformanda – “the church is always in need of reform”). The explanation of this apparent paradox is found in the distinction between the church visible and the church invisible. Normally when men refer to the church, they have the everyday, visible church in mind. But this human institution is less important than the true, invisible church responsible for the work of salvation, and whose composition is known to God alone. The invisible church somehow exists within the visible, but is never identical to it. Obviously, the decay of genuine learning within a corrupt academy is analogous to a near-throttling of the invisible church by the visible.

If you give an uneducated (in the proper sense) person an educational credential, he—or more to the point, she—will accept it unquestioningly as a proof of her own real accomplishment. Dutton reports that the young olfactory racism expert weathered the storm of public scorn directed at her successfully. He even quotes her as saying, “I’m fine, I’m quite pleased that I’ve upset these basement-dwelling incels.” It does not occur to her that the incels may only be incels because thousands of academic spinsters like herself are ludicrously deluded as to the value of their own attainments.

In short, the corruption of our educational institutions has produced a status-mirage that women are unable to see through, one which condemns both themselves and men to childlessness—though not necessarily depriving the women of polygynous sex with men above them in the outward status hierarchy.

In addition to the mediocrity of their minds and the modesty of their attainments, women in the academy may have difficulty seeing through the corrupt status hierarchies in which they are enmeshed simply because they are women. As I wrote in a recent essay, the sex generally consists of “impressionable conformists with a powerful need for social approval.” Status hierarchies are produced by men, as Napoleon knew (“Les femmes n’ont pas de rang”). Women rarely consider them critically; they accept them as given, and all their instincts concerning the “attractiveness” of men operate downstream from there. If a society is healthy, its status hierarchy embodies sound values, and female hypergamy functions as a spur to worthwhile male achievement. If a society is sick—we get what we see in Henderson’s article.

A Valuable Historical and Literary Parallel

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote a wonderful story reflecting how an impressionable female mind functions within a different sick society marked by an equally distorted educational status hierarchy: early Soviet Russia. It is called Nastenka, and can be found in English translation in the collection Apricot Jam (the relevant narrative begins on p. 91). The story presents numerous suggestive analogies with the decadence and corruption of the contemporary West as described in this essay. Let us have a look.

Just before the revolution, Nastenka enrolls in “a classical high school, one of the best in Moscow.” It survives unchanged well into the 1920s because at that period the Bolsheviks have more pressing matters than educational policy to worry about. The young heroine becomes fascinated with the imaginative literature of the nineteenth century. “It was an entire, enormous, organic world, more vivid than the reality that flowed around her.” At first, she simply enjoys the direct experience of reading, but gradually her teacher, a cultivated lady who received her education under the old regime, reveals to her the possibility of going deeper:

She learned to look at books in a new way—not just to live with the characters, but to live constantly with the author. How did he regard his characters? Was he the sole master of their lives, or where they independent of them? How did he organize this scene or that, and what words and phrases did he use in doing so?

Gradually Nastenka conceives the ambition of sharing her love of literature with the rising generation by becoming a teacher.

At age sixteen, one year before graduation, her family moves and she is thrust into an unfamiliar environment. At her new school “she couldn’t recognize the literature of the past in what was now being laid out before her in lectures.”

Though they did acknowledge, in passing, the musicality of Pushkin’s poetry (but never mentioned the transparent clarity of his perception of the world), they insistently pointed out that he expressed the mindset and ideology of the mid-level landowners during the incipient crisis of Russian feudalism. [The playwright] Ostrovsky reflected the decay of the feudal, serf-owning system and its displacement by developing industrial capitalism.

Nastenka pores over the new Soviet literature textbook produced by some communist ideologue named Kogan, where she learns how “all these Onegins and Bolkonskys” (characters in Pushkin and Tolstoy respectively) are our class enemies. She quietly thinks: “That may be so, yet they certainly knew how to love in those days!” But she cannot bring herself to question the overall validity of what she is being taught: “There was no way to maintain a sustained argument against Kogan. He couldn’t have constructed all these many things on utter nonsense. Surely there was a genuine historical and social basis for them? . . . Surely they weren’t built on thin air?” She begins to feel a mixture of confusion and boredom that contrasts sharply with the enthusiasm for literature that initially inspired her choice of career.

Her boredom vanishes temporarily when she meets a charismatic young man named Shurik, overflowing with ideas that he expresses with extreme confidence. As we all know, women love confident men: “How did Shurik know all these things? When had he found the time to soak it all up?” The reader quickly perceives—although Nastenka herself never does—the reason for Shurik’s self-assurance. He is a communist militant who follows the party line unswervingly. He knows exactly what he is supposed to say about everything under the sun. Nastenka drinks up his every word, and a romance begins. But soon he is pressing her to consummate the relationship, and something inside her tells her that, at the very least, it is not yet time. Concerning early Soviet manhood in general, she reflects: “None of them could understand the slow, gradual development of feelings.”

So Shurik breaks off with her and demonstratively ignores her for the rest of the time they are in class together. Soon he is called to Moscow and a no doubt successful rise within the official status hierarchy of the Soviet literary world. Nastenka is left broken-hearted. The reader understands—as she herself does not—that she has barely avoided a spiritual landmine.

Time passes and Nastenka, now addressed at Anastasia Dmitrievna, is put in charge of a class: “At long last, her dream had come true [and] she could pour into [her students’] heads all the things she had preserved from this great and good literature” (as well as “make sure these little boys become decent men, not like the ones today”).

One day she is handed a new literature textbook meant to guide her own teaching. In it a major Soviet author is quoted as stating: “It is entirely natural that workers’ and peasants’ power is crushing its enemies like lice.” She wonders, “How could you possibly present that to the children?” Yet this writer is “a Russian classic, and an authority respected across the globe, so how could your wretched little mind challenge him?”

By this time the Soviet curriculum is tightly controlled. She makes the best of things, teaching “all these production and Five-Year Plan works with the same dedication that she felt to her own sacred cause of literature.” On her own time, however, she organizes an after-school literary circle for a dozen or so of her best students where she “takes them through the best of the nineteenth century, things that weren’t included on the syllabus.” But word gets out and she is ordered to stop. “Enough harping on the classics! It distracts the students from life.”

Nastenka’s fate is the tragedy of a promising young female mind stunted due to an inability to trust its own healthy instincts and question what it receives from a corrupt authority. She senses the gulf separating the great literature she learned to love in her youth from the Marxist rubbish she is forced to impart, but never breaks through to clear insight about her situation. Perhaps most fascinatingly, she dimly perceives that this cultural decline bears some relation to the contrast between the men of her own time who insist on getting straight down to business with women and the Onegins and Bolkonskys who “certainly knew how to love in those days.”

So in general, as I said, women accept the authorities and status hierarchies that they find in place. This is probably because authority and status are essentially male concerns. Les femmes n’ont pas de rang—women are never going to tear down corrupt hierarchies for us, nor is it reasonable for men to blame them for being as nature made them. Their sexual instincts will function properly again once we have replaced rotten hierarchies with sound ones in better accord with the nature of things and a proper sense of values. When we do, we shall never again have female olfactory racism scholarettes turning up their noses at hardworking men.

What, Then, Must We Do?

Some years ago I came across an amusing article about a fire breaking out in an office building. What was amusing was the reaction of the female employees. Firemen, as everyone knows, do not enjoy the very highest status within our society, despite the dangerous and life-saving nature of their work. But every dog has its day, and even firemen come into their own when a fire breaks out. Under such circumstances, there is no time for discussion or persuasion. Everyone who knows what’s good for him must do exactly as the firemen direct, including the corporate CEO. You do not give firemen any backtalk while a fire is raging. For a brief moment, they are at the top of the status hierarchy.

Well, these corporate “career girls” were practically swooning. Once out of the building and in safety, they began marveling to one another how manly those guys were. This was virility the likes of which they had never known. It was the first time in their whole lonely, miserable lives that any man had put them in their place, and they were simply beside themselves. It was better than Love’s Sweet Fury.

It would be interesting to know whether any of these women went on the internet afterwards to seek dates with firemen. I doubt it. Most firemen are not terribly “educated,” and often earn less than the ass-sitting female paper-pushers they rescue. Perhaps if women had to spend several post-pubertal years being continually rescued from burning buildings, we could foster a baby-boom. Instead, of course, America’s fire departments are busy replacing firemen with firewomen. (When a large part of Los Angeles recently burned down, it emerged that the three persons in charge of the fire department were all lesbians.) So those rescued women probably went back to their sterile lives as soon as the building reopened. What a pity.

So what can we do? It is tempting to say we must raise the status of young men. But the solution to the problem described in Henderson’s article is surely not for policemen, farmers, and plumbers to get post-doctoral fellowships in feminist theory. If we cannot make female hypergamy function correctly once again by raising the status of men, all that remains is . . . to lower that of women. In effect, this is what briefly occurred in that burning office building. And the women just loved it.

Feminists, like broken clocks giving the right time twice a day, have described how women under “patriarchy” eroticize and derive pleasure from their own oppression, meaning their exclusion from the male status hierarchy. They are correct. The reader who wishes to observe how women might be made happier once men finally work up the gumption to deprive them of status is advised to watch my favorite Italian movie, Swept Away (1974; avoid Madonna’s 2002 remake). It was made by a woman—and could only have been made by a woman. Meanwhile, clueless male traditionalists offer nothing but laments that women are no longer being placed upon sufficiently high pedestals, unaware that their excessively elevated status is now the principal factor in their loneliness and sexual frustration. Watch the movie!

Sex is not simply something that happens in people’s bedrooms. It structures the whole of society. Societies that are badly out of order sexually, as ours is, can expect to experience sexual dysfunction and a potentially catastrophic decline in fertility. Women need men’s love, but to get it they need to respect men. (For men to respect women is also nice, but not as essential—although discussed ad nauseam.) Women have traded love for status, a properly male concern, and they are deeply unhappy. This is because they are not getting the love they need, neither from the men above them in the status hierarchy who can go from hookup to hookup nor, even more obviously, from the lower-status men their inborn instincts virtually compel them to reject. And it does not matter that these men are not actually unworthy of them. For women, all that matters is the outward status hierarchy.

Another point to consider: Henderson asks only how the ladies might find worthy men, not how men might find worthy wives. But what would the average academic spinster really have to offer a man who must go out every day and accomplish challenging tasks in the real world? She probably cannot cook, since grad students live on frozen entrees and takeout. Can she clean, decorate, grow a vegetable garden, or do anything else that might make his home a comforting and pleasant place? Assembling snippets from Virginia Woolf just doesn’t cut it.

So far I have spoken only of the 84 percent of non-college men who are employed. Henderson himself passes rapidly over this larger group to discuss the 16 percent who are stuck playing video games and watching pornography. Obviously, their long-term happiness and self-respect as well as the good of society demands that some useful work be found for them to perform. Fortunately, there is always valuable work to be done in this world; it is just a matter of suiting the tasks to the men. But this is a complex economic problem I have no special qualifications for addressing. One thing I would not recommend most of these young men do is enroll in college, where they can expect to be demeaned and resented. Leave the campuses to the purple-haired women’s studies majors who organize slut marches.

Proper employment will take care of most of the video game addiction from which these young men suffer. There remains the question of pornography. Being by temperament more analyst than moralist, I have been reluctant to address this question. Moreover, I long assumed that even a fairly mediocre woman could be counted upon to win out over lifeless images in the heart of any normal young man. I am no longer so sure.

Let us look at just a few of the advantages pornography enjoys from the point of view of Henderson’s unemployed and underemployed young men:

  • Pornography cannot divorce them and clean out their bank accounts with the armed backing of the state.
  • While porn cannot give them children, it also cannot take their children away from them. Pornography has never denounced any man to Child Protective Services as an abuser.
  • Pornography does not despise any man for having failed to earn an academic credential in oppression studies, does not call his masculinity “toxic,” does not condemn him for the natural sexual urges he cannot help: in sum, does not indulge in the endless litany of complaints about men heard from contemporary women.
  • Porn is cheap. Wives cost a lot of money, especially when they are carrying and nursing babies, whereas making porn requires only a camera and a slut. Not being a capital-intensive industry, the end user can find a nearly limitless ocean of it online for free.
  • Perhaps not least important, you do not actually have to pay attention to pornography. If forced to choose between keeping either porn or a pretentious female racism “scholar” under my roof, I would unhesitatingly choose the porn since I could always stuff it in a drawer and ignore it—something that cannot be done with a woman.

I can only conclude that these young men are behaving rationally in preferring pornography to the available women. If I were God or possessed a magic wand, I would (after finding them gainful employment) provide these men with sweet, loving, grateful young wives capable of creating homes for them and bearing and rearing decent children. But I am not hiding any stash of such women from anyone. I really do not know where they are to be found. If someone were able to solve this problem, I suspect the plague of pornography would largely take care of itself. Any eventual legislation to outlaw it would provide no more than the coup de grace.

End of Part 2 of 2.

Decadence, the Corruption of Status Hierarchies, & Female Hypergamy A Response to Rob Henderson’s Article “All the Single Ladies,” Part 1 of 2

In the comment section responding to my essay “Hooking Up,” I found a reference to an article called “All the Single Ladies” by journalist Rob Henderson. I am grateful—it is a fascinating piece for any observer of the contemporary sexual scene. The gist is that women in the world of higher education are having extreme difficulty finding suitable mates due to their numerical predominance on campuses. Just as my own writings have described, a situation has developed where too many women are chasing too few men. But Henderson’s article will find more favor with many readers since it expresses strong sympathy for the ladies’ predicament—and perhaps not so much for the men. A deflater of female pretentions must swim against a strong current originating in the male protective instinct. Skeptical as my observation of female behavior have made me, however, I do not actually enjoy seeing women lonely and miserable. The coeds described in Henderson’s article have never done me any harm, and I would like to help a few of them understand the situation in which they find themselves. That situation has been a long time in the making, however, and clarifying it will require a somewhat lengthy argument.

Henderson’s Article

Let us begin with a brief summary of the main points Henderson makes in “All the Single Ladies.” He begins by noting that “women, on average, prefer educated men.” Two of the strongest predictors of how many responses a man’s online dating profile receives are years of formal education and income. A controlled experiment holding all other factors constant found that women were 91 percent more likely to hit the “like” button for a man with a master’s degree than a bachelor’s. In that minority of marriages where the wife has enjoyed more formal education than her husband, the husband almost always (93 percent of the time) earns more money. If a man trails a woman in both education and income, his chances of finding acceptance from her approach zero. Men looking for a woman, on the other hand, care far less about either education or real or potential earnings.

From the point of view of economic rationality, a highly credentialed, high-earning woman should have less need of finding those same traits in a husband. But women’s sexual instinct does not obey the principle of economic rationality: the more a woman has achieved herself, the greater the stress she places on finding a mate of higher achievement still. This means, of course, that the dramatic expansion in academic and professional opportunities for women in recent decades has led to proportionately massive female loneliness and sexual frustration.

There are 5.5 million college-educated women between the ages of 22 and 29 in America today vs. only 4.1 million men. That translates into four women for every three men in this dating pool, or an excess of 1.4 million women. The resulting competition for scarce men leads to bad behavior among the men on campus, who find themselves able to pursue short-term relationships and sexual variety. Women at institutions of higher education will often engage in sex with such men simply for the chance to be in their company, but they do not necessarily enjoy it very much. Indeed, in what may sound like a paradox, women actually have more sex rather than less in environments where they outnumber men: it just tends to be lousy sex.

On STEM-heavy campuses like Caltech men still outnumber women and continue to court them by seeking to demonstrate commitment. But such campuses are getting rarer. A girl from heavily female-dominant Sarah Lawrence College is quoted as saying: “One of my friends was dumped by a guy after they’d been hooking up for less than a week. When he broke up with her, the guy actually used the word ‘market’—like the ‘market’ for him was just too good.”

This is, of course, the sort of thing that drives the editors at Chronicles into a frenzy. But women press their advantage in the battle of the sexes just as strongly as men wherever conditions permit. It is not a matter of these men being fiends: a whole system of perverse incentives has somehow arisen, and correcting it is going to require more than simply denouncing or punishing men. Indeed, traditional morality placed less emphasis on exhorting men not to accept sex in such situations than on commanding women not to provide it. That Sarah Lawrence coed simply learned the hard way why this used to be done.

Feminism is big on campuses where women outnumber men. The men cannot be relied on, so women respond by trying to become “strong and independent,” as the cliché runs: in Henderson’s words, they seek to “reduce their social, economic and political dependence on men.” In societies with an excess of men, on the other hand, the men are more interested in trying to adapt themselves to women. The men are dependable, so women depend on them. The author does note one supposed drawback, however: “women in such societies were more likely to be cast in stereotypical gender roles.”

Later in the article, the author broadens his scope from the campus to the wider society. Here there exists no shortage of men: as of 2022, there were 1.048 boys born for every girl in the United States. As parents used to assure their romantically forlorn offspring: “For every girl there is a boy.” Off campus we find plenty of unattached young men; the difficulty is that the frustrated coeds described above would never consider them as possible mates due to their lack of education or earning power. What are these young men doing with themselves?

Most are working, of course. But unfortunately, a growing number are unemployed or underemployed: “among never-married adults, for every 100 women, there are only 84 employed men. If all employed men were suddenly taken, every sixth woman would be partner-less.” And what do young men who are neither working nor in higher education do with their abundant free time? Mostly, they play video games. To a lesser but still worrisome extent, they view pornography. Average hours worked by men aged 21-30 declined by 12 percent between 2000 and 2015, and leisure increased proportionally. Around 75 percent of this leisure time is accounted for by gaming, which has become very big business. Young men are naturally interested in fighting and sex. Video games give them a risk-free virtual experience of combat, and can even provide a sense of accomplishment as players gradually improve their skills (although the skills are of little value outside the games themselves). And of course, porn offers fake sex. Both provide phony satisfaction of needs men have inherited from our evolutionary past, and so can be highly addictive for men with little else to do. Surveys of self-reported happiness indicate that at least when they are younger, these men are fairly content. As Henderson cautiously notes, however, such substitutes are unlikely to carry them through life.

So we have some college men gaining status and gathering harems while many noncollege men must console themselves with fake fighting and fake sex. “All the Single Ladies” closes by making a point I have been hammering away at for nearly twenty years now:

In a deregulated market, power laws dominate. At no point in history have all men in a given society been equally desirable. Today, though, the disparity between men is particularly pronounced. And the gap shows no sign of slowing or closing.

The reader of my recent essay “Hooking Up” will see that this description of contemporary sexual dysfunction partially overlaps with my own. The main differences are that I talk about what happens on campus, stressing the hierarchy of attractiveness (which for men includes status), whereas Henderson emphasizes campus sex ratios and the status and behavioral contrasts between men on and off campus.

My Response Part One: The Corruption of the Educational Status Hierarchy

As I see it, the major flaw in Henderson’s portrait of contemporary sexual mores is his disregard of a drastic equivocation contained in the term “education”—one with a strong bearing on its relation to status, and hence men’s sexual attractiveness. I understand education to refer primarily to three sorts of things: 1) the acquisition of knowledge and skills, 2) the training and sharpening of the mind both for its own sake and for the pursuit of external ends, and 3) the transmission of a cultural patrimony to the rising generation of a specific people.

You can buy F. Roger Devlin’s Sexual Utopia in Power here.

Education involves these goals at all levels, from the primary instruction offered to all normal children to the higher education traditionally provided only to the most promising young adults. The shift in the content of education from the primary to the tertiary level can be explained not only by the natural growth of the human mind as it approaches adulthood but also partly in terms of psychologist Abraham Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. Human beings’ most basic needs are physiological: food, warmth, sleep, and the like. When these have been satisfied, people go on to seek safety, then relations with their fellow human beings, then esteem and a sense of accomplishment. Once they have satisfied all these needs, they can concern themselves with higher yet more nebulous ambitions such as creativity, reaching one’s full potential, or self-actualization. Maslow’s hierarchy runs from needs that are urgent for all men yet concrete and well-defined, to immaterial and vague goals that are not particularly urgent for most of us most of the time. It is often represented as a pyramid, with a broad base gradually narrowing as one moves toward the upper levels. In healthy societies, the very peak of Maslow’s pyramid is so small that it is possible to name many of the men occupying it: names like Goethe, Pascal, Da Vinci, Leibniz, and Mozart.

Higher education is an elite enterprise concerned mainly with matters fairly high up Maslow’s pyramid, though the men occupied with it are not normally those at the very top. The character and quality of the higher education a nation provides for its young elites says much about it and is one of the best measures of its advancement.

We inhabitants of the West are living through a late phase of our culture, in a society gone flabby from prolonged prosperity. A leading characteristic of such phases is that Maslow’s pyramid becomes top-heavy: too many people are working on self-realization and not enough are growing turnips. Everyone forgets about the necessities of life to focus on luxuries. This results in an evolutionary mismatch. We are adapted to an environment where most people spend most of their time securing basic needs, and relatively little on creativity and trying to reach their full potential. When large numbers of people naturally suited to growing food and providing security are drafted into the world of higher education instead, strange things start to happen there, and the nature of education itself is inevitably and profoundly altered.

How does this process operate? The philosopher Alisdair MacIntyre once drew a contrast between practices and institutions: practices are forms of human activity that provide social benefits, and institutions are human organizations created to foster, protect, and perpetuate such practices. For example, medicine is a practice which combats illness, thus extending and improving human lives. But medical practice would be unable to flourish for long without being embodied in institutions: primarily hospitals, but also including research laboratories, medical schools, etc.

The point at which MacIntyre was driving is that there exist ends or goods proper to practices themselves and ends proper to the institutions established to foster the practices—and these two sets of ends are not identical. They may even conflict. For example, the end pursued by the practice of medicine is the combatting of illness. Hospitals are set up to foster this practice. Yet those in charge of hospitals eventually and almost inevitably start making decisions with a view not so much to the quality of medicine being practiced there as to what is good for the hospital itself. Marble flooring might be installed, e.g., or a public relations campaign staged to increase institutional prestige and attract external funding—but without necessarily contributing anything to the curing of patients.

Many examples could be cited of how what is good for institutions may be given priority over the needs of the practices they were established to foster, but the principle aim of institutions considered as such is usually growth. The bigger the hospital becomes, the more people it can employ and the greater the rewards available to them. Examples of absurdly unjustified institutional growth are easy to find. Here is just one: in 1914, fewer than 4400 men administered the Royal British Navy, the largest in the world; by 1967, over 33,000 men were being paid to administer a Navy that had largely ceased to exist. This did nothing for British Naval power, obviously, but it benefited the administrators themselves.

Education is obviously an important human practice in the sense intended by MacIntyre. The goods or ends it pursues are mainly the three already stated: the acquisition of knowledge, the improvement of the mind, and the transmission of a cultural patrimony. The great European universities were established during the Middle Ages as places where a few men could cultivate rational debate, be trained in canon law, and study the works of Aristotle. The first scholars often literally did not have a roof to protect them from the rain. Gradually, universities acquired better physical endowments, but for centuries academic life remained the preserve of a small minority. In early America one had to demonstrate mastery of Greek and Latin before being admitted to a college. As late as 1910, only six percent of Americans graduated from secondary school, to say nothing of higher studies.

The first seven decades of the twentieth century witnessed reckless, headlong growth in educational institutions. This required drawing in students ever lower down the hierarchy of natural gifts. First attendance and then completion of secondary school became nearly universal. Then, following the Second World War and the GI Bill, tertiary institutions simply exploded. By 1975, 27 percent of men and 22.5 percent of women were earning bachelor’s degrees (up from 7.5 percent and 5 percent respectively on the eve of the war).

Enrollment plateaued soon after because a minimum IQ of about 115 was still considered necessary for a young person to derive much benefit from a college education. But even that weak standard has been eroding in recent years. A recent meta-analysis found that while the average American undergraduate in 1960 had an IQ of 120, the figure has now sunk to 102, equal to that of the average white American. There is no longer anything “higher” about higher education. Obviously, instruction has had to shift accordingly. As the late columnist Joe Sobran famously quipped: “In 100 years we have gone from teaching Latin and Greek in high schools to teaching Remedial English in college.”

Worthwhile learning has been replaced in part by frivolous classes in basket weaving, but often the new substitutes are worse than any frivolity: the students are indoctrinated in pernicious ideological fixations such as antiracism, feminism, post-colonial theory, etc. A powerful factor favoring this shift is precisely the lower intelligence of undergraduates. The ideological courses are far simpler in content that genuine academic study and almost impossible to do badly in unless a student is reckless enough to dispute the ideas presented. Why should a mediocre student risk his grade point average trying to master formal logic, particle physics, or the history of the Protestant Reformation when he can take oppression studies and get an easy “A”?

The scholarship produced by academics has gone through a similar change. This may have begun in schools of education, where young doctoral candidates have long occupied themselves with such weighty matters as the best way to arrange tables and chairs in an elementary school lunch cafeteria. But the nonsense has spread throughout the humanities and social sciences, and is now threatening STEM education.

Evolutionary psychologist Ed Dutton recently did a short video on a completely unremarkable young female academic who just received a doctorate from Cambridge University with a dissertation entitled Olfactory Ethics: The Politics of Smell in Modern and Contemporary Prose. According to Dutton, the

thesis shows how literature registers the importance of olfactory discourse, the language of smell and the olfactory imagination it creates, in structuring our social world. The broad aim is to offer an intersectional and wide-ranging study of olfactory oppression.

Essentially, what the young lady did was read some feminist novels by Virginia Woolf, note all the passages referring to odors, and then fit them into a ready-made interpretive scheme built around the oppressor/oppressed dichotomy.

I have not read her dissertation, so it is just possible I am being unfair—although I doubt it. It hardly matters, however, for I only mention this young woman as a convenient example. Whatever the qualities of her work, most academic dissertations are now every bit as pointless and absurd as what I have just described. This particular thesis achieved notoriety only because the author bragged about her accomplishment online and was met with gales of scorn from the general public. Dutton claims that hers is far from the worst dissertation he has heard about. For comparison he mentions Dr. Desiree Odom’s A Multiple Marginalized Intersectional Black Lesbian Leader: A Critical Feminist Autoethnographic Narrative. In plain English, this woman wrote a doctoral thesis on herself.

Some legitimate and worthwhile learning and scholarship still goes on within universities, but it is under threat due to a kind of Gresham’s Law of the intellect whereby bad scholarship drives out good. In sum, the utopian attempt to extend the benefits of higher education to the general public has led to a catastrophic decline in the practice of education itself. And we must bear in mind that the very attempt was only made possible by the unexampled material prosperity of America and other Western nations, i.e., their success at securing the more urgent needs farther down Maslow’s pyramid.

Go to Part 2 of 2.

This article originally appeared at Counter-Currents and is posted here with permission of the author.

Missives from Satan: Memoranda of George Soros on his “GeorgeSoros.com” website

One thing few do enough of is the systematic examination of the public statements — especially when solidified in written form — of one’s enemies.  Depending on whom you view as your enemy, therefore, a careful examination of such texts as The Russian Revolution by Leon Trotsky (real name, Lev Bronstein), Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler, plus Hitler’s second book, drafts of which were found by the U.S. Army after World War II, or Saul Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals (1971) would have been in order.

In today’s world, a Hungarian-Jewish immigrant named George Soros has clearly become an enemy of ordered society — at least, as such a society would be defined by most sane people and, presumably, most readers on this website.  For that reason, the humble author of this piece thinks it might be wise to peruse some of the writings of this eminent individual.  I was an early reader of George’s first book Alchemy of Finance; however, that was a more or less anodyne description of the irrationality of securities markets with which even the mainstream Charlie Munger would agree.  However it is his later works, most of which are set forth on his website, are the ones most relevant to his views on public policy.

I call them “Missives from Satan”.  And when one is fighting Satan, it might be wise to read some of his writings.  So here goes.

George’s big “shtick”1/ is famously his espousal of an “open society” everywhere, which, if he is to be believed, is the cure for all ills.  Whatever.  But a clear understanding of what he means by “open society” in fact lays bare his actual goals.  Which are anything but open, and prognosticates a “society” in which few sane people would like to live.

Below is Soros’ 1993 sorry attempt to define an “open society”:

Open and Closed Societies:

This brings me to the second part of my conceptual framework. To understand the current situation, I contend that it is very useful to draw a distinction between open and closed societies. The distinction is based on the same philosophical foundations as my theory of history, namely, that participants act on the basis of imperfect understanding. Open society is based on the recognition of this principle and closed society on its denial. In a closed society, there is an authority which is the dispenser of the ultimate truth; open society does not recognize such authority even if it recognizes the rule of law and the sovereignty of the state. The state is not based on a dogma and society is not dominated by the state. The government is elected by the people and it can be changed. Above all, there is respect for minorities and minority opinions. Soros, “Toward a New World Order:  The Future of NATO”, November 1, 1993

Clearly there is a contradiction.  What if the “people” that “elects” the government doesn’t like certain or any minorities?  This is a problem, because, in addition, in an “open society”,  “above all, there is a respect for minorities and minority opinions”!  There is an inherent conflict.  This is no accident — either for Soros or his intellectual progenitor, Karl Popper.  See:The Idea that Shaped the Modern World: | Soros, Popper & The Open Society” (youtube.com)(sadly, since this time, removed from youtube).

By 2023, ol’ George had apparently determined to avoid this linguistic conflict.  In his various ex cathedra missives in these later years, there is no mention of “elections” or “democracy”.  The definition he gives of an “open society” is simply that it is a free-market society that elevates minorities, sort of like an international business convention.

So he has dispensed with tiresome ol’ democracy.

But note that his definition of an “open” society as developed over the years is not even “open” as a normal human would define it.  In actuality, there is no respect for opinions other than those of the group — presumably a minority — that have grasped control.  In the West, sadly, this means that it is a society that has respect for Jewish opinions and those of their shabbos goy allies. Opinions of all others be damned.

Since the people who run the EU, in contrast to their predecessor statesmen, are not very smart or educated, they simply slap on the word “democracy” on the assumption it is synonymous with “open society”.  However, it is clear from their actions that they promote not “democracy”, but only George Soros’ view of an open society.

Accordingly, every time the EU uses the word “democracy” we should translate from “EU speak” to “Soros speak” and substitute the words “open society”.  Doing so, their statements start to make sense.  So they claim that Hungary is not a “democracy”, but really mean it is not an “open society” because it does not worship the views that Soros holds as sacred.  But if we then translate one more time from Soros speak to plain English and substitute the words “anti-White society” for “open society”, we finally realize that the EU statements make sense.

So the real claim is “Hungary is not an anti-White society dominated by Jewish opinions on immigration and multiculturalism.”  True.  So far.

EU speak:  “Poland before Tusk and Hungary under Orban are not democratic.”   This is patently ridiculous.  The people of those countries elected those governments in open elections.

Translation from EU speak to Soros speak, however, “neither are ‘open societies’”.

Translation from Soros speak to plain English: “neither are anti-White societies dominated by Jewish opinions on immigration and multiculturalism.”  Aha!  Now that makes perfect sense!  Score one for the European Union.

Of course, the failure of Poland and Hungary to be anti-White societies is why the EU is trying to crucify both those nations.  So the full statement would read “Poland before Tusk and Hungary under Orban are not anti-White societies dominated by Jewish opinions on immigration and multiculturalism.”  True.  Can’t argue with that!

More disturbingly, Soros, even in 1993, saw the world in a crisis that demanded international intervention to promote “open societies”, a.k.a, “anti-White societies dominated by Jewish opinions on immigration and multiculturalism”, since it seemed in the post-Soviet period that many countries were continuing to be or reverting to non-open, i.e., “non-Anti-White societies dominated by Jewish opinions on immigration and multiculturalism”.  Apparently people didn’t like Jews, even back then.  So here it is:

The Need for Collective Security 

We did not oppose the Soviet Union because it was a closed society, but because it posed a threat to our existence. That threat has now disappeared and it is difficult to justify any kind of intervention—whether it is political, economic or military—on the grounds of national self- interest. It is true that the danger of some kind of nuclear disaster remains, but it concerns the rest of the world at least as much as it concerns us. Therefore, the only basis for action is collective security. And that is where the problem lies. The collapse of the Soviet empire has created a collective security problem of the utmost gravity. Without a new world order, there will be disorder; that much is clear. But who will act as the world’s policeman? That is the question that needs to be answered. Ibid.

What is the “disorder” of which he speaks?  And why is it necessarily a threat to anyone?  Presumably “disorder” means a number of small nations that want to maintain their homogeneity rather than become cosmopolitan market places characterized by policies such as open immigration, multiculturalism pornography, selling drugs, financialization, and promotion of deviant sexual practices.  In order to prevent such “disorder”, something like NATO is needed!

Here is the purported “security” threat that “closed societies” — i.e., democratic, homogeneous nations — pose to NATO:

Closed societies based on nationalist principles constitute a threat to security because they need an enemy, either outside or within. But the threat is very different in character from the one NATO was constructed to confront, and a very different approach is required to combat this threat. It involves the building of democratic states and open societies and embedding them in a structure which precludes certain kinds of behavior. Only in case of failure does the prospect of military intervention arise. The constructive, open society building part of the mission is all the more important because the prospect of NATO members intervening militarily in this troubled part of the world is very remote. Bosnia is ample proof. Ibid.

Note the completely unsupported premise that “closed societies based on nationalistic principles” are “a threat to national security because they need an enemy, either outside or within” — i.e., otherwise homogeneous societies which reject Muslim minorities or Jewish intervention in their morals or life are a security threat that requires NATO intervention!  By the rules of logic, the conclusions drawn from this are incorrect, even if valid, because the premise is unproven and in fact contradicted by history.  A country’s treatment of minorities is not a threat to NATO.  To make it plainer, both the premise and the validity of the conclusion from that premise are wrong.  The premise that closed (read “normal”) societies “need an enemy” is not true (in fact, it is when previously homogeneous societies are forced into becoming “open” — i.e., multi-racial/cultural that internal divisions and violence can arise, of against White majorities); thus the key premise to Soros’ syllogism is false.  Moreover, the conclusion that if a nation does have an internal enemy (let’s assume for a moment this premise is factually true), it poses a threat to all other nations is not a justified conclusion from the premise — i.e., the reasoning from the premise to the conclusion is invalid.  So Soros has concocted a syllogism that is both false and invalid — a neat trick — committing the two cardinal sins of reasoning in one little statement.

The whole Davos / WEF project is based on this extraordinarily weak reasoning.

By creating a crisis where none existed, Soros was (and is) attempting to justify, in effect, a world government.  Note, he does not say that the US will necessarily be the one running this new order — only, presumably, a bunch of international organizations and NGO’s like Soros’ own Open Society foundation.  This also implies that any chance there is to grab onto another event — whether it be a bad flu season, COVID, climate change (or, paradoxically perhaps if that fails, peak oil) to remove power from states to international bodies that will then use their power not so much against the cited threats, but to enforce further, by another turn of the ratchet, Jewish influence over nations — and everything else.

Viewing the otherwise mindless WEF as effectively driven by Soros’ vision, one can better understand the motives of the WEF:  a world run (perhaps indirectly) by Jews and their shabos-goy allies—essentially an international superpower of nasty quangos (quasi-NGOs funded by the government), enforcing certain policies upon every nation on earth (i.e., policies such as enforcing replacement-level immigration, encouragement of homosexuality and transsexuality; prohibition of certain types of historical research related to the holocaust; prohibition of free speech on issues related to diversity).

Note that, apparently, Soros and the WEF (though not the US’s incompetent national security establishment) has concluded that the “closed society is a risk to other nations” argument has not been compelling to anyone outside of the West.  So every year, they create another crisis — COVID, climate change, etc.) to permit the international control that Soros (and the WEF) desires, not to fight the “crisis du jour” but to force “open societies” on all of us.  But the “new” crises are really just an excuse.  The driving goal is exactly the same goal that Soros identified in 1993 — the goal of “open societies” everywhere.

An example of Soros’ current thinking — so insane it would be comical if not for his power — is this, written in anticipation of Ukraine’s much vaunted and, ultimately, failed “counter offensive” in June of 2023:

The countries of the former Soviet empire, eager to assert their independence, can hardly wait for the defeat of the Russian army in Ukraine [presumably, in the counter-offensive, in which, earlier in the article, he predicts Ukrainian victory]. At that point, Vladimir Putin’s dream of a renewed Russian empire will disintegrate and cease to pose a threat to Europe … and it will allow the world to concentrate on its biggest problem, climate change. Soros, “Updating My Munich Predictions”, March 16, 2023 (emphasis added)

First, the Ukraine war was (until NATO got involved) a localized crisis brought on by NATO’s aggression, not Russia’s.  Second, of course, Soros was totally wrong on the military front.  His memo was written undoubtedly in chop-licking expectation of a successful Ukrainian offensive.  Wiser heads at the same time as Soros’ article was published were instead (correctly) predicting Ukraine’s total defeat in this counter offensive.  They were right.  Ukraine’s army utilized in that effort was destroyed.  Third, once Putin is defeated in the Ukraine he will “cease to pose a threat to Europe”.  Ha!  First, he was not defeated.  Second, even if he had been, Russian history tells us his — and Russia’s — response would not be to create Soros’ anti-White “open society”, but to close further and build the military to such massive levels that such a defeat could never happen again.

And then Soros finishes with his biggest howler:  once Russia “ceases to be a threat”, then “the world will be able to focus on its biggest problem:  climate change”.

Nothing more needs to be said.  Soros should be incarcerated in a mental institution and euthanized.

________________________

1/  Yiddish.  Sorry for the “cultural appropriation” folks.

2/  “Holocaust denial” is factual research on thehHolocaust that comes to the wrong conclusion.

3/  In addition to promoting Jewish supremacy, Soros appears as well, not surprisingly, to be a classic limousine liberal.  Here is his July 31, 2022 missive:

“We need to acknowledge that black people in the U.S. are five times as likely to be sent to jail as white people. That is an injustice that undermines our democracy.”  Soros, “Why I support Reform Prosecutors”, July 31, 2022.George Soros | Why I Support Reform Prosecutors.

This failed point of view — rejected by every serious evolutionary biologist or geneticist in the world — is a classic example of Donald Rumsfeld’s admonition that, when formulating public policy, “Distinguish between problems and facts.  A problem is solvable; a fact cannot be “solved”; instead it must be taken into account in formulating public policy.”

The genetically based low IQ and ultra-high testosterone levels among Blacks is the cause of their ultra-high violence — 10-20 times the White level.  This, in turn — not racism — is the cause of their high incarceration rates.

This contra-factual assertion is not Soros’ creation.  It has been used by Jews for a long time to create massive race trouble in White, Christian societies, and, sadly, it has also been a favorite of leading upper-class White Anglo-Saxon (“WASP”) policy makers.  An example is the eminent and aristocratic WASP Cyrus R. Vance.  After his service as Deputy Secretary of Defense under Lyndon Johnson (remember Vietnam?), he led countless fruitless and deceptive commissions authorized by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, pointing out that Blacks went to jail more than Whites (hello!) and of course immediately jumping to the conclusion that the law needed to be changed as necessary in order that the incarceration rates of Blacks equal that of Whites in the NYC metropolitan area.  Of course, had Strom Thurmond headed the commission, he might have pointed out that the higher incarceration rate was not a “problem”, but a “fact” with which we had to deal, due to the “fact” of higher Black propensity to crime.  The solution of his committee might have been to re-impose segregation laws to protect the rest of us.

Cyrus Vance of course held a lucrative senior partnership of Wall Street law firm — a virtual money-making machine — and was, better yet, married to an heiress of a major industrial fortune.  He lived with the heiress in their very own town house in one of the best sections of the upper east side of Manhattan, sending their children to expensive private schools such as Buckley and Groton, thence to Yale — certainly not to what the Vances undoubtedly viewed as the proletarian abyss of the New York City public school system.  Oh no.  To that system, the children of his domestic servants and lower-paid associates and mailroom boys at his law firm would go.

Sadly, it is the Cyrus Vances of the WASP world who have become a secondary non-Jewish support network for the Soros types.  This creates, to say the least, an incredibly powerful coalition against the public interest.

Ties Abroad: The context and causes of Jewish immigration from 1881

In a previous essay I discussed the causes of the Jewish immigration wave that began in 1881 and the role of the existing Jewish population and their supporters in Britain. Here I expand on the situation of Jews in Britain before 1881, their influence on British foreign and domestic policy, the reasons for the mass immigration from 1881 onwards and the initial reactions of the more settled population to the arrival of the new, drawing on the works of Jewish historians.

Jews in Britain before 1881

A mixture of Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews, amounting to 50–60,000 people, lived in Britain before the inundation from the east began, and they were remarkably free and prosperous compared to their co-religionists elsewhere.1 Todd Endelman tells us that

“The great mass of Jews, who could hardly aspire to sit in Parliament or hold a naval commission, suffered little from legal inequality. There were no restrictions on the trades they might follow, the goods in which they might trade, the areas in which they might live. Nor were they subject to special taxes, tolls, levies, or extortions. The statute book simply ignored their presence…”.2

Some legal disabilities did apply to Jews in statute but had long been enforced inconsistently. As Geoffrey Alderman describes, “professing Jews were prohibited from voting in British parliamentary elections until 1835”, after which they were on par with native Britons, but before that date “the returning officers who supervised constituency election arrangements had the right to demand the swearing of a Christian oath by all intending voters. … [T]his was not a right they were obliged to exercise,” and some chose not to:

“In May 1830 Sir Robert Wilson told the House of Commons that Jews habitually voted in parliamentary elections in Southwark (south London) because no one bothered to insist that they take the Christian oath. In December 1832 Rabbi Asher Ansell of Liverpool was clearly able to vote in the general election without hindrance.”3

After gaining the right to vote, British Jewry was still eluded by

“…full political emancipation – meaning the right of professing Jews to stand as candidates for, and be elected to, the House of Commons. Jews were not the only religious group to be denied this right. Catholics had only won the right in 1829. Unitarians did not then enjoy the right, nor did atheists.”4

Emancipation was achieved largely thanks to the propinquity of wealthy Jews to powerful Britons. The campaign for it, as Endelman says, was “the work of a handful of ambitious, well-connected City men, whose close government contacts allowed them to put the question of Jewish disabilities on the national agenda.”5 Common British folk, and presumably the enemies of Jewry, lacked such contacts or campaigned less effectively; the successful demonstrations against the Jew Bill of 1753 were not replicated.

Overrepresentation in politics followed immediately. As Alderman describes,

“Lionel de Rothschild’s ceremonial entry into the House of Commons to take his seat (28 July 1858) was an occasion of great communal rejoicing, but it also brought into the open a worry. … Jews were overrepresented in the social strata from which the political classes were drawn, and there were enough of them with sufficient private wealth to make their candidatures an attractive proposition regardless of their religious backgrounds. So the Jewish presence in the legislature grew with embarrassing speed. … After the general election of 1865 no less than six Jews sat in the Commons; a further two were returned at by-elections during the lifetime of the 1865–8 Parliament.

Compared with the proportion which Jews comprised of the total population of the United Kingdom, they were already ‘overrepresented’ in the Commons, a state of affairs that has persisted ever since.”6

The Liberal Party was identified as the vehicle for Jewish interests. By the late 1860s,

“[w]ithout exception all the Jewish MPs at this period were Liberals. The first Jewish Conservative MP, the obscure Nottinghamshire coal-owner Saul Isaac, did not make his appearance at Westminster till 1874. Until then the parliamentary Jewish lobby was a Liberal lobby, one which had, moreover, developed during the decade (1859–68) when the Liberal party had taken on a definite form and substance, under the leadership of, first, Lord John Russell and then Gladstone. The triumphs of Liberalism and Jewish emancipation thus seemed to go hand in hand, as products of the same political ethos. On Saturday, 28 April 1866 there was a remarkable demonstration of this fact, when Russell’s Parliamentary Reform bill passed its second reading in the Commons by a majority of five votes; all six Jewish MPs voted for it, the sabbath notwithstanding.”7

Endelman shows that a degree of formal exclusion from the City of London (the financial centre) did not stop Jews trading there.8 Certainly long before 1881, Jews like the Rothschild and Mocatta families were prominent in finance, spanning bond and commodity trading to every sort of brokerage. The Rothschilds in particular were uniquely important in enabling states to borrow and, as they worked as an international partnership, their role in financing wars made their approval a factor in deciding which states could afford to fight and when.

No Jewish family, and no other family, was as rich as the Rothschilds, but Jews in general were ascendant in wealth. As Endelman says,

“At the start of the nineteenth century, most Jews in England were immigrants or the children of immigrants—impoverished, poorly educated, dependent on low-status street trades and other forms of petty commerce, popularly identified with crime, violence, and chicanery, widely viewed as disreputable and alien. Over the next three-quarters of a century, the social character of the Jewish community was transformed dramatically. Poverty ceased to be its defining characteristic. On the eve of mass migration from Eastern Europe, the majority of Jews in Britain were middle class. They were native English speakers, bourgeois in their domestic habits and public enthusiasms, full citizens of the British state, their public and personal identities increasingly shaped by the larger culture in which they lived—even if their gentile neighbors viewed them as less than fully English.”9

Geoffrey Alderman’s description is similar. In 1883,

“Over half London Jewry [the bulk of British Jewry] was now located within the middle‑classes; in 1850 the proportion had been about a third. Moreover, we know from Jacobs’ painstaking examination of commercial directories and other records that within these middle‑classes the greatest single occupational group was to be found within the financial sector—pre-eminently the Stock Exchange—followed by general merchants (over half the dealers in military stores were Jews) and certain manufacturing sectors (cigars, pipes, slippers and boots, furniture, furs, jewellery and watches, and diamonds). Jews still accounted for only 6% of London’s tailors and only 5% of London Jewry was engaged in the professions—barristers and solicitors, surgeons, dentists and architects.”10

Jews were well-positioned to influence British policy in favour of their own tribe, and they did so. They were, however, also forced to adapt to the effects of the far larger numbers of Jews entering from 1881, and in some ways were altered by it. Subsequent essays will show that British history over the subsequent century and a half has been characterised by the part-confrontation, part-collaboration of the older, more settled, wealthier Anglo-Jewry and the later incomers from eastern Europe.

Modern Jewish Politics and foreign policy

The burgeoning of the Jewish population even before 1881 resulted in ever-growing pressure on British politicians to divert British policy in favour of Jewish interests. There has never been a body that speaks for all Jews, but several institutions constitute communal leadership with at least the tacit acceptance of a large majority of Jews in Britain. The Board of Deputies of British Jews is the most ‘central’ of these, and as early as 1836, “the Board notified the chancellor of the exchequer that it was the only official channel of communication for the secular and political interests of the Jews.”11

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Board and the leading families that controlled it increasingly concerned themselves with the interests of Jewry worldwide. The historian C. S. Monaco has described their practices as ‘the rise of modern Jewish politics’ and has shown how they set the pattern for the present and the past century.12 From the 1840s, Jewish interventions in foreign affairs were usually led by Sir Moses Montefiore, the long-standing president of the Board of Deputies, who famously travelled to petition for Jewish interests in several countries.

Moses Montefiore

From 1871, the Board faced competition from the Anglo-Jewish Association. As Alderman describes, “[t]he Association might indeed have become a rival to the Board of Deputies”, and “[a]t first the Board of Deputies held aloof from it. But after its very effective intervention during the Balkan crisis of the late 1870s … the Board came to terms with it, and agreed in 1878 to the formation of a Conjoint Foreign Committee, consisting of seven representatives from the Board and seven from the Association.” The collaboration was productive. Jews thereafter had “an Anglo-Jewish ministry of foreign affairs” whose deliberations “were conducted in secret” and whose “conclusions were reported to neither of its constituent bodies.”13 In addition to the “close contacts” that won Jews the right to enter Parliament, the “overrepresentation” that immediately followed and the proclivities of some powerful Britons to put Jewish interests first, the secret “ministry” ensured that Jewish interests worldwide would be represented immediately and insistently in a way that had never applied to the British people or Christians.

It had become advantageous to be an ethnic minority in Britain. While Jews’ assertive internationality was rewarded, no such ministry for the native British would have been suffered to exist, let alone given any audience by the powerful. As Endelman approvingly describes,

“In Victorian Britain, at least before the end of the century, the pressures that caused Jews elsewhere to abandon traditional notions of peoplehood, collective fate, and mutual responsibility were muted. British Jews were free to express their ties to Jews abroad without fear of endangering their own struggle for civil equality and social acceptance. In this sense, the diplomatic activities of Montefiore and the Board of Deputies … testify to the confidence of communal leaders about their own status. It is important to stress this, for the contrary has been argued … Only toward the end of the century, with classical liberalism under attack and nationalism and antisemitism on the rise, did fears [of emancipation being reversed] gain ground and begin to shape communal policy—especially in regard to the newcomers from Eastern Europe.”14

Earlier in the century, Jews openly tried to steer policy their way. Later they gained reasons to hew closer in their overt conduct to the gentile elite, whose receptiveness to them was already in evidence.

Jewish foreign policy

The first professing Jewish member of Parliament, Lionel de Rothschild, probably the richest man in the world, and others of his family, used their influence in favour of the Ottoman Empire and against Europe, as did their friend and beneficiary Benjamin Disraeli. In 1876,

“Disraeli’s Eastern policy had the warm approval of most British Jews. In the first place Jews had considerable investments in Turkey, and were loath to see them thrown away because of Gladstone’s conscience. Beyond that, British Jews, in common with their co-religionists in Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, and America, looked at the situation from the point of view of Balkan Jewry. Turkish rule had allowed these Jews ‘a degree of tolerance far beyond anything conceded by Orthodox Christianity’. A. L. Green, minister of the prestigious Central Synagogue in London’s West End and ‘a Liberal in politics all my life’, instructed the Liberal Daily News ‘The Christian populations of the Turkish provinces have held, and continue with an iron hand to hold, my coreligionists under every form of political and social degradation.’”

As Alderman describes, “With very few exceptions … British Jews did not merely refuse to be associated with Gladstone’s Bulgarian Agitation; they actively opposed it.” Jewish allegiances in Britain were decided by the perceived interests of Jews at the other end of Europe. The Rothschilds became Tory supporters. “The Daily Telegraph (owned by the Jewish Levy-Lawson family) swung its influence behind Disraeli’s policy.” Then a “conference of European and American Jewish organizations” met to discuss “the reopening of the Eastern Question to improve the lot of Balkan Jewry” and soon afterward the Anglo-Jewish Association lobbied the government to amend British foreign policy. That the Ottoman forces had verifiably slaughtered thousands of Bulgarians while the Jewish organisations were merely vaguely presaging crimes against their co-religionists made no difference. “When war broke out between Russia and Turkey the following year, Sir Moses Montefiore made no secret about where his sympathies lay; he contributed £100 to the Turkish Relief Fund.”15

Alderman complains that “[i]t never occurred to Gladstone to consider the position of Balkan Jews, whom Turkish rule had allowed ‘a degree of tolerance far beyond anything conceded by Orthodox Christianity’.”16 Why that would occur to Gladstone is unexplained. Were Jewish interests already so sharply divergent from British ones, and on major issues? If so, was it Gladstone’s duty to side against his own people? And were Jewish politicians not loyal to Britain first? Evidently not. Then as now, Jewish politicians, activists, journalists and historians openly sided with their own tribe, wherever located, against the host nation, with scarcely any reproach, and no threat of expulsion.

The Rothschilds’ pre-eminence as financiers of states enabled them to be represented by the two main powers at the Congress of Berlin. As Alderman describes,

“While the Anglo-Jewish Association (later in collaboration with the Board of Deputies) petitioned the British Government on the need to secure the civil and political rights of Jews in newly independent Balkan states, the aged Lionel de Rothschild mobilized the considerable resources of his extended European family, and those of his German-Jewish banking associate Gerson von Bleichröder (Bismarck’s banker and adviser) to influence proceedings at the Congress of Berlin called to resolve the crisis, and of which Bismarck was President. The result was that the western European delegates at Berlin refused to sign a final treaty until Jewish anxieties had been allayed. The Treaty of Berlin, when signed in July 1878, thus contained definite guarantees of civil and political rights for the Jews of Romania, Bulgaria, and the Danubian principalities.

For British Jewry this represented a very considerable victory; it was little wonder that when Disraeli returned in triumph from Berlin, Moses Montefiore (despite his ninety-four years) was the first to greet him at Charing Cross railway station.”17

“A very considerable victory” it was, over anyone more sympathetic to Christians than to Jews, as in the common folk of Christendom. The Congress of Berlin is spoken of by derivative historians today as a ‘triumph for Disraeli’, and it was, but for Disraeli as a Jew, not as the Prime Minister of Britain. Establishing the paradigm wherein British interests are treated as the automatic inverse of Russian (and Eastern Christian) ones was also a victory for Disraelites that continues to pay dividends today.

The Liberal Party lost Jewish electoral support, funding and candidates:

“[T]he secession of the Rothschilds had turned a great many City Jews into Conservatives, and seems to have acted as a green light to provincial Jewries also to demonstrate their support for Conservatism. This happened at Liverpool in 1876 and three years later at Sheffield, where the Conservative candidate won the support of Jews specifically because of issues of foreign policy.”18

An Impression of the Congress of Berlin

The loss was fruitless. Disraeli had his way at Berlin anyway, the Conservative Party was accommodating, and Gladstone and the Liberals resisted Jewish demands only to the extent of causing anger, not defeat. As Alderman describes,

“the Bulgarian Agitation had had unpleasant anti-Jewish overtones, in which Disraeli’s own ethnic origins were exploited to the full, particularly by Liberal members of the intelligentsia such as Gladstone’s friend and future biographer, John Morley. Worse still, Gladstone himself had unleashed the full fury of his oratorical powers against Jews and Jewish influence. ‘I deeply deplore’, he told Leopold Gluckstein, author of a pamphlet on The Eastern Question and the Jews, ‘the manner in which, what I may call Judaic sympathies, beyond as well as within the circle of professed Judaism, are now acting on the question of the East.’”19

Gladstone’s deploration only amounted to a campaigning stance while in opposition. His own conduct of foreign policy, after he became Prime Minister in 1880, is generally agreed to have been aimless and ill-informed. And though, as Alderman notes, Gladstone refused “to become moved by the plight of Russian Jewry, or to get up an ‘agitation’ on its behalf,” it was under his premiership that the westward flood of eastern European Jews began, which led to the Jewish population of Britain quintupling by the First World War. The effects of ‘Judaic sympathies’ were multiplied in intensity by Gladstone’s own passivity toward the composition of the demos.

William Gladstone

Reasons for mass migration

Still, it would be misleading to single out Gladstone for condemnation. Jewish immigration on a smaller scale preceded 1881. According to Endelman, “In addition to middle-class immigration from Germany, there was also a small but steady trickle of impoverished Jews from Eastern Europe—contrary to the popular myth that the pogroms of 1881 inaugurated immigration from Poland and Russia.”20 Alderman notes that “The famine in north-east Russia in 1869–70 had brought some migrants to Britain; young Jewish men, seeking to escape service in the Russian army during the war with Turkey in 1875–6, also made their way to England” before ‘the pogroms’.21 Before 1881, chain migration was underway: “as Professor Gartner has noted, a high proportion of Jewish immigrants to Britain before the 1870s appear to have been single men, without family responsibilities.’ But by 1875 this pattern had broken down.”22 Simply, as Lloyd Gartner says, “emigration did not begin on account of pogroms and would certainly have attained its massive dimensions even without the official anti-Semitism of the Russian Government.”23 Endelman’s explanation is worth quoting in full:

“The most fundamental cause of emigration from Eastern Europe was the failure of the Jewish economy to grow as rapidly as the Jewish population. Between 1800 and 1900, the Jewish population of the Russian empire shot from one million to five million persons, exclusive of the one million who emigrated before the end of the century. (The Jews of Galicia, who enjoyed Habsburg tolerance but contributed to the migration current nonetheless, increased from 250,000 to 811,000.) During this same period, tsarist policy toward Jews oscillated between schemes to coerce their russification (through military service or education in state schools, for example) and measures to accomplish the reverse, that is, to isolate them from contact with sections of Russian society considered too weak to resist their alleged depredations—the peasantry, in particular. Measures with the latter goal in mind constricted Jewish economic activity and caused increasing immiseration over the course of the century. As the number of Jews exploded, the government repeatedly imposed limits on their ability to support themselves. With the exception of certain privileged persons, Jews were forbidden to live outside the Pale of Settlement, Russia’s westernmost provinces, and thus were denied access to those cities and regions where industrialization was creating new opportunities. At the same time, the government undertook steps to remove Jews from border regions and the countryside and concentrate them in the Pale’s overcrowded cities. There artisans and petty traders faced mounting competition from each other and, in the case of the former, from factory production as well. General conscription of Jewish males, imposed in 1873, as well as countless arbitrary acts of cruelty, made material immiseration seem even more unbearable.

In this context the pogroms of 1881 and the repressive legislation that followed were more catalyst than cause. Spreading fear and despair throughout Poland and Russia, they convinced the young that they had scant hope for a better future under tsarist rule. They accelerated a decades-old movement, causing migration to assume a momentum and life of its own. Personal exposure or immediate proximity to mob violence was not necessary to set people in motion. The first waves of immigrants to Britain came disproportionately from northern districts in the Pale, which were hardly touched by the pogroms of 1881. In Habsburg Galicia, which remained relatively free of pogroms throughout this period, a higher proportion of Jews migrated than in Russia. Here economic backwardness propelled migration—to Britain, the United States, and the Habsburg capital, Vienna.”24

Susan Tananbaum places more emphasis on Jews’ plight and notes that “pogroms, such as the one in Kishinev in 1903 and elsewhere, and the failure of the 1905 Revolution, provided additional impetus to leave” but agrees that “population increases and poverty had the greatest impact” and says that “[f]or several million Jews, the opportunities of the industrializing West offered their best hope for the future.”25 As Alderman says,

“most emigrants from eastern Europe were not, in the narrow sense, political refugees or, in the narrow sense, the victims of persecution. Most came from Lithuania and White Russia, where there was comparatively little anti-Jewish violence. Of course, the Russian pogroms that followed the assassination of Alexander II [in 1881], and which were renewed and intensified between 1882 and 1889, and again between 1902 and 1906, turned the trickle of Jewish refugees from Russia that had been observed before 1880 into a flood; restrictions imposed by the Russian authorities on Jewish residence, the forcing of Jews off the land while they were prohibited from living in cities, the expulsion of Jews from Moscow in 1891, all made it virtually impossible for most Russian Jews to participate in normal economic life.

In the west, pogroms and persecutions were regarded as the basic causes of Jewish emigration. In truth the picture was much more complex. The overriding reason for Jewish emigration from eastern Europe to England was economic. During the nineteenth century the Jewish population of the Russian Empire increased from one to over six millions. Given the ever more onerous restrictions on Jewish life, this burgeoning population sought better prospects elsewhere. But the towns to which they were drawn could not support them; the flow was driven further west, and, eventually, overseas. Nor did this flow originate only in Russia or Russian Poland. The Jews of Galicia (then part of the Habsburg Empire) were politically emancipated in 1867 and were relatively persecution-free thereafter; but Jews emigrated from Galicia in greater proportion than they did from Russia. From Romania, in 1899–1900, came a stream of fusgayers (walkers), a spontaneous march across Europe by young Jews searching to escape from persecution, famine, and hopelessness.”26

Fusgayers from Romania

Gartner describes the escalation of the migration wave:

“The turn of the century brought a decade of turmoil. In almost consecutive order, East European Jewry underwent the Rumanian ‘exodus’ of 1900, the Kishinev outrage of 1908, the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, the Revolution of 1905, and its trail of pogroms lasting into 1906. Under these hammer blows, the semblance of orderly movement which had been preserved for some ten years vanished. Waves of Rumanian wanderers, fleeing conscripts, pogrom victims, and above all, Jews who simply despaired of improvement in Russia streamed into the British Isles in proportions which bewildered those who tried to organize the flow. An added magnet was the dissolution of the “Atlantic Shipping Ring’ and that price war upon the high seas, the Atlantic Rate War from 1902 to 1904. Previously, English shippers had agreed with Continental firms that they would not sell their cheaper trans-Atlantic tickets to transmigrants. The connivances used by immigrants to outwit the shippers were abandoned and the fare dropped precipitously. Furthermore, a recognizable number of Jews from South Africa sought refuge at the commencement of the Boer War. By 1907, the great waves had spent themselves, and the Aliens Act [of 1905] erected a barrier to uncontrolled torrents.”27

Gartner characterises the easterly flood as “a spontaneous movement of people which flowed unencouraged by outsiders.”28 Yet Jews in America at the time, concerned with limiting immigration as well as helping those who had already immigrated settle, noted that “many of the refugees had been lured by extravagant promises of assistance and ‘glowing accounts of America given them by persons interested in inducing them to emigrate”.29 Many of those who settled in Britain had been in transit to America but found reasons to stop partway. Gartner himself describes how British officials in Odessa “always warned those who are proceeding to England to settle there that England is over crowded with unemployed workmen and that it is most undesirable that people should proceed there… but they invariably insist on going as their friends send them glowing accounts and also money to pay their passage.’”30

Lures

Immigration was also encouraged by and profitable for organised criminals and predators. According to Nelly Las, in large cities in Eastern Europe, “prostitution took place in certain sections known to be controlled by the Jewish underworld, to which the authorities turned a blind eye… In 1908, the American consul in Odessa reported that ‘All the business of prostitution in the city is in the hands of the Jews’.” Amid mass migration, “Jewish criminals … exported prostitution to distant lands.” Some prostitutes chose to move to wealthier countries in the expectation of earning more. Others were trafficked: “To entice their victims, Jewish sex traffickers used newspaper advertisements for jobs, the promise of an immigration certificate, and marriage proposals, all the while taking advantage of the parents’ naiveté and poverty.”31 As Tananbaum describes, “immigrants, particularly women, found travel precarious… Dishonest agents overcharged immigrants, promised them a marriage partner at the end of their journey, tricked them into the white slave trade or raped or harassed them en route.”32 Jewish women entering Britain could also be trapped into prostitution on arrival. “In the chaos of landing, the recruiter could too easily entice some friendless bewildered girls to accept hospitality at a place which would turn out to be a brothel”, according to Gartner.33

Jewish communal leaders were aware that Jews were over-represented in slavery both as victims and as perpetrators. Constance Rothschild co-founded the Jewish Association for the Protection of Girls and Women in 1885 to address the “mixture of Jewish traffickers and Jewish victims”.34 The latter were thought unlikely to seek help from Christian organisations. The JPGAW observed that “the girls have been lured from their parents and natural protectors, to be taken for immoral purposes to lands strange to them where a language they cannot understand is spoken.” According to Tananbaum, “[t]he founders soon learned that local prostitution was only a small part of a worldwide sex slave trade involving a number of Jews and extending from Eastern Europe to South America” and that “[w]hile small in total number, Jews made up a significant proportion of white slavers.”35 “The principal ‘contribution’ made by Jews was the supply of girls to the entrepôts of the system in Buenos Aires, Bombay, Constantinople, and elsewhere, fresh from the East European Pale and London also”, according to Gartner. As Las describes, “Jewish sex traffickers were prominent in major transit points from Europe to Latin America, such as Berlin, London, and Hamburg. In the latter, for example, of 402 sex traffickers caught by police in 1912, 271 were Jewish.”36

Numbers of immigrants

The immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe into Britain and America should be thought of less as a great flight of innocents from persecution and more as a great transposition of a large part of the Jewish population and its ways of life into the receiving countries. The larger the Jewish population in the West grew, the easier it was to avoid adapting or assimilating, even if the setting had changed for some from rural to urban, and some old trades were unviable in the West. The years from 1870 to 1914 “witnessed a phenomenal growth” of the Jewish population “both quantitatively and qualitatively” according to Immanuel Jakobovits. Gartner says that the population movement “was of vast proportions”.37 As Alderman describes,

“On the eve of the Russian pogroms the number of Jews living in London was, as we have seen, about 46,000, and in the country as a whole around 60,000. By 1914 these totals had been dwarfed by the arrival of about 150,000 immigrants; most found their way to London. Merely from a demographic viewpoint this amounted to a revolution. [B]etween 1881 and 1900 London Jewry expanded to approximately 135,000 [and] of these, it was estimated in 1899 that roughly 120,000 were living in the East End.”38

Between 250,000 and 300,000 Jews lived in Britain by the time of the Great War. “Merely from a demographic viewpoint this amounted to a revolution”, says Alderman.39 The inflow also had other revolutionary effects. Assimilation was a threat that was successfully headed off, as Jakobovits describes:

“[T]his influx was no doubt responsible for the intensity of the religious and Zionist commitment, the diversity, and indeed the sheer survival of the community as we know it today. Without this enormous transfusion of new blood, very few descendants of those resident in this country in 1870 would now maintain their Jewish identity, let alone sustain a vibrant Jewish community.”40

Reaction of settled Jews

The position of the older Jewish population was transformed. Through the Jewish Board of Guardians or ad-hoc relief efforts many aimed to help those who had arrived survive and, as seen, avoid being drawn into criminality or slavery, but did not typically encourage more to come. Although, according to Robert Henriques, the influence of the Board of Deputies “had been largely responsible for the liberal immigration policy which had doubled or trebled the numbers of Anglo-Jewry after 1880”41 and, as Gartner says, the “leading families like Rothschild, Montefiore, and Mocatta… would have kept the gates of England always open to all”, they “would give no encouragement and as little aid as possible to immigrants”.42 A typical view was that the “Jewish community could best protect itself from the charge of fostering immigration by ignoring the immigrant.”43 Aid could be expected to beget the demand for more aid. The Jewish Chronicle observed as early as 1880 that “over ninety per cent of our applicants to our Board of Guardians have been subjects of the Czar, and the larger proportion of our poor are invariably immigrants from Russia or Poland.”44 With whatever reluctance, though, aid and other kinds of communal uplift were provided. A typical view at the time was that “[t]hey will drag down, submerge and disgrace our community if we leave them in their present state of neglect”.45 Alderman summarises:

“Jews already settled in Britain objected to foreign-born Jews coming to Britain because these foreign Jews drew attention to themselves, and brought political controversy in their wake, so that the public mind became focused upon Jews as foreigners and a cause for concern at the very time at which the established Jewry was trying its hardest to blend itself, chameleon-like, into its non-Jewish environment… Jews became news.”46

Blending in became impossible, the more so as newcomers brought new ideas and advanced them with vigour and disregard for any pre-existing consensus. The immigrants, unlike the Rothschilds and the cousinhood, were “Poor (for the most part), Yiddish-speaking, Orthodox, socialist and Zionist”.47 As James Appell describes, the immigrants into London also “resented an attitude towards them from their co-religionists which placed low value on the character of the immigrant.”48 There was unanimity on two points, though: “[t]he Yiddish press kept a prudent distance from contentious social and economic questions, except the defence of Jews against anti-Semitism and in favour of free immigration to England.”49 The newcomers outnumbered the older Jewish population manifold, and today “[t]he vast majority of British Jews are third- or fourth-generation descendants of working-class migrants from eastern Europe”, according to Alderman.50 As will be seen in future essays, Britain was altered by the incomers in unprecedented ways. As Alderman says,

“The Jewish immigrants changed the shape of the British polity as surely as they changed the structure of British Jewry: the Jewish experience and the British experience merged and affected each other in a manner far more central than that offered by emancipation itself.”51

My people were refugees, goy

That ‘mass immigration’ into Britain began in 1997 or later is a myth convenient to those who condone the smaller numbers that came before. First as immigrants themselves, then as advocates, instigators and facilitators, Jews have been inseparably involved with mass migration into white countries. Their own movement through Europe, sometimes marching in columns, prefigured that of Muslims in the decades since the Second World War. Angela Merkel, who proudly opened Germany to the entry of more than a million Africans and Asians per year from 2015, has been lavishly acclaimed by Jewish activists and the state of Israel. Vaguely the advocates of immigration speak as though her importees were all refugees, a tactic that continues to work. Except in Israel, Jewish organisations, including the Board of Deputies, routinely cite the experiences of their ancestors to justify their pro-immigration stance. While British electors and leaders continue to respond cravenly, they will do nothing for their own nation. Repudiating the myths may help revive it.


References

1

Modern British Jewry, Geoffrey Alderman, 1992, p117

2

The Jews of Britain, 1656 to 2000, Todd Endelman, 2002, p73-4

3

Controversy and Crisis, Geoffrey Alderman, 2008, p274

4

Geoffrey Alderman in Leeds and its Jewish Community, edited by Derek Fraser, 2019, ch1

5

Endelman, p106

6

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p63-4

7

The Jewish Community in British Politics, Geoffrey Alderman, 1983, p31. The sabbath was to become more withstanding when it came to the controversy over Sunday trading laws, to be covered in a later article.

8

Endelman, p36, 101, 277 (note 36)

9

Endelman, p79

10

Controversy, Alderman, p234

11

Endelman, p106. Endelman adds parenthetically that the Board “continued to make this claim throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, although there was no legal basis for it.” For more on the question of the extent to which the Board speaks for Jews, see The Communal Gadfly, Geoffrey Alderman, 2009, p15-28.

12

See The Rise of Modern Jewish Politics, C.S. Monaco, 2013. Today, similar practices are continued by the likes of the World Jewish Congress and the Anti-Defamation League, though Jews’ situation has been transformed since the 1880s.

13

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p96

14

Endelman, p123-4

15

Jewish Community, Alderman, p37-8 and Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p99. See also Alderman, MBJ, p98-9: “[M]ost British Jews supported Disraeli’s Eastern policy.”

16

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p98-9

17

ibid., p99-100

18

ibid., p99-100

19

ibid., p99-100]

20

Endelman, p81. See also p128: “Contrary to popular myth, East European immigration did not begin with the pogroms that swept through Bessarabia and Ukraine in 1881.”

21

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p112. ‘Pogroms’, referring varyingly to organised riots against Jews or to more spontaneous inter-communal violence, had occurred before 1881, but the term ‘the pogroms’ is sometimes used to refer to the violence of 1881-2 and the subsequent mass emigration.

22

ibid., p82

23

The Jewish Immigrant in England, 1870-1914, Lloyd Gartner, 1973, p41

24

Endelman, p128-9. See also Gartner, p41. As Gartner says of the population increase, “The economic structure of Jewish life failed to expand with the needs imposed by this unprecedented increase.” See Gartner, p21. “Economic backwardness” was a cause of broader trends in rural-to-urban migration at the same time. According to Gartner, “[b]etween the earlier years of the nineteenth century and 1930 occurred the heaviest voluntary migration of people known in history… 62,000,000 persons… crossed international frontiers in this age of relative ‘free trade’ in human movement… migration, even of such dimensions, was itself partly an aspect of such pervasive nineteenth century trends as industrial development, urban growth, and strivings for personal freedom. Under the heading of migration one may well include tens of millions more who crossed no political boundary, yet traversed an economic frontier by pulling up stakes from a farm or village community and settling in an industrial city within their own country.” Gartner, p270

25

Jewish Immigrants in London, 1880-1939, Susan Tananbaum, 2014, p22

26

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p111-2. Columns of African and Asian ‘fusgayers’ marched through Europe in 2015.

27

Gartner, p46-7

28

Gartner, p12

29

Russians, Jews and the Pogroms of 1881-2, John Doyle Klier, 2011, p373. In the 1940s, the Jewish-owned Gleaner used similar methods to entice Afro-Caribbeans to move to Britain.

30

Gartner, p29. He cites the example of a villager seeing the volume of money being sent from Britain to his neighbours and deciding to move too.

31

White Slavery, Nelly Las, Shalvi/Hyman Encyclopedia of Jewish Women, 2021. Jewish Women’s Archive

32

Tananbaum, p19

33

Gartner, p183. “In 1910, the Jewish Association for the Protection of Girls and Women (JAPGW) called a conference in London to discuss the issue. It was attended by representatives from all over the world and focused on Jewish women from Russia and Romania leaving Europe and becoming involved in prostitution in South America. The editors of Anglo-Jewry were concerned that white slaving was seen as a Jewish issue and that more than just Jews were involved in the trafficking of women. At a Yorkshire level, the Hull Jewish community were sufficiently concerned that they monitored all single Jewish girls who came through the port as lone travellers and checked that they safely reached their destination.” Grizzard in Leeds, edited by Fraser, ch7

34

Constance Rothschild, Lady Battersea, Linda Gordon Kuzmack and Ellery Gillian Weil, Shalvi/Hyman Encyclopedia of Jewish Women, 2021. Jewish Women’s Archive

35

Tananbaum, p132-3

36

Las, 2021

37

Preface by Immanuel Jakobovits to The Jewish Immigrant in England by Gartner, p1, and p45

38

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p117-8

39

Controversy, Alderman, p196-7

40

Jakobovits in Gartner, p1. Endelman concurs with Jakobovits: “[W]ithout this infusion of new blood, the small, increasingly secularized, native-born community, left to itself, would have dwindled into insignificance, as drift, defection, and indifference took their toll.” Endelman p127

41

Sir Robert Waley Cohen, 1877-1952: A Biography, Robert Henriques, 1966, p353

42

Gartner, p50-1

43

ibid., p55-6

44

ibid., p41]

45

James Appell in New Directions in Anglo-Jewish History, edited by Geoffrey Alderman, 2010, p31-2

46

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p120

47

Alderman in Leeds, edited by Fraser, ch1

48

Appell in New Directions, edited by Alderman, p31-2

49

Gartner, p260

50

Controversy, Alderman, p313

51

Modern British Jewry, Alderman, p102