Jewish Opposition to Free Speech

Culture of Critique Expanded and Updated

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The Culture of Critique: An Evolutionary Analysis of Jewish Involvement in Twentieth-Century Intellectual and Political Movements, 3rd edition
Kevin MacDonald
Antelope Hill Publishing, 2025 (recently banned on Amazon)
666+c pages, $39.89 paperback

In the later half of the twentieth century, the United States of America—hitherto the world’s most powerful and prosperous country—opened its borders to hostile foreign multitudes, lost its will to enforce civilized standards of behavior upon blacks and other “minority groups,” began enforcing novel “antidiscrimination” laws in a manner clearly discriminatory against its own founding European stock, repurposed its institutions of higher education for the inculcation of radical politics and maladaptive behavior upon the young, and submitted its foreign and military policy to the interests of a belligerent little country half way around the world. In the process, we destroyed our inherited republican institutions, wasted vast amounts of blood and treasure, and left a trail of blighted lives in a country which had formerly taken for granted that each rising generation would be better off than the last. One-quarter of the way into the twenty-first century, the continued existence of anything deserving the name “United States of America” would seem very much in doubt. What on earth happened?

While there is plenty of blame to go around, including some that rightfully belongs with America’s own founding stock, the full story cannot be honestly told without paying considerable attention to the rise of Eastern European Jews to elite status.

This population is characterized by a number of positive traits, including high verbal intelligence and an overall average IQ of 111. They typically have stable marriages, practice high-investment parenting, and enjoy high levels of social trust within their own community. In their European homelands they lived for many centuries in shtetls, closed townships composed exclusively of Jews, carefully maintaining social and (especially) genetic separation from the surrounding, usually Slavic population. This was in accord with an ancient Jewish custom going back at least to the Biblical Book of Numbers, in which the prophet Balaam tells the children of Israel “you shall be a people that shall dwell alone.”

If one wants to preserve social and genetic separation, few methods are more reliable than the cultivation of negative affect toward outsiders. This is what was done in such traditional, religiously organized Jewish communities: gentiles were considered treif, or ritually unclean, and Jewish children were encouraged to think of them as violent drunkards best avoided apart from occasional self-interested economic transactions.

Following the enlightenment and the French Revolution, Jews were “emancipated” from previous legal disabilities, but ancient habits of mind are not changed as easily as laws. One consequence was the attraction of many newly-emancipated Jews to radical politics. Radicals by definition believe there is something fundamentally wrong and unjust about the societies in which they live, which disposes them to form small, tightly-knit groups of like-minded comrades united in opposition to an outside world conceived as both hostile and morally inferior. In other words, radicalism fosters a social and mental environment similar to a shtetl. It is not really such a big step as first appears from rejecting a society because its members are ritually unclean and putative idolaters to rejecting it for being exploitative, capitalist, racist, and anti-Semitic. Jews themselves have often been conscious of this congruence between radicalism and traditional Jewish life: the late American neoconservative David Horowitz, e.g., wrote in his memoir Radical Son: “What my parents had done in joining the Communist Party and moving to Sunnyside was to return to the ghetto.”

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Eastern European Jewish population had grown beyond the capacity of traditional forms of Jewish economic activity to support it, resulting in widespread and sometimes dire poverty. Many turned to fanatical messianic movements of a religious or political character. Then, beginning in the 1890s, an increasing number of these impoverished and disaffected Jews started migrating to the United States. Contrary to a widespread legend, the great majority were not “fleeing pogroms”—they were looking for economic opportunity.

Even so, many Jews brought their radicalism and hostility to gentile society with them to their new homeland, and these persisted even in the absence of legal restrictions upon them and long after they had overcome their initial poverty. Jewish sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset has written colorfully of the countless wealthy and successful American Jewish “families which around the breakfast table, day after day, in Scarsdale, Newton, Great Neck, and Beverly Hills have discussed what an awful, corrupt, immoral, undemocratic, racist society the United States is.”

Over the course of the twentieth century, these smart, ambitious, and ethnically well-networked Eastern European Jews rose to elite status in the academy, the communications media, law, business, and politics. By the 1960s, they had succeeded in replacing the old Protestant ruling class with an alliance between themselves, other “minorities” with grudges against the American majority, and a sizeable dose of loyalty-free White sociopaths on the make. Unlike the old elite it replaced, the new rulers were at best suspicious of—and often actually hostile toward—the people they came to govern, and we have already enumerated some of the most disastrous consequences of their rule in our opening paragraph.

Kevin MacDonald’s The Culture of Critique describes several influential movements created and promoted by Jews during the twentieth century in the course of their rise. It is the best book you will find on the Jewish role in America’s decline. First published by Praeger in 1998, a second paperback edition augmented with a new Preface appeared in 2002. Now, twenty-three years later, he has brought out a third edition of the work through Antelope Hill Publishing. In addition to expanding the earlier editions’ accounts of Boasian Anthropology, Freudian Psychoanalysis, various Marxist or quasi-Marxist forms of radicalism, and Jewish immigration activism, he has added an entirely new chapter on neoconservatism. As he explains:

I argue that these movements are attempts to alter Western societies in a manner that would neutralize or end anti-Semitism and enhance the prospects for Jewish group continuity and upward mobility. At a theoretical level, these movements are viewed as the outcome of conflicts of interest between Jews and non-Jews in the construction of culture and in various public policy issues.

This edition is fully 40 percent longer than its predecessor, yet a detailed table of contents makes it easier for readers to navigate.

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We shall have a detailed look at the chapter on “The Boasian School of Anthropology and the Decline of Darwinism in the Social Sciences,” since it is both representative of the work as a whole and significantly augmented over the version in previous editions.

Anthropology was still a relatively new discipline in America at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, but it enjoyed a promising theoretical foundation in Darwinian natural selection and the rapidly developing science of genetics. Darwinists and Mendelians, however, were opposed by Lamarckians who believed that acquired characteristics could be inherited: e.g., that if a man spent every day practicing the piano and then fathered a son, his son might have an inborn advantage in learning the piano. This idea was scientifically discredited by the 1930s, but long remained popular among Jewish intellectuals for nonscientific reasons, as a writer cited by MacDonald testifies:

Lenz cites an “extremely characteristic” statement of a Jewish intellectual: “The denial of the racial importance of acquired characters favours race hatred.” The obvious interpretation of such sentiments is that Jewish intellectuals opposed the theory of natural selection because of its negative political implications.

In one famous case a Jewish researcher committed suicide when the fraudulent nature of his study in support of Lamarckism was exposed.

Franz Boas was among the Jewish intellectuals to cling to Lamarckism long after its discrediting. He had what Derek Freeman describes as an “obscurantist antipathy to genetics” that extended even to opposing genetic research. This attitude was bound up with what Carl Degler called his “life-long assault on the idea that race was a primary source of the differences to be found in the mental or social capabilities of human groups.” He did not arrive at this position as a result of disinterested scientific inquiry. Rather, as Degler explains, he thought racial explanations “undesirable for society” and had “a persistent interest in pressing his social values upon the profession and the public.”

Boas appeared to wear his Jewishness lightly; MacDonald remarks that he “sought to be identified foremost as a German and as little as possible as a Jew.”  Anthropologist and historian Leonard B. Glick wrote:

He did not acknowledge a specifically Jewish cultural or ethnic identity. . . . To the extent that Jews were possessed of a culture, it was . . . strictly a matter of religious adherence. . . . He was determined . . . not to be classified as a member of any group.

Yet such surface appearances can be misleading. From a very early age, Boas was deeply concerned with anti-Semitism and felt alienated from the Germany of his time. These appear to have been the motives for his emigration to America. He also maintained close associations with the Jewish activist community in his new homeland. Especially in his early years at Columbia, most of his students were Jewish, and of the nine whom Leslie White singles out as his most important protegés, six were Jews. According to David S. Koffman: “these Jews tended to marry other Jews, be buried in Jewish cemeteries, and socialize with fellow Jews, all core features of Jewish ethnicity, though they conceived of themselves as agents of science and enlightenment, not Jewish activists.”

Boas was also dependent on Jewish patronage. In the 1930s, for instance, he worked to set up a research program to “attack the racial craze” (as he put it). The resulting Council of Research of the Social Sciences was, as Elazar Barkan acknowledges in The Retreat of Scientific Racism (1993) “largely a façade for the work of Boas and his students.” Financial support was principally Jewish, since others declined solicitations. Yet Boas was aware of the desirability of disguising Jewish motivations and involvement publicly, writing to Felix Warburg: “it seemed important to show the general applicability of the results to all races both from the scientific point of view and in order to avoid the impression that this is a purely Jewish undertaking.”

One of Boas’s Jewish students remarked that young Jews of her generation felt they had only three choices in life—go live in Paris, hawk communist newspapers on street corners, or study anthropology at Columbia. The latter option was clearly perceived as a distinctively “Jewish” thing to do. Why is this?

Many Jews have supplemented Jewish advocacy with activism on behalf of “pluralism” and other ethnic “minority groups.” Boas himself, for example, maintained close connections with the NAACP and the Urban League. David S. Lewis has described such activities as an effort to “fight anti-Semitism by remote control.” And anthropology itself as conceived by Boas was not merely a scholarly discipline but an extension of these same concerns.

Much of the actual fieldwork conducted by Boas and his students focused on the American Indian. In a passage new to this edition, MacDonald quotes from David S. Koffman’s The Jews’ Indian (2019) on the Jewish motivations that frequently lay behind their work:

Jewishness shaped the profession’s engagement with its practical object of study, the American Indian. Jews’ efforts—presented as the efforts of science itself—to salvage, collect, and preserve disappearing American Indian culture was a form of ventriloquism. [Yet they] assumed their own Jewishness would remain an invisible and insignificant force in shaping the ideas they would use to shape ideas about others.

Boasian anthropologists did not draw any sharp distinction between their professional and their political concerns:

Political action formed a part of many anthropologists’ sense of the intellectual mission of the field. Their findings, and the framing of distinct cultures, each worthy of careful attention in its own right, mattered to social existence in the United States. Their scholarship on Native American cultures developed alongside their personal and political work on behalf of Jewish causes.

Koffman highlights the case of Boas’s protegé Edward Sapir:

Sapir’s Jewish background continuously influenced and intersected with his scholarship on American Indians. Sapir’s biography shows a fascinating parallel preoccupation with both Native and Jewish social issues. These tracks run side by side, concerned as both were with parallel questions about ethnic survival, adaptability, dignity, cultural autonomy, and ethnicity.

Some Jews from Boas’s circle of influence even went to work for the US government’s Bureau of Indian Affairs, where they “consistently linked Indian uplift with an articulation of minority rights and cultural pluralism.” In this way, writes Koffman, “Jewish enlightened self-interest impacted the course of American Indian life in the middle of the twentieth century.”

Boas had a number of gentile students as well, of course, especially in the later part of his career. Yet some observers have commented upon differences in the thinking and motivations of his Jewish and gentile followers. While the rejection of racial explanations was a moral crusade for many of the Jews, as it was for Boas himself, his gentile students were more inclined to view the matter simply as a theoretical issue. Alfred Kroeber, for example, once impatiently remarked that “our business is to promote anthropology rather than to wage battles on behalf of tolerance.”

Two of Boas’s best known gentile disciples were Margeret Meade and Ruth Benedict, and it may not be an accident that both of these women were lesbians. As Sarich and Miele write in Race: The Reality of Human Difference (2004): “Their sexual preferences are relevant because developing a critique of traditional American values was as much a part of the Boasian program in anthropology as was their attacks on eugenics and nativism.” More generally, they note, “the Boasians felt deeply estranged from American society and the male WASP elites they were displacing in anthropology.” Jewish or not, they saw themselves as a morally superior ingroup engaged in a struggle against a numerically superior outgroup. In this respect, they formed a historical link between the radical cells and shtetls of the old world and the hostile elite ruling America today.

Boas posed as a skeptic and champion of methodological rigor when confronted with theories of cultural evolution or genetic influence on human differences, but as the evolutionary anthropologist Leslie White pointed out, the burden of proof rested lightly on Boas’s own shoulders: his “historical reconstructions are inferences, guesses, and unsupported assertions [ranging] from the possible to the preposterous. Almost none is verifiable.”

MacDonald writes:

An important technique of the Boasian school was to cast doubt on general theories of human evolution . . . by emphasizing the vast diversity and chaotic minutiae of human behavior, as well as the relativism of standards of evaluation. The Boasians argued that general theories of cultural evolution must await a detailed cataloguing of cultural diversity, but in fact no general theories emerged from this body of research in the ensuing half-century of its dominance of the profession. Leslie White, an evolutionary anthropologist whose professional opportunities were limited because of his theoretical orientation, noted that because of its rejection of fundamental scientific activities such as generalization and classification, Boasian anthropology should be classed more as an anti-theory than a theory of human culture.

Boas brooked no dissent from his followers:

Individuals who disagreed with the leader, such as Clark Wissler, were simply excluded from the movement. Wissler was a member of the Galton society, which promoted eugenics, and accepted the theory that there is a gradation of cultures from lowest to highest, with Western civilization at the top.

Among Boas’s most egregious sins against the scientific spirit was a study he produced at the request of the US Immigration Commission called into being by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1907. This was eventually published as Changes in Bodily Form of Descendants of Immigrants. It maintained the extremely implausible thesis that the skulls of the children of immigrants to the US differed significantly from those of their parents—in spite of the influence of heredity, and due entirely to growing up in America. The paper came to be cited countless times by writers of textbooks and anyone who wished to deprecate the importance of heredity or stress that of environment.

Ninety years later, anthropologists Corey S. Sparks and Richard L. Janz reanalyzed Boas’s original data. While they stop short of accusing him of deliberate fraud, they did find that his data fail to support his conclusions. In MacDonald’s words:

Boas made inflated claims about the results: very minor changes in cranial index were described as changes of “type” so that Boas was claiming that within one generation immigrants developed the long-headed type characteristic of northwest Europeans. Several modern studies show that cranial shape is under strong genetic influence. [Sparks and Janz’s] reanalysis of Boas’s data indicated that no more than one percent of the variation between groups could be ascribed to the environmental effects of immigration.

In short, Boas’s study was not disinterested science but propaganda in a political battle over immigration. At a minimum, he was guilty of sloppy work inspired by wishful thinking.

Boas’s actual anthropological studies, such as those on the Kwakiutl Indians of Vancouver Island, contributed little to human knowledge. But this was not where his talent lay: his true achievement was in the realm of academic politics. He built a movement that served as an extension of himself long after his death, capturing and jealously controlling anthropological institutions and publications, and making it difficult for those who dissented from his scientifically groundless views to achieve professional success. As MacDonald writes:

By 1915 his followers controlled the American Anthropological Association and held a two-thirds majority on its executive board. In 1919 Boas could state that “most of the anthropological work done at the present time in the United States” was done by his students at Columbia. By 1926 every major department of anthropology was headed by Boas’s students, the majority of whom were Jewish.

Boas strenuously promoted the work of his disciples, but rarely cited works of people outside his group except to disparage them. A section new to this third edition explains how his influential student Melville Herskovits also blocked from publication and research funding those not indebted to him or not supporting his positions. Margaret Meade’s fairy tale of a sexually liberated Samoa, on the other hand, became the bestselling anthropological work of all time due almost entirely to zealous promotion by her fellow Boasians at prominent American universities.

Among the more obvious biases of anthropological work carried out by Boas’s disciples was a nearly complete ignoring of warfare and violence among the peoples they studied. Their ethnographic studies, such as Ruth Benedict’s account of the Zuni Indians in Patterns of Culture (1934), promoted romantic primitivism as a means of critiquing modern Western civilization. Works like Primitive War (1949) by Harry Holbert Turney-High, which documented the universality and savagery of war, were simply ignored. As MacDonald explains:

The behavior of primitive peoples was bowdlerized while the behavior of European peoples was not only excoriated as uniquely evil but also as responsible for all extant examples of warfare among primitive peoples. From this perspective, it is only the fundamental inadequacy of European culture that prevents an idyllic world free from between-group conflict.

Leslie White wrote that “Boas has all the attributes of the head of a cult, a revered charismatic teacher and master, literally worshiped by disciples whose permanent loyalty has been effectively established.” MacDonald describes his position as closer to that of a Hasidic Rebbe among his followers than to the leader of a genuinely scientific research program—the results of which can never be known in advance.

Due to the success of Boas’s mostly Jewish disciples in gaining control of institutional anthropology, by the middle of the twentieth century it became commonplace for well-read American laymen to refer to human differences in cultural terms. Western Civilization was merely different from, not better than, the ways of headhunters and cannibals. A vague impression was successfully propagated to the public that “science had proven” the equality of the races; few indeed understood that the “proof” consisted in the scientists who thought otherwise having been driven into unemployment. Objective research into race and racial differences largely ceased, and an intellectual atmosphere was created in which many imagined that the opening of America’s borders to the world would make little practical difference.

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Space precludes us from looking in similar detail at all the book’s chapters, but we must give the reader an idea of the material new to this third edition. Some of the most important is found in an 85-page Preface, and concerns the rise of Jews in the American academic world. Boasian anthropology may be seen in hindsight as an early episode in this rise, but Boas died in 1942 and our main story here concerns the postwar period. As MacDonald writes:

The transformation of the faculty was well under way in the 1950s and by the late 1960s was largely complete. It was during this period that the image of the radical leftist professor replaced the image of the ivory tower professor—the unworldly person at home with his books, pipe, and tweed jacket, totally immersed in discussions of Renaissance poetry.

The old academic elite had been better educated than the public at large, of course, but saw themselves as trustees of the same Christian European civilization, and did not desire radical changes to the society in which they lived. Today’s representative professor “almost instinctively loathes the traditional institutions of European-American culture: its religion, customs, manners, and sexual attitudes.”

This matters, because the academy is a crucial locus of moral and intellectual authority:

Contemporary views on issues like race, gender, immigration are manufactured in the academy (especially elite universities), disseminated throughout the media and the lower levels of the educational system, and ultimately consumed by the educated and not-so-educated public. Newspaper articles and television programs on these issues routinely include quotes from academic experts.

By 1968 Jews, who made up less than three percent of the US population, constituted 20 percent of the faculty of elite American colleges and universities, with overrepresentation most pronounced among younger faculty. Studies found Jewish faculty well to the left of other academics, more supportive of student radicals, and more likely to approve relaxing standards in order to recruit non-White faculty and students. By 1974, a study of articles published in the top twenty academic journals found that Jews made up 56 percent of the social scientists and 61 percent of the humanities scholars.

A possibly extreme but telling example of left-wing bias is Jonathan Haidt’s informal 2011 survey at a convention of social psychologists, reputedly the most left-leaning area of academic psychology. Haidt found only three participants out of 1000 willing publicly to label themselves “conservative.” He acknowledges that this discipline has evolved into a “tribal moral community” that shuns and ostracizes political conservatives, with the result that research conflicting with its core political attitudes is either not performed or is likely to be excluded from peer-reviewed journals.

MacDonald devotes considerable attention to a widely discussed 2012 paper “Why Are Professors Liberal?” by Neil Gross and Ethan Fosse. The authors argue that academics are more liberal than the population at large for three reasons. First and most importantly, due to the higher proportion of academics with advanced educational credentials, an effect they consider independent of the role IQ plays in helping obtain such credentials. MacDonald remarks that this liberal shift may be due either to socialization and conditioning in the graduate school environment or to perceived self-interest in adopting liberal views and/or identifying with an officially sanctioned victim group.

Second, Gross and Fosse believe liberalism results from academic’s greater tolerance for controversial ideas. MacDonald is dismissive of this proposal, writing that in his observation such tolerance does not exist outside the professoriate’s self-conception.

Third, they find that liberalism corelates with the larger fraction of the religiously unaffiliated in the academy. MacDonald points out that many of the religiously unaffiliated are probably Jews, and remarks that the study would have been more informative if race and Jewish ethnic background had been included as variables alongside religious affiliation.

Gross and Fosse acknowledge that their data can be interpreted in a number of ways, but their own argument is that

the liberalism of professors . . . is a function . . . of the systematic sorting of young adults who are already liberally—or conservatively—inclined into and out of the academic profession, respectively. We argue that the professoriate, along with a number of other knowledge work fields, has been “politically typed” as appropriate for and welcoming of people with broadly liberal political sensibilities, and as inappropriate for conservatives.

In other words, academic liberalism is the product of a natural sorting process similar to that which has resulted in a career such as nursing being typecast as appropriate for women. It should be emphasized, however, that much of this sorting is done by the academy itself, not by prospective academics: many professors unhesitatingly acknowledge their willingness to discriminate against conservative job candidates.

The Gross and Fosse study also fails to explore the way the meaning of being liberal or left wing has changed over the years. The academy was already considered left-leaning when the White Protestant ascendency was still intact. But in those days being liberal meant supporting labor unions and other institutions aimed at improving the lot of the (predominantly White) working class.

The New Left abandoned the White working class because it was insufficiently radical, desiring incremental improvements of its own situation rather than communist revolution. The large Jewish component of the New Left, typified by the Frankfurt School, was also shaken by Hitler’s success in gaining the support of German labor. So they abandoned orthodox Marxism in a search for aggrieved groups more likely to demand radical change. These they found in ethnic and sexual minority groups such as Blacks, feminists, and homosexuals. They also advocated for massive non-White immigration to dilute the power of the White majority, leave Jews less conspicuous, and recruit new ethnic groups easily persuadable to cultivate grievances against the dwindling White majority.

Today’s academy is a product of the New Left of the 1960s. While it is more “liberal” (in the American sense) than the general public on economic issues, what makes it truly distinctive is its attitudes on social issues: sexual liberation (including homosexuality and abortion), moral relativism, religion, church-state separation, the replacement of patriotism by cosmopolitan ideals, and the whole range of what has been called “expressive individualism.”

Sorting can explain how an existing ideological hegemony within the academy maintains itself, but not how it could have arisen in the first place. To account for the rise of today’s academic left, Gross and Fosse propose a conflict theory of successful intellectual movements. In particular, they cite sociological research indicating that such movements have three key ingredients: 1) they originate with people with high-status positions having complaints against the current environment, resulting in conflict with the status quo; 2) these intellectuals form cohesive and cooperative networks; and 3) this network has access to prestigious institutions and publication outlets.

This fits Kevin MacDonald’s theory of Jewish intellectual movements to a T. Indeed, since the academic left is so heavily Jewish, we are in part dealing with the same subject matter. Even Gross and Fosse show some awareness of this, as MacDonald writes:

Gross and Fosse are at least somewhat cognizant of the importance of Jewish influence. They deem it relevant to point out that Jews entered the academic world in large numbers after World War II and became overrepresented among professors, especially in elite academic departments in the social sciences.

So let us apply the Gross and Fosse three-part scheme to radical Jewish academics. First, Jews do indeed have a complaint against the environment in which they live, or rather two related complaints: the long history of anti-Semitism and the predominance of White Christian culture.

As MacDonald notes, “it is common for Jews to hate all manifestations of Christianity.” In his book Why Are Jews Liberals? (2009), Norman Podhoretz formulates this Jewish complaint as follows:

[The Jews] emerged from the Middle Ages knowing for a certainty that—individual exceptions duly noted—the worst enemy they had in the world was Christianity: the churches in which it was embodied—whether Roman Catholic or Russian Orthodox or Protestant—and the people who prayed in and were shaped by them.

Anti-Jewish attitudes, however, by no means depend on Christian belief. In the nineteenth century Jews began to be criticized as an economically successful alien race intent on subverting national cultures. Accordingly, the complaint of many Jews today is no longer merely Christianity but the entire civilization created by Europeans in both its religious and its secular aspects.

From this point it is a very short step to locating the source of anti-Semitism in the nature of European-descended people themselves. The Frankfurt School took this step, and the insurgent Jewish academic left followed them. MacDonald writes:

This explicit or implicit sense that Europeans themselves are the problem is the crux of the Jewish complaint. [It] has resonated powerfully among Jewish intellectuals. Hostility to the people and culture of the West was characteristic of all the Jewish intellectual movements of the left that came to be ensconced in the academic world of the United States and other Western societies.

The second item in Gross and Fosse’s list of the traits of successful intellectual movements is that their partisans form cohesive, cooperative networks. All the Jewish movements studied by Kevin MacDonald have done this, as he has been at pains to emphasize. Group strategies outcompete individualist strategies in the intellectual and academic world just as they do in politics and the broader society. It does not matter that Western science is an individualistic enterprise in which people can defect from any group consensus easily in response to new discoveries or more plausible theories. The Jewish intellectual movements studied by MacDonald are not scientific research programs at all, but “hermeneutic exercise[s] in which any and all events can be interpreted within the context of the theory.” These authoritarian movements thus represent a corruption of the Western scientific ideal, yet that does nothing to prevent them from being effective in the context of academic politics.

Finally, Gross and Fosse note that the most successful intellectual movements are those with access to prestigious institutions and publication outlets. This has clearly been true of the Jewish movements Kevin MacDonald has studied, as he himself notes:

The New York Intellectuals developed ties with elite universities, particularly Harvard, Columbia, the University of Chicago, and the University of California-Berkeley, while psychoanalysis and Boasian anthropology became entrenched throughout academia. The Frankfurt School intellectuals were associated with Columbia and the University of California-Berkeley, and their intellectual descendants are dispersed through the academic world. The neoconservatives are mainly associated with the University of Chicago and Johns Hopkins University, and they were able to get their material published by the academic presses at these universities as well as Cornell University.

The academic world is a top-down system in which the highest levels are rigorously policed to ensure that dissenting ideas cannot benefit from institutional prestige. The panic produced by occasional leaks in the system, as when the University of Chicago’s John Mearsheimer teamed up with Harvard’s Stephen Walt to offer some cautious criticisms of the Israel lobby, demonstrate the importance of obtaining and monopolizing academic prestige.

Moreover, once an institution has been captured by the partisans of a particular intellectual perspective, informal scholarly networks become de facto gatekeeping mechanisms, creating enormous inertia. As MacDonald writes: “there is tremendous psychological pressure to adopt the fundamental assumptions at the center of the power hierarchy of the discipline. It is not surprising that people [are] attracted to these movements because of the prestige associated with them.”

What MacDonald calls the final step in the transformation of the university into a bastion of the anti-White left is the creation since the 1970s of whole programs of study revolving around aggrieved groups:

My former university is typical of academia generally in having departments or programs in American Indian Studies, Africana Studies (formerly Black Studies), American Studies (whose subject matter emphasizes “How do diverse groups within the Americas imagine their identities and their relation to the United States?”), Asian and Asian-American Studies, Chicano and Latino Studies, Jewish Studies, and Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies. All of these departments and programs are politically committed to advancing their special grievances against Whites and their culture.

Although it is difficult to specify the exact linkage, the academic triumph of Jewish radicals was followed in short order by the establishment of these other pillars of the cultural left within the university.

As MacDonald notes, women make up an important component of the grievance coalition in academia, and not only in the area of “Women’s Studies.” They make up around 60 percent of PhDs and 80 percent of bachelor’s degrees in ethnic, gender and cultural studies.

Overall, compared to men, women are more in favor of leftist programs to end free speech and censor speech they disagree with. They are more inclined toward activism, and less inclined toward dispassionate inquiry; they are more likely to agree that hate speech is violence, that it’s acceptable to shout down a speaker, that controversial scientific findings should be censored, and that it should be illegal to say offensive things about minorities.

Such differences are likely due to women’s evolutionary selection for empathy and fear. No amount of bravado about “smashing the patriarchy” can conceal women’s tendency to timid conformism, and that is precisely what leads to success in academic grievance studies.

Although MacDonald does not consider feminism a fundamentally Jewish movement, many Jewish women have unquestionably played a prominent role within it, and it is marked by the same disregard of biological realities we observed in Boasian anthropology. The new Preface accordingly offers some brief remarks on Jewish lesbian and academic gender theorist Judith Butler. One of her leading ideas is that gender identity is “performative,” and unconstrained by genetic or hormonal influences. This leaves us free to rebel against the patriarchy by engaging in “subversive performances of various kinds.” Obviously, the contemporary transgender movement would count as an example of such a performance.

Jews have been greatly overrepresented in the student bodies of elite American universities for several decades, to a degree that their intelligence and academic qualifications cannot begin to account for:

Any sign that the enrollment of Jews at elite universities is less than about 20 percent is seen as indicative of anti-Semitism. A 2009 article in The Daily Princetonian cited data from Hillel [a Jewish campus organization] indicating that, with the exception of Princeton and Dartmouth, on average Jews made up 24 percent of Ivy League undergraduates. Princeton had only 13 percent Jews, leading to much anxiety and a drive to recruit more Jewish students. The result was extensive national coverage, including articles in The New York Times and The Chronicle of Higher Education. The rabbi leading the campaign said she “would love 20 percent”—an increase from over six times the Jewish percentage in the population to around ten times.

According to Ron Unz:

These articles included denunciations of Princeton’s long historical legacy of anti-Semitism and quickly led to official apologies, followed by an immediate 30 percent rebound in Jewish numbers. During these same years, non-Jewish white enrollment across the entire Ivy League had dropped by roughly 50 percent, reducing those numbers to far below parity, but this was met with media silence or even occasional congratulations on the further “multicultural” progress of America’s elite education system.

The Preface to this new edition of The Culture of Critique also contains additions on the psychology of media influence and Jewish efforts to censor the internet, along with an updating of information on Jewish ownership and control of major communications media.

Chapter Three on “Jews and the Left” includes a new sixteen-page section “Jews as Elite in the USSR,” as well as shorter additions on Jews and McCarthyism, and even the author’s own reminiscences of Jewish participation in the New Left at the University of Wisconsin in his youth. The additions incorporate material from important works published since the second edition, including Solzhenitsyn’s Two Hundred Years Together (2002), Yuri Slezkine’s The Jewish Century (2004), and Philip Mendes’s Jews and the Left (2014).

Chapter Four on “Neoconservatism as a Jewish Movement” is new to this edition, although its core has already appeared in the author’s previous book Cultural Insurrections (2007) and elsewhere. MacDonald’s account of how the neocons maintained a self-image as a beleaguered and embattled minority even as they determined the destiny of the world’s most powerful country is an impressive testament to the unchanging nature of the Jewish shtetl mindset.

Chapter Five on “Jewish Involvement in the Psychoanalytic Movement” has been expanded with material on Freud’s Hungarian-Jewish disciple Sándor Ferenczi and the Budapest school of psychoanalysis.

Chapter Six on “The Frankfurt School of Social Research and the Pathologization of Gentile Group Allegiances” includes new biographical sketches of the major figures and cites extensively from the recently published private correspondences of Horkheimer and Adorno. A new section on Samuel H. Flowerman (based on the research of Andrew Joyce) throws light on the nexus between the Frankfurt School and influential Jews in the communications media. There is also expanded coverage of Jaques Derrida and the Dada movement.

Chapter Eight on “Jewish Shaping of US Immigration Policy” has been updated and corroborated using more recent scholarship by Daniel Okrent Daniel Tichenor, and Otis Graham, as well as Harry Richardson and Frank Salter’s Anglophobia (2023) on Jewish pro-immigration activism in Australia. MacDonald makes clear that Jewish pro-immigration activism was motivated by fear of an anti-Jewish movement among a homogeneous White Christian society, as occurred in Germany from 1933–1945) Moreover:

Nevertheless, despite its clear importance to the activist Jewish community [and its eventual tranformative effects], the most prominent sponsors of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965,

did their best to downplay the law’s importance in public discourse. National policymakers were well aware that the general public was opposed to increases in either the volume or diversity of immigration to the United States. . . . [However,] in truth the policy departures of the mid-1960s dramatically recast immigration patterns and concomitantly the nation. Annual admissions increased sharply in the years after the law’s passage. (Daniel Tichenor, Dividing Lines: The Politics of Immigration Control in America, Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 218)

The Conclusion, “Whither Judaism and the West?” is heavily updated from the previous version. MacDonald speculates on the possible rise of a new non-Jewish elite that might challenge Jewish hegemony in three key areas: the media, political funding, and the academy. He sees Elon Musk, with his support for Donald Trump’s populism and (relatively) free speech, as a possible harbinger of such an elite. Musk has commented explicitly on Jewish hostility to Whites and taken heat for it.

Regarding the media, MacDonald writes:

If the 2024 election shows anything, it’s that the legacy mainstream media is distrusted more than ever and has been effectively replaced among wide swaths of voters, especially young voters, by alternative media, particularly podcasts and social media. […] The influence of the legacy media, a main power base of the mainstream liberal-left Jewish community, appears to be in terminal decline.

A recent sign of the times was the eviction of the New York Times, National Public Radio, NBC and Politico from their Pentagon offices to make room for outlets such as One America News Network and Breitbart.

Jewish financial clout is still in place, but may be of diminishing importance as well. As of August 2024, twenty-two of the twenty-six top donors to the Trump campaign were gentiles, and only one Jew—Miriam Adelson at $100 million—made the top ten. (Musk eventually contributed around $300 million. The author quotes a description of all the wealthy people in attendance at Trump’s second inaugural, and only one of the six men named was Jewish. MacDonald notes that “most of these tycoons were likely just trying to ingratiate themselves with the new administration, but this is a huge change from the 2017 and suggests that they are quite comfortable with at least some of the sea changes Trump is pursuing.”

The university is the most difficult pillar of Jewish power to challenge, as MacDonald notes, “because hiring is rigorously policed to make sure new faculty and administrators are on the left.” There has recently been a challenge to Jewish interests in the academy by students protesting—or attempting to protest—Israeli actions in the Gaza strip. But Ron Unz vividly describes what can happen to such students:

At UCLA an encampment of peaceful protestors was violently attacked and beaten by a mob of pro-Israel thugs having no university connection but armed with bars, clubs, and fireworks, resulting in some serious injuries. Police stood aside while UCLA students were attacked by outsiders, then arrested some 200 of the former. Most of these students were absolutely stunned. For decades, they had freely protested on a wide range of political causes without ever encountering a sliver of such vicious retaliation. Some student organizations were immediately banned and the future careers of the protestors were harshly threatened.

Protesting Israel is not treated like protesting “heteronormativity.” Two Ivy League presidents were quickly forced to resign for allowing students to express themselves.

Despite this awesome display of continuing Jewish power, anti-White “Diversity, Equity and Inclusion” policies are now under serious attack at American universities. MacDonald also notes that the academy is a less important a power base than either the media or political funding.

The Conclusion has also been updated with a consideration of whether multiculturalism may be backfiring on its Jewish creators as some members of the anti-White coalition turn to anti-Semitism.

It should be acknowledged that the insertion of new material into this updated edition required the deletion of a certain amount of the old. I was sorry to note, e.g., the removal of the table contrasting European and Jewish cultural forms, found on page xxxi of the second edition. So while everyone concerned with the question of Jewish influence should promptly procure this new third edition, I am not ready to part with my copy of the second.

Britain’s “Hate Speech” Trap

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In one of the more famous Zen Buddhist riddles, or koans, an army officer meets with a monk and attempts to frustrate the contemplative monastic. “A man has been raising a goose in a bottle since it was a tiny gosling,” the officer explains. “Now it is fully grown and has no space left in the bottle. Without hurting the goose, and without breaking the bottle, how can the man get it out?” The monk doesn’t answer the question and instead moves the conversation to the weather. A little while later, the meeting coming to an end, the officer stands up to leave and approaches the door. As he reaches for the handle, the monk cries out “Oh officer!” As the officer turns, the monk smiles and continues, “There. It’s out!”

This particular koan is a good example of koans in general, in that the reader or student is presented with an impossible riddle, an intellectual trap that is totally unsolvable by logic. The goal is to sublimate the thinking mind to the instinctual mind that takes precedent in living “in the moment,” or “being present.” The koan came to mind recently while I read the horrifying news from Britain that a man has been found guilty of incitement to hatred merely for producing stickers bearing such non-aggressive slogans as “Reject White Guilt”, “Nationalism is Nurture”, and “We will be a minority in our homeland by 2066.”

How has British speech legislation been used to secure this criminal conviction and, to return to the idea of the koan, how can pro-White advocates advocate for anything when even the more passive elements of their argument have been criminalized? The riddle is straightforward: What can be said when saying anything runs the risk of imprisonment?

The Public Order Act 1986: A Jewish Contrivance

Samuel Melia, a long-serving activist and a figure apparently well-known and liked in British nationalist circles, has been convicted under section 19 of the Public Order Act 1986, which makes it a criminal offence to publish or distribute “written material which is threatening, abusive or insulting.” In the wording of the legislation, someone is guilty of an offence if “(a) he intends thereby to stir up racial hatred, or (b) having regard to all the circumstances, racial hatred is likely to be stirred up thereby.” Melia was also convicted of “encouraging or assisting the commission of the offence of racially aggravated criminal damage,” presumably because, in an act of race terrorism, the stickers may have left tiny residues of glue upon removal.

As far as legal texts go, there is much left to interpretation in the Public Order Act 1986. It’s a highly subjective piece of work. Consider, for example, the necessary but inevitably tendentious speculation on a defendant’s intentions. This is to say nothing about “regard to all the circumstances” or how exactly the likelihood of “stirring up hatred” is to be measured. The document has always been vague, and because it has remained unaltered for almost 40 years, we might assume that this was by design.

Britain’s speech law is demonstrably Jewish in origin and design. The impetus behind the Public Order Act 1986 can be traced back to the 1910s with early murmurings among Britain’s Jewish elite about the potential criminalization of anti-Semitism. Following the Jewish bombing of the King David Hotel, then British administrative headquarters for Mandatory Palestine, in 1946, Jewish delegates attempted to pass a resolution “outlawing anti-Semitism” at that year’s annual Labour Party Conference.[1] However, the bombing cost the Zionists a great many non-Jewish friends within the Labour movement, and the proposal was crushed. Following the notorious Sergeant’s Affair, in which Jewish terrorists murdered British soldiers in barbaric fashion, another explicit proposal to outlaw anti-Semitism was introduced in the House of Commons, but was rejected at its first reading in 1948. Direct and explicit efforts such as these continued to fail. In Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policy Making Since the 1960s, Erik Bleich notes that “during the late 1950s and early 1960s Jewish groups sought laws against anti-Semitic public speeches made during this era, but there is little evidence that this pressure achieved substantial results.”[2]

Further attempts to achieve speech laws were attempted through stealth, in that they concerned race more generally rather than Jews explicitly. These measures were also introduced, though unsuccessfully, with the assistance of willing White M.P.s with a track record of assisting Jews. Bleich notes that “a small number of individual Labour Party Members of Parliament repeatedly proposed anti-discrimination laws. In the early 1950s, Reginald Sorensen and Fenner Brockway each introduced ‘color bar bills’ designed to prevent discrimination against blacks on British soil.”[3] Brockway attempted no less than nine times over nine years to achieve laws against ‘discrimination’ and free speech. Although the full extent of the involvement of these politicians with Jews is unknown, a record of Parliamentary debates shows that Sorensen had been involved in assisting Jews since at least the 1930s, even participating in a 1945 symposium titled “The Future of the Jews,” where he gave a lecture to his mostly Jewish audience on “Our Common Humanity.” We have evidence that around the same time, Brockway was breaking the law by assisting Jews with forged passports and documents enabling them to enter Palestine.[4]

Since 1945, the Board of Deputies of British Jews had also been working on drafting a “group libel law” that it eventually hoped to get passed in Parliament.[5] Efforts to further tighten libel laws were made in 1952, when Jewish M.P. Harold Lever introduced a Private Members’ Bill modifying Britain’s libel laws for the first time in over fifty years. However, Lever’s efforts were later mauled by a hostile Parliament to such an extent that by the time his Bill became an Act of Parliament, his provisions were not extended, as he and his co-ethnics had hoped, to cover groups.[6] Britain’s first legislation containing any such provision as prohibiting ‘group libel’ was introduced in Parliament by Frank Soskice, the son of David Soskice — a Russian-Jewish revolutionary exile. Scholars Mark Donnelly and Ray Honeyford state that it was Soskice who “drew up the legislation” and “piloted the first Race Relations Act, 1965, through Parliament.”[7] The Act “aimed to outlaw racial discrimination in public places,” though it was soon felt, in Jewish circles, that it hadn’t gone far enough. Crucially, the 1965 Act created the Jewish-led ‘Race Relations Board’ and equipped it with the power to sponsor research for the purposes of monitoring race relations in Britain and, if necessary, extending legislation on the basis of the ‘findings’ of such research.

In 1985, another Jew moved to criminalize expressions of White racial solidarity when M.P. Harry Cohen introduced a “Racial Harassment Bill” to Parliament. Sociologist Rob Witte reports that Cohen’s attempt only failed because of “lack of parliamentary time.”[8] The following year, Cohen made a second attempt, which failed, only for Jews to return to more stealthy methods when racial elements were included with the much broader Public Order Act (1986).

The Public Order Act had been introduced to Parliament by Leon Brittanisky (renamed Leon Brittan) and supported primarily by Malcolm Rifkind, a descendant of Lithuanian Jewish immigrants. It was another clever piece of work. Brittan’s team had been tasked with drafting a White Paper on Public Order to deal with a series of miners’ strikes and demonstrations. Although issues of race were not remotely related to the events provoking the White Paper, Brittan saw that the government was eager to pass legislation restricting the miners as soon as possible and, sensing that the wide-ranging bill would endure little opposition, he ensured that additional elements were included, such as the criminalization of “incitement to racial hatred.”[9] It is Brittan’s clever little addition which has posed problems for more vocal racial nationalists in Britain today, and has led to the criminal conviction of Samuel Melia for “stickering.”

Legislative Evolution

In the early years of the Act, sentencing on conviction was a maximum of two years in prison and this was normally reserved for blunt expressions of animosity towards non-White groups. John Tyndall for example, founder of the British National Party, was one of the earliest victims of the Public Order Act and was sentenced in 1986 to 12 months in prison, serving four. In 1998, Tyndall’s successor Nick Griffin was given a nine-month suspended sentence for publishing his Who Are The Mindbenders? pamphlet in the course of which he pointed out Jewish influence in the British mass media and how this had flooded the nation with “anti-British trash.”

The Act was problematic, and had a gagging effect on British nationalism, but its reach was sufficiently blunt, and sentences relatively short, for Jonathan Bowden to remark during one of his speeches in the late 2000s that one could still discuss many controversial topics in public so long as this was done in an abstract or slightly indirect way. This seemed partially proven in 2004 when Nick Griffin was arrested and charged again, this time for remarks he made in a pub about Muslims and Islam. Although subjected to a trial, both Griffin and his co-accused Tyndall were found not guilty. Today, however, we can have no doubt that Bowden’s analysis no longer applies.

The vague wording of the Act has allowed the transformations in British culture to carry it to greater extremes without the need for an entirely new law. And there can be little doubt that culture has shifted radically further to the Left in the last 20 years. An amendment led to the extension of the maximum sentence from 2 to 7 years, with the result that sentences are now averaging 3–4 years rather than 10–12 months.

More important, the law has been gradually reinterpreted in light of new cultural ‘understandings’ of hate. ‘Hate’ used to mean that you had extreme and quasi-violent feelings of animosity towards a particular individual or group, but we now live in an age where hatred can be something as simple as insisting on the biological basis of gender, or conducting a survey of intelligence or crime alongside racial taxonomies. Hate has moved from being understood as an active and aggressive position against a given entity, to being something as banal as adopting a neutral or non-radical position on a sensitive cultural question treasured by the Left. Crucially for Mr. Melia, ‘hate’ now also encompasses the position that Whites as an ethnic group have interests and should defend them. Stickers with slogans like “No White Guilt” are seen as hateful, and part of an extreme and dangerous ideology. In such a context, we can assert that Britain has criminalized White self-defense.

Hate Crime Entrepeneurs

The increasingly extreme reach of British hate speech law has led Civitas: Institute for the Study of Civil Society, to call for the government to “hold an inquiry to determine, review and potentially repeal all elements of the law that conflict with freedom of speech, for example: Section 127 of the Communications Act, offences of stirring up hatred under the Public Order Act 1986, and the offence of ‘indecent or racialist chanting’ under the Football (Offences) Act 1991.” Of particular concern to Civitas are what it calls “hate crime entrepreneurs,” or “groups with a vested interest in presenting their members as victims of hate crime” and are thus able to “influence hate crime legislation.”

Civitas point out that the very concept of hate speech has led to a loss of freedom orchestrated by an unelected elite of lawyers and intellectuals.

Each new Act of Parliament and clarification of police guidance introduces a more subjective element into the law. The state, either through the Crown Prosecution Service or the police, comes to define what is offensive, threatening or abusive. Such understandings are grounded in a perception of the ‘lived experiences’ of ‘victims’ as members of historically oppressed groups and a belief that words can have an impact as harmful as an act of physical violence. … Every aspect of people’s lives will come under legal scrutiny in order to promote a set of state sanctioned values that have been determined by lawyers rather than voted on by the electorate.

Civitas explain that “identity groups are represented by ‘hate crime entrepreneurs’ who are incentivized to report ever increasing harms experienced by members of their community. The law comes to play a role in affirming the identity of victim groups, recognising suffering, re-educating offenders about the ‘correct’ way to think and sending a message to the rest of society about the values deemed ‘appropriate’.” In other words, society is undergoing an incentivised brainwashing and the reduction of freedom across the board. All minority identity groups have a vested interest in expanding definitions of hate crime to encompass the groups they represent, and obviously they have a vested interest in seeing increased reporting of hate crimes committed as a basis for their own future fundraising.

The groups insinuate themselves, in undemocratic fashion, into the police and legal structure, with one group noted by Civitas as boasting “we have also established joint training between the police and Crown Prosecution staff to improve the way the police identify and investigate hate crime.” So the very manner in which the police see crime and speech is being determined by non-elected minority agents. Civitas also make some comments which match up well with the historical and contemporary record of Jews ensuring their place as a privileged and protected elite within Western societies.

Such organizations lobby for better protections for their members. In order to secure these protections, they are incentivized to increase the reporting of hate crimes committed against members of their particular identity group. This lends itself to ever looser definitions of hate crime and ever more expansive cohorts of victims. Furthermore, many groups that lobby on behalf of particular communities receive government funding for their work. For example, Challenge It, Report It, Stop It reports on plans to support a range of groups such as the Jewish Museum, Show Racism the Red Card, Searchlight Educational Trust [founded by a Jewish communist] and Faith Matters’ Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks (MAMA) project.

Jewish, Muslim, and other groups hold almost constant “meetings with legal and academic experts, police and the Crown Prosecution Service (‘CPS’), charities and civil society groups, and numerous individuals with an interest in hate crime laws.” The hate crime entrepreneurs thus “play a significant role in determining the assumptions and theoretical underpinnings for the Law Commission’s analysis.”

In other words, it is the activities of these groups, as well as the problematic Jewish-led Public Order Act 1986 itself, that have led to the current predicament of Samuel Melia for mere stickering. Mr Melia is the victim of a vast and corrupt “hate crime” industry that is fuelled both by material greed and by a seething and entirely genuine hatred of the native peoples of the British Isles. To that extent we can say that the nation is in fact host to a hate crime of gargantuan nature and scope, but that it is totally forbidden, and now illegal, to speak its name.

[1] P. Medding, Studies in Contemporary Jewry: XI: Values, Interests and Identity, 108.

[2] E. Bleich, Race Politics in Britain and France: Ideas and Policy Making Since the 1960s, 42.

[3] Ibid, 41.

[4] C. Knowles, Race, Discourse and Labourism, 172.

[5] D.S. Wyman, The World Reacts to the Holocaust, 617.

[6] C. Adler (ed), The American Jewish Year Book, 1953, 234.

[7] M. Donnelly, Sixties Britain: Culture, Society and Politics, p. 115, & R. Honeyford, The Commission for Racial Equality: British Bureaucracy Confronts the Multicultural Society p.95.

[8] R. Witte, Racist Violence and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Britain, France, and the Netherlands, p.71.

[9] T. Brain, A History of Policing in England and Wales Since 1974, p.104.

“Secure Tolerance”: The Jewish Plan to Permanently Silence the West, Part 1

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“The promotion of secure tolerance will be permanent and irreversible.”
Moshe Kantor, Manifesto on Secure Tolerance, 2011.

In 2010, Harvard duo Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons published The Invisible Gorilla, which detailed their study of the human capacity to overlook even the most obvious things. In one of their experiments, Chabris and Simons created a video in which students wearing white and black t-shirts pass a basketball between themselves. Viewers were asked to count the number of times the players with the white shirts passed the ball, and many were later very satisfied to find that they were accurate in their counting. This satisfaction was tainted, however, when they were asked if they had spotted “the gorilla.” Amidst considerable confusion, the video would then be replayed for the puzzled viewers, who were stunned to see a man in a gorilla suit walk among the students and balls, take up a position in the center of the screen, and wave at the camera. They’d missed him entirely in their initial viewing. The study highlighted the capacity for humans to become fixated on set tasks, events, or other distractions, and miss even the most elaborate and remarkable of occurrences.

When it comes to Jewish activism, and especially Jewish activism in the area of censorship and mass migration, I fear that the same dynamics are at work. Panicked by this or that website or YouTube channel being defunded or banned, we miss the ‘Invisible Gorilla’ — a plan of action far more horrifying and deadly in its implications than any single act of censorship.

There are essentially two forms of censorship. The hard kind we are very familiar with. It consists in the banning or removal of websites, videos, books, podcasts, and social media accounts. It extends to defunding and deplatforming, and it reaches its apogee in the banning of activists from entering certain countries, in the arrest of activists on spurious grounds, and in the development of new laws with harsh criminal penalties for speech. These methods are dangerous and rampant, and I myself have fallen victim to several of them.

I think, however, that softer, more diffuse methods of censorship are even more insidious and perhaps even more catastrophic. We could consider, for example, the manipulation of culture so that even if certain speech is not illegal and carries no legal repercussions, it nevertheless leads to the loss of employment, the destruction of education opportunities, and the dissolving of one’s relationships. This is a form of cultural self-censorship, involving the modification of in-group standards, that has demonstrable Jewish origins. “Soft” censorship can also take the form of socio-cultural prophylaxis. Take, for example, the recent initiative of the U.S. State Department to initiate a drive to engage in the global promotion of philo-Semitic (pro-Jewish) attitudes. I really don’t believe that this will play out in the manner the State Department hopes, and I watch with interest to see precisely what the methodologies of this policy will be. I sincerely doubt its prospects for success. But what other way can this be interpreted than as a preventative measure, obstructing the growth of organic attitudes that, let’s face it, are more likely to skew to the anti-Jewish? Finally, isn’t it in the nature of contemporary culture, with its emphasis on entertainment, consumption, and sex, to be the perfect environment in which to hide many “Invisible Gorillas”? Isn’t it a whirlwind of fixations and distractions, replete with untold numbers of “woke” viewers happy to report that they’ve been enthusiastically counting passes and have the accurate number? Isn’t it rather the axiom of our time that, from the idiotic Left to the idiotic Right, Invisible Gorillas stroll freely and unhindered, laughing and waving as they go, hidden in plain sight? 

Moshe Kantor: Oligarch Activist

If I could single out one point in time at which a process was set in motion that culminated in the heightened censorship that we see today, it wouldn’t be the recent banning of the NPI/Radix YouTube channel, or the removal of the Daily Stormer from the internet after Charlottesville. No answers will be found in the banning of Alex Jones, of Stefan Molyneaux, the European travel ban on Richard Spencer, the eviction of NPI from Hungary, or recent revelations about PayPal’s selective banning process. These are all symptoms that possess no answers in themselves. I do believe, however, that we can locate the immediate intellectual and political beginnings of our present situation in 2011, in the publication of a document titled Manifesto for Secure Tolerance. The document was written by Moshe Kantor, a Russian billionaire, pernicious oligarch, and president of no less than the European Jewish Congress, the European Council on Tolerance and Reconciliation (ECTR, which we will return to), the World Holocaust Forum Foundation, the European Jewish Fund, and the Policy Council of the World Jewish Congress. In short, this Jewish billionaire is the quintessential strongly-identified leading Jewish activist, fully committed to the advancement of the interests of his ethnic group.

As leader of so many groups, and mover in so many high circles, Kantor fulfils the qualifications of the early modern stadtlans, Court Jews who boasted of significant wealth and intensive relationships with non-Jewish elites. And he exemplifies many of the same qualities, acting always in un-elected but highly-influential intercessory roles, seeking to improve the tactical and material advantages of his tribe. When not crossing the continent bleating about ‘tolerance,’ Kantor also advances Jewish interests in his capacity as the President of Moscow’s Museum of Avant-Garde Mastery — a dubious establishment dedicated to extolling the disgusting and poisonous art of co-ethnics like Marc Chagall, Chaim Soutine, and Mark Rothko (Rothko is the subject of a 3-part series of TOO articles by Brenton Sanderson).

Although masquerading as a world-renowned “peace activist,” Kantor is in fact a devoted practitioner of international Zionism. A citizen of Russia, the United Kingdom, and Israel, this world parasite wages unconventional warfare by means of backstage diplomacy, policy development, and ceaseless lobbying for repressive legislation to be imposed on Europeans everywhere.

Let’s start with his Manifesto for Secure Tolerance. Its ethos can be summed up in its slogan: “Restrictions are necessary for the freedom to live a secure life.” The instinct is to describe such as phrase as Orwellian, but surely the time has come to describe such concoctions more accurately and plainly as “Judaic.” Surely only the Judaic mind has both the shamelessness, arrogance, and spiteful aggression required to present the removal of freedoms as the key to freedom?


Moshe Kantor: Dedicated Zionist

Kantor argues that “tolerance,” which in his definition basically means acquiescence to globalism (promoted by Kantor as a universal good) and mass migration, is an essential aspect of a successful society. He argues that in order to protect “tolerance,” we should therefore impose “security requirements” (oppressive laws) that focus on “racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism.” Thus, Kantor’s creation of the idea of “Secure Tolerance,” which will see the gradual expansion of cultural and legislative repressions on Whites/nativists, first in the European Union, and then throughout the rest of the West. In Kantor’s own words:

Secure tolerance must be promoted in the public mind and practised in the most democratic way, that is, through law-making. In this way alone will the promotion of secure tolerance be permanent and irreversible. There is no better field in which to implement this project than the European Union because that in itself is a product of tolerance shown by twenty-seven nations for each other and because it is fully exposed to all the challenges of the day. The crucial factors, among others, however, determine the promotion of secure tolerance:

Education, above all primary education (we may be too late forever if we start to teach this difficult new language of communication to children over five years of age).

Secure tolerance is inseparable from the need to develop techniques or practices of Reconciliation in society, which, in turn, are based on the legal recognition of the historical truth of the Holocaust.

And, last but not least, secure tolerance and Reconciliation techniques should be formalized in a code of laws, both national and supra-national, the making of which, once started, is never to stop.

There is a lot to unpack here, but we should start with Kantor’s over-arching expressed goal, the one that opens and closes this section of his Manifesto: the imposition of supranational legislation imposing “tolerance” and outlawing dissent. Kantor’s appeal here to law-making being “the most democratic way,” is pure theater. As we will see, there is nothing democratic about the later course of Kantor’s proposals into becoming law. The Western public has never heard of Kantor’s manifesto or its later incarnations (honestly, have you?), and certainly never had an opportunity to vote on it. Kantor wants repressive laws, “permanent and irreversible,” the “making of which, once started, is never to stop,” in order to deal with, in his words, the “neo-Fascist politicians and organizations, radical nationalists and militarised racists who, in their turn are jeopardising European democratic accomplishments” and therefore represent “destructive manifestations of anti-globalism.”

Further theater is observed in Kantor’s choosing the European Union as a starting point because it “is a product of tolerance.” Of course, I’m sure it had nothing to do with the tactical advantage offered by the opportunity to give his legislative proposals a running head start by ensuring their adoption in twenty-seven countries in one swoop. Jews, of course, have much love for European unity in its current, bureaucratic incarnation. The EU is useful to Jews, who believe that Europe must be compelled to undergo its demographic death as a Continent and sooner rather than later. Supranational government in the form of the EU is seen as the most efficient means to this end. Why go to the effort of separately promoting mass migration in Germany, Britain, France, Spain etc., and navigating speech laws through each of their legal systems and parliaments, when the EU is the purse seine that can reap them all? It’s the same in the U.S. where Jews have always championed a strong central government rather than states’ rights. Jews have always perceived the capabilities of the EU as an engine of mass immigration. When Brexit happened, Ari Paul, writing in The Forward, argued in terror that a reversion to the nation-state government across Europe would be a “return to the state of affairs that gave us two world wars and the Holocaust.” His proposed remedy is the suggestion that the populations of the E.U. should be more tightly controlled through speech and hate laws, and the final solution “is to make the E.U.’s policy more favorable to multiculturalism and migration. … Jews are certainly going to play a role in which direction Europe goes.”

Moshe Kantor is one of those Jews. His insidious education proposals, designed to brainwash our children as early as possible, are mere copies of the tactics of the ADL and countless Jewish activists within psychiatry. And his call for the international legal protection of the Jewish historical narrative of the Holocaust is simply the worldwide criminalization of “Holocaust denial.” He is making speedy progress on all fronts. 

ECTR and the Jewish “Think Tank” Strategy for Increasing Non-White Migration in Britain

Kantor’s 2011 manifesto was the product of an existing diplomatic trajectory to achieve the same goals. In 2008, Kantor had founded the European Council on Tolerance and Reconciliation (ECTR), as a:

non-partisan and non-governmental institution. It is envisaged to be an opinion-making and advisory body on international tolerance promotion, reconciliation and education. It fosters understanding and tolerance among peoples of various ethnic origin; educates on techniques of reconciliation; facilitates post-conflict social apprehensions; monitors chauvinistic behaviors, proposes pro-tolerance initiatives and legal solutions.

In other words, it’s something between a think tank and a lobbying group. This “think tank” strategy is absolutely crucial to the Jewish ability to bypass or exploit democratic institutions, and has been devastating in its effectiveness. As I remarked in my study of the use of this tactic in destroying free speech in Britain, Jews had been unable to get speech-restricting legislation through Parliament by relying solely on Jewish M.P.s until the Jew Frank Soskice designed and “piloted the first Race Relations Act, 1965, through Parliament.”[1] The Act approached the problem of White British resistance to mass migration from a different angle and “aimed to outlaw racial discrimination in public places.” Crucially, the 1965 Act created the ‘Race Relations Board’ and equipped it with the power to sponsor research for the purposes of monitoring race relations in Britain and, if necessary, extending legislation on the basis of the ‘findings’ of such research:

It was a clever tactic. The Board soon began sponsoring research from ‘independent’ bodies staffed by, and often explicitly created by, Jews.[2] One of the best examples of such bodies, and certainly the most influential, was ‘Political and Economic Planning’ (PEP) a supposedly “independent research organization whose philosophy and methodology are based on the principles and values of sociology.”[3] Ray Honeyford states that although PEP dabbled in other areas, “its most influential work has been in the field of race. It is no exaggeration to say that its work in this field is far and away the biggest source of information, ideas, and opinions about the state of race relations in Britain and the experience of discrimination by ethnic minorities.”[4] One of its 1977 publications has been called “the bible of the race relations lobby in Britain.”[5]

But PEP was never ‘independent.’ From its inception it was closely linked to the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI), a body which worked to advance the cause (and demographics) of Blacks and South-East Asians in Britain, but which was run by a group of decidedly pale, not to mention Hebraic, British-born lawyers. In one of those little instances of lack of accountability in our modern ‘democracy,’ in 1965 the NCCI had been inexplicably appointed to “advise the British government on matters relating to the integration of Commonwealth immigrants.”[6] From its early days of operation, the NCCI, which became the Community Relations Commission in 1968, was staffed with Jewish lawyers like Anthony Lester (1936–). Although never elected to any public office his own Wikipedia entry states that Lester was “directly involved with the drafting of race relations legislation in Britain.” In 1968 Lester founded the Runnymede Trust, described on its website as “the UKs leading independent race equality think tank.” Indicative of the ethnic composition of the Trust, and its deeper origins and goals, Lester had founded the organization with his fellow Jew, Jim Rose. Rose is described in the Palgrave Dictionary of Anglo-Jewish History as the “Director of the Survey of Race Relations in Britain. … The Race Relations Act owed much to him.”[7] So basically, if you see a ‘think tank’ described as ‘independent,’ you can be sure its board reads like a Bar Mitzvah invitation list.

One of the ways in which Lester developed and imposed his influence on the drafting of race legislation was in his capacity as ‘special adviser’ to Roy Jenkins, the far-Left successor at the Home Office of the Frank Soskice who, as mentioned above, is Jewish. With Lester behind Jenkins, Britain had essentially gone from having a Jewish Home Office Minister, to having a Jewish-influenced puppet in the same office. In Race Relations in Britain: A Developing Agenda (1998), Lester himself writes about his involvement (though he is often ‘economical’ with the truth) in the drafting and implementation of race laws in Britain. Of course, Lester downplays his role and that of Soskice, writing that “the arrival, in December 1965, of a liberal and receptive Minister, Roy Jenkins, at the Home Office was of decisive importance in making the Race Relations Act. … When Labour came to power in 1974 I abandoned my practice at the Bar to help Roy Jenkins secure the enactment of effective legislation tackling race and sex discrimination.”[8] He further writes that “every democratic society should be concerned with promoting what Roy Jenkins memorably defined thirty years ago as a national goal: equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.”[9]

But Lester wasn’t giving anywhere near an accurate portrayal of his own interest and unceasing activism in the field of race and multiculturalism. For a start, we know that it was Lester himself who penned the influential speech he now attributes exclusively to Jenkins.[10] Further, scholar Peter Dorey notes that Lester was “the leading campaigner on race relations” for the Society of Labour Party Lawyers and that Lester had been at the forefront of the Society’s Race Relations Committee when it put pressure on the government for harsher legislation in 1966.[11] Illustrating the true nature of the relationship between Lester and Jenkins, Dorey cites correspondence between the two in which Lester castigated the 1965 law  as a “shoddy job” and in which Lester presents Jenkins with a “shopping-list of discontents: the Government should commit itself to extending the race relations legislation to cover all public places, as well as employment, housing, credit and insurance services, and it should strengthen the Race Relations Board.”[12] Dorey notes that it was in response to pressure from Lester, channeled through Jenkins, that “the Government began to reconsider its race relations policy.”[13]

In truth, Lester was one of the chief architects of modern multicultural Britain and its accompanying repressive bureaucracy. It was Lester who by his own admission, in 1975, set out “coherent principles for new legislation in the White Paper on Racial Discrimination.”[14] The principles were that: “The overwhelming majority of the colored population is here to stay, that a substantial and increasing proportion of that population belongs to this country, and that the time has come for a determined effort by Government, by industry and unions, and by ordinary men and women to ensure fair and equal treatment for all our people, regardless of their race, color, or national origin.”[15]

The point of reiterating this particular process (and Brenton Sanderson has pointed to clear and well-documented parallels in Canada, Australia and elsewhere) is that this is what is meant by Kantor’s “most democratic” way of “law-making.” This process has the appearance of democracy in that legislation is eventually moved through a Parliament or Congress, but beneath this appearance is a sequence of events mired in ethnic activism, obscured methodologies, background lobbying, false representation, and ultimately, the passing of legislation entirely at odds with the wider democratic will. We were never asked, and, in Kantor’s political philosophy, we never will be asked. These laws will continue to be developed and imposed in this manner, and, as Kantor prescribes, they will “never stop.”

The European Council on Tolerance and Reconciliation was Kantor’s first “think tank” vehicle for achieving “Secure Tolerance” legislation. Keen for the ECTR to have a “goy” face, he stayed in the background while initially handing the Presidency of the group to former Communist and President of Poland Aleksander Kwaśniewski. Kwaśniewski had a useful history of neglecting and belittling the Catholic-National character of his people, and made himself known as an ally of Jews by formally apologizing for a 1941 killing of Jews at Jedwabne by Poles, and restoring citizenship to Jews stripped of it by the communist government in 1968. Since 2015, the Presidency of the ECTR has been held by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, a dedicated globalist and arch-traitor of Satanic proportions. Beneath the Gentile faces, however, Kantor has always pulled the strings. This is his project, based on his manifesto, and his history of activism. The group’s board is stacked with honorary roles for non-Jewish politicians, but its legal direction is entirely dictated by Kantor and Prof. Yoram Dinstein, a retired Italian supreme court justice and former President and Dean of Law at Tel Aviv University. Dinstein’s area of expertise is mainly in war legislation, and his co-operation with Kantor is not really a departure from this since it amounts to a declaration of war on Whites everywhere.

Go to Part 2 of 3.

[1] M. Donnelly, Sixties Britain: Culture, Society and Politics (115), & R. Honeyford, The Commission for Racial Equality: British Bureaucracy Confronts the Multicultural Society, 95.

[2] Donnelly, 115.

[3] Honeyford, 93.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid, 94.

[6] I. Solanke, Making Anti-Racial Discrimination Law: A Comparative History of Social Action and Anti-Racial Discrimination Law, 85.

[7] W. Rubinstein (ed), The Palgrave Dictionary of Anglo-Jewish History, 566, 810.

[8] T. Blackstone (ed), Race Relations in Britain: A Developing Agenda, 24.

[9] Ibid, 22.

[10] C Williams (ed), Race and Ethnicity in a Welfare Society, 38.

[11] P. Dorey, The Labour Governments 1964-1970, 322.

[12] Ibid, 323.

[13] Ibid.

[14] T. Blackstone (ed), Race Relations in Britain: A Developing Agenda, 22.

[15] Ibid.

How the Jews won the Battle of Charlottesville

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“We have been working on the ground and behind the scenes leading up to, during, and after the rally.”
Anita Gray, regional director of the Anti-Defamation League.

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the high point in a period of increasing Alt Right confidence and activism, and it was the moment that marked our first major clash with the globalist hydra. In the wake of Charlottesville, the System that we now find ourselves in more or less open conflict with has followed its dissemination of false narratives of the day’s events with opportunistic boldness and a series of actions. In the first few days after ‘Unite the Right’, an event which saw the apparently co-ordinated ambush of White Identitarian attendees, various arms of the Alt Right have suffered logistical attacks on their internet-based activities, Steve Bannon has left the White House, the myth of the ‘right wing extremist’ has been resurrected with a vengeance, and dangerous precedents have been established on the vital issues of internet freedom and freedom of speech. We are, to a greater degree than any point in recent memory, backed into a corner.

However, despite these strained circumstances, and the hectic and confused media coverage of events in Virginia, it is crucial to understand that none of these actions and reactions against the Alt Right have been spontaneous or ad hoc. Rather, what we have witnessed is the culmination of intensive efforts by our opponents to forge a hegemonic anti-White interface encompassing Jewish ethnic activists, the police, all levels of government, Antifa, and the incentivized agents of globalism and Cultural Marxism. In the following essay I want to step back from the finer points of events in Charlottesville in order to illustrate and contextualize some of the broader patterns of Jewish activity that are in evidence. Read more

The Jewish War on White Australia: The Anti-Defamation Commission and “Click Against Hate,” Part 1 of 4

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The Australian Anti-Defamation Commission (ADC) is the Australian equivalent of America’s Anti-Defamation League (ADL). Both organizations fall under the umbrella of B’nai B’rith International which holds NGO status at the United Nations. The stated mission of the ADC is to make Australia “a better place” by fighting “anti-Semitism and all forms of racism” and combatting “the defamation of the Jewish people and Israel.” Describing itself as a “harm prevention charity,” the ADC claims to be dedicated to “promoting tolerance, justice and multiculturalism.” But despite its pious pretentions to universal benevolence, the ADC, like countless other Jewish activist organizations around the world, exists to promote the ethnic interests of Jews. The “harm” this organization is determined to prevent is any harm to these perceived interests.

Regarding the plethora of Jewish activist organizations in the United States, the Jewish academic and journalist Adam Garfinkle has observed:

The main mass-membership advocacy organizations of American Jewry — B’nai B’rith and its Anti-Defamation League (ADL), the American Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, the National Conference of Jewish Federations, and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations (a kind of steering group for the major organizations), to mention only a few — are not religious organizations but ethnic ones. It is not necessary to have any Jewish religious affiliation to be a member in good standing in these organizations, and their leaderships are composed mainly of people who are not religious or Jewishly learned Jews.

We need not go into foundational texts and statements of purpose on the question of origins, for the answer is simple enough: organizations like B’nai B’rith and the American Jewish Committee were created to lobby for particular Jewish interests. … In time, these and most other Jewish organizations became explicitly or implicitly Zionist, and thereafter existed to one degree or another to support, first, a Jewish home in Palestine, and then, after 1948, the security and prosperity of the State of Israel. In other words, all these organizations have depended, and still depend, on the validity of their serving parochial Jewish ethnic interests that are simultaneously distinct from the broader American interest but not related directly to religion. [Emphasis added][1]

Contrary to the propaganda put out by the ADC for non-Jewish consumption, the interests of Jews are not the same as those of the broader Australian community, particularly the White Australian community. While the ADC — whose motto is “Promoting Diversity” — pretends that all conflicting group interests can be reconciled through “education” and “mutual understanding,” the interests of different racial and religious groups are often fundamentally opposed and irreconcilable. The group evolutionary interests of White Australians are absolutely harmed by the mass importation of non-Whites into the country — compounded by ideological commitments by state and federal governments to “diversity” and “multiculturalism.” Read more

The big chill on free speech hits Britain

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It is a fair bet that any ‘media reform’ welcomed by Dr Moshe Kantor, President of the European Jewish Congress, will be bad news for the defenders of free speech. So it is with his reaction to the British government’s groundbreaking new definition of anti-Semitism.

Kantor said:

We welcome the UK’s landmark decision to define anti-Semitism, particularly in the face of rising attacks against Jews. We must now look towards other European governments to follow the example set by the UK.

He is referring to the British government’s decision to adopt a “legally binding definition” which will be used by police forces, councils, universities and public bodies. This ratchets the law sharply in the direction of making Jews a legally protected group and placing them beyond criticism. It would certainly sharply curtail academic and journalistic discussion of Jewish group behaviour.

For if the ethnic agendas of this very powerful and ethnocentric group cannot be discussed, it would effectively end legitimate academic and journalistic inquiry on the matter. It would certainly curtail discussion of all unflattering examples of Jewish group behaviour such as those outlined in the Culture of Critique.

The definition drafted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance definition (IHRA) is broadly the same one contained in the Anti-Semitism Awareness Act that quietly went through the US senate. The aim seems to be to create a global standard on stifling free speech about Jewish power.

The definition itself is so open-ended as to be meaningless. Read more

America as a Promised Land for Jews: Threatened by Muslims, Israel and White Identity?

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Note: This is an edited, linked version of my talk at the NPI conference in Washington, DC, November 19, 2016.

I am going to talk about Jews. It’s not that I relish doing this, but somebody’s got to do it, and it’s definitely a subject that needs to be addressed as best we can, fairly and factually, and with the understanding that we are not talking about all Jews but about activist Jews and the general thrust of the organized Jewish community.

Beginning in the nineteenth century, Jews saw America as a promised land, whose “streets are paved with gold” as they often wrote to their families in Europe. Jews were therefore staunch advocates of unrestricted immigration. Writing in 1914, University of Wisconsin sociologist Edward A. Ross believed that liberal immigration policy was exclusively a Jewish issue and he quoted the prominent author and Zionist pioneer Israel Zangwill who articulated the idea that America is an ideal place to achieve Jewish interests.

America has ample room for all the six million [Russian Jews]; any one of her states could absorb them. And next to being in a country of their own, there could be no better fate for them than to be together in a land of civil and religious liberty, of whose Constitution Christianity forms no part and where their collective votes would practically guarantee them against future persecution. (Israel Zangwill, in Ross 1914, 144)

Zangwill wrote a famous play called The Melting Pot that premiered in 1908 in Washington, DC, the heart of American political culture. What’s interesting is his idea that America was a land where all the old ethnic hatreds would be abolished in a grand symphony of ethnic harmony. Sound familiar? In the play a Jewish immigrant fleeing Russian pogroms comes to America, writes a great symphony and marries a wealthy Christian woman. Audiences were wildly enthusiastic:

There were cries for Zangwill after every scene, and President Roosevelt himself joined in the applause. During the play he sat next to Mrs. Zangwill “and positively raved.” When Zangwill took his bows afterward, “the President shouted across the theater, ‘that’s a great play, Mr. Zangwill.’ “2 … Throughout the drama [the Jewish character] argues that the United States is a land of universal love and brotherhood. He sees it as a place in which the divisions among men will soon disappear. … Within the stirring and seething of the vast cauldron, the “Great Alchemist” was melting Celt and Latin, Slav and Teuton, Greek and Syrian, black and yellow. He was fusing together East and West, North and South, pole and equator, crescent and cross.”[1]

So there you have it. Crescent and Cross. Black, Yellow and White all coming together in blissful harmony — less than 50 years after the Civil War. The reception given the play, and remember this was over a century ago, shows that this optimistic image appealed to many Americans—prominent Americans like President Teddy Roosevelt. Read more