Emil Kirkegaard: Eulogy for Richard Lynn (1930-2023)

Editor’s note: This eulogy is from Emil Kirkegaard’s Substack. Richard Lynn was truly a pillar of the hereditarian thrust in psychology which is under assault or ignored by most academics now. I have cited him extensively in my writing. The good news is that researchers like Emil Kirkegaard are carrying on this tradition.

The last man of the old hereditarian triumvirate

JUL 21, 2023
Richard Lynn passed away a few days ago in his sleep. His health had been in decline for some time, so his passing was expected. Still, it offers us a moment reflect upon the man and his work. As I knew him personally, it falls on me to provide some contrast to the usual hate mongering from SPLC and their friends.

For those interested in his personal history, you should read his 2020 autobiography Memoirs of a Dissident Psychologist (477 pages). It is one of the funniest nonfiction books I’ve read. For those looking for something shorter, there is his 2019 summary Reflections on Sixty-Eight Years of Research on Race and Intelligence. It’s worth quoting the introduction for his background for getting into the field:

I first encountered the question of race and intelligence sixty-eight years ago. This was in 1951 when I was a student reading psychology at Cambridge and attended Alice Heim’s lectures on intelligence. She told us that Blacks in the United States had a lower IQ than Whites and this was attributable to discrimination, which she subsequently asserted in her book (Heim, 1954) [1]. She also told us of the UNESCO (1951) [2] statement that “Available scientific knowledge provides no basis for believing that the groups of mankind differ in their innate capacity for intellectual and emotional development.” She did not tell us that this assertion was disputed by Sir Ronald Fisher (1951) [3], the Professor of Genetics at Cambridge, who wrote a dissent stating that evidence and everyday experience showed that human groups differ profoundly “in their innate capacity for intellectual and emotional development” and that “this problem is being obscured by entirely well-intentioned efforts to minimize the real differences that exist.”

Nor did Alice Heim tell us that Henry Garrett, the Professor of Psychology at Columbia University, had argued that genetic factors are largely responsible for the lower IQ of Blacks than of Whites (Garrett, 1945) [4] so I and my fellow students at Cambridge were not well-informed about the issue of race differences in intelligence and its causes. Alice Heim was giving us the mainstream position among social scientists in the 1950s and this remained largely unchallenged in the 1960s. I believe the only person who challenged it was Henry Garrett (1961) [5], who designated it “the equalitarian dogma”, but I did not know of him until much later. At this time I did not question the mainstream position among social scientists that Blacks and Whites have equal ability as my interest during these years was in personality and I was not thinking about intelligence.

It was in 1967 that I became interested in this issue. This came about when I moved to Ireland to take up a position as research professor at the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESIR) in Dublin. The purpose of the ESIR was to carry out research on the economic and social problems of Ireland and find policies that would help solve them. Foremost among these was that, at that time, Ireland was quite economically backward compared with Britain and I researched the literature to see what contribution I could make to this problem. It was not long before I discovered a study by John Macnamara (1966) [6] that reported that the IQ of Irish 12 year olds was 90, compared with 100 in Britain. It appeared that the low IQ was likely a significant cause of the Irish economic backwardness. I knew that intelligence was a determinant of earnings among individuals and that this was also true for groups. I knew of Cyril Burt’s (1937) [7] book The Backward Child, in which he showed that children in the boroughs of London had different IQs and that these were highly correlated across the boroughs with the earnings of adults. I knew that this had also been shown by Maller (1933) [8] in the boroughs of New York city. It seemed likely that the same would hold for nations and, in particular, for the economic backwardness of Ireland. This was how I came to formulate the theory that differences in intelligence are an important determinant of national per capita incomes that I was to publish later, in collaboration with Tatu Vanhanen, in IQ and the Wealth of Nations (Lynn and Vanhanen, 2002) [9].

As I thought about this in 1968, I decided it would be wise to check Macnamara’s study reporting the low Irish IQ. I asked two of my assistants, Ian Hart and Bernadette O’Sullivan, to carry out a further study and they did this by administering Cattell’s Culture Fair test to a sample in Dublin. They found their sample had an IQ of 88 compared with 100 in Britain (Hart and O’Sullivan, 1970) [10] and therefore closely similar to the IQ of 90 that Macnamara had reported.

Although this confirmed Macnamara’s study, it was a disconcerting result. I wondered whether it would be wise to publish my conclusion that the low IQ was a significant factor responsible for the economic backwardness of Ireland. I doubted whether this conclusion would be well received, particularly coming from an Englishman telling the Irish that they had a low IQ problem. Furthermore, it would raise the question of what policies could be adopted to solve the problem. These would be a set of eugenic policies that would raise the Irish IQ, such as the sterilization of the mentally retarded and incentives for graduates to have more children. Eugenic policies of this kind had been regarded as sensible by most informed people in the first half of the twentieth century but in the late 1960s they had begun to be repudiated. In many countries, eugenics societies closed themselves down or changed their names and that of their journals. In 1968, the British Eugenics Society ended the publication of its journal The Eugenics Review and replaced it with Journal of Biosocial Science and in 1969 the American Eugenics Society ended the publication of its journal Eugenics Quarterly and replaced it with Social Biology. Neither of these new journals published papers on eugenics. In addition, although eugenics societies had been founded in virtually all economically developed countries in the first half of the twentieth century, Ireland was an exception. Ireland at that time was a deeply Catholic country and the Catholics had been the only group, articulated by G. K. Chesterton, that had opposed eugenics in the first half of the twentieth century. By 1970, eugenics had become almost universally rejected. Virtually no-one supported eugenic programs anymore and anyone who proposed doing so would be accused of being a Nazi. For all these reasons, I did not think I could publish the low Irish IQ while I was in Dublin and I decided that, in order to do so, I would have to move.

In 1969, the consensus that there are no race differences in intelligence was challenged by Art Jensen in his paper How much can we boost IQ and scholastic achievement? [11] In this he argued that the 15 IQ point difference between Blacks and Whites in the United States was likely to have some genetic basis. To quote his words, “it is not an unreasonable hypothesis that genetic factors are implicated in the average Negro–White intelligence difference”. This paper generated a storm of protest. I read Jensen’s paper and concluded that he was right. I discussed it with Hans Eysenck who said he agreed and in 1971 [12], he published his book Race, Intelligence and Education, in which he summarised the evidence for this. About the same time, William Shockley began lecturing and publishing papers arguing that the Black IQ deficit is largely genetic (Shockley, 1971) [13] and this also generated a lot of publicity on account of his being a Nobel prize-winner for the invention of the transistor.

Lynn’s father was Sydney Harland, a British geneticist. He had an affair with Lynn’s mother at some point, but did not join the family. As such, Lynn was raised by a single mother in the 1930-1940s England. Lynn certainly inherited behavior from his father, in that Lynn’s career is essentially that of a collector of biological specimens — except that Lynn chose to collect human intelligence data instead of plants! And he sure did a lot of collecting. Lynn remained active in publishing almost up to his death at the age of 93, spanning over 50 years. Here’s a list of his most famous books, many of which will be familiar to the reader:

  • 1997. Dysgenics: Genetic Deterioration in Modern Populations.
  • 2001. The Science of Human Diversity: A History of the Pioneer Fund.
  • 2001. Eugenics: A Reassessment.
  • 2002. IQ and the Wealth of Nations. With Tatu Vanhanen.
  • 2006. IQ and Global Inequality. With Tatu Vanhanen.
  • 2006. Race Differences in Intelligence: An Evolutionary Analysis. (Second edition 2015, currently being revised.)
  • 2008. The Global Bell Curve: Race, IQ, and Inequality Worldwide.
  • 2011. The Chosen People: A Study of Jewish Intelligence and Achievement.
  • 2012. Intelligence: A Unifying Construct for the Social Sciences. With Tatu Vanhanen.
  • 2015. Evolution and Racial Differences in Sporting Ability. With Edward Dutton.
  • 2019. The Intelligence of Nations. With David Becker.
  • 2019. Race Differences in Psychopathic Personality: An Evolutionary Analysis. With Edward Dutton.
  • 2020. Memoirs of a Dissident Psychologist.
  • 2021. Sex Differences in Intelligence: The Developmental Theory.

We attempted to compile a list of his compilations. We found 445 academic papers, 22 books, 20 magazine/newspaper articles, and 6 book chapters, so in total 493 works. We probably missed some, so the true count is probably slightly north of 500 publications. Here’s a timeline of his extraordinary productivity:

Unusually, Lynn accelerated his speed of publication in his older age, the opposite of the usual pattern seen for academics and creative workers in general. I can think of several reasons for this. First, it got easier to publish with better technology. Second, after he was pensioned, he no longer had to fear social sanctions for his work, as he did when he was a professor. Third, as he got more famous, it was much easier to find coauthors to work with, and one can publish more work when one has more coauthors. Still, managing to put out 20+ papers a year while being over 80 years old is almost unheard of.

The Flynn-Lynn effect

Many people mistakenly think that James Flynn discovered the Flynn effect, which is named after him. Secular increases in intelligence test scores had been noted already in the 1930s. Lynn published a review of this work in 2013 (Who discovered the Flynn effect? A review of early studies of the secular increase of intelligence):

The term “the Flynn effect” was coined by Herrnstein and Murray (1994, p.307) to designate the increases in IQs during the twentieth century that were documented for the United States and for a number of other countries by Flynn (1984, 1987). This designation has led many to believe that it was Flynn who discovered the phenomenon. Thus, the rise of IQs “has been called the Flynn effect after its discoverer” (Newcombe, 2007, p. 74); “Flynn’s discovery” (Zhu & Tulsky, 1999, p.1,255); “Flynn, a New Zealand psychologist who discovered that IQ scores are inflating over time” (Syed, 2007, p.17); and “the insight that made him famous…intelligence scores are rising, James R. Flynn has discovered” (Holloway, 1999, p.3).

These attributions are misplaced. There were numerous reports of secular increases in intelligence during the half century before they were rediscovered by Flynn in 1984. The first objective of this paper is to summarize these early and largely forgotten studies. Who knows today of the work of Runquist (1936), who first discovered the effect? Or of Roesell (1937), Johnson (1937), Wheeler (1942) or Smith (1942) who published early reports on this phenomenon? None of these names appear in textbooks on intelligence such as those of Brody (1992), Sternberg (2000), Hunt (2011), Mackintosh (2011) and Sternberg and Kaufman (2011), or even in books wholly devoted to the Flynn effect by Neisser (1998) and Flynn (2007). The second objective of this paper is to discuss the implications that can be drawn from these early studies.

James Flynn had a piece in the same issue of the journal and his commentary began thus: “Richard is correct.”. For this reason, some authors refer to the effect as the Flynn-Lynn effect, or FLynn effect, to show the double honor. True to his lack of self-promotion, Lynn himself suggested naming it after the first author who noted it, the Runquist effect. Still, it is true that Flynn’s work was pivotal in sparking renewed interest in the score gains, an interest that remains to this day. In terms of causes, Lynn thinks he basically got it right initially:

Fifth, these results tell against most of the explanations advanced for the Flynn effect, namely that it is attributable to increased test sophistication and education (Tuddenham, 1948), “improvements in education reflecting more effective teaching” (Meadows, Herrick, Feiler, & the ALSPAC Study Team, 2007, p.58), the greater complexity of more recent environments providing greater cognitive stimulation (Williams, 1998), greater cognitive stimulation from television and media (Greenfield, 1998) and from computer games (Wolf, 2005), improvements in child rearing (Elley, 1969), more confident test taking attitudes (Brand, Freshwater, & Dockrell, 1989), the “individual multiplier” and the “social multiplier” (Dickens & Flynn, 2001) and “an enhanced real-world capacity to see the world through scientific spectacles” (Flynn, 2007, p.42). All these hypotheses predict that the effect should be absent or minimal among infants and should increase progressively through childhood and adolescence as these environmental inputs have cumulatively IQ boosting impacts, and most of them predict that that the Flynn effect should be greater for verbal abilities that are taught in schools than in non-verbal abilities. The early evidence falsifies these predictions and arguably leaves the nutrition theory impacting on infants as the most plausible explanation of the secular increase of IQs, although this has also been criticized (Flynn, 2008).

It would be historically amusing if Lynn will be chiefly remembered for correctly identifying an environmental effect on intelligence scores.

Group differences, group differences everywhere

Richard Lynn is of course most famous for his work on group differences, whether these are national and subnational differences, sex differences, or race differences. To say that he worked in areas somewhat prone to political attacks would be an understatement. Essentially all his work since 2000 concerned group differences as well as eugenics/dysgenics. Lynn was the first person to seriously study national intelligence differences, and the only prior researcher of note to have studied this previously was Raymond Cattell (1905-1998) whose 1983 edited book Intelligence and National Achievement probably inspired Lynn’s work on national differences.

His works on group differences had a large impact on my own research interests. In fact, after I emailed with Lynn in 2011 and told him I was a philosophy student, he suggested:

Have you thought about changing to psychology?

Philosophy is about words, psychology is about facts & is more satisfying.

How right he was! One year later, I changed my major to linguistics (having an extreme antipathy to the continental philosophy that is the focus of the philosophy degree at Aarhus University), but of course, I never really did much work in linguistics. While taking the degree, I spent most of my time studying psychology, statistics, genetics, programming etc. The result was my first published paper in 2013 about Danish immigration and IQ. Lynn helped me find it a place to publish it too — in Mankind Quarterly of course — and the year after he invited me to come to the first London Conference on Intelligence. The rest is history.

Lynn’s work on national intelligence differences started, as he mentioned above, back with his studies of Irish intelligence and economic underperformance relative to the United Kingdom. Ironically, Ireland is now one of the wealthiest countries in the world on paper, owing to their tax haven status for large multinational companies, while the United Kingdom is falling behind in international rankings. His work on national differences in intelligence show them to be very reliable over time. Here’s a table of Lynn’s original 1978 estimates versus Becker’s 2019 estimates:

The correlation is .81, excellent considering the small number of studies available at the time. Replication is a key tenet of science, something it has taken the mainstream psychologists decades to appreciate.

Lynn’s research on the causality of national intelligence differences was very limited in methodology. Essentially, he noted the evidence that intelligence is causal for income, education etc. at the level of persons as supporting evidence, but did not try to use econometric methods to establish causality at the national level, just publishing the correlations. Later Jones & Schneider (2006) showed that intelligence is a great predictor using Bayesian model averaging, and certainly better than most other factors that have been advocated by popular authors. We replicated and extended this result in 2022:

Since Lynn and Vanhanen’s book IQ and the Wealth of Nations (2002), many publications have evidenced a relationship between national IQ and national prosperity. The strongest statistical case for this lies in Jones and Schneider’s (2006) use of Bayesian model averaging to run thousands of regressions on GDP growth (1960-1996), using different combinations of explanatory variables. This generated a weighted average over many regressions to create estimates robust to the problem of model uncertainty. We replicate and extend Jones and Schneider’s work with many new robustness tests, including new variables, different time periods, different priors and different estimates of average national intelligence. We find national IQ to be the “best predictor” of economic growth, with a higher average coefficient and average posterior inclusion probability than all other tested variables (over 67) in every test run. Our best estimates find a one point increase in IQ is associated with a 7.8% increase in GDP per capita, above Jones and Schneider’s estimate of 6.1%. We tested the causality of national IQs using three different instrumental variables: cranial capacity, ancestry-adjusted UV radiation, and 19th-century numeracy scores. We found little evidence for reverse causation, with only ancestry-adjusted UV radiation passing the Wu-Hausman test (p < .05) when the logarithm of GDP per capita in 1960 was used as the only control variable.

Sex differences in intelligence

Lynn delights in quoting authorities in a field confidently claiming something, and then proving them wrong. Here’s the opening of his 2017 summary on sex differences in intelligence:

The equal intelligence of males and females has been almost invariably asserted from the early twentieth century up to the present. Two of the first to advance this conclusion were Burt and Moore (1912) and Terman (1916). In the second half of the century it was frequently restated. Typical conclusions by leading authorities are those of Cattell (1971, p. 131): “it is now demonstrated by countless and large samples that on the two main general cognitive abilities – fluid and crystallized intelligence – men and women, boys and girls, show no significant differences”; Brody (1992, p. 323): “gender differences in general intelligence are small and virtually non-existent”; Eysenck (1981, p. 40): “men and women average pretty much the same IQ”; Herrnstein and Murray (1994, p. 275): “the consistent story has been that men and women have nearly identical IQs”; Mackintosh (1996): “there is no sex difference in general intelligence worth speaking of ”; and Hutt (1972, p. 88): “there is little evidence that men and women differ in average intelligence”. Others who stated the same conclusion include Maccoby and Jacklin (1974, p. 65) and Geary (1998, p. 310).

The assertions that males and females have the same average IQ continued to be made in the twenty-first century. Lubinski (2000): “most investigators concur on the conclusion that the sexes manifest comparable means on general intelligence ”; Colom et al. (2000): “we can conclude that there is no sex difference in general intelligence”; Loehlin (2000, p. 177): “there are no consistent and dependable male-female differences in general intelligence”; Lippa (2002): “there are no meaningful sex differences in general intelligence”; Jorm et al. (2004): “there are negligible differences in general intelligence”; Anderson (2004, p. 829): “the evidence that there is no sex difference in general ability is overwhelming”; Spelke and Grace (2007, p. 65): “men and women have equal cognitive capacity”; Hines (2007, p. 103): “there appears to be no sex difference in general intelligence; claims that men are more intelligent than women are not supported by existing data”; Haier (2007): “general intelligence does not differ between men and women”; Pinker (2008, p. 13): “the two sexes are well matched in most areas, including intelligence”; Halpern (2007, p. 123): “there is no difference in intelligence between males and females…overall, the sexes are equally smart”; Mackintosh (2011, p. 380): “the two sexes do not differ consistently in average IQ”; Halpern (2012, p. 233): “females and males score identically on IQ tests.”

But it isn’t really so. The error these authors have been making is to neglect the effect of age. Sex differences in cognitive abilities are very small for children, it is true, but they start showing up with age. Here’s a study by Nyborg (2015):

There is a large amount of research on such post-pubescence differences, which I reviewed in 2021. That is not to say the data are perfectly consistent, but it is certainly more consistent in the direction of favoring men than showing no differences. Almost no research show a female advantage.

Dysgenic problems and eugenic solutions

Lynn’s two books on dysgenics and eugenics likewise got me to think more seriously about the problem and the potential solutions. True to his style, Lynn was ahead of the time in recommending technological solutions:

There’s no sub-chapter on surrogacy but otherwise it’s pretty much a list of currently trending technologies. The book might also contain one of the first discussions of predicted East Asian supremacy in the 2100s, as the west declines from dysgenics and political correctness. The jury is still out on that front as East Asia has even larger fertility issues than the west, and do China is moving back towards communist authoritarianism from their capitalist liberation.

Richard Lynn as a man

When I learned of his work, I read the usual online sources about him. These gave me the expectation that he has a hard nosed, perhaps mean spirited, political conservative. My actual experience with him over the years taught me exactly the opposite. Richard was a gentle, polite, scientific autist, who did not often talk about politics. In this aspect, he was similar to his long time friend Arthur Jensen. The various political extremisms attributed to him can best be described as projection by the ones writing them. Rest in peace, Richard.

Nick’s Pics: The Amazing Atheistic Adventures of Sleazy Semitic Sex-Pest Nick Cohen

Nick Cohen is a Jewish journalist who loves atheism, neo-con wars, and non-White migration. Naturally enough, he also hates Russia, Brexit, and White nationalism. While pursuing his loves and hates at the staunchly feminist Observer, sister-paper of the Guardian, he became notorious as a serial groper and sex-pest. For decades, the newspaper’s management did nothing to help his female victims or stop his sexual predation. When the scandal finally got too big to hide any more, they bade farewell to Cohen with lavish praise for his journalism and a “big cash payment.” Can you believe it?

Sleazy Semitic sex-pest Nick Cohen finds a new home

If you can believe it, you won’t be surprised to learn which other newspaper gave him a new home after he left his happy hunting ground at the Observer. Sex-pest Cohen is now nursing regular columns to life at the Jewish Chronicle. Maybe the Chronicle is nostalgic for the good old days:

Dodging the pests at the JC [Jewish Chronicle]

Gloria Tessler recalls life at the JC in the 70s when “so many editors were lunging, touching and smooching”. … Girls had to manipulate, charm and edge their way out of sexual harassment at the JC. Yes, the JC! When I started here in my 20s, back in the 1970s, I was the only woman reporter and I could not imagine lasting out the week, so many senior editors were lunging, touching and smooching. If you were not agile enough to manage a pre-emptive escape, life would be a true battlefield.

… the way to stave off these men’s unwelcome advances was to keep talking about other things, reminding them of their wives and children, praising their brilliant articles, charming them, until they slowly — very slowly, if ever — began to see you as a human being and not a sexual plaything. …

But worst of all, was the day when I walked into one senior executive’s office. His door bore a red light, so I politely knocked. Once inside, I turned to face him — to find he had exposed himself. Shocked and disbelieving, I offered some gibbering excuse about the editor needing to see me, and made a quick getaway. This was something you read about in the papers; half-dressed blokes leaping out of bushes in the park, not something you expect in a newspaper office. …

Working freelance in Fleet Street proved easier, apart from a publication where I tried offering stories to a scarily lascivious, Czech-Jewish editor with a mordant wit. He suggested lunch and the harassment began in the taxi and ended in a restaurant where he had booked a private room. With his hands groping everywhere except the salmon en croute, I managed to free myself and flee in time, lamenting later that I hadn’t sold a single story. (Dodging the pests at the JC, The Jewish Chronicle, 9th November 2017)

Why did “working freelance” elsewhere in the British media prove easier for the Jewish woman? I’d suggest it’s because she encountered fewer Jewish men. Of course, some Jewish men behave with complete propriety towards women and some White gentile men don’t. But the pattern is clear: there is a much stronger tendency towards sexual predation among Jewish men. It’s not a coincidence that prolific sex-criminals like Harvey Weinstein and Jeffrey Epstein are Jewish. Nor is a coincidence that prolific fraudsters like Bernie Madoff and Robert Maxwell are Jewish. Fraudster and Mossad agent Maxwell, who was born Hyman Binyamin Hoch in Czechoslovakia in 1923, was also a sexual predator. He was very likely the “scarily lascivious, Czech-Jewish editor” mentioned in the article above.

Jewish women support Jewish sex-criminals

Maxwell should have gone to jail for stealing huge sums from the pension funds of goyim who had worked for his media empire. But he escaped justice. His daughter Ghislaine hasn’t been so lucky. She was jailed in 2022 for working with the Jewish sex-criminal Jeffrey Epstein to exploit under-aged shiksas. The Jewish sex-criminal Harvey Weinstein also had the support of Jewish women. His Jewish lawyer, Lisa Bloom, worked with the Israeli company Black Cube to spy on the shiksas who were trying to bring Weinstein to justice. Now Jewish women have rallied to the defense of Nick Cohen. Tanya Gold tweeted that his alcoholism explained his bad behavior and made him just as much of a victim (if not more so). Hadley Freeman tweeted that he “has apologised,” so it was unfair of the New York Times to report that he had repeatedly groped junior female colleagues, had “pressed his erection” without invitation against one woman’s thigh, and had “repeatedly offered to send … explicit photographs” to another woman.

I wonder how Tanya Gold and Hadley Freeman would have reacted if Vladimir Putin or Donald Trump or Nigel Farage were proven to have pressed unsolicited erections against unsuspecting women and offered to flood the ether with mega-pixel dick-pics? I’m sure that Tanya and Hadley wouldn’t have been so forgiving. But Vlad and company are right-wing goyim. Nick is a fellow leftist Jew. And a very powerful leftist Jew too. The mainstream British media have barely covered the Nick Cohen scandal and even in the fringe media no-one has discussed obvious patterns of Jewish ethnocentrism and Jewish power. One example of that power appears in the fact that Nick Cohen, champion of free speech and doughty defender of the powerless, used his wealth to issue legal threats against his victims:

“Literally everyone knows about it, but nothing ever happens,” a sympathetic coworker reportedly told one of the women abused by Cohen.

They may have been intimidated when they learned that another person encouraging them to go public received a legal threat from a high-priced law firm acting on Cohen’s behalf. The lawyers warned that individual of “inevitable bankruptcy” unless they issued a full retraction, made a public apology, paid Cohen’s legal costs, gave a £1,000 donation to charity, and ominously, disclosed the identities of his accusers. In one particularly twisted passage, the legal threat asserted The Observer columnist was “a long established advocate of free speech.” (British media protected pro-war serial sex pest Nick Cohen for decades, The Grayzone, 8th June, 2023)

But Cohen has had support before from “high-priced” lawyers. When he wrote a book on free speech, he received a glowing review from his fellow Jew Anthony Julius, deputy chairman of the shekel-seeking law firm Mishcon de Reya. Back in 2013, Andrew Joyce discussed Julius’s extreme ethnocentrism and ability to find anti-Semitism in the most surprising places. I too have discussed him at the Occidental Observer. In “High-Voltage Hate” I described how he had lavished praise on Cohen’s anti-censorship polemic You Can’t Read This Book (2012), which he said “stands alongside” libertarian classics like “Milton’s Areopagitica (1644) and Mill’s On Liberty (1859).” But it’s clear that Julius has no genuine belief in free speech. Particularly not when Jewish interests are threatened. He was the lawyer for Ronnie Fraser, a Jewish academic who made a pro-Israeli, anti-Palestinian claim against the University and College Union in 2013. The claim was dismissed by a panel of judges as “an impermissible attempt to achieve a political end by litigious means.” The judges condemned Fraser and his supporters for betraying “a worrying disregard for pluralism, tolerance and freedom of expression.”

The chutzpah of Anthony Julius

As I described in “Gas-Chamber Blues Re-Visited,” that attack on free speech by no means exhausted the appetite of Anthony Julius and Mishcon de Reya for censorship. In the 2010s, the firm acted against a female Maltese journalist called Caruana Galizia, who was trying to expose the activities of corrupt businessmen and politicians on Malta. Her campaign ended when she was blown up by a car-bomb. After trying to silence that brave journalist in Malta, Anthony Julius then had the chutzpah to join the board of trustees at the “writers’ campaign group English PEN,” whose “mission is to defend writers and freedom of speech.” Caruana Galizia’s sons complained to English PEN about Julius’s appointment, saying that his firm Mishcon de Reya “sought to cripple her financially with libel action in UK courts. … Had our mother not been murdered, they would have succeeded.” Nick Cohen condemned Julius by name and denounced the “unsavoury alliance between oligarchs and London’s top lawyers,” then had the chutzpah to use the same tactics against his own victims.

Anthony Julius loves money, not free speech

The law firm acting for sex-pest Nick Cohen also threatened to “cripple” one of his accusers financially, even as it boasted of his credentials as “a long established advocate of free speech.” It’s clear that Jews like Nick Cohen and Anthony Julius have no real belief in free speech. It’s also clear that leftists like Nick Cohen and the Guardian News and Media group have no principle but the pursuit of power. Even as the Observer and Guardian were publishing endless articles about #MeToo and the horrors of patriarchal oppression, senior management were ignoring Cohen’s sexual predation.

Solidarity with sexual predators

But Nick and his dick-pics won’t be high on the list of indictments when managers, editors, and journalists at the Observer and Guardian are put on trial in a future White nationalist Britain. What will be high on the list is the way they have ignored the much worse and much longer-lasting sexual predation of non-White men in Rotherham and many other British towns and cities. Nick Cohen himself should face a charge of collaboration with sexual war-crimes, because he was damned by his own words in a pro-migrant article he wrote in 2015. Describing the so-called Jungle, a refugee-camp in Calais, he noted that “women sleep in a separate enclosure because they fear being raped.”

Cohen knows very well that male illegal migrants are far more likely to be sexual predators. But he still condemns all attempts to keep them out of Britain. Perhaps he feels solidarity with them, as a fellow predator. He certainly feels solidarity with them as a Jew. They don’t belong in Britain any more than he does.

Tuberville’s Tormentors: Sens. McConnell (R-PRC) and Schumer (D-Israel) Veto American Whites Protecting Their Interests

As James Fulford noted in Tommy Tuberville Vs. Chuck Schumer on ”White Nationalism”—Or Americanismwe were all very surprised to see this objectively weak Con Inc. replacement for Alabama’s great Senator Sessions taking an interest in white Americans:

…the reporter asked Tuberville, “Do you believe they should allow white nationalists in the military?” Tuberville said, “Well, they call them that. I call them Americans.”

Inevitably Tuberville was immediately bullied into cuckingTommy Tuberville now says ‘White nationalists are racists’ after refusing to denounce them, by Manu Raju, Rashard Rose and Lauren Fox, CNN, July 11, 2023.

Leaders of the Political Police were Chuck Schumer (D-Israel) and Mitch McConnell (R-PRC).

Part of the problem here is a malicious confusion of terms. White Supremacy in the sense of whites keeping political control over other races, which was a conscious strategy in the post-Reconstruction South for obvious reasons, was broken by federal power in the Civil Rights Era, with largely unreported results (see herehere). I think that simple White Supremacism, in the sense of the belief that whites are superior, which was at least plausible in the 19th century, is now extinct. Apart from the huge Asian economic renaissance, everyone who looks into the matter is aware of the racial IQ distribution and its implications. This science was not available until the 20th century.

What remains viable is white particularism, or ethnocentrism: the notion that whites can and should take action to protect the interests of their own group. (This is the definition long favored by VDARE.com.) For whites, this is crucial at a time when other groups are already practicing it in an ethnically diverse society.

This legitimacy of white interests is what I am trying to get over to the GOP Smithsonian Regents: Black Conquers Asian at Smithsonian. ASK GOP Regents Why Not a WHITE Women’s Museum Director?

As Senator Tuberville has apparently sensed, white interests desperately need protecting in the military. This week the Senate is moving to confirm what John Derbyshire describes as a White-Hating Black General to Head Our Anti-White MilitaryI tweeted:

Greenfield’s underlying article, Next Joint Chiefs Chairman Wants White Male Officers to Be a Minority [frontpagemag.com, May 11, 2023], notes:

…quotas had been issued by political appointees in a Politically Correct military, but they had focused on slowly boosting minority officers rather than calling for a purge of white men.

The 2014 quotas had looked for an 80 percent white, 10 percent black and 8 percent Asian officer corps … this fell short of Brown’s proposed racist purge.

Brown’s quotas limit the number of white officers to 67% and cut white men down to 43% … getting it down to 67%, a reduction of 10%, would require serious effort to purge white officers and bar the doors to any new ones.

As Paul Craig Roberts commented:

The real reason for recruitment failure is the recruitment message to the white heterosexual males, essentially from the “racist” South who have always been the backbone of the military services:

Join the military and be discriminated against… You will not be promoted.  The US military has too many white officers.  Your officers will be blacks, feminists, homosexuals, and transgendered freaks who have been taught to hate heterosexual white males… In fact, you and your despicable kind in the civilian population are the main enemy as seen by US Armed Forces

[Why the US Armed Services Cannot Recruit, July 11, 2023]

Judging by his mumbles in the CNN article cited above, Mitch McConnell has no idea of what White Nationalism vs. White Supremacism means. He just knows he wants to do what his donors demand. That does not include protecting white Americans.

My comment:

Q: What Military would benefit the most from a collapse in U.S. military technical competence as unsuitable browns and women waste training capabilities?

A: Obviously, China.

This is why the issue I raised in Gatestone Says ”Hundreds” of U.S. Politicians Purchased. How Can Mitch McConnell NOT Be One? is so desperately important.

Chuck Schumer is a different matter entirely.

There are many gradations of Nationalism. At the mildest, it is not much more than an affection for language, literature, dress and cuisine. Most do not aspire to actually eliminating other nations.

As a major beneficiary of “Coalition of the Fringes“ politics, Schumer has always been determined to blur the differences between White Nationalism and White Supremacism. As he was quoted lying in the CNN article above:

“The definition of white nationalism is not a matter of opinion. White nationalism, the ideology that one race is inherently superior to others, that people of color should be segregated, subjected to second-class citizenship, is racist down to its rotten core.” [My emphasis]

Schumer lives in dread that the GOP might reformulate along the lines of the Generic American Party (GAP) and wreck his plans for this country.

To save our Palestinian readers writing in: It has to be said that Schumer’s definition of White Nationalism sounds a lot like Zionism as practiced in Israel.

Here’s what Schumer recently said about his Zionism:

[as] the highest-ranking Jewish American elected official in history, I stand here today in the shadow of my ancestors who perished in the Holocaust to promise that as long as Hashem breathes air into my lungs, the United States Senate will stand behind Israel with our fullest support.

[Chuck Schumer declares “fullest support” for Israel, by Michael F. Brown, The Electronic Intifada, February 27, 2023]

This scathing article continues:

As for Schumer, his views on Israel have not changed. His religious language and support for Israel is not far removed from the remarks he made at an AIPAC conference in 2018 when he intoned in bigoted and exclusivist terms against Palestinians: “We say it’s our land. The Torah says it. But they [Palestinians] don’t believe in the Torah. So, that’s the reason there is not peace.”

Shades of Sheldon Adelson!

To get the true measure of this dishonest and extremely dangerous man, I strongly recommend Did Schumer Shill for Madoff?, by John Graham, Occidental Observer, January 16, 2011.

In brief, Schumer had fundraisers in Ponzi scheme operator Bernard Madoff’s offices, and intervened to chill the last and most serious SEC investigation into Madoff 2006-8. Then he commandeered the afternoon session of the Senate banking committee investigating the scandal and spent all the time abusing the SEC.

God save the Republic.

Email Patrick Cleburne.

Reposted from VDare.com with permission.

How diversity and immigration annihilated historical Poland

6618 words

Few countries, if any, have had their borders redrawn so many times and so thoroughly. Few nations, if any, have been entombed for more than a century, subjugated and humiliated, and resurrected. I intend to tell you a story about how immigration and diversity annihilated a nation’s statehood and almost obliterated a nation. I will tell you a story of Poland, a story of a nation that accepted and accommodated huge numbers of Germans, Jews and Russians (Ukrainians), which fact gradually and unavoidably led to the nation’s obliteration from political maps.

[Since generally Slavica non leguntur [Slavic languages are not widely read], I assume the Western reader knows nothing or next to nothing about Central Europe, about such countries as Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Hungary, Romania or Bulgaria, which is why I make oversimplifications and approximations to show a broad picture.]

Introduction

Take a look at the present-day political map of Europe and find Poland. Yes, it is this area between the Oder River to the West and the Bug (/book/) River to the East, between the Baltic Sea to the north and the Sudeten/Western Carpathian Mountains to the south. This territory roughly falls into six big parts (names are Latinized or Anglicized, as usually accepted in English historical publications):

The Baltic Sea

Pomerania Masuria
Greater Poland Mazovia
Silesia Lesser Poland

Sudeten/Carpathian Mountains

Image preview

Pomorze = Pomerania, Prusowie = Masuria (later Prussia), Wielkopolska = Greater Poland, Mazowsze = Mazovia, Śląsk = Silesia, Małopolska = Lesser Poland

Scroll the site down to the very end and see how Polish territory kept changing dramatically and notice that the geographical shape of present-day Poland overlaps to a very large degree with the initial shape a thousand years ago.

More than a thousand years ago the Polish state emerged as if from nowhere into history: the year was 966, the year of the nation’s Christian baptism, with only two or three dates known from German or Czech annals that recorded events connected with Poland prior to 966. Within the first three or four centuries of its existence, Poland – now a principality, now a kingdom, now split into a few principalities as political circumstances allowed – occupied the areas of Pomerania, Greater Poland, Lesser Poland, Silesia and Lesser Poland, roughly overlapping with today’s state area, experiencing constant but relatively slight border changes. The only area not occupied by the Slavic tribes was that of Masuria, which was inhabited by Old Prussians (not to be confused with German Prussians that most of us are familiar with [see below]), a people ethnically and linguistically related to neighbouring Lithuanians. To the east, medieval Poland bordered on Rus’ (again, now one big principality, now several principalities). No Belarus or Ukraine as political entities were known at that time. Just as it is today, the Western Carpathian Mountains separated Poland from what today is known as Slovakia, while across the Sudeten Mountains Poland was bordered by Czechia (in medieval annals and chronicles as well as in present-day historical literature referred to as Bohemia). Thus, medieval neighbours of Poland were – apart from Old Prussians – the same as they are today, with one exception: there was no Germany, no German principality or kingdom across the Oder: these territories (approximately the area of the former German Democratic Republic) were occupied by Western Slavs, who still survive in very small numbers in East Germany in the area around Dresden and Leipzig (toponyms of Slavic origin!)) and are known as Sorbs (think of Serbs in the Balkans!) and Lusatians. Today, names of towns and villages along with names of streets in this area are given in German and simultaneously Sorbian or Lusatian.

Survey names of towns and villages in a detailed map of East Germany: you will discover  Slavic-sounding toponyms. Many of them end in -ow (compare Kraków, anglicized Cracow, Poland’s second largest city), and their strangeness to the German ear is marked by the fact that in German pronunciation their final w is silent. A rather well-known neighbourhood in Berlin that goes by the name of Pankow is pronounced PAHN-kaw. The same is true of German surnames of Slavic origin ending in -ow.

Also, German names in -witz correspond to the Slavic/Polish toponymic ending -ice /eetzeh/, and they are commonly found in East Germany.

Now the linguistic icing on the cake: Germany’s capital city is a Slavic name par excellence! Without resorting to complicated linguistic analysis, consider this simple observation: unlike other “truly” German toponyms, the name Berlin is stressed on the last syllable (not only in German, but also in English). Why? Because Slavs would stress the penultimate syllable irrespective of the form of the word. First German settlers, colonisers or conquerors would hear the name Berlin mostly in grammatical cases other than the nominative because we usually say phrases like I live in Berlin, I go to Berlin, I left Berlin etc. rather than This is Berlin. These other grammatical cases (Slavic languages are highly inflectional; if you know Latin, you get the idea) added a syllable to the name Berlin and the added syllable drew the stress from BER- to -LIN because stress always falls on the last-but-one syllable. The German settlers, colonisers or conquerors would adopt the toponym, without however adopting its grammatical endings as they meant nothing to them, and so Berlin ended up being pronounced as ber-LIN. It goes for all other Germanized names in Eastern Germany, like for instance Schwerin, a large port on the Baltic Sea.

Excuse this longish aside. It was intended to impress upon the reader how big the ethnic changes can be throughout centuries. By way of comparison, names of numerous villages and towns in England retell roughly the history of the many peoples that settled there; consider the Spanish names in southern United States or the toponyms of Indian origin in all of the United States.

Germans

The territories west of the Oder did not belong to medieval Poland, but they were certainly no part of medieval Germany, either. They might have become part of Poland due to ethnic closeness, but they did not; rather, western and northern parts of Poland became Germany. How did it come about?

The Slavic territories West of the Oder were successively conquered and colonised by the Germans, to which end Germans even created special administrative units whose task it was to carry out the process. Medieval Poland tried – weakly – to compete for influence over these territories but was compelled to give up. Westernmost Slavs were slowly but surely subjugated, nationally deracinated or ethnically cleansed. At this juncture the reader will not be surprised to know that there is an appreciable Slavic genetic component among present-day Germans.

Let us consider now Poland proper. Within three centuries from the inception of Polish statehood, Silesia and Pomerania (see the graph above) became German along with Masuria (which was originally inhabited by Old Prussians). You might think such huge ethnic changes must have taken place as a result of a war or – still better – a series of wars. How otherwise do you lose territory? Nothing of the sort happened. In the 12th century, Poland disintegrated into a few principalities, which was the usual phenomenon in medieval feudal Europe (think about the complicated interdependencies between kings, princes, dukes and barons of France and England). Silesian and Pomeranian princes, either greedy for profit or compelled by circumstances, began to voluntarily import German settlers; they also began marrying mainly German princesses. It is of some interest to survey the list of names of Silesian princes: such common Slavic names as Mieszko /MYESH-kaw/, Bolesław /baw-LESS-wahf/, Kazimierz /kah-ZEE-myesh/or Władysław /vwah-DISS-wahf/ were replaced by Heinrich and Konrad. Sure enough, German wives to those Heinrichs and Konrads raised generations of new Heinrichs and Konrads and imbued them with German culture. The trickling German settlement metastasized throughout Silesia or Pomerania – slowly, very slowly – and yet after three or so centuries both provinces eventually lost their Slavic/Polish identity. The name of Silesia’s capital city of Wrocław /VRAWTS-wahf/ was Germanized into Breslau (compare letter with letter and sound with sound in the two language versions of the toponym), while the Baltic port of Szczecin /SHCHEH-chin/ became Stettin (with the stress on the last syllable! just as Berlin). That’s it. Wave after wave after another wave of immigration and the area was lost to Poland for centuries, till 1945. No war was waged over those territories and, indeed, none was needed. Demographics decided all.

Another medieval Polish prince, the one who ruled over Mazovia (see graph above), had trouble with Old Prussians who would make military inroads into his territory. Since the prince was incapable of fending off the threat for himself, on the advice of one of those German princesses married to a Silesian prince, he invited and settled on a piece of his own territory (1226) the Teutonic Knights to do the job for him. Prior to this event the Teutonic Knights or the Teutonic Order known formally as the Order of Brothers of the German House of Saint Mary in Jerusalem had been in trouble. Established in the Holy Land (c. 1190) for the fight against Muslims, when eventually the Christian states had been vanquished by the Muslims, they needed to relocate to Europe and search for land. At first, the Order was invited by a Hungarian monarch to fight the peoples which made inroads into Hungary from the east. The Hungarian monarch was not slow to notice that the Teutonic Order was more after grabbing Hungarian land than defending Hungary against aliens, so he expelled them in no time before they became too strong. (It must run in Hungarian blood to sense the threat immigrants pose: think of Viktor Orban.) The Polish prince proved to be a dupe: he had the Order settle down on his territory – in today’s parlance, he helped the poor immigrants who had been expelled from both the Holy Land and Hungary – and trusted them beyond measure.

The first unit of the Teutonic Knights was made up of… seven (7) men. They built a wooden! castle and called it Vogelsang (=Birdsong). How nice! How innocuous! It took the German knights (with ever growing numbers of them) fifty years to entirely destroy Old Prussians and to establish in Masuria a state of their own, now threatening not only the part of Poland called Mazovia, whose ruler had invited them, but also the whole rest of Poland. When the Polish kingdom was recreated out of Lesser Poland, Greater Poland and the eastern part of Pomerania (the western part of Pomerania and Silesia had dropped off, Germanized as described above), the Teutonic Order conquered the eastern part of Pomerania and held it for over a century and a half. Thus, within three-four centuries Poland lost two component provinces due to immigration to which her rulers had consented.

Another aside. Whenever the European Union presses Poland into accepting immigrants, there is some opposition to it among the ruling circles. If some of them are about to cave in to the EU demands, they keep arguing that they are willing to accommodate a limited number of immigrants providing they are Christians. It only shows for the umpteenth time that history teaches us nothing. The Teutonic Order, Germans in general, Russians and Ukrainians were all Christian and still, and despite that, they all posed the greatest existential threat to Poland throughout centuries.

Consider far-reaching consequences of the ethnic changes taking place on Polish territory not only for Poland, but also for Europe and – dare I say it – for the world. Take a look at the map. Yes, you see a German state in Masuria, a German state in Pomerania and a German state in Silesia. Combine them mentally and – if you are knowledgeable about history – you will recognize the geographic contours of the Prussian state of the 18th and 19th centuries, the state that later united the whole of Germany. The Polish Corridor i.e. the strip of land connecting Poland with the Baltic Sea with its port of Gdańsk/Danzig was a constant bone of contention between German Prussia and later the Third Reich on the one hand, and Poland on the other. It was a matter of either–or. Either Poland has access to the sea, which means that the German state is split, or German territory is integral, which means that Poland is cut off from the sea. That was the primary cause of the partitions of Poland (of which later), that was the cause of the beginning of the Second World War.

In the inter-war period of 1918–1939, Poland had a significant German minority, and Germany had a significant Polish minority. That fact was used by the Third Reich to pressure Warsaw into submissive cooperation with Berlin or else. Obviously, Poland was accused of suppressing the minorities, a trump card always used by interfering powers. In 1945, the old Polish territories were reclaimed (thanks to the Red Army) and the province of East Prussia also known as Masuria was incorporated into Poland. The incorporation of Silesia, Pomerania and Masuria was accompanied with the expulsion of the entire German population. The result? Absolutely no ethnic problems with the German minority ever since because it was… non-existent.

To sum up: German immigrants, invited by Polish rulers, Germanized some of the Polish territories and also established a German state in a place separated from Germany proper by a strip of land belonging to Poland. Those Germanized Polish territories plus the area once inhabited by Old Prussians gave rise to the Prussian state. The state was the most militaristic of the German states: after all, it originated from the Teutonic Order, an order of professional soldiers. Without German Prussia, without the Polish Corridor, Poland would not have been annihilated (of which later), Germany would have been significantly smaller and weaker, and – who knows? – World War One and World War Two might not have happened, at least in the form we know from history.

Jews

In the 13th and 14th centuries large influxes of Jews began to settle in medieval Poland with the connivance of Polish princes. Wherever in Europe Jews were not welcome, they found their way to Poland. Medieval princes would invite them en masse with one of the kings having a Jewish lover who is supposed to have acted upon him for the benefit of her compatriots. Jews soon started to play a big role in Polish history, which is corroborated by the fact that towards the end of the 12th century there must have already been well-established Jewish bankers as many of the coins issued at that time bore legends in Hebraic, which was quite a unique phenomenon in the Europe of that time. The Jewish diaspora on Polish lands was constantly on the increase and it received a number of privileges from consecutive rulers, allowing them much autonomy. In the centuries to come, Jews would create their own communities and – with the permission from the Crown – they would have their own parliament! that existed for approximately three centuries: it was this parliament rather than the parliament of the kingdom that decided about the level of taxation and the Jewish parliament levied taxes on Jewish communities.

What did Jews do for a living? Apart from residing in their own little towns and villages – kind of ghettos or no-go zones of that time – and dealing in trade, typically they acted as intermediaries between the aristocracy and the peasantry. Their favourite professions was running inns and tax farming, which alienated them from Polish and later Russian (of which more below) subjects of the kingdom. When an enemy penetrated the country, they kept neutral at best: after all, they were an alien body and remained indifferent to whether they were ruled by Poles or Swedes or Germans or Russians. This, too, did not ingratiate them with the Polish nation.

The number of Jews grew constantly, which had its consequences in later centuries down to the 2oth century. After Poland had been partitioned by its neighbours – Prussia, Russia and Austria (1772–1795) – the huge Jewish community found itself in the various states as large minorities. Russia’s ruling elites soon found out that the influence of the Jewish communities on the Russian peasantry was destructive: the Jews – as said above – ran inns, and enriched themselves selling alcohol to the peasantry and giving loans. Many peasants hooked on alcohol would pledge their not-yet grown crops to receive money. Hence the idea of the government to limit Jewish influence by confining them to the area in which they could live and run their businesses, known as the Pale of Settlement. Jews would come to resent this restriction, and some of them would later go to great lengths to undermine Russian statehood which they perceived as hostile toward them. Now the Pale of Settlement was a huge chunk of territory, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Seas: it was not a ghetto in any sense of the word. But there you have it.

Jews constituted a nation within a nation, in Poland, a state within a state, and lived separately from the rest of society. There were at that time many German immigrants who settled in towns: these, as a rule, would have been Polonized within two or three generations. It was hardly the case with the Jews, most of whom did not speak Polish at all or spoke it badly. This separation was very much due to their faith – one of the surest factors anywhere, if treated seriously, counteracting the forces of assimilation.

No wonder then that when in the second half of 18th century there erupted a Jewish sectarian movement headed by Jacob Frank, who advocated the adoption of Catholicism and reconciliation with the Christian majority, the Polish gentry and of course clergy were more than positively excited. As a result, Jews who decided to convert to Catholicism were automatically recognized as part of the gentry! This was an act of ethnic aberration on the part of the Polish nobility, who regarded their own peasantry – their ethnic kith and kin – as little more than cattle, but adored Jews the moment the latter turned Christian! This phenomenon also demonstrates the power of any ideology or religion. Since that time, Jews have worked their way into the Polish middle class, later becoming doctors and lawyers and scholars who were referred to as assimilated or Polonized Jews.

One of the honorifics assigned to Austrian emperors was that of King of Jerusalem. Emperor Joseph II Habsburg, after southern parts of Poland had been joined to his monarchy, made a tour of the new lands and was so shocked at seeing so many Jews there that he is reputed to have said: Now I understand why I bear the title of the King of Jerusalem! The same monarch seeing the pernicious influence of the Jews on the peasantry forced them administratively to give up on the buying-and-selling business and tried to make them till the soil. Correspondingly, twenty thousand Jewish families were granted plots of land across that part of Poland that had been incorporated into the Habsburg monarchy. Within a few years almost all of the Jewish families sold their property and reverted to trade, money lending and running village inns. Talk of the ethnic deep-wired characteristics!

When Poland regained its independence in 1918 after 123 years of political non-existence, its Jewish minority made up 3 million against the overall number of 35 million citizens. To put it into perspective: the 1938 Munich Agreement tore away the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia because it was inhabited by 3 million Germans. True, unlike in Czechoslovakia, where the Sudeten Germans (descendants of German colonists from the Middle Ages invited there by Czech monarchs[!] to boost the Czech economy) lived compactly in Sudetenland with but few Czechs among them, Jews in Poland were scattered around the country, living both in towns and in small settlements, of which those that were majority Jewish bore the generic Yiddish/German denomination of Stettl (German for little town or Städlein).

In the years 1918–1939 nothing much changed. Many Jews did not speak Polish or spoke it badly, they continued to constitute a state within a state though officially all citizens were endowed with the same rights and obligations. Their community split into those who either had been assimilated or wanted assimilation and those who felt little or no loyalty toward the Polish state. Resentment born of the feeling of alienation and – as they called it and continue to call it – Polish antisemitism induced many of the Jews to work against the Polish state within national Jewish organizations or as majority members of a political structure ironically called the Communist Party of Poland.

There was constant tension between the Polish and Jewish nations. Jews were satisfied with owning most of the property while leaving to Poles the trappings of sovereignty, which found its expression in the saying addressed by Jews to Poles: yours are the (names of the) streets, ours are neighbourhoods (i.e. the possession of real estate). In pre-war newspapers, ads were frequently posted by Polish entrepreneurs to the tune of informing the Polish reader that: The shop/bakery/barber’s/depot etc. located at Street X is owned by a Jew. Nothing more, nothing less. The conscious Polish patriot understood the message.

At this juncture one might ask why Jews possessed property/real estate and Poles did not. Part of the answer lies in Polish patriotism. After each national uprising, Russians would confiscate the property of the insurrectionists and sell it to either Russians or wealthy Jews.

World War Two saw two dramatic developments in Polish-Jewish relations. In 1939, it was not only Germany that invaded Poland (September 1), but also Soviet Russia (September 17).  Jews in the Western parts of the country naively welcomed the aggressor: after all, when Germans had occupied Polish territories during World War One, they had not done any harm to the local Jews. Jews in the eastern part of Poland welcomed with enthusiasm the Red Army, soon were given administrative posts and were active in identifying and persecuting Polish patriots. The divide between the two nations could not be bigger.

In German-occupied Poland, Jews began to be isolated in ghettos and generally persecuted, with some Poles remaining indifferent to the fact, and with others – including some of the ardent pre-war anti-Semites – trying to extend to them a helping hand. The latter act was extremely dangerous, as in occupied Poland and only in occupied Poland such an act was punishable by the physical extermination of the whole family.

As the Red Army rolled over Poland in 1945, it was accompanied by a small Polish army, formed from the Polish citizens that inhabited pre-war eastern Poland or citizens who had been deported by the Soviets into Russia or Kazakhstan and had the luck to survive the labour camps. A large number of the officers, and especially political officers in this Polish army was made up of Polish Jews, usually former members of the above-mentioned Communist Party of Poland. They were Stalin’s pawns who together with Polish communists would rule post-war Poland. Naturally, they were bitterly anti-Catholic and anti-Polish, hunting down the Polish resistance movement that existed a few years after the war and that had hopelessly tried to combat communists. It was then that the term Judeo-Communism was formed in the consciousness of the Polish nation: people were aware that they were governed by the conglomeration of Polish and Jewish communists. The latter occupied positions especially in the government and the secret police.

Just as in Soviet Russia, so too, in Poland the party members of Polish ethnicity attempted to   free themselves of Jewish preponderance. The first success was reported in 1956 (the year of the Budapest Uprising), on the wave of the post-Stalinist thaw; the second attempt was made in 1968 (the year of student riots in France), when Jews were purged from most of higher state or party positions, with many of them leaving communist Poland and ending up miraculously occupying influential positions in the non-communist West, and in an act of revenge painting a gloomy picture of Poland, the Polish nation, and Polishness ever since. To this day, Jewish newspapers in Poland keep reminding of the year 1968 in an attempt to shame the Polish nation for its alleged unparalleled anti-Semitism. Politically and nationally conscious Poles keep reminding themselves of the joke that made the rounds in 1968: A school headmaster encounters a student on the school playground at the time when the student was supposed to participate in classes, so he asks the boy: Johnny, why are you not in class? Johnny answers: You see, sir, the teacher expelled me from class, but I don’t understand the teacher’s logic. I let out a fart, and the teacher told me to leave. Now I am enjoying fresh air while they are sitting in the stinky classroom.

Russians/Ukrainians

Roughly, east of the River Bug /book there extended vast territories inhabited by eastern Slavs collectively known as Rus’. At that time and many centuries thereafter there was no such notion as Ukraine. Kievan Rus’ stretched from almost the Black Sea to almost the Baltic Sea. In due time, as everywhere in medieval Europe, it split into a number of rivalling principalities, and in the 13th century it was partially overridden by Tartars, who subjugated most of it. The Tartars  neither changed the social structure nor the Christian religion of Rus’; they were satisfied with levying an annual tribute and deciding which of the princes was to occupy the senior position among other princes.

Much though it may come as a surprise, Lithuania – the country that on today’s political maps looks like a teeny-weeny speck of territory – by means of conquest or dynastic marriages  extended its leverage over much of the weakened Rus’, including Smolensk and Kiev. At that time the Polish reunited kingdom (which comprised only two of the five original provinces. i.e., Greater Poland and Lesser Poland) also took advantage of the weakened Rus’ and incorporated a small chunk of it, centered around the town of Lvov, which might be viewed as an attempt to compensate territorially for the provinces lost to Germans. As towards the end of the 14th century Poland and Lithuania felt threatened by the Teutonic Order (see above), their elites came up with an idea of forming a political union. The Lithuanian grand duke became simultaneously a Polish king, and later successfully led the combined Polish-Lithuanian (or rather, Russian) troops against the Teutonic Knights, while his successors on the throne subjugated the Order and incorporated a part of its territory into the Polish Crown: the Order was secularised, made dependent on Poland, and so began the history of modern (German) Prussia.

The union between Poland and Lithuania or between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was later renewed and strengthened a few times, eventually taking on the form of the body politic known in history as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which extended from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, from almost the River Oder to almost Moscow. At its territorial peak it covered an area of one million square kilometers. Ethnically or demographically it was a sight to behold!

Though it was called the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, in the mid-17th century Poles made up 40% of the whole population of 11 million, while the name Lithuanian did not reflect reality at all: almost all the remaining millions of people were Russians: present-day Belorusians and Ukrainians. The elites of the latter usually underwent Polonization and conversion to Catholicism, while the lower classes remained Russian and Orthodox Christian. Naturally, religious tolerance was the prime political requirement for such a structure to survive. How could 40 or so percent of Polish Catholics wage war against at least 50% of Orthodox Christians? That this society also comprised Protestants goes without saying: they too – and the Jews – enjoyed tolerance. The principle of tolerance led to the principle of personal freedom (true, at that time limited to the gentry), which in turn rendered royal or central authority weak. Add to it the magnates – something like present-day billionaires – with their private armies and income, both surpassing those of the state and you have the whole picture.

So long as the neighbours were relatively weak, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – a political giant  with feet of clay – continued to function and even operated relatively successfully on the international arena. The moment, however, there rose a European superpower while the Commonwealth experienced a crisis, it was prone to collapsing and disintegration. Sweden was such a European power (think of the Thirty Years’ War), whose troops regularly marched across Germany, the Baltic Seaboard and, in mid-17th century, across almost the whole of Poland. As could be expected, Polish protestants or German protestants domiciled in Poland were more than happy to either oblige the Swedes or at least refrain from putting up a fight. Encouraged by the collapse of the state, neighbouring Russia, an emerging political player, moved westwards. Russian/Ukrainian minorities (where the word minority is a misnomer) rose up and were naturally supported by Muscovy. Magnates cared more about preserving their property than laying down their lives for their country and many of them betrayed their king.

Poland barely survived this first frontal assault, and it never regained its previous might. She lost some of the territories (among others, Poland released its control over German Prussia), while the many acts of treason committed by ethnic and religious minorities turned Catholic Poles against their Protestant co-citizens, against Jews and Orthodox Christians. This in turn resulted in prosecutions for those who helped the neighbouring states – Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia – which were more than happy to seize the opportunity of exploiting internal religious tensions in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Then, at the end of the 18th century – just at the time of the French Revolution and American War of Independence – the three neighbours of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth – Prussia (which by now comprised East Prussia, West Pomerania and Silesia along with Brandenburg), Russia and Austria – acting in cahoots, dismembered the state and incorporated its parts into their countries. There was a Poland no more. The nation ceased to exist. The nation?

Enrichment by diversity

That’s how this word is understood in the English-speaking world: you draw a border line, you give a name to the enclosed territory and, lo and behold, you have created a nation. Yet, such artificial structures are by no means nations. At the time when we had two Germanies, did we have two German nations? Did they miraculously merge to create a new one after East Germany had been swallowed by West Germany? That the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was not a nation in the true ethnic sense of the word is easy to prove. The whole of the 19th, i.e., the period when Poland ceased to exist politically, was marked by numerous uprisings against the occupying countries: two against Russia, two against Prussia and one against Austria. Insurrectionists operated almost exclusively on territories that were ethnically majority Polish. No attempts at involving Russian speaking communities in the uprising against Russia were even remotely successful. There was no loyalty to the once glorious Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the part of – to use today’s terms – Ukrainians or Belorusians, let alone Jews or Germans. Polish intellectuals and political activists stubbornly daydreamed about recreating Poland in her previous borders, with millions of Belorusians and Ukrainians, and stubbornly refused to see reality: Belorusians and Ukrainians did not wish to be part of Poland. Jews, naturally, were indifferent whether they were under the rule of a Polish king or a Russian tsar or a German kaiser: none of them was one of their own.

That was the proof of the pudding: a nation is a community that is related by blood, common ancestry, the resultant language, faith and culture. Other ethnicities within the same country are at best good-weather friends. A German, a Ukrainian, a Jew could be proud of being a subject of the Polish-Lithuanian Kingdom so long as it benefited him, so long as the Kingdom was powerful. The moment it became weak or collapsed…

The respective powers that dismembered the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth accepted large numbers of Poles and Jews with precisely the same problems that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had had with its minorities. Take Poles in Russia in the cross-hairs. At first they did not have any autonomy. Then came the Napoleonic Wars. As could be expected, Poles pinned a great hope on the French Emperor.: they joined the ranks of his armies and fought under his command in diverse places such as Spain and Russia. In order to placate the Poles after the Napoleonic Wars had come to an end, Austria, Prussia and Russia decided to re-create a makeshift Poland: there emerged the Grand Duchy of Posen (territory of Greater Poland) under Prussian rule, the Republic of Cracow (semi-independent but for all practical purposes under Austrian rule), and the Kingdom of Poland (Mazovia) with a very small territory, under Russian rule. Of the three entities, the Kingdom of Poland enjoyed almost full sovereignty: it had its small army and its own currency, it had a parliament and preserved the national language along with the national symbols of statehood. It could not pursue foreign policy and Russia’s tsar was at the same time the Polish king. It was precisely in this part of Poland that the first and the biggest uprising broke out, crushed after ten months of intense fighting, with the resultant significant reduction of the autonomy.

Poles under Russian rule coalesced haphazardly with Russian society, but only up to a point. Many studied in Petersburg, Moscow or Kiev, and some made a career in the Russian army. Assimilation and integration to the hilt, one might say. No. Some of the Poles would clandestinely do political work, getting involved in anti-Russian conspiracy and prepared the nation for yet another uprising. When it broke out within thirty two years of the previous one, it was headed by high-ranking Polish officers of the… Russian army who, if caught, were shot or hanged as traitors. One of them – Zygmunt Sierakowski (shyeh-rah-KAW-vskee) was an officer of the General Staff (!) in St Petersburg: he had been tasked with the preparation of a new penal code for the Russian army and sent for that purpose to visit with the corresponding military institutions in Prussia, France and England (what enormous trust was put in him!); when the 1863–64 insurrection broke out, he joined. Romuald Traugutt, the longest dictator of the 1863–64 uprising, had been a colonel in the Russian army, fighting with distinction against the French and the English during the Crimean War!

Now, obviously not all Poles conspired against the Russian state. Some remained loyal, some were paralyzed by fear, some did not believe in the success of an insurrection. However, Russians could never figure out who was about to betray them and when. They wanted Poles (and other nationalities) to assimilate or integrate; hence, they did not prevent the alien element from joining the highest ranks of the army or administration. Yet, even those seemingly loyal Poles would have quickly reversed course if an uprising had succeeded.

The same goes for Jews, the inheritance that Russia received from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Their very large numbers and their roles as money lenders, traders and owners of village inns, put the Russian authorities on guard. They recognised especially the deleterious impact that Jews had on the peasantry (selling alcoholic beverages and giving loans), which led the authorities to the establishment of the Pale of Settlement. This caused a lot of resentment among Jews and their later strong participation in the revolutionary movement. Assimilation or integration failed completely: the three probably most feared names of the Bolshevik Revolution were those of Joseph Stalin (Georgian), Leo Trotsky (Jewish) and Felix Dzerzhinsky (Polish). Though they and company saved the empire, they destroyed Russianness and Orthodox Christianity to a very great extent.

Poland after 1945 became nationally and religiously monolithic: White, Polish, and Catholic – a thorn in the flesh of the Western liberals. Sadly, lately millions of Ukrainians have made their way to Poland, with the majority of the Polish nation being entirely oblivious to its past and supporting the immigration, especially to spite hated Russians. I have the gut feeling that the same stories will repeat themselves: [1] numerous Ukrainian uprisings during the time of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, [2] terrorist attacks in inter-war Poland, peaking in the assassination of the Polish minister of internal affairs in 1935 by a Ukrainian terrorist, and [3] the Volhynia massacre of 1943 (i.e., mass killings of Poles by Ukrainians). All these events were characterized by enormous bloodbaths, savagery and ruthlessness.

Conclusions

[1] German mass immigration into Silesia and Pomerania occurring at the invitation of Polish rulers brought about the total Germanization of these territories and their gradual estrangement from Poland. Absolutely no war was needed for those territories to be lost and there was none. One might think about the southern states of the United States in this respect with their ever increasing Spanish-speaking population.

[2] The territorial and demographic compensation when Poland joined vast eastern territories to its ethnic core was a kind of accepting a huge influx of immigrants (by way of shifting borders eastward) and resulted in a bizarre composition of the otherwise Polish (and Lithuanian) state in which aliens – i.e. the Russian speaking population – were the majority. This led to frequent and bloody internal upheavals and the intervention of the neighbours who acted in the interests of their ethnic kith and kin. Once these Russian territories had been lopped off from Poland, they never returned under her rule and no national uprising ever took place there. No assimilation or integration worked.

[3] A large Jewish minority was at best indifferent to the fate of their adopted homeland and one should not even wonder why this might be. Why should they?

[4] The huge Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth disappeared from political maps of Europe within less than 25 years (1772–1795), and remained politically subjugated for 123 years, while small, tiny German or Italian states continued to exist and enjoyed sovereignty by virtue of the ethnic coherence of each.

[5] The then billionaires – i.e., magnates, owners of land, villages and small towns –  driven by greed made successivePolish monarchs expand state territory in order for the former to gain new land and labour. That this weakened the ethnic and religious cohesiveness of the state did not bother them in the least.

[6] Ethnic and religious diversity entailed excessive tolerance, which in turn entailed excessive liberalism – to use the modern term – and excessive freedom of an individual, which in the long run wreaked havoc with the state structure and brought about its disintegration. Of the three neighbouring European powers that partitioned Poland, two – Prussia and Russia – were ethnically relatively homogeneous, and so they have survived in one form or another till this day (Imperial Germany, Weimar Germany, the Third Reich, East/West Germany, Federal Germany; Imperial Russia, Soviet Russia, the Russian Federation); the multinational third power – the Habsburg Monarchy – lived for a time and inevitably disintegrated at the end of World War One. The current European Union is a recreation of the Habsburg monarchy on a grander scale (27 nations as opposed to 10), and so its fate is similarly sealed.

[7] Assimilation or integration works up to a point under favorable circumstances and if it is enforced. Then, unavoidably, the ethnic differences come to the fore. To take one example from the text above: both Russians within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth remained Russian and eventually left the Commonwealth, and Poles within the Russian Empire remained Polish and worked towards the destruction of Russia.

How the media spread transgender ideology

Introduction

The idea that the media exist to impart information might hold good when the news is something that no one is in a position to deny. In such cases they can state their message plainly, as in: “Reckless driver arrested” or “Body of fourth victim pulled from lake”. The more questionable their message is, however, the more subtly they must convey it, until when it is patently false they must convey it so subtly that they can deny that they ever conveyed it. In short, when the media are intent on outright deception, their modus operandum is covert. With this in mind, let us look at some of the techniques they use to spread transgender ideology.

Exposure

Their most obvious technique is to give the ideology exposure. In Britain the high-point in this seems to have been around 2018, when segments such as “Does Gender Self-Identification Put Women at Risk?”, “Piers Morgan Weighs in on Girl Guides Transgender Row” and “Munroe Bergdorf Clashes With Piers in Heated Debate on Gender Fluidity” continually appeared on breakfast television. It didn’t matter whether Piers Morgan was questioning the ideology or standing up for “transgender rights, freedom and equality”, to quote one of his favourite phrases. Either way, viewers of Good Morning Britain received another ten minutes of the ideology each time.

A discussion programme

A segment from a 2017 television discussion programme began with the presenter Nicky Campbell saying to a strange-looking girl called Emma: “You’re neither male or female, right?”[1] She replied: “That’s true. I identify as non-binary, which means I’m neither male nor female, and corresponding to that I use the ‘they’/‘them’ pronouns”. Nicky Campbell made no comment, failing to point out that calling yourself something doesn’t mean that you are that thing and that she was wrong to say that she used “they”/”them” pronouns, presumably meaning to refer to herself. The pronouns she used to refer to herself were presumably the same ones everyone else uses, namely “I”, “me” and so on. What she meant was that she sought to get others to refer to her using the plural pronouns, which is a fairly tyrannical thing to do. By letting these things pass, Nicky Campbell conveyed the idea that transgenders were a special case. Their statements were exempt from rational appraisal.

Crysta, Feb. 20th 2019, “Smart Woman Leaves Gender Fluid Person SPEECHLESS In Heated Argument.” You Tube comments available here

Emma went on to say that because there was a “huge variance of gender presentation and gender identity within humankind”, there weren’t simply men and women. Again, instead of ridiculing her Nicky Campbell treated the comment as though it might be worth listening to, when clearly a person’s “gender presentation” implies nothing about their sex. He went on to give Emma several more turns to speak, signalling that she was the most important person in the studio.

At some point he jocularly asked a journalist whether his newspaper would be using “gender-neutral language”. Peter Foster said that it pretty much already did, citing its use of the word “firefighter”. He had two daughters and would be delighted if they wanted to join the fire service when they grew up, he said, suggesting that they wouldn’t have been able to join it when its employees were called firemen. If that theory was true, no woman could have joined the political party called Brothers of Italy, still less risen to become its leader and then the country’s prime minister, yet there Georgia Meloni is.

As for referring to individuals as “they”, Peter Foster said that it was a question of whether such usages caught on, suggesting that the media follow the public preference. Was he a fool or being disingenuous? The only reason most people adopt a new usage, such as calling male transgenders “her”, is that the media model it. But Peter Foster said he doubted that “they” would stick as a pronoun for one person “because actually that’s not how most people see the world”. Language is organic, he maintained, and reflects the society it comes out of. Perish the thought that it might be influenced by the media!

On the old-fashioned side, a woman named Bethany Brown said: “We mustn’t lose sight of the fact that language does refer to a reality. As a writer I’m very aware of this. It’s very important.” The pronouns “he” and “she” referred to male and female reality, she said. She thought that there was something very serious at stake if we started eroding these concepts.

To judge from comments made by viewers of the video, many agreed with her. One wrote: “Thank you to the lady who spoke out against this insanity”. Another said: “This pronoun stuff is just crap. They need to start worrying about something that deserves to be worried about.” A third observed: “The fact that this is even a discussion shows how far we’ve fallen”. An American compared Bethany Brown to “the no-nonsense teachers we had growing up”, who had “had no problem tongue-lashing idiotic kids who said stupid shit. Good for you, lady!”, he concluded.

But Nicky Campbell asked her: “What about people who are non-binary? What about people who are gender-fluid?”, presupposing the existence of such people and teaching his audience these terms. “We’re all male or female”, replied Bethany Brown, “and the attempt to suggest that there is a third gender, as far as I’m concerned it’s an ideological and a political project. It doesn’t exist.”

Shock, horror!

Another media technique for conveying a falsehood, apart from throwing a spotlight on someone expressing it, is to present the truth as scandalous. Thus a BBC breakfast television segment was entitled “Feminist Blogger Believes Trans-Women Aren’t Real Women”.[2] Not real women? What an extraordinary person this must be!

While presenting the obvious as shocking, the media present the impossible as commonplace, as in their references to people “transitioning”, intended to suggest that they have changed their sex. In the same segment, Eamonn Holmes asked Kelly Jay Keen, the “feminist blogger”: “Why does she threaten you?”, referring to one of the media’s go-to transgenders, who was also in the studio. Kelly Jay Keen said: “I think when you decide that men can come into a women’s space, it’s no longer a woman’s space”. Holmes: “But she sees herself as a woman”. According to him, the other guest saw himself as a woman, therefore he was a woman, therefore what was Kelly Jay Keen worried about?

The need for “respect”

Going back to Emma, she said that using the “wrong language” to refer to transgender people was a mark of disrespect, perhaps “one of the greatest acts of disrespect” it was possible to perform. The media use the same tactic, describing anyone who says something that will not please transgender activists as lacking respect or sensitivity.

When Susie Green as CEO of the charity Mermaids took her sixteen-year-old son to Thailand to be castrated, the Catholic journalist Caroline Farrow put out a series of tweets, only to find herself being interviewed under caution by the police six months later in connection with the Malicious Communications Act, which makes it illegal to send or deliver letters or the like for the purpose of causing distress or anxiety. Susie Green had reported her for “misgendering” her “daughter”.[3]

Caroline Farrow had tweeted that Susie Green had “mutilated” her son and rendered him sterile while he was still a child. She had written: “I think it’s time everyone called out Susie Green and Mermaids for what it is: child abuse”. This was not purely personal, she maintained, because Susie Green was a public figure who ran a lobby group that had access to Westminster and influence over education policy and the police. Susie Green had herself given out highly personal details about her son, as when describing on television how his penis had been so shrivelled by drugs as to make the surgery particularly difficult. The Thai authorities were so outraged when they found out what had happened, Caroline Farrow said, that they had outlawed child castration. The police eventually dropped the case against her.

Susanna Reid, a presenter of Good Morning Britain, deemed the language of Caroline Farrow’s tweets “inflammatory”. We should treat even public figures with respect, she said. Piers Morgan thought that if the trans lobby’s opponents acted as aggressively as the trans lobby, they wouldn’t help themselves. But Caroline Farrow said that she was trying to strip away the lobby’s euphemisms, such as “gender affirmation surgery” and “bottom surgery”, which left many people with only a hazy idea of what such surgery involved. How could she do this if she had to use the euphemisms herself?

The presenters would not be moved. Susanna Reid thought that her guest’s comments were “incredibly personal” and couched in language that was “frankly insensitive”. Piers Morgan thought that there was a “more respectful way”. “But this is the truth”, Caroline Farrow said, “and on this issue we need to tell the truth”. In her opinion we needed a clear and honest discussion. Not according to the media, we didn’t.

The removal of the stigma

Another strategy the media use to spread destructive ideologies is to erode our defences against them, which take the form of stigmas. Thirty or forty years ago there were few transsexuals, as they were then called, because they were shunned and derided as freaks. The media have since taught us that this was wrong. Instead of shunning and deriding transgenders we should embrace them as perfectly normal. Indeed, we should see them as super-normal: so normal that we who are merely normal must defer to them at every turn.

Similar is the war on science and medicine waged by transgender activists and by the media on their behalf. Just as the anti-psychiatrist R.D. Laing taught in the 1960s that schizophrenics were reacting in a sane fashion to an insane world, only to be locked up for it, so today’s transgender ideologues teach that psychiatrists are at fault if they say that transgenders are disordered. Far from it: transgenders have discovered their true, authentic selves. They are luminaries, who have completed a spiritual journey on which the rest of us might just be taking the first few stumbling steps.

Conducive language

In 2018 Susanna Reid, having pointed out that Girl Guides were aged 10–14, referred to a “transgender girl” in the Guides who “still obviously has a male body”. This wasn’t a boy, according to Susanna Reid, but a girl who happened to inhabit a boy’s body.[4] Her guest, Susie Green again, was well prepared to deflect any criticism of the idea of letting boys of this age share tents with girls. It wasn’t surprising, she said, that people thought of “transgender girls” as a safeguarding issue since this was the impression created by the media. In reality it was “trans girls” who were at risk, as we knew from the statistics “around self-harm and suicide”. And so we see that the media are quite willing to broadcast the idea that they themselves have been unjust if it will help to cast transgenders as in need of pity.

Susie Green went on to use the expression “trans girls” innumerable times, stressing that they were children, and insisted that there was “absolutely no evidence whatsoever to say that trans girls are a threat and that any issue around abuse has ever happened”. She went on: “It just seems that every time there’s an opportunity to have a go at trans girls — I mean, these are children!” When asked why parents should not be told that boys might be put in tents with their daughters, which was the main point at issue, she replied that the question was “picking on a marginalized group of children who have already been subjected often to abuse within their environment”. If parents were told, the children would be “othered”.

When Piers Morgan mentioned the recent case of a rapist in a women’s prison who had committed more sexual offences there, Susie Green pleaded for a change of subject. “Can we move away? This is about children, children being allowed to be children, and children — girls, trans girls, who are girls — being allowed take part”. We were conflating sexual predators with innocent children. No we weren’t, said Caroline Farrow, the other guest. We had already seen the case of a Scout leader being asked to advise the Green Party on its transgender policy, who had subsequently been sent to prison for 22 years for raping and torturing girls. “But he’s a man”, said Susie Green, looking puzzled. “He’s not trans.” When Piers Morgan asked Susie Green about a man celebrated as a woman, who only dressed as a woman once a week, she again looked puzzled and asked what this had to do with Girl Guides. The media make a point of giving a platform to such experts in misdirection and evasion.

Conclusion

In short, the media spread transgender ideology by exposing us to it night and day, or at least over breakfast. They obscure the falsity of is doctrines, such as that one can change one’s sex or partake of both sexes, largely by suggesting that words govern reality or by excusing preposterous statements. They show us people who can’t think or who pretend they can’t so as to stop us thinking, and obscure the grisly reality of sex surgery in the name of “respecting” those who undergo it. They do allow common sense to be heard from time to time. They do not present it as common sense, however, but rather as the outlandish voice of yesteryear. They present transgenders as our victims while dismantling our defences against their ideology.

This ideology makes a direct assault on reality and truth. A man is a woman; to classify someone as a member of their sex is to “misgender” them; to deny a person’s sex is to “affirm” it, and so on. It thereby makes an indirect assault on all that is good, for it is always the most reasonable and principled people, often Christians, whom the media oppose and who in the real world are visited by the police or lose their jobs. Correspondingly, it is always the most vicious and moronic who get rid of them. Unfortunate transgenders march behind their ideologues and their ideologues’ advocates in the media with the Father of Lies in the lead.


[1] Crysta, Feb. 20th 2019, “Smart Woman Leaves Gender Fluid Person SPEECHLESS In Heated Argument”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tM5vzvfxJ_M. The programme was The Big Questions. The full segment, without viewers’ comments, is at Simpson Training, Aug. 23rd 2017, “Would Gender Neutral Language be Better for Humankind?”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IX21PukO39g.

[2] BBC, Sept. 28th 2018, “Feminist Blogger Believes Trans-Women Aren’t Real Women | This Morning”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDSOP_j7HZE.

[3] Good Morning Britain, March 25th 2019, “Caroline Farrow on ‘Misgendering’ Tweets Row: ‘I’m Absolutely Not Regretful’ | Good Morning Britain”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rpo4rsZUNPM.

[4] Good Morning Britain, Sept. 25th 2018, “Piers Morgan Weighs in on Girl Guides Transgender Row | Good Morning Britain”, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SrQM8VQQ-P8.

A Collision at the Intersection

The American term “intersection”, what the British call a “crossroads”, is both a practical solution and a hazard. Aided by traffic lights and signage, it allows the flow of traffic travelling in different, non-parallel directions, but the fact that these differing streams have to traverse common space is what gives it a greater element of risk than driving on a regular road. There are often auto accidents at intersections.

“Intersectionality” is also part of the lexicon used by those under the spell of identity politics. For a definition, who better to turn to than the Center for Intersectional Justice (CIJ)?

The concept of intersectionality describes the ways in which systems of inequality based on gender, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, gender identity, disability, class and other forms of discrimination ‘intersect’ to create unique dynamics and effects.

Unique dynamics and effects. Keep that in mind, as this Venn-like model is currently producing both, although not in the way the CIJ passionately strive for. Intersectionality is designed to produce a united front of the oppressed and, presumably, each of the separate identities so put upon will find the others right behind them. However, at one particular intersection, a pile-up has been coming for some time. A recent and apparently insignificant example from England perfectly illustrates a culture clash that was built into the system from the outset.

Until recently, the Mayor of Keighley in Yorkshire was a Muslim, Councillor Mohammed Nazam. He attended a pride festival, and later apologized for his attendance on a Facebook page called “Keighley Pakistanis”, calling his decision to attend “a lapse in judgment”. This did not sit well with his political party, the Conservatives (we will return to Muslim conservatism), and he was forced to resign. One point of interest, from his own defense on Facebook, is that he claimed the ceremony contradicted his “personal religious beliefs”.

This is only partly true. There is a sense in which Muslims have personal religious beliefs in that they are technically individuals. But the Muslim faith is collective, that of the ummah. It is sectarian, certainly, but the Five Pillars of Islam, along with the Koran, are a common center of gravity for Muslims, an amalgam of faith and politics which features certain immutable characteristics. One of these is an explicit rejection of homosexuality.

While homosexuality is illegal in around 70 countries, there are 11 which explicitly impose or can impose a death sentence. They are all Muslim countries, and perhaps Gay Times — or at least its tourism advice department — can be relied to know where they are. This thorough-going inventory includes the relevant clause from the various nations’ penal code. The exception is Saudi Arabia, which has no penal code and instead cuts out the middle-man by applying shariah direct from the Koran.

Muslim parents have also protested against LGBTQ in the classroom in Canada and America, stamping on pride flags and not confining their protests to placards at the school gate. Three sets of Muslim parents in Maryland are taking the Montgomery School board to court on the principle that their inability to opt-out from books they find offensive contravenes their First Amendment rights. Muslims are very effective in the law courts, because what individuals don’t know, their imam does.

Protests in Ottawa caused severe cognitive dissonance among counter-protestors, says the National Post, as the opposing marchers “…appeared to be discomfited by the fact that their protestors weren’t their supposed bogeyman [conservative Whites] but included many people of color, including socially conservative Muslims.”

Socially conservative. Watch that phrase, because it has a big future in the Left’s explanation as to why intersectionality has become, to use their language, “problematic”.

Those on the political right are often accused of “not understanding” Islam. We certainly understand it better than did the White liberal residents of Hamtrack, Michigan. From the UK’s Left-wing Guardian;

In 2015, many liberal residents in Hamtrack, Michigan, celebrated as their city attracted international attention for becoming the first in the United States to elect a Muslim-majority city council … This week [published June 17] many of those same residents watched in dismay as a now fully Muslim and socially conservative city council passed legislation banning Pride flags from being flown on city property. [Italics added]

What exactly did they expect? The dominant far-Left in the West, while they are obsessed with hated conservatism, have overlooked the fact that Muslims are the most hyper-conservative creed on the planet. While an old-school British Tory might want to ease the UK back to the 1950s, many Muslims would prefer to route-march us all back to the eighth century. They make the Amish look like progressives.

And so Muslims can be reasonably said not to devote too much time to doing what the rest of us are mandated to do, which is “celebrate” pride month, or season, or year. By all accounts it is not possible to travel far in any British city without seeing the dystopian bunting of the pride flag, an ensign as ugly as the ideology that forces it on schoolchildren and, by proxy, their parents. But you won’t see the pride flag flown in Tower Hamlets, Newham, Luton or any other “social conservative” majority area of London. You will, on the other hand, see so-called “Shariah zone” posters in those areas.

Early versions of such posters had two men hand-in-hand with a cross struck through, but this was removed as Islamic activists doubtless did not want to be seen as homophobic. It would be inadvisable, however, for two men to walk holding hands in the areas mentioned, and many others in the UK. Muslims are the only British group actively promoting hardline conservative values.

But Muslims are not some ideological cavalry riding to save the timid kufr, who dare not otherwise criticize the forced LGBTQ curriculum. Elsewhere in Yorkshire, a teacher and his family, under new identities, are still in hiding after the teacher showed a cartoon of the prophet Mohammed from French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo to the class he was teaching. No one from the “intersectionality” lobby has ever spoken up to help him.

The gay community are also having problems with the trans lobby, and the latter’s embrace of diversity at every level is making it problematic to be homosexual in an increasingly Islamized society. The French gay community, although staunchly against Marine Le Pen and her Rassemblement National due to its opposition to same-sex marriage, still saw one third of them voting for her in the run-off stage of the last French Presidential election.

Unlike Western politicians, representatives of the extensive Muslim community are quite clear on their tolerance level. In the USA, a document precisely outlining the Islamic position on the LGBTQ community was released in May of this year, and it achieves what no Western politician has been able to in that it makes absolutely clear Islam’s attitude to shifting cultural norms. Navigating Differences: Clarifying Sexual and Gender Ethics in Islam has hundreds of signatories from the Western Islamic infrastructure. And these signatories cannot be dismissed as crank lobbyists unsupported by the heads of their religion. Islam has no head, it has no Pope. Imams and Islamic scholars (the ulama) make a consensus by weight of numbers, not by Papal decree.

In the section Our Constitutional Right to Hold Our Views, an interesting legal juxtaposition is made:

We recognize that our moral code conflicts with the goals of LGBTQ proponents. We also acknowledge their constitutional right to live in peace and free from abuse. Nevertheless, we emphasize our God-given and constitutional rights to hold, live by, and promote our religious beliefs in the best manner (Quran, al-Nahl: 125) without fear of legal reprisal or systematic marginalization.

Despite the document claiming “constitutional” rights, the American Constitution is not referenced, despite the famous First Amendment being explicit about religious freedoms. “Constitutional rights” here refer to the Koran.

The Democrat-media complex took a little while to spin this, but eventually wheeled out Jen Psaki to explain that the GOP are “recruiting” Muslims to oppose transgender policies. They surely know that no recruitment is needed. Muslims are already conscripted, just not to the GOP but what they see as a higher authority.

So-called “woke” ideology is becoming a victim of its own pathological obsession with diversity, its intersectional mainframe rupturing as Muslims — and Blacks — will not tolerate homosexuality and all its works. And there are other stress fractures within “intersectionality”. “Trans Exclusionary Radical Feminists”, or TERFs, have been ostracized by the LGBTQ community for their biologically realist approach. And left-wing feminists are leaving areas controlled by  Muslims for fear of harassment.

The default left-wing riposte to the Islamic injunction on homosexuality is that the Bible says the same thing as the Koran. Quite so, but if you arrange a drag show in Birmingham, Britain’s second city — 34% Christian, 30% Muslim — it won’t be the Seventh-Day Adventists who pay you a visit. The Koran, incidentally, although it condemns homosexuality, does not endorse the death penalty. That occurs in the Hadith, the supposed sayings of Mohammed: “Whoever you find doing the action of the people of Lut (Lot), execute the one who does it and the one to whom it is done”.

The dar al Islam does not recognize the separation of state and religion it sees in the dar al harb and will not tolerate LGBTQ propaganda in its children’s schools — or anywhere else as their presence increases. The British state — an extension of globalist concerns — will not countenance opposition to its LGBTQ agenda. Either an unstoppable force is about to be stopped, or an immovable object is about to move. Stay clear of the intersection.

Traditional Jewish Separatism and De-humanization of Gentiles: A Review of Stephen Bloom’s Postville

[W]hat the Postville Hasidim ultimately offered me was a glimpse at the dark side of my own faith, a look at Jewish extremists whose behavior not only made the Postville locals wince, but made me wince.
Stephen Bloom

Postville: A Clash of Cultures in Heartland America
Stephen G. Bloom
Mariner Books, 2001 (originally published by Harcourt in 2000)

7367 words

*        *        *

Did Stephen Bloom write a book that savaged the Jews?

More than twenty years ago, a journalism professor from the University of Iowa, Stephen Bloom, published a highly readable and fascinating book on an incredible culture clash that played out in the Northeastern Iowa town of Postville; a description of the difficulty that the transplantation of a Hasidic Jewish community into a withering, rural Iowa farm town in the 1980s and 1990s posed from both the Jewish and native Iowan perspective alike. The author’s Jewishness, fairly or unfairly, allowed him access to the Hasidic community that no gentile would have been afforded; the author’s secularism and “local” status allowed him access to the native Iowan community as well. What follows then is a sketch of two antagonistic communities from the inside out.

Bloom is a talented writer — he weaves scenes and characters that are compelling. In many ways, Postville reads like a novel in the sense that the characters he introduces and develops become fixtures in the mind of the reader — we know them and are interested in them. While I am not sure that Postville teaches us something we did not already know — it is an intriguing look at the Hasidic movement and the death of rural America, all at the same time. And while Bloom showed an implied hostility against a strongly manifested faith — and that bias is palpable throughout the book — his irreligiosity was not so overwhelming to distract from the overall evenhandedness of the book.

If anything, the years that have passed have made the book more relevant than even when it was published. It is the intersection, and future, of religion in America and America itself — as it was, as it is, and as it is becoming. Not only is the story of Postville one of rural and urban, immigrant and native, and Christian and Jewish, but it is also the account of Jewish versus Jewish — the Jewishness of intense insularity versus the Jewishness of liberal cosmopolitanism, the Jewishness of tribalism versus the Jewishness of universalism. Bloom’s book about the culture clash between Hasidic Jews and rural Iowans is riveting on many levels but one that figures most prominently is the theme of Jewish inward-looking supremacism, and how this theme correlates with Jewish religiosity. Simply stated, the more religious a Jew is, the more he believes that he must turn within the Jewish community and shun the gentile (lest he, the religious Jew, is contaminated by the filth and impurity of the gentile). Not only does he not love the gentile in any conceivable way, but the religious Jew is categorically indifferent to the gentile’s existence as if the gentile does not matter in any essential way—that the gentile has no moral worth. There is then a powerful and undeniable correlation between Jewish religious intensity and observance and insularity from, and indifference to, the “other.” Of course, as I have known from experience, not every religious Jew is hostile and indifferent to gentiles per se. But the gravity exerted within religious Judaism is one that pulls towards itself — fundamentally, religious Judaism is not interested in the world outside of its narrow parameters. By contrast, the more religious a Christian becomes, the more he loves (or should love) all men as his neighbor — Christianity as a creed cannot produce anything approaching Jewish supremacism and insularity because Christianity is uniquely universal. For the Christian, Jew and gentile are essentially equal in dignity before God — for the religious Jew, such a concept would be totally unacceptable. And, as an “ultra” orthodox outpost, Postville recounts appalling episodes of indifference and hostility towards the gentiles by the Postville Jews.

All of it plays out — this brutal culture clash — through the filter and musings of a Jewish author who embodies and personifies the insecurity of the “emancipated” Jew who is home in no place. Because secular Jews have become synonymous, to one extent or another, with modern liberalism and at least the appeal of universal values, the idea of Jewish supremacism that undergirds the Hasidic Jewish religiosity is something that is, to say the very least, an uncomfortable reality. But unlike the secular Jew’s visceral reaction and discomfort with displays of religious fervor by Christians, secular Jews have a more muted and compromised response to intensely religious Judaism. There is something much more forgiving in the secular Jew’s consideration of their religious cousins — a lack of harshness — that distinguishes intra-Jewish relationships. By contrast, apostate or secular Christians are almost universally nasty and unforgiving towards their religious cousins. And, to some extent, that distinction makes sense; Judaism is primarily an ethnicity that has credal aspects while Christianity is primarily a creed with ethnic aspects — as such, disputes about beliefs are often forgiven by “family” members but not by people who are defined by faith and adherence. Bloom, as a secular American liberal and Jew, turns out to be an exception to the rule — a Jew who nonetheless takes his “Americanism” and “liberalism” seriously enough to turn his caustic pen on religious Jews. And he learned this hostility in real time while writing Postville. His book then is more than the account of a kulturkampf that played out in rural Iowa; it was a conscious discovery of the ugliness of Jewish chauvinism in its most religious form.

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Working professionally as I do with many Jews who keep Kosher means that I have dined in many Kosher restaurants. Kosher food can be good, and some of the restaurants are excellent. They are also expensive: Kosher food is significantly costlier than non-Kosher food. Kosher food is more than merely Jewishly blessed food — it is a particular method of slaughter, storage, and preparation — and blessing. Kosher meat cannot be sourced from a gentile butcher because the animal must be slaughtered and drained of blood in a precise manner. Obviously then, religious Jews require ready access to meat that is slaughtered and prepared in accordance with religious law. As religious Jews have flourished in the United States — gaining numbers from fecundity and converts from mainstream Judaism, while Reform and Conservative Judaism have floundered — the need to Kosher food has only increased. Thus an underlying theme to Postville is the sizable business opportunity to feed the growing need for Kosher meat throughout the United States and abroad. Postville is eponymously centered in Postville, Iowa — where a group of investors from the Orthodox Lubavitch Jewish community in Crown Heights, New York purchased an abandoned slaughterhouse and turned it into a large Kosher butchery in 1987. In a sense then, Postville is first a story of the seizure of an economic opportunity that is, as such, uniquely an American story. The investors were led by a Russian-born Lubavitcher named Aaron Rubashkin, and Rubashkin led a migration of families to Postville to manage the Kosher slaughterhouse.

Initially, the Postville residents and civic leaders welcomed the investment in their community and the economic impact it would bring. Postville was reeling in the mid-1980s. The United States experienced a major agricultural crisis during the 1980s. Record production during this time led to a plunge in the price of commodities. Exports fell, due in part to the 1980 United States grain embargo against the Soviet Union. Farm debt for land and equipment purchases soared during the 1970s and early 1980s, doubling between 1978 and 1984. Other negative economic factors included high interest rates, high oil prices and a strong dollar. By the mid-1980s, the crisis had reached its peak. Land prices fell dramatically, leading to record foreclosures. Some forty years later, it is hard to imagine a collapse in value of quality farmland, especially in a place as fertile as Iowa, but in the mid-1980s, rural America was decimated in a way that not merely destroyed countless family farms but scarred the American rural way of life forever.

The refurbishing of the abandoned slaughterhouse and the addition of several hundred people to the local economy indeed provided Postville a modest economic bump, but problems between the Hasidic Jews and Iowans began immediately afterwards and persisted for decades. And more than that, the meat-processing plant brought in hundreds of illegal immigrants as workers — thus operating to apply a double pressure of change to what had been a longstanding homogeneous community. The Iowans were expecting new neighbors who would acclimate to the Iowa way of hospitality and cooperation — who would add more than economic value to their community — but instead were matched with religious Jews who viewed those goyim as virtually sub-human and treated them accordingly with vacillations of indifference or hostility.

Bloom was a professor of journalism at the nearby University of Iowa when he came across a reference in the local news of a nearby Hasidic outpost — and accompanying tension — in Postville in the mid-1990s. Bloom was admittedly dealing with a culture clash of his own after relocating from San Francisco after a career as a journalist. While Bloom’s initial interest was the desire to connect with his Jewishness amid Iowa’s overwhelming Christian homogeneity, the deteriorating situation between the Jews and the locals was a news story in its own right — in addition to the sheer peculiarity of Hasidic Jews living in rural Iowa. By the time he arrived in the mid-1990s, tensions were at a breaking point. The Iowans had made their stand against the Jews by deciding to hold a referendum to allow the town of Postville to annex the land on which the kosher meat-processing plant stood. If Postville annexed the land, the Iowans would then be able to raise taxes and better control the Lubavitchers. The annexation issue was thus a vote essentially to shame the Jews in Postville by the native Iowans of the town.

Bloom, like any investigative reporter, interviewed countless locals and tried, initially in vain, to do the same with the Postville Hasidic Jews. On some level, at least by implication, Bloom wanted to believe that the locals were anti-Semitic and, indeed, he found some comments by them to be exactly that. Indeed, there is an arrogance in how Bloom related to the native Postville people — as if he reduced to mere country bumpkins all the gentileswho simply did not know how to relate to outsiders. Thus, Bloom begins his account by frankly describing his suppressed, but deep-seated, dislike of the Iowans. At the same time, he also wanted to connect with the Hasidic Jews for their side of the story, but also because he was, at least in a sense, lost himself. As a coastal and secular Jew, he felt more than out-of-place in Iowa — he resented their version of middle America, and, to the extent that he was attracted to it, he resented that too. But he interviewed a variety of Iowa locals that he grew to like — he identified with them in terms of their values. At the very least, he understood them.

Northeastern Iowa is — or was — German-Lutheran country. And the imprints of neatness, cleanliness and mannerliness were seemingly everywhere in these communities. As Bloom described it in the mid-1990s, it sounded like America in the 1920s or earlier. White, religious, neighborly, civic, and orderly. It was the kind of place with Memorial Day and July 4th parades with the 4H Club, Future Farmers of America, and Chamber of Commerce — where chain stores, and Walmart in particular, were resisted, and people did not lock their doors. It is exactly the type of place that would later become ground zero for two independent phenomena — the opioid crisis and MAGA. But in the mid-1990s, this was still a place where World War II and Korean War veterans congregated in coffee shops in John Deere hats and overalls, where the high school football game was an event that the whole town eagerly waited on, where homes and yards were manicured, where people prided themselves on their sense of belonging and where “city-slicker” was a term that meant something. Understated, honest, lawful and thrifty, the local Iowans were simply not prepared (but, then again, who is) for a group to descend upon them who were shrewd, discourteous, and disorderly.

One way to look at the differences, at the most basic level, is that Jews (and this is not merely the ultra-orthodox) look at rules as pliable, and, in any event, not always applicable to any individual Jew. In this same way that Jews look at bargaining (“to hondle” in Yiddish) as a sign of intelligence, they also take a flexible view with respect to following rules for the sake of rules. German ethnics could not be more different — not only are they rules-oriented, but they are also rules-worshipping. Simple things like observing traffic and zoning laws become flashpoints that are hard for outsiders to understand. In many ways, Bloom was won over by the Iowans in their culture war with the Jews — slowly and surely — because their complaints that the Jews should just follow the rules everyone has to follow resonated with him. He may have been a secular, coastal Jew, but he did not accept a job in Iowa for no reason — he wanted to escape from wherever he was even if he did not realize it or know why. In a sense, he wanted “Ozzie and Harriet” even if it came without pastrami or a good bagel. That he chose to live in Iowa says something more about him than he himself was able to articulate. He was more receptive to the locals’ complaints that the Jews were rude and unneighborly than he wanted to admit.

But that was later — he was still, midstream in the book, searching for something in his own religion. After considerable difficulty, he finally managed to interview Aaron Rubashkin’s son, Sholom, who managed the operation in Postville to discuss the relations with the locals. The Lubavitchers are unique among Jews in that they are religious and proselytizers, at least towards wayward Jews. In many ways, they are like first-century Christians who missioned, at least initially, to other Jews. They are aggressive in their ministry and believe heartily that they can convince any such Jew to join them. Rubashkin began immediately to work on Bloom accordingly — to save his Jewish soul. Part of that outreach involves matching the wayward Jew with a model Lubavitcher family for a Shabbat weekend. Bloom was receptive to this for several reasons — first, he wanted to see the Lubavitchers from the inside out, and second, he was genuinely curious about whether they had something to say to fix, as it were, his longing for something more meaningful in his Jewish life.

Bloom’s weekend with the Lubavitcher was gracious enough. He, along with his young son, took part in every aspect of the worship and dining. He observed a Jewish life that was so far removed from his own that he felt a great divide between himself and the patriarch of that family, Lazar. The model Lubavitcher made any number of comments that chafed at him excessively — from the casual dismissal of every other type of Jewishness as something obviously inferior, to the gross characterizations of gentiles, from the outright racism to the nasty prejudice. He was embarrassed by the willingness to treat the goyim with such disrespect — to view them as worthless. In what would be a theme that runs throughout the book, the Lubavitchers thought about the locals as people to be avoided, to navigate among them, or take advantage of them — but, in any event, never people with whom they would fraternize. If there was friction, and there was, it was universally and categorically chalked up to anti-Semitism.

There was a palpable groupthink among the Jews that refused to see the perspective of the locals, let alone empathize with them. The Jews were strictly transactional with the locals — we live here, you live here, leave us alone. But it was more than mere avoidance for the sake of toleration — it was an almost glee in deceiving the goyim that irked Bloom. The locals were essentially non-entities to the Jews — lacking any inherent value as human beings. To the Jews, however, their theology towards the gentiles made perfect sense — the Jew alone possessed a special relationship with God that required an insularity to protect it. The outside world — the non-observant world — was marked by one overriding theme: contamination and filth. The idea of fraternizing with the locals — of making nice with them — was then, at least to the ultra-orthodox mind, something incomprehensible. By analogy, it would be like asking them to put themselves in the “near-occasion” of sin. The Lubavitchers could never understand why Bloom cared what the locals thought — one way or the other — when he, Bloom, stood at the precipice of entering the fullness of Jewish life which he was gifted with entering by virtue of his birth as a Jew.

Bloom’s foray into religious Jewish life is something, however, that began to grate on him — a lot. Whether he was ever open-minded about it or not, he could not shake off his internal compass of liberalism in assessing the Lubavitcher way of life. In what was an interesting twist in the book, Bloom’s sympathy for the religious Jews did not merely stop as he came face-to-face with Jewish indifference and rudeness to the locals — but when he came to see the exclusionary nature of the religion from the inside out. In a sense, he became like an apostate (even though he was never a believer in that sense) in terms of his disgust with the Lubavitchers. They saw themselves as the best of Jews — he saw them as bigots and pious frauds. During his investigation, Bloom in fact confirmed that the Jews were very offensive to Postville’s civic leaders and the local populace. They often swindled contractors, retailers, and handymen by spreading out their payments over many months — when they did not simply toss the bill, that is. They drove too fast on the roads or simply ignored the parking rules. They drove jalopies with missing mufflers, and they parked them on their front laws. He recounts that one Jewish woman tried to bribe a policeman, and one Rabbi stole some handmade leather sheaths from a retailer, insisting that he had already paid for them. And they made the yards surrounding their homes into shambles — something which may seem insignificant on the surface, but which is nevertheless a sign of disrespect for the Germanic Iowans who took an inordinate pride in well-kept yards and homes as signs of civilization and breeding.

Another issue involved Postville’s municipal swimming pool. The Iowans were alarmed, legitimately at it turned out, that the Hasidic Jews would demand “Jews only” hours. Iowans would thus be displaced from a facility which they had built. As it turned out, the Lubavitchers eventually got their gentile-free time. There were also a great many zoning and building use violations. The Jews simply ignored the zoning rules as if they did not apply to them and built whatever they wanted wherever they wanted. About this, Bloom writes:

If the city of Postville tried to enforce any ordinance the Jews disagreed with, the immediate cry was anti-Semitism. If a local complained about the noise from the shul, if anyone disagreed about annexation, he or she was quickly branded an anti-Semite. Ultimately, I discovered, carrying on a conversation with any of the Postville Hasidim was virtually impossible. If you didn’t agree, you were at fault, part of the problem. You were paving the way for the ultimate destruction of the Jews, the world’s Chosen People. There was no room for compromise, no room for negotiation, no room for anything but total and complete submission.

Bloom’s attitudes grew more hostile to the Lubavitchers — so much so that he inserted himself into the story as someone actively rooted for the annexation vote to win and stick it to the Jews. Beyond the insolence and the refusal to treat the local goyim with even a modicum of respect, Bloom was vexed by the Jewish supremacism that he found among them during their attempts to proselytize him. The Lubavitchers also sensed that Bloom was a lost cause — an irredeemable Jew who did not — and would not — “get” it. Slowly but surely, Bloom became simply one of the non-Jews to the Lubavitchers.

Bloom was probably pushed to his limit when he researched a crime that involved a few dubious Lubavitchers that had happened years earlier. What he found disgusted him on several levels. He describes the September 27, 1991, crime spree of Lubavitchers Pinchas Lew and Phillip Stillman. The pair got drunk, removed the license plate from their car, and robbed two townspeople at gunpoint. They shot one woman — she recovered but the bullet was permanently lodged in her spine, causing her continual pain for the rest of her life. Bloom found out  that in Brooklyn Stillman had been part of the Orthodox underworld, and he left for Iowa after one of his gang’s members was murdered, execution-style. Stillman was a fascinating case — an adopted Colombian street kid and consistent problem and ne’er-do-well who was all but abandoned by the Lubavitcher community when he was arrested. By contrast, the arrest and imprisonment of a “real” Jew with a proud Chabad lineage, Pinchas Lew, caused a tumult in Postville’s Jewish community. The Lubavitchers saw Lew’s imprisonment an unjust kidnapping, and they mustered assistance from their community back in Crown Heights, raising vast sums for Lew’s bail and defense. Bloom describes illegal activities undertaken by the community on Lew’s behalf, like the spoliation and destruction of evidence that clearly implicated Lew in the crime spree. In the end, Lew received little punishment for his crime because Stillman was essentially bribed by the community to take the fall for the whole incident. Stillman and Lew vanished from the memory of the Iowa Lubavitchers — to merely mention them, as Bloom found out, was tantamount to anti-Semitism and insulting the Lubavitchers. Bloom was astounded by the collective indifference of the Lubavitchers to the crimes; they never checked up on the victims, expressed remorse, or even so much as offered them some kosher beef. Instead, the Jews militantly supported their criminals (at least Lew), and, as always, ignored those whom they had harmed. Aaron Rubashkin would only declaim to Bloom, “no matter what we do, the goyim always find fault with us.” Indeed, it is precisely when Bloom began researching and putting the story of the Stillman-Lew case together that the Lubavitchers cut him off altogether.

But in the end, what really pushed Bloom over the edge was how the Lubavitchers, in his view, sought to take advantage of a locally respected Jewish doctor’s death as a publicity stunt. “Doc” Wolf had served northeastern Iowa for fifty years and was a thoroughly assimilated Jew and widower. In his last dying days, Doc Wolf had asked the Lubavitchers to provide him some homemade Jewish food. He got the food — and then some. The Lubavitchers sent dozens of men to minister to him and sought to make him one of their own. They turned his hospice room into a turnstile of Rabbis praying with — and over — Doc Wolf. Not able to push them out — and perhaps lacking the mental acuity to do so — Doc Wolf tolerated their presence for his last few days. Bloom argues that the motivation to minister to Doc Wolf was the Lubavitchers’ view that if they could claim the well-regarded local doctor as their own, it would help in the upcoming annexation vote that was basically seen as a referendum of the locals on the Jews. I think Bloom discounts the sincerity of the Lubavitchers, however, because they probably believed that they were doing right by a wayward Jew in his last hours. Only after he died did Doc Wolf’s secular children forcibly remove the Lubavitchers from Doc Wolf’s room and still-warm body.

The annexation measure eventually passed but it did not make that much of a difference between the Jews and the locals. As a post-script (written a few years later in 2001), Bloom describes the tensions as persisting. The problems associated with the plant had continued, and the changes to the community from the influx of illegal immigrants (Russian, Ukrainian, Mexican, and then Somali) changed the once-sleepy White town of Postville forever. What happened afterwards is even more interesting — in 2008, the federal government ordered a massive immigration raid on the plant and hundreds of people were arrested, including Aaron Rubashkin’s son. Eventually, Sholom Rubashkin was sentenced to prison only to have President Trump pardon him in 2017.  Today, the plant is still Kosher although run by a different Jewish group — and Postville continues to have a large Hasidic community.

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Postville is compelling read — I finished it over two days because I could not put it down.

Several themes stand out that warrant further consideration — the first among them is the personal turmoil of the author. Postville, when it came out, generated a lot of interest — reviews in The New York Times and other publications showed that the book touched a nerve about diversity and inclusion in the United States. What I found interesting about some of those reviews as I read them is that the author’s personal story was deemed by some to an intrusion in the overall story of Postville. Some reviewers felt that the book dwelt on Bloom’s inner conflict too much. I find myself in vigorous disagreement with that view. Bloom’s inner conflict — his biographical relationship to the Postville drama — was as much the story as was the conflict between the Hasidic Jews and native Iowans. In many ways, Bloom was the most interesting character in Postville — a sort of tortured and conflicted soul who related the broader conflict through the prism of his turmoil. In a sense, he was the most honest of brokers in telling this tale because the conclusion he reached was not the one he necessarily wanted to reach. In that, Bloom was acutely conscious of his own seemingly traitorous conduct in airing, as it were, the “dirty laundry” of the Jews in publishing Postville. And in the Jewish community, the role of traitor is especially odious, and I give Bloom credit for being willing to withstand that role even if it will stay with him for the rest of his life among most Jews.

But Bloom’s story is more than the turmoil — it is the source of that turmoil, which, at least in a sense, transcends Judaism. Bloom was navigating the threadbare meaning within the secular life and searching for some cure to it. All secular people face, whether they know it or not, the implications of their “faith” — that is, they face the realization that they have embraced a “faith” that posits that life has no essential meaning, that truth has no stable source, that morality is little more than opinion and convention, and that all we are is what we see. For an honest and sensitive secularist, there is a heartbreak within that worldview. No one wants to admit that their life — or the lives of their loved ones — is meaningless, but the materialist ethos of our secular age necessarily implies it. Parenthetically, while some may argue that secularism and irreligion are not overlapping circles, I have yet to meet a committed secularist who was not, at the same time, an irreligious materialist. To some secularists, we should just grow up and face it — life has no meaning, so let us enjoy it and not be overwrought by its the portents of its dismal reality. To others, meaning punctuates too much to be ignored and there exists a palpable tension between that feeling and the implications of meaninglessness. Bloom strikes me as the latter — he wanted meaning, he wanted purpose, he wanted to believe but he found in the Hasidic Jews meaning and purpose that were deeply offensive. In a sense, years of secularism have taken hold of his life and heart — he was essentially egalitarian. Thus, even if meaning and purpose were lacking, he could never find it in a religion that was essentially exclusionary.

His attempt, however, to give Hasidic Judaism a “chance” — at least I thought — was very telling. While I object to the ugliness at the heart of Talmudic Judaism, I feel much in common with it as a Traditional Catholic. My belief, and theirs, in the stark and abiding reality of God is a commonality. My belief, and theirs, in the bankruptcy of the secular world is another. My belief, and theirs, that we must follow the whole of God’s commandments no matter the cost is yet another. My belief, and theirs, that we should not count the cost of children but see each one as a supreme blessing from God is another. Finally, the belief in a rigorous morality, a hierarchal and teaching religion, and a life steeped in prayer for the glory and worship of God are more still. Serious Talmudic Jews, such as the Postville Jews, would dismiss me a non-entity and polytheist, and, in turn, I dismiss them as the blind and stubborn descendants of those who denied the messianic and divine reality of Jesus Christ. All the same, I have, at least on a practical level, more in common with them than I do with Stephen Bloom. And, in that sense, I am for more forgiving towards them than Bloom is — he did not merely reject them, he ratted on them and conveyed to the world the things that Jews say comfortably and discretely to only one another. In a sense then, he really did write a book that savaged them — perhaps not unfairly, but certainly uncharitably.

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Another theme that fascinated me about Postville was its depiction of the death of a type of America — a homogeneous America that was marked by the yeoman farmer and local businessman. Small town and rural America before the opioid crisis, before the brain drain, before the sexual revolution, and before Walmart and the shopping mall. There was an element of Postville, Iowa as the last outpost of De Tocqueville’s America — a place where the farm-to-market road was not merely an historical signpost or road name. That America is all but gone — it is a place of changing demographics, addiction, disability, and Trump country. MAGA is a cheap substitute for the time when Americans were genuinely free and independent — and the rearguard action that is MAGA is a political and cultural death rattle for places like Postville. Indeed, the Whites of Postville are aging and contracepting — the high school undoubtedly is filled with Somalis, Mexicans, and other non-Whites. Not that I lament the American dream extending to others; I do not.; But the loss of Postville and the countless other rural places like it is a definitive sign of the demise of at least one version of America. If this is progress, it does not feel like it. I liked the world with Postville, as it was; and I think they should exist somewhere.

If Postville is a death, it is also a birth — a new America is being born there and elsewhere. Setting aside whether it is a better America, it is a different America to say the very least. Homogeneity and heterogeneity are dirty words unless we apply them panegyrically to the cult of diversity. We have no choice, praise diversity or else. So that Postville is now home to many languages, many cultures, many “others” is axiomatically good. And what Postville once was — an enclave of White Christian America — is axiomatically worse.

I happen to live in one of the most diverse places in America. I do not resent it — or the “other” — but I do not celebrate it either. The reality is that people tend to stick with other people most like them in terms of race, religion and, to a lesser extent, socio-economic station. In my town, we are “diverse” inasmuch as we have virtually the entire world’s population represented in microcosm in a small city but, at the same time, there is little overlap in the meaningful social interactions between these groups. It remains to be seen whether a land of many cultures can persist where one culture was once the norm. Certainly, at a minimum, the death of White America as epitomized by Postville’s collapse and the birth of the new multi-racial and multi-cultural America portends new and dramatic ways of living — less trust, less communication, less interaction, and less confidence. And all of that takes place in what is becoming a racial spoils system in which the various groups compete with each other for competitive advantage.

No, I am not bullish on the future of the multi-cultural paradise that liberalism is constructing on the ashes of the old America. Indeed, I am convinced that it portends an impossible situation that will not end well.

But homogeneity, in its racial or religious form, is far from dead. There is something to be said for the Hasidic Jews — and all fervent believers of virtually any type — in this new America. While the multi-racial and multi-cultural America is far more liberal and hostile to religion, and while secularism touches more and more Americans, a distinct and pugnacious religious minority (or minorities) is being born. Hasidic Jews are different from all of the Jews that came before them in the United States — they are militantly Jewish and refuse to make any compromises in the ways that past Jews undoubtedly did. Traditional Catholics are similarly militant. Other offshoots, for the lack of a better word, are taking root all over the country. While the morass of people is slowly and imperceptibly saying “no” to organized religion, a small minority within each tradition is reacting combatively, and they are persevering and growing.

Because of secularism’s hedonism and sterility, the growth of these micro-groups will soon begin to mushroom for two reasons. First, they have children (lots of them). When the average American family is well below the replacement rate of fertility of 2.1 children (because, after all, children exact a sacrifice which is inconsistent with a narcissistic culture), Hasidic Jews, the Amish, Traditional Catholics, and some White nationalists are having seven, eight or more children. And they are also happily rejecting feminism, homosexuality, modern culture, and divorce. The demographic exponential effect of large families birthing many children who, in turn, have large families will be felt much sooner than people realize. Second, an assertive, confident, and happy minority will attract more and more from the doldrums that is the secular hell of hedonism, meaninglessness, and nihilism. The Hasidic Jews will continue to make inroads among secular Jews; Traditional Catholics will do the same among the mass of lapsed and semi-religious Catholics; and racially conscious Whites will attract adherents as they see the burgeoning anti-White hate all around them. The new America will be confusing and hostile, but it will not be able to match the militancy of these groups who know who they are and resist contemporary liberal culture in every conceivable way. In a strange sense, I am comforted by the Hasidic rise in Postville and places like it — not because, of course, I want to live near them or condone their attitudes and behavior, but because they are a brand of Judaism that is growing wildly and rejecting secularism forcefully. In that, Hasidism represents just a type of rejection that transcends Judaism — one in which I myself am participating.

Postville and the takeover of the town by militantly religious Jews is interesting — but the themes it explores could have been written about the community of Traditional Catholics who similarly took over a Kansas town only a few years earlier. Indeed, in a feature article of the January/February 2020 Atlantic magazine Emma Green explored how an outside and militant Catholic group overwhelmed a small Midwestern farming town. The overlapping themes are there — exclusion, self-righteousness and assertiveness, fecundity in the extreme and the accusation of a cult-like atmosphere. As times goes by, I suspect that we will see more intentional communities like Saint Marys, Kansas and Postville, Iowa as militantly religious seek to live their lives in common with like-minded co-religionists.

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Another theme that is uniquely Jewish is that of food. Of course, the premise of the Hasidic relocation was based upon the preparation and slaughter of Kosher food for religious Jews, but food is seemingly lurking on every page. Bloom himself reduces his attachment to Judaism to the food of his youth — to the traditional foods of the Jews. The Shabbat dinner, which is the central meal of the Jews each week, stands prominently in the description of the lives of the Hasidic Jews. I must not be the first person to make the connection that the Jewish ritual of Shabbat dinner — its meaning and importance — must provide some antecedents for the Catholic ritual of the eucharistic meal and sacrifice. In a shadowy sense, the Shabbat dinner, and the Catholic Mass share important connections.

Bloom finally cuts himself off from the Lubavitchers, psychologically anyway, during the long discourse that takes place over Shabbat dinner. For the native Iowans, their food — and ironically enough, the pig — are central to their lives as well. Everything that moves the story seems to involve food, or dinners, or coffee shops. The Doc Wolf incident itself was motivated by the old and dying Jew’s desire for some traditional and authentic Jewish food. While I like to eat, like any human being, I cannot relate to the significance of food for Jews. It is not a judgment on my part, but rather an observation. Food is frequently on the mind of the author.

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The Hasidic contempt for the gentile is palpable throughout Postville. And in this, the ultra-orthodox stand in a long tradition drawing similar conclusions. According the one source, which appears to be consistent with the Hasidic view outlined in Postville, gentile and Jewish souls are very different — ontologically different. For example, “the people of Israel, the Zohar states, possess a living, holy, and elevated soul (“nefesh ayah kadisha ila’ah”), as opposed to the other nations, who are described as akin to animals and crawling creatures, which lack this “Divine” soul and possess only an “animal” soul.” See The Soul of a Jew and the Soul of a Non-Jew by Rabbi Hanan Balk, Ḥakirah, the Flatbush Journal of Jewish Law and Thought. For a variety of reasons, I have seen any number of Jewish sources that have indicated that the souls of Jews and gentiles are different, and, as such, Jews and gentiles are creatures of a different kind. The Jew is, accordingly, a spiritualized creature whose very essence is touched by God; the gentile by contrast is not and, as such, is likened to having an existence that is more animal-like.

These sources state a principle that is, on its face, not biologically grounded per se — who is a Jew is, more or less, assumed. One thing that has always interested me is whether the concept of a Jewish soul is the same as the definition of Jewishness. Would, for example, a man born of a Jewish father and a gentile mother have half a Jewish soul? Would the fact that Jewishness is typically deemed passed matrilineally mean that such a “half-breed” would have the “animal” soul of the gentile or something else? Does only a Jewish woman have the power to pass a Jewish soul down to her child — leaving Jewish men bereft of that power? To be fair, there are sources, and even the article cited above, that make clear that there is no consensus on this point, but the fact that this is something deeply embedded with Hasidic Judaism and the Jewish psyche is deeply disturbing. If it is axiomatic to condemn the Nazis for their dehumanization of Jews as “sub-humans,” what can we say of Jews and their brand of Judaism that say that non-Jews are essentially animals? Is that as objectionable? And, if not, why?

For those who pay any attention, the idea of a Jewish superiority complex should not be surprising. “Chosen-ness” evidently carries with it the implication of “un-chosen-ness,” which means necessarily that gentiles were not chosen. Interestingly enough to me, I have always puzzled over why Jews seem to think that their “chosen-ness” carries with it a superiority — as if God chose them because they were special or different. If the Christian charge is that Jews misunderstand seemingly everything about God, it certainly seems to this Christian that they misunderstand that God did not elevate them because they were different or more special; they became different and more special because God elevated them. But that elevation was never meant to be invitation to glory in themselves as if they were better than other men; it was a responsibility to bring the light of God’s glory to the nations, which, of course, they did in Jesus Christ. What seems lacking — profoundly — among Jews is humility. Their insufferable pride, which was on display in Postville, is there for anyone with eyes to see. And it is profoundly unholy.

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Another theme that stood out to me was the obtuseness of Jewishness versus the liberalism of Jewishness. It goes without saying that the Hasidic Jews are not the majority of Jews in the United States or the world — if current demographic trends continue, they might be — but we are probably some time off from that now. Bloom became central to this conflict of Jewish liberalism and Jewish insularity — and, to his credit, he “walked the walk” when it came to what side he chose. I think Bloom is relatively unusual, even as a secular, liberal Jew, because he became the Frank Serpico of the Jews — a complete turncoat. Anyone who reads Postville — religious, non-religious, anti-religious — cannot help but be disgusted with the Hasidic Jews and everything about them. And Bloom is so unusual because my sense is that most liberal Jews like him would never do what he has done because there is a deep hypocrisy that runs through liberal Judaism that condemns every form of tribalism (in the most vicious way) except their own. Bloom took the Hasidic tribalism to task and that makes him someone very different. For example, most liberal Jews see no contradiction in supporting the transparently discriminatory practices of the ethnocentric state of Israel — the tiny and sovereign enclave of Jews increasingly dominated by Orthodox and ethnonationalist Jews much like the Hasidim — while excoriating any political aspirations for other groups to attain a similar place of homogeneous existence and perpetuation.

In the end, Bloom paints a horrible picture of Hasidic life and values. And, for the non-Jew anyway, reading and internalizing the reality of the Postville Jews cannot help but force people to question what they think they know about the Jews generally. True enough, Bloom critiqued his “own,” but the Hasidic Jews are not a different species of Jews — they are just a more extreme version of already existing attitudes among Jews (with the clear implication that even non-Hasidic Jews maintain some of these attitudes, even if more muted and closeted — as indicated by the broad support enjoyed by Orthodox, ethnonationalist Israel within the Jewish diaspora in the West).

It remains to be seen whether Jewish liberalism has a future — clearly, Hasidic Judaism does. My experience of Judaism has taught me that it exerts a gravity unto itself over those born into it — even among liberal Jews. But liberal Jews and Hasidic Jews are literally worlds apart in spirit and practice. Whether liberal Judaism can survive the varied impacts of assimilation, intermarriage, and socio-political distances from Talmudic Judaism is an open question. So is how long the cognitive dissonance between the putative liberal values of most secular Jews and the tribalist predicates for continued support for Israel and Jewish separation can last.