Featured Articles

Russia is Back, and so is History

Ukraine as it was before 2014, when it was neutral, independent and whole

I remember the Cuban Missile Crisis when I was thirteen and for the only time in my life nuclear war seemed like a very real and imminent possibility. I also remember the very different feelings I had in the spring of 1989 when we saw the first definite signs of the end of the Cold War that began before I was born. I remember expressing the hope that with the external distraction of the Cold War that had so engaged the thoughts, passions and energies of potential pro-Whites (“White” here meaning European) for so long coming to an end, our people would finally refocus their attention on the much more dangerous internal enemy. I also allowed myself to hope that Russia would join us in a Pan-European grand alliance.

Alas, that hope was not to be. Within the next several years the Soviet Union not only collapsed politically but the Russian successor state also suffered an economic collapse, largely engineered and exploited by U.S. and Russian Jewish actors, that wreaked more havoc and suffering on the people than the Great Depression of the 1930s did upon the United States, causing the Russian people to feel that the friendship and trust they had extended to America had been betrayed. This was followed by betrayal in international relations, as the assurances given by Western leaders that they would not take advantage of Russia’s weakness to expand the anti-Russian NATO alliance eastward was repeatedly violated, and subversive Western NGOs worked to promote color revolutions and regime change in several of the successor states, most notably and fatefully with the U.S. engineered anti-Russian coup in Ukraine in February 2014, when Russian President Vladimir Putin finally offered resistance and pushed back by annexing Crimea and supporting breakaway states in the Donbass.

In the quarter century since 1989, and especially after the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States had enjoyed the so-called “unipolar moment,” a period of military dominance and effective global hegemony, that lasted without noteworthy challenge until at least the Georgian-Ossetian conflict of August 2008. One could even describe this period as a Pax Americana except for the numerous military campaigns, nearly all conducted by the United States and its allies, that made it far from peaceful. Near the beginning of this epoch Francis Fukuyama heralded it with his much-celebrated book The End of History and the Last Man (1992) in which he maintained the world had evolved institutionally into a final human state of perpetual peace based on universal liberal democracy. Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations (1996) and prominent neocon Robert Kagan’s The Return of History and the End of Dreams (2008) countered Fukuyama’s thesis, largely based on the continued existence of authoritarian and autocratic governments, but it still enjoyed broad acceptance. During this period, it was as if, as far as the West was concerned, Russia had exited the stage of history as an independent actor, and its interests and capabilities were generally ignored or dismissed as inconsequential. As a result, during this period, it seemed that events at the scale of Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014  were not sufficient to categorically refute the “end of history” idea. But with Russia’s current invasion or “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine there can no longer be any doubt or denial. History is definitely back, and in a very big way, in fact roaring back, and Russia is back with it as an independent actor of the first rank on history’s stage, shocking those who had remained so unwise as to continue to dismiss them.

International relations can be likened to a game of 3D chess. In this great game Putin, in the finest Russian tradition, or like Mr. Spock in Star Trek, is a grand master. I don’t believe the chess players in the U.S. State Department, such as Victoria Nuland (wife of the Robert Kagan mentioned above) and the other neocons who are at the helm, are quite at Putin’s level, but they had the great advantage of being able to make a series of aggressive moves (e.g., the series of NATO expansions and the 2014 Ukraine coup) before Putin was able (i.e., was strong enough) to make a counterplay in response. By comparison, the general run of media journalists, commentators and even supposed analysts are tiddlywinks players.

International relations occur and need to be seen and analyzed at different levels similar to the different levels of military affairs. In this context we can skip the lowest or tactical level. The level above the tactical is the operational level, and above this is the strategic level. Seen only from the operational level, the Russian “Special Operation” in Ukraine is an offensive or aggressive move, initiating the use of military force. But in strategic terms, seen from the perspective of the higher strategic level, it is a defensive move in reaction or response to a series of strategically offensive moves by the United States and NATO to turn Ukraine into what Putin regards as an existential threat to Russian security and independence.

In theory there are two major schools of international relations, the liberal idealist school and the realist school. The former, which was exemplified in Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis, is based on the Enlightenment concepts of rights and values and since its inception has been preached much more than practiced, honored more in the breach than in the observance, with the realist approach actually applied in practice though often hypocritically disguised or cloaked under liberal idealist arguments and justifications. Realism is the tradition of Thucydides (“The strong do what they want. The weak suffer what they must.”), Machiavelli, Bismarck, George Kennan and Henry Kissinger, and is currently perhaps best represented academically by John Mearsheimer. Realism has always been dominant in the actual practice of international relations by the Great Powers, however dominant liberal idealism might be in academia and among philosophers, media talking heads, a deluded public, and the misleading politicians who help delude them. Col. Douglas Macgregor, although primarily a military analyst, is also firmly in the realist tradition in his analysis of international relations. The problem is that liberalism, in the words of Will Durant, is a luxury of security, and this is especially true in international relations. Where one’s security, one’s perceived existential interests, are at stake, liberalism is a luxury one cannot afford, and realism reigns.

John Mearsheimer (b. 1947) in 2007

It is futile to attempt to discuss the Ukraine matter in a useful way with those who are ignorant of its background or context, or of the Russian perspective, or who are intolerantly hyperpartisan or hypersubjective and thus unwilling or dangerously unable to understand the opponent’s position and motives. This would seem to include the great majority of the public, along with the media figures who pose as experts and presume to lecture us in the moralistic terms of liberal idealism. In this sense, John Mearsheimer (co-author of The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy) and Ray McGovern (former head of the Russia desk at the C.I.A.) are commendable for carefully and objectively providing the necessary background, context and facts before presenting their realist views, which would not be so understandable and justifiable otherwise. (See “Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine Salon” with Ray McGovern and John Mearsheimer, March 2, 2022).

By contrast, at least from what I’ve seen and heard, the mainstream media provides neither context nor the pre-2014 background, or the Russian perspective, but rather seeks to block or ban this information as it would tend to discredit the politically correct liberal idealist posturing that is being used to cloak the strictly realist and strategically offensive aggressive moves made by the U.S. and NATO. In this regard there is also a clear difference between military analysts Col. Douglas Macgregor and Lt. Gen. Keith Kellogg. The latter, when asked what reasons or justifications Putin could have for invading Ukraine, could only — with the look of a deer caught in the headlights — profess complete bafflement, thus revealing his own uselessness as a serious analyst, because to admit any legitimate reason would be politically incorrect, and modern generals tend to be careful political animals, and colonels who are not careful political animals are unlikely to be promoted to general.

The United States and NATO are major players in the Ukraine crisis (with the U.S. leading). Their series of strategic offensive moves actually precipitated the event, so Russia clearly can’t trust them to act as honest brokers in peace negotiations. This provides an opportunity for France and Germany to step back onto the stage of history as independent actors, following-up on their role as mediators in the Minsk agreements, to again offer their good offices in peace negotiations. Failing this, it seems likely the war could continue for some time, with the Russians eventually imposing a de facto partition in which they occupy much more of Ukraine than would have been the case if the crisis had ended quickly by satisfying their demands. John Mearsheimer said that Russia didn’t want to occupy Ukraine as doing so would be like swallowing a porcupine. In the context of this analogy the densest concentration of quills is in the northwest, the ten northwestern Oblasts (administrative districts) that are the most anti-Russian part of the country. That is also the part of the country closest to Poland and the core NATO countries. It is therefore the part of Ukraine that Russia would be least likely to occupy. The rest of the country, including the entirety of its Black Sea coast, could end up on the Russian side of a partition, with a border perhaps running north to south along the eastern borders of the Oblasts of Zhytomyrs’ka and Vinnyts’ka that would be about 250 miles long compared to the previous 1,226 mile border.

Mearsheimer is an exponent of what he terms offensive realism. In this theory of international relations, states seek to maximize their power, wanting as much as they can get, with hegemony as their ultimate goal. This contrasts with defensive realism, which theorizes that states don’t want much more power than they already have if it is enough to give them security, in which case they concentrate on maintaining the balance of power rather than risk upsetting it by seeking more. In these terms I would tend to see the United States as primarily practicing defensive realism, in the form of George Kennan’s policy of containment, in the first several decades of the Cold War. Then, during the Reagan era and the rise of the Neocons, there was a shift in the direction of offensive realism, with this going into overdrive after the breakup of the Soviet Union when it enjoyed the “unipolar moment” as the world’s sole superpower and sought to prevent the rise of any challenger to peer status. Russia’s strategy throughout the Cold War tended to be more consistently and cautiously defensive (the Cuban Missile Crisis being a rare exception, and even this was more of a counter to the missiles already deployed by the U.S. in Turkey than a true offensive initiative) and this has remained true during the Putin era. In the nuclear arms race the U.S. took the initiative with the Russians following well behind and trying to catch up, not finally achieving parity until the beginning of the 1970s.

According to Mearsheimer, a cardinal tenet of offensive realism is that a smaller and weaker state, such as Ukraine, that borders a much larger and more powerful state, such as Russia, should seek to avoid being antagonistic toward or being a serious threat to—and certainly not existential threat to, the larger state. In this situation Ukraine is an abject lesson that should be a warning to others, as it persistently violated this tenet, whether by its own folly or as a U.S. puppet being led down the primrose path, for although it was not capable of posing a serious threat to Russia in itself, it was capable of being such a threat if they became a host and a platform for U.S. and NATO offensive power, a process which was already long underway even though it had not yet become a NATO member.

U.S. troops of a training mission on parade in Ukraine before Russia’s “Special Operation.” Does it mean the end of the Pax Americana?

The tenets of offensive realism have lessons for pro-Whites that apply not only to international relations but also to the dynamics of the relations between different races and ethnic groups with conflicting interests in a multiracial society. Seen in the context of realist international relations, the small ethnostate or secessionist concept is clearly not a credible option as its independence and even existence would be under constant threat from more powerful hostile actors. This means that the “National Premise” or grand partition ethnostate concept, with the European successor ethnostate remaining in the first rank of global powers, is the only credible option for European racial preservation and independence in realist terms. An example of this concept would be my proposal for a partition into European and non-European successor states, with the non-European population occupying the 669,000 sq. miles of the southwest between the Atchafalaya, Mississippi and Arkansas rivers in the east and the Pacific in the west, and the European population occupying the larger remaining part of 2,226,000 sq. miles.

Applying realist theory to interracial relations, where the different races have competing and conflicting interests and a resulting adversarial relationship, with each wanting to maximize its level of power and control, supports the necessity for a separation of the races into different countries or ethnostates with their own governments where each can be in control of its own existence.

What should be the stance of pro-Whites on the Ukraine issue? The realist answer would be whatever is best for the White (i.e., European) race in its current struggle for survival and liberation from the anti-White forces that are subjugating and destroying it. Obviously, we should seek to avoid any war between the kindred peoples of our race, which in Eastern Europe is complicated — as it was in Yugoslavia — by traditional but now petty intra-Slavic nationalism, ethnic ressentiment, and revanchism. But in terms of the interests of the White race, and of the racial interests of the Ukrainian people themselves, Ukraine has been moving in the wrong direction, as have almost all White countries. It has been following, or been put on, a Westernizing course, which now unfortunately means an anti-White course, for the West is now dominated by anti-White forces which have turned it against the White race, promoting White racial replacement and the global homogenization program (“globohomo”) of multiracialism and John Lennon’s Imagine, and will remain so unless and until its subjugated White populations, long ensnared in the Kumbaya delusion, somehow assert their racial interests and liberate themselves.

Russia, in stark contrast, has been the only major White state with both the power and the will to resist the anti-White tide, with Hungary being a minor White state which has also showed admirable resistance to the extent its lesser power allows it to do so. This makes Russia far more important to the interests of the White race than it has ever been before. Indeed, unless Whites in the West do liberate themselves, Russia may become the last remaining major White state upon which all hope for any White future, however tragically diminished, will depend. But to fulfill that hope and remain independent of globalist control and the New World Order Russia must have security and freedom of action. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explained in a March 19 interview:

The West did not want equal cooperation and, as we can now see, has kept true to the “will and testament” of Zbigniew Brzezinski who said that Ukraine should not be allowed to side with Russia. With Ukraine, Russia is a great power, while without Ukraine, it is a regional player.

So what is at stake here is not just Ukraine but something much bigger — the power and independence of Russia and its ability to stand against the anti-White tide led by the anti-White-dominated United States. The Polish-born and deeply anti-Russian Brzezinski (1928–2017), a grand master of the Neocons, authored The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives (1998), described as follows in the Amazon blurb for the updated 2016 edition:

In The Grand Chessboard, renowned geostrategist Zbigniew Brzezinski delivers a brutally honest and provocative vision for American preeminence in the twenty-first century. The task facing the United States, he argues, is to become the sole political arbiter in Eurasian lands and to prevent the emergence of any rival power threatening our material and diplomatic interests. The Eurasian landmass, home to the greatest part of the globe’s population, natural resources, and economic activity, is the “grand chessboard” on which America’s supremacy will be ratified and challenged in the years to come. In this landmark work of public policy and political science, Brzezinski outlines a groundbreaking and powerful blueprint for America’s vital interests in the modern world.

Since 1965 the United States has been an effectively anti-White country in the most profound, meaningful and ultimate sense of the concept. It has been against the most vital (life-essential) and existential interests — the interests involving the conditions required for its continued existence and control of its own existence — of the White race, and it has set on an anti-White course culminating in White racial dispossession, subjugation, replacement and destruction. Within one or two decades after 1965, the same was true for Canada, Australia, Britain and the other countries of western Europe. After 1991 most of the countries of eastern Europe started on the same course. What Foreign Minister Lavrov said in a March 18 interview on Russia Today about Ukrainian cultural distortion and brainwashing since circa 1991, promoted by western governments and NGOs, can be multiplied by an order of magnitude for the U.S. and the other western countries.

The United States’ desire … to come back to a unipolar world… to take the melting pot concept from the United States soil and to make a melting pot of the entire world, and they will do the melting … . [T]he efforts of our Western colleagues [are] to make Ukraine Russophobic and an anti-Russian instrument, anti-Russia.”

For the anti-White forces in control of the West, with the globalists and Neocons in control of U.S. foreign policy, the ultimate goal, what they mean by the New World Order, is an anti-White (i.e., opposed to White existence and independence) global unipolar system, exercised through the U.S. acting as global hegemon. To reach that goal, the true end of history and end of any hope for White survival, they must first eliminate any White obstacles in their path. Putin has made Russia the foremost of those White obstacles, the one most capable of effective opposition, so they must pacify and subjugate Russia and bring it to heel, preferably through subversion and regime change, thus removing Russia as an independent actor from the stage of history and making it as subservient to U.S. will as Germany, France or Poland. Pro-Whites seek a collaborative relationship with Russia as part of a Pan-European grand alliance. Anti-Whites seek it by Russian subjugation to the Pax Americana. That is offensive realism with a vengeance.

Unfortunately for pro-Whites, the return of Russia and history includes the return of the external distraction from the far greater internal threats to our racial independence and survival. Indeed, that external distraction has also returned with a vengeance, serving the interests of the anti-White forces so well that one could almost suspect they wanted and intended this to happen. The conservatives who had rightly come to view Facebook and Twitter as enemies after their censorial banning of conservatives and subversive intentions and actions were made clear (actually banning pro-Russian speech), now rush to their defense when that same behavior in Russia caused Putin to reply in kind and ban the banners and subverters.

Our task, as always, requires our primary focus and attention to the internal threat that is destroying us. Russia and history are both back in action, and so is the external distraction, as they were before 1991. The internal threat we face now is the same we faced then, only much larger and more developed. The history we need to make is in our own countries. The conflict we face at home is far more dangerous to us than any that might threaten us from afar, so we should not go abroad to seek conflict but commit ourselves fully to winning the conflict at home. That is the epic historical victory we seek. The continued existence and independence of our race depends on it.

Weapon of Mass Psychosis: Leftist Power-Lust and the Rhetoric of Racism

If you’re interested in war, here’s a question for you. What’s the world’s most powerful weapon? You might come up with some good guesses, but I suspect you’ll miss the right answer. So here are some clues. The weapon can wreck entire nations, not just individual cities. But it’s not a mega-bomb or a death-ray. Millions of people live in daily fear of this weapon. But it’s not a nerve gas or a lab-enhanced pathogen. And despite its power, it’s simple enough to be used by children and very stupid adults. In fact, its use is vigorously encouraged among those groups. And using it doesn’t cost them a thing!

Silence, censor and paralyze

So what is the world’s most powerful weapon? It’s a word. And the word is ‘racism’. Wielded as a weapon by low-IQ non-Whites and the treacherous White left, it has already done huge physical, financial, and psychological damage to the West. It is used to silence, censor and paralyze, crushing the discussion of obvious racial facts and all attempts by ordinary Whites to defend their own interests. By attacking those Whites as “racist,” the left has been able to justify massive transfers in wealth and resources from Whites to non-Whites who are allegedly persecuted and oppressed, even as those non-Whites commit endless violent and acquisitive crimes against Whites. Charges of “racism” have been hurled with powerful effect against anyone who questions the wisdom of mass immigration from the crime-plagued, corruption-rife, disease-ridden and tribalistic Third World. And against all scientists who have tried to investigate and expose the truth about innate racial differences in intelligence, psychology and creative potential.

The word-weapon of “racism” in action during “mostly peaceful” BLM protests

Yes indeed, the word “racism” has been a hugely effective and powerful weapon against White Western societies. And yet it’s a remarkably flimsy weapon, susceptible to some easy and obvious counter-measures. But the mainstream right refuses to use those counter-measures. Everything the mainstream right does in response merely strengthens the left and confirms the validity of “racism.” As I explained in “Jewish Loot and Neglected Fruit,” I don’t think this is because the mainstream right is inept or incompetent. I think it’s because the mainstream right is an ally of the left. It exists to betray Whites and serve the anti-White Jews who fund its politicians and reward them for their treachery. When Republicans in America say that “Democrats are the real racists,” they don’t simply fail to harm Democrats, they strengthen Democrats by accepting “racism” as a valid and coherent concept. It’s as though one side in a war is supplying weapons to the other side.

Stonetoss foresees the future of rightist rhetoric

So how should a sincere and effective right respond to leftist rhetoric about racism? First of all, the right should say that, as ever, the left is not interested in truth, equality or justice. No, the left is interested in power. By “truth,” it means lies. By “equality,” it means enslavement. And by “justice,” it means revenge. All of that is obvious in the endless accusations of “racism” it hurls against Whites and their civilization. The right should stress the incoherence and dishonesty of those accusations. On the one hand, the left claims that all humans are the same under the skin. On the other, the left treats Whites as uniquely and horrifically guilty of racism. But how can guilt attach to behavior that, on leftist principles, is determined by chance and historical contingency? If Whites and Blacks are, as the left insists, entirely the same under the skin, it automatically follows that Blacks are capable not only of exactly the same achievements as Whites but also of exactly the same misdeeds. If the historical and geographic dice had rolled in another way, it would have been Blacks who enslaved Whites and Africa that conquered Europe — just as it would have been Blacks who first walked on the Moon and Blacks who first split the atom.

The moralistic rhetoric of anti-racism

As I’ve pointed out in articles like “Destroy the Goy,” leftists don’t explain human history by genetics but by geography. The Jewish leftist Jared Diamond has repeatedly claimed that White achievements are owed to nothing but the blind fortune of being born on the right kind of continent. He says that “if Africa’s rhinos and hippos had lent themselves to domestication,” then “African cavalry mounted on rhinos or hippos would have made mincemeat of European cavalry mounted on horses.” In fact, as Gregory Cochran has pointed out, horses didn’t “lend themselves to domestication” either. Diamond’s pose as an objective, truth-seeking scientist conceals his real anti-White purpose. When Kevin MacDonald attended a talk by Diamond for the Skeptic Society at Cal Tech in the early 2000s, he saw “the crowd burst into applause” when Diamond “gleefully fantasized about Africa conquering Europe.” As MacDonald says: “it was a good introduction to the anti-White hatred that boils just below the surface of the moralistic rhetoric of anti-racism.”

MacDonald is right: leftists are indeed motivated by “anti-White hatred” and their anti-racist rhetoric is indeed highly “moralistic.” Anti-Pope Francis, the leftist currently usurping the throne of St Peter, announced that “Racism is a virus” on the United Nations’ so-called “International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination” (21 March, 2021). In fact, it’s the International Day for the Demonization of Whites and was chosen to commemorate how “the police in Sharpeville, South Africa, opened fire and killed 69 people at a peaceful demonstration against apartheid laws in 1960.” South Africa and its neighbor Zimbabwe are excellent examples of how effectively the word “racism” has been used as a weapon of mass destruction. They were prosperous and civilized countries under White rule. Then the left began to screech that White rule was “racist” and that Blacks there were being exploited, oppressed and prevented from realizing their sky-high potential.

Slavery is “an indelible stain” on Whites

Blacks duly took over and revealed exactly how much potential they have. They didn’t sustain or enhance the civilizations that Whites had built: they wrecked them. Zimbabwe was once the bread-basket of Africa; today it’s the basket-case. South Africa is a swamp of violent crime, corruption and misgovernance. Except for a tiny kleptocratic elite, Blacks in South Africa and Zimbabwe are now far worse off than they were under White rule. As ever, leftists most harm those whom they claim to care about most.

Leftists will bring the same destruction to Western nations if they can, using the same verbal venom. Anti-Pope Francis is one example; Prince Charles, the leftist heir to the British throne, is another. He first claimed in a speech in Ghana that “The appalling atrocity of the slave trade, and the unimaginable suffering it caused, left an indelible stain on the history of our world.” He then claimed in a speech in Barbados that “the appalling atrocity of slavery forever stains our history.” Note that he chose his words carefully: he meant “British history,” but didn’t say that directly. He’s happy to heap guilt on ordinary British Whites and incite Blacks against them, but he doesn’t want to open the monarchy to claims for reparations. After all, who ruled Britain during the “appalling atrocity of slavery”? Who was enriched by “the appalling atrocity”? It was Charles’ royal ancestors, but he doesn’t intend to hand over any of the abundant wealth and property they bequeathed to him.

In other words, Charles wasn’t sincere: he was posturing in typical leftist fashion. He was also being dishonest in typical leftist fashion. In his speeches he didn’t mention the extensive and continuing history of slavery and human sacrifice in Black Africa. And he didn’t raise an obvious question: How can Britain and other Western nations be “stained” by something that, on leftist principles of history, they could just as easily have been victims of as the perpetrators?

Censure for Whites, sycophancy for Jews: leftist traitor Prince Charles (right) lights Hannukah candles under the supervision of Britain’s Chief Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis

Indeed, Western nations were the victims: Muslim ships raided coastal settlements everywhere from Italy to Iceland and carried Whites off to perpetual slavery. But it was ordinary Whites who suffered that horrible fate. Charles’ royal ancestors were safe from abduction in well-guarded palaces, just as Charles himself is safe from Black and Muslim criminals today. He’s a traitor, but no-one on the mainstream right condemned his treachery or exposed the anti-White rhetoric in his speech. As I’ve pointed out before, while the European slave-trade is endlessly condemned and publicized by Western journalists, politicians, academics, film-makers and authors, the Muslim slave-trade, which was bigger and longer-lasting, is almost ignored. Even the leftist author Jeremy Black, in his book Slavery: A New Global History (2011), is struck by this contrast in attitude: “[The] period of Mamluk rule [in Muslim Egypt] was roughly equivalent in length to that of slavery in the USA, and it is an interesting sign of relative concerns that the attention devoted to slavery in the Mamluk empire and the USA is as a drop of water compared to an ocean.” (ch. 1, p. 33)

Self-righteous psychosis

Has anyone ever claimed that “the appalling atrocity of slavery forever stains Egyptian history”? Or Muslim history? Or Jewish history? Of course not: that kind of moralistic rhetoric is applied only against Whites and Christians. But the rhetoric is not just self-righteous: it’s self-gratifying too. A certain kind of White leftist obviously derives great pleasure from public displays of anti-Whiteness. Here’s a good example:

Glasgow authorities have apologised for the city’s role in the Atlantic slave trade, saying the “tentacles” of money from the practice reached every corner of Scotland’s biggest metropolis. … “Follow the Atlantic slavery money trail and its tentacles reach into every corner of Glasgow,” council leader Susan Aitken [of the SNP] told colleagues at a meeting on Thursday. “It’s clear what this report tells is that the blood of trafficked and enslaved African people, their children and their children’s children is built into the very bones of this city.” …

A total of 62 Glasgow streets are named after slave owners who built their fortunes on tobacco plantations. These include Buchanan Street and Glassford Street, named after the “tobacco lords” Andrew Buchanan and John Glassford. James Watt, whose improvements to the steam engine drove the Industrial Revolution, was personally involved in trafficking a black child for sale to a family in north-east Scotland, the report said. …

Glasgow council’s chief executive, Annemarie O’Donnell, said the city acknowledged that black, Asian and minority ethnic citizens wished the council to “recognise the historic legacy of chattel slavery based on the exploitation of enslaved Africans”. The report, by the University of Glasgow academic Stephen Mullen, who has written extensively on the city’s links to slavery, was “a step towards healing the anger and frustration” felt by these citizens, she added. (Glasgow apologises for role in slave trade, saying its ‘tentacles’ are in every corner of city, The Guardian, 1st April, 2022

The overweight and unattractive SNP politician Susan Aitken poses with two non-Whites

That story appeared in the Guardian on April 1, 2022, but it wasn’t an April Fool’s joke. The overweight and unattractive leftist Susan Aitken was entirely serious in her overwrought rhetoric: “the blood of trafficked and enslaved African people, their children and their children’s children is built into the very bones of this city.” Indeed, I detect psychosis in that kind of language. As I’ve said before: leftism is better regarded as a psychiatric disorder than as an ideology. That’s why you can describe the concept of “racism” as a weapon of mass psychosis. It induces irrational and destructive behavior in millions of White leftists, who work to destroy their own race and nations on behalf of non-Whites.

They’ll kill us to cure us

Susan Aitken is one small but significant example. She’s a member of the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), which defends Scotland in the same way as the bigger Labour party defends the working class. That is, the SNP betrays and harms Scotland just as Labour betrays and harms the working class. Look at how Aitken accepts and amplifies a report that attacks the Scottish hero James Watt. He has traditionally been celebrated as an emblem of the hugely disproportionate contributions made by Scots in the fields of engineering, science, medicine, literature and philosophy.

Scottish hero James Watt, a giant hated by modern pygmies

That’s precisely why Scottish leftists like Susan Aitken want to drag him down and besmirch his memory. He was a giant; they are pygmies. He could create; they can only destroy. By traducing the giants of Scottish history, they gratify their own power-lust. Just like leftists everywhere else, leftists in Scotland need to pretend that their nation is diseased in order to justify the cure of leftist control. As in South Africa and Zimbabwe, the cure will prove far worse than the alleged disease.

The Great Russian Restoration VIII: A Pivot to “Patriotic” Corruption

I promised an article on the pro-Kremlin faction of the oligarchs, but that will have to wait until we get a final head count of who fled and who stayed in Russia. Friends today, enemies tomorrow — such is life in… well just about anywhere nowadays. Instead, we should probably say a few words about corruption, the security services and the way business is done in Russia to set the stage better for when we get into the nitty-gritty of it all soon.

Corruption is a buzzword in Eastern Europe in a way that it simply is not in the West. This is because in the West, corruption is legal and understood to be part and parcel of the Liberal Democratic process, whereas in the East, people still have the capacity to feel outrage at it. But in Washington, professional corrupters occupy seats in offices of prestigious lobbying organizations on K Street and no one denounces them. As we all know, these professionals help foreign interests, big business and ethnic grievance groups grease the wheels of political bureaucracy with nothing more than innocent handshakes, playful winks and well thought-out suggestions. In other countries this would be called corruption, but because America is a Human Rights Freedom-Loving Liberal Democracy we know a priori that corruption simply cannot exist because that’s not our values — that’s simply not who we are.

But take Nancy Pelosi and her son, who allegedly supports youth soccer programs in Ukraine. They’ve managed to extract staggering sums of loot from the poorest country in Europe. Then take Joe Biden and his son, who allegedly invest in shale gas extraction in Ukraine and, according to the recently revealed laptop emails, were involved in biolabs pathogen research. They’ve also made a tidy profit. This is, of course, considered normal and no one so much as shrugs in Washington or in the controlled media. One doesn’t even have to look abroad to American politicians fleecing failed states to see what Liberal Democracy is really about. Again, Joe Biden, for example, has had a long and storied career as an insurance industry representative. His home state of Delaware has had many companies come in to take advantage of tax loopholes and the like, and Joe Biden has gone to Congress for decades to push for legislation that is agreeable to their continued profits.

Again, this is normal. It’s not a bug, it’s a feature. This is how the system works.

“Corruption!” The proles cried.

“Simply the cost of doing business!” The oligarchs replied.

Fundamentally, Liberal Democracy is based on the premise of giving the merchant/business class control over the political process. People with money at some point wanted to convert their currency into political power, which they were barred from accessing by the existing system of hereditary titles and a “services-rendered” based reward system run by the monarch. To give their money a voice, they had to change the political structure of their host countries to make them more amicable to the interests of their business caste, which led to the modern system of Liberal Democracy as we know it coming into its own.

But the proletariat of Eastern Europe didn’t understand this — they were willing to give Liberal Democracy a shot. They were then taken aback and morally outraged when they saw the whole country come to be dominated by oligarchic business interests. No doubt they should have read the fine print before signing on the dotted line as it were. Back in the Soviet Union, a party elite that adhered to the correct political ideology ran the country. Ambitious youth joined the Communist party and rose through the ranks by writing theses on Marxism-Leninism and then running some office or another until they got noticed and pulled up to the next rank by a party official. It was a system that people grew to hate at first, but then ended up becoming nostalgic for. At least the average prole more-or-less understood how the system worked and how to advance in it. You could figure out who to talk to to get something done and some problem solved. This new system, however, turned out to be even more opaque and labyrinthine than the one that came before it.

In general, if we compare Capitalism with, say, Communism, then we see a striking difference emerge. In one system, a group of powerful businessmen collude with one another to ban criticism of themselves and set up a system of private monopolies to fleece the people. In contrast, with Communism, we see a group of powerful party elites who conspire with one another to ban criticism of themselves and set up a system of state monopolies to fleece the people. The difference couldn’t be more stark. All this is to say that Oligarchy can take on many forms. You can have a political oligarchy that then takes on elements of an economic oligarchism. Or you can have an economic oligarchy that then ends up taking political power. Point being: the ruling caste of the USSR and the USSA have far more in common with one another than they would ever admit to their own captive populations.

The “Russian” form of corruption, however, is far worse than the one practiced in the West because the stolen money is then taken out of the country. In contrast, if we take Carnegie and Rockefeller, who were robber barons and oligarchs in their time as well, we can at least say they built some nice libraries and funded other public works within America with their stolen money. This is an important distinction and I would never forgive myself for not using this opportunity to push a rather esoteric political position promoted by the infamous modern occult philosopher Aleksander Dugin who stressed the need for the Russian government to promote “patriotic corruption” like the kind practiced in the West. A word on Dugin: he has never enjoyed the same levels of popularity in Russia as he has in the West, where he was seen as a kind of éminence grise of Russian politics, whereas his ideas were more often ridiculed in Russia than not. Personally, I maintain that the man had many good points to make that he was simply too “based” and realpolitik for correct-thinking people to even entertain his ideas. Most modern thinkers seem to be unable to throw off utopian castle-in-the-sky type thinking and simply make do with reality as it is and not insist on it conforming to their vision of how it should be.

Anyway, let’s get into our final point of discussion for today — the rentier siloviks.

In the Soviet Union, when the Bolsheviks first came to power, they did not practice Socialism or Communism as we understand it today. The first years saw the formation of the NEP program under which gangs of Jews appropriated private and state businesses and cannibalized huge swaths of Russian capital and assets while also positioning themselves as monopolists in the new “free market” economy. It was only under Stalin that the whole Communism thing started in earnest. What this Communism amounted to was Stalin killing off these private monopolists and putting his own people from the security organizations in charge of them. By this method, the NKVD came into ownership of property, land and other valuable assets. Many families living in the desirable downtowns of big cities like St. Petersburg and Moscow are descendants of one NKDV family or the other to this day. Unlike his predecessors, Stalin actually invested the appropriated resources back into the Soviet economy and began building his vision of Communism in earnest. Again, all it really amounted to was the private cartel from the NEP period being replaced by NKVD agents and a clamp down on capital flight from the USSR. But just by clamping down on capital flight and forcing the resources to stay in the country, Stalin was, indeed, able to turn the Soviet ship around. Moscow is largely a city built by Stalin. The towering “Stalinkas” that ring the capital are the most impressive and enduring monuments to Soviet architecture. Everything that came before and since Stalin has been the regular cost-saving brutalist concrete slurry that we have on display everywhere in the world, whether the country be Communist or Capitalist.

Now, the NKDV structure morphed into the KGB and then the FSB, which continued the legacy of security people maintaining a grip on state resources and directing them as they saw fit while also extracting a profit for themselves. This is still a reality in Russia today, although their grip on economic power weakened because of the 90s and the rise of a competing mafia — the private oligarchs. Entrepreneurs who want to start making money eventually have to do business with one mafia or the other. In modern Russia, they can approach the private oligarchs, the FSB or the official state — all approaches which have their advantages and drawbacks and which have to be weighed carefully.

In the West, in contrast, the state is the main mafia one has to deal with, and the government extracts its rents through fees, inspections, compliance codes, taxes and so on, not to mention the mountains of paperwork and time that have to be sunk in as well. Russia certainly has this system in place as well, but the official state’s monopoly on rent collection is not totally like in the West. By choosing to do businesses with the FSB, the strapping entrepreneur can bypass the bureaucracy and even save money in the short term. They simply pay their “Krisha” protection money to the FSB boss in charge of their street or section of the city or building and then they can set up their business tomorrow if they wish, no red tape involved. It seems like a good deal and most businessmen in the West would probably jump at the opportunity to pay a fee upfront and not have to deal with waiting, say 2 years, to get a state-issued liquor license.

However, all is not as it seems at first glance and the FSB boss might start considering a hostile takeover of the business on his territory if it starts becoming too profitable. Businessmen in Russia constantly complain about being muscled out of their projects and forced to sell to the people who are providing them with protection. And because they paid a bribe to avoid having to deal with state bureaucracy, their business dealings aren’t exactly clean. Most do a mental calculation and decide to cash out instead of fighting in the courts and possibly losing everything and getting a prison term to boot. Politics, then, becomes a necessary part of doing business for any striving oligarch-to-be because they need allies in power to protect their assets from lawfare waged by hostile, already established oligarchs, predatory FSB chiefs, and an impersonal, merciless bureaucracy that will grind them up in its gears before spitting them out to be torn to bits by scavengers.

There it is — an overview of the exquisitely, metaphysically evil nature of business and corruption in Russia.

But, having explained the Russian corruption system in general terms, I can only shrug and point out that despite all of this, or perhaps because of all of this, the ease of starting a business remains much easier in Russia than anywhere in the West. I also don’t think that Russia is all-in-all any more “corrupt” than the West either — in fact, I would say that it is less so. Consider: big companies in the West push for regulation that forces their smaller competitors out of business and allows them to set up monopolies. Is this not “corruption” by legal means?

Or consider what happens when a general retires and begins making millions of dollars working for a private weapons contractor bidding on government contracts that they are guaranteed to win because of money spent bribing politicians who are, in turn, themselves simply the puppets of business interests that got them elected in the first place. Is this not a form of corruption?

Does legalizing graft and sanctimoniously denouncing others change anything? Does creating a system of corruption that is more elegant make that system any less corrupt? What is the end result? What is the end goal? What are we crusading against and what are we trying to build? Who gets to decide the meanings of the terms we use? And the most important question: why do the peasants allow themselves to be politicized into caring about who is stealing from whom halfway around the world from where they live?

I contend, unlike the utopians, that corruption in one form or another will always exist in society regardless of whatever political ideology is adopted and promulgated as the state religion. Fundamentally, the state can monopolize and legalize corruption, like in the West, or you can have older, more archaic forms continue to flourish like in the East. Furthermore, an anonymous internet peasant like myself can afford to be a moral crusader, but no serious statesmen can, which means that Russia will remain a “corrupt” country for the foreseeable future. What is far more important to consider is the question is what form of corruption will come out on top as a result of the sanctions and the turn to autarky that we are witnessing occurring now in real time. A system of “patriotic corruption” where state assets stay within the country and are reinvested in the economy will be far better than what came before it. Furthermore, it is quite clear that state assets are better off in the hands of state spooks than in the hands of an international clique of rootless cosmopolitans. Finally, there should indeed be a legal and open path for honest businessmen to be able to take — but leaving a potentially risky off-road shortcut option open isn’t exactly a civilization-ending situation either.

Keep all of this in mind when we start talking about the pro-Kremlin oligarchs and the Chinese-style fusion of big business and government system that Russia is moving towards adopting in the near future.

Putin’s Holocaust Obsession

“The only international ally on the battlefields of history Russia has is Israel, due to the Holocaust.”[1]

As the Russia-Ukraine conflict rages on, it continues to act in the West as a kind of Rorschach test of general political attitudes. Broadly speaking, the Center and Left have adopted a strong pro-Ukrainian position, while elements of the hard or alternative Right have attempted to find common ground with Putin’s Russia, often using anti-Wokism and antipathy towards globalism and NATO as the preferred conduit for ideological solidarity. My own personal opinion is that it is difficult for Westerners to form valid opinions on the moral merits of each cause, since both causes (Ukrainian nationalist and Russian separatist) bear some validity. This is the harsh reality of multiethnic states where the population is divided on self-assertion and self-determination. Beyond one’s basic position on the right of one nation to wage war on another, most Western commentary on the conflict thus remains a Rorschach, divulging infinitely more about the politics of the commentator than the true nature of events on the ground. With this caveat, and since this website has dedicated much work to the question of Jews and their influence, the following essay offers not so much another ‘explanation’ of, or apologetic for, the ongoing war, but instead a spotlight on one of its stranger, but no less important, aspects: Vladimir Putin’s adoption, promotion, and use of the Holocaust narrative in pursuit of geopolitical goals.

The Rise and Fall of Russian Holocaust Propaganda

Russia was an integral part of the creation of the Holocaust industry from the very beginning. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, it was in Soviet interests to utterly delegitimize the governments and peoples of those Eastern European countries selected for absorption into the Communist mega-state. Accusing the peoples of Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, or Ukraine of being complicit in genocide or “crimes against humanity,” for example, was an easy way of both demoralizing them and suppressing anti-Soviet nationalism. The first Holocaust propagandists were of course Russian Jewish photojournalists like Samary Gurary, Mark Markov-Grinberg, Max Alpert, Semen Fridlyand, Mikhail Trakhman, and Georgy Zelma, who published posed and curated images that historian David Shneer has described as comprising a new “atrocity genre” of photojournalism. While their work proved incendiary in the Soviet Union, the Western response to Russian atrocity reports was initially muted and cautious, changing only thanks to the repeated efforts of Western Jewish journalists and the increasingly lurid nature of Soviet accounts. When the Los Angeles Times printed some Russian photos from Majdanek, for example, it warned its readers that the material it was publishing might be “propaganda.” In Britain, Jewish BBC journalist Alexander Werth later recalled that he was at first “continually frustrated by his editor’s unwillingness to run his stories of horror and atrocities.”[2]

Buoyed by the prolific activities of Soviet Jewish propagandist Ilya Ehrenburg, the Holocaust narrative was initially pushed internationally as part of a funding drive, with key figures like Solomon Mikhoels (Chairman of the Soviet Union’s official Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee) and journalist Vasily Grossman tasked with developing propaganda to raise money for the Soviet war effort. Grossman, author of the well-known novel Life and Fate (reviewed by Spencer J. Quinn) was the creator of some of the first outrageous stories from Treblinka, for example, including a report on a camp guard of superhuman strength who was said to have ripped apart babies with his bare hands. Mikhoels, meanwhile was specifically instructed to appeal to the national sentiments of Jews and was sent to the United States in 1943 to fundraise.

Solomon Mikhoels

After the war, the Soviet need for a Holocaust narrative disappeared overnight. While it was soon adopted in the West as a methodology for the advance of multiculturalism and White guilt, in the Soviet Union Jewish atrocity propaganda, as a discourse, was more or less eliminated. By 1948, Grossman, the author of lurid tales, was marginalized and his works were suppressed. In January 1948, Mikhoels was invited to Minsk to judge a play for the Stalin Prize and was killed in a country house under the supervision of the chief of the Soviet Belarusian state police. His body was crushed by a truck and left in a street, fulfilling Stalin’s request that his death be attributed to a “car accident.” In November 1948, the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was formally dissolved.

The Soviet Union’s antipathy to the Holocaust narrative was directly related to the need to spread the message to new satellite states that the Russian nation had struggled and suffered like no other. International Jewry, at one time useful for funds and other forms of influence, could not be tolerated as a competitor. Stalin’s mood towards Jews declined further after the creation of Israel in 1947. He was personally shocked by public displays of Jewish identity in Moscow, including mass gatherings for Jewish high holidays and fawning affection for Golda Meir. The “nation within a nation” had made itself too obvious. In January 1949 Pravda published its famous article condemning “rootless cosmopolitans,” and by March the newspaper was purged of Jews. Jewish officers in the Red Army were then dismissed. Jewish activists were removed from the leadership of the communist party. Hundreds of Jewish writers were arrested, and, if they wrote under Russian pseudonyms, they suddenly found their real names appearing in parentheses. In August 1952, 13 Jews were tried, convicted, and executed for anti-Soviet espionage.

By the summer of 1949, the Holocaust narrative once again emerged as a matter of political contention, this time in Poland. The Soviet ambassador wrote to Moscow in July complaining that 37% of Polish Ministry of Public Security officers were Jewish in a country where Jews comprised less than 1% of the population. Jakub Berman, one of the Jewish leaders of the country and a former associate of Holocaust propagandist Solomon Mikhoels, hastily attempted to defuse the situation by offering a strange bargain — the assertion that six million people had died in “the Holocaust” but that this total involved three million Jews and three million non-Jews.[3] With this gambit, offering a shared reward from Jewish propaganda efforts, Berman bought himself some time and managed to avoid the more severe anti-Jewish purges associated with the “Doctor’s Plot,” Stalin’s last attempt to curb Jewish influence in the Soviet Union. The Holocaust narrative, as a tale of special Jewish victimhood, then fell dormant in Russia for half a century.

Putin Revives “The Holocaust”

As indicated by his long speech announcing a “special military action” in Ukraine, Putin is a keen student of history and is highly sensitive to the way in which understandings of history, or rather the politics of history, influence culture, national identity, geopolitics, and even military goals. It’s therefore not all that surprising that he should reach into the past in order to secure a more dominant grip over neighboring nations. Putin’s intense utilization of the Holocaust narrative is of special interest because he has revived one of its original intentions: as a weapon against anti-Russian nationalism in what are now the former Soviet satellite states. Whether Putin is a “true believer” in the Holocaust story, or whether he is employing it purely for tactical reasons, is besides the point. The Holocaust narrative is critical to Putin’s ideological war in Eastern Europe and to his ongoing ambition to forge stronger links with Israel. One of the results is that Putin has emerged as one of the foremost promoters of the Holocaust narrative globally.

Writing in Putin’s Russia and The Falsification of History (2020), Anton Weiss-Wendt writes:

Within an international setting, Putin referred to the Holocaust for the first time during the official visit of the Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to Russia in November 2003. Putin stressed the importance of building bridges to the Russian diaspora in Israel, and at one point proposed organising a Holocaust exhibition at the Victory Museum in Moscow. … Beginning in 2005, in the run-up to the sixtieth anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany, formal references to the Holocaust proliferated. Since then, the Putin regime has firmly incorporated the Holocaust into its foreign policy, making it essentially an instrument of soft power. The Holocaust is now part of Russian history politics, coordinated at the highest government level.

If Putin is keen to revive the Holocaust narrative in Russia and to export it worldwide, we should be clear about which Holocaust narrative Putin prefers. Putin has adopted what we might call the “Berman model,” named after the Jakub Berman, described above, who tried to appease Stalin with his less ambitious death estimates shared equally among Jews and Soviets. In other words, Putin is interested in the Holocaust narrative only to the extent that it can be politically useful to the Russian state.

In April 2005, Putin visited Israel and said that “Jewish people, like people of our country, incurred massive losses during the Second World War.” He complained about former Soviet states erecting statues that glorified “anti-Semites,” “Nazis” and “the German Waffen SS.” It should be a point of common ground, argued Putin, that “Jews and Russians have the same [low] status” in nationalist, post-Soviet countries. The bottom line then, is that Jews and Russians should be seen as brothers in suffering. The more Putin can boost the alleged historical sufferings of the Jews, the more he can share in the resulting propaganda benefits, especially since one of the more potent side-effects of such a narrative is that the nationalisms of smaller, surrounding states can be disparaged, tarnished, and declared illegitimate. But sharing in these benefits, as we will see, is both crucial and contentious.

Memorials

There is a hurried and ill-conceived quality to Russian promotion of the Holocaust, perhaps best illustrated by the Kremlin’s comical donation of a Holocaust monument to Israel in 2005. By all accounts, the Russian government had commissioned the piece at short notice to Zurab Tsereteli, president of the Russian Academy of Arts. The speed of the commission is suggested by the fact Tsereteli appears to have reused models from an earlier statue now sitting in Moscow, resulting in Israelis puzzling over a monument supposedly depicting naked Jewish Holocaust victims, none of whom appear to be circumcised.

This hasty approach to Holocaust promotion doesn’t diminish its import. Russia has engaged in a “comprehensive Holocaust remembrance program.”[4] In 2012, Putin intensified his approaches to Jews internationally using the Holocaust narrative as a vehicle for dialogue. Weiss-Wendt comments that during a visit to Israel in June 2012,

Putin raised [the Holocaust] nearly every time he met with the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Both Russia and Israel are sensitive to a biased interpretation of history, he said. … Netanyahu was happy to oblige, having on various occasions over the years emphasised that Russia and Israel see eye to eye on issues of history.

That same year, Putin established more formal relations with Russia’s Chabad movement, with Weiss-Wendt suggesting that “the Kremlin may not know how much their affiliation with Chabad is worth, but it is courting them on account of their international connections nevertheless, in the belief of the strength of international Jewry.” Also in the same year, Moscow witnessed the opening of the Jewish Museum and Tolerance Center. Putin was a major supporter of the project from the beginning, symbolically donating one month’s salary toward the construction costs. The FSB, successor to the KGB, supplied the center with a number of historical documents, a move illustrative of a much broader relationship between the Russian government and the organized Jewish community in Russia, since the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia has a special department dedicated to ongoing privileged co-operation with the ministry of defense and law-enforcement agencies.

Putin’s “Berman model” remains a sticking point with Jews, however. While Russia’s two most prominent rabbis “stressed the tolerance aspect” of the new museum, Putin made sure that Russian interests can continue to hitch a ride on Jewish atrocity propaganda. In a public speech Putin suggested that the museum be renamed the Russian Jewish Museum and Tolerance Center. “It’s located in Russia, right? And we made it happen together.” His comments were reminiscent of a 2012 incident in which Russian authorities replaced a memorial plaque in Rostov-on-Don that had claimed 27,000 Jews were killed in a nearby gorge (even Yad Vashem suggest such a figure is a gross exaggeration) with a plaque stating only that “Soviet citizens” had been killed in the area.

The Russian ADL

As well as investing in Holocaust memorials, the Kremlin has also worked to develop and promote its own version of the ADL. One of the central figures of the Federation of Jewish Communities of Russia is the Ukraine-born Jewish oligarch Boris Spiegel, founder and former chairman of World Without Nazism, and former president of the World Congress of Russian Jews. World Without Nazism is styled as an “international human rights NGO” and closely follows the ADL playbook. The organization’s stated objectives include “consolidation of anti-fascist forces, mobilisation of world public opinion in annunciating the significance of the Nuremberg judgment, promoting “denazification” of countries of Eastern and Central Europe, opposing the glorification of Nazism, safeguarding minority rights, and countering Holocaust denial.” Spiegel was a harsh critic of “extremism and neo-Nazism” in Ukraine, and World Without Nazism endorsed the Russian annexation of Crimea. Putin’s own claims to be presently engaged in the “denazification” of Ukraine illustrate some of the influence of this kind of rhetoric, even if tactical rather than sincere.

Anton Weiss-Wendt describes an increasingly integrated Russian-Jewish effort to promote the Holocaust narrative, and Russian-friendly historical interpretations of it, globally:

Since 2009, Russian Jewish organizations have been increasingly incorporated into Moscow’s designs. On January 27, 2009, the foreign ministry, in collaboration with the UN Committee on information, organized a panel, “Lessons of the Holocaust and Modernity,” in New York. According to a Russian diplomat, the event featured “leading Russian and American nonprofit organizations,” Moscow Human Rights Bureau, and the American branch of the World Congress of Russian Jews. In December 2009 in Berlin,  the latter organization—in cooperation with unspecified Jewish and antifascist entities from Europe and CIS—held a conference with a modified title. “Lessons of the Second World War and the Holocaust.” Next, the foreign ministry deployed big guns, the government proxy World Without Nazism. On February 10, 2011, at the UN headquarters, the World Congress of Russian Jews and World Without Nazism (both headed by Speigel) put together a roundtable, “World Without Nazism: The Global Goal of Mankind Today and the Sixty-Fifth Anniversary of the Nuremberg Trial.” The roundtable proclaimed the Nuremberg judgment to be the ultimate truth, condemned the “glorification of Nazism,” and decried an attempted falsification of history. To spread the truth about the Second World War, the roundtable participants proposed carrying out educational and “media propaganda” campaigns.

Spiegel has had other lasting influences in Russia. In Spring 2013 he introduced a draft in the Duma of what would eventually become the Law Against the Glorification of Fascism. The world Holocaust is used 53 times in the draft, and explicitly mentions “Holocaust denial” as a form of “propaganda of Nazism.” Putin’s insistence on the “Berman model” remained strong however. No mention of Jewish deaths occurs anywhere in the final, enacted legislation. Spiegel eventually outlasted his usefulness to Putin. He was imprisoned last year, and there are rumors that his Big Pharma business has been taken over by the FSB.

Despite its pursuit of a “Berman model” that is only halfway useful to Jews, Russia has increasingly presented itself as a “natural ally” of Jews against antisemitism and Holocaust denial. In January 2016, Putin met with leaders of the European Jewish Congress and told them they were Russia’s “natural ally” in “fighting antisemitism, safeguarding the memory of the Second World War, and consistently standing up against ‘glorification of Nazism’.” Putin was thanked for his remarks by Moshe Kantor, presently one of the only major Russian Jewish oligarchs to have escaped Western sanctions, who suggested that the situation of Russian Jews was the best in all of Europe. Putin, beaming with delight, suggested that any Jews wishing to leave Western Europe should “come here, to Russia. We are ready to accept them.”

Culture and Education

Russia has also invested in promoting the Holocaust narrative culturally, most notably in the 2018 release of the big budget motion picture Sobibor. The film, which trades graphically in the usual lurid tropes (one review describes it as including the death throes of hundreds of naked women in a gas chamber, a rape scene, immolation, savage beatings, floggings, stabbings, a bludgeoning to the head and firearm executions), was the brainchild of the Russian minister of culture Vladimir Medinsky, whose ministry financed its production. According to Times of Israel, Sobibor “made a huge splash in Russia thanks to a government-led commemoration campaign that culminated this year.” The Kremlin put a viewing of the film on the agenda of President Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Moscow summit in January 2018. In April, Valentina Matvienko, chair of the Duma’s Federation Council, organized a joint screening and discussion via videobridge with her counterpart at the Israeli Knesset. Special screenings of the film were arranged around the world, encouraging a Holocaust binge not seen since Schindler’s List.

Mikhail Ponomarev, of Russia’s Federation Council, has proposed a state policy on history that would be coordinated at the federal level. Among a package of legislation, he includes laws against “the revival of Nazism,” laws promoting organizations that monitor manifestations of neo-Nazism, calls for intensive lobbying of the Council of Europe for “a joint curriculum on the history of the Second World War and, specifically, the Holocaust,” and offers sponsorship to any scholarship “on Nazi mass crimes, especially the mass murder of Jews.” The Russian Historical Society was suggested as a useful vehicle for countering “anti-Russian” historical narratives such as the Holodomor famine in Ukraine, 1932–3. Russian multiculturalism, meanwhile, was to be enforced through the Ministry of Culture, with demands that all presentations of the history of Russia’s many ethnic groups would have to “aim at reducing interethnic tensions” and build nationwide solidarity.

Denazification

The primary rationale for promotion of the Holocaust narrative by the Russian state appears to be an attempt at negative soft power targeting former Soviet satellite states. While Ukraine is the most well-known target of current Russian “denazification” efforts, the incorporation of the Holocaust narrative into Russian foreign policy has resulted in very similar accusations and rhetorical attacks in recent years against Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. History politics, especially those linked to the Holocaust narrative, have become an integral part of Russia’s diplomatic and political technology.

In 2019, Putin lashed out at Poland after the European Parliament passed a resolution in September identifying the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as the immediate cause of World War II and accusing Russia of whitewashing Stalin’s crimes. Putin, by way of response, “blamed Poland for interwar antisemitism” and pointed to its destruction of Soviet monuments to the Red Army which has “liberated the European countries from Nazism.”[5] Backed into a corner in terms of its historical interpretation, Russia in Global Affairs, a Kremlin-linked foreign policy journal,

divided the world into friends and foes. The only international ally on the battlefields of history Russia has is Israel, due to the Holocaust. … Russia should be reaching out to the ‘Jewish lobby’ in the United States, suggest Dmitry Efremenko, of the Academy of Sciences. Perhaps to Jews generally, adds Alexander Philippov, professor at the Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg.[6]

The journal suggested that Russia should focus a soft power attack on Poland as the main adversary, based heavily on accusations of antisemitism, and seek allies “in the countries of South Europe with a historically strong left, such as Spain and Greece.”

Strange as it sounds, a Kremlin notion of Russians and Jews bound together by history and surrounded by Nazis has become entrenched in Moscow. In 2015, when Putin was ‘accidentally’ not invited to attend a ceremony at Auschwitz, he went to the Jewish Museum and Tolerance Center in Moscow instead. There, he

spoke in one breath of antisemitism and Russophobia, nationalism and terrorism. Of the different ethnicities that fought within the Red Army ranks he mentioned just two — Russians and Jews. In the opposite camp he put Bandera followers in Ukraine and Baltic Nazis. … Putin craftily linked this ‘lesson in history’ to the ‘coldblooded destruction of the peaceful population of Donbass.’ … The point Putin is making is hard to miss: bound by the tragic experience, Jews should join Russians in pushing back violent nationalism of the Ukrainian and Baltic kind.[7]

Sergey Lavrov, Russia’s foreign minister and now a household name thanks to the war in Ukraine, has spent much of the last ten years pushing the UN for resolutions designed to stop or condemn Baltic states from erecting statues to nationalists, some of whom fought in German divisions during World War II. In this effort he has worked closely with the World Jewish Congress and (Moshe Kantor’s) European Jewish Congress. Both organizations were only too keen to add vocal support to Lavrov’s General Assembly Resolution 67/154, which attempted to smear Latvia’s annual march of former Waffen SS soldiers by “collectively implicating all Waffen SS members in war crimes and crimes against humanity.” The United States voted against the resolution, and EU countries abstained. Much to the anger of the Kremlin, Ukraine voted with the United States and opposed the measure.

As well as introducing measures designed to vilify nationalist statues and commemorations, Russia has “never failed to air any new episode in history or politics playing out between Russia and its East European neighbors in connection with the Holocaust.”[8] When a monument to the Soviet soldier was vandalized in Tallinn, Estonia, in May 2006, for example, Russia’s foreign ministry complained to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe that this “extremist incident” goes “against the grain of raising awareness about the tragedy of the Second World War and the Holocaust.” Anton Weiss-Wendt concludes that “Russia’s modus operandi is molding the Holocaust to fit any new twist in regional memory politics it regards as adversarial.”

Conclusion

Much like an earlier essay I wrote on “Jewish subtexts in Ukraine,” what is offered here is not an ‘explanation’ of the Russia-Ukraine war but a clarification of some of its stranger and muddier edges. Try as I might, I find it difficult to find much in either side, Ukrainian or Russian, that I can give firm backing to. Both sides are a morass of corruption, subversion, and layers of interests that are impossible for outsiders to untangle.

Who benefits from Putin’s Holocaust obsession? Jews, but only to an extent. Massive investment from Russia in the promotion of the idea of the Holocaust will do something to revive the narrative at a time when its historicization is beginning to gather pace. There’s no question that Jews will benefit more greatly from legislative proposals ancillary to the promotion of the narrative itself, especially when Putin seems keen only on a “Berman model” of the narrative that deprives Jews of its foremost benefit — the concept of Jews as unique victims. In other words, Russia’s worldwide lobbying for mandatory education programs and criminalization of Holocaust denial will be infinitely more useful to Jews than nausea-inducing showings of Sobibor.

Will Russia benefit from its adopted role as world-wide promoter of the Holocaust? This remains to be seen, though it strikes me as utterly foolhardy and contemptible. Russia’s approach to Jews has had middling, even poor, results thus far. Jewish oligarchs have been jumping ship since they started feeling the pinch of Western sanctions, prompting Putin to lash out at a “fifth column” of “scum and traitors” who will be spat out “like a gnat that accidentally flew into our mouths.” Will Putin have his “Stalin moment”? I doubt it, because Putin has gone “all in” with his pro-Jewish strategy despite its lack of benefits. Israel, always seeking to have its cake and eat it too, is currently pursuing an awkward neutrality between the US and Russia. Russia’s claims to be fighting Nazism in Ukraine haven’t provoked the slightest response from the international Jewish community, while missile strikes on Kyiv, resulting in damage to Jewish memorials, have prompted outrage. The world has more or less rejected Russia’s Holocaust narrative or, even worse for Putin, simply doesn’t care about it.

This is perhaps the most scathing criticism that can made about Putin’s Holocaust obsession — that out of desperation for moral legitimacy and soft power in the Eastern sphere he has hitched Russian foreign policy to something that should have been left to die with Mikhoels and the other propagandists after World War II. What a strange and lonely hill to die on.


[1] Anton Weiss-Wendt, Putin’s Russia and The Falsification of History: Reasserting Control Over the Past (New York: Bloomsbury, 2020).

[2] D. Shneer, Through Soviet Jewish Eyes: Photography, War, and the Holocaust (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 164.

[3] See T. Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010).

[4] Weiss-Wendt, Putin’s Russia and the Falsification of History.

[5] Weiss-Wendt, Putin’s Russia and the Falsification of History.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

Why Hire from Harvard? Will Harvard be to the 2020s what General Motors was to the 1980’s?

Recently, Albemarle Man expressed the hope that the Supreme Court might give Harvard University more leeway to admit ever more Blacks and ever fewer Asians.  In other words, leeway to significantly reduce the average IQ of its student body.

Let’s say, one way or another, the Supreme Court punts the ball down field and not much changes.  Harvard will continue to admit students based on a grab bag list of what — to any employer — must seem idiotic criteria.

It has been doing this for decades.

Is it time to ask why anyone would hire from Harvard?

Perhaps an analogy to the humble motor car is in order.

From 1930 through 1970, General Motors established Cadillac (perhaps along with Ford’s Lincoln Continental) as the premier luxury car brand in the U.S.  Aside from handmade specialties like Rolls Royce and a few Italian super-sportscars, Cadillac was the vehicle you drove if you wanted to show you had arrived.  If you had asked anyone from McKinsey in the day whether another mass-produced luxury car had a chance of vaulting past Cadillac, he would have given you a long lecture about the power of branding backed by massive advertising.

Fast forward to 1990.  The premier luxury cars in the world were now (i) the Mercedes Benz; (ii) the BMW 7-Series, and, increasingly (iii) the Toyota Lexus.  Cadillac had tarnished its brand due to two factors: (i) first, it did not continue to match its vehicles to newer realities — such as significantly higher gas prices; (ii) second, and most crucially, it started to produce defect-plagued cars.  This problem evidenced itself through the entire GM fleet.  However, the vision of a Cadillac (!) with doors rattling from the Coke bottles left inside by negligent or angry workers must have been an unpleasant shock to the denizens of country clubs like the Winged Foot or River Oaks.  Not surprisingly, the parking lots of such venerable institutions soon filled up with fewer Cadillacs and more German and Japanese luxury automobiles.

Can this degrading process apply to higher education?  Today, if one were to suggest that Harvard’s bizarre selection process may eviscerate the desirability of its graduates, one would get another long lecture about the power of branding over generations.  Possibly the memo from 1970 could be re-used, simply replacing “Cadillac” with “Harvard.”

That is not to say that qualities apart from pure IQ are not important in life success.  However, to those who use this as a justification for Harvard’s grab-bag admissions criteria, one must ask:  is it likely that a diversity bureaucrat who has never held a real job in his life, is likely to identify such a person?

The blunt fact is that, in today’s increasingly IQ-driven and quantitative skills-demanding economy, Harvard is no longer fit for purpose.  And probably has not been for quite a while.  A stroll down memory lane may be in order.

One could do worse in this regard than to peruse a couple of volumes of the Foreign Policy of the United States (produced by the State Department) for the Carter administration (the most recent Presidency represented, since generally 40 years must pass from a Presidency to publication of these volumes due to classification restrictions).

After reading the 1,800 pages of previously classified internal memoranda, inter-office communications, and the like reprinted in two of those volumes, it becomes obvious who the key players were.  And they are not people you have heard of.  No, they do not include Cyrus Vance, the eminent Yale-trained lawyer then Secretary of State on leave from the equally distinguished law firm of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, his deputy for Arms Control, Yale-trained lawyer Paul Warnke of Clifford & Warnke (yes, that Clifford), or even the ever-self promoting “international relations” specialist from Columbia, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

No, they include people who, almost to a man, were mathematicians, physicists, chemists, and game theorists (did I say mathematicians?) such as Secretary of Defense Harold Brown (Bronx School of Science, grade average 99.5, Ph.D. in Physics from Columbia, personally selected by Ede [Edward] Teller to help miniaturize the fusion nuclear bomb), William Perry, a mathematician heading DARPA, later to be Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, the immortal Andrew Marshall (degrees in a number of subjects ranging from mathematics to economics to history, but primarily self-taught, a RAND emigre selected by his fellow traveler at RAND, James Schlesinger during Schlesinger’s brief tour as Secretary of Defense during the late Nixon and early Ford administrations), heading [the DOD “Office of Net Assessment,” whose creations included the Trident missile system and, with DARPA, the electronic warfare we know today).  For all the “sturm and drang” about relatively inconsequential items like the 400 hapless hostages held at “hotel Tehran,” the real game was being played by Harold Brown, who quietly allowed his generals to scotch arms control and, in private meetings, negotiated with Germany’s Helmut Schmidt, UK’s Dennis Healey, and France’s Valerie Giscard d’Estang and their respective technical experts to introduce the Pershing missiles into Germany.  It was the ultimate introduction of those missiles in the Reagan administration that, by his own admission, made Gorbachev’s blood run cold and led to substantial positive changes in the security environment facing the United States.

Fundamentally, foreign policy is governed by the power a nation is capable of projecting and delivering to a potential enemy.  In the Carter administration, whether the subject was disarmament (a big bête noire of President Carter), how to deal with the massive Soviet superiority in conventional forces vis-à-vis Western Europe, or virtually anything else (apart perhaps from the “touchy-feely” subject of civil revolutions like Vietnam, which in any case was over by that time), the memoranda and inter-agency projectiles launched by the DOD against its erstwhile bureaucratic adversaries, the Yale-trained lawyers at State or the “international relations expert” from Columbia at the NSC, were so comprehensive and devastating from a technical point of view that no successful response would have been possible without massive quantitative counter-backup — which, in the event, was not there.  Undoubtedly, Carter, himself the beneficiary of engineering training at Annapolis, appreciated this.

To summarize, public policy at the highest levels is a serious business.  And whether the subject is defense, public health, or any other program dealing with either new technology or massive numbers, the people who will be of value and, as the saying goes, “in the game,” will be people with significant quantitative backgrounds — as at least part, if not all, of their skill sets.  Which will presuppose, of course, massive IQs.

Government is not the only sector where this has occurred.  Private business has followed the same path.  Finance has become so much more quantitative in the recent past that, say, the head of bond trading at a Salomon Brothers or Lehman as recently as 1980 would simply be incapable of understanding any of the products that today make banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley the bulk of their money.  Even the advertising business has converted from a touchy-feely enterprise of aspiring word and pictorial artists into an information collection business involving the analysis of massive pools of data and the ability to produce mathematical algorithms to assist in interpreting that data, often real time.  One need not even mention the elephant in the room — the high-tech industry, which now makes up about 1/4th of the S&P 500 by fair market value.

A couple of years ago, the head of the eminent Winchester School in England — hardly a bastion of technocratic Jews like Harold Brown — publicly recognized this on his school’s website.  This man, head of a school that has been operating since at least the year 1400 — said that “what Latin was to the 15th century, mathematics will be for the 21st century.” At Winchester, he implied, we continue to teach Latin, but we need to up the game in mathematics.  To put it crudely, the day of public policy or American business being meaningfully guided by gentlemen from Groton and Choate (and Harvard) with pretty good history plus a little geometry and maybe some trigonometry — plus their affirmative-action hires — is past its sell-by date.

Now let us turn back to fair Harvard.  And take a look at some of the simpler numbers a crude analysis of its current class makeup gives us.  It won’t take a 99.5% grade average at Bronx Science to decipher what it might mean to a prospective employer — and to the public interest.

Harvard each year admits approximately 1,600 students.  Of these, cross-checking a number of informal sources on the internet, the following groups appear:

  • Approximately 400 are athletes.
  • Approximately 400 are legacies.
  • Approximately 400 are low-performing Blacks and other minorities there solely because of affirmative action, probably substantially less capable than even the athletes or the legacies.

Well, not much left is there?  Do we dare conclude that only about 400 of a 1,600 entering class are there on any form of intellectual merit?  And even among those, the highest IQs are weeded out by the grab-bag of “leadership” criteria used for entry, including after-school activities, working on a kibbutz (but, God forbid, not an American farm in Illinois, known source of Hitler Jugend).  One could do worse than to read a truly depressing article about the students at Groton who did, and did not, get into the Ivy League Universities.  (See For Groton Grads, Academics Aren’t Only Keys to Ivy Schools: “Most of the students in [Groton’s senior] class who were accepted by those universities had less impressive academic credentials than his. What they had instead were certain characteristics such as money, connections, or minority status that helped them vault over him to the universities of their choice.) The reader of such an article must only conclude that the Groton students he wants will precisely be those who are not accepted at Harvard — or any other Ivy League institution, since the ones accepted at Harvard seemed to be a group of the least intelligent and/or least capable one could scrape up from the basement floor of that otherwise esteemed preparatory school.

So what is the net result?

The Harvard Mathematics Department reports that each year approximately ten (10) — yes 10, (for those mathematically challenged, 10 is the lowest two-digit number) — students out of 1,600 graduate with a degree in Pure Mathematics, probably the most intellectually demanding mathematics (or any other) discipline.  Another 150–200 or so graduate with applied math degrees.  Another 200 or so graduate with Physics degrees.  Assuming no overlap, there you are almost at 400.  With probable significant overlap, there is still room for a significant number of Chemistry and Electrical Engineering majors.  In fact, one fine fellow recently graduated with a dual-major in Mathematics and Fine Arts — apparently the first time this had happened in Harvard’s history.  Of course, he was an Asian.

It is obvious that the truly difficult disciplines are reserved to the genetically elite 400.  Athletes, legacies, and minorities need not apply.  Nor would they be stupid enough to do so.  They know they would flunk out.

So the intellectually terrorized “untermenschen” crowd the economics, government, history, and sociology departments (we do not even discuss the ridiculous “Black Studies” departments), producing, one must only assume future second-grade Cyrus Vances — now in both White-and Blackface.  Is that really what we need more of at this time?  And, even if an employer does not want or need a quant background in his hires, must not an employer realize that, in hiring from Harvard’s economics and government graduates, the employer is almost guaranteed to get inferior-grade material, as compared to, say, a double 800 with a 4.0 from Stuyvesant or Groton rejected at Harvard and hence attending the University of Illinois?

Combining this with the increasing momentum of woke affirmative action, it is clear that Harvard, like the folks at Cadillac before it, is hell-bent on turning their product into an inferior brand.  And at some point the market will recognize this and react.  Savagely and with speed.  With the cold calculation of a businessman seeking the smartest people to maximize his return on invested capital, or the grim determination of a DOD Secretary under huge pressure who needs — in real time — informed analysis of a host of impossibly complex weapons systems or war scenarios.

But, more importantly, what is the competition doing — and what has it been doing for more than a century?  Andrei Martyanov, an immigrant from the Soviet Union, has contributed his point of view.  Martyanov, a graduate of a Naval engineering and mathematics academy in the Soviet Union, in his recent book Losing Military Supremacy:  The Myopia of American Strategic Planning has decried the composition of American elites as compared with those in less fortunate countries like China, Russia, and even a good portion of Europe.  He decries the reality that none of our elites “know anything.”  They have no technical backgrounds and thus are incapable of even engaging in sophisticated debate, let alone of arriving at sensible policies.  Though there are a few, like Harold Brown and William Perry, the bulk appear to be completely non-quantitative.

The competition, as Martyanov notes, has not been sitting still.  As long ago as 150 years ago, European countries, packed together in a hostile national security environment (think Hungary not far from Germany or the Austro-Hungarian Empire smack up against France, Prussia, and not far from the borders of the Russian Empire) realized that technological advance was necessary in order that they not be leap-frogged — perhaps fatally — by one of their all-too-nearby adversaries in terms of armament capacity and quality.  About 3 seconds later, each realized that they needed a pipeline from grades K through 12 to produce students with sufficient background in mathematics and the sciences such that they could progress rapidly through first-class engineering programs.  The result was a K-through university mathematics and science pipeline unrivalled by anything ever seen, to this day, in the fat and happy United States, whose main interest was in producing potential aspiring clerks in John Hancock’s counting house. (Although the USSR’s launch of Sputnik in 1957 led to what has turned out to be a temporary emphasis on science and technology education in the U.S.) This has produced some anomalous results, including the outstanding performance in mathematics competitions of the top math school in the tiny country of Rumania.  The result that, notwithstanding a number of commercially inventive product roll-outs from places like the Edison labs, the U.S. had, until after World War II, very little “big league” scientific establishment compared to, say, Germany or Russia or even the rest of Europe.  The geniuses and well-trained minds that did the most difficult science that allowed the US to leapfrog the rest of the world during and after World War II were, in the main, imported from Europe and had been trained in Europe, due in part to Hitler’s driving out a number of his best scientists on religious or ethnic grounds.  To this day, émigrés from the Soviet Union claim that the bottom half of the graduate math classes at places like Harvard and Yale are generally composed of native-born Americans; the top performers are those educated at places like Tsing Hai, Lomosonov Moscow State University, and even Oxford and Cambridge.

To compete, we need to up our game.  And from that point of view, Harvard is not part of the solution.  Increasingly, it is part of the problem.  For private business, and for the rest of us.

So, I ask again.

Unless Harvard drastically changes its game plan, will employers be asking in 2030:

“Why hire from Harvard?”

Sholem Aleichem’s Curse: Anti-Russian Themes in Vasily Grossman’s Life and Fate

Jewish diaspora fiction has always been problematic for me, largely because the authors I have read will either champion an overtly Jewish perspective without taking competing gentile ones into account (Saul Bellow, Chaim Potok, Isaac Bashevis Singer) or perceive themselves as ethnic outsiders and attempt to subvert gentile societies which are, of course, inherently bad (Franz Kafka, Philip Roth, Nathaniel West). As with anything, the quality varies, and there is much more to the crude categorizing I resort to above. Arthur Koestler’s excellent Darkness at Noon bucks the trend, as does Stanislaw Lem’s Polaris in the science fiction genre. And what to make of Ayn Rand? But if I had to distill my feelings for Jewish diaspora fiction in one sentence, this, unfortunately, would have to be it.

These two author types rely on the spurious Jew Good/Gentile Bad dichotomy which is essentially opposite sides of the same shekel, so to speak. The classic example, of course, is Sholem Aleichem’s Fiddler on the Roof (and I am referring to the popular musical and film adaptations and not so much to Aleichem’s Teyve the Milkman stories). In Fiddler, Jews are portrayed as charmingly innocent salt-of-the-Earth types who are at best heroic and honorable, and, at worst, eccentric in their picadilloes. In such a worldview, the anti-Jewish wrath of gentiles resembles natural disasters in that they attack without warning or reason, and leave devastation in their wake. Unlike natural disasters, however, this is the work of Man, and so can be ascribed to Evil and therefore dealt with. That Jews commit deadly sins of their own which cause equal devastation among the gentiles never enters the plotlines of these stories. Neither does any good resulting from self-identifying, nationalistic non-Jews. As a result, much of Jewish diaspora fiction amounts to little more than libel of the goyim.

Very few Jewish fiction authors can overcome this dichotomy. Better they forget their Jewishness and write simply to enthrall gentiles, or keep their Jewish identity and write strictly for Jews, preferably in Hebrew.

Jewish author Vasily Grossman’s epic novel Life and Fate fails to escape this dichotomy and yet retains a great deal of value for its realistic depiction of the enforced conformity of mid-century Soviet life. It also deserves note for its narrative reporting of the Battle of Stalingrad and depiction of the Soviet gulag. Completed in 1960 and suppressed by the KGB, it was smuggled to the West and published in 1980 to instant acclaim, sixteen years after the author’s death. Fortunately, it avoids the trap of modernism, and weaves its many plots and subplots together in a complex yet comprehensible fashion. Stream of consciousness, fragmentation, Freudianism, nonlinear storytelling, and other postmodern tricks are thankfully eschewed. So is all hint of degeneracy. This makes Life and Fate one of the breeziest long novels I have ever read. That it is uneven, tendentious, strident, overpopulated, and lacking the majestic story arc worthy of its 870-odd pages keeps it from the ranks of great novels. It also tells almost as much as it shows, which sucks much of the power out of the story. For example, when one of our female protagonists decides to toss over her lover (a brilliant tank commander) for her ex-husband (a disgraced commissar languishing in the Lubyanka prison), we learn about it after the fact from the narrator. But we don’t get to see it. Grossman glosses over several important plot points in the same manner.

Even worse, when the author speaks as a Jew—directly to his readership, which he does several times—he’s little better than a bad poet lecturing us on the evils of anti-Semitism. His gnashing of teeth over the poor, noble-hearted Jews being sent to their deaths are as manipulative as anything in Schindler’s List. For example, upon entering a German concentration camp, the saintlike Sofya Levinton realizes she could save herself because she has medical training, but chooses not to. She opts instead to remain by the side of a little orphan boy named David as they tragically get gassed together.

From Part Two, Chapter 46:

Death was standing there, as huge as the sky, watching while little David walked towards him on his little legs. All around him there was nothing but music, and he couldn’t cling to it or even batter his head against it.

As for the cocoon, it had no wings, no paws, no antennae, no eyes; it just lay there in its little box, stupidly trustful, waiting.

David was a Jew…

Grossman, editorializing transparently through his narration, is also quick to dishonestly condemn fascism and Nazism, while failing to condemn the demonstrably greater evils of communism and Bolshevism just as directly. (To be fair, Grossman does do this, but through character and plot over hundreds of pages—that is, appropriately, and never in the didactic manner with which he dismisses fascism.) For example, in Part One, Chapter 2, he writes the following series of lies:

National Socialism had created as new type of political criminal: criminals who had not committed a crime. [Tell that to A.I. Vipper, the prosecutor of the 1913 Menahem Beilis trial who was shipped off to a concentration camp by the Bolsheviks in 1919 and never heard from again.]

The detainment of prisoners-of-war in a concentration camp for political prisoners was another innovation of fascism. [Apparently, Grossman had never heard of the Solovki prison camp, which was established in 1923 by the Soviets to detain perceived enemies of the newly formed Bolshevik state.]

Giving common criminals power over political prisoners was yet another innovation of National Socialism. [A falsehood repeatedly exposed in Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago. The Soviets were doing this as early as the 1920s, before the rise of National Socialism.]

Here is my favorite, from Part One, Chapter 42—lurid, hysterical, and impossible to refute:

If fascism should ever be fully assured of its final triumph, the world will choke in blood. If the day ever dawns when Fascism is without armed enemies, then its executioners will know no restraint: the greatest enemy of fascism is man.

Yet when Grossman forgets his Jewishness and gives us the nuts-and-bolts narrative of how the Soviets emerged victorious at Stalingrad, he’s first rate. He presents a splendid array of characters: from a true-believing commissar with a dark secret, to a skeptical and reticent tank commander, to a war-weary power station director, to a womanizing staff officer, to an independent-minded soldier fighting fearlessly in the rubble. His mastery of geography and scenery is complete as well, from the dusty Kalmyk steppes, to the dingy apartments of Kazan, to the demolished city blocks of Stalingrad. His sympathetic portrayals of German General Friedrich Paulus and other officers of the Wehrmacht while they were locked in deadly struggle over that nearly-conquered city were some of the most moving for me. And this all makes sense, given that Grossman was a war correspondent who was in Stalingrad and many other places during the fighting. For the war scenes of Life and Fate, he certainly wrote what he knew, and what we get is punchy, insightful, gripping historical fiction, which serves almost as much as a critique of the oppressive groupthink associated with communism as it does of the German invasion itself. But this is about half the novel.

Vasily Grossman with the Red Army in Schwerin, Germany, 1945.

The other half, which is dominated by the drama surrounding Jewish physicist Viktor Shtrum and his family, focuses on Stalinism and how it tempts ethnic Russians to commit the twin sins of nationalism and anti-Semitism. This predictably evokes the stereotypically Jewish fear of the vengeful gentile so prevalent in Fiddler on the Roof and other diaspora works. And as translator Robert Chandler admits in the novel’s introduction, this makes Grossman a liar since the Russian pushback against Jewish dominance didn’t occur until the late 1940s and early 1950s—not as early as 1942 as Grossman depicts. Shtrum’s story also has little to do with the battle of Stalingrad, and could have been culled out of Life and Fate to constitute a completely different novel. As such, we’re left with a disjointed narrative which is much longer than it needs to be.

But this is one of the novel’s lesser flaws. Its greatest (and the one likely to be of most interest to Occidental Observer readers) is how Grossman, try as he might, cannot overcome Aleichem’s Curse. Gentiles remain tainted in Life and Fate. They are the source of all evil, while Jews maintain their existential innocence in the face of injustice and oppression.

In Grossman’s USSR, Jews never willingly identify as Jews. Instead, they are simply honest and industrious participants in the Soviet experiment. They self-identify only when they are betrayed by anti-Semitic gentiles who remind them of their Jewishness. This happens first by the Nazis, then by the Soviet leadership, and finally by ordinary Russians who, according to one Jewish character, enjoy not having to smell garlic now that all the Jews are gone. This, of course, is pure Judeophilic cant. Given the complicity of Jews in the bloodiest years of the Soviet Union as well as their well-documented ethnocentrism and xenophobia, this reviewer will never disbelieve that Jews are at all times keenly aware of themselves a distinct ethnic group—which is indeed why gentiles everywhere have anti-Jewish feelings to begin with.

Often in the novel we are reminded that Viktor Shtrum never once thought of himself as a Jew until he came face to face with Fascism. Part One, Chapter 18 is the (admittedly heartbreaking) text of Shtrum’s mother’s final letter to her son before being herded off to the camps, and in it she writes: “That morning I was reminded of what I’d forgotten during the years of the Soviet regime—that I was a Jew.”

This is the first key to Jewish innocence in Life and Fate. The second is that while Jews are pure Soviets, Russians are either Russians in Soviet clothing or they are willing to bow down when their co-ethnics exhibit such insidious nationalism. Of course, not all Russians in Life and Fate are like this—not Shtrum’s estranged wife Lyudmila, who’s mourning the loss of her son in battle; not her first husband Abarchuk, who’s languishing in a gulag; not Mostovskoy, an old Bolshevik who’s about to stage a hopeless rebellion in a German prison camp; and certainly not Marya Ivanovna, the wife of Shtrum’s colleague for whom he has deep feelings. Grossman handles all of these characters (and others) impeccably. What isn’t impeccable is how he depicts only the villainous, the cowardly, and the ignorant as expressing the gentile nationalism which he as a Jew finds so threatening.

Here is Getmanov, a calculating and menacing commissar complaining about affirmative action (Part One, Chapter 52):

A frown suddenly appeared on his face. ‘Quite frankly,’ he went on angrily, ‘all this makes me want to vomit. In the name of the friendship of nations we keep sacrificing the Russians. A member of a national minority barely needs to know the alphabet to be appointed a people’s commissar, while our Ivan, no matter if he’s a genius, has to “yield place to the minorities”. The great Russian people’s becoming a national minority itself. I’m all for the friendship of nations, but not on these terms. I’m sick of it!’

Here is Sokolov, Shtrum’s colleague (and Marya Ivanovna’s husband) who ultimately fails to stand by Shtrum when he’s about to be arrested for anti-Soviet thoughtcrimes (Part One, Chapter 64):

‘Allow me to love Tolstoy—and not only because of what he wrote about the Tartars. We Russians, for some reason, are never allowed to be proud of our own people. And if we show such pride, we’re immediately taken for members of the Black Hundreds.’

It should be noted that this speech occurs in a conversation with a wholly sympathetic Tartar named Karimov who calls for the banning of Dostoevsky because “[a] great writer in this country has no right to persecute foreigners, to despise Poles and Tartars, Jews, Armenians and Chuvash.”

Here is the internal monologue of tank commander Novikov on the nationalistic Russian apparatchiks who force him to promote Russians over non-Russians (Part Two, Chapter 4):

… his superiors had always been men who were ignorant of the calibres of different guns, men who were unable to read without mistakes a speech that had been written for them by someone else, men who were incapable of making sense of a map or even of speaking proper Russian. Why had he had to report to them?

And here is the internal monologue of Lieutenant Bach, a well-meaning and thoughtful German officer who’s warming to the idea of the Final Solution (Part Two, Chapter 11):

The law that determines the birth of a nation-state is something miraculous and wonderful. A state is a living unity; it alone has the power to express what is most precious, what is truly immortal in millions of people—a German character, a German hearth, a German will, a German spirit of sacrifice.

And speaking of Germans, who can forget the gratuitous chapter Grossman includes on the young Adolf Eichmann who was sidelined into the Nazi Party because he simply wasn’t smart or talented enough to compete with Jews for work or for acceptance into universities? Such people Grossman summarily condemns in Part Two, Chapter 31 as “fools, reactionaries and failures.”

The final key to Jewish innocence in Life and Fate is that there are no Jewish villains. Grossman does absolutely no Jewish soul-searching. Yes, Genrikh Yogoda gets mentioned a few times as a bugbear of the Great Terror from the 1930s. But he is never outed as a Jew. Grossman (to his credit) discusses terror famines, dekulakization, and other Soviet atrocities in his text, but never does he even hint of Jewish culpability in these crimes. The closest he gets is stating in Part Two, Chapter 31 that “during the epoch of revolutionary struggle, many of the most important revolutionary leaders were Jews.” That’s not enough.

In Life and Fate, Jews are portrayed as victims more often than not. For example, a Jewish fighter pilot who gets harassed by an anti-Semitic comrade ultimately gets shot down. Rubin, a friend of Abarchuk’s, gets murdered in the gulag—and having read Chapter 20 of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s 200 Years Together, it’s hard to believe that Jews were murdered as often as gentiles in similar circumstances. Further, Shtrum’s junior colleagues, all of whom are smart, competent, and Jewish, fail to get promotions for dubious reasons.

Meanwhile, Shtrum is portrayed as downright sublime as he solves an important problem of theoretical physics. What lands him in trouble with his narrow-minded superiors is how he refuses to renounce Einstein and how he speaks of science in Part Two, Chapter 6 “as though it were a religion, an expression of man’s aspiration towards the divine.” He rejects the Party understanding of his field and instead insists that he keep his mind free from dogma. And when such scandalous individualism puts him on the brink of arrest, not one gentile colleague stands by him.

Ultimately, Vasily Grossman wishes to impress upon his readers that ethnonationalism is bad and that Jews would never indulge in a such a sin. Instead, we must worship individualism, as he states plainly in Part One, Chapter 53:

Human groupings have one main purpose: to assert everyone’s right to be different, to be special, to think, to feel and live in his or her own way. People join together in order to win or defend this right. But this is where a terrible, fateful error is born: the belief that these groupings in the name of a race, a God, a party or a State are the very purpose of life and not simply a means to an end. No! the only true and lasting meaning of the struggle for life lies in the individual, in his modest peculiarities and in his right to these peculiarities.

Yes. This is how Jews like their gentiles: atomized, isolated, and unprotected from predatory minority groups—such as the Jews—who have no intention of relinquishing their common identity and agenda. If Grossman had addressed this fatal flaw of the Jews as well, his novel may have achieved greatness. But that would have required reversing Aleichem’s Curse and transcending the Jew Good/Gentile Bad dichotomy which defines so much Jewish diaspora fiction, something Grossman was unfortunately not strong enough to do. (He was strong enough to defy the Soviet authorities, but not this.) This kind of overt political messaging also has nothing to do with the Battle of Stalingrad and reinforces my point that Life and Fate would have been better as two novels: one about the war and the other about Viktor Shtrum’s struggles against the Soviet Machine. Further, the latent anti-Russianness of the latter undercuts the accuracy of former since, as Solzhenitsyn pointed out in Chapter 19 of 200 Years Together, calls to Russian nationalism during the darkest days of the war were what helped the Russian people ultimately defeat the Germans.

There is much that is worthy about Life and Fate. Aside from its substantial literary qualities, it pre-dated The Gulag Archipelago by over a decade in its unveiling of the Soviet Union’s horrific crimes. It also superbly portrays the communist republic’s oppressive cultural atmosphere. The KGB had good reason to suppress Life and Fate, since the book did speak truth to power at a time when such an act could prove lethal for an author. The problem, however, is that we only get half the truth from Grossman. Sadly, he’s too much of a Jew to give us anything more.

The Great Russian Restoration VII: The Kremlin’s Post-Soviet State Ideology

Many pundits and analysts have pointed out that Russia doesn’t seem to have a visible political/economic/state ideology and they are correct to do so. That being said, the Kremlin civic platform has always been quite basic and straightforward. The Kremlin’s official civic platform is based on three pillars: sport, Orthodoxy and World War II. As a result of this formula, Russia committed state resources in the form of manpower, money and propaganda to these three areas. The West understood this, accepted the terms of battle and committed itself to undermining these three pillars of support. This isn’t all that different from the the policy of the USSR, or any other country’s civic platform really. If we just swap Orthodoxy for Communism, then we have the USSR platform and if we swap Orthodoxy for Laïcité, then we have the French platform. The point I’m making here is simple: all states have civic political platforms in one form or another and Russia’s isn’t particularly special.

In this context, the rationale for Russia’s systematic banning from all international sporting competitions becomes clearer. One could be forgiven for thinking that this was simply petty bear-baiting from a Russophobic predominantly Jewish ruling caste in the West, but, in actual fact, there was a strategic political goal behind this unsportsmanlike behavior. Russian athletes—and all athletes in fact—train for these international competitions where they win cash prizes, promotion deals, partnerships, gain international exposure, and so on. With the bannings, many of these athletes’ careers got nuke’d and so did the Kremlin promotion campaign based on these role-models and the soft power prestige that their performances brought to Russia. It’s hard to deny that the West has been rather successful in undermining the Kremlin’s plan on this front.

Now, Orthodoxy seems rather self-explanatory, but it’s still worth a few words of contextualization here. Hundreds of new churches are built in Russia every single year with state financing, to the point that the church struggles to staff them all with priests. The vast majority of the post-Soviet population, however, does not attend these churches religiously. That being said, most people are generally pro-Orthodox in the sense that they do not practice any kind of militant atheism or hold hostile views of the church. Most people simply aren’t in the habit of going to church and don’t really believe that they need to go to church to consider themselves Christians. The church, of course, begs to disagree and wants to boost its share of devoted, regular church-goers from the 10–15% of the population that the number hovers at now to something closer to a majority of the population. I had some modest suggestions to share with the Patriarch on how better to accomplish this, but he hasn’t returned my calls as of yet. Nonetheless, I will keep spamming his inbox and keep you guys posted about any developments that might occur on that front.

As for World War II, there’s some history here that few people in the West know. The USSR, in the first decades after the war, did not talk much about the Great Patriotic War. Sure, they had a parade after the victory in Moscow which has been continued ever since, but it wasn’t until the late 60s and 70s when the Kremlin began to lean into Victory Day and began treating it more seriously. I can only speculate on what may have been the reason for this reticence to incorporate that great victory into the Kremlin’s political platform. The simplest and obvious explanation is that they no doubt felt embarrassed by the war at the time and tried to move past it as quickly as they could. As we all know, the Soviet Union suffered humiliating losses in the first weeks and months of the war due to the sheer incompetence of the Bolshevik leadership, and the war had such a catastrophic effect on the lives of Soviet citizens that it was no doubt difficult to spin a narrative around glory and victory so soon after the mass-suffering and destruction. Furthermore, many war heroes had risen up through the ranks who could become potential political rivals of the Bolshevik party elite and the last thing that they wanted was another “Bonaparte” rising up to sweep them aside and become the new Emperor of the Red Empire. It is for this reason that many war heroes and officers spent their veteran years worried that they might be arrested and sent to the Gulags. In my family, my great-grandfather, for example, hid his medals and his uniform and rarely spoke about the war with his family until far later in his life. Many Russian historians believe that the great Red Army general Georgiy Zhukov was assassinated because the Bolsheviks were terrified of his near demigod-like popularity. Zhukov, remember, was rotting in a Siberian gulag at the start of the war and had to be pulled out by the desperate Reds who had successfully lost their entire forward army in Europe in a few short months of fighting against the Germans. Few in the West understand that the latter USSR was far less repressive and extreme as the earlier USSR was, mostly because many Jews fled the USSR following Stalin’s purges and the gradual “Russification” of the state security structures. The “old-timers” who vote for the Communists out of nostalgia mostly remember and grew up during this relatively normal period and don’t associate the Communists with mass murder, mass arrests, and terror because most of that happened before their time. Incidentally, I promised to talk about the Communist opposition and still plan to do so in the future.

Regardless, it’s hardly a secret that the Kremlin talks a lot and I mean A LOT about World War II. This is also why they are so prickly about historical revisionism aimed at reexamining the causes of the war. As a part of its civic platform, the Kremlin has thrown its weight and support behind the May 9th Victory Parades and the Immortal Brigade marches in particular. This only really took off following the annexation of Crimea when literally hundreds of thousands of Russians used the Victory Day parade as a proxy venue for expressing their latent Russian patriotism in an acceptable civic manifestation. Despite their attempts to disguise and justify their pro-Russia patriotism behind the morally unassailable status of World War II and the defeat of Nazism, the liberal media was particularly vicious in its attacks on people who began to attend these Victory Day parades, labeling them paid agents of the Kremlin and, naturally, Fascists hiding behind the black and orange victory banner. Bizarrely, the Orthodox Church also expressed anti-Victory Day sentiment, alleging that it was not Orthodox to march with banners of slain family members and that it verged on shamanism or animism or ancestor worship, which the Christian faith does not allow. This is easily explained by the fact that the Orthodox clergy doesn’t want a civic religion to emerge and split the loyalty of the Russian population, which they believe rightfully belongs to them. Unsurprisingly, they’ve had to tone down this rhetoric in recent years.

In any case, the Western media has, in recent years, taken to pointing out historically inconvenient facts about, for example, Stalin’s pact with Hitler over the partition of Poland. Or that the Soviet Union trained German pilots and provided Germany with fuel and grain and other raw materials as part of their alliance right up into the start of the invasion. The point of this isn’t to rehabilitate Hitler or because of a new-found commitment to WWII objectivism on the part of the Western media. It’s an attack on the Kremlin’s platform by arguing that Stalin and the USSR were just as evil as Hitler and that Russia is a continuation of the USSR and seeks to take back Poland and invade Europe—as in  Biden’s speech yesterday in Warsaw, linking present day Russian actions in Ukraine to “Hungary, 1956. Poland, 1956, and then again, 1981. Czechoslovakia,1968. Soviet tanks crushed democratic uprisings.” Many nationalists in the West know that there is far more to WWII than the standard narrative, be it Western or Eastern, that is allowed to be mentioned in the public sphere and polite society. They should perhaps ask themselves why the Western media is allowing historical revisionism back into the public sphere in the run-up to a conflict with Russia when it was an absolute taboo topic for so many years.

Now, none of these “pillars” are ideological per se although they are promoted and defended as stolidly as any political or religious creed. This is because Russia is a post-Ideological nation and Putin has often stressed his commitment to this course of development. In other words, when Putin talks about Russia being a “normal country” in his video addresses to the West, he means a country that isn’t committed to one messianic political/economic theory or another like, say, the U.S., which is committed to crusading for its religion of Liberal Human Rights-Democracy-Freedom around the world. “Normal” just means a country that acts in the interests of itself and its people first and foremost and tries to get along with other countries as well. One could even call this “nationalism” if one were so inclined, but Russian civil society has an aversion to this word, preferring to brand their enemies with it instead. Again, the preferred term is “normal” and that means that you will often hear phrases like “Russia is not a nationalistic country, Russia is a normal country” because that’s the official state line. Me, personally, I like the term ‘nationalism’ and have no qualms about using it. Consider: are the Russian soldiers fighting to save the Russians in Donbass and to defend Russia’s interests not literally “Russian Nationalists”? At the risk of sounding like some French deconstructionist philosopher, I’d like to point out that terms do not seem to have any inherent meaning to them (although they should) separate from the meaning that we choose to ascribe to them. I guess I don’t really mind calling myself a “normalist” going forward, but I think it lacks a certain artistic je ne sais quoi, don’t you?

As I’ve written about before, Russia has been accelerating its process of internal “normalization” with the shutdown of the Liberals and their beloved ideological institutions. “Ukraine is rightful Russian land with Russians living on it,” is a statement that was considered extreme a few weeks ago, but is now rather mainstream and one that the average Russian can hear from the pundit class on the state channels. These same pundits then turn around and condemn “nationalism.” A head-scratcher, for sure. But most people’s heads go unscratched because they’re agreeing with every word that is being said, even the parts that seem to contradict one another. I suppose results speak louder than any words or tweets or at least the Russian government seems to think so. This would no doubt explain why there are so few videos coming out from the Russian side and the pro-Russian propaganda channels rely on official statements from the Ministry of Defense or Kadyrov’s Chechen brigades, who seem to be flouting any rules regarding social media posting and instead seem to relish the social media propaganda game. All of this begs the question: is the Kremlin’s inability to produce quality propaganda for its side part of a clever plan to not release important military details or a catastrophic oversight by its Boomer tech-luddite leadership? I really wish I could answer this question, but I’m afraid I’ll have to cop out and just say “we will see” and “the results will speak for themselves” in time.

But does Russia even need a state ideology? Should Russia recommit herself and her resources to making the world safe for Communism/Orthodoxy/Borsht or something of the kind? I share the same opinion as the Kremlin and think that allowing oneself to slide into one ideology or another is a dangerous gambit that more often than not leads a country or even the individual that adopts it to making catastrophic mistakes because of their commitment to a separate, higher Truth  that often runs contrary to the actual truth and the reality that we find ourselves in. Ideology can indeed unite and motivate people to great heights of fanaticism that can be harnessed by the state or a group of clever people to achieve world-changing goals. But ideology is a double-edged sword that cuts the hand that wields it the moment that its holder begins to actually commit himself to uncritically believing in it. Putin clearly doesn’t want a new messianic world-changing ideology for Russia because Putin probably saw what happened with the USSR and sees what is happening to the USSA right now and has drawn some conclusions. He will, however, have to come up with a new civic platform for the Kremlin to promote eventually. Interest in World War II is virtually nonexistent among the youth, Orthodoxy will take a while to “take” again, and the sanctions on Russian athletes won’t end anytime soon. The current wave of enthusiasm for the military operation in Ukraine is enough for now, but eventually, a new popular platform will be needed .

President Putin, my man, you know where to reach me. Let’s boil some coffee, order some takeout and start throwing some ideas up on the whiteboard. We can discuss my fee at a later date, but I promise to be reasonable about it. The ball is in your court, big guy.